2014 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979,
accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was
previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects,
the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a
corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500
in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the
years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份除外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）来计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的结果已按新规则重新列示。其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在该指数正回报的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；而在该指数负回报的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

A note to readers: Fifty years ago, today's management took charge at Berkshire. For this Golden Anniversary, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger each wrote his views of what has happened at Berkshire during the past 50 years and what each expects during the next 50. Neither changed a word of his commentary after reading what the other had written. Warren's thoughts begin on page 24 and Charlie's on page 39. Shareholders, particularly new ones, may find it useful to read those letters before reading the report on 2014, which begins below.

读者须知：五十年前，现任管理层接管了伯克希尔。值此金禧纪念之际，沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格各自写下他们对伯克希尔过去 50 年所发生的一切以及对未来 50 年的期望。两人在阅读了对方的评论后，都没有改动一个字。沃伦的想法从第 24 页开始，查理的想法从第 39 页开始。股东，尤其是新股东，在阅读下面开始的 2014 年报告之前，先阅读这两封信可能会有所裨益。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔 2014 年的净资产增加了 183 亿美元，使我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 8.3%。在过去的 50 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 146,186 美元，年复合增长率为 19.4%。*

During our tenure, we have consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire's per-share book value. We've done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that really counts: intrinsic business value.

在我们任职期间，我们一直将标普 500 指数的年度表现与伯克希尔每股账面价值的变化进行比较。我们这样做是因为账面价值一直是一个粗略但有用的跟踪工具，用以衡量真正重要的数字：内在业务价值。

In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire's assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were "marked to market."

在我们早期的几十年里，账面价值与内在价值之间的关系比现在紧密得多。这是因为当时伯克希尔的资产主要是证券，其价值不断调整以反映当前市场价格。用华尔街的行话来说，账面价值计算中涉及的大部分资产都是“按市价计价”的。

Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire's intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.

如今，我们的重点已大幅转向拥有和经营大型企业。其中许多企业的价值远远超过其基于成本的账面价值。但这些价值无论增长多少，都从未被向上重估。因此，伯克希尔内在价值与账面价值之间的差距已显著扩大。

With that in mind, we have added a new set of data - the historical record of Berkshire's stock price - to the performance table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress, have their limitations in the short term. Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices and intrinsic value almost invariably converge. Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I believe that has been true at Berkshire: In our view, the increase in Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1,826,163% gain in market price of the company's shares.

考虑到这一点，我们在对页的表现表中增加了一组新数据——伯克希尔股价的历史记录。让我强调一下，市场价格在短期内有其局限性。股票的月度或年度变动往往不规则，并不预示内在价值的变化。然而，随着时间的推移，股价和内在价值几乎总会趋于一致。伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人查理·芒格和我相信，这在伯克希尔确实是事实：我们认为，过去 50 年伯克希尔每股内在价值的增长大致等于公司股价 1,826,163% 的涨幅。

It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts, except one. Here are the important developments:

对伯克希尔来说，除了一个方面之外，在主要战线上都是不错的一年。以下是重要进展：

Our "Powerhouse Five" - a collection of Berkshire's largest non-insurance businesses - had a record $12.4 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2014, up $1.6 billion from 2013. The companies in this sainted group are Berkshire Hathaway Energy (formerly MidAmerican Energy), BNSF, IMC (I've called it Iscar in the past), Lubrizol and Marmon.

我们的“五大动力中心”——伯克希尔最大的非保险业务组合——在 2014 年实现了创纪录的 124 亿美元税前利润，比 2013 年增加 16 亿美元。这个卓越集团中的公司是：伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司、BNSF、IMC（我过去称之为 Iscar）、路博润和 Marmon。

Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us a decade ago. Subsequently we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the ten-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.

在这五家公司中，十年前只有当时赚取 3.93 亿美元的伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源为我们所拥有。随后，我们以全现金方式购买了另外三家。在收购第五家（BNSF）时，我们支付了约 70% 的现金成本，其余部分通过发行伯克希尔股票支付，这使流通股数量增加了 6.1%。换句话说，在十年的时间里，这五家公司为伯克希尔带来的年收益增加了 120 亿美元，而稀释却很微小。这实现了我们的目标：不仅仅是增加收益，还要确保我们增加每股业绩。

If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve as well. The gain could reach $1 billion, in part because of bolt-on acquisitions by the group that have already closed or are under contract.

如果美国经济在 2015 年继续改善，我们预计五大动力中心的收益也会改善。增长可能达到 10 亿美元，部分原因是该集团已经完成或正在签约的补强收购。

Our bad news from 2014 comes from our group of five as well and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, BNSF disappointed many of its customers. These shippers depend on us, and service failures can badly hurt their businesses.

我们 2014 年的坏消息也来自五巨头，但与收益无关。在这一年里，BNSF 让许多客户失望。这些托运人依赖我们，服务失误可能严重损害他们的业务。

BNSF is, by far, Berkshire's most important non-insurance subsidiary and, to improve its performance, we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly extraordinary amount, whether compared to revenues, earnings or depreciation charges.

BNSF 是伯克希尔迄今为止最重要的非保险子公司，为了改善其业绩，我们将在 2015 年花费 60 亿美元用于厂房和设备。无论与收入、收益还是折旧费用相比，这一数额都远高于任何其他铁路公司在一个年度内的支出，实属非凡。

Though weather, which was particularly severe last year, will always cause railroads a variety of operating problems, our responsibility is to do whatever it takes to restore our service to industry-leading levels. That can't be done overnight: The extensive work required to increase system capacity sometimes disrupts operations while it is underway. Recently, however, our outsized expenditures are beginning to show results. During the last three months, BNSF's performance metrics have materially improved from last year's figures.

尽管天气（去年特别恶劣）总会给铁路带来各种运营问题，但我们的责任是不惜一切代价将服务水平恢复到行业领先水平。这无法一蹴而就：增加系统容量所需的大量工作有时会在进行中干扰运营。然而，最近我们超额的支出开始显现成果。在过去三个月中，BNSF 的业绩指标比去年有了显著改善。

Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.1 billion last year, up from $4.7 billion in 2013. Here, as with our Powerhouse Five, we expect further gains in 2015. Within this group, we have two companies that last year earned between $400 million and $600 million, six that earned between $250 million and $400 million, and seven that earned between $100 million and $250 million. This collection of businesses will increase in both number and earnings. Our ambitions have no finish line.

我们的数十家较小的非保险业务去年赚取了 51 亿美元，高于 2013 年的 47 亿美元。与我们的五大动力中心一样，我们预计 2015 年将进一步增长。在这个群体中，我们有两家公司去年赚了 4 亿至 6 亿美元，六家赚了 2.5 亿至 4 亿美元，还有七家赚了 1 亿至 2.5 亿美元。这个业务集合在数量和收益上都会增长。我们的雄心没有终点线。

Berkshire's huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2014 - that makes 12 years in a row - and increased its float. During that 12-year stretch, our float - money that doesn't belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire's benefit - has grown from $41 billion to $84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire's earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.

伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险业务 2014 年再次实现承保利润——这已是连续 12 年——并增加了浮存金。在这 12 年期间，我们的浮存金——不属于我们但我们可以为伯克希尔的利益进行投资的资金——从 410 亿美元增长到 840 亿美元。尽管这一增长和浮存金的规模都没有反映在伯克希尔的收益中，但浮存金由于允许我们持有的资产而产生可观的投资收益。

Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $24 billion during the twelve-year period, including $2.7 billion earned in 2014. And all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.

与此同时，我们在十二年期间的承保利润总额为 240 亿美元，其中包括 2014 年赚取的 27 亿美元。这一切都始于我们 1967 年以 860 万美元收购国民赔偿公司。

While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year was particularly fruitful: We contracted for 31 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $7.8 billion in aggregate. The size of these transactions ranged from $400,000 to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition, Duracell, will not close until the second half of this year. It will then be placed under Marmon's jurisdiction.

在查理和我寻找新企业收购的同时，我们的许多子公司也在定期进行补强收购。去年尤其富有成果：我们签约了 31 笔补强收购，总成本为 78 亿美元。这些交易的规模从 40 万美元到 29 亿美元不等。不过，最大的收购——Duracell——要到今年下半年才能完成。届时它将归 Marmon 管辖。

Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us aren't.) They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these bolt-on deals in future years.

