1969年10月9日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110

巴菲特合伙有限公司
基威特广场610号
内布拉斯加州奥马哈68131
电话 042-4110

October 9th, 1969

1969年10月9日

To My Partners:

致各位合伙人：

Here is my present estimate of the BPL calendar for the months to come:

以下是我对BPL未来几个月日程的当前估计：

(1) This letter - to tell you something of Bill Ruane, the money manager within my knowledge who ranks the highest when combining the factors of integrity, ability and continued availability to all partners. I also want to comment upon the present range of expectations involved in deciding on a bond-stock mix.

(1) 这封信——向你们介绍比尔·鲁安，据我所知，在诚信、能力和对所有合伙人的持续可用性这三方面综合排名最高的资金管理人。我还想评论一下在决定债券与股票配置时涉及的当前预期范围。

(2) Late November - the required thirty days formal notice of my intent to retire from the Partnership at the end of the year.

(2) 11月下旬——我将按规定提前30天正式通知，我打算在年底从合伙公司退休。

(3) Early December - a package of publicly available material, as well as some general comments by me relating to our controlled companies. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (owning the textile business, Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Sun Newspapers) and Diversified Retailing Company (owning Hochschild, Kohn & Co. and Associated Cotton Shops). I want you to have ample time to study the material relating to such companies before you make any decision to hold, sell or buy such securities after distribution to you in early January. I will solicit written questions from partners (I don't want to talk to you individually about such companies, as I want all partners to obtain exactly the same information) and then have a further mailing late in December, giving all questions received relating to these companies along with my answers, if possible. I still anticipate having a plan enabling partners to promptly convert such controlled company holdings to cash, if they wish.

(3) 12月初——我将寄送一份公开材料，以及我对我们控股公司的一些总体评论。这些公司包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（拥有纺织业务、伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行与信托公司、国民赔偿公司、国民火灾与海事保险公司以及太阳报业）和多元化零售公司（拥有霍克希尔德·科恩公司和联合棉布商店）。我希望你们在1月初获得这些证券的分配后，有充裕时间研究相关材料，再决定是持有、出售还是买入。我将征求合伙人的书面提问（我不想单独与你们讨论这些公司，因为我要确保所有合伙人获得完全相同的信息），然后可能在12月下旬再次寄信，列出收到的所有关于这些公司的问题以及我的回答。我仍预期能有一个方案，让希望将这类控股公司持股迅速转换为现金的合伙人得以实现。

(4) About January 5th - (a) a cash distribution amounting to at least 56% (probably more - depending upon what percentage of our remaining holdings are sold before yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital, less any distributions (the regular monthly payments many of you receive) or borrowings by you during 1969, (b) your proportional share of our holdings in Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. which, if you dispose of them, will bring 30% - 35% (my estimate of value will be made at yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital.

(4) 约1月5日——（a）现金分配，至少占你1969年1月1日资本的56%（可能更多，取决于我们在年底前出售剩余持股的比例），减去你在1969年收到的任何分配（许多合伙人每月收到的固定付款）或借款；（b）你在多元化零售公司及伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司持股中的相应份额，如果你将其处置，将带来你1969年1月1日资本的30%至35%（我将在年底对价值做出估计）。

We may make substantial additional sales before yearend - if so, the early January cash distribution will be somewhat larger than the 56% mentioned above. If we don't, such sales will be made during the first half of 1970 and an interim distribution made. Residual assets will be sold at appropriate times and I believe not more than 10% of our present asset value will remain after June 30th, 1970 pending a final distribution when all assets and liabilities have been cleaned up.

我们可能在年底前进行大量额外出售——如果是这样，1月初的现金分配将比上述56%稍高。如果没有，这些出售将在1970年上半年进行，并进行中期分配。剩余资产将在适当时候出售，我相信在1970年6月30日之后，我们当前资产价值中不会超过10%的部分待最终清理所有资产和负债后进行分配。

Unless there is a further substantial decline in the market. I still expect about a breakeven performance before any monthly payments for 1969. We were lucky - if we had not been in liquidation this year, our results would have been significantly worse. Ideas that looked potentially interesting on a "continuing" basis have on balance performed poorly to date. We have only two items of real size left - one we are selling as I write this and the other is a holding of limited marketability representing about 7-1/2% of the outstanding stock of Blue Chip Stamps which we may sell via a registered public offering around yearend, depending upon market conditions and other factors.

