2003 年致股东信

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

注：以下表格出现在印刷版年报中董事长信件的扉页，并在该信件中被引用。
伯克希尔公司业绩 vs. 标普500指数

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

注：数据为日历年度，但有例外：1965和1966年为截至9月30日的年度；1967年为截至12月31日的15个月。
从1979年开始，会计准则要求保险公司按市值而非原先的成本与市价孰低法来计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年及以前的结果已重述以符合变更后的规则。在所有其他方面，结果均使用最初报告的数字计算。
标普500数据为税前，而伯克希尔数据为税后。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司仅仅持有标普500并计提相应税款，那么在标普500指数正回报的年份，其结果将落后于标普500；但在指数负回报的年份，其结果将超过标普500。多年来，税收成本会导致总体落后幅度相当大。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%. Over the last 39 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $50,498, a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.*

2003年我们的净资产增加了136亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票的每股账面价值都增长了21%。在过去39年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到50,498美元，年复合增长率为22.2%。*

It’s per-share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book value. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39-year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book. (For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire’s vice-chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner’s Manual, beginning on page 69.)

然而，真正重要的是每股内在价值，而非账面价值。这方面消息不错：从1964年到2003年，伯克希尔从一家挣扎中的北方纺织企业（其内在价值低于账面价值）转变为一家业务广泛多元、价值远超账面价值的企业。因此，我们39年来的内在价值增长略超过了22.2%的账面价值增长。（要更好理解内在价值以及指导查理·芒格——我的合伙人兼伯克希尔副董事长——和我管理伯克希尔的经济原则，请阅读我们的《所有者手册》，从第69页开始。）

Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long-term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in rating any single year’s performance versus the S&P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000-03. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case.

尽管有缺点，账面价值计算在伯克希尔仍是一个有用的指标，可以略微低估地衡量我们内在价值的长期增长率。然而，在评估单一年份相对于标普500指数的表现时（我们在扉页展示了这一比较），这个计算的相关性已经不如从前。我们的股票持仓（包括可转换优先股）占净资产的比例已大幅下降，例如从1980年代的平均114%下降到2000-03年的平均50%。因此，股市的年度波动现在对我们净资产的影响比过去小得多。

Nonetheless, Berkshire’s long-term performance versus the S&P remains all-important. Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per-share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S&P’s performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.

尽管如此，伯克希尔相对于标普500的长期表现仍然至关重要。我们的股东可以通过指数基金以非常低的成本购买标普500。除非我们未来在每股内在价值增长上超过标普500的表现，否则查理和我将无法为你们自己能实现的目标增添任何价值。

If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in Berkshire’s results will not be caused by our managers.

如果我们失败了，没有任何借口。查理和我处于一个理想的环境中运作。首先，我们得到了一支出色的管理团队的支持，他们运营着我们的各个业务单元。如果有一个“企业名人堂”，其名单中肯定会包括我们的许多CEO。伯克希尔业绩的任何不足都不会是由我们的经理们造成的。

Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company’s history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street’s tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital-allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.

此外，我们享有罕见的管理自由。大多数公司都背负着制度性约束。例如，公司的历史可能使其固守于一个如今机会有限的行业。更常见的问题是股东群体施压，要求经理人跟着华尔街的调子跳舞。许多CEO抵制住了，但另一些屈服了，采取的经营和资本配置政策与他们自主时会选择的政策大相径庭。

At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision-making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are – in tennis parlance – unforced errors.

在伯克希尔，历史和所有者的要求都不会阻碍明智的决策。当查理和我犯错时，用网球术语说，都是非受迫性失误。

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*本报告使用的所有数字均适用于伯克希尔的A股，即公司1996年之前唯一流通股的继承者。B股的经济权益相当于A股的三十分之一。

Operating Earnings

营业收益

When valuations are similar, we strongly prefer owning businesses to owning stocks. During most of our years of operation, however, stocks were much the cheaper choice. We therefore sharply tilted our asset allocation in those years toward equities, as illustrated by the percentages cited earlier.

当估值相似时，我们强烈倾向于拥有企业而非股票。然而，在我们经营的大部分年份里，股票是便宜得多的选择。因此，我们在那些年份将资产配置大幅倾斜于股票，如前文引用的百分比所示。

In recent years, however, we’ve found it hard to find significantly undervalued stocks, a difficulty greatly accentuated by the mushrooming of the funds we must deploy. Today, the number of stocks that can be purchased in large enough quantities to move the performance needle at Berkshire is a small fraction of the number that existed a decade ago. (Investment managers often profit far more from piling up assets than from handling those assets well. So when one tells you that increased funds won’t hurt his investment performance, step back: His nose is about to grow.)

然而，近年来我们发现很难找到显著低估的股票，而我们需配置的资金规模急剧膨胀，更加剧了这一困难。如今，能够以足够大的数量购买、从而对伯克希尔业绩产生影响的股票数量，仅为十年前的一小部分。（投资经理们往往从堆积资产中获利远多于从良好管理资产中获利。所以，当有人告诉你资金增加不会损害他的投资业绩时，请后退一步：他的鼻子就要变长了。）

The shortage of attractively-priced stocks in which we can put large sums doesn’t bother us, providing we can find companies to purchase that (1) have favorable and enduring economic characteristics; (2) are run by talented and honest managers and (3) are available at a sensible price. We have purchased a number of such businesses in recent years, though not enough to fully employ the gusher of cash that has come our way. In buying businesses, I’ve made some terrible mistakes, both of commission and omission. Overall, however, our acquisitions have led to decent gains in per-share earnings.

缺乏我们可以投入大笔资金、价格有吸引力的股票并不会让我们烦恼，前提是我们可以找到符合以下条件的企业来购买：(1) 拥有良好且持久的经济特征；(2) 由有才华且诚实的经理人经营；(3) 价格合理。近年来我们确实购买了若干这样的企业，尽管还不足以完全吸纳我们涌入的大量现金。在购买企业方面，我犯过一些糟糕的错误，既有做了不该做的，也有该做没做的。但总体而言，我们的收购带来了每股收益的可观增长。

Below is a table that quantifies that point. But first we need to warn you that growth-rate presentations can be significantly distorted by a calculated selection of either initial or terminal dates. For example, if earnings are tiny in a beginning year, a long-term performance that was only mediocre can be made to appear sensational. That kind of distortion can come about because the company at issue was minuscule in the base year – which means that only a handful of insiders actually benefited from the touted performance – or because a larger company was then operating at just above breakeven. Picking a terminal year that is particularly buoyant will also favorably bias a calculation of growth.

下表量化了这一观点。但首先我们需要警告您，增长率展示可能因精心选择起始或终止年份而被显著扭曲。例如，如果起始年份的收益很小，那么一个仅为平庸的长期表现可能被渲染得令人惊叹。这种扭曲可能发生，因为所涉公司在基年规模极小——意味着只有少数内部人士真正从被吹捧的表现中受益——或者因为一家较大的公司当时仅在盈亏平衡点之上运营。选择一个特别景气的终止年份也会对增长计算产生有利偏差。

The Berkshire Hathaway that present management assumed control of in 1965 had long been sizable. But in 1964, it earned only $175,586 or 15 cents per share, so close to breakeven that any calculation of earnings growth from that base would be meaningless. At the time, however, even those meager earnings looked good: Over the decade following the 1955 merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing, the combined operation had lost $10.1 million and many thousands of employees had been let go. It was not a marriage made in heaven.

现任管理层于1965年接手的伯克希尔·哈撒韦早已颇具规模。但在1964年，它仅赚得175,586美元，合每股15美分，如此接近盈亏平衡，以至于从该基数计算任何收益增长都毫无意义。然而在当时，即使是那微薄的收益看起来也不错：在1955年伯克希尔精纺联合公司与哈撒韦制造公司合并后的十年里，合并后的业务亏损了1,010万美元，且解雇了数千名员工。那并非天作之合。

Against this background, we give you a picture of Berkshire’s earnings growth that begins in 1968, but also includes subsequent base years spaced five years apart. A series of calculations is presented so that you can decide for yourself which period is most meaningful. I’ve started with 1968 because it was the first full year we operated National Indemnity, the initial acquisition we made as we began to expand Berkshire’s business.

在此背景下，我们为您呈现伯克希尔收益增长的图景，从1968年开始，但也包括了之后每隔五年的基年。我们提供了一系列计算，以便您自行判断哪个时期最具意义。我从1968年开始，因为那是我们运营国民赔偿公司的第一个完整年度，这是我们在开始扩展伯克希尔业务时所做的首笔收购。

I don’t believe that using 2003 as the terminal year distorts our calculations. It was a terrific year for our insurance business, but the big boost that gave to earnings was largely offset by the pathetically low interest rates we earned on our large holdings of cash equivalents (a condition that will not last). All figures shown below, it should be noted, exclude capital gains.

我不认为使用2003年作为终止年份会扭曲我们的计算。这对我们的保险业务来说是极好的一年，但给收益带来的大幅提升在很大程度上被我们持有大量现金等价物所赚取的可怜的低利率所抵消（这种情况不会持续）。应注意，下表显示的所有数字均不包括资本利得。

We will continue the capital allocation practices we have used in the past. If stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses, we will buy them aggressively. If selected bonds become attractive, as they did in 2002, we will again load up on these securities. Under any market or economic conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards. And, for those that do, the bigger the better. Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen periodically. It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing something stupid. (I speak from experience.)

我们将继续采用过去使用的资本配置做法。如果股票变得比整体企业显著便宜，我们将大举买入。如果某些债券变得有吸引力，就像2002年那样，我们将再次大量买入这些证券。在任何市场或经济条件下，我们都很乐意购买符合我们标准的企业。而且，对于符合标准的企业，越大越好。我们的资本目前未充分利用，但这会周期性发生。这种状况很痛苦——但不如做蠢事那么痛苦。（我有切身体会。）

Overall, we are certain Berkshire’s performance in the future will fall far short of what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I remain hopeful that we can deliver results that are modestly above average. That’s what we’re being paid for.

总体而言，我们确信伯克希尔未来的表现将远逊于过去。尽管如此，查理和我仍然希望能交出略高于平均水平的成绩。这就是我们被聘用的目的。

Acquisitions

收购

As regular readers know, our acquisitions have often come about in strange ways. None, however, had a more unusual genesis than our purchase last year of Clayton Homes.

正如老读者所知，我们的收购常常以奇怪的方式发生。然而，没有哪笔收购比我们去年购买克莱顿房屋公司的起源更不寻常。

The unlikely source was a group of finance students from the University of Tennessee, and their teacher, Dr. Al Auxier. For the past five years, Al has brought his class to Omaha, where the group tours Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s, eats at Gorat’s and then comes to Kiewit Plaza for a session with me. Usually about 40 students participate.

这个不太可能的来源是一群田纳西大学的金融学学生，以及他们的老师阿尔·奥克西尔博士。过去五年，阿尔都会带他的班级来奥马哈，参观内布拉斯加家具市场和波仙珠宝店，在戈拉特牛排馆用餐，然后来到基维特广场与我会面。通常约有40名学生参加。

After two hours of give-and-take, the group traditionally presents me with a thank-you gift. (The doors stay locked until they do.) In past years it’s been items such as a football signed by Phil Fulmer and a basketball from Tennessee’s famous women’s team.