如果价格合理，查理和我鼓励补强收购。（提供给我们的多数交易并非如此。）它们将资本配置到与我们现有业务契合、并由我们专业经理团队管理的活动中。这意味着我们无需更多工作，却有更多收益，这种组合我们觉得特别有吸引力。未来几年我们将进行更多这类补强交易。

Two years ago my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann, asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital group in the acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a no-brainer: I knew immediately that this partnership would work well from both a personal and financial standpoint. And it most definitely has.

两年前，我的朋友豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼邀请伯克希尔加入他的 3G 资本集团共同收购亨氏。我肯定地回答，这显而易见：我立刻知道这种合作关系无论从个人还是财务角度都会很好。事实确实如此。

I'm not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under Alex Behring, Chairman, and Bernardo Hees, CEO, than would be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to extraordinarily high performance standards and are never satisfied, even when their results far exceed those of competitors.

我毫不尴尬地承认，亨氏在董事长亚历克斯·贝林和 CEO 贝尔纳多·赫斯的领导下，比如果由我负责要好得多。他们对自己设定了极高的绩效标准，即使他们的业绩远超竞争对手，也从不满足。

We expect to partner with 3G in more activities. Sometimes our participation will only involve a financing role, as was the case in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King. Our favored arrangement, however, will usually be to link up as a permanent equity partner (who, in some cases, contributes to the financing of the deal as well). Whatever the structure, we feel good when working with Jorge Paulo.

我们期待与 3G 在更多活动中合作。有时我们的参与只涉及融资角色，如最近汉堡王收购 Tim Hortons 那样。然而，我们偏爱的安排通常是作为永久性股权合作伙伴（在某些情况下也为交易提供融资）。无论何种结构，与豪尔赫·保罗合作都让我们感觉良好。

Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and Leucadia, and we may form new ones with them or with other partners. Our participation in any joint activities, whether as a financing or equity partner, will be limited to friendly transactions.

伯克希尔与玛氏和 Leucadia 也有着良好的合作关系，我们可能与它们或其他伙伴建立新的合作关系。我们对任何联合活动的参与，无论是作为融资还是股权合作伙伴，都将仅限于友好交易。

In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company's owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now "car guys."

10 月，我们签约收购了 Van Tuyl Automotive，一个由 78 家汽车经销商组成的、运营非常出色的集团。公司所有者拉里·范·泰尔和我几年前相识。他当时决定，如果有一天要出售公司，它的归宿应该是伯克希尔。我们的收购最近完成，我们现在是“汽车人”了。

Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.

拉里和他的父亲塞西尔花了 62 年时间打造这个集团，遵循的战略是让所有本地经理成为所有者合伙人。建立这种利益共享被反复证明是成功的。Van Tuyl 现在是美国第五大汽车集团，单店销售额数据非常出色。

In recent years, Jeff Rachor has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will continue. There are about 17,000 dealerships in the country, and ownership transfers always require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer. Berkshire's job is to perform in a manner that will cause manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us. If we do this - and if we can buy dealerships at sensible prices - we will build a business that before long will be multiples the size of Van Tuyl's $9 billion of sales.

近年来，杰夫·拉霍尔一直与拉里并肩工作，这种成功的安排将继续下去。全美约有 17,000 家经销商，所有权转让始终需要相关汽车制造商的批准。伯克希尔的任务是表现良好，让制造商欢迎我们进一步的收购。如果我们做到这一点——并且能够以合理价格收购经销商——我们将建立起一个业务，其规模不久将是 Van Tuyl 的 90 亿美元销售额的数倍。

With the acquisition of Van Tuyl, Berkshire now owns 9½ companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 were they independent (Heinz is the ½). That leaves 490½ fish in the sea. Our lines are out.

随着 Van Tuyl 的收购，伯克希尔现在拥有 9.5 家如果独立就能入选《财富》500 强的公司（亨氏就是那 0.5 家）。海里还剩下 490.5 条鱼。我们的鱼线已经抛出。

Our subsidiaries spent a record $15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over twice their depreciation charges. About 90% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we will always invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunities runs through America. The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I were born in the United States, and we are forever grateful for the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.

我们的子公司 2014 年在厂房和设备上花费了创纪录的 150 亿美元，远超过其折旧费用的两倍。其中约 90% 的资金用在了美国。尽管我们也会在国外投资，但机会的母脉贯穿美国。迄今为止已被发掘的宝藏，与那些尚未被发掘的相比，相形见绌。凭借愚蠢的运气，查理和我出生在美国，我们永远感激这个出生的偶然赋予我们的惊人优势。

Berkshire's yearend employees - including those at Heinz - totaled a record 340,499, up 9,754 from last year. The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters (where 25 people work). No sense going crazy.

伯克希尔的年末员工——包括亨氏的员工——总计创纪录的 340,499 人，比去年增加 9,754 人。我自豪地说，这一增长不包括总部（那里有 25 名员工）的人头增加。没有必要疯狂。

Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its "Big Four" investments - American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at yearend 2013). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised our percentage ownership of each. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%, our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8% and our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren't important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our ownership raises Berkshire's portion of their annual earnings by $50 million.

伯克希尔去年增加了其在“四大”投资中的每一家——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行——的持股比例。我们购买了更多 IBM 股票（持股比例从 2013 年底的 6.3% 提高到 7.8%）。与此同时，可口可乐、美国运通和富国银行的股票回购提高了我们在每家公司的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的权益从 9.1% 增长到 9.2%，在美国运通的权益从 14.2% 增长到 14.8%，在富国银行的持股从 9.2% 增长到 9.4%。如果你认为十分之一百分点不重要，请看这个计算：对于这四家公司合计，我们的持股比例每增加十分之一百分点，伯克希尔在其年收益中的份额就增加 5000 万美元。

These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It's better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

这四家被投资方拥有卓越的业务，并由既有才华又以股东为导向的管理者经营。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家出色公司的非控股但可观的股份，而不是拥有一家平庸企业的 100%。拥有希望之钻的部分权益，比拥有一颗水钻的全部要好。

If Berkshire's yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the "Big Four's" 2014 earnings before discontinued operations amounted to $4.7 billion (compared to $3.3 billion only three years ago). In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive - about $1.6 billion last year. (Again, three years ago the dividends were $862 million.) But make no mistake: The $3.1 billion of these companies' earnings we don't report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

如果以伯克希尔的年底持股作为标志，我们在“四大”2014 年非持续经营利润中的份额为 47 亿美元（而三年前仅为 33 亿美元）。然而，在我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包括收到的股息——去年约 16 亿美元。（同样，三年前的股息为 8.62 亿美元。）但不要搞错：我们没有报告的这 31 亿美元的公司收益，与伯克希尔记录的部分对我们同等有价值。

The earnings these investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock - a move that enhances Berkshire's share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. Their retained earnings also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time (though 2015 will be a tough year for the group, in part because of the strong dollar). If the expected gains materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the package of four, our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at yearend.)

这些被投资方留存的收益通常用于回购自己的股票——这一举动无需我们花费一分钱就能提高伯克希尔在未来收益中的份额。它们的留存收益也为通常证明是有利的商业机会提供资金。所有这些都使我们预期，随着时间的推移，这四家被投资方的每股收益总额将大幅增长（尽管 2015 年对该集团来说是艰难的一年，部分原因是美元走强）。如果预期的收益实现，支付给伯克希尔的股息将会增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本收益也会增加。（对于这四家组合，我们的未实现收益在年底已达到 420 亿美元。）

Our flexibility in capital allocation - our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses - gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire's endless gusher of cash.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意被动地将大笔资金投资于非控股企业——使我们在那些仅限于收购自己经营的企业方面具有显著优势。我们对经营业务或被动投资的渴望，使我们在为伯克希尔源源不断的现金找到明智用途方面的机会加倍。

I've mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps me as an investor and that my investment experience has made me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons that are applicable to the other. And some truths can only be fully learned through experience. (In Fred Schwed's wonderful book, Where Are the Customers' Yachts?, a Peter Arno cartoon depicts a puzzled Adam looking at an eager Eve, while a caption says, "There are certain things that cannot be adequately explained to a virgin either by words or pictures." If you haven't read Schwed's book, buy a copy at our annual meeting. Its wisdom and humor are truly priceless.)

