巴菲特合伙公司致股东信 1957-1970

The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

1957 年股市总体形势

In last year's letter to partners, I said the following:

在上一年致合伙人信中，我曾说过：

My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.

我认为当前市场整体估值高于内在价值。这一观点主要针对蓝筹股。如果这一判断正确，那么所有股票——无论低估与否——都可能面临大幅下跌的风险。无论如何，我认为当前市场价格在五年后被视为便宜的可能性极小。即便发生全面熊市，对我们的套利类投资市值影响应该也不大。

If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.

如果市场整体回到低估状态，我们的资金可能会全部投入普通类股票，届时或许还会使用部分借款。反之，如果市场大幅走高，我们的方针是在获利了结时减持普通类股票，增加套利类持仓。

All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

以上并非暗示市场分析是我的首要任务。我一贯的主要精力都放在寻找严重低估的证券上。

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word "moderate" since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.

过去一年股市温和下跌。我特意强调“温和”二字，因为随便读读报或与刚接触股市的人交谈，可能会给人一种跌幅更大的错觉。实际上，在我看来，股价跌幅远小于当前商业环境下企业盈利能力的下滑。这意味着公众仍然非常看好蓝筹股和整体经济前景。我从不预测经济或股市走势；上述内容只是为消除一种误解，即股市已大幅下挫或整体市场处于低位。从长期投资价值看，我仍认为市场整体估值偏高。

Our Activities in 1957

1957 年我们的活动

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term "work-out" is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.

市场下跌增加了低估类投资机会，因此整体上，相比去年，我们的组合中低估类占比高于套利类。这里可能需要解释一下“套利类”这个词。套利类投资是指利润依赖于特定公司行动而非股价普遍上涨的一类投资，这与低估类情形不同。套利机会来自：出售、合并、清算、要约收购等。每笔套利中，风险在于某些因素搅局导致计划行动终止，而不是经济恶化和大盘下跌。1956 年底，我们普通类与套利类的比例约为 70:30，现在约为 85:15。

During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

过去一年，我们投资了两个规模较大的标的，预计我们可能参与公司决策。其中一项占各合伙基金组合的 10% 至 20%，另一项约占 5%。这两项投资可能都需要三到五年时间，但目前看来潜力很大，平均年化收益率高且风险极小。它们虽不属于套利类，但对股市总体走势的依赖程度很低。当然，若大盘显著上涨，我预计这部分组合会落后于市场。

Results for 1957

1957 年业绩

In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

1957 年，我们在 1956 年成立的三家合伙基金业绩均显著优于大盘。年初，道琼斯工业指数为 499，年末为 435，下跌 64 点。如果持有道指成分股，可获得约 22 点股息，使得整体损失降至 42 点，或全年 -8.47%。这一损失与大多数投资基金的表现相当，据我所知，当年没有一只投资于股票的基金取得正收益。

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

三家 1956 年合伙基金年度均获正收益，分别约为 1956 年末净值的 6.2%、7.8% 和 25%。第三家基金表现远超另两家，自然会引人发问，尤其是前两家基金的合伙人。这一表现凸显了短期内运气的重要性，尤其是资金到位的时间点。第三家基金 1956 年最晚成立，当时市场点位较低，且有几只证券特别有吸引力。因为资金到位，我们在这些标的上建立了较大仓位。而较早成立的两家基金当时已基本满仓，只能在这些标的上建立相对较小的仓位。

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

实际上，各合伙基金都投资于相同的证券，比例也大致相同。不过，尤其在初期，资金到位的时间和市场点位各不相同，因此业绩差异比后续年份更大。往长看，只要每年能跑赢道指 10 个百分点，我就很满意了。就这三家基金而言，1957 年很成功，或许还高于平均水平。

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

1957 年中成立了两家合伙基金，它们的年内业绩与道指大致相当，自成立以来道指下跌约 12%。目前它们的组合正逐渐向 1956 年基金靠拢，未来整个群体的业绩可比性会大大增强。

Interpretation of results

业绩解读

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

1957 年我们跑赢平均，在一定程度上是因为这一年大多数股票表现欠佳。我们在熊市中相对表现往往更好，在牛市中则不然，因此上述结果应结合这一背景来看——这本就是我们预期会做得比较好的年份。如果大盘大幅上涨，能跟上道指涨幅我就很满意了。

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

我可以肯定地说，1957 年底我们的组合价值比 1956 年底更高。这既得益于总体股价走低，也得益于我们有更多时间耐心收集那些严重低估的证券。前面我提到我们的最大仓位占各合伙基金资产的 10% 至 20%。我计划将来让它在所有基金中占 20%，但这急不得。显然，在任何买入期间，我们最希望看到的是股价不动或下跌，而非上涨。因此，在任何时候，我们组合中相当一部分可能处于潜伏状态。这种策略虽需耐心，但应能最大化长期利润。

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

我已试着涵盖可能感兴趣的要点，并在不谈及具体个股的前提下，尽可能多地披露我们的理念。如对运作有任何疑问，欢迎来信。

1958 Letter

1958 年致合伙人信

THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958

1958 年股市总体形势

A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: "The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least".

一位管理中型投资信托的朋友最近来信说：“美国人变幻莫测的性情在 1958 年引发了重大转变，至少用‘狂热’来形容股市毫不为过。”

I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.

我认为这概括了 1958 年主导股市的心理变化，无论业余还是专业层面皆如此。过去一年，人们几乎抓住任何理由来为“投资”股市正名。毫无疑问，眼下股市中情绪化的人比过去很多年都多，他们能逗留多久，取决于他们觉得可以快速轻松获利的时间有多长。虽然无法判断他们还会涌入多少新人并推高股价，但我认为可以说：他们逗留越久，随之而来的反噬就越猛烈。

I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.

我不试图预测大盘——我专注于寻找低估证券。但我确实相信，普遍认为投资股票必然赚钱的观念终将带来麻烦。如果这种情况发生，即使是低估证券的价格（而非内在价值）预计也会受到重大影响。

RESULTS IN 1958

1958 年业绩

In my letter of last year, I wrote:
"Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively will. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages."

我去年的信中说：
“我们在熊市中相对表现往往更好，在牛市中则不然，因此上述结果应结合这一背景来看——这本就是我们预期会做得比较好的年份。如果大盘大幅上涨，能跟上道指涨幅我就很满意了。”

The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.

后一句话恰如我们在 1958 年遇到的年份，我的预言成真了。道指从 435 点上涨到 583 点，加上约 20 点股息，道指整体涨幅为 38.5%。全年运作的五家合伙基金平均业绩略优于这一水平。按两年年末市值计算，它们的涨幅在 36.7% 至 46.2% 之间。考虑到相当一部分资产过去和现在仍投资于几乎不随快速上涨市场波动的证券，我认为这些成绩还算不错。我将继续预计，在下跌或横盘市场中我们能跑赢，但在上涨行情中只能勉强跟上。

TYPICAL SITUATION

典型案例

So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.

为便于理解我们的操作方式，我认为最好回顾 1958 年的一项具体活动。去年我提到我们的最大持仓，占各合伙基金资产的 10% 到 20%。我曾指出，我们希望这只股票下跌或保持稳定，以便我们能买入更多，正因如此，这类证券在牛市可能会拖累我们的相对业绩。

This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantial earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.

这只股票是新泽西州尤宁城的 Commonwealth Trust Co.。我们开始买入时，按保守估算，其内在价值为每股 125 美元。然而，出于合理原因，尽管每股盈利约 10 美元，它却完全不派发现金股息，这很大程度上导致股价低迷在 50 美元左右。因此，我们持有了一家管理出色、盈利可观的银行，交易价格远低于内在价值。管理层对我们新股东态度友好，最终损失的风险看似极低。

Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for persona1 reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of: 1. Very strong defensive characteristics; 2. Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and; 3. Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.

