1974 年致股东信

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Operating results for 1974 overall were unsatisfactory due to the poor performance of our insurance business. In last year’s annual report some decline in profitability was predicted but the extent of this decline, which accelerated during the year, was a surprise. Operating earnings for 1974 were $8,383,576, or $8.56 per share, for a return on beginning shareholders’ equity of 10.3%. This is the lowest return on equity realized since 1970. Our textile division and our bank both performed very well, turning in improved results against the already good figures of 1973. However, insurance underwriting, which has been mentioned in the last several annual reports as running at levels of unsustainable profitability, turned dramatically worse as the year progressed.

1974年整体经营业绩不佳，主要源于保险业务的糟糕表现。去年的年报中曾预测盈利会有所下降，但下降幅度之大、并在年内加速恶化，仍出乎意料。1974年运营利润为8,383,576美元，合每股8.56美元，期初股东权益回报率为10.3%，这是自1970年以来最低的净资产回报率。我们的纺织部门和银行表现非常出色，在1973年已优异的业绩基础上更进一步。然而，保险承保业务——过去几年我们在年报中多次提到其盈利能力不可持续——在这一年间急剧恶化。

The outlook for 1975 is not encouraging. We undoubtedly will have sharply negative comparisons in our textile operation and probably a moderate decline in banking earnings. Insurance underwriting is a large question mark at this time—it certainly won’t be a satisfactory year in this area, and could be an extremely poor one. Prospects are reasonably good for an improvement in both insurance investment income and our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps. During this period we plan to continue to build financial strength and liquidity, preparing for the time when insurance rates become adequate and we can once again aggressively pursue opportunities for growth in this area.

1975年展望并不令人鼓舞。纺织业务无疑将出现严重负增长，银行盈利也可能温和下降。保险承保目前存在巨大不确定性——今年肯定不会令人满意，甚至可能极为糟糕。保险投资收入以及我们在蓝筹印花公司盈利中的权益增加，前景相对乐观。在此阶段，我们计划继续增强财务实力和流动性，为保险费率回升至合理水平、我们能够再次积极寻求该领域增长机会做好准备。

Textile Operations

纺织业务

During the first nine months of 1974 textile demand was exceptionally strong, resulting in very firm prices. However, in the fourth quarter significant weaknesses began to appear, which have continued into 1975.

1974年前九个月，纺织需求异常旺盛，价格坚挺。然而，第四季度开始出现明显疲软，并持续至1975年。

We currently are operating at about one-third of capacity. Obviously, at such levels operating losses must result. As shipments have fallen, we continuously have adjusted our level of operations downward so as to avoid building inventory.

目前我们仅以约三分之一的产能运行。显然，这种开工水平必然导致经营亏损。随着出货量下降，我们不断下调运营水平以避免增加库存。

Our products are largely in the curtain goods area. During a period of consumer uncertainty, curtains may well be high on the list of deferrable purchases. Very low levels of housing starts also serve to dampen demand. In addition, retailers have been pressing to cut inventories generally, and we probably are feeling some effect from these efforts. These negative trends should reverse in due course, and we are attempting to minimize losses until that time comes.

我们的产品主要集中在窗帘领域。在消费者信心不足时期，窗帘很可能成为推迟购买的物品之一。住房开工率极低也进一步抑制了需求。此外，零售商普遍施压削减库存，我们可能也受到一定影响。这些负面趋势迟早会逆转，我们正努力在逆转到来前将损失降至最低。

Insurance Underwriting

保险承保

In the last few years we consistently have commented on the unusual profitability in insurance underwriting. This seemed certain eventually to attract unintelligent competition with consequent inadequate rates. It also has been apparent that many insurance organizations, major as well as minor, have been guilty of significant underreserving of losses, which inevitably produces faulty information as to the true cost of the product being sold. In 1974, these factors, along with a high rate of inflation, combined to produce a rapid erosion in underwriting results.

过去几年，我们不断指出保险承保领域异乎寻常的盈利水平。这几乎必然最终引来非理性竞争，导致费率不足。同样明显的是，许多保险机构，无论大小，都存在严重的损失准备金提取不足问题，这不可避免地产生关于所售产品真实成本的错误信息。1974年，这些因素与高通胀率相叠加，导致承保业绩迅速恶化。

The costs of the product we deliver (auto repair, medical payments, compensation benefits, etc.) are increasing at a rate we estimate to be in the area of 1% per month. Of course, this increase doesn’t proceed in an even flow but, inexorably, inflation grinds very heavily at the repair services—to humans and to property—that we provide. However, rates virtually have been unchanged in the property and casualty field for the last few years. With costs moving forward rapidly and prices remaining unchanged, it was not hard to predict what would happen to profit margins.