我过去曾提到，我的商业经验帮助我成为一名投资者，而我的投资经验使我成为一名更好的商人。每一次追求都传授了适用于另一方的经验。有些真理只能通过经验才能完全学会。（在弗雷德·施韦德精彩的著作《客户的游艇在哪里？》中，彼得·阿诺的一幅漫画描绘了一个困惑的亚当看着一个热切的夏娃，配文是：“有些事情无论用言语还是图片都无法向处女充分解释。”如果你还没读过施韦德的书，在我们的年会上买一本吧。它的智慧和幽默真是无价之宝。）

Among Arno's "certain things," I would include two separate skills, the evaluation of investments and the management of businesses. I therefore think it's worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our two investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase two companies that, though smaller than we would normally acquire, have excellent economic characteristics. Combined, the two earn $100 million annually on about $125 million of net tangible assets.

在阿诺的“某些事情”中，我会包括两种不同的技能：投资评估和企业管理。因此，我认为让我们的两位投资经理托德·库姆斯和特德·韦施勒每人至少监督我们的一项业务是值得的。几个月前，当我们同意收购两家公司时，一个明智的机会出现了。这两家公司虽然比我们通常收购的要小，但具有出色的经济特征。两家公司合计，在约 1.25 亿美元的净有形资产上每年赚取 1 亿美元。

I've asked Todd and Ted to each take on one as Chairman, in which role they will function in the very limited way that I do with our larger subsidiaries. This arrangement will save me a minor amount of work and, more important, make the two of them even better investors than they already are (which is to say among the best).

我已请托德和特德各担任其中一家公司的董事长，在这个角色中，他们将以我对待较大子公司的那种非常有限的方式发挥作用。这种安排将为我节省少量工作，更重要的是，使他们两人成为比现在更好的投资者（也就是说，跻身最佳之列）。

Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire's history. At the time, I called the transaction an "all-in wager on the economic future of the United States."

2009 年底，在大萧条的阴霾中，我们同意收购 BNSF，这是伯克希尔历史上最大的一笔收购。当时，我把这笔交易称为“对美国经济未来的全押赌注”。

That kind of commitment was nothing new for us. We've been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too: Charlie and I have always considered a "bet" on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.

这种承诺对我们来说并不新鲜。自巴菲特合伙有限公司于 1965 年获得伯克希尔控股权以来，我们一直在进行类似的赌注。理由也很充分：查理和我一直认为，押注美国不断增长的繁荣几乎是一件确定无疑的事情。

Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 238 years by betting against America? If you compare our country's present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. In my lifetime alone, real per-capita U.S. output has sextupled. My parents could not have dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see. Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly about America's problems, I've never seen one who wishes to emigrate (though I can think of a few for whom I would happily buy a one-way ticket).

事实上，在过去 238 年里，有谁曾因做空美国而受益？如果你把我们国家的现状与 1776 年的情况相比，你会惊讶地揉眼睛。仅在我的一生中，美国的人均实际产出就增长了六倍。我的父母在 1930 年无法想象他们的儿子将看到的世界。尽管悲观主义的布道者无休止地谈论美国的问题，但我从未见过一个想移民的人（尽管我能想到几个人，我乐意为他们买单程票）。

The dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Gains won't come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner; they never have. And we will regularly grumble about our government. But, most assuredly, America's best days lie ahead.

我们市场经济中蕴含的活力将继续发挥魔力。收益不会以平稳或连续的方式到来；从来都不是。我们会经常抱怨政府。但可以肯定的是，美国最好的日子还在后头。

With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

凭借这股顺风，查理和我希望通过以下方式构建伯克希尔的每股内在价值：（1）不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；（2）通过补强收购进一步增加其收益；（3）从被投资方的增长中受益；（4）当伯克希尔股票出现相对于内在价值的大幅折价时进行回购；（5）偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过很少（如果有的话）发行伯克希尔股票来为您实现最大的回报。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.

这些基石建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一百年后，BNSF 和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源仍将是我们经济中至关重要的角色。住房和汽车仍将是大多数家庭生活的中心。保险将继续对企业和个人都至关重要。展望未来，查理和我看到一个为伯克希尔量身定制的世界。我们为被委托管理它而感到幸运。

Intrinsic Business Value

内在业务价值

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements - one of them qualitative - that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 123-124.

尽管查理和我经常谈论内在业务价值，但我们无法准确告诉你伯克希尔股票的这个数字是多少（事实上，对任何其他股票也是如此）。然而，在我们的 2010 年年报中，我们列出了三个要素——其中一个是定性的——我们认为这些是合理估算伯克希尔内在价值的关键。该讨论全文转载于第 123-124 页。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2014 our per-share investments increased 8.4% to $140,123 and our earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 19% to $10,847 per share.

以下是两个定量因素的更新：2014 年，我们的每股投资增长 8.4%，达到 140,123 美元；除保险和投资以外的业务每股收益增长 19%，达到 10,847 美元。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 44 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main focus is to build operating earnings. That's why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings stock for operating businesses last year and to contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合增长率 19% 的速度增长，我们的收益数字以 20.6% 的速度增长。在随后的 44 年里，伯克希尔股价的增长率与我们这两个价值衡量指标的增长率非常相似，这并非巧合。查理和我喜欢看到这两个领域的增长，但我们的主要重点是构建营业收益。这就是为什么我们很高兴去年将 Phillips 66 和 Graham Holdings 的股票交换为经营业务，并与宝洁签约，以类似的交换方式收购 Duracell，该交易将于 2015 年完成。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don't get any ideas!)

现在，让我们审视我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，我们将它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法（尽管将它们整合在一个屋檐下具有重要且持久的经济优势）。我们的目标是提供在我们角色互换——你是报告的管理者，而我们是缺席的股东——时我们希望拥有的信息。（但别胡思乱想！）

Insurance

保险

Let's look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.

让我们先看看保险，伯克希尔的核心业务。自 1967 年我们以 860 万美元收购国民赔偿公司及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine 以来，该行业一直是推动我们扩张的引擎。尽管那次收购对伯克希尔产生了巨大的影响，但其执行却非常简单。

Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack's companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn't ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.

杰克·林沃尔特，我的朋友，也是这两家公司的控股股东，来到我的办公室说他想要出售。十五分钟后，我们达成了交易。杰克的两家公司都从未接受过公共会计师事务所的审计，我也没有要求。我的理由是：（1）杰克诚实；（2）他也有点古怪，如果交易变得复杂起来，他可能会走开。

On pages 128-129, we reproduce the ½-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire's best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.

在第 128-129 页，我们复制了用于完成交易的半页收购协议。那份合同是自制的：双方都没有使用律师。按页数计算，这一定是伯克希尔最好的交易：国民赔偿公司今天的 GAAP（公认会计原则）净资产为 1110 亿美元，超过世界上任何其他保险公司。

One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是其财务特征：财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式使财产意外险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，保险公司可以为了自己的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费收入保持相当稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少，如下表所示：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity's reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in Berkshire's economic fortress.

浮存金的进一步增长将难以实现。有利的一面是，GEICO 和我们新的商业保险业务几乎肯定会以良好的速度增长。然而，国民赔偿公司的再保险部门是一些已停止承保的合同的当事方，其浮存金在逐渐下降。如果我们确实经历浮存金下降，那也将是非常缓慢的——任何一年最多不超过 3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了我们永远不会面临与现金资源相比数额巨大的即时资金需求。这一优势是伯克希尔经济堡垒的关键支柱。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润被赚取时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，如此激烈以至于经常导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。竞争动态几乎保证了保险业，尽管其所有公司都享有浮存金收入，但与美国其他企业相比，将继续其有形净资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。我们国家目前正在应对的长期低利率导致浮存金收益下降，从而加剧了该行业的利润问题。

As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for twelve consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. That message is given at least lip service by all insurers; at Berkshire it is a religion.

正如本报告第一部分所述，伯克希尔目前已连续 12 年实现承保利润，期间的税前收益总额为 240 亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们将在大多数年份继续盈利承保。这是我们所有保险经理的日常重点，他们知道虽然浮存金很有价值，但其好处可能被糟糕的承保结果所淹没。所有保险公司至少都在口头上这样说；在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire's book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses - a huge $22.7 billion to more than six million claimants in 2014 - and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float.