Commonwealth 被一家更大的银行持有 25.5% 的股份（Commonwealth 资产约 5000 万美元——约为奥马哈第一国民银行的一半），该大行多年来一直希望合并。合并因个人原因受阻，但有迹象表明这种局面不会无限期持续。因此，我们拥有三合一优势：1. 极强的防守特性；2. 稳健的内在价值正以令人满意的速度增长；3. 有证据表明最终这一价值会释放，尽管可能需一年或十年。若是后者，价值可能会积累到更高的数字，比如每股 250 美元。

Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposa1.

在大约一年时间里，我们成功以均价约每股 51 美元购得该银行约 12% 的股份。显然，股价保持沉寂对我们极为有利。随着持股量增加，我们股权的价值上升，尤其是我们成为第二大股东后，拥有足够投票权，可在任何合并提案中受邀磋商。

Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.

Commonwealth 仅有约 300 名股东，月均交易大概只有两笔，所以你就能理解为何我说大盘走势对我们某些持仓的价格变动影响甚微。

Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any "Leakage" regarding our portfolio holdings.

不幸的是，我们确实碰到了一些买入竞争，将股价推高至 65 美元左右，此时我们既未买入也未卖出。在一只交投清淡的股票上，非常小的买单就能引发如此幅度的价格变动，这说明了我们持仓信息保密的重要性。

Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.

年底我们成功发现一个特殊机会，能以有吸引力的价格成为最大股东，因此我们出售了 Commonwealth 的持股，每股获得 80 美元，而当时市场报价约低 20%。

It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.

显然，我们原本可能还拿着 50 美元的股票耐心零星买入，我也很乐意这么做，尽管相对市场看去年的表现会很差。像 Commonwealth 这样的投资何时实现利润，很大程度上是偶然的。因此，以任一年度的业绩来推测长期结果有严重局限。不过，我相信投资于这类低估且有良好保护的证券，是获取长期证券利润的最可靠途径。

I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.

我可以说，以 80 美元买入的投资者未来几年收益也会不错。然而，80 美元相对内在价值 135 美元的低估程度，与 50 美元相对内在价值 125 美元的低估程度截然不同，而且我认为我们的资本可以更好地配置到替代它的那个机遇上。这个新机会比 Commonwealth 稍大，占各合伙基金资产的约 25%。虽然低估程度不亚于我们持有的其他许多证券（甚至一些品种），但我们是最大股东，这在决定纠正低估所需时间方面多次具有显著优势。就这一特定持仓而言，在持有期间我们几乎肯定能跑赢道指。

THE CURRENT SITUATION

当前形势

The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.

市场点位越高，低估证券就越少，我发现要找到足够多有吸引力的投资越来越难。我倾向于提高套利类资产的占比，但要找到条件合适的很不容易。

To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.

因此，在可能范围内，我正试图通过大量买入几只低估证券来创造自己的套利机会。这一策略应会导致实现我先前的预测——熊市中跑赢。我希望以此为基础来接受评判。如有任何问题，请随时提出。

1959 Letter

1959 年致合伙人信

The General Stock Market in 1959:

1959 年股市总体形势：

The Dow-Jones Industrial Average, undoubtedly the most widely used index of stock market behavior, presented a somewhat faulty picture in 1959. This index recorded an advance from 583 to 679, or 16.4% for the year. When the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the average are added, an overall gain of 19.9% indicated for 1959.

道琼斯工业平均指数无疑是衡量股市表现最常用的指标，但它在 1959 年呈现的图景有些失真。该指数从 583 点上涨到 679 点，年内涨幅 16.4%。加上持有该指数成分股获得的股息，1959 年整体涨幅为 19.9%。

Despite this indication of a robust market, more stocks declined than advanced on the New York Stock Exchange during the year by a margin of 710 to 628. Both the Dow-Jones Railroad Average and Utility Average registered declines.

尽管数据显示市场强劲，但当年纽约证交所下跌股票多于上涨股票，比例为 710 对 628。道琼斯铁路平均指数和公用事业平均指数均录得下跌。

Most investment trusts had a difficult time in comparison with the Industrial Average. Tri-Continental Corp. the nation's largest closed-end investment company (total asset $400 million) had an overall gain of about 5.7% for the year. Fred Brown, its President, had this to say about the 1959 marked in a recent speech to the Analysts Society:

与工业指数相比，多数投资信托表现挣扎。全美最大的封闭式投资公司 Tri-Continental Corp.（总资产 4 亿美元）全年整体涨幅约 5.7%。其总裁 Fred Brown 最近在分析师协会演讲时谈及 1959 年市场：

"But, even though we like the portfolio, the market performance of Tri-Continental's holdings in 1959 was disappointing to us. Markets in which investor sentiment and enthusiasm play so large a part as those of 1959, are difficult for investment managers trained in values and tuned to investing for the long-term. Perhaps we haven't had our space boots adjusted properly. However, we believe that there is a limit to risks that an investing institution such as Tri-Continental should take with its stockholders' money, and we believe that the portfolio is in shape for the year ahead."

“不过，尽管我们喜欢这个组合，但 Tri-Continental 所持证券在 1959 年的市场表现令我们失望。像 1959 年这样投资者情绪和热情起如此大作用的市场，对受价值训练、着眼于长期投资的经理人来说很难应对。也许我们的太空靴还没调好。但我们认为，像 Tri-Continental 这样的投资机构用股东资金承担的风险应有限度，我们相信投资组合已为来年做好准备。”

Massachusetts Investors Trust, the country's largest mutual fund with assets of $1.5 billion showed an overall gain of about 9% for the year.

全美最大的共同基金 Massachusetts Investors Trust，资产 15 亿美元，当年整体涨幅约 9%。

Most of you know I have been very apprehensive about general stock market levels for several years. To date, this caution has been unnecessary. By previous standards, the present level of "blue chip" security prices contains a substantial speculative component with a corresponding risk of loss. Perhaps other standards of valuation are evolving which will permanently replace the old standard. I don't think so. I may very well be wrong; however, I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a "New Era" philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.

你们多数人知道，几年来我一直对股市整体水平忧心忡忡。时至今日，这种谨慎仍无必要。按以往标准，当前蓝筹股股价包含大量投机成分，相应也有损失风险。也许新的估值标准正在形成，将永久取代旧标准。我不这么认为。我很可能错了；然而，我宁愿承受过度保守带来的惩罚，也不愿面对因采纳“新时代”理念（认为树木真能长到天上）而犯错、甚至可能永久性资本损失的后果。

Results in 1959:

1959 年业绩：

There has been emphasis in previous letters on a suggested standard of performance involving relatively good results (compared to the general market indices and leading investment trusts) in periods of declining or level prices but relatively unimpressive results in rapidly rising markets.

以往信函中，我一直强调建议的业绩基准：在下跌或横盘市场中，相对表现要好（与大盘指数和主要投资信托相比），但在快速上涨市场中则相对平淡。

We were fortunate to achieve reasonably good results in 1959. The six partnerships that operated throughout the year achieved overall net gains ranging from 22.3% to 30.0%, and averaging about 25.9%. Portfolios of these partnerships are now about 80% comparable, but there is some difference due to securities and cash becoming available at varying times, payments made to partners, etc. Over the past few years, there hasn't been any partnership which has consistently been at the top or bottom of performance from year to year, and the variance is narrowing as the portfolios tend to become comparable.

我们幸运地在 1959 年取得了合理的好成绩。全年运作的六家合伙基金整体净收益在 22.3% 至 30.0% 之间，平均约 25.9%。这些基金的组合目前约 80% 相同，但因证券和现金到位时间不同、向合伙人支付款项等，存在一些差异。过去几年，没有哪只基金每年一直位居榜首或榜尾，且随着组合趋同，差异正在缩小。

The overall net gain is determined on the basis of market values at the beginning and end of the year adjusted for payments made to partners or contributions received from them. It is not based on actual realized profits during the year, but is intended to measure the change in liquidating value for the year. It is before interest allowed to partners (where that is specified in the partnership agreement) and before any division of profit to the general partner, but after operating expenses.

