1976 年致股东信

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

After two dismal years, operating results in 1976 improved significantly. Last year we said the degree of progress in insurance underwriting would determine whether our gain in earnings would be "moderate" or "major." As it turned out, earnings exceeded even the high end of our expectations. In large part, this was due to the outstanding efforts of Phil Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company.

经过惨淡的两年后，1976年经营业绩有了显著改善。去年我们曾表示，保险承保的进展程度将决定盈利增长是“温和”还是“显著”。事实证明，盈利甚至超出了我们预测的上限。这在很大程度上归功于菲尔·利舍（Phil Liesche）管理团队在国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity Company）的卓越努力。

In dollar terms, operating earnings came to $16,073,000, or $16.47 per share. While this is a record figure, we consider return on shareholders’ equity to be a much more significant yardstick of economic performance. Here our result was 17.3%, moderately above our long-term average and even further above the average of American industry, but well below our record level of 19.8% achieved in 1972.

以美元计，经营利润达到16,073,000美元，合每股16.47美元。虽然这是一个创纪录的数字，但我们认为，股东权益回报率是衡量经济表现的更重要的标尺。我们今年的回报率为17.3%，略高于长期平均水平，更远高于美国产业界均值，但远低于我们在1972年创下的19.8%的纪录水平。

Our present estimate, subject to all the caveats implicit in forecasting, is that dollar operating earnings are likely to improve somewhat in 1977, but that return on equity may decline a bit from the 1976 figure.

鉴于预测固有的各种不确定性，我们目前的估计是，1977年按美元计的经营利润可能会有所提高，但股本回报率可能略低于1976年的数字。

Textile Operations

纺织业务

Our textile division was a significant disappointment during 1976. Earnings, measured either by return on sales or by return on capital employed, were inadequate. In part, this was due to industry conditions which did not measure up to expectations of a year ago. But equally important were our own shortcomings. Marketing efforts and mill capabilities were not properly matched in our new Waumbec operation. Unfavorable manufacturing cost variances were produced by improper evaluation of machinery and personnel capabilities. Ken Chace, as always, has been candid in reporting problems and has worked diligently to correct them. He is a pleasure to work with—even under difficult operating conditions.

1976年，我们的纺织部门令人大失所望。无论是按销售利润率还是投入资本回报率衡量，盈利均显不足。部分原因在于行业状况不及一年前的预期，但同样重要的是我们自身的不足。在新的Waumbec工厂，营销努力与工厂产能未能有效匹配；由于对机器和人员能力评估不当，产生了不利的制造成本差异。一如既往，肯·蔡斯（Ken Chace）坦诚地报告了问题，并努力加以纠正。即便在困难的经营条件下，与他共事仍是一件令人愉快的事。

While the first quarter outlook is for red ink, our quite tentative belief is that textile earnings in 1977 will equal, or exceed modestly, those of 1976. Despite disappointing current results, we continue to look for ways to build our textile operation and presently have one moderate-size acquisition under consideration. It should be recognized that the textile business does not offer the expectation of high returns on investment. Nevertheless, we maintain a commitment to this division—a very important source of employment in New Bedford and Manchester—and believe reasonable returns on average are possible.

尽管第一季度预计将出现亏损，我们初步认为，1977年纺织业务盈利将与1976年持平或略高。虽然当前业绩令人失望，但我们仍在寻找拓展纺织业务的机会，目前正考虑一项中等规模的收购。应认识到，纺织业务并无法提供高投资回报的前景。尽管如此，我们仍然承诺维持这一部门——它是新贝德福德和曼彻斯特十分重要的就业来源——并相信平均而言有望实现合理回报。

Insurance Underwriting

保险承保

Casualty insurers enjoyed some rebound from the disaster levels of 1975 as rate increases finally outstripped relentless cost increases. Preliminary figures indicate that the stockholder owned portion of the property and casualty industry had a combined ratio of 103.0 in 1976, compared to 108.3 in 1975. (100 represents a break-even position on underwriting—and higher figures represent underwriting losses.) We are unusually concentrated in auto lines where stock companies had an improvement from 113.5 to 107.4. Our own overall improvement was even more dramatic, from 115.4 to 98.7.