那么，我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？当计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们必须明天支付而无法补充一样。但是，将浮存金严格视为负债是不正确的；它应该被视为一个循环基金。每天，我们支付旧的索赔和相关费用——2014 年向超过 600 万索赔人支付了惊人的 227 亿美元——这会减少浮存金。同样确定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，从而产生新的索赔，增加浮存金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises - because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute - is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities are treated as equals, however, under GAAP.

如果我们的循环浮存金既无成本又持久（我相信会是如此），那么这项负债的真实价值就远远小于会计负债。欠 1 美元但实际上永远不会离开公司——因为新业务几乎肯定会提供替代——与欠 1 美元明天就会出门且不会被替代，是天壤之别。然而，这两种负债在 GAAP 下被同等对待。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion "goodwill" asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这种高估负债的部分抵消是我们购买保险公司时产生的 155 亿美元“商誉”资产，它增加了账面价值。在很大程度上，这种商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，如果一家保险公司遭受巨大且持续的承保亏损，那么账上记录的任何商誉资产都应被视为毫无价值，无论其原始成本如何。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill - what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it - to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Under present accounting rules (with which we agree) this excess value will never be entered on our books. But I can assure you that it's real. That's one reason - a huge reason - why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，这并不描述伯克希尔。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——如果我们购买拥有类似质量浮存金的保险业务时我们愿意支付的价格——远远超过其历史账面价值。根据现行会计准则（我们同意这些规则），这种超额价值永远不会被记入我们的账簿。但我可以向你保证，它是真实的。这是我们相信伯克希尔的内在业务价值大大超过其账面价值的一个原因——一个重要的原因。

Berkshire's attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔诱人的保险经济之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营着纪律严明、拥有难以复制的商业模式的业务。让我告诉你主要的业务单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。

Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe - a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced - Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, if not facing insolvency.

事实上，我们在规避风险方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某场特大灾难遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——这大约是历史最高损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上可能仍会因多元化的收益流而录得可观的年度利润。我们也将继续拥有充足的现金，并在一个可能陷入震惊的市场中寻找大机会。与此同时，其他主要保险公司和再保险公司即使不面临破产，也将处于严重亏损状态。

Ajit's underwriting skills are unmatched. His mind, moreover, is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. Last year I told you about his formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance ("BHSI"). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly welcomed by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. Previously, we had written only a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.

阿吉特的承保技巧无与伦比。而且，他的头脑是一个创意工厂，总是在寻找可以添加到当前业务组合中的更多业务线。去年我告诉过你他成立了伯克希尔·哈撒韦专业保险公司。这一举措使我们进入了商业保险领域，我们立即受到了全美主要保险经纪人和公司风险经理的欢迎。以前，我们只承保少数几条专业商业保险线。

BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both international business and new lines of insurance. We repeat last year's prediction that BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years.

BHSI 由彼得·伊斯特伍德领导，他是一位经验丰富、在保险界广受尊敬的核保人。在 2014 年，彼得扩大了他才华横溢的团队，进军国际业务和新保险业务线。我们重申去年的预测：BHSI 将成为伯克希尔的一项主要资产，几年内将达到数十亿的业务量。

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要遵守四项纪律。它必须：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can't turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, "The other guy is doing it, so we must as well," spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，但在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法拒绝那些被竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re's international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经远优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其充满热情，自 1998 年我们收购该公司以来，该业务一直持续且盈利地增长。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators - and me as well, briefly - to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

值得一提的是，在我们收购通用再保险后不久，它就被一些问题困扰，导致评论员——也包括我，短暂地——认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。那个时代早已过去。通用再保险现在是一颗宝石。

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 64 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in 2014. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony.

最后，还有 GEICO，这是我 64 年前初出茅庐时接触的保险公司。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2014 年已服务 53 年。托尼于 1993 年成为 CEO，从那以后公司一直在飞速发展。没有比托尼更好的管理者了。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them - and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.

当我在 1951 年 1 月第一次接触 GEICO 时，该公司与行业巨头相比所享有的巨大成本优势令我震惊。我清楚地知道 GEICO 会成功，因为它理应成功。没有人喜欢购买汽车保险。但几乎每个人都喜欢开车。因此所需的保险对大多数家庭来说是一项主要支出。省钱对他们很重要——而只有低成本运营才能做到这一点。事实上，阅读这封信的人中至少有 40% 可以通过投保 GEICO 来省钱。所以停止阅读，访问 geico.com 或致电 800-368-2734。

GEICO's cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company's low costs create a moat - an enduring one - that competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality - he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.

GEICO 的成本优势是使得公司能够年复一年吞噬市场份额的因素。（2014 年底我们拥有 10.8% 的市场份额，而 1995 年伯克希尔获得 GEICO 控股权时为 2.5%。）公司的低成本创造了一条护城河——一条持久的护城河——竞争对手无法跨越。我们的壁虎从不厌倦告诉美国人 GEICO 可以如何为他们节省大量资金。我应该补充一点，壁虎有一个特别讨人喜欢的品质——他无偿工作。与人类代言人不同，他从不因名声而自大，也没有经纪人不断提醒我们他有多值钱。我喜欢这个小家伙。

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade, they have earned $2.95 billion from underwriting while growing their float from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数在保险世界的小众领域开展业务。总的来说，这些公司是一项不断增长的业务，持续产生承保利润。事实上，在过去十年中，它们从承保中赚取了 29.5 亿美元，同时将浮存金从 17 亿美元增加到 86 亿美元。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The "customer" pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.

简而言之，保险是承诺的销售。“顾客”现在付钱；保险公司承诺，如果将来发生某些不希望发生的事件，则在未来支付钱款。

Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by people in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives, is all-important.

有时，这个承诺几十年都不会被检验。（想想 20 多岁的人购买的人寿保险。）因此，即使在支付时经济混乱盛行，保险公司支付的能力和意愿也是至关重要的。

Berkshire's promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world's largest and most sophisticated P/C insurers, who wished to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities. That is, these insurers wished to "cede" these liabilities - most of them potential losses from asbestos claims - to a reinsurer. They needed the right one, though: If a reinsurer fails to pay a loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it. Choosing a reinsurer, therefore, that down the road proves to be financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its lap.

伯克希尔的承诺无与伦比，近年来世界上一些最大、最成熟的财产意外险公司证实了这一事实，它们希望摆脱巨大且异常长尾的负债。也就是说，这些保险公司希望将这些负债——其中大部分是石棉索赔的潜在损失——“分出”给一家再保险公司。但需要选对再保险公司：如果再保险公司未能支付损失，原保险公司仍然对其负责。因此，选择一个后来被证明财务困难或行为不当的再保险公司，可能会让原保险公司把这些巨额负债又拿回来。

Last year, our premier position in reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying a $3 billion single premium. I believe that the policy's size has only been exceeded by our 2007 transaction with Lloyd's, in which the premium was $7.1 billion.

去年，我们在再保险领域的领先地位再次得到证实，我们承保了一份单笔保费 30 亿美元的保单。我相信，只有我们 2007 年与劳合社的交易（保费为 71 亿美元）超过了这笔保单的规模。

In fact, I know of only eight P/C policies in history that had a single premium exceeding $1 billion. And, yes, all eight were written by Berkshire. Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial payments 50 years or more from now. When major insurers have needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will be made, Berkshire has been the party - the only party - to call.