整体净收益基于年初和年末市值确定，并根据向合伙人支付的款项或从他们收到的出资进行调整。它并非基于年内实际实现利润，而是旨在衡量年度清算价值的变化。该数据未扣除应支付给合伙人的利息（若合伙协议有规定）及普通合伙人的利润分成，但已扣除运营费用。

The principal operating expense is the Nebraska Intangibles Tax which amounts to .4% of market value on practically all securities. Last year represented the first time that this tax had been effectively enforced and, of course penalized our results to the extent of .4%.

主要运营费用是内布拉斯加州无形资产税，几乎所有证券都要按市值的 0.4% 征收。去年是该税首次有效执行，自然使我们的业绩损失了 0.4%。

The present portfolio:

当前组合：

Last year, I mentioned a new commitment which involved about 25% of assets of the various partnerships. Presently this investment is about 35% of assets. This is an unusually large percentage, but has been made for strong reasons. In effect, this company is partially an investment trust owing some thirty or forty other securities of high quality. Our investment was made and is carried at a substantial discount from asset value based on market value of their securities and a conservative appraisal of the operating business.

去年，我提到一项新投资，约占各合伙基金资产的 25%。目前该投资约占资产的 35%。这一比例异常高，但有充分理由。实际上，这家公司本身部分就是一家投资信托，持有约三四十只高质量证券。我们的投资并以大幅低于其资产价值的价格买入和持有，该资产价值基于其持有证券的市价及对运营业务的保守评估。

We are the company’s largest stockholder by a considerable margin, and the two other large holders agree with our ideas. The probability is extremely high that the performance of this investment will be superior to that of the general market until its disposition, and I am hopeful that this will take place this year.

我们以较大优势成为该公司最大股东，另两大股东也认同我们的想法。这笔投资在处置前跑赢大盘的概率极高，我希望今年就能实现。

The remaining 65% of the portfolio is in securities which I consider undervalued and work-out operations. To the extent possible, I continue to attempt to invest in situations at least partially insulated from the behavior of the general market.

组合其余 65% 是我认为低估的证券和套利类操作。我继续尽可能投资于至少部分独立于大盘走势的品种。

This policy should lead to superior results in bear markets and average performance in bull markets. The first prediction may be subject to test this year since, at this writing, the Dow-Jones Industrials have retraced over half of their 1959 advance.

这一策略应在熊市中带来优异表现，在牛市中表现一般。第一个预测今年可能面临检验，因为写这封信时，道指已回吐 1959 年涨幅的一半以上。

Should you have any questions or if I have not been clear in any respect, I would be very happy to hear from you.

如有疑问或我任何方面未讲清楚，非常欢迎来信。

1960 Letter

1960 年致合伙人信

The General Stock Market in 1960:

1960 年股市总体形势：

A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one.

一年前，我评论道指 1959 年呈现的图景有些失真，它从 583 点涨到 679 点，涨幅 16.4%。尽管当年几乎所有投资公司均录得收益，但不到 10% 能平或超越工业平均指数的表现。道琼斯公用事业平均指数小幅下跌，铁路平均指数则大幅下挫。

In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.

1960 年，局面反转。工业平均指数从 679 点跌至 616 点，跌幅 9.3%。加上持有该指数可获得的股息，整体仍亏损 6.3%。另一方面，公用事业平均指数表现良好，虽然全部结果尚未揭晓，我猜约 90% 的投资公司跑赢了工业平均指数。多数投资公司年末整体收益在 ±5% 之间。纽约证交所 653 只普通股下跌，404 只上涨。

Results in 1960:

1960 年业绩：

My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.

我管理合伙基金的一贯目标是取得长期优于工业平均指数的业绩记录。我认为该指数多年表现将大致与主要投资公司相当。除非我们实现这种优越表现，否则合伙基金没有存在理由。

However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.

不过，我也指出，我们可能取得的任何优异记录，不应期待通过相对指数稳定不变的优势来体现。更可能的情况是，若取得这样的优势，它源于在平稳或下跌市场中跑赢，而在上涨市场中持平、甚至略逊于平均。

I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three's and par five's.

我认为我们跌 15% 而指数跌 30% 的年份，远优于我们和指数都涨 20% 的年份。长周期下，好坏年份皆有；为它们出现的顺序而兴奋或沮丧毫无益处。重要的是跑赢标准杆；在 3 杆洞打出 4 杆，不如在 5 杆洞打出 5 杆，而且假设我们不会遇上 3 杆洞和 5 杆洞是不切实际的。

The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations.

上述一番理念阐述，是因为今年我们有不少新合伙人，我想确保他们理解我的目标、衡量标准及我自知的一些局限。

With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are:

在此背景下，1960 年对我们来说是优于平均的一年并不意外。工业平均指数整体亏损 6.3%，而我们全年运作的七家合伙基金实现 22.8% 的收益。我们合伙运营的四个完整年度，扣除费用后、支付有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成前的业绩如下：

Year Partnerships Operating Entire Year Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Gain
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%

年份 全年运作合伙数 合伙收益 道指涨幅
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%

It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected.

需再次强调，以上是合伙基金的净业绩；有限合伙人的净业绩取决于他们选择的合伙协议。

The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.

整体盈亏按市值计算。考虑新增或提取资金后，该方法结果基于：年初清算合伙基金可实现的金额与年末清算可实现的金额之差，这自然与我们的税务结果不同，后者按成本计价，仅在实际出售时确认盈亏。

On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:

按复利计算，累计业绩如下：

Year Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Gain
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1958 55.6% 26.9%
1959 95.9% 52.2%
1960 140.6% 42.6%

年份 合伙累计收益 道指累计涨幅
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1958 55.6% 26.9%
1959 95.9% 52.2%
1960 140.6% 42.6%

Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned "blue-chip" securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.

四年时间太短，远不足以得出结论，但现有证据倾向于确认：在温和下跌或横盘市场中，我们的相对表现会更好。如果这一点成立，说明我们的组合可能比持有蓝筹股更保守，尽管绝对更不传统。在蓝筹股大幅上涨的市场中，我们可能确实难以匹敌其表现。

Multiplicity of Partnerships:

合伙基金数量：

A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense.

前表显示大家庭在壮大。没有任何一家合伙基金持续优于或逊于群体平均值，但每年都存在一些差异，尽管我努力让所有基金投资于相同证券、比例大致相同。当然，通过将现有基金合并为一家大基金，可以消除这种差异。此举还将省去许多细节和适量费用。

Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.

坦率说，我希望未来几年能朝此方向做些事。问题在于不同合伙人表达了对不同合伙安排的偏好。未经全体合伙人一致同意，不会做任何变动。

Advance Payments:

预付资金：

Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year.

几位合伙人询问年内向合伙基金追加资金的事。虽然有过特例，但在有限合伙人包含多个家庭的情况下，年中修改合伙协议过于困难。因此，在混合型合伙中，新增份额只能在年末获得。

We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.

我们确实接受年内预付的合伙份额款项，并自收到之日起至年末支付 6% 的利息。届时，在全体合伙人同意修改协议后，该款项加利息纳入合伙资本，之后参与损益分配。

Sanborn Map:

Sanborn Map:

Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you.

去年提到一项投资占我们净资产异常高的比例（35%），并说我期望该投资能在 1960 年了结。这一期望实现了。这笔投资的历程可能你们感兴趣。

Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year.

Sanborn Map Co. 从事美国所有城市超详细地图的出版和持续修订。例如，奥马哈的地图册可能重达 50 磅，提供每栋建筑的详尽信息。地图通过粘贴覆盖方式修订，显示新建、用途变更、消防设施更新、建筑结构材料变化等。修订大约每年一次，每二三十年当贴覆无法再进行时出版新地图。为奥马哈客户保持地图更新，每年费用约 100 美元。

This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn's business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities.