除非市场进一步大幅下跌，我仍预计1969年在每月付款前的业绩约为盈亏平衡。我们很幸运——如果我们今年没有进入清盘，我们的业绩会差得多。那些在“持续经营”基础上看起来有潜在吸引力的想法，迄今为止总体表现不佳。我们只剩下两项真正规模较大的资产——一项我正在写作此信时出售，另一项是流动性有限、约占蓝筹印花公司已发行股份7.5%的持股，我们可能在年底前后通过注册公开发售的方式出售，视市场情况和其他因素而定。

(5) March 1st. 1970 - John Harding expects to leave Buffett Partnership. Ltd. and open a branch office in Omaha for Ruane, Cunniff & Stires. Bill Scott and I will be available at BPL offices to help any partners who are desirous of purchasing bonds, tax-free or taxable. We will set aside the month of March to make our services available without cost to those who want to acquire bonds. Because of some experience we have in analysis and purchasing, as well as the access we have to wholesale markets. I think it is likely we can save material elements of cost as well as help select better relative values for those of you who wish to invest in bonds. After April 1st, however, we want to be out of any form of personal advisory activity.

(5) 1970年3月1日——约翰·哈丁计划离开巴菲特合伙有限公司，并在奥马哈开设鲁安·坎尼夫·斯特莱斯公司的分公司。比尔·斯科特和我会在BPL办公室为任何希望购买债券（免税或应税）的合伙人提供帮助。我们将留出整个3月份，免费为那些希望购买债券的人士提供服务。由于我们在分析和购买方面有一些经验，并且能够进入批发市场，我认为我们很可能能够为希望投资债券的你们节省实质性的成本，并帮助选择更好的相对价值。不过，4月1日之后，我们想退出任何形式的个人咨询活动。

(6) After March, 1970 - Bill and I will continue to office in Kiewit Plaza, spending a very minor portion of our time completing the wind-up of BPL. This will mean filing tax returns for 1970 and probably 1971 resolving minor assets and liabilities etc.

(6) 1970年3月之后——比尔和我将继续在基威特广场办公，用极少部分时间来完成BPL的清算工作。这将包括提交1970年以及可能1971年的纳税申报，处理少量资产和负债等。

Now, to Bill Ruane - we met in Ben Graham's class at Columbia University in 1951 and I have had considerable opportunity to observe his qualities of character, temperament and intellect since that time. If Susie and I were to die while our children are minors, he is one of three trustees who have carte blanche on investment matters - the other two are not available for continuous investment management for all partners, large or small.

现在来说说比尔·鲁安——我们于1951年在哥伦比亚大学本·格雷厄姆的课堂上相识，从那时起我有大量机会观察他的品格、性情和才智。如果苏茜和我在孩子尚未成年时去世，他是在投资事务上拥有全权委托的三位受托人之一——另外两位无法为所有合伙人（不论大小）提供持续的投资管理服务。

There is no way to eliminate the possibility of error when judging humans particularly in regard to future behavior in an unknown environment. However, decisions have to be made - whether actively or passively - and I consider Bill to be an exceptionally high probability decision on character and a high probability one on investment performance. I also consider it likely that Bill will continue as a money manager for many years to come.

在评判人时，尤其是在未知环境中预测未来行为，不可能完全消除出错的可能性。然而，必须做出决定——无论是主动还是被动——我认为比尔在品格方面是一个极高概率的正确决定，在投资业绩方面也是一个高概率的决定。我还认为比尔很可能在未来许多年继续担任资金管理人。

Bill has recently formed a New York Stock Exchange firm, Ruane, Cunniff & Stires, Inc., 85 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004, telephone number (212) 344-6700. John Harding presently plans to establish an office for the firm in Omaha about March 1st, 1970. Bill manages accounts individually on a fee basis and also executes brokerage for the accounts - presently with some portion of the brokerage commissions used to offset a portion of the investment advisory fee. His method of operation allows monthly withdrawals on a basis similar to BPL - as a percentage of capital and unrelated to realized or unrealized gain or loss. It is possible he may form some sort of pooled account but such determinations will be made between him and those of you who elect to go with him. I, of course, will not be involved with his operation. I am making my list of partners available to him and he will be writing you fairly soon regarding a trip he plans to make before yearend to Omaha, Los Angeles and Chicago, so that those of you who wish to meet him may do so. Any of you who are going to be in New York during the next few months can contact him directly.