事实上，据我所知，历史上只有八份财产意外险保单的单笔保费超过 10 亿美元。而且，是的，所有八份都是由伯克希尔承保的。其中一些合同将要求我们在 50 年或更长时间后支付大笔款项。当主要保险公司需要得到此类付款的无可置疑的承诺时，伯克希尔一直是——也是唯一——要联系的对象。

Berkshire's great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

伯克希尔的杰出管理者、一流的财务实力以及由宽阔护城河保护的各种商业模式，在保险界是独一无二的。这种优势组合对伯克希尔的股东来说是一项巨大的资产，并且只会随着时间的推移变得更加宝贵。

We have two major operations, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE"), that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们有两项主要业务，BNSF 和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司，它们具有区别于其他业务的重要特征。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF's interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们对非常长寿命的受监管资产进行了巨额投资，这些投资部分由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。事实上，我们的信用并非必需，因为每家公司都具有即使在糟糕的经济条件下也远远超过其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，去年，BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数超过了 8:1。（我们对覆盖倍数的定义是税前利润与利息的比率，而非 EBITDA/利息——我们认为后者是一个有严重缺陷的常用指标。）

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company's ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Recently, we have further broadened that base through our $3 billion (Canadian) acquisition of AltaLink, an electric transmission system serving 85% of Alberta's population. This multitude of profit streams, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, has enabled BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

与此同时，在 BHE，有两个因素确保了公司在任何情况下偿还债务的能力。第一个是所有公用事业公司共有的：抗衰退的收益，这是由于这些公司基于排他性提供基本服务。第二个是很少有其他公用事业公司享有的：收益流的巨大多样性，这保护我们免受任何单一监管机构的严重伤害。最近，我们通过以 30 亿加元收购 AltaLink（一个为艾伯塔省 85% 人口服务的电力传输系统）进一步拓宽了基础。这种众多的利润来源，再加上拥有强大母公司的固有优势，使 BHE 及其公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一经济事实使我们和我们的客户都受益。

Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways: BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important entry in our economy's circulatory system. BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel. BHE's utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are a leader in renewables: From a standing start ten years ago, BHE now accounts for 6% of the country's wind generation capacity and 7% of its solar generation capacity. Beyond these businesses, BHE owns two large pipelines that deliver 8% of our country's natural gas consumption; the recently-purchased electric transmission operation in Canada; and major electric businesses in the U.K. and Philippines. And the beat goes on: We will continue to buy and build utility operations throughout the world for decades to come.

每天，我们的两家子公司都以重要的方式为美国经济提供动力：BNSF 运输了约 15%（按吨英里计算）的所有城际货物，无论这些货物是通过卡车、铁路、水路、航空还是管道运输。事实上，我们运输的吨英里货物比任何人都多，这一事实使 BNSF 成为我们经济循环系统中最重要的组成部分。BNSF 与所有铁路一样，也以极其燃油高效和环境友好的方式运输货物，仅用一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输约 500 英里。承担相同工作的卡车消耗约四倍的燃料。BHE 的公用事业公司服务于 11 个州的受监管零售客户。没有哪家公用事业公司覆盖得更广。此外，我们是可再生能源的领导者：从十年前的零起步，BHE 现在占全国风力发电能力的 6% 和太阳能发电能力的 7%。除这些业务外，BHE 还拥有两条大型管道，输送我们国家天然气消耗量的 8%；最近收购的加拿大电力传输业务；以及英国和菲律宾的主要电力业务。业务持续发展：我们将在未来几十年继续在世界各地购买和建设公用事业业务。

BHE can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. In fact, last year the company retained more dollars of earnings - by far - than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this 100% retention policy as an important advantage - one almost certain to distinguish BHE from other utilities for many years to come.

BHE 能够进行这些投资，因为它保留了所有收益。事实上，去年该公司留存的收益金额——远远超过——任何其他美国电力公用事业公司。我们和我们的监管机构都将这种 100% 留存政策视为一项重要优势——几乎肯定会在未来许多年将 BHE 与其他公用事业公司区分开来。

When BHE completes certain renewables projects that are underway, the company's renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. In addition, we have conventional projects in the works that will also cost many billions. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns - and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

当 BHE 完成正在进行的一些可再生能源项目时，该公司的可再生能源组合将耗资 150 亿美元。此外，我们还在进行中的常规项目也将耗资数十亿美元。只要这些投资能带来合理的回报，我们就乐于进行——在这方面，我们对未来的监管寄予厚望。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既源于过去的经验，也源于认识到社会将永远需要在交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。政府以确保持续资金流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同时，我们的经营方式赢得监管者及其所代表人民的认可，也符合我们的自身利益。

Last year we fully met this objective at BHE, just as we have in every year of our ownership. Our rates remain low, our customer satisfaction is high and our record for employee safety is among the best in the industry.

去年我们在 BHE 完全实现了这一目标，就像我们拥有的每一年一样。我们的费率保持低位，客户满意度高，员工安全记录在业内名列前茅。

The story at BNSF, however - as I noted earlier - was not good in 2014, a year in which the railroad disappointed many of its customers. This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures that BNSF has made in recent years, with those having far exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal competitor.

然而，BNSF 的情况——正如我之前指出的——在 2014 年并不好，那一年铁路让许多客户失望。尽管 BNSF 近年来进行了创纪录的资本支出，远超过我们的主要竞争对手联合太平洋公司的支出，但问题仍然发生了。

The two railroads are of roughly equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably more freight (measured either by carloads or ton-miles). But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific's last year, and we lost market share as a result. Moreover, U.P.'s earnings beat ours by a record amount. Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.

按收入衡量，两家铁路公司的规模大致相当，尽管我们运输的货物量（按车皮数或吨英里衡量）要多得多。但去年我们的服务问题比联合太平洋更严重，结果我们失去了市场份额。此外，联合太平洋的利润以创纪录的优势超过我们。显然，我们有很多工作要做。

We are wasting no time: As I also mentioned earlier, we will spend $6 billion in 2015 on improving our railroad's operation. That will amount to about 26% of estimated revenues (a calculation that serves as the industry's yardstick). Outlays of this magnitude are largely unheard of among railroads. For us, this percentage compares to our average of 18% in 2009-2013 and to U.P.'s projection for the near future of 16-17%. Our huge investments will soon lead to a system with greater capacity and much better service. Improved profits should follow.

我们毫不拖延：正如我前面提到的，我们将在 2015 年花费 60 亿美元用于改善铁路运营。这将约占预计收入的 26%（这一计算是行业标尺）。这种规模的支出在铁路公司中基本上是前所未闻的。对我们来说，这一比例相比我们 2009-2013 年的平均水平 18% 以及联合太平洋近期预测的 16-17%。我们巨额的投资将很快带来一个容量更大、服务更好的系统。利润改善应该随之而来。

Here are the key figures for Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF:

以下是伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源和 BNSF 的关键数据：

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these "real," the rest not. The "non-real" charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.

在第 49 页显示的符合 GAAP 的数字中，11.5 亿美元的摊销费用已被扣除作为开支。我们认为其中约 20% 是“真实的”，其余不是。这些“非真实”费用，在伯克希尔曾经不存在，但由于我们进行了许多收购，它们变得重要起来。随着我们收购更多公司，非真实摊销费用几乎肯定会进一步上升。

The GAAP-compliant table on page 67 gives you the current status of our intangible assets. We now have $7.4 billion left to amortize, of which $4.1 billion will be charged over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of non-real costs becomes entirely charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat.

第 67 页的 GAAP 合规表格给出了我们无形资产的当前状况。我们现在还有 74 亿美元需要摊销，其中 41 亿美元将在未来五年内摊销。当然，最终，每一美元的非真实成本都会被完全冲销。当这种情况发生时，即使真实收益持平，报告的收益也会增加。

Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize, are different: Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real cost. That's true, moreover, at most other companies. When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph test.

我们要强调的是，折旧费用是不同的：我们报告的每一分折旧费用都是真实的成本。而且，在大多数其他公司也是如此。当 CEO 们兜售 EBITDA 作为估值指引时，给他们接上测谎仪吧。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.

我们公开报告的收益当然会继续符合 GAAP。然而，要拥抱现实，你应该记得加回我们报告的大部分摊销费用。

To get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, they sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector's businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates.

回到我们的许多制造、服务和零售业务，它们销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。该板块中的一些企业，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，拥有极好的经济状况，产生的税后利润从 25% 到远超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12% 到 20% 的良好回报。然而，有少数回报非常差，这是我在资本配置工作中犯下的一些严重错误的结果。我没有被误导：我只是错误地评估了公司或其所处行业的经济动态。

Fortunately, my blunders normally involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.

幸运的是，我的失误通常涉及相对较小的收购。我们的大规模收购通常效果很好，在少数情况下，甚至非常好。尽管如此，我还没有犯下购买企业或股票的最后一次错误。并非所有事情都能按计划进行。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using little leverage, earned 18.7% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来看，该板块的公司是一项出色的业务。它们在 2014 年平均使用了 240 亿美元的净有形资产，尽管持有大量过剩现金且仅使用了很少的杠杆，在这些资本上获得了 18.7% 的税后收益。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in both the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.