由于费率上调最终超过了持续上升的成本，财产意外险公司从1975年的灾损水平中有所反弹。初步数据显示，股东拥有的财产意外险行业1976年的综合成本率为103.0，而1975年为108.3（100代表承保收支平衡点，更高数字代表承保亏损）。我们的业务异常集中于汽车险，在这一领域，股份制公司承保业绩从113.5改善至107.4。而我们自身的整体改善更为显著，从115.4降至98.7。

Our major insurance sector in insurance, the traditional auto and general liability business of National Indemnity Company, had an outstanding year, achieving profit levels significantly better than the industry generally. Credit for this performance must be given to Phil Liesche, aided particularly by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims.

我们保险板块的核心——国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity Company）的传统汽车和一般责任险业务表现卓越，盈利水平远超行业总体。这一业绩应归功于菲尔·利舍，承保部门的罗兰·米勒（Roland Miller）和理赔部门的比尔·莱昂斯（Bill Lyons）也给予了重要支持。

Volume at National Indemnity Company grew rapidly during 1976 as competitors finally reacted to the inadequacy of past rates. But, as mentioned in last year’s annual report, we are concentrated heavily in lines that are particularly susceptible to both economic and social inflation. Thus present rates, which are adequate for today, will not be adequate tomorrow. Our opinion is that before long, perhaps in 1978, the industry will fall behind on rates as temporary prosperity produces unwise competition. If this happens, we must be prepared to meet the next wave of inadequate pricing by a significant reduction in volume.

1976年，随着竞争对手最终对过去费率不足作出反应，国民赔偿公司的保费规模快速增长。但正如去年年报所述，我们高度集中于那些对经济和社会通胀尤为敏感的业务线。因此，今天尚属充足的费率，明天就会变得不足。我们认为，不久之后——或许在1978年——由于暂时性繁荣引发不明智的竞争，整个行业又会面临费率滞后的问题。若果真如此，我们必须做好以大幅缩减业务量来应对下一波定价不足的准备。

Reinsurance underwriting has lagged the improvement in direct business. When mistakes are made in the pricing of reinsurance, the effects continue for even longer than when similar mistakes are made in direct underwriting. George Young, an outstanding manager, has worked tirelessly to achieve his goal of profitable underwriting, and has cancelled a great many contracts where appropriate rate adjustments were not obtainable. Here, as in the direct business, we have had a concentration in casualty lines which have been particularly hard hit by inflationary conditions. The near term outlook still is not good for our reinsurance business.

再保险承保的改善滞后于直接业务。再保险定价错误的影响，持续时间甚至比直接承保中的类似错误更长。乔治·扬（George Young），一位出色的经理，为实现盈利承保的目标不知疲倦地工作，取消了大量无法获得适当费率调整的合同。与直接业务一样，我们在此也集中于受通胀条件冲击尤为严重的意外险业务。近期而言，我们的再保险业务前景仍不乐观。

Our “home state” operation continues to make substantial progress under the management of John Ringwalt. The combined ratio improved from 108.4 in 1975 to 102.7 in 1976. There still are some excess costs reflected in the combined ratio which result from the small size of several operations. Cornhusker Casualty Company, oldest and largest of the home state companies, was the winner of the Chairman’s Cup in 1976 for achievement of the lowest loss ratio among the home state companies. Cornhusker also achieved the lowest combined ratio in its history at 94.4, marking the fifth time in its six full years of existence that a ratio below 100 has been recorded. Premium growth was 78% at the home state companies in 1976, as market position improved significantly. We presently plan a new home state operation later this year.