比尔最近成立了一家纽约证券交易所成员公司，鲁安·坎尼夫·斯特莱斯公司，地址为纽约市百老汇大街85号，邮编10004，电话（212）344-6700。约翰·哈丁目前计划于1970年3月1日左右在奥马哈为该公司设立一个办公室。比尔以收费方式单独管理账户，同时为账户执行交易——目前将一部分经纪佣金用于抵免部分投资顾问费。他的运作模式允许按月提款，方式与BPL类似——按资本的一定比例提取，与已实现或未实现盈亏无关。他可能会设立某种集合账户，但此类决定将由他和选择跟随他的合伙人共同做出。当然，我不会参与他的业务。我正在将我的合伙人名单提供给他，他很快会写信给你们，介绍他计划在年底前到奥马哈、洛杉矶和芝加哥的行程，以便想要见他的人可以见面。未来几个月内将去纽约的任何一位，都可以直接与他联系。

Bill's overall record has been very good-averaging fairly close to BPL's, but with considerably greater variation. From 1956-1961 and from 1964-1968, a composite of his individual accounts averaged over 40% per annum. However, in 1962, undoubtedly somewhat as a product of the euphoric experience of the earlier years, he was down about 50%. As he re-oriented his thinking, 1963 was about breakeven.

比尔的总体记录非常好——平均而言相当接近BPL，但波动幅度大得多。从1956到1961年以及从1964到1968年，他个人账户的组合年均超过40%。然而，在1962年，无疑部分受到早年极度乐观经历的影响，他下跌了约50%。随着他的思路调整，1963年大致盈亏平衡。

While two years may sound like a short time when included in a table of performance, it may feel like a long time when your net worth is down 50%. I think you run this sort of short-term risk with virtually any money manager operating in stocks and it is a factor to consider in deciding the portion of your capital to commit to equities. To date in 1969, Bill is down about 15%, which I believe to be fairly typical of most money managers. Bill, of course, has not been in control situations or workouts, which have usually tended to moderate the swings in BPL year-to-year performance. Even excluding these factors, I believe his performance would have been somewhat more volatile (but not necessarily poorer by any means) than mine - his style is different, and while his typical portfolio (under most conditions) would tend to have a mild overlap with mine, there would always be very significant differences.

虽然在业绩表中两年可能听起来很短，但当你的净资产下跌50%时，可能感觉像是漫长的时光。我认为，几乎任何投资于股票的基金经理都会让你面临这种短期风险，在决定配置到股票上的资本比例时，这是一个需要考虑的因素。1969年迄今，比尔下跌了约15%，我相信这相当代表大多数基金经理的情况。当然，比尔没有参与控股或套利类投资，这些通常有助于缓和BPL逐年业绩的波动。即使排除这些因素，我相信他的业绩比我的波动性更大（但绝不意味着更差）——他的风格不同，虽然他的典型投资组合（在大多数情况下）与我的存在轻度重叠，但总会有非常显著的差异。

Bill has achieved his results working with an average of $5 to $10 million. I consider the three most likely negative factors in his future to be: (1) the probability of managing significantly larger sums - this is a problem you are going to have rather quickly with any successful money manager, and it will tend to moderate performance; I believe Bill's firm is now managing $20 -$30 million and, of course, they will continue to add accounts; (2) the possibility of Bill's becoming too involved in the detail of his operation rather than spending all of his time simply thinking about money management. The problems of being the principal factor in a NYSE firm as well as handling many individual accounts can mean that he, like most investment advisors, will be subject to pressures to spend much of his time in activities that do nothing to lead to superior investment performance. In this connection, I have asked Bill to make his services available to all BPL partners - large or small and he will, but I have also told him he is completely a free agent if he finds particular clients diverting him from his main job; (3) the high probability that even excellent investment management during the next decade will only produce limited advantages over passive management. I will comment on this below.