经过两小时的问答交流，按传统这群人会送我一份感谢礼物。（门会一直锁着直到他们送出。）过去几年送过诸如菲尔·富尔默签名的橄榄球，以及田纳西著名女子篮球队的篮球。

This past February, the group opted for a book – which, luckily for me, was the recently-published autobiography of Jim Clayton, founder of Clayton Homes. I already knew the company to be the class act of the manufactured housing industry, knowledge I acquired after earlier making the mistake of buying some distressed junk debt of Oakwood Homes, one of the industry’s largest companies. At the time of that purchase, I did not understand how atrocious consumer-financing practices had become throughout most of the manufactured housing industry. But I learned: Oakwood rather promptly went bankrupt.

今年二月，这群人选择了一本书——对我幸运的是，那是最近出版的克莱顿房屋公司创始人吉姆·克莱顿的自传。我早已知道这家公司是活动房屋行业的佼佼者，这一认知源于我之前犯的一个错误：购买了该行业最大公司之一奥克伍德房屋公司的一些不良垃圾债。在购买时，我并不了解消费融资行为在活动房屋行业的大部分地区已经变得多么糟糕。但我学到了：奥克伍德很快就破产了。

Manufactured housing, it should be emphasized, can deliver very good value to home purchasers. Indeed, for decades, the industry has accounted for more than 15% of the homes built in the U.S. During those years, moreover, both the quality and variety of manufactured houses consistently improved.

需要强调的是，活动房屋可以为购房者提供非常好的价值。事实上，几十年来，该行业占美国新建住宅的15%以上。而且，在这些年里，活动房屋的质量和种类都在不断改进。

Progress in design and construction was not matched, however, by progress in distribution and financing. Instead, as the years went by, the industry’s business model increasingly centered on the ability of both the retailer and manufacturer to unload terrible loans on naive lenders. When “securitization” then became popular in the 1990s, further distancing the supplier of funds from the lending transaction, the industry’s conduct went from bad to worse. Much of its volume a few years back came from buyers who shouldn’t have bought, financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent. The consequence has been huge numbers of repossessions and pitifully low recoveries on the units repossessed.

然而，设计和施工的进步并未伴随着分销和融资的进步。相反，随着时间推移，该行业的商业模式越来越集中在零售商和制造商将糟糕的贷款转嫁给天真贷款人的能力上。当“证券化”在1990年代变得流行时，进一步拉远了资金提供者与贷款交易的距离，行业行为每况愈下。几年前的大部分销量来自于本不该购买的买家，由本不该放贷的贷款人提供融资。后果是大量的收回和收回单位的回收率低得可怜。

Oakwood participated fully in the insanity. But Clayton, though it could not isolate itself from industry practices, behaved considerably better than its major competitors.

奥克伍德完全参与了这场疯狂。但克莱顿，尽管无法将自己与行业实践隔离开来，其行为比其主要竞争对手好得多。

Upon receiving Jim Clayton’s book, I told the students how much I admired his record and they took that message back to Knoxville, home of both the University of Tennessee and Clayton Homes. Al then suggested that I call Kevin Clayton, Jim’s son and the CEO, to express my views directly. As I talked with Kevin, it became clear that he was both able and a straight-shooter.

收到吉姆·克莱顿的书后，我告诉学生们我非常钦佩他的成就，他们把这句话带回了诺克斯维尔——田纳西大学和克莱顿房屋公司的所在地。阿尔随后建议我给吉姆的儿子、CEO凯文·克莱顿打电话，直接表达我的看法。在与凯文交谈时，我清楚地看到他既有能力又坦诚直率。

Soon thereafter, I made an offer for the business based solely on Jim’s book, my evaluation of Kevin, the public financials of Clayton and what I had learned from the Oakwood experience. Clayton’s board was receptive, since it understood that the large-scale financing Clayton would need in the future might be hard to get. Lenders had fled the industry and securitizations, when possible at all, carried far more expensive and restrictive terms than was previously the case. This tightening was particularly serious for Clayton, whose earnings significantly depended on securitizations.

此后不久，我仅基于吉姆的书、我对凯文的评估、克莱顿的公开财务报表以及我从奥克伍德经验中学到的东西，提出了收购要约。克莱顿的董事会乐于接受，因为他们明白克莱顿未来所需的大规模融资可能难以获得。贷款人已逃离该行业，而证券化即使可能，其条款也比以往昂贵和严格得多。这种收紧对克莱顿尤其严重，因为其收益在很大程度上依赖证券化。

Today, the manufactured housing industry remains awash in problems. Delinquencies continue high, repossessed units still abound and the number of retailers has been halved. A different business model is required, one that eliminates the ability of the retailer and salesman to pocket substantial money up front by making sales financed by loans that are destined to default. Such transactions cause hardship to both buyer and lender and lead to a flood of repossessions that then undercut the sale of new units. Under a proper model – one requiring significant down payments and shorter-term loans – the industry will likely remain much smaller than it was in the 90s. But it will deliver to home buyers an asset in which they will have equity, rather than disappointment, upon resale.

如今，活动房屋行业仍然问题重重。逾期率持续高企，收回的房屋仍然大量存在，零售商数量已减半。需要一种不同的商业模式，消除零售商和销售人员通过注定违约的贷款销售来预先赚取大笔钱的能力。这种交易给买家和贷款人都带来了困难，并导致大量收回，进而削弱新单位的销售。在一种合适的模式下——需要大额首付和短期贷款——该行业的规模可能会比90年代小得多。但它将为购房者提供一项资产，在转售时他们拥有权益，而不是失望。

In the “full circle” department, Clayton has agreed to buy the assets of Oakwood. When the transaction closes, Clayton’s manufacturing capacity, geographical reach and sales outlets will be substantially increased. As a byproduct, the debt of Oakwood that we own, which we bought at a deep discount, will probably return a small profit to us.

在“兜了一圈”方面，克莱顿已同意收购奥克伍德的资产。交易完成后，克莱顿的制造能力、地理覆盖范围和销售网点将大幅增加。作为副产品，我们以深度折扣购买的奥克伍德债务，可能会为我们带来一点小利润。

And the students? In October, we had a surprise “graduation” ceremony in Knoxville for the 40 who sparked my interest in Clayton. I donned a mortarboard and presented each student with both a PhD (for phenomenal, hard-working dealmaker) from Berkshire and a B share. Al got an A share. If you meet some of the new Tennessee shareholders at our annual meeting, give them your thanks. And ask them if they’ve read any good books lately.

那些学生呢？十月，我们在诺克斯维尔为那40位激发我对克莱顿兴趣的学生举行了一场惊喜的“毕业”典礼。我戴上学士帽，给每位学生颁发了伯克希尔的博士学位（颁给非凡、勤奋的交易促成者）和一股B股。阿尔得到了一股A股。如果你在我们的年会上遇到一些田纳西州的新股东，向他们表示感谢。并问问他们最近有没有读过什么好书。

In early spring, Byron Trott, a Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, told me that Wal-Mart wished to sell its McLane subsidiary. McLane distributes groceries and nonfood items to convenience stores, drug stores, wholesale clubs, mass merchandisers, quick service restaurants, theaters and others. It’s a good business, but one not in the mainstream of Wal-Mart’s future. It’s made to order, however, for us.

早春时节，高盛的董事总经理拜伦·特洛特告诉我，沃尔玛希望出售其麦克莱恩子公司。麦克莱恩向便利店、药店、批发俱乐部、大众商家、快餐店、影院等分销食品杂货和非食品物品。这是一项好业务，但不符合沃尔玛未来的主流方向。然而，对我们来说却是量身定做。

McLane has sales of about $23 billion, but operates on paper-thin margins – about 1% pre-tax – and will swell Berkshire’s sales figures far more than our income. In the past, some retailers had shunned McLane because it was owned by their major competitor. Grady Rosier, McLane’s superb CEO, has already landed some of these accounts – he was in full stride the day the deal closed – and more will come.

麦克莱恩的销售额约为230亿美元，但其利润率极低——税前约1%——它将使伯克希尔的销售额数字远大于我们的收入。过去，一些零售商曾回避麦克莱恩，因为它由其主要竞争对手所有。麦克莱恩出色的CEO格雷迪·罗西尔已经拿下了其中一些客户——他在交易完成当天就全力投入——更多的客户将随之而来。

For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the balloting for Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” list. Our McLane transaction reinforced my opinion. To make the McLane deal, I had a single meeting of about two hours with Tom Schoewe, Wal-Mart’s CFO, and we then shook hands. (He did, however, first call Bentonville). Twenty-nine days later Wal-Mart had its money. We did no “due diligence.” We knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it would be – and it was.

多年来，在《财富》杂志“最受赞赏”榜单的投票中，我一直投票给沃尔玛。我们的麦克莱恩交易强化了我的看法。为了达成麦克莱恩交易，我与沃尔玛的CFO汤姆·舍韦只开了一次约两小时的会，然后我们就握手成交了。（不过，他确实先打了电话给本顿维尔总部。）29天后，沃尔玛就拿到了钱。我们没有做“尽职调查”。我们知道一切都会和沃尔玛说的一模一样——事实也确实如此。

I should add that Byron has now been instrumental in three Berkshire acquisitions. He understands Berkshire far better than any investment banker with whom we have talked and – it hurts me to say this – earns his fee. I’m looking forward to deal number four (as, I am sure, is he).

我应该补充说，拜伦已经在三起伯克希尔收购中起到了关键作用。他比我们谈过的任何投资银行家都更理解伯克希尔——而且，说起来让我心痛——他赚取了他的费用。我期待着第四笔交易（我相信他也是）。

Taxes

税收

On May 20, 2003, The Washington Post ran an op-ed piece by me that was critical of the Bush tax proposals. Thirteen days later, Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, delivered a speech about the new tax legislation saying, “That means a certain midwestern oracle, who, it must be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still safe retaining all his earnings.” I think she was talking about me.

2003年5月20日，《华盛顿邮报》刊登了我的一篇评论文章，批评布什的税收提案。13天后，美国财政部负责税收政策的助理部长帕梅拉·奥尔森就新税法发表演讲说：“这意味着某位中西部圣人——必须指出，他把税法玩得像小提琴一样——仍然可以安全地保留他所有的收入。”我想她说的是我。

Alas, my “fiddle playing” will not get me to Carnegie Hall – or even to a high school recital. Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury $3.3 billion for tax on its 2003 income, a sum equaling 2½% of the total income tax paid by all U.S. corporations in fiscal 2003. (In contrast, Berkshire’s market valuation is about 1% of the value of all American corporations.) Our payment will almost certainly place us among our country’s top ten taxpayers. Indeed, if only 540 taxpayers paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam. That’s right: 290 million Americans and all other businesses would not have to pay a dime in income, social security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government. (Here’s the math: Federal tax receipts, including social security receipts, in fiscal 2003 totaled $1.782 trillion and 540 “Berkshires,” each paying $3.3 billion, would deliver the same $1.782 trillion.)