在约翰·林沃尔特（John Ringwalt）的管理下，我们的“本州”业务持续取得重大进展。综合成本率从1975年的108.4改善至1976年的102.7。但综合成本率中仍包含因部分业务规模较小而产生的一些超额成本。在本州集团中历史最久、规模最大的康哈斯克意外保险公司（Cornhusker Casualty Company）荣获1976年主席杯，因其在本州公司中取得了最低的损失率。康哈斯克还实现了其历史上最低的综合成本率——94.4，这是它成立六个完整年度以来第五次低于100。1976年，本州公司的保费增长78%，市场地位显著提升。我们目前计划在今年晚些时候再启动一家新的本州业务。

Our Home and Automobile Insurance Company subsidiary, writing primarily automobile business in the Cook County area of Illinois, experienced a strong recovery in 1976. This is directly attributable to John Seward who, in his first full year, has revamped significantly both rating methods and marketing. The auto business has been shifted to a six month direct bill policy, which permits a faster reaction time to underwriting trends. Our general liability business at Home and Automobile has been expanded significantly with good results. While it remains to be proven that we can achieve sustained underwriting profitability at Home and Auto, we are delighted with the progress John Seward has achieved.

我们的子公司——家庭和汽车保险公司（Home and Automobile Insurance Company），主要在伊利诺伊州库克县地区承保汽车险，1976年强劲复苏。这直接归功于约翰·苏厄德（John Seward），在他首个完整年度里，大幅改革了费率厘定方法和营销方式。汽车险业务已转为六个月直接出单的保单，从而能够更快地对承保趋势作出反应。家庭和汽车保险公司的一般责任险业务也显著扩张，效果良好。虽然尚需证明我们能够在该公司实现持续的承保盈利，但我们为约翰·苏厄德所取得的进展感到欣喜。

Overall, we expect a good year in insurance in 1977. Volume is high and present rate levels should allow profitable underwriting. Longer term, however, there are significant negatives in the insurance picture. Auto lines, in particular, seem highly vulnerable to pricing and regulatory problems produced by political and social factors beyond the control of individual companies.

总体而言，我们预计1977年保险业将是不错的一年。业务量很高，当前费率水平应能实现承保盈利。然而，从更长远看，保险业前景存在重大的负面因素。尤其是汽车险业务，极易受到政治和社会因素导致的定价和监管问题的冲击，而这些问题超出了单个公司的控制范围。

Insurance Investments

保险投资

Pre-tax investment income in 1976 improved to $10,820,000 from $8,918,000 as invested assets built up substantially, both from better levels of profitability and from gains in premium volume.

1976年税前投资收入从8,918,000美元增至10,820,000美元，这得益于盈利水平提升和保费规模增长所带来的投资资产大幅增加。

In recent reports we have noted the unrealized depreciation in our bond account, but stated that we considered such market fluctuations of minor importance as our liquidity and general financial strength made it improbable that bonds would have to be sold at times other than those of our choice. The bond market rallied substantially in 1976, giving us moderate net unrealized gains at yearend in the bond portfolios of both our bank and insurance companies. This, too, is of minor importance since our intention is to hold a large portion of our bonds to maturity. The corollary to higher bond prices is that lower earnings are produced by the new funds generated for investment. On balance, we prefer a situation where our bond portfolio has a current market value less than carrying value, but more attractive rates are available on issues purchased with newly-generated funds.

在近期的报告中，我们曾指出债券账户存在未实现贬值，但我们表示，考虑到我们的流动性和整体财务实力，不太可能被迫在非自愿的时间出售债券，因此这种市场波动无关紧要。1976年债券市场大幅反弹，使我们的银行和保险公司在年末的债券组合均出现了适度的未实现净收益。这同样无关紧要，因为我们的意图是将大部分债券持有至到期。债券价格上升的连带后果是，新产生可用于投资的资金只能获得较低的收益。总体而言，我们更倾向于这样的情形：债券组合的市价低于账面价值，但用新产生的资金购买的债券能获得更有吸引力的利率。

Last year we stated that we expected 1976 to be a year of realized capital gains and, indeed, gains of $9,962,000 before tax, primarily from stocks, were realized during the year. It presently appears that 1977 also will be a year of net realized capital gains. We now have a substantial unrealized gain in our stock portfolio as compared to a substantial unrealized loss several years ago. Here again we consider such market fluctuations from year to year relatively unimportant; unrealized appreciation in our equity holdings, which amounted to $45.7 million at yearend, has declined by about $5 million as this is written on March 21st.