比尔在管理平均500万至1000万美元的资产时取得了他的业绩。我认为他未来最有可能出现的三个负面因素是：（1）可能管理更大规模的资金——这是任何成功的基金经理都会很快面临的问题，它会倾向于降低业绩；我相信比尔的公司目前管理着2000万至3000万美元，当然他们还会继续增加账户；（2）比尔可能过于投入运营细节，而不是把全部时间花在单纯思考投资管理上。作为一家纽约证券交易所成员公司的主要负责人，同时处理许多个人账户，这可能意味着他会像大多数投资顾问一样，面临将大量时间花在对卓越投资业绩毫无帮助的活动上的压力。关于这一点，我已要求比尔向所有BPL合伙人——无论大小——提供服务，他会的，但我也告诉他，如果发现某些客户使他偏离主业，他完全保留自主权；（3）即使未来十年有出色的投资管理，也很可能只能相对于被动管理取得有限优势。我将在下文对此进行评论。

The final point regarding the negatives listed above is that they are not the sort of drawbacks leading to horrible performance, but more likely the sort of things that lead to average performance. I think this is the main risk you run with Bill - and average performance is just not that terrible a risk.

关于上述负面因素的最后一点是，它们并非那种会导致可怕业绩的缺陷，而更可能是导致业绩平平的因素。我认为这是你与比尔合作面临的主要风险——而平均业绩并非那么可怕的风险。

In recommending Bill, I am engaging in the sort of activity I have tried to avoid in BPL portfolio activities - a decision where there is nothing to gain (personally) and considerable to lose. Some of my friends who are not in the Partnership have suggested that I make no recommendation since, if results were excellent it would do me no good and, if something went wrong, I might well get a portion of the blame. If you and I had just had a normal commercial relationship, such reasoning might be sound. However, the degree of trust partners have extended to me and the cooperation manifested in various ways precludes such a "hands off" policy. Many of you are professional investors or close thereto and need no advice from me on managers - you may well do better yourself. For those partners who are financially inexperienced, I feel it would be totally unfair for me to assume a passive position and deliver you to the most persuasive salesman who happened to contact you early in 1970.

在推荐比尔这件事上，我正从事一种我在BPL投资组合活动中试图避免的行为——一个个人没有收益却可能损失重大的决定。一些不在合伙公司内的朋友建议我不要做任何推荐，因为如果结果优异对我没有好处，而如果出了差错，我很可能受到部分指责。如果你我之间只是普通的商业关系，这种理由或许成立。然而，合伙人对我的信任程度以及以各种方式表现出的合作，排除了这种“袖手旁观”的政策。你们中许多人是专业投资者或接近专业水平，不需要我关于管理人的建议——你们自己可能会做得更好。对于那些缺乏财务经验的合伙人，我觉得如果采取被动态势，任你们在1970年初被最能说会道的推销员拉走，对我来说是完全不公平的。

Finally, a word about expectations. A decade or so ago was quite willing to set a target of ten percentage points per annum better than the Dow, with the expectation that the Dow would average about 7%. This meant an expectancy for us of around 17%, with wide variations and no guarantees, of course - but, nevertheless, an expectancy. Tax-free bonds at the time yielded about 3%. While stocks had the disadvantage of irregular performance, overall they seemed much the more desirable option. I also stressed this preference for stocks in teaching classes, participating in panel discussions, etc…

最后，谈谈预期。大约十年前，我很愿意设定一个每年比道琼斯指数高出十个百分点的目标，同时预期道琼斯指数平均约7%。这意味着我们的预期收益率约为17%，当然波动幅度很大且没有保证——但仍然是预期。当时免税债券的收益率约为3%。虽然股票表现不规律是劣势，但总体而言它们似乎是更可取的选择。我在授课、参加小组讨论等场合也强调了对股票的偏好。

For the first time in my investment lifetime. I now believe there is little choice for the average investor between professionally managed money in stocks and passive investment in bonds. If correct, this view has important implications. Let me briefly (and in somewhat oversimplified form) set out the situation as I see it:

在我整个投资生涯中，我第一次认为，对于普通投资者而言，在专业管理的股票投资与被动投资债券之间几乎没什么可选择的。如果这个观点正确，它具有重要含义。让我简要地（以略微简化的形式）阐述一下我所看到的情况：

(1) I am talking about the situation for, say, a taxpayer in a 40% Federal Income Tax bracket who also has some State Income Tax to pay. Various changes are being proposed in the tax laws, which may adversely affect net results from presently tax-exempt income, capital gains, and perhaps other types of investment income. More proposals will probably come in the future. Overall, I feel such changes over the years will not negate my relative expectations about after-tax income from presently tax-free bonds versus common stocks, and may well even mildly reinforce them.