唉，我的“小提琴演奏”不会把我带到卡内基音乐厅——甚至不会带到高中独奏会。伯克希尔，代表你和我，将为2003年的收入向财政部缴纳33亿美元的税款，这个数额相当于美国所有公司在2003财年缴纳所得税总额的2.5%。（相比之下，伯克希尔的市值约为所有美国公司总价值的1%。）我们的纳税额几乎肯定会让我们跻身国家前十名纳税人之列。事实上，如果只有540个纳税人支付伯克希尔将支付的金额，那么没有其他个人或公司需要向山姆大叔支付任何费用。没错：2.9亿美国人和其他所有企业都不必向联邦政府缴纳一分钱的所得税、社会保障税、消费税或遗产税。（计算如下：2003财年联邦税收收入，包括社会保障收入，总计1.782万亿美元，而540个“伯克希尔”，每个支付33亿美元，将贡献同样的1.782万亿美元。）

Our federal tax return for 2002 (2003 is not finalized), when we paid $1.75 billion, covered a mere 8,905 pages. As is required, we dutifully filed two copies of this return, creating a pile of paper seven feet tall. At World Headquarters, our small band of 15.8, though exhausted, momentarily flushed with pride: Berkshire, we felt, was surely pulling its share of our country’s fiscal load.

我们2002年的联邦纳税申报表（2003年尚未定稿），当时我们支付了17.5亿美元，仅仅有8,905页。按照要求，我们尽职地提交了两份申报表，堆起了七英尺高的纸堆。在世界总部，我们小小的15.8人团队虽然筋疲力尽，但一时间也充满了自豪：我们觉得，伯克希尔肯定在为国家的财政负担尽了自己的一份力。

But Ms. Olson sees things otherwise. And if that means Charlie and I need to try harder, we are ready to do so.

但奥尔森女士看法不同。如果这意味着查理和我需要更加努力，我们准备好了。

I do wish, however, that Ms. Olson would give me some credit for the progress I’ve already made. In 1944, I filed my first 1040, reporting my income as a thirteen-year-old newspaper carrier. The return covered three pages. After I claimed the appropriate business deductions, such as $35 for a bicycle, my tax bill was $7. I sent my check to the Treasury and it – without comment – promptly cashed it. We lived in peace.

不过，我确实希望奥尔森女士能对我已经取得的进步给予一些肯定。1944年，我提交了我的第一份1040表格，申报了我作为一个13岁报童的收入。申报表有三页。在我申报了适当的业务扣除（比如35美元的自行车）后，我的税款是7美元。我把支票寄给了财政部，他们——没有评论——迅速兑现了。我们和平共处。

I can understand why the Treasury is now frustrated with Corporate America and prone to outbursts. But it should look to Congress and the Administration for redress, not to Berkshire.

我能理解为什么财政部现在对美国企业界感到沮丧并容易爆发。但它应该向国会和政府寻求纠正，而不是向伯克希尔。

Corporate income taxes in fiscal 2003 accounted for 7.4% of all federal tax receipts, down from a post-war peak of 32% in 1952. With one exception (1983), last year’s percentage is the lowest recorded since data was first published in 1934.

2003财年的企业所得税占联邦税收总收入的7.4%，低于1952年32%的战后峰值。除一个例外（1983年），去年的百分比是自1934年首次公布数据以来的最低记录。

Even so, tax breaks for corporations (and their investors, particularly large ones) were a major part of the Administration’s 2002 and 2003 initiatives. If class warfare is being waged in America, my class is clearly winning. Today, many large corporations – run by CEOs whose fiddle-playing talents make your Chairman look like he is all thumbs – pay nothing close to the stated federal tax rate of 35%.

即便如此，对公司的税收减免（及其投资者，尤其是大投资者）是政府2002年和2003年计划的主要部分。如果美国正在进行阶级战争，我的阶级显然在赢。如今，许多大公司——由那些小提琴演奏才华使你们的主席看起来笨手笨脚的CEO们经营——支付的税款远未接近35%的联邦法定税率。

In 1985, Berkshire paid $132 million in federal income taxes, and all corporations paid $61 billion. The comparable amounts in 1995 were $286 million and $157 billion respectively. And, as mentioned, we will pay about $3.3 billion for 2003, a year when all corporations paid $132 billion. We hope our taxes continue to rise in the future – it will mean we are prospering – but we also hope that the rest of Corporate America antes up along with us. This might be a project for Ms. Olson to work on.

1985年，伯克希尔支付了1.32亿美元的联邦所得税，所有公司支付了610亿美元。1995年的可比较金额分别为2.86亿美元和1570亿美元。而如前所述，我们将为2003年支付约33亿美元，当年所有公司支付了1320亿美元。我们希望我们未来的税收继续增加——这将意味着我们蒸蒸日上——但我们也希望美国企业界的其他公司与我们一同出钱。这也许是奥尔森女士可以着手的一个项目。

Corporate Governance

公司治理

In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren’t encouraging. A few CEOs, such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his example has been more admired than followed.

在判断美国企业界是否认真对待自我改革时，CEO薪酬仍是试金石。到目前为止，结果并不令人鼓舞。少数CEO，如通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特，已率先启动了对管理者和股东都公平的项目。然而，总体而言，他的榜样更多是被钦佩而非被效仿。

It’s understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest is equal on both sides of the table. One party’s gain is the other party’s loss, and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest-to-God negotiation.

薪酬失控是可以理解的。当管理层雇佣员工，或公司与供应商讨价还价时，双方的利益强度是对等的。一方的收益就是另一方的损失，涉及的金钱对双方都有实际意义。结果就是一场真正的谈判。

But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation committees, too often one side – the CEO’s – has cared far more than the other about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem unimportant – particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the negotiation often has a “play-money” quality.

但当CEO（或其代表）与薪酬委员会会面时，往往一方——CEO那一方——比另一方更关心达成的交易。例如，CEO总会认为获得10万股期权还是50万股期权的差别是巨大的。然而，对薪酬委员会来说，这种差别可能看起来无关紧要——尤其是在大多数公司的情况下，两笔授予都不会对报告收益产生任何影响。在这种条件下，谈判往往带有一种“假钱”的性质。

Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages gained by the most avaricious– a title for which there was vigorous competition – were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments, which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one compensation consultant commented: “There are two classes of clients you don’t want to offend – actual and potential.”

CEO们的过度行为在1990年代大大加速，因为最贪婪者（这个头衔竞争激烈）获得的薪酬方案很快在其他地方被复制。这种贪婪流行病的传播者通常是顾问和人力资源部门，他们不难看出谁给他们面包抹黄油。正如一位薪酬顾问评论的那样：“有两类客户你不想得罪——现有的和潜在的。”

In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for “independent” directors. But the question of what truly motivates independence has largely been neglected.

在改革这一失灵体系的提案中，呼声是要求“独立”董事。但什么真正激励了独立性这一问题在很大程度上被忽视了。

In last year’s report, I took a look at how “independent” directors – as defined by statute – had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we’ve had an extended test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should perform – whether at a mutual fund business or any other. These two all-important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.

在去年的报告中，我审视了法定意义上的“独立”董事在共同基金领域的表现。1940年的《投资公司法》规定了这类董事，这意味着我们已经有了一项关于法定标准产生何种结果的长期测试。在我们去年的考察中，我们审视了基金董事在董事会成员应履行的两项关键任务上的记录——无论是在共同基金业务还是其他任何业务。这两项至关重要的职能是：第一，获得（或留住）一位能干且诚实的经理；第二，公平地补偿该经理。

Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company, however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold – invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets – the directors experienced a “counter-revelation” and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would pay the most for the old management company was the party that should manage the shareholders’ money in the future.

我们的调查结果并不令人鼓舞。年复一年，在成千上万的基金中，董事们例行公事地重新聘请现任管理公司，无论其表现多么糟糕。同样例行公事地，董事们盲目批准了费用，在许多情况下远远超出了本可以谈判达成的水平。然后，当一家管理公司被出售时——总是以相对于有形资产而言巨大的价格——董事们经历了“反向启示”，并立即与新经理签约，接受其费用表。实际上，董事们决定了：谁为旧管理公司出价最高，谁就应该在未来管理股东的资金。

Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are bad people. They’re not. But sadly, “boardroom atmosphere” almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.

尽管独立基金董事表现出哈巴狗般的行为，我们并未得出结论说他们是坏人。他们不是。但遗憾的是，“董事会氛围”几乎总是会抑制他们的信托基因。

On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire’s report appeared, the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about “The State of our Industry.” Responding to those who have “weighed in about our perceived failings,” he mused, “It makes me wonder what life would be like if we’d actually done something wrong.”

2003年5月22日，在伯克希尔的报告发布后不久，投资公司协会的主席向其成员发表了关于“我们行业的现状”的讲话。回应那些“对我们被认为的失败发表了意见”的人，他沉思道：“这让我想知道，如果我们真的做错了什么，生活会是什么样子。”

Be careful what you wish for.

小心你的愿望。

Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund-management companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.

几个月内，世界开始了解到，许多基金管理公司遵循的政策伤害了其所管理基金的股东，同时提高了管理者的费用。应该指出，在其违规行为之前，这些管理公司赚取的利润率和有形股本回报率令美国企业界羡慕。然而，为了进一步膨胀利润，它们以令人发指的方式践踏了基金股东的利益。

So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys-will-be-boys attitude?

那么，这些被掠夺基金的董事们在做什么？在我写这封信时，我没有看到任何一家终止了违规管理公司的合同（尽管该实体自然常常解雇了其一些员工）。你能想象如果董事们自己被欺诈，他们会采取这种“男孩子总是男孩子”的态度吗？

To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for “delivering” the mutual funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a travesty. Why in the world don’t the directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge “payoff” to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on this approach to obtaining a new manager.

更糟糕的是，至少有一家作恶的管理公司已将自己挂牌出售，无疑希望因“交出”其所管理的共同基金给出价最高的其他管理者而获得一笔巨款。这是一种嘲弄。为什么这些基金的董事们不干脆在竞标机构中选择他们认为最好的那家，并直接与那方签约？这样，获胜者就不必向前任管理者支付巨额“报酬”，而前任管理者因藐视受托原则，分文不值。无需承担那笔收购成本，获胜者肯定能以比其他情况下低得多的持续费用来管理相关基金。任何真正独立的董事都应坚持这种获取新经理的方法。

The reality is that neither the decades-old rules regulating investment company directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his income from director fees – and who may wish to enhance his income through election to other boards – is deemed independent. That is nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from any source would not torpedo Ron’s independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50% of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I think it’s clear that at mutual funds, it has.

现实是，无论是规范投资公司董事的已有数十年之久的规则，还是针对美国企业界的新规则，都没有促进真正独立董事的选举。在这两种情况下，一个100%收入来自董事费的人——并且可能希望通过当选其他董事会来提高收入——被认为是独立的。这简直是胡说八道。同样的规则说，伯克希尔董事兼律师罗恩·奥尔森，他从我们这里获得的收入大约只占其巨额收入的3%，却不具备独立资格，因为这3%来自伯克希尔支付给他律所的法律费用，而不是他作为伯克希尔董事赚取的费用。请放心，来自任何来源的3%都不会破坏罗恩的独立性。但是，从董事费中获得20%、30%或50%收入的人，其独立性很可能受到抑制，特别是如果他们的总收入不高的话。事实上，我认为在共同基金领域，情况显然如此。

Let me make a small suggestion to “independent” mutual fund directors. Why not simply affirm in each annual report that “(1) We have looked at other management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds would negotiate.”