当然，如果收购价格过高，一家经济状况极好的企业也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务支付了远高于净有形资产的价格，这一成本反映在我们显示的商誉的巨额数字中。然而，总体而言，我们在该板块部署的资本上获得了不错的回报。此外，这些业务的内在价值总和，远远超过其账面价值，而且这种溢价可能会扩大。即便如此，保险和受监管行业板块的内在价值与账面价值之间的差距要大得多。真正的赢家就在那里。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97-100.

这个板块有太多的公司，无法逐一评论。此外，它们的竞争对手——无论是现有的还是潜在的——都会阅读这份报告。在我们的一些业务中，如果其他人知道了我们的数字，我们可能会处于不利地位。因此，在我们一些规模对伯克希尔的评估不重要的业务中，我们只披露所需的信息。不过，你可以在第 97-100 页找到关于我们许多业务的大量细节。

This year we include in this section Marmon's very sizable leasing operations, whose wares are railcars, containers and cranes. We have also restated the previous two years to reflect that change. Why have we made it? At one time there was a large minority ownership at Marmon, and I felt it was more understandable to include all of the company's operations in one place. Today we own virtually 100% of Marmon, which makes me think you will gain more insight into our various businesses if we include Marmon's leasing operations under this heading. (The figures for the many dozens of Marmon's other businesses remain in the previous section.)

今年我们将 Marmon 规模可观的租赁业务（其产品是铁路车辆、集装箱和起重机）包含在这一节中。我们还重述了前两年以反映这一变化。我们为什么这样做？曾经 Marmon 有较大的少数股权，我觉得将公司所有业务放在一起更容易理解。今天我们几乎拥有 Marmon 100% 的股份，这让我认为，如果我们将 Marmon 的租赁业务包含在此标题下，你会对我们各项业务有更深入的了解。（Marmon 许多其他业务的数据仍在前一节中。）

Our other leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture) and XTRA (semi-trailers). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. Both companies have invested more money in new equipment than have many of their competitors, and that's paying off.

我们的其他租赁和出租业务由 CORT（家具）和 XTRA（半挂车）运营。这些公司是行业领导者，随着美国经济走强，它们的收益大幅增加。这两家公司在新设备上的投资都比许多竞争对手多，并且得到了回报。

Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the largest home builder in America. Last year, Clayton sold 30,871 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. When we purchased Clayton in 2003 for $1.7 billion, its share was 14%.

凯文·克莱顿再次在克莱顿家园（美国最大的住宅建筑商）取得了行业领先的业绩。去年，克莱顿售出了 30,871 套房屋，约占美国人购买的活动房屋的 45%。当我们在 2003 年以 17 亿美元收购克莱顿时，其市场份额为 14%。

Key to Clayton's earnings is the company's $13 billion mortgage portfolio. During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, when funding for the industry dried up, Clayton was able to keep lending because of Berkshire's backing. In fact, we continued during that period to finance our competitors' retail sales as well as our own.

克莱顿盈利的关键是该公司 130 亿美元的抵押贷款组合。在 2008 和 2009 年的金融恐慌期间，当该行业的资金枯竭时，克莱顿由于伯克希尔的支持得以继续放贷。事实上，在此期间，我们继续为我们竞争对手的零售销售以及我们自己的销售提供融资。

Many of Clayton's borrowers have low incomes and mediocre FICO scores. But thanks to the company's sensible lending practices, its portfolio performed well during the recession, meaning a very high percentage of our borrowers kept their homes. Our blue-collar borrowers, in many cases, proved much better credit risks than their higher-income brethren.

克莱顿的许多借款人收入低，FICO 分数平平。但得益于公司明智的贷款实践，其组合在经济衰退期间表现良好，这意味着我们很高比例的借款人保住了他们的房屋。在许多情况下，事实证明，我们的蓝领借款人的信用风险比他们收入更高的同龄人要好得多。

At Marmon's railroad-car operation, lease rates have improved substantially over the past few years. The nature of this business, however, is that only 20% or so of our leases expire annually. Consequently, improved pricing only gradually works its way into our revenue stream. The trend, though, is strong. Our 105,000-car fleet consists largely of tank cars, but only 8% of those transport crude oil.

在 Marmon 的铁路车辆业务中，租赁费率在过去几年显著提高。然而，这项业务的性质是，每年只有约 20% 的租约到期。因此，提价只能逐渐渗透到我们的收入流中。不过，趋势强劲。我们的 105,000 辆车队主要由罐车组成，但其中只有 8% 运输原油。

One further fact about our rail operation is important for you to know: Unlike many other lessors, we manufacture our own tank cars, about 6,000 of them in a good year. We do not book any profit when we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed on our books at a "bargain" price. The difference between that figure and a "retail" price is only slowly reflected in our earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we enjoy over the 30-year life of the car. Because of that fact as well as others, Marmon's rail fleet is worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is carried on our books.

关于我们的铁路业务，还有一个重要的事实需要你知道：与许多其他租赁公司不同，我们自己制造罐车，好年景大约制造 6,000 辆。当我们把车辆从制造部门转移到租赁部门时，我们不确认任何利润。因此，我们的车队以“优惠”价格记在账上。这个数字与“零售”价格之间的差异，只能通过我们在车辆 30 年寿命期内享受的较小年折旧费用缓慢地反映在我们的收益中。由于这一点以及其他原因，Marmon 的铁路车队价值远高于我们账面上的 50 亿美元数字。

Here's the earnings recap for this sector:

以下是该板块的收益汇总：

\* Excludes capital gains or losses

\* 不包括资本收益或损失

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。

\ This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules. \ Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. \ Held under contract of sale for this amount.

\ 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP 成本因 GAAP 规则要求的增记或减记而有所不同。\ 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金计划持有的股份。\ 按此金额的销售合同持有。

Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment - and one we value highly.

伯克希尔有一个未包含在表中的主要股票头寸：我们可以在 2021 年 9 月之前的任何时间以 50 亿美元购买 7 亿股美国银行股票。到年底，这些股票价值 125 亿美元。我们可能会在期权到期前购买这些股票。与此同时，重要的是你要认识到，美国银行实际上是我们的第四大股权投资——而且我们高度评价它。

Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor, I'm embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.

细心的读者会注意到，去年还出现在我们最大普通股投资名单中的乐购，现在已经不在了。我很尴尬地报告，一个细心的投资者本应更早卖出乐购股票。我在这项投资上因犹豫不决而犯了一个大错误。

At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.

2012 年底，我们拥有 4.15 亿股乐购股票，当时和现在一样，乐购是英国领先的食品零售商，也是其他国家的重要杂货商。我们这项投资的成本为 23 亿美元，市值也差不多。

In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company's then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior "thumb-sucking." (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)

2013 年，我有点讨厌该公司当时的管理层，卖出了 1.14 亿股，实现了 4300 万美元的利润。我缓慢的卖出速度后来被证明代价高昂。查理称这种行为为“吮拇指”。（考虑到我的拖延使我们的损失，他已经很客气了。）

During 2014, Tesco's problems worsened by the month. The company's market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.

在 2014 年，乐购的问题逐月恶化。公司的市场份额下降，利润率收缩，会计问题浮出水面。在商业世界里，坏消息常常连环出现：你在厨房里看到一只蟑螂；随着时间的推移，你会遇到它的亲戚。

We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire's net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper.

我们在全年出售了乐购股票，现在已经清仓。（我们应该提到，该公司已经聘请了新的管理层，我们祝愿他们顺利。）我们在这项投资上的税后损失为 4.44 亿美元，约占伯克希尔净资产的 0.2%。在过去 50 年中，我们只有一次在出售时遭受了占净资产 2% 的投资损失。有两次经历了 1% 的损失。这三笔损失都发生在 1974-1975 年期间，当时我们卖掉了非常便宜的股票，以购买我们认为更便宜的其他股票。

Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind. During the 1964-2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to 2,059, which, with reinvested dividends, generated the overall return of 11,196% shown on page 2. Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now takes $1 to buy what could be bought for 13½¢ in 1965 (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).

我们投资业绩得到了强劲顺风的帮助。在 1964 年至 2014 年期间，标普 500 指数从 84 点上升到 2,059 点，加上股息再投资，产生了第 2 页所示的 11,196% 的总回报。同时，美元的购买力惊人地下降了 87%。这一下降意味着，现在需要 1 美元才能购买 1965 年只需 13.5 美分就能买到的东西（按消费者价格指数衡量）。

There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as "the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power - after taxes have been paid on nominal gains - in the future."