去年我们曾表示，预计1976年将是一个实现资本收益的年份。事实上，我们当年实现了9,962,000美元的税前收益，主要来自股票。目前看来，1977年也将是净实现资本收益之年。与几年前存在巨额未实现亏损相比，我们现在的股票组合持有大量未实现收益。我们再次认为，这种逐年波动的市价变动相对并不重要；截至1976年末，我们持股的未实现增值为4,570万美元，而在我写下这些文字（3月21日）时，已减少了约500万美元。

However, we consider the yearly business progress of the companies in which we own stocks to be very important. And here, we have been delighted by the 1976 business performance achieved by most of our portfolio companies. If the business results continue excellent over a period of years, we are certain eventually to achieve good financial results from our stock holdings, regardless of wide year-to-year fluctuations in market values.

然而，我们认为，我们持有股票的公司的年度业务进展非常重要。在这方面，我们对大多数投资组合公司在1976年的经营表现感到欣喜。如果这些公司的经营业绩能在多年间持续优异，我们确信，最终我们的持股将带来良好的财务回报，无论市价逐年如何剧烈波动。

Our equity holdings with a market value of over $3 million on December 31, 1976 were as follows:

截至1976年12月31日，我们市值超过300万美元的持股如下：

You will notice that our major equity holdings are relatively few. We select such investments on a long-term basis, weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business: (1) favorable long-term economic characteristics; (2) competent and honest management; (3) purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner; and (4) an industry with which we are familiar and whose long-term business characteristics we feel competent to judge. It is difficult to find investments meeting such a test, and that is one reason for our concentration of holdings. We simply can’t find one hundred different securities that conform to our investment requirements. However, we feel quite comfortable concentrating our holdings in the much smaller number that we do identify as attractive.

你会注意到，我们的主要持股数量相对较少。我们以长期眼光选择这些投资，权衡的因素与收购一家运营企业全部股权时相同：（1）有利的长期经济特征；（2）能干且诚实的管理层；（3）以相对于私人所有者价值衡量的吸引力价格买入；（4）我们熟悉的行业，且我们有能力判断其长期业务特征。很难找到满足这些标准的投资，这也是我们持股集中的原因之一。我们根本无法找到一百只不同的证券符合我们的投资要求。不过，对于将持股集中在自己确实识别出吸引力的少数标的上，我们感到相当自在。

Our intention usually is to maintain equity positions for a long time, but sometimes we will make a purchase with a shorter expected time horizon such as Kaiser Industries. Here a distribution of securities and cash from the parent company is expected to be initiated in 1977. Purchases were made in 1976 after the announcement of the distribution plan by Kaiser management.

我们通常打算长期持有股权头寸，但有时也会进行预期持有时间较短的投资，例如凯撒工业（Kaiser Industries）。该公司预计将于1977年启动来自母公司的证券和现金分配。在凯撒管理层宣布分配计划后，我们于1976年进行了买入。

Banking

银行业务

Eugene Abegg, Chief Executive of Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, our banking subsidiary, continues to lead the parade among bankers—just as he has even since he opened the bank in 1931.

我们银行子公司——位于伊利诺伊州罗克福德的伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司（Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford）的首席执行官尤金·阿贝格（Eugene Abegg），继续在银行家中处于领先地位，正如他自1931年创办该行以来一直做到的那样。

Recently, National City Corp. of Cleveland, truly an outstandingly well-managed bank, ran an ad stating “the ratio of earnings to average assets was 1.34% in 1976 which we believe to be the best percentage for any major banking company.” Among the really large banks this was the best earnings achievement but, at the Illinois National Bank, earnings were close to 50% better than those of National City, or approximately 2% of average assets.