这些详尽信息——显示街道下方水管直径、消防栓位置、屋顶构成等——主要供火灾保险公司使用。它们的承保部门设在中央办公室，可评估全国代理人提交的业务。其理念是一图抵千言，这种评估决定风险定级是否恰当、某区域的火灾蔓延风险程度、再保险安排建议等。Sanborn 大部分业务来自约三十家保险公司，不过地图也售予保险业外的客户，如公用事业、抵押贷款公司和税务机构。

For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn's profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn's board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity.

75 年来，该业务以近乎垄断的方式运营，每年盈利，几乎不受衰退影响，无需销售努力。早期，保险业担心 Sanborn 利润过高，安排了多位知名保险人士进入董事会起监督作用。

In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as "carding" made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over $500,000 in the late 1930's to under $100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power.

1950 年代初，一种称为“卡片化”的竞争性承保方法侵入了 Sanborn 的业务，地图业务税后利润从 1930 年代后期年均超过 50 万美元，降至 1958-1959 年的不足 10 万美元。考虑同期经济上行趋势，这几乎完全摧毁了原本可观且稳定的盈利能力。

However, during the early 1930's Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.

然而，1930 年代初，Sanborn 开始积累投资组合。该业务无需资本投入，因此留存收益可全部用于此。一段时间内，约 250 万美元被投资，大致一半债券一半股票。因此，尤其近十年，投资组合欣欣向荣，而地图运营业务却日渐枯萎。

Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at $110 per share. In 1958 with the Average in the 550 area, Sanborn sold at $45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about $20 per share to $65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of $90 per share on the map business ($110 less the $20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus $20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.

让我举例说明这两大因素的极端分化。1938 年道指在 100-120 区间时，Sanborn 股价 110 美元。1958 年道指约 550 点时，Sanborn 股价仅 45 美元。但同期，Sanborn 投资组合价值从每股约 20 美元升至 65 美元。这意味着，实际上，1938 年买入 Sanborn 股票的投资者，在商业和股市萧条之年，给地图业务估值每股 90 美元（110 美元减去与地图无关的投资价值 20 美元）。而在 1958 年远为蓬勃的环境中，同一地图业务被估值为负 20 美元，买家只愿以不到投资组合价值 70% 的价格购买股票，等于地图业务白送。

How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.

何以至此？Sanborn 在 1958 年同 1938 年一样，拥有对保险业极具价值的海量信息。要复制他们多年积累的详细信息，需耗资数千万美元。尽管“卡片化”冲击，仍有超 5 亿美元火灾保费由“绘图”公司承保。然而，Sanborn 销售和包装其信息产品的方式多年来一成不变，最终这种惰性反映在盈利上。

The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about $2 million per year and owned about $7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director's and committee fees.

投资组合表现如此出色，反而使多数董事眼中地图业务重振的必要性大为降低。Sanborn 年销售额约 200 万美元，持有约 700 万美元有价证券。投资组合收入可观，公司无任何财务之忧，保险公司对地图价格满意，股东仍获股息。然而，八年里股息削减了五次，但我从未找到任何关于削减薪水或董事、委员会费用的建议记录。

Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.

我进入董事会前，14 名董事中 9 位是保险业知名人士，他们合计持有 46 股，总股本 10.5 万股。尽管他们在大公司身居高位，暗示具备至少少量投资的财力，但该群体中最大持股仅 10 股。有几例，这些人所在的保险公司持有少量 Sanborn 股票，但相较于其投资组合规模，不过是象征性投资。近十年来，这些保险公司在所有涉及 Sanborn 股票的交易中一直是卖方。

The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.

第十位董事是公司律师，持股 10 股。第十一位是银行家，持股 10 股，他认识到公司问题，积极指出，后来增持。接下来两位是 Sanborn 最高主管，合计持有约 300 股。他们有能力，了解业务问题，但被董事会置于从属地位。最后一位登场的是 Sanborn 已故总裁之子，遗孀持有约 15000 股。

In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we.

1958 年底，该子对公司业务趋势不满，要求得到最高职位，被拒后提交辞呈并获接受。不久，我们向他母亲发出收购其持股的要约，获接受。当时还有两大持股群体，一个约 10000 股（分散在一家经纪公司客户中），另一个约 8000 股。这些人对现状非常不满，期望将投资组合与地图业务分离，我们也是如此。

Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn's wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer.

随后，我们（包括盟友）通过公开市场购买增持至约 24000 股，三大群体合计增至 46000 股。我们希望将两项业务分离，实现投资组合的公允价值，并努力恢复地图业务的盈利能力。似乎存在真正机会，通过利用 Sanborn 丰富的原始资料并结合电子手段将数据转化为客户最易用的形式，来倍增地图业务利润。

There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over $1.25 million in government and municipal bonds as a reserve fund, and a potential corporate capital gains tax of over $1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.

董事会对任何变革都有相当大反对，尤其是外界发起的变革，尽管管理层完全赞同我们的计划，且管理咨询公司 Booz, Allen & Hamilton 也推荐过类似方案。为避免代理权争夺（很可能本就不会发生，且我们必胜无疑），也避免因 Sanborn 大量资金套在蓝筹股上（当时价格我不喜欢）而延误时机，我们制定了一个计划，以公允价值买断所有想退出的股东。SEC 裁定该计划公平。约 72% 的 Sanborn 股票（涉及 1600 名股东中的 50%）被交换为公允价值下的投资组合证券。地图业务留存超过 125 万美元的政府和市政债券作为储备金，并消除了超过 100 万美元的潜在公司资本利得税。剩余股东获得了略微提升的资产价值、大幅提高的每股收益和增加的股息率。

Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.”

以上简短剧情自然是此次投资操作的高度概括。但它确实说明了我们组合操作保密的必要性，以及仅以一年这样的短周期衡量业绩的无意义。这类控制情形可能极少发生。我们的基本业务是买入低估证券，待低估修复后卖出，同时投资于利润取决于公司行动而非市场波动的特殊情形。随着合伙资金持续增长，在“控制类”方面可能出现更多机会。

The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know.

审计人员应在大约一周内寄出你们的财务报告和税务信息。若对他们的报告或本信有任何疑问，务必告知。

1961 Semi-Annual Letter

1961 年半年度信函

TO MY PARTNERS:

致合伙人：

In the past, partners have commented that a once-a-year letter was “a long time between drinks,” and that a semi-annual letter would be a good idea. It really shouldn’t be too difficult to find something to say twice a year; at least it isn’t this year. Hence, this letter which will be continued in future years.

过去，合伙人评论说一年一封信“间隔太长”，半年一信会更好。每半年找点话说应该不算太难；至少今年不难。因此，今后我将继续发送此类信函。

During the first half of 1961, the overall gain of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was about 13%, including dividends. Although this is the type of period when we should have the most difficulty in exceeding this standard, all partnerships that operated throughout the six months did moderately better then the Average. Partnerships formed during 1961 either equaled or exceeded results of the Average from the time of formation, depending primarily on how long they were in operation.

1961 年上半年，道指整体涨幅约 13%（含股息）。虽然这本应是我们最难超越指数的时期，但整个六个月运作的合伙基金均温和跑赢。1961 年新成立的基金，自成立以来表现要么持平、要么超越指数，主要取决于运作时长。

Let me, however, emphasize two points. First, one year is far too short a period to form any kind of an opinion as to investment performance, and measurements based upon six months become even more unreliable. One factor that has caused some reluctance on my part to write semi-annual letters is the fear that partners may begin to think in terms of short-term performance which can be most misleading. My own thinking is much more geared to five year performance, preferably with tests of relative results in both strong and weak markets.

然而，我要强调两点。第一，一年时间太短，难以对投资业绩形成任何判断，基于六个月的衡量就更不可靠。我不太愿意写半年度信，原因之一是担心合伙人开始以短期表现思考，这可能极具误导。我自己的思维更倾向于五年期，最好能涵盖强市和弱市的相对业绩检验。

The second point I want everyone to understand is that if we continue in a market which advances at the pace of the first half of 1961, not only do I doubt that we will continue to exceed the results of the DJIA, but it is very likely that our performance will fall behind the Average.