股票与美元之间的这种不同表现给投资者带来了一个重要信息。回想一下我们 2011 年的年度报告，其中我们将投资定义为“将当下的购买力转移给他人，并理性地期望在未来（在名义收益缴税后）获得更多的购买力。”

The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities - Treasuries, for example - whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century.

从过去五十年得出的非常规但不可避免的结论是：投资于多元化的美国企业组合远比投资于价值与美国货币挂钩的证券（例如国债）安全得多。在上半个世纪，包括大萧条和两次世界大战的时期，也是如此。投资者应关注这段历史。在下一个世纪，这种情况几乎肯定会以不同程度重演。

Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term, however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments - far riskier investments - than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray.

股票价格总是比现金等价物投资波动大得多。然而，从长期来看，以货币计价的工具是风险更高的投资——比随时间推移购买、只需支付象征性费用和佣金的广泛多元化股票投资组合风险高得多。这一教训通常不在商学院讲授，商学院几乎普遍用波动性作为风险的代理指标。尽管这种教学假设便于教学，但它大错特错：波动性远非风险的代名词。将两者等同起来的流行公式会导致学生、投资者和 CEO 误入歧途。

It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors - say, investment banks - whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits.

当然，持有一天、一周或一年的股票（无论是名义上还是购买力上）比将资金留在现金等价物中的风险要大得多。这对某些投资者（例如投资银行）来说很重要，它们的生存能力可能受到资产价格下跌的威胁，并可能在市场低迷时被迫出售证券。此外，任何可能有重大近期资金需求的一方，都应将适当的资金存放在国债或有保险的银行存款中。

For the great majority of investors, however, who can - and should - invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time, will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities.

然而，对于绝大多数能够——也应该——以数十年为投资期限的投资者来说，报价下跌并不重要。他们的注意力应始终集中在在其投资生命周期内获得显著的购买力增长上。对他们来说，随时间购买、多元化的股票投资组合将证明比美元计价证券的风险小得多。

If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in "safe" Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).

相反，如果投资者害怕价格波动，错误地将其视为风险的衡量标准，那么具有讽刺意味的是，他最终可能会做非常冒险的事情。请回想一下六年前那些哀叹股价下跌、建议投资“安全”国债或银行存单的权威人士。听从这番说教的人，现在他们原本期望能安享退休生活的资金却只赚到微薄的收益。（当时标普 500 指数在 700 点以下；现在约为 2,100 点。）如果不是因为他们害怕毫无意义的价格波动，这些投资者本可以通过简单地购买一只成本极低的指数基金来确保自己一生的良好收入，其股息会随着时间推移呈上升趋势，本金也会增长（当然会有很多起伏）。

Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to "time" market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor's tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator – and definitely not Charlie nor I – can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.

当然，投资者可以通过自己的行为使股票所有权变得非常高。许多人也确实如此。频繁交易、试图“择时”市场走势、分散投资不足、向经理和顾问支付高昂且不必要的费用、以及使用借来的钱，都可能摧毁长期股权所有者本可享有的体面回报。事实上，借来的钱在投资者的工具箱里没有位置：市场上任何时候都可能发生任何事情。没有哪个顾问、经济学家或电视评论员——当然也不是查理和我——能告诉你混乱何时会发生。市场预测者会充斥你的耳朵，但永远不会填满你的钱包。

The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to "the little guy." Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool's game.

上述投资罪的犯案者并不限于“小人物”。大型机构投资者作为一个整体，长期以来表现逊于只需简单持有数十年、不谙世故的指数基金投资者。一个主要原因是费用：许多机构向顾问支付大笔费用，而这些顾问反过来推荐高费用经理。那是一场傻瓜的游戏。

There are a few investment managers, of course, who are very good – though in the short run, it's difficult to determine whether a great record is due to luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far better at generating high fees than they are at generating high returns. In truth, their core competence is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their siren songs, investors – large and small – should instead read Jack Bogle's The Little Book of Common Sense Investing.

当然，有一些投资经理非常优秀——尽管在短期内，很难确定卓越的业绩究竟是源于运气还是才华。然而，大多数顾问在产生高费用方面的能力远远超过产生高回报的能力。事实上，他们的核心能力是推销。投资者——无论大小——不应听信他们的魔笛之歌，而应该阅读杰克·博格尔的《常识投资小书》。

Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for investment failure, using a quote from Shakespeare: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves."

几十年前，本·格雷厄姆引用莎士比亚的一句话指出了投资失败的责任所在：“亲爱的布鲁图斯，错误不在我们的命运，而在我们自己。”

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 2nd at the CenturyLink Center. Last year's attendance of 39,000 set a record, and we expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our Golden Anniversary. Be there when the doors open at 7 a.m.

年度股东大会将于 5 月 2 日星期六在 CenturyLink 中心举行。去年的 39,000 人出席创下了纪录，我们预计今年庆祝金禧纪念时人数将进一步增加。早上 7 点开门时到场。

Berkshire's talented Carrie Sova will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked her to take charge of the meeting – a huge undertaking, requiring a multitude of skills – and she jumped at the chance. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in the hundreds who work with her. She is aided by our entire home office crew who enjoy pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.

伯克希尔才华横溢的 Carrie Sova 将再次负责。Carrie 六年前以 24 岁秘书的身份加入我们。之后，四年前，我请她负责会议——这是一项艰巨的任务，需要多种技能——她欣然接受了机会。Carrie 沉着冷静、足智多谋，擅长激发与她共事的数百人的最佳状态。我们总部的全体工作人员都为她提供帮助，他们乐于协助，为我们的所有者打造一个有趣且富有信息的周末。

And, yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our products while they're here. In fact, this year we will substantially increase the hours available for purchases, opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st, from noon to 5 p.m. as well as the usual 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie's face and do some serious shopping.

而且，是的，我们也试图在来访股东在场时向他们销售我们的产品。事实上，今年我们将大幅增加购物时间，5 月 1 日星期五中午至下午 5 点在 CenturyLink 营业，会议日也照常从上午 7 点到下午 4 点。所以给查理带来笑容，认真购物吧。

Get up early on Saturday morning. At 6:20 a.m., Norman and Jake, two Texas longhorns each weighing about a ton, will proceed down 10th Street to the CenturyLink. Aboard them will be a couple of our Justin Boot executives, who do double duty as cowboys. Following the steers will be four horses pulling a Wells Fargo stagecoach. Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles. Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our reputation as America's all-purpose transportation company.

周六早上早起。6:20，诺曼和杰克——两头重约一吨的得克萨斯长角牛——将沿着第 10 街走向 CenturyLink。骑在它们身上的是我们的几位 Justin Boot 高管，他们兼任牛仔。跟在公羊后面的是四匹马拉着的富国银行驿站马车。伯克希尔已经销售飞机、火车和汽车。将公羊和驿站马车加入我们的投资组合，应该能巩固我们作为美国全能运输公司的声誉。

At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, we will have our fourth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target again will be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager - in my one brief flirtation with honest labor - I tossed about 500,000 papers. So I think I'm pretty good. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! I'll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). I'll present a special prize to the 12-or-under contestant who makes the best toss. Deb Bosanek will be the judge.

周六早上 7:30 左右，我们将举行第四届国际投报挑战赛。目标再次是克莱顿之家门廊，距离投掷线正好 35 英尺。我十几岁的时候——在我短暂涉足诚实劳动期间——投过大约 50 万份报纸。所以我认为我很擅长。挑战我！羞辱我！让我丢脸！任何比我更靠近门口的人，我都会买一个 Dilly Bar 送给他。报纸有 36 到 42 页，你必须自己折叠（不能用橡皮筋）。我会给 12 岁及以下投得最好的参赛者颁发特别奖。黛布·博萨内克担任裁判。

At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink's stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so.

上午 8:30，将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，中间在 CenturyLink 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在下午 3:45 召集年度股东大会。这个正式会议通常只持续半小时左右。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. If you don't get your shopping done on Friday, slip out while Charlie's talking on Saturday and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad layout also. Even though I'm 84, it still excites me.

你的购物场所将是毗邻会议厅的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅，我们数十家子公司的产品将在那里出售。如果你周五没买完，周六趁查理讲话时溜出来，尽情享受我们的便宜货。也看看精彩的 BNSF 铁路模型布局。即使我已经 84 岁了，它仍然让我兴奋。

Last year you did your part as a shopper, and most of our businesses racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period on Saturday, we sold 1,385 pairs of Justin boots (that's a pair every 23 seconds), 13,440 pounds of See's candy, 7,276 pairs of Wells Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup. Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will be available this year. (Buy both!) Now that we are open for business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every precinct.