最近，克利夫兰国民城市公司（National City Corp. of Cleveland）——一家确实管理极其出色的银行，刊登了一则广告，声称“1976年盈利与平均资产之比为1.34%，我们认为这一比率为所有大型银行公司中的最佳”。在真正的大银行中，这确实是最佳的盈利表现，但在伊利诺伊国民银行，盈利几乎比国民城市高出50%，约为平均资产的2%。

This outstanding earnings record again was achieved while:
(1) paying maximum rates of interest on all consumer savings instruments (time deposits now make up well over two-thirds of the deposit base at the Illinois National Bank),
(2) maintaining an outstanding liquidity position (Federal Funds sold plus U.S. Government and Agency issues of under six months’ duration presently are approximately equal to demand deposits), and
(3) avoiding high-yield but second-class loans (net loan losses in 1976 came to about $12,000, or .02% of outstanding loans, a very tiny fraction of the ratio prevailing in 1976 in the banking industry).

这一杰出的盈利记录再次实现，同时：
（1）对所有消费者储蓄工具支付最高利率（目前定期存款已占伊利诺伊国民银行存款基础的三分之二强）；
（2）保持卓越的流动性（已售出的联邦基金加上期限在6个月以下的美国政府及机构证券，目前大致相当于活期存款）；
（3）避免高收益但次级的贷款（1976年净贷款损失约为12,000美元，占未偿还贷款的0.02%，仅为1976年银行业普遍比率的极小一部分）。

Cost control is an important factor in the bank’s success. Employment is still at about the level existing at the time of purchase in 1969 despite growth in consumer time deposits from $30 million to $90 million and considerable expansion in other activities such as trust, travel and data processing.

成本控制是这家银行成功的重要因素。尽管消费者定期存款从1969年收购时的3000万美元增长到9000万美元，且信托、旅行和数据处理等其他活动有很大扩展，但雇员人数仍大致维持在1969年收购时的水平。

Blue Chip Stamps

蓝筹邮票公司

During 1976 we increased our interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and by yearend we held about 33% of that company’s outstanding shares. Our interest in Blue Chip Stamps is of growing importance to us. Summary financial reports of Blue Chip Stamps are contained in the footnotes to our attached financial statements. Moreover, shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. are urged to obtain the current and subsequent annual reports of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting them from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

1976年，我们增持了蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的股份，至年末持有该公司约33%的流通股。我们在蓝筹邮票的利益对我们的重要性日益增加。蓝筹邮票的简要财务报告包含在我们所附财务报表的脚注中。此外，我们敦促伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东获取蓝筹邮票的当期及后续年报，可向蓝筹邮票公司秘书罗伯特·H·伯德先生（Mr. Robert H. Bird）索取，地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

K & W Products has performed well in its first year as a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Both sales and earnings were up moderately over 1975.

K&W Products作为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的子公司在第一年表现良好。销售额和盈利均较1975年温和增长。

We have less than four years remaining to comply with requirement that our bank be divested by December 31, 1980. We intend to accomplish such a divestiture in a manner that minimizes disruption to the bank and produces good results for our shareholders. Most probably this will involve a spin-off of bank shares in 1980.

我们距必须在1980年12月31日前剥离银行的要求还剩不足四年。我们打算以一种最大化减少对银行干扰、并为股东带来良好结果的方式完成剥离。最可能的方式是在1980年进行银行股份的分拆。

We also hope at some point to merge with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. Both corporate simplification and enhanced ownership position in Blue Chip Stamps would be benefits of such a merger. However, it is unlikely that anything will be proposed in this regard during 1977.

我们也希望能在某个时候与多元化零售公司（Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.）合并。此举既能简化公司结构，又能增强对蓝筹邮票的持有地位。然而，1977年内不太可能提出任何相关方案。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 21, 1977

董事长 沃伦·E·巴菲特
1977年3月21日