让我给“独立”共同基金董事们一个小建议。为什么不在每份年报中简单申明：“(1) 我们已经考察了其他管理公司，并相信我们为下一年度保留的那家是该领域较好的运营者之一；(2) 我们已经与管理层谈判达成的费用，与其他拥有相当资金的客户所能谈判得到的费用相当。”

It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors – who are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually – to declare themselves on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the maxim “If you don’t know whose side someone is on, he’s probably not on yours.”

股东期望基金董事——他们通常每年收取超过10万美元的费用——在这些问题上表明立场，似乎并不过分。当然，如果这些董事把自己的一大笔钱交给经理管理，他们也会在这两件事上让自己满意。如果董事们不愿意做出这两项声明，股东们应该记住这句格言：“如果你不知道某人站在谁一边，他很可能不在你这边。”

Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that charge above-average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low-cost (such as Vanguard’s) are investor-friendly by definition and are the best selection for most of those who wish to own equities.

最后，一个免责声明。尽管存在渎职的机会，但仍有大量基金被良好且尽责地管理。这些基金的股东受益，其管理者也赚取了应得的报酬。事实上，如果我是某些基金的董事，包括一些收取高于平均费用的基金，我会热情地做出我所建议的两项声明。此外，那些成本极低的指数基金（如先锋集团的）从定义上就是对投资者友好的，并且是大多数希望持有股票的人的最佳选择。

I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for owners or for managers.

我现在站在肥皂箱上，只是因为发生的公然不法行为背叛了数百万股东的信任。数百名业内人士一定知道发生了什么，但没有人公开说过一个字。是艾略特·斯皮策以及帮助他的举报人启动了清理工作。我们敦促基金董事们继续这项工作。就像整个美国企业界的董事一样，这些受托人现在必须决定他们的职责是为所有者工作还是为管理者工作。

Berkshire Governance

伯克希尔的治理

True independence – meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish – is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is also rare. The place to look for it is among high-grade people whose interests are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders – and are in line in a very big way.

真正的独立性——即在事情错误或愚蠢时敢于挑战强势CEO的意愿——是董事身上极具价值的特质。它也很罕见。寻找这种特质的地方应该是那些利益与普通股东利益一致——而且是在很大程度上一致——的高素质人群。

We’ve made that search at Berkshire. We now have eleven directors and each of them, combined with members of their families, owns more than $4 million of Berkshire stock. Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many years. In the case of six of the eleven, family ownership amounts to at least hundreds of millions and dates back at least three decades. All eleven directors purchased their holdings in the market just as you did; we’ve never passed out options or restricted shares. Charlie and I love such honest-to-God ownership. After all, who ever washes a rental car?

我们在伯克希尔进行了这样的寻找。我们现在有十一位董事，每一位连同其家庭成员，都持有超过400万美元的伯克希尔股票。此外，所有人都持有伯克希尔的主要股份多年。在十一位中的六位，家族持股至少数亿美元，且追溯到至少三十年前。所有十一位董事都像你们一样在市场上购买了他们的持股；我们从未分发过期权或限制性股票。查理和我喜欢这种真正的所有权。毕竟，谁会洗租来的车呢？

In addition, director fees at Berkshire are nominal (as my son, Howard, periodically reminds me). Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all eleven is proportionately the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder. And it always will be.

此外，伯克希尔的董事费用是象征性的（正如我儿子霍华德不时提醒我的那样）。因此，伯克希尔的上涨对于所有十一位董事来说，与任何伯克希尔股东的比例相同。而且永远如此。

The downside for Berkshire directors is actually worse than yours because we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. Therefore, if something really catastrophic happens on our directors’ watch, they are exposed to losses that will far exceed yours.

伯克希尔董事的下行风险实际上比你们更糟，因为我们没有购买董事及高管责任保险。因此，如果在我们董事任期内真的发生灾难性事件，他们将面临的损失将远远超过你们的损失。

The bottom line for our directors: You win, they win big; you lose, they lose big. Our approach might be called owner-capitalism. We know of no better way to engender true independence. (This structure does not guarantee perfect behavior, however: I’ve sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were rubber-stamped.)

对我们董事的底线是：你们赢，他们大赢；你们输，他们大输。我们的方法可以称为所有者资本主义。我们不知道有更好的方法能产生真正的独立性。（然而，这种结构并不能保证完美的行为：我曾坐在一些伯克希尔持有巨额股份的公司的董事会上，对有问题的提案被橡皮图章式通过保持沉默。）

In addition to being independent, directors should have business savvy, a shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company. The rarest of these qualities is business savvy – and if it is lacking, the other two are of little help. Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no real understanding of business. That’s no sin; they may shine elsewhere. But they don’t belong on corporate boards. Similarly, I would be useless on a medical or scientific board (though I would likely be welcomed by a chairman who wanted to run things his way). My name would dress up the list of directors, but I wouldn’t know enough to critically evaluate proposals. Moreover, to cloak my ignorance, I would keep my mouth shut (if you can imagine that). In effect, I could be replaced, without loss, by a potted plant.

除了独立，董事还应该具备商业头脑、股东导向和对公司的真正兴趣。这些品质中最罕见的是商业头脑——如果缺乏这一点，其他两点帮助不大。许多聪明、口才好、受人尊敬的人对商业没有真正的理解。这不是罪过；他们可能在别处发光。但他们不属于公司董事会。同样，在医学或科学委员会上我也会毫无用处（尽管可能会受到希望按自己方式行事的董事长的欢迎）。我的名字会装点董事名单，但我不懂足够的知识来批判性地评估提案。而且，为了掩饰我的无知，我会闭上嘴（如果你能想象的话）。实际上，我可以被一盆盆栽植物取代，且不会有任何损失。

Last year, as we moved to change our board, I asked for self-nominations from shareholders who believed they had the requisite qualities to be a Berkshire director. Despite the lack of either liability insurance or meaningful compensation, we received more than twenty applications. Most were good, coming from owner-oriented individuals having family holdings of Berkshire worth well over $1 million. After considering them, Charlie and I – with the concurrence of our incumbent directors – asked four shareholders who did not nominate themselves to join the board: David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough and Tom Murphy. These four people are all friends of mine, and I know their strengths well. They bring an extraordinary amount of business talent to Berkshire’s board.

去年，当我们着手改变董事会时，我要求那些认为自己具备伯克希尔董事必备素质的股东自我提名。尽管缺乏责任保险或有意义的报酬，我们收到了二十多份申请。大多数都不错，来自以所有者为导向的个人，他们家族持有的伯克希尔股票价值远超100万美元。在考虑之后，查理和我——在现任董事的同意下——邀请了四位并未自我提名的股东加入董事会：戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥和汤姆·墨菲。这四个人都是我的朋友，我深知他们的长处。他们为伯克希尔董事会带来了非凡的商业才能。

The primary job of our directors is to select my successor, either upon my death or disability, or when I begin to lose my marbles. (David Ogilvy had it right when he said: “Develop your eccentricities when young. That way, when you get older, people won’t think you are going gaga.” Charlie’s family and mine feel that we overreacted to David’s advice.)

我们董事的主要工作是在我去世、残疾或开始老糊涂时选择我的继任者。（大卫·奥格威说得对：“年轻时培养你的怪癖。这样，当你年老时，人们不会认为你老糊涂了。”查理和我的家人都觉得我们对大卫的建议反应过度了。）

At our directors’ meetings we cover the usual run of housekeeping matters. But the real discussion – both with me in the room and absent – centers on the strengths and weaknesses of the four internal candidates to replace me.

在我们的董事会议上，我们涵盖通常的例行事务。但真正的讨论——无论我在场还是缺席——都集中在四位内部候选人接替我的优缺点上。

Our board knows that the ultimate scorecard on its performance will be determined by the record of my successor. He or she will need to maintain Berkshire’s culture, allocate capital and keep a group of America’s best managers happy in their jobs. This isn’t the toughest task in the world – the train is already moving at a good clip down the track – and I’m totally comfortable about it being done well by any of the four candidates we have identified. I have more than 99% of my net worth in Berkshire and will be happy to have my wife or foundation (depending on the order in which she and I die) continue this concentration.

我们的董事会知道，衡量其表现的最终记分卡将由我继任者的记录决定。他或她需要维持伯克希尔的文化，配置资本，并让一群美国最优秀的经理人对工作感到满意。这不是世界上最艰巨的任务——火车已经在轨道上快速行驶——我完全放心，我们确定的四位候选人中的任何一位都能把它做好。我超过99%的净资产在伯克希尔，我很乐意让我的妻子或基金会（取决于她和我去世的顺序）继续这种集中。

Sector Results

板块业绩

As managers, Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were reversed. To do this with both clarity and reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as Berkshire’s scope widens. Some of our businesses have vastly different economic characteristics from others, which means that our consolidated statements, with their jumble of figures, make useful analysis almost impossible.

作为管理者，查理和我希望提供给我们的所有者我们角色互换时希望收到的财务信息和评论。随着伯克希尔范围的扩大，要清晰且合理地简洁做到这一点变得更加困难。我们的一些业务与其他业务具有截然不同的经济特征，这意味着我们的合并报表，数字混杂，几乎无法进行有用的分析。

On the following pages, therefore, we will present some balance sheet and earnings figures from our four major categories of businesses along with commentary about each. We particularly want you to understand the limited circumstances under which we will use debt, since typically we shun it. We will not, however, inundate you with data that has no real value in calculating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Doing so would likely obfuscate the most important facts. One warning: When analyzing Berkshire, be sure to remember that the company should be viewed as an unfolding movie, not as a still photograph. Those who focused in the past on only the snapshot of the day sometimes reached erroneous conclusions.

因此，在接下来的几页中，我们将展示我们四大类业务的一些资产负债表和收益数据，并对每类进行评论。我们特别希望你们理解我们使用债务的有限情况，因为我们通常回避债务。然而，我们不会用对计算伯克希尔内在价值没有实际价值的数据来淹没你们。这样做可能会混淆最重要的事实。一个警告：在分析伯克希尔时，请务必记住，公司应被视为一部正在展开的电影，而不是一张静止的照片。过去只关注当日快照的人有时得出错误的结论。

Insurance

保险

Let’s start with insurance – since that’s where the money is.

让我们从保险开始——因为钱就在那里。

The fountain of funds we enjoy in our insurance operations comes from “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, since it sometimes takes years for losses to be reported (think asbestos), negotiated and settled.

我们在保险业务中享用的资金源泉来自“浮存金”，即不属于我们但我们暂时持有的资金。我们大部分浮存金的产生是因为：(1) 保费是预先支付的，而我们提供的服务——保险保障——是在通常涵盖一年的期间内交付的；(2) 今天发生的损失事件并不总是导致我们立即支付索赔，因为损失有时需要数年才能被报告（想想石棉）、谈判和结算。

Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t come at a high price. The cost of float is determined by underwriting results, meaning how losses and expenses paid compare with premiums received. The property-casualty industry as a whole regularly operates at a substantial underwriting loss, and therefore often has a cost of float that is unattractive.