去年你们作为购物者尽了力，我们的大多数业务都取得了创纪录的销售额。在周六的九个小时内，我们卖出了 1,385 双 Justin 靴子（每 23 秒一双），13,440 磅喜诗糖果，7,276 双 Wells Lamont 工作手套和 10,000 瓶亨氏番茄酱。亨氏有了新的芥末产品，所以今年芥末和番茄酱都会有。（都买！）既然我们周五也开始营业，我们预计在各个品类都会创下新纪录。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our third annual "Berkshire 5K," an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor's Guide that will be sent to you with your credentials for the meeting. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire's managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.)

我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 将在会议上再次推出特别的纪念鞋。购买一双后，第二天早上 8 点穿上它们参加我们第三届年度“伯克希尔 5 公里跑”，比赛从 CenturyLink 出发。参与的详细信息将包含在随会议证件一起发送给你的访客指南中。参赛者将发现他们与许多伯克希尔的经理、董事和同事一起跑步。（然而，查理和我会睡懒觉。）

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company's top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money.

购物区的 GEICO 展位将由来自全国各地的一些公司顶级顾问提供服务。请过来看看报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们的价格。我们可以为你们中的许多人节省真金白银。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Last year, many shareholders purchased Max Olson's compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for the meeting. We also expect to be selling an inexpensive book commemorating our fifty years. It's currently a work in process, but I expect it to contain a wide variety of historical material, including documents from the 19th Century.

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。它将携带约 35 本书和 DVD，其中包括几本新书。去年，许多股东购买了 Max Olson 汇编的伯克希尔 1965 年以来的信件集，他为这次会议制作了更新版。我们还预计会出售一本纪念我们五十周年的廉价书。目前它还在制作中，但我预计它将包含各种历史材料，包括 19 世纪的文件。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末提高票价。如果你从远方来，请比较飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。两座城市之间的车程约为 2.5 小时，堪萨斯城可能会为你节省大量资金，特别是如果你原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。一对夫妇节省的费用可能达到 1,000 美元或更多。把钱花在我们这里。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did a record $40,481,817 of business. (An average week for NFM's Omaha store is about $9 million.)

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年在会议前后的一周里，该店的营业额创下了 40,481,817 美元的纪录。（NFM 奥马哈店的每周平均营业额约为 900 万美元。）

To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 28th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 28 日（周二）至 5 月 4 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周五上午 10 点至晚上 9 点营业，周六上午 10 点至晚上 9:30，周日上午 10 点至晚上 8 点。周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办野餐会，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded our sales in all of December, normally a jeweler's best month.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 5 月 1 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 3 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。近年来，我们三天的销售额远远超过整个 12 月的销售额，而 12 月通常是珠宝商的最佳月份。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 27 日（周一）持续到 5 月 9 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don't play them for money.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。不要和他们赌钱。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she's a sophomore at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don't mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.

我的朋友邢延华也将在周日出现在商场里，与挑战者进行乒乓球比赛。我在她九岁时就认识了她，即使在那时我也无法从她身上得分。现在，她是普林斯顿大学的二年级学生，已代表美国参加了 2012 年奥运会。如果你不介意让自己难堪，可以在下午 1 点开始测试你的技能。比尔·盖茨和我将首先上场，试图削弱她的体力。

Gorat's and Piccolo's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat's opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo's opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before); for Piccolo's, call 402-346-2865. At Piccolo's, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only issues get the small one.

Gorat's 和 Piccolo's 将在 5 月 3 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。两家餐厅都将营业到晚上 10 点，Gorat's 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo's 下午 4 点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅，我将在周日晚上两家都吃。记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-346-2865。在 Piccolo's，点一杯巨大的根汁汽水浮冰作为甜点。只有小问题的人才会点小杯。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, who retired last year after sixty years at Fortune, but remains the expert on business and financial matters, and who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将再次有同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：Carol Loomis，她在《财富》杂志工作六十年后于去年退休，但仍然是商业和金融事务专家，电子邮件地址为 loomisbrk@gmail.com；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和最重要的六个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners' understanding and knowledge of their investment.

我们还将有一个由三位关注伯克希尔的分析师组成的小组。今年保险专家将是 Dowling & Partners 的 Gary Ransom。涉及我们非保险业务的问题将来自 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 和 Morningstar 的 Gregg Warren。我们希望分析师和记者提出的问题能够增进我们的所有者对其投资的理解和认识。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that's the way we like it. All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 62 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于即将向我们提出的问题的线索。有些问题肯定会很棘手，这正是我们喜欢的方式。总而言之，我们预计至少有 54 个问题，每位分析师和记者 6 个，观众 18 个。（去年我们总共有 62 个。）现场观众的提问者将通过 11 次抽签选出，抽签将在年会当天早上 8:15 进行。安装在主会场和主要溢出会场的 11 个麦克风中的每一个都将，可以这么说，举办一次抽签。

While I'm on the subject of our owners' gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That's why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.

在我谈到所有者获取知识的话题时，让我提醒你，查理和我认为所有股东应该同时获得伯克希尔发布的新信息，并且应该有足够的时间进行分析。这就是为什么我们试图在周五晚些时候或周六早些时候发布财务数据，以及为什么我们的年会总是在周六举行。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一会谈，而是像对待所有其他股东一样对待他们。

We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy yourselves. This year, because we expect record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of hotel rooms. To deal with that possible problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to have a wide array of accommodations to offer. Airbnb's services may be especially helpful to shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive. Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.

我们的会议得到了成千上万希望你们玩得开心的奥马哈居民和企业的极大帮助。今年，由于我们预计出席人数将创纪录，我们担心酒店房间短缺。为了解决这个可能的问题，Airbnb 正在特别努力，在会议前后期间获取房源清单，并可能提供多种住宿选择。对于那些预计只在奥马哈住一晚、并且知道去年有些酒店要求客人至少支付三晚房费的股东来说，Airbnb 的服务可能特别有帮助。这可是一笔不小的开支。预算紧张的人应该查看 Airbnb 网站。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers also to be a shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business "home runs" means as much to them as their paycheck.

我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营他们的企业就像这些是他们的家庭拥有的唯一资产一样。我相信我们的经理们的心态也与大型上市公司中能找到的一样以股东为导向。我们的大多数经理没有工作的经济需求。打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说和薪水一样重要。

Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 24,100-page Federal income tax return and oversees the filing of 3,400 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country's largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board's activities - and the list goes on and on.

然而，同样重要的是在我公司办公室与我一起工作的 24 名男男女女。这个团队高效地处理着大量的 SEC 和其他监管要求，提交一份 24,100 页的联邦所得税申报表，并监督 3,400 份州税申报表的提交，回应无数的股东和媒体询问，发布年度报告，准备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的活动——这样的例子不胜枚举。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率高得令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超越了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动：去年，他们处理了 40 所大学（从 200 名申请者中选出）派学生到奥马哈与我进行问答日的事宜。他们处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买来汉堡包和炸薯条（当然要浇上亨氏番茄酱）作为午餐。没有 CEO 比我更好了；我真的每天都想跳着踢踏舞去上班。

Last year, for the annual report, we dropped our 48-year-old "no pictures" policy - who says I'm not flexible? - and ran a photo of our remarkable home-office crew that was taken at our Christmas lunch. I didn't warn the gang of the public exposure they were to receive, so they didn't have on their Sunday best. This year was a different story: On the facing page you will see what our group looks like when they think someone will be noticing. However they dress, their performance is mind-boggling.

去年，在年度报告中，我们放弃了 48 年来的“不拍照”政策——谁说我不灵活？——并刊登了一张在圣诞午餐时拍摄的我们出色的总部团队照片。我没有提醒团队他们将受到的公众曝光，所以他们并没有穿最好的衣服。今年情况不同：在对页，你会看到我们的团队认为有人会注意时的样子。无论他们怎么穿，他们的表现都令人难以置信。

Come meet them on May 2nd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.

5 月 2 日来见见他们，享受我们的资本家伍德斯托克。

February 27, 2015

2015 年 2 月 27 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席