我希望大家明白的第二点是：如果市场持续以 1961 年上半年的速度上涨，我不仅怀疑我们能继续跑赢道指，而且很可能我们的表现将落后于该指数。

Our holdings, which I always believe to be on the conservative side compared to general portfolios, tend to grow more conservative as the general market level rises. At all times, I attempt to have a portion of our portfolio in securities as least partially insulated from the behavior of the market, and this portion should increase as the market rises. However appetizing results for even the amateur cook (and perhaps particularly the amateur), we find that more of our portfolio is not on the stove.

相比一般组合，我始终认为我们的持股偏保守，且随大盘上涨趋向更保守。我始终努力让部分组合至少部分隔绝于市场波动，这部分应随市场上涨而增加。尽管业余厨子（或许尤其是业余厨子）做出的结果很诱人，但我们发现组合中有更多没放在炉灶上。

We have also begun open market acquisition of a potentially major commitment which I, of course, hope does nothing marketwise for at least a year. Such a commitment may be a deterrent to short range performance, but it gives strong promise of superior results over a several year period combined with substantial defensive characteristics.

我们还开始在公开市场收购一项可能成为重大持仓的标的，我自然希望它至少一年内股价毫无表现。这样的持仓可能拖累短期业绩，但结合其极强的防御特性，有望在未来几年带来优异成果。

Progress has been made toward combining all partners at yearend. I have talked with all partners joining during this past year or so about this goal, and have also gone over the plans with representative partners of all earlier partnerships

在年底合并所有合伙人方面已取得进展。我已与过去一年左右加入的所有合伙人谈论此目标，也与之前所有合伙的代表讨论过计划。

Some of the provisions will be:

部分条款将包括：

(A) A merger of all partnerships, based on market value at yearend, with provisions for proper allocation among partners of future tax liability due to unrealized gains at yearend. The merger itself will be tax-free, and will result in no acceleration of realization of profits;

(A) 基于年末市值合并所有合伙基金，并规定适当分配未来因年末未实现收益产生的税务责任。合并本身免税，不会加速利润实现；

(B) A division of profits between the limited partners and general partner, with the first 6% per year to partners based upon beginning capital at market, and any excess divided one-fourth to the general partner and three-fourths to all partners proportional to their capital. Any deficiencies in earnings below the 6% would be carried forward against future earnings, but would not be carried back. Presently, there are three profit arrangements which have been optional to incoming partners:

(B) 有限合伙人和普通合伙人之间的利润分配：基于年初市值，首先每年向合伙人分配 6%，超出部分四分之一归普通合伙人，四分之三按资本比例分配给所有合伙人。任何低于 6% 的收益缺口可结转至未来收益弥补，但不追溯。目前，新合伙人可选三种利润安排：

(C) In the event of losses, there will be no carry back against amounts previously credited to me as general partner. Although there will be a carry-forward against future excess earnings. However, my wife and I will have the largest single investment in the new partnership, probably about one-sixth of total partnership assets, and thereby a greater dollar stake in losses than any other partner of family group, I am inserting a provision in the partnership agreement which will prohibit the purchase by me or my family of any marketable securities. In other words, the new partnership will represent my entire investment operation in marketable securities, so that my results will have to be directly proportional to yours, subject to the advantage I obtain if we do better than 6%;

(C) 若发生亏损，不会追溯调整之前作为普通合伙人归属我的金额。但会向未来超额收益结转。此外，我妻子和我会是新合伙中的最大单一投资者，约占合伙总资产的六分之一，因此在亏损中承担的美元金额比任何其他合伙家庭都大。我将在合伙协议中插入条款，禁止我或我家人购买任何可流通证券。换句话说，新合伙将代表我在可流通证券上的全部投资操作，因此我的结果必须直接与你们成比例，除非我们收益超过 6% 时我获得优势；

(D) A provision for monthly payments at the rate of 6% yearly, based on beginning of the year capital valued at market. Partners not wishing to withdraw money currently can have this credited back to them automatically as an advance payment, drawing 6%, to purchase an additional equity interest in the partnership at yearend. This will solve one stumbling block that has heretofore existed in the path of consolidation, since many partners desire regular withdrawals and others wish to plow everything back;

(D) 规定可按年初市值资本、年化 6% 的比率每月支付。不愿当前取款的合伙人可自动将其记为预付款，计息 6%，年末用于购买合伙的额外权益。这将解决此前合并之路上的一个障碍，因为许多合伙人希望定期取款，而其他人希望全部再投入；

(E) The right to borrow during the year, up to 20% of the value of your partnership interest, at 6%, such loans to be liquidated at yearend or earlier. This will add a degree of liquidity to an investment which can now only be disposed of at yearend. It is not intended that anything but relatively permanent funds be invested in the partnership, and we have no desire to turn it into a bank. Rather, I expect this to be a relatively unused provision, which is available when something unexpected turns up and a wait until yearend to liquidate part of all of a partner’s interest would cause hardship;

(E) 年内借款权，最高可达合伙权益价值的 20%，利率 6%，贷款于年底或更早偿还。这将为原本只能年底处置的投资增加一定流动性。本意绝非将非长期资金投入合伙，我们也无意为将其变为银行。相反，我预计此项将相对少用，仅在意外发生、等到年底清算部分或全部合伙权益会造成困难时使用；

(F) An arrangement whereby any relatively small tax adjustment, made in later years on the partnership’s return will be assessed directly to me. This way, we will not be faced with the problem of asking eighty people, or more, to amend their earlier return over some small matter. As it stands now, a small change, such as a decision that a dividend received by the partnership has 63% a return of capital instead of 68%, could cause a multitude of paper work. To prevent this, any change amounting to less than $1,000 of tax will be charged directly to me.

(F) 安排后续年度对合伙报税的小额调整直接由我承担。这样，我们就无需为一些小事要求八十多人修改早先的税表。按现状，一个小改动，比如判定合伙收到的一笔股息中资本回报占 63% 而非 68%，就可能引发大量文书工作。为防止此，任何小于 1000 美元税款的变动将直接向我收取。

We have submitted the proposed agreement to Washington for a ruling that the merger would be tax-free, and that the partnership would be treated as a partnership under the tax laws. While all of this is a lot of work, it will make things enormously easier in the future. You might save this letter as a reference to read in conjunction with the agreement which you will receive later in the year.

我们已向华盛顿提交提议的协议，请求裁定合并免税，且该合伙按税法视为合伙企业。尽管工作繁重，但未来将极大简化。你可保留本信，与晚些时候收到的协议一并对照阅读。

The minimum investment for new partners is currently $25,000, but, of course, this does not apply to present partners. Our method of operation will enable the partners to add or withdraw amounts of any size (in round $100) at yearend. Estimated total assets of the partnership will be in the neighborhood of $4 million, which enables us to consider investments such as the one mentioned earlier in this letter, which we would have had to pass several years ago.

目前新合伙人最低投资额为 25000 美元，不过这不适用于现有合伙人。我们的操作方式允许合伙人在年末任意金额（以 100 美元为整数）增减。估计合伙总资产将约 400 万美元，这使我们能考虑本信早前提及的那种投资，而若在几年前我们只能放弃。

This has turned out to be more of a production than my annual letter. If you have any questions, particularly regarding anything that isn’t clear in my discussion of the new partnership agreement, be sure to let me know. If there are a large number of questions, I will write a supplemental letter to all partners giving the questions that arise and the answers to them.

这封信比我年度信更长。如有疑问，特别是关于新合伙协议讨论中不明白之处，务必告知。若问题众多，我会写补充信给所有合伙人，列出所提问题及答复。

1961 Annual Letter

1961 年年度信函

Our Performance in 1961

1961 年业绩

I have consistently told partners that it is my expectation and hope (it's always hard to tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general market.