浮存金是美妙的——只要它不以高昂的代价到来。浮存金的成本由承保业绩决定，即支付的损失和费用与收到的保费相比如何。整个财产意外险行业通常以大幅承保亏损运营，因此其浮存金成本往往不具吸引力。

Overall, our results have been good. True, we’ve had five terrible years in which float cost us more than 10%. But in 18 of the 37 years Berkshire has been in the insurance business, we have operated at an underwriting profit, meaning we were actually paid for holding money. And the quantity of this cheap money has grown far beyond what I dreamed it could when we entered the business in 1967.

总体而言，我们的业绩不错。诚然，我们有五个可怕的年份，浮存金成本超过10%。但在伯克希尔从事保险业务的37年中有18年，我们实现了承保利润，这意味着我们实际上因持有资金而获得了报酬。而这种廉价资金的数量增长远远超出了我在1967年进入该行业时的梦想。

Last year was a standout. Float reached record levels and it came without cost as all major segments contributed to Berkshire’s $1.7 billion pre-tax underwriting profit.

去年是突出的一年。浮存金达到创纪录水平，而且没有成本，所有主要板块都为伯克希尔17亿美元的税前承保利润做出了贡献。

Our results have been exceptional for one reason: We have truly exceptional managers. Insurers sell a non-proprietary piece of paper containing a non-proprietary promise. Anyone can copy anyone else’s product. No installed base, key patents, critical real estate or natural resource position protects an insurer’s competitive position. Typically, brands do not mean much either.

我们的业绩之所以卓越，只有一个原因：我们有真正卓越的经理人。保险公司出售的是一张非专有的纸，其中包含一个非专有的承诺。任何人都可以复制别人的产品。没有安装基础、关键专利、关键房地产或自然资源地位来保护保险公司的竞争地位。通常，品牌也意义不大。

The critical variables, therefore, are managerial brains, discipline and integrity. Our managers have all of these attributes – in spades. Let’s take a look at these all-stars and their operations.

因此，关键变量是管理者的头脑、纪律和诚信。我们的经理人完全具备这些品质——而且是绰绰有余。让我们来看看这些全明星及其业务。

• General Re had been Berkshire’s problem child in the years following our acquisition of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a 400-pound child, and its negative impact on our overall performance was large.
That’s behind us: Gen Re is fixed. Thank Joe Brandon, its CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, for that. When I wrote you last year, I thought that discipline had been restored to both underwriting and reserving, and events during 2003 solidified my view.

• 通用再保险在我们1998年收购后的几年里一直是伯克希尔的问题儿童。不幸的是，它是一个400磅重的孩子，对我们整体业绩的负面影响很大。
这已成为过去：通用再保险已被修复。感谢其CEO乔·布兰登和他的搭档塔德·蒙特罗斯。去年我给你们写信时，我认为承保和准备金方面的纪律已经恢复，2003年的事件巩固了我的看法。

That does not mean we will never have setbacks. Reinsurance is a business that is certain to deliver blows from time to time. But, under Joe and Tad, this operation will be a powerful engine driving Berkshire’s future profitability.

这并不意味着我们永远不会遇到挫折。再保险是一个注定会时不时受到打击的业务。但是，在乔和塔德的领导下，这项业务将成为推动伯克希尔未来盈利能力的强大引擎。

Gen Re’s financial strength, unmatched among reinsurers even as we started 2003, further improved during the year. Many of the company’s competitors suffered credit downgrades last year, leaving Gen Re, and its sister operation at National Indemnity, as the only AAA-rated companies among the world’s major reinsurers.

通用再保险的财务实力，即使在2003年初在再保险公司中已无人能及，在去年又进一步提升。该公司的许多竞争对手去年遭遇了信用评级下调，使得通用再保险及其在国民赔偿公司的姊妹业务成为世界主要再保险公司中仅有的两家AAA级公司。

When insurers purchase reinsurance, they buy only a promise – one whose validity may not be tested for decades – and there are no promises in the reinsurance world equaling those offered by Gen Re and National Indemnity. Furthermore, unlike most reinsurers, we retain virtually all of the risks we assume. Therefore, our ability to pay is not dependent on the ability or willingness of others to reimburse us. This independent financial strength could be enormously important when the industry experiences the mega-catastrophe it surely will.

当保险公司购买再保险时，他们只买一个承诺——其有效性可能数十年都不会被检验——而在再保险世界，没有哪个承诺能比得上通用再保险和国民赔偿公司所提供的。此外，与大多数再保险公司不同，我们实际上保留了所承担的所有风险。因此，我们的支付能力不依赖于他人偿还我们的能力或意愿。当行业经历必将发生的特大灾难时，这种独立的财务实力可能极为重要。

• Regular readers of our annual reports know of Ajit Jain’s incredible contributions to Berkshire’s prosperity over the past 18 years. He continued to pour it on in 2003. With a staff of only 23, Ajit runs one of the world’s largest reinsurance operations, specializing in mammoth and unusual risks.

• 我们年报的老读者都知道阿吉特·贾恩在过去18年里对伯克希尔的繁荣做出的不可思议的贡献。他在2003年继续大放异彩。阿吉特仅带领23名员工，经营着世界上最大的再保险业务之一，专门从事巨大和非同寻常的风险。

Often, these involve assuming catastrophe risks – say, the threat of a large California earthquake – of a size far greater than any other reinsurer will accept. This means Ajit’s results (and Berkshire’s) will be lumpy. You should, therefore, expect his operation to have an occasional horrible year. Over time, however, you can be confident of a terrific result from this one-of-a-kind manager.

通常，这些涉及承担巨灾风险——例如，加州大地震的威胁——其规模远大于任何其他再保险公司愿意接受的程度。这意味着阿吉特的业绩（以及伯克希尔的业绩）将是起伏不定的。因此，你应该预期他的业务偶尔会有一个糟糕的年份。但随着时间的推移，你可以相信这位独一无二的经理人会带来出色的结果。

Ajit writes some very unusual policies. Last year, for example, PepsiCo promoted a drawing that offered participants a chance to win a $1 billion prize. Understandably, Pepsi wished to lay off this risk, and we were the logical party to assume it. So we wrote a $1 billion policy, retaining the risk entirely for our own account. Because the prize, if won, was payable over time, our exposure in present-value terms was $250 million. (I helpfully suggested that any winner be paid $1 a year for a billion years, but that proposal didn’t fly.) The drawing was held on September 14. Ajit and I held our breath, as did the finalist in the contest, and we left happier than he. PepsiCo has renewed for a repeat contest in 2004.

阿吉特承保了一些非常不寻常的保单。例如，去年百事公司推广了一项抽奖活动，参与者有机会赢得10亿美元奖金。可以理解，百事希望规避这一风险，而我们是对冲该风险的逻辑方。于是我们承保了一份10亿美元的保单，完全自留风险。因为奖金如果被赢取，将随时间支付，我们的现值风险敞口为2.5亿美元。（我曾建议，获胜者可以在十亿年内每年领取1美元，但那个提议没被采纳。）抽奖于9月14日举行。阿吉特和我屏住呼吸，决赛选手也是，最后我们比他更开心。百事公司已经续约了2004年的重复比赛。

• GEICO was a fine insurance company when Tony Nicely took over as CEO in 1992. Now it is a great one. During his tenure, premium volume has increased from $2.2 billion to $8.1 billion, and our share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.1% to 5.0%. More important, GEICO has paired these gains with outstanding underwriting performance.

• 当托尼·奈斯利在1992年接任CEO时，GEICO已经是一家不错的保险公司。现在它是一家伟大的公司。在他的任期内，保费收入从22亿美元增加到81亿美元，我们在个人汽车市场的份额从2.1%增长到5.0%。更重要的是，GEICO将这些增长与出色的承保业绩结合在了一起。

(We now pause for a commercial)
It’s been 67 years since Leo Goodwin created a great business idea at GEICO, one designed to save policyholders significant money. Go to Geico.com or call 1-800-847-7536 to see what we can do for you.
(End of commercial)

（我们现在暂停一下，插播广告）
自利奥·古德温在GEICO创造了一个伟大的商业理念——旨在为投保人节省大量资金——以来，已经过去了67年。访问Geico.com或致电1-800-847-7536，看看我们能为你做什么。
（广告结束）

In 2003, both the number of inquiries coming into GEICO and its closure rate on these increased significantly. As a result our preferred policyholder count grew 8.2%, and our standard and non-standard policies grew 21.4%.

2003年，进入GEICO的咨询数量及其成交率都显著增加。结果，我们的优选保单持有人数量增长了8.2%，而标准和非标准保单增长了21.4%。

GEICO’s business growth creates a never-ending need for more employees and facilities. Our most recent expansion, announced in December, is a customer service center in – I’m delighted to say – Buffalo. Stan Lipsey, the publisher of our Buffalo News, was instrumental in bringing the city and GEICO together.

GEICO的业务增长对更多员工和设施产生了永无止境的需求。我们最近的一次扩张于12月宣布，是在——我很高兴地说——布法罗建立一个客户服务中心。我们的《布法罗新闻报》的出版人斯坦·利普西在促使该市与GEICO合作方面发挥了关键作用。

The key figure in this matter, however, was Governor George Pataki. His leadership and tenacity are why Buffalo will have 2,500 new jobs when our expansion is fully rolled out. Stan, Tony, and I – along with Buffalo – thank him for his help.

然而，这件事的关键人物是州长乔治·帕塔基。正是因为他的领导力和坚韧，当我们的扩张全面展开时，布法罗将新增2,500个工作岗位。斯坦、托尼和我——还有布法罗——感谢他的帮助。

• Berkshire’s smaller insurers had another terrific year. This group, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster, increased its float by 41%, while delivering an excellent underwriting profit. These men, though operating in unexciting ways, produce truly exciting results.

• 伯克希尔的小型保险公司又度过了极好的一年。这个团队由罗德·埃尔德雷德、约翰·凯泽、汤姆·纳尼、唐·托尔和唐·沃斯特管理，浮存金增长了41%，同时实现了出色的承保利润。这些人虽然以不起眼的方式运营，却产生了真正令人兴奋的结果。

We should point out again that in any given year a company writing long-tail insurance (coverages giving rise to claims that are often settled many years after the loss-causing event takes place) can report almost any earnings that the CEO desires. Too often the industry has reported wildly inaccurate figures by misstating liabilities. Most of the mistakes have been innocent. Sometimes, however, they have been intentional, their object being to fool investors and regulators. Auditors and actuaries have usually failed to prevent both varieties of misstatement.

我们应该再次指出，在任何一年，承保长尾保险（其索赔通常在损失事件发生多年后才得以解决的险种）的公司几乎可以报告CEO想要的任何收益。该行业常常因错报负债而报告极不准确的数据。大多数错误是无意的。然而，有时它们是故意的，目的是欺骗投资者和监管者。审计师和精算师通常未能防止这两种类型的错报。

I have failed on occasion too, particularly in not spotting Gen Re’s unwitting underreserving a few years back. Not only did that mean we reported inaccurate figures to you, but the error also resulted in our paying very substantial taxes earlier than was necessary. Aaarrrggghh. I told you last year, however, that I thought our current reserving was at appropriate levels. So far, that judgment is holding up.