(1) 我考虑的情况是，比如一个处于40%联邦所得税等级、还要缴纳一定州所得税的纳税人。税法的各种修改正在被提议，可能会对当前免税收入、资本利得以及可能其他类型投资收入的净结果产生不利影响。未来很可能还会有更多提案。总体而言，我认为这些变化多年来不会否定我对当前免税债券与普通股税后收入的相对预期，甚至可能略微强化这些预期。

(2) I am talking about expectations over the next ten years - not the next weeks or months. I find it much easier to think about what should develop over a relatively long period of time than what is likely in any short period. As Ben Graham said: "In the long run, the market is a weighing machine - in the short run, a voting machine." I have always found it easier to evaluate weights dictated by fundamentals than votes dictated by psychology.

(2) 我谈的是未来十年的预期——而非未来几周或几个月。我发现思考相对长时间内应该发生什么比预测任何短期情况要容易得多。正如本·格雷厄姆所说：“长期来看，市场是一台称重机；短期来看，是一台投票机。”我一直发现评估由基本面决定的分量比评估由心理决定的选票更容易。

(3) Purely passive investment in tax-free bonds will now bring about 6-1/2%. This yield can be achieved with excellent quality and locked up for just about any period for which the investor wishes to contract. Such conditions may not exist in March when Bill and I will be available to assist you in bond purchases, but they exist today.

(3) 目前，纯粹被动投资于免税债券将带来约6.5%的收益。这个收益率可以通过优质债券获得，并且几乎可以根据投资者希望的任何期限锁定。到3月份比尔和我能协助你们购买债券时，这种条件可能不存在，但今天确实存在。

(4) The ten year expectation for corporate stocks as a group is probably not better than 9% overall, say 3% dividends and 6% gain in value. I would doubt that Gross National Product grows more than 6% per annum - I don't believe corporate profits are likely to grow significantly as a percentage of GNP - and if earnings multipliers don't change (and with these assumptions and present interest rates they shouldn't) the aggregate valuation of American corporate enterprise should not grow at a long-term compounded rate above 6% per annum. This typical experience in stocks might produce (for the taxpayer described earlier) 1-3/4% after tax from dividends and 4-3/4% after tax from capital gain, for a total after-tax return of about 6-1/2%. The pre-tax mix between dividends and capital gains might be more like 4% and 5%, giving a slightly lower aftertax result. This is not far from historical experience and overall, I believe future tax rules on capital gains are likely to be stiffer than in the past.

(4) 对于公司股票整体而言，未来十年的预期总体可能不超过9%，比如3%的股息和6%的价值增长。我怀疑国民生产总值的年增长率不会超过6%——我不认为公司利润占GNP的比重大幅增长——如果盈利倍数不发生变化（基于这些假设和当前利率，它们也不应该变化），美国公司企业的总估值长期复合增长率不应超过6%每年。这种典型的股票投资经历可能为（前面描述的纳税人）带来税后1.75%的股息收入和4.75%的资本利得，总共约6.5%的税后回报。股息和资本利得的税前分布可能更接近4%和5%，导致税后结果略低。这与历史经验相差不远，总体而言，我相信未来对资本利得的税收规则可能比过去更严厉。

(5) Finally, probably half the money invested in stocks over the next decade will be professionally managed. Thus, by definition virtually, the total investor experience with professionally managed money will be average results (or 6-1/2% after tax if my assumptions above are correct).

(5) 最后，未来十年约有一半投资于股票的资金将由专业机构管理。因此，几乎从定义上讲，专业管理资金的整体投资者体验将是平均结果（如果我的上述假设正确，即税后6.5%）。

My judgment would be that less than 10% of professionally managed money (which might imply an average of $40 billion just for this superior segment) handled consistently for the decade would average 2 points per annum over group expectancy. So-called "aggressively run" money is unlikely to do significantly better than the general run of professionally managed money. There is probably $50 billion in various gradations of this "aggressive" category now - maybe 100 times that of a decade ago - and $50 billion just can't "perform".