我一直告诉合伙人，我期望并希望（向来难分彼此）在下跌或横盘市场中我们的相对表现较好，但在上涨市场中可能不那么出色。在强势上涨市场，我预计很难跟上大盘。

Although 1961 was certainly a good year for the general market, and in addition, a very good year for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.

虽然 1961 年对大盘无疑是丰收年，对我们而言无论绝对还是相对都是极好的一年，但上段所述预期不变。

During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to the general partner, averaged 45.9%. The details of this gain by partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the partnerships started during the year.

1961 年，以道琼斯工业平均指数（下称“道指”）衡量的大盘整体上涨 22.2%（含持有道指所得股息）。全年运作的所有合伙基金，扣除全部运营费用后、支付有限合伙人款项或普通合伙人分成前，平均收益为 45.9%。各合伙基金收益详情及年内新设基金业绩见附录。

We have now completed five full years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described in the preceding paragraph; after expenses, but before division of gains among partners or payments to partners.

我们已完成五个完整合伙年度，五年结果按年度和累计（复利）呈现如下。这些结果基于上一段所述基准：扣除费用后、合伙人之间分配收益或支付合伙人之前。

Year Partnerships Operating Entire Year Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Industrials Gain*
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%
1961 7 45.9% 22.2%
* Including dividends received through ownership of the Dow.

年份 全年运作合伙数 合伙收益 道指涨幅*
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%
1961 7 45.9% 22.2%
*含持有道指所得股息。

On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:

按复利计算，累计结果如下：

Year Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Industrials Gain
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1957-58 55.6% 26.9%
1957-59 95.9% 52.2%
1957-60 140.6% 42.6%
1957-61 251.0% 74.3%

年份 合伙累计收益 道指累计涨幅
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1957-58 55.6% 26.9%
1957-59 95.9% 52.2%
1957-60 140.6% 42.6%
1957-61 251.0% 74.3%

These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the over-all net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of overall performance.

这些结果并未衡量有限合伙人的收益，而你们最感兴趣的正是这一数字。由于过去存在不同合伙安排，我以合伙基金整体净收益（基于年初年末市值）作为最公平的整体业绩衡量标准。

On a pro-forma basis adjusted to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership, Ltd. agreement, the results would have been:

按我们现行巴菲特合伙有限公司协议中收益分配方式调整的模拟结果如下：

Year Limited Partners’ Gain Dow Gain
1957 9.3% -8.4%
1958 32.2% 38.5%
1959 20.9% 19.9%
1960 18.6% -6.3%
1961 35.9% 22.2%

年份 有限合伙人收益 道指涨幅
1957 9.3% -8.4%
1958 32.2% 38.5%
1959 20.9% 19.9%
1960 18.6% -6.3%
1961 35.9% 22.2%

COMPOUNDED

复利

1957 9.3% -8.4%
1957-58 44.5% 26.9%
1957-59 74.7% 52.2%
1957-60 107.2% 42.6%
1957-61 181.6% 74.3%

1957 9.3% -8.4%
1957-58 44.5% 26.9%
1957-59 74.7% 52.2%
1957-60 107.2% 42.6%
1957-61 181.6% 74.3%

A Word About Par

关于标准杆

The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.

我选择合伙人以及后续关系中，最重要的一点就是我们使用同一把标尺。如果我业绩糟糕，我预期合伙人会撤资，而我也该为自己的资金寻找新出路。如果业绩好，我自然表现不错，这种状况我确信自己能适应。

The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.

难就难在确保大家对好坏的定义一致。我相信应在行动前就确立标尺；事后回溯，几乎任何东西都能通过与某物对比看起来不错。

I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.

我一直以道指作为我们的标准杆。我认为三年是检验业绩的最低期限，最佳测试是至少该长周期内道指终点与起点合理接近。

While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.

道指作为业绩衡量工具虽不完美（任何工具皆如此），但优点是广为人知，有长期连续性，且相当准确地反映了投资者整体的市场经历。我不反对使用其他大盘表现衡量方法，如其他股指、主要多元化共同股票基金、银行普通信托基金等。

You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.

你或许觉得我设定的标尺太短，以为跑赢一个无人管理的 30 只领先普通股指数似乎很容易。但实际上，该指数通常被证明是相当强劲的竞争对手。Arthur Wiesenberger 关于投资公司的经典著作列出了 1946-1960 年 15 年间所有主要共同基金的业绩。目前共同基金投资额超 200 亿美元，因此这些基金的经历集体代表了数百万投资者的经历。我个人认为（尽管无法获得数据），多数领先投资咨询机构和银行信托部门的组合业绩与此类似。

Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.

Wiesenberger 在《图表与统计》中列出了自 1946 年有连续记录的 70 只基金。我因各种原因排除了其中 32 只，因为它们是平衡基金（因此未充分参与大盘上涨）、特定行业基金等。因我认为比较不公平而排除的 32 只中，31 只跑输道指，因此排除它们绝非为倾斜下述结论。

Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.

余下 38 只运作方式我认为与道指合理可比的共同基金中，32 只跑输道指，6 只跑赢。1960 年底表现较优的 6 只资产约 10 亿美元，较差的 32 只资产约 65 亿美元。6 只较优者每年跑赢道指均不超过几个百分点。

Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don't have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:

以下是我们的运作期内（不含 1961 年，因我无确切数据，但粗略数字表明与 1957-60 年无异）两大普通股开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两大封闭式投资公司的逐年业绩：

Year Mass. Inv. Trust Investors Stock Lehman Tri-Cont. Dow Limited Partners
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1958 44.1% 47.6% 40.8% 33.2% 38.5% 32.2%
1959 8.2% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4% 19.9% 20.9%
1960 -0.9% -0.1% 2.6% 2.8% -6.3% 18.6%
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)

年份 Mass. Inv. Trust Investors Stock Lehman Tri-Cont. 道指 有限合伙人
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1958 44.1% 47.6% 40.8% 33.2% 38.5% 32.2%
1959 8.2% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4% 19.9% 20.9%
1960 -0.9% -0.1% 2.6% 2.8% -6.3% 18.6%
（来源：穆迪银行与金融手册，1961 年）

COMPOUNDED

复利

Year Mass. Inv. Trust Investors Stock Lehman Tri-Cont. Dow Limited Partners
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1957-58 26.8% 29.3% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
1957-59 37.2% 42.6% 34.8% 40.9% 52.2% 74.7%
1957-60 36.0% 42.5% 38.3% 44.8% 42.6% 107.2%

年份 Mass. Inv. Trust Investors Stock Lehman Tri-Cont. 道指 有限合伙人
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1957-58 26.8% 29.3% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
1957-59 37.2% 42.6% 34.8% 40.9% 52.2% 74.7%
1957-60 36.0% 42.5% 38.3% 44.8% 42.6% 107.2%

Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri -Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.

Massachusetts Investors Trust 净资产约 18 亿美元；Investors Stock Fund 约 10 亿美元；Tri-Continental Corporation 约 5 亿美元；Lehman Corporation 约 3.5 亿美元；合计超 35 亿美元。

I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.

我出示以上表格和数据并非为指责投资公司。若我自己管理如此巨额资金，且在我有投资的公司中行动受限，业绩不会更好，若能持平已属不错。我展示这些数据是为表明道指这个投资竞争对手不容小觑，国内绝大多数投资基金都难以超越甚至追平它。

Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.

我们的组合与道指大不相同。我们的操作方式也与共同基金截然不同。

However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.

不过，大多数合伙人若不投资合伙，很可能会将资金投到产生与道指相当结果的媒介中，因此我认为这是公平的业绩检验。

Our Method of Operation

我们的操作方式

Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.

我们的投资途径分为三类。各类有不同行为特征，资金在它们之间的分配方式将显著影响任一年度相对于道指的业绩。类别间的实际比例分配一定程度是计划的，但很大程度上取决于机会可得性，带有偶然。

The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called "generals") where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.

第一部分由通常低估的证券构成（下称“普通类”），我们对其公司政策无发言权，也无何时纠正低估的时间表。多年来，这一直是我们最大的投资类别，赚的钱也多于其他两类。我们通常在五六只普通类中各持有较大仓位（占总资产的 5% 至 10%），另在十到十五只中持有较小仓位。

Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.