我有时也失败了，尤其是在几年前未能发现通用再保险无意中的准备金不足。这不仅意味着我们向你们报告了不准确的数字，而且这个错误还导致我们比必要时间更早地支付了非常可观的税款。啊啊啊啊。不过，去年我告诉过你们，我认为我们目前的准备金处于适当水平。到目前为止，这个判断是成立的。

*These contracts were explained on page 10 of the 2002 annual report, available on the Internet at www.berkshirehathaway.com. In brief, this segment consists of a few jumbo policies that are likely to produce underwriting losses (which are capped) but also provide unusually large amounts of float.

*这些合同在2002年年报第10页有解释，可在www.berkshirehathaway.com上获取。简而言之，该板块由几份巨额保单组成，这些保单可能产生承保亏损（有上限），但也提供异常大量的浮存金。

Regulated Utility Businesses

受监管公用事业业务

Through MidAmerican Energy Holdings, we own an 80.5% (fully diluted) interest in a wide variety of utility operations. The largest are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 689,000 electric customers in Iowa and; (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas transported in the United States.

通过中美洲能源控股，我们拥有一系列公用事业业务80.5%（完全稀释后）的权益。最大的包括：(1) 约克郡电力和北方电力，其370万电力客户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；(2) 中美洲能源，为爱荷华州689,000电力客户提供服务；(3) 克恩河和北方天然管道，输送了美国7.8%的天然气。

Berkshire has three partners, who own the remaining 19.5%: Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of the business, and Walter Scott, a long-time friend of mine who introduced me to the company. Because MidAmerican is subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”), Berkshire’s voting interest is limited to 9.9%. Walter has the controlling vote.

伯克希尔有三位合伙人，持有剩余19.5%的股份：戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔，他们是该业务杰出的管理者，以及沃尔特·斯科特，我的老朋友，是他把我介绍给这家公司的。由于中美洲受《公共事业控股公司法》的约束，伯克希尔的投票权被限制在9.9%。沃尔特拥有控制性投票权。

Our limited voting interest forces us to account for MidAmerican in our financial statements in an abbreviated manner. Instead of our fully including its assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses in our statements, we record only a one-line entry in both our balance sheet and income account. It’s likely that some day, perhaps soon, either PUHCA will be repealed or accounting rules will change. Berkshire’s consolidated figures would then take in all of MidAmerican, including the substantial debt it utilizes.

我们有限的投票权迫使我们在财务报表中以简化方式核算中美洲。我们没有将其资产、负债、收入和费用完全纳入报表，而仅在资产负债表和损益账户中记录一行。很可能有一天，也许很快，PUHCA将被废除或会计规则将改变。届时伯克希尔的合并数据将包含中美洲的全部，包括其所使用的巨额债务。

The size of this debt (which is not now, nor will it be, an obligation of Berkshire) is entirely appropriate. MidAmerican’s diverse and stable utility operations assure that, even under harsh economic conditions, aggregate earnings will be ample to very comfortably service all debt.

这笔债务的规模（现在不是，将来也不会是伯克希尔的义务）是完全适当的。中美洲多元化和稳定的公用事业业务确保，即使在恶劣的经济条件下，总收益也将足以非常轻松地偿还所有债务。

At yearend, $1.578 billion of MidAmerican’s most junior debt was payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed acquisitions to be financed without our three partners needing to increase their already substantial investments in MidAmerican. By charging 11% interest, Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of their equity interests.

截至年底，中美洲最次级债务中的15.78亿美元应付给伯克希尔。这笔债务使得收购融资成为可能，而无需我们的三位合伙人增加他们已经可观的中美洲投资。通过收取11%的利息，伯克希尔因提供收购所需资金而获得公平补偿，同时我们的合伙人免于股权被稀释。

MidAmerican also owns a significant non-utility business, Home Services of America, the second largest real estate broker in the country. Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically. We have an exceptional manager, Ron Peltier, who, through both his acquisition and operational skills, is building a brokerage powerhouse.

中美洲还拥有一个重要的非公用事业业务——美国家居服务公司，是美国第二大房地产经纪商。与我们的公用事业业务不同，这项业务具有高度周期性，但我们仍然热切地看待它。我们有一位出色的经理人罗恩·佩尔蒂埃，他通过收购和运营技能，正在打造一个经纪巨头。

Last year, Home Services participated in $48.6 billion of transactions, a gain of $11.7 billion from 2002. About 23% of the increase came from four acquisitions made during the year. Through our 16 brokerage firms – all of which retain their local identities – we employ 16,343 brokers in 16 states. Home Services is almost certain to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to acquire leading localized operations.

去年，家居服务公司参与了486亿美元的交易，比2002年增加了117亿美元。增长中约23%来自年内完成的四次收购。通过我们16家经纪公司——所有这些公司都保留其本地身份——我们在16个州雇用了16,343名经纪人。随着我们继续收购领先的本地化业务，家居服务公司几乎肯定会在未来十年大幅增长。

Here’s a tidbit for fans of free enterprise. On March 31, 1990, the day electric utilities in the U.K. were denationalized, Northern and Yorkshire had 6,800 employees in functions these companies continue today to perform. Now they employ 2,539. Yet the companies are serving about the same number of customers as when they were government owned and are distributing more electricity.

给自由企业的粉丝们一个趣闻。1990年3月31日，英国电力事业私有化当天，北方和约克郡在这些公司至今仍在履行的职能上拥有6,800名员工。现在他们雇佣了2,539人。然而，这些公司服务的客户数量与国有时大致相同，并且输送了更多的电力。

This is not, it should be noted, a triumph of deregulation. Prices and earnings continue to be regulated in a fair manner by the government, just as they should be. It is a victory, however, for those who believe that profit-motivated managers, even though they recognize that the benefits will largely flow to customers, will find efficiencies that government never will.

应当指出，这并非放松管制的胜利。价格和收益继续以公平的方式由政府监管，正如它们应有的那样。然而，这是那些相信以利润为动力的管理者——即使他们认识到收益将主要流向客户——能够找到政府永远找不到的效率的人的胜利。

*Includes interest paid to Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $118 in 2003 and $75 in 2002.

*包括2003年支付给伯克希尔的利息（扣除相关所得税后）1.18亿美元，2002年为7,500万美元。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector includes a wide-ranging group of activities. Here’s some commentary on the most important.

该板块包括一系列广泛的活动。以下是对最重要部分的评论。

• I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed-income securities that have been quite profitable in the last few years. These opportunities come and go – and at present, they are going. We sped their departure somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital gains we show in the table that follows.
While far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit risk and are conducted in exceptionally liquid securities. We therefore finance the positions almost entirely with borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so also are the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now have means that in the near future our earnings in this category will decline significantly. It was fun while it lasted, and at some point we’ll get another turn at bat.

• 我在AAA级固定收益证券中管理一些机会型策略，这些策略在过去几年相当盈利。这些机会来了又去——目前正在离去。去年我们加速了它们的离去，从而实现了下表中24%的资本利得。
虽然远非万无一失，但这些交易不涉及信用风险，并且在流动性极高的证券中进行。因此，我们几乎完全用借来的资金为这些头寸融资。随着资产减少，借款也随之减少。我们现在较小的投资组合意味着在不久的将来，我们在这一类别中的收益将显著下降。有乐趣的时候持续了一段时间，在某个时点我们会再次获得上场击球的机会。

• A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General Reinsurance.
When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn’t pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit’s managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend – nearly two years later – we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453 counterparties. (As the country song laments, “How can I miss you if you won’t go away?”)

• 在通用再保险证券，即我们购买通用再保险时继承的交易和衍生品业务中，正在进行一次远不那么愉快的清盘操作。
当我们在2002年初开始清算通用再保险证券时，它有23,218笔未平仓交易，涉及884个交易对手（有些名字我读不出来，更不用说评估其信用可靠性了）。此后，该部门的经理们一直在熟练而勤勉地平仓。然而，到年底——近两年后——我们仍有7,580笔未平仓交易，涉及453个交易对手。（正如乡村歌曲哀叹的那样：“如果你不走开，我怎么能想念你？”）

The shrinking of this business has been costly. We’ve had pre-tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came from a portfolio of contracts that – in full compliance with GAAP – had been regularly marked-to-market with standard allowances for future credit-loss and administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign market – we’ve had no credit losses of significance – and in an orderly manner. This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.

这项业务的收缩代价高昂。我们在2002年和2003年分别产生了1.73亿美元和9,900万美元的税前亏损。应当指出，这些亏损来自一个合同组合，这些合同——完全符合GAAP——之前一直按市值计价，并计提了未来信用损失和管理费用的标准准备金。此外，我们的清盘既在一个良性的市场中进行——我们没有重大信用损失——而且有序进行。这与如果金融危机迫使许多衍生品交易商同时停止运营时可能预期的情况正好相反。

If our derivatives experience – and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mind-blowing size and audacity that were revealed last year – makes you suspicious of accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up. No matter how financially sophisticated you are, you can’t possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its positions. Indeed, the more you know about derivatives, the less you will feel you can learn from the disclosures normally proffered you. In Darwin’s words, “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.”

如果我们在衍生品方面的经历——以及去年披露的弗雷迪·麦克那种规模惊人、胆大妄为的恶作剧——使你对这一领域的会计产生怀疑，那么你算是清醒了。无论你在金融方面多么老练，你都不可能通过阅读一家衍生品密集型公司的披露文件来了解其头寸中潜藏的风险。事实上，你对衍生品了解得越多，就越觉得无法从通常提供给您的披露中学到什么。用达尔文的话说：“无知比知识更容易产生自信。”

And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would have. Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.)

现在是坦白时间：我确信，如果我更迅速地关闭通用再保险证券，本可以为你节省大约1亿美元的税前成本。查理和我在通用再保险合并时都知道其衍生品业务没有吸引力。报告的利润给我们虚幻的感觉，我们认为该业务带有相当大的、无法有效衡量或限制的风险。此外，我们知道该业务可能遇到的任何重大问题都可能与金融或保险领域的麻烦相关，而这些麻烦会在其他地方影响伯克希尔。换句话说，如果衍生品业务需要支撑，它就会在我们可以将那些资源以巨大优势部署的恰当时刻，征用伯克希尔的资本和信用。（历史注：我们在1974年就有过这样的经历，当时我们是一场重大保险欺诈的受害者。我们在一段时间内无法确定欺诈最终会给我们带来多大损失，因此比平时保留了更多现金等价物。如果没有这一预防措施，我们会更大规模地购买当时极其便宜的股票。）

Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities – no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.

查理会迅速采取行动关闭通用再保险证券——毫无疑问。然而，我犹豫了。结果是，我们的股东为退出这项业务付出了远高于必要的代价。

• Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents.
We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.