我们所交付产品（汽车修理、医疗费用、赔偿金等）的成本，我们估计正以每月约1%的速度上涨。当然，这种上涨并非均匀发生，但通胀无情地严重侵蚀着我们提供的对人、对物的维修服务成本。然而，财产和意外险领域的费率在过去几年中基本未变。成本快速上升而价格不变，利润率会如何便不难预测。

Best’s, the authoritative voice of the insurance industry, estimates that in 1974 all auto insurance premiums in the United States increased only about 2%. Such a growth in the pool of dollars available to pay insured losses and expenses was woefully inadequate. Obviously, medical costs applicable to people injured during the year, jury awards for pain and suffering, and body shop charges for repairing damaged cars increased at a dramatically greater rate during the year. Since premiums represent the sales dollar and the latter items represent the cost of goods sold, profit margins turned sharply negative.

保险业权威机构贝氏估计，1974年美国全部汽车保险费仅增长约2%。用于支付投保损失和费用的资金池如此微薄的扩张，远远不够。显然，当年受伤人员的医疗成本、陪审团裁定的痛苦赔偿金，以及修车厂的汽车修理费，都以远超2%的速度上升。由于保费代表销售收入，而后者代表销售成本，利润率急剧转负。

As this report is being written, such deterioration continues. Loss reserves for many giant companies still appear to be understated by significant amounts, which means that these competitors continue to underestimate their true costs. Not only must rates be increased sufficiently to match the month-by-month increase in cost levels, but the existed expense-revenue gap must be overcome. At this time it appears that insurors must experience even more devastating underwriting results before they take appropriate pricing action.

撰写本报告时，这种恶化仍在持续。许多大公司的损失准备金似乎仍被大幅低估，这意味着这些竞争对手继续低估其真实成本。不仅必须将费率提高到足以匹配成本每月上涨的幅度，还需要弥合已存在的收支缺口。目前看来，保险商只有在承受了更具灾难性的承保结果后，才会采取恰当定价措施。

All major areas of insurance operations, except for the “home state” companies, experienced significantly poorer results for the year.

除“家乡州”公司外，所有主要保险业务领域今年业绩均大幅下滑。

The direct business of National Indemnity Company, our largest area of insurance activity, produced an underwriting loss of approximately 4% after several years of high profitability. Volume increased somewhat, but we are not encouraging such increases until rates are more adequate. At some point in the cycle, after major insurance companies have had their fill of red ink, history indicates that we will experience an inflow of business at compensatory rates. This operation, headed by Phil Liesche, a most able underwriter, is staffed by highly profit-oriented people and we believe it will provide excellent earnings in most future years, as it has in the past.

我们最大的保险业务板块——国民保险公司直接业务，在连续多年高盈利后，1974年录得约4%的承保亏损。业务量略有增加，但在费率更合理之前，我们并不鼓励这种增长。在周期的某个时点，当主要保险公司吃够了自己的“赤字”之后，历史经验表明我们将迎来一波费率合理的新业务。该业务由极其能干的承保人菲尔·利舍领导，团队高度注重利润，我们相信它将在未来大多数年份继续提供丰厚回报，一如过去。

Intense competition in the reinsurance business has produced major losses for practically every company operating in the area. We have been no exception. Our underwriting loss was something over 12%—a horrendous figure, but probably little different from the average of the industry. What is even more frightening is that, while about the usual number of insurance catastrophes occurred during 1974, there really was no “super disaster” which might have accounted for the poor figures of the industry. Rather, a condition of inadequate rates prevails, particularly in the casualty area where we have significant exposure. Our reinsurance department is run by George Young, an exceptionally competent and hardworking manager. He has cancelled a great many contracts where prices are totally inadequate, and is making no attempt to increase volume except in areas where premiums are commensurate with risk. Based upon present rate levels, it seems highly unlikely that the reinsurance industry generally, or we, specifically, will have a profitable year in 1975.

再保险领域的激烈竞争导致几乎每家公司都遭受重大损失，我们也不例外。我们的承保亏损超过12%——一个骇人的数字，但或许与行业平均水平相差无几。更令人忧心的是，虽然1974年发生了次数大致正常的保险灾害，但并没有某场“超级灾难”可以为全行业的惨淡业绩开脱。真正的问题在于费率普遍不足，尤其是在我们承保风险较大的意外险领域。我们的再保险部门由乔治·杨管理，他才干出众且勤勉尽责。他已取消了大量费率完全不足的合同，并且不会试图增加业务量，除非保费与风险对等。基于当前费率水平，整个再保险行业，乃至我们自身，在1975年实现盈利的希望似乎极为渺茫。

Our “home state” companies, under the leadership of John Ringwalt, made good progress in 1974. We appear to be developing a sound agency group, capable of producing business with acceptable loss ratios. Our expense ratios still are much too high, but will come down as the operation develops into units of economic size. The Texas problem which was commented upon in last year’s report seems to be improving. We consider the “home state” operation one of our most promising areas for the future.