有时这些投资很快见效；多数时候需要数年。买入时很难知道它们为何应上涨的具体原因。然而，正因缺乏魅力或任何可能创造即刻有利市场走势的事件，它们以极低价格可得。付出价格可换来巨大价值。这种价值的显著超出为每笔交易提供了舒适的安全边际。这种单个安全边际与多样化持仓结合，构成了极具吸引力的安全与增值组合。多年来，我们买入时机的把握远胜卖出。我们并非抱着榨干最后一分钱的想法进入这些普通类，而是通常乐于在买入价与我们视为对私人所有者公允价值的某个中间水平卖出。

The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.

普通类往往与道指走势高度同步。便宜并不意味着不会下跌。市场急跌时，这部分很可能按百分比跌幅与道指一样多。往长看，我相信普通类会跑赢道指，而在像 1961 年这样的强势上涨年中，这是我们组合中表现最佳的部分。当然，在下跌市中也最脆弱。

Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.

第二类是“套利类”。这些证券的财务结果取决于公司行动而非证券买卖双方形成的供需因素。换言之，它们是有时间表的证券，我们能在合理误差范围内预测何时获多少回报及哪些因素可能搅局。合并、清算、重组、分拆等公司事件会带来套利机会。近年一个重要来源是石油生产商出售给大型综合石油公司。

This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.

这类投资年复一年产生相当稳定的收益，很大程度上不依赖道指走势。显然，如果全年大部分组合在套利类，碰上道指下跌我们就会非常亮眼，若道指强势上涨则很糟糕。多年来，套利类是我们第二大类别。任意时点，我们可能持有十到十五只此类证券；有些刚开始，有些已近尾声。我相信用借款来对冲部分套利组合，因为该类别在最终结果和中期市场行为上安全性都很高。扣除借款带来的收益后，业绩通常在 10% 到 20% 之间。我自我设定的借款上限是合伙净资产的 25%。我们经常无借款，即使借款，也仅对冲套利类。

The final category is "control" situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.

最后一类是“控制类”，即我们控股公司或持有大量股份并试图影响公司政策。这类操作必须按几年期衡量。某一年可能毫无产出，因为在收购期间股价长期停滞通常对我们有利。这类情况也与道指行为关联很小。当然，有时我们买入普通类时心里想着它可能发展成控制局面。如果价格长期足够低，这很可能发生。若在我们持有公司可观比例股份前股价上涨，我们就在更高位卖出，完成一次成功的普通类操作。我们目前正在买进若干几年后可能演变成控制局面的股票。

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

We are presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went on the Board about four years ago. In August 1961, we obtained majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not exactly of the "overnight" variety.

我们目前正控股内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯的 Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company。第一批股票五年前作为普通低估证券买入。后来有一大笔可供购买，约四年前我进入董事会。1961 年 8 月，我们获得多数控股权，这说明我们的很多操作并非“一夜之间”的类型。

Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for a controlling block. Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the quoted price.

目前我们持有 Dempster 70% 的股份，另有 10% 由几位合伙人持有。仅有约 150 名其他股东，该股票市场几乎不存在，而且对控股股份来说也毫无意义。我们在这样的市场中自己的行动就可能大幅影响报价。

Therefore, it is necessary for me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest. This is of particular importance since, in effect, new partners are buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a portion of their interest based upon the same price. The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etc., but what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.

因此，我必须估算我们控股权益的年末价值。这尤为重要，因为实际上新合伙人是基于此价格买入，老合伙人也基于同一价格卖出部分权益。估计价值不应是我们希望的价值，或对急切买家可能的价值等，而应是我估计在当前条件下合理短时间内出售我们的权益能获得的金额。我们的努力将致力于提高这一价值，我们觉得有不错的前景做到。

Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of about $9 million. Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation to invested capital during recent years. This reflected a poor management situation, along with a fairly tough industry situation. Presently, consolidated net worth (book value) is about $4.5 million, or $75 per share, consolidated working capital about $50 per share, and at yearend we valued our interest at $35 per share. While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners. Certainly, if even moderate earning power can be restored, a higher valuation will be justified, and even if it cannot, Dempster should work out at a higher figure. Our controlling interest was acquired at an average price of about $28, and this holding currently represents 21% of partnership net assets based on the $35 value.

Dempster 是农具和水系统制造商，1961 年销售额约 900 万美元。近年相对于投入资本仅产生微薄利润。这反映出管理不善以及行业环境相当艰难。目前合并净资产（账面值）约 450 万美元，即每股 75 美元，合并营运资金约每股 50 美元，年末我们以每股 35 美元对我们的权益估值。虽然在此类事上我不敢声称有神谕般的洞见，但我认为这对新老合伙人都是公允估值。当然，即便只恢复中等盈利能力，更高估值也合理；即便不能，Dempster 也应能实现更高数字。我们的控股权益平均收购价约 28 美元，基于 35 美元估值，当前持仓占合伙净资产的 21%。

Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull market, operations in control situations will seem like a very difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from these dangers.

当然，这部分的组合不会只因通用汽车、美国钢铁等股价上涨就变得更值钱。在狂热的牛市中，控制类操作相比单纯买入大盘，看起来会像一种极难赚钱的方式。但我更意识到当前市场水平带来的危险而非机会。控制类与套利类一起，提供了一种将部分组合与这些危险隔绝的方法。

The Question of Conservatism

保守主义问题

The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.

以上对我们各操作领域的描述或许能提供线索，说明我们组合投资有多保守。多年前许多人以为购买中期或长期市政或政府债券是最保守的做法。但该策略许多情况下造成了显著的市场贬值，且肯定未能维持或提高实际购买力。

Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.

意识到通胀，或许过度意识到通胀，如今许多人觉得他们几乎不计市盈率、股息收益率等买入蓝筹股是在采取保守做法。未像债券案例那样借助后见之明，我感觉这一行动路线充满危险。在我看来，投机贪婪善变的公众会给盈利多高的乘数，丝毫谈不上保守。

You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.

你不会因为很多人暂时同意你就正确。你不会因为大人物同意你就正确。在很多地方，上述两个因素同时出现就足以让某个行为路线通过保守主义的检验。

You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.

经过许多交易，如果你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确，你终将正确。真正的保守主义唯有通过知识和理性才能实现。

I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.

我或许可补充说，我们组合非传统的这一事实决不证明我们比标准投资方法更保守或不够保守。这只能通过检验方法或检验结果来确定。

I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 0.5% of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.

我觉得检验我们投资方式有多保守的最客观测试，是评估下跌市场中的表现。最好是道指大幅下跌的情形。我们在 1957 年和 1960 年相当温和的下跌中的表现将证实我的假设：我们以极其保守的方式投资。我欢迎任何合伙人提出关于保守性的客观测试，看看我们表现如何。我们从未遭遇超过总净资产 0.5% 的已实现亏损，已实现收益总额与已实现亏损总额之比约为 100:1。当然，这反映了总体上我们是在上涨市场中操作的事实。然而，即使在这样的市场中也有很多亏损交易机会（你们中可能有人亲身经历过一些），所以我认为以上事实有一定意义。

The Question of Size

规模问题

Aside from the question as to what happens upon my death (which with a metaphysical twist, is a subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most often: "What affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going to have upon performance?”

除了我去世后会发生什么这个问题（带点形而上意味，这对我可是个饶有兴趣的话题），我最常被问的大概是：“合伙资金快速增长会对业绩产生什么影响？”

Larger funds tug in two directions. From the standpoint of "passive" investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust department investing in securities with very broad markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General Motors is only slightly more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying 1,000 or 100 shares.