• 虽然我们将通用再保险规模可观的人寿和健康再保险业务包含在“保险”板块，但我们将阿吉特·贾恩的人寿和年金业务的结果放在本节。这是因为这项业务在很大程度上涉及资金套利。我们的年金范围从直接在网上销售的零售产品，到需要我们在70年或更长时间内向严重事故受伤者支付款项的结构化结算。
我们在这项业务中实现了一些额外收入，原因是我们从某些以折扣价购买的固定收益证券中收到了加速的本金支付。这种现象已经结束，因此未来几年该板块的收益可能会降低。

• We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value.
Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities – which usually are above $20 billion – are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.

• 我们对价值资本有6.04亿美元的投资，这是一个由马克·伯恩运营的合伙制企业，马克来自一个多年来以多种方式帮助伯克希尔的家族。伯克希尔是有限合伙人，对马克的企业管理没有发言权，该企业专注于高度对冲的固定收益机会。马克聪明而诚实，他和他的家人对价值资本有重大投资。
由于安然和其他地方的会计滥用，规则将很快出台，可能要求将价值资本的资产和负债合并到伯克希尔的资产负债表上。我们认为这一要求是不合适的，因为价值资本的负债——通常超过200亿美元——绝不是我们的。随着时间的推移，其他投资者将作为合伙人加入价值资本。当有足够多的投资者加入时，我们合并价值资本的需求将消失。

• We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind-down of Finova, a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that’s the way it has worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova’s portfolio that the $5.6 billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.

• 我们过去曾告诉过你们伯卡迪亚，即三年前我们与Leucadia组建的合伙制企业，旨在为破产的贷款机构Finova的清算提供融资和管理。计划是我们提供大部分资金，Leucadia提供大部分智慧。事实也是如此。事实上，共同运营Leucadia的乔·斯坦伯格和伊恩·卡明在清算Finova投资组合方面做得非常出色，以至于我们为这笔交易承担的56亿美元担保已被解除。这种快速偿还的不幸副产品是，我们未来的收入将大大减少。总体而言，伯卡迪亚为我们赚了极好的钱，乔和伊恩是出色的合伙人。

• Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT (office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest improvement in their earnings this year.

• 我们的租赁业务是XTRA（运输设备）和CORT（办公家具）。过去两年，由于经济衰退导致需求下降幅度远超预期，这两项业务的收益都很差。它们仍然是各自领域的领导者，我预计今年它们的收益至少会有适度改善。

• Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufactured-housing finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on Clayton’s balance sheet, but a by-product was the “front-ending” of income (a result dictated by GAAP).
We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance-sheet strength, and believe that over the long-term the economics of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain its loans.

• 通过收购克莱顿，我们获得了一个重要的活动房屋融资业务。克莱顿，像该行业的其他公司一样，传统上将其发起的贷款证券化。这种做法缓解了克莱顿资产负债表的压力，但一个副产品是收入的“前置”（GAAP要求的结果）。
我们并不急于确认收入，拥有巨大的资产负债表实力，并相信长期来看，持有我们消费信贷资产的经济效益优于我们目前通过证券化所能实现的。因此，克莱顿已开始保留其贷款。

We believe it’s appropriate to finance a soundly-selected book of interest-bearing receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would). Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton’s portfolio and re-lend these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.

我们认为，几乎完全用债务为一项精心挑选的附息应收账款组合融资是合适的（就像银行那样）。因此，伯克希尔将借款为克莱顿的投资组合融资，并以我们的成本加一个百分点将这些资金再贷给克莱顿。这一加价公平地补偿了伯克希尔利用其卓越信用评级，但仍以有吸引力的价格将资金提供给克莱顿。

In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re-lending, with Clayton using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided “catch-up” funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.

2003年，伯克希尔进行了20亿美元的此类借款和再贷款，克莱顿将其中大部分资金用于从退出该行业的贷款人手中购买几笔大型投资组合。我们对克莱顿的部分贷款还为其当年早些时候自身业务产生但难以证券化的票据提供了“追加”资金。

You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It’s because of our “every tub on its own bottom” philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.

你可能会好奇，为什么我们坐拥大量现金还要借钱。这是因为我们的“各凭自身实力”理念。我们认为，任何放贷的子公司都应该为其应收账款所需的资金支付适当的利率，而不应受到母公司的补贴。否则，有个富爸爸会导致决策草率。与此同时，我们在伯克希尔积累的现金将用于企业收购或购买提供重大盈利机会的证券。克莱顿的贷款组合很可能在不多年后增长到至少50亿美元，并且在合理的信用标准下，应该能带来可观的收益。

For simplicity’s sake, we include all of Clayton’s earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.

为简便起见，我们将克莱顿的所有收益都纳入该板块，尽管相当一部分来自消费金融以外的领域。

*Includes all liabilities
**From date of acquisition, August 7, 2003

*包括所有负债
**自收购之日（2003年8月7日）起

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this category cover the waterfront. But let’s look at a simplified balance sheet and earnings statement consolidating the entire group.

我们在这一类别中的活动包罗万象。但让我们看一下合并整个集团的简化资产负债表和损益表。

Balance Sheet 12/31/03 (in $ millions)

2003年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

Earnings Statement (in $ millions)

损益表（百万美元）

This eclectic group, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to B-737s, earned a hefty 20.7% on average tangible net worth last year. However, we purchased these businesses at substantial premiums to net worth – that fact is reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.2%.

这个包罗万象的集团，销售从Dilly Bars到B-737飞机的产品，去年实现了平均有形净资产20.7%的可观收益。然而，我们以相对于净资产的大幅溢价购买了这些企业——这一事实反映在资产负债表上显示的商誉项目中——这使得我们平均账面价值的收益降至9.2%。

*From date of acquisition, May 23, 2003

*自收购之日（2003年5月23日）起

• Three of our building-materials businesses – Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore and MiTek – had record operating earnings last year. And earnings at Johns Manville, the fourth, were trending upward at yearend. Collectively, these companies earned 21.0% on tangible net worth.

• 我们的三家建筑材料业务——Acme Brick、Benjamin Moore和MiTek——去年的营业收益创下了记录。第四家Johns Manville的收益在年底呈上升趋势。总的来说，这些公司的有形净资产收益率为21.0%。

• Shaw Industries, the world’s largest manufacturer of broadloom carpet, also had a record year. Led by Bob Shaw, who built this huge enterprise from a standing start, the company will likely set another earnings record in 2004. In November, Shaw acquired various carpet operations from Dixie Group, which should add about $240 million to sales this year, boosting Shaw’s volume to nearly $5 billion.

• 肖工业，世界上最大的阔幅地毯制造商，也经历了创纪录的一年。在鲍勃·肖的领导下，他从零开始建立了这家庞大的企业，公司很可能在2004年再次创下收益记录。11月，肖从Dixie Group收购了各种地毯业务，这应该会为今年的销售额增加约2.4亿美元，使肖的销售额接近50亿美元。

• Within the apparel group, Fruit of the Loom is our largest operation. Fruit has three major assets: a 148-year-old universally-recognized brand, a low-cost manufacturing operation, and John Holland, its CEO. In 2003, Fruit accounted for 42.3% of the men’s and boys’ underwear that was sold by mass marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, K-Mart, etc.) and increased its share of the women’s and girls’ business in that channel to 13.9%, up from 11.3% in 2002.

• 在服装集团中，Fruit of the Loom是我们最大的业务。Fruit拥有三大资产：一个拥有148年历史的普遍认可的品牌，一个低成本制造业务，以及其CEO约翰·霍兰德。2003年，Fruit占大众零售商（沃尔玛、塔吉特、凯马特等）销售的男童内衣的42.3%，并将该渠道的女童内衣份额从2002年的11.3%提高到13.9%。

• In retailing, our furniture group earned $106 million pre-tax, our jewelers $59 million and See’s, which is both a manufacturer and retailer, $59 million.
Both R.C. Willey and Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”) opened hugely successful stores last year, Willey in Las Vegas and NFM in Kansas City, Kansas. Indeed, we believe the Kansas City store is the country’s largest-volume home-furnishings store. (Our Omaha operation, while located on a single plot of land, consists of three units.)

• 在零售业，我们的家具集团税前赚了1.06亿美元，珠宝商赚了5,900万美元，而既是制造商又是零售商的See's赚了5,900万美元。
R.C. Willey和内布拉斯加家具市场去年都开设了非常成功的门店，Willey在拉斯维加斯，NFM在堪萨斯州堪萨斯城。事实上，我们相信堪萨斯城门店是美国销量最大的家居用品店。（我们的奥马哈业务虽然位于一块土地上，但由三个单元组成。）

NFM was founded by Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”) in 1937 with $500. She worked until she was 103 (hmmm . . . not a bad idea). One piece of wisdom she imparted to the generations following her was, “If you have the lowest price, customers will find you at the bottom of a river.” Our store serving greater Kansas City, which is located in one of the area’s more sparsely populated parts, has proved Mrs. B’s point. Though we have more than 25 acres of parking, the lot has at times overflowed.

NFM由罗斯·布卢姆金（“B夫人”）于1937年以500美元创立。她一直工作到103岁（嗯……不是个坏主意）。她传授给后辈的一句智慧是：“如果你有最低的价格，顾客会在河底找到你。”我们服务大堪萨斯城地区的门店位于该地区人口较稀少的区域之一，这证明了B夫人的观点。尽管我们有超过25英亩的停车场，但有时仍会爆满。

“Victory,” President Kennedy told us after the Bay of Pigs disaster, “has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” At NFM, we knew we had a winner a month after the boffo opening in Kansas City, when our new store attracted an unexpected paternity claim. A speaker there, referring to the Blumkin family, asserted, “They had enough confidence and the policies of the Administration were working such that they were able to provide work for 1,000 of our fellow citizens.” The proud papa at the podium? President George W. Bush.

“胜利，”肯尼迪总统在猪湾灾难后告诉我们，“有一千个父亲，而失败是一个孤儿。”在NFM，我们在堪萨斯城成功开业一个月后就知道我们有了一个赢家，当时我们的新店吸引了一个意想不到的“认父”声明。一位演讲者在那里提到布卢姆金家族时说：“他们有足够的信心，而政府政策正在发挥作用，以至于他们能够为我们的一千名同胞提供工作。”讲台上的骄傲爸爸？乔治·W·布什总统。

• In flight services, FlightSafety, our training operation, experienced a drop in “normal” operating earnings from $183 million to $150 million. (The abnormals: In 2002 we had a $60 million pre-tax gain from the sale of a partnership interest to Boeing, and in 2003 we recognized a $37 million loss stemming from the premature obsolescence of simulators.) The corporate aviation business has slowed significantly in the past few years, and this fact has hurt FlightSafety’s results. The company continues, however, to be far and away the leader in its field. Its simulators have an original cost of $1.2 billion, which is more than triple the cost of those operated by our closest competitor.

• 在飞行服务中，我们的培训业务FlightSafety的“正常”营业收益从1.83亿美元下降到1.5亿美元。（非正常项：2002年，我们因向波音出售合伙权益获得6,000万美元税前收益；2003年，我们确认了因模拟器过早淘汰导致的3,700万美元亏损。）过去几年，公务航空业务显著放缓，这一事实损害了FlightSafety的业绩。然而，该公司仍然遥遥领先于其领域内的竞争对手。其模拟器的原始成本为12亿美元，是我们最接近竞争对手运营成本的3倍多。

NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation lost $41 million pre-tax in 2003. The company had a modest operating profit in the U.S., but this was more than offset by a $32 million loss on aircraft inventory and by continued losses in Europe.
NetJets continues to dominate the fractional-ownership field, and its lead is increasing: Prospects overwhelmingly turn to us rather than to our three major competitors. Last year, among the four of us, we accounted for 70% of net sales (measured by value).