我们的“家乡州”公司在约翰·林沃尔特领导下，1974年取得了良好进展。我们似乎正在建立一个稳健的代理群体，能够产生赔付率可接受的业务。我们的费用率仍然过高，但随着业务规模逐步达到经济规模，将会下降。去年报告中提到的德州问题似乎正在改善。我们认为“家乡州”业务是未来最有前景的领域之一。

Our efforts to expand Home and Automobile Insurance Company into Florida proved disastrous. The underwriting loss from operations in that market will come to over $2 million, a very large portion of which was realized in 1974. We made the decision to drop out of the Florida market in the middle of 1974, but losses in substantial amounts have continued since that time because of the term nature of insurance contracts, as well as adverse development of outstanding claims. We can’t blame external insurance industry conditions for this mistake. In retrospect, it is apparent that our management simply did not have the underwriting information and the pricing knowledge necessary to be operating in the area. In Cook County, where Home and Auto’s volume traditionally has been concentrated, evidence also became quite clear during 1974 that rates were inadequate. Therefore, rates were increased during the middle of the year but competition did not follow; consequently, our volume has dropped significantly in this area as competitors take business from us at prices that we regard as totally unrealistic.

我们将家庭与汽车保险公司扩展到佛罗里达的努力被证明是灾难性的。该市场的承保亏损将超过200万美元，其中大部分在1974年已实现。我们在1974年中期决定退出佛州市场，但由于保险合同具有期限性，加之已发生赔案的不利发展，此后仍有大量亏损延续。我们不能将此错误归咎于外部保险行业环境。回想起来，显然我们的管理层根本不具备在该地区运营所需的承保信息和定价知识。在家庭与汽车公司传统上业务集中的库克县，1974年也明显显现出费率不足的问题。因此，我们在年中提高了费率，但竞争对手并未跟进；结果，由于竞争对手以我们认为完全不切实际的价格抢走业务，我们在该地区的业务量大幅下滑。

While the tone of this section is pessimistic as to 1974 and 1975, we consider the insurance business to be inherently attractive. Our overall return on capital employed in this area—even including the poor results of 1974—remains high. We have made every effort to be realistic in the calculation of loss and administrative expense. Because of accruals, this had a double effect at both the bank and corporate level in 1974.

尽管本节对1974年和1975年持悲观论调，但我们仍认为保险业务本质上具有吸引力。我们在此领域的整体运用资本回报率——即便计入1974年的糟糕表现——依然很高。我们已尽一切努力，力求在损失和管理费用的计算上实事求是。由于应计项目的原因，这一点在1974年对银行和公司层面都产生了双重影响。

Under present money market conditions, we expect bank earnings to be down somewhat in 1975 although we believe they still are likely to compare favorably with those of practically any banking institution in the country.

在当前货币市场环境下，我们预计1975年银行盈利将有所下降，但我们相信它仍可能比美国几乎任何一家银行机构都更出色。

Blue Chip Stamps

蓝筹印花公司

During 1974 we increased our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps to approximately 25.5% of the outstanding shares of that company. Overall, we are quite happy about the results of Blue Chip and its prospects for the future. Stamp sales continue at a greatly reduced level, but the Blue Chip management has done an excellent job of adjusting operating costs. The See’s Candy Shops, Inc. subsidiary had an outstanding year, and has excellent prospects for the future.

1974年，我们将蓝筹印花公司的持股增至其发行在外股份的约25.5%。总体而言，我们对蓝筹的经营成果及其未来前景相当满意。印花销售虽仍在大幅萎缩，但蓝筹管理层在调整营运成本方面表现出色。其子公司喜诗糖果店公司今年表现突出，未来发展前景极佳。

Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 64% owned subsidiary, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops, Inc. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to be a source of continued substantial earning power for Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

本人担任蓝筹印花公司董事会成员，同时担任其持股64%的子公司韦斯科金融公司董事，并担任喜诗糖果店公司董事会主席。我们预期蓝筹印花公司将继续为伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司提供可观的盈利贡献。

The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ended March 1, 1975 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at any time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

蓝筹印花公司年报将包含截至1975年3月1日止年度的财务报表，由普华会计师事务所审计，将于5月提供。任何欲获取蓝筹印花公司年报的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东，可随时致函公司秘书罗伯特·H·伯德先生，地址：加利福尼亚州洛杉矶市东大街南区5801号，邮编90040。

Merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.

与多元化零售公司的合并

As you previously have been informed, the proposed merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. was terminated by the respective Boards of Directors on January 28, 1975. We continue to view such a merger as eventually desirable, and hope to reopen the subject at some future time.

如先前所告知，与多元化零售公司的拟议合并于1975年1月28日经各自董事会决定终止。我们仍然认为该合并最终是合意的，并希望在未来某个时候重启讨论。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 31, 1975

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1975年3月31日