更大资金朝两个方向拉扯。从“被动”投资角度看（我们不试图以投资规模影响公司政策），更大金额会损害业绩。对于投资于市场极广的证券的共同基金或信托部门，大额资金对业绩的拖累应非常轻微。购买 10000 股通用汽车仅比购买 1000 或 100 股略微昂贵（基于数学期望）。

In some of the securities in which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible. Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This category includes most of our work-outs and some generals.

在我们交易的一些证券中（但绝非全部），购买 10000 股比 100 股困难得多，有时甚至不可能。因此，对部分组合而言，更大金额肯定不利。对组合的更大部分，我认为增加资金仅略微不利。这包括我们大多数套利类和一些普通类。

However, in the case of control situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A "Sanborn Map" cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase. This is due to the sharp fall-off in competition as the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists between increased size of company and lack of concentrated ownership of that company's stock.

然而，在控制情形下，资金增加无疑是优势。没有财力就无法成就“Sanborn Map”这类事。我明确相信，随着资金增加，这一领域的机会也在增加。这是因为随着门槛提高竞争急剧减少，加上公司规模增大与该公司股票缺乏集中持股之间存在重要的正向关联。

Which is more important -- the decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the increasing prospects in control investments? I can't give a definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say, most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of 1956 and 1957.

被动投资盈利前景下降和控制投资前景上升哪个更重要？我无法给出确切答案，因为很大程度上取决于我们所处的市场类型。我目前的看法是，没有理由认为这两者不应是相互抵消的因素；若我的看法改变，定会告知。我可以非常肯定地说，若我们仍以 1956 和 1957 年那样少得多的资金运作，1960 和 1961 年的业绩不会更好。

And a Prediction

一个预测

Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

常读者（或许是我自夸）会觉得我一谈预测就离经叛道。预测是我一直回避的事，正常意义上仍是。

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.

我当然不会预测未来一两年总体经济或股市走势，因为我毫无头绪。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

我想你可以相当肯定，未来十年会有几年大盘涨 20% 或 25%，几年跌同等幅度，多数年份居中。我不知这些发生的顺序，也不认为这对长期投资者有多重要。

Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

在任何长周期年份，我认为道指很可能从股息与市值增长合计产生大约年化 5% 到 7% 的复利。尽管近年经历，期望从大盘获取远胜于此的回报者很可能失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

我们的工作是逐年累积对道指的优势，而不必太在意某一年绝对收益是正是负。我认为我们跌 15% 而道指跌 25% 的年份，远优于合伙和道指都涨 20% 的年份。与合伙人交谈时我一直强调这点，并看到他们以不同程度的热情点头。对我最重要的是你们完全理解我这方面的推理，并且不仅头脑中同意，心里也赞同。

For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

出于我在操作方式中概述的原因，我们相对道指的最佳年份很可能出现在下跌或横盘市场。因此，我们追求的优势很可能以大幅波动的形式出现。肯定会有我们被道指超越的年份，但若长周期中我们能每年平均领先十个百分点，我便觉得结果令人满意。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

具体而言，若某年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得未来十年中某年出现这种情况的概率很高——没人知道是哪一年），我们应该只跌 15% 或 20%。若当年市场基本不变，我们希望能上涨约十个百分点。若市场上涨 20% 或更多，我们将奋力跟上。这种表现持续多年，后果将是：若道指产生年化 5% 到 7% 的整体复利收益，我期望我们的结果可能达到年化 15% 到 17%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!

以上预期可能听起来有点轻率，毫无疑问，从 1965 年或 1970 年的角度回头看更显如此。结果可能我完全错了。但我觉得合伙人当然有权知道我这方面的想法，尽管生意的本质决定了这种预期很可能出错。在任何一年，变数都可能相当大。1961 年就是这样，幸运的是变数是往好的一面。不可能年年如此！

Miscellaneous

杂项

We are now installed in an office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no "vicuna coat" situation. Overall, I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than 0.5 of 1% of net assets. We should get our money's worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is being spent.

我们如今在 Kiewit Plaza 810 号设有办公室，拥有一流的秘书 Beth Henley 和一位在我这类证券上经验丰富的助手 Bill Scott。我父亲与我们共用办公空间（也分摊费用），从事证券经纪业务。我们的经纪业务均不经他手，所以没有“羊驼绒大衣”情况。总体上，我预计我们的管理费用，不含借款利息和内布拉斯加州无形资产税，将不到净资产的 0.5%。我们应让这笔支出物有所值，热忱欢迎你们随时过来看看钱是怎么花的。

With over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the details.

拥有 90 多位合伙人和大概 40 只左右证券，你们能理解，能从一些细节中脱身对我真是解脱。

We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $ 7,178,500.00. Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00, and other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling $782,600.00. The minimum for new partners last year was $25,000, but I am giving some thought to increasing it this year.

目前合伙人的居住地从加州到佛蒙特，1962 年初净资产为 7,178,500 美元。苏茜和我持有合伙权益 1,025,000 美元，我的其他亲属合计权益 782,600 美元。去年新合伙人最低投资额 25,000 美元，但我正考虑今年提高。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this performance can be continued.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company 在加速审计方面做得很出色，比以往更早提供税务数据。他们保证能持续下去。

Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit, status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle you.

若对本信任何方面、审计、合伙权益状况等有疑问，请来信。

Cordially Warren E. Buffett.

沃伦·E·巴菲特谨上

1962 Semi-Annual Letter

1962 年半年度信函

A Reminder:

提醒：

In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:

在我 1962 年 1 月 24 日报告 1961 年的信函中，我插入了题为“一个预测”的部分。虽然我不想对读者施加残酷且不寻常的惩罚，但再次全文刊登该部分或许值得：

And a Prediction

一个预测

Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

常读者（或许是我自夸）会觉得我一谈预测就离经叛道。预测是我一直回避的事，正常意义上仍是。

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.

我当然不会预测未来一两年总体经济或股市走势，因为我毫无头绪。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

我想你可以相当肯定，未来十年会有几年大盘涨 20% 或 25%，几年跌同等幅度，多数年份居中。我不知这些发生的顺序，也不认为这对长期投资者有多重要。

Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

在任何长周期年份，我认为道指很可能从股息与市值增长合计产生大约年化 5% 到 7% 的复利。尽管近年经历，期望从大盘获取远胜于此的回报者很可能失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

我们的工作是逐年累积对道指的优势，而不必太在意某一年绝对收益是正是负。我认为我们跌 15% 而道指跌 25% 的年份，远优于合伙和道指都涨 20% 的年份。与合伙人交谈时我一直强调这点，并看到他们以不同程度的热情点头。

It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

对我最重要的是你们完全理解我这方面的推理，并且不仅头脑中同意，心里也赞同。

For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

出于我在操作方式中概述的原因，我们相对道指的最佳年份很可能出现在下跌或横盘市场。因此，我们追求的优势很可能以大幅波动的形式出现。肯定会有我们被道指超越的年份，但若长周期中我们能每年平均领先十个百分点，我便觉得结果令人满意。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year over-all gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

具体而言，若某年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得未来十年中某年出现这种情况的概率很高——没人知道是哪一年），我们应该只跌 15% 或 20%。若当年市场基本不变，我们希望能上涨约十个百分点。若市场上涨 20% 或更多，我们将奋力跟上。这种表现持续多年，后果将是：若道指产生年化 5% 到 7% 的整体复利收益，我期望我们的结果可能达到年化 15% 到 17%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!

以上预期可能听起来有点轻率，毫无疑问，从 1965 年或 1970 年的角度回头看更显如此。结果可能我完全错了。但我觉得合伙人当然有权知道我这方面的想法，尽管生意的本质决定了这种预期很可能出错。在任何一年，变数都可能相当大。1961 年就是这样，幸运的是变数是往好的一面。不可能年年如此！

The First Half of 1962:

1962 年上半年：

Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.

1961 年底至 1962 年 6 月 30 日，道指从 731.14 点跌至 561.28 点。若在此期间持有道指，将收到约 11.00 美元股息，因此投资道指整体亏损 21.7%。对统计感兴趣者，附录 A 给出了前身合伙成立以来道指各年结果。