我的判断是，持续十年管理的专业资金中，只有不到10%（这意味着仅这个优秀群体平均就有400亿美元）能够每年超越群体预期2个百分点。所谓“积极管理”的资金不太可能比一般专业管理的资金表现好多少。目前各种级别的“积极”类资金大约有500亿美元——可能是十年前的100倍——而500亿美元是不可能都“表现出色”的。

If you are extremely fortunate and select advisors who achieve results in the top 1% to 2% of the country (but who will be working with material sums of money because they are that good), I think it is unlikely you will do much more than 4 points per annum better than the group expectancy. I think the odds are good that Bill Ruane is in this select category. My estimate, therefore, is that over the next decade the results of really excellent management for our "typical taxpayer" after tax might be 1-3/4% from dividends and 7-3/4% from capital gain, or 9-1/2% overall.

如果你非常幸运，选择了全国业绩前1%到2%的顾问（但由于他们如此优秀，管理的资金规模会很大），我认为你不太可能达到比群体预期每年高出4个百分点以上的业绩。我认为比尔·鲁安很有机会进入这一精英类别。因此，我估计，在未来十年中，对于我们的“典型纳税人”来说，真正卓越的管理税后结果可能是股息1.75%加上资本利得7.75%，整体为9.5%。

(6) The rather startling conclusion is that under today's historically unusual conditions, passive investment in tax-free bonds is likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from professionally managed money in stocks, and only modestly inferior to extremely well-managed equity money.

(6) 相当令人吃惊的结论是，在今天这种历史罕见的条件下，被动投资于免税债券很可能完全等同于专业管理股票投资的预期，并且仅略逊于极其出色的股权资金管理。

(7) A word about inflation - it has very little to do with the above calculation except that it enters into the 6% assumed growth rate in GNP and contributes to the causes producing 6-1/2% on tax-free bonds. If stocks should produce 8% after tax and bonds 4%, stocks are better to own than bonds, regardless of whether prices go up, down or sidewise. The converse is true if bonds produce 6-1/2% after tax and stocks 6%. The simple truth, of course, is that the best expectable after-tax rate of return makes the most sense - given a rising, declining or stable dollar.

(7) 关于通货膨胀——它与上述计算几乎无关，除了它包含在GNP假设的6%增长率中，并促成了免税债券产生6.5%收益的因素。如果股票税后收益8%，债券4%，那么无论物价上涨、下跌还是持平，股票都比债券好。反之，如果债券税后收益6.5%，股票6%，则债券更好。当然，最简单的真理是，在美元升值、贬值或稳定的情况下，最佳可预期的税后回报率最具意义。

All of the above should be viewed with all the suspicion properly accorded to assessments of the future. It does seem to me to be the most realistic evaluation of what is always an uncertain future - I present it with no great feeling regarding its approximate accuracy, but only so you will know what I think at this time.

以上所有内容都应持以对预测未来应有的怀疑态度来看待。在我看来，这确实是对永远不确定的未来最为现实的评估——我提供这些，并非对其近似准确性有多少把握，而只是为了让你们知道我目前的看法。

You will have to make your own decision as between bonds and stocks and, if the latter, who advises you on such stocks. In many cases, I think the decision should largely reflect your tangible and intangible (temperamental) needs for regularity of income and absence of large principal fluctuation, perhaps balanced against psychic needs for some excitement and the fun associated with contemplating and perhaps enjoying really juicy results. If you would like to talk over the problem with me, I will be very happy to help.

你们必须自己在债券和股票之间做出决定，如果选择后者，还需决定由谁为你们管理这些股票。在许多情况下，我认为这个决定应该主要反映你们对收入规律性和避免本金大幅波动的有形与无形（性情上的）需求，或许再与对某些刺激感以及憧憬和享受真正丰厚回报的心理需求相平衡。如果你们想与我讨论这个问题，我会非常乐意提供帮助。

Sincerely,

真诚的，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WEB/glk

WEB/glk