我们的部分所有权业务NetJets在2003年税前亏损了4,100万美元。该公司在美国有适度的营业利润，但这被3,200万美元的飞机库存亏损和欧洲的持续亏损所抵消。
NetJets继续主导部分所有权领域，其领先优势正在扩大：潜在客户压倒性地转向我们，而不是我们的三大竞争对手。去年，在我们四家中，我们占了净销售额的70%（按价值计算）。

An example of what sets NetJets apart from competitors is our Mayo Clinic Executive Travel Response program, a free benefit enjoyed by all of our owners. On land or in the air, anywhere in the world and at any hour of any day, our owners and their families have an immediate link to Mayo. Should an emergency occur while they are traveling here or abroad, Mayo will instantly direct them to an appropriate doctor or hospital. Any baseline data about the patient that Mayo possesses is simultaneously made available to the treating physician. Many owners have already found this service invaluable, including one who needed emergency brain surgery in Eastern Europe.

NetJets与众不同的一个例子是我们的梅奥诊所行政旅行响应计划，这是我们所有所有者享受的一项免费福利。无论是在陆地还是空中，在世界任何地方，在任何一天的任何一个小时，我们的所有者及其家人都能与梅奥建立即时联系。如果他们在国内外旅行时发生紧急情况，梅奥会立即将他们引导到合适的医生或医院。梅奥拥有的任何关于患者的基线数据都会同时提供给治疗医生。许多所有者已经发现这项服务非常宝贵，其中包括一位需要在东欧进行紧急脑部手术的所有者。

The $32 million inventory write-down we took in 2003 occurred because of falling prices for used aircraft early in the year. Specifically, we bought back fractions from withdrawing owners at prevailing prices, and these fell in value before we were able to remarket them. Prices are now stable.

我们在2003年计提的3,200万美元库存减记是由于年初二手飞机价格下跌。具体来说，我们按现行价格从退出的所有者手中回购了部分份额，而这些份额在我们能够重新销售之前价值下跌了。现在价格已经稳定。

The European loss is painful. But any company that forsakes Europe, as all of our competitors have done, is destined for second-tier status. Many of our U.S. owners fly extensively in Europe and want the safety and security assured by a NetJets plane and pilots. Despite a slow start, furthermore, we are now adding European customers at a good pace. During the years 2001 through 2003, we had gains of 88%, 61% and 77% in European management-and-flying revenues. We have not, however, yet succeeded in stemming the flow of red ink.

欧洲的亏损令人痛苦。但任何放弃欧洲的公司，正如我们所有竞争对手所做的那样，都注定成为二流。我们的许多美国所有者频繁在欧洲飞行，希望获得NetJets飞机和飞行员所保证的安全保障。此外，尽管起步缓慢，我们现在正以良好的速度增加欧洲客户。在2001年至2003年期间，我们的欧洲管理和飞行收入分别增长了88%、61%和77%。然而，我们尚未成功止住亏损。

Rich Santulli, NetJets’ extraordinary CEO, and I expect our European loss to diminish in 2004 and also anticipate that it will be more than offset by U.S. profits. Overwhelmingly, our owners love the NetJets experience. Once a customer has tried us, going back to commercial aviation is like going back to holding hands. NetJets will become a very big business over time and will be one in which we are preeminent in both customer satisfaction and profits. Rich will see to that.

NetJets杰出的CEO里奇·圣图利和我预计，我们欧洲的亏损将在2004年减少，并且预计它将被美国的利润完全抵消。绝大多数情况下，我们的所有者喜欢NetJets的体验。一旦客户尝试过我们，回到商业航空就像回到牵手一样。随着时间的推移，NetJets将成为一项非常大的业务，并且我们将在这项业务中在客户满意度和利润方面都处于卓越地位。里奇会确保这一点。

Investments

投资

The table that follows shows our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2003 are itemized.

下表显示了我们的普通股投资。那些在2003年底市值超过5亿美元的被逐项列出。

We bought some Wells Fargo shares last year. Otherwise, among our six largest holdings, we last changed our position in Coca-Cola in 1994, American Express in 1998, Gillette in 1989, Washington Post in 1973, and Moody’s in 2000. Brokers don’t love us.

我们去年买了一些富国银行的股票。除此之外，在我们六大持股中，我们最后一次变动头寸是：可口可乐在1994年，美国运通在1998年，吉列在1989年，华盛顿邮报在1973年，穆迪在2000年。经纪商不爱我们。

We are neither enthusiastic nor negative about the portfolio we hold. We own pieces of excellent businesses – all of which had good gains in intrinsic value last year – but their current prices reflect their excellence. The unpleasant corollary to this conclusion is that I made a big mistake in not selling several of our larger holdings during The Great Bubble. If these stocks are fully priced now, you may wonder what I was thinking four years ago when their intrinsic value was lower and their prices far higher. So do I.

我们对我们持有的投资组合既不热情也不消极。我们拥有优秀企业的一部分——所有这些企业去年的内在价值都有良好增长——但它们当前的价格反映了它们的卓越。这个结论令人不快的推论是，我在大泡沫期间没有卖出我们几个较大的持股，犯了一个大错误。如果这些股票现在价格合理，你可能会想知道四年前当它们的内在价值更低而价格更高时我在想什么。我也是。

In 2002, junk bonds became very cheap, and we purchased about $8 billion of these. The pendulum swung quickly though, and this sector now looks decidedly unattractive to us. Yesterday’s weeds are today being priced as flowers.

2002年，垃圾债券变得非常便宜，我们购买了大约80亿美元。然而，钟摆迅速摆动，这个板块现在对我们来说显然缺乏吸引力。昨天的杂草今天被当作花朵定价。

We’ve repeatedly emphasized that realized gains at Berkshire are meaningless for analytical purposes. We have a huge amount of unrealized gains on our books, and our thinking about when, and if, to cash them depends not at all on a desire to report earnings at one specific time or another. Nevertheless, to see the diversity of our investment activities, you may be interested in the following table, categorizing the gains we reported during 2003:

我们一再强调，伯克希尔已实现的收益对于分析目的来说毫无意义。我们的账面上有大量未实现收益，我们对何时（以及是否）兑现它们的思考完全不依赖于在某一个特定时间报告收益的愿望。尽管如此，为了了解我们投资活动的多样性，你可能会对下表感兴趣，该表对我们2003年报告的收益进行了分类：

The common stock profits occurred around the edges of our portfolio – not, as we already mentioned, from our selling down our major positions. The profits in governments arose from our liquidation of long-term strips (the most volatile of government securities) and from certain strategies I follow within our finance and financial products division. We retained most of our junk portfolio, selling only a few issues. Calls and maturing bonds accounted for the rest of the gains in the junk category.

普通股利润出现在我们投资组合的边缘——而不是像我们已经提到的，来自我们减持主要头寸。政府债券的利润来自我们对长期剥离债券（政府证券中波动性最大的）的清算，以及我在金融和金融产品部门内遵循的某些策略。我们保留了大部分垃圾债券组合，只卖出了少数几只。垃圾债券类别中的其余收益来自赎回和到期债券。

During 2002 we entered the foreign currency market for the first time in my life, and in 2003 we enlarged our position, as I became increasingly bearish on the dollar. I should note that the cemetery for seers has a huge section set aside for macro forecasters. We have in fact made few macro forecasts at Berkshire, and we have seldom seen others make them with sustained success.

2002年，我平生第一次进入外汇市场，2003年我们增加了头寸，因为我越来越看空美元。我应该指出，预言家的墓地里为宏观预测者留出了很大一块空间。事实上，我们在伯克希尔很少做宏观预测，而且我们很少看到其他人能持续成功地做出宏观预测。

We have – and will continue to have – the bulk of Berkshire’s net worth in U.S. assets. But in recent years our country’s trade deficit has been force-feeding huge amounts of claims on, and ownership in, America to the rest of the world. For a time, foreign appetite for these assets readily absorbed the supply. Late in 2002, however, the world started choking on this diet, and the dollar’s value began to slide against major currencies. Even so, prevailing exchange rates will not lead to a material letup in our trade deficit. So whether foreign investors like it or not, they will continue to be flooded with dollars. The consequences of this are anybody’s guess. They could, however, be troublesome – and reach, in fact, well beyond currency markets.

我们已经——并将继续——将伯克希尔的净资产大部分保留在美元资产中。但近年来，我们国家的贸易逆差一直在向世界其他国家大量输送美国的债权和所有权。有一段时间，外国对这些资产的胃口很容易吸收了供应。然而，2002年末，世界开始对这种“饮食”感到窒息，美元兑主要货币开始贬值。即便如此，当前的汇率也不会导致我们的贸易逆差实质性缓解。因此，无论外国投资者喜欢与否，他们将继续被美元淹没。其后果谁也说不准。然而，它们可能是麻烦的——实际上会远远超出货币市场。

As an American, I hope there is a benign ending to this problem. I myself suggested one possible solution – which, incidentally, leaves Charlie cold – in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune Magazine. Then again, perhaps the alarms I have raised will prove needless: Our country’s dynamism and resiliency have repeatedly made fools of naysayers. But Berkshire holds many billions of cash-equivalents denominated in dollars. So I feel more comfortable owning foreign-exchange contracts that are at least a partial offset to that position.

作为一个美国人，我希望这个问题有一个良性的结局。我自己在2003年11月10日的《财富》杂志上提出了一个可能的解决方案——顺便说一句，查理对此不感兴趣。话说回来，也许我发出的警报将被证明是不必要的：我们国家的活力和韧性一再让悲观者成为傻瓜。但伯克希尔持有数百亿美元计价的现金等价物。因此，持有外汇合约让我感觉更舒服，至少可以部分抵消那个头寸。

These contracts are subject to accounting rules that require changes in their value to be contemporaneously included in capital gains or losses, even though the contracts have not been closed. We show these changes each quarter in the Finance and Financial Products segment of our earnings statement. At yearend, our open foreign exchange contracts totaled about $12 billion at market values and were spread among five currencies. Also, when we were purchasing junk bonds in 2002, we tried when possible to buy issues denominated in Euros. Today, we own about $1 billion of these.

这些合约受会计规则约束，要求其价值的变化同时计入资本利得或损失，即使合约尚未平仓。我们每季度在收益表的金融和金融产品板块中显示这些变化。年底时，我们未平仓的外汇合约市值总计约120亿美元，分布在五种货币中。此外，当我们在2002年购买垃圾债券时，我们尽可能购买欧元计价的债券。如今，我们拥有约10亿美元此类债券。

When we can’t find anything exciting in which to invest, our “default” position is U.S. Treasuries, both bills and repos. No matter how low the yields on these instruments go, we never “reach” for a little more income by dropping our credit standards or by extending maturities. Charlie and I detest taking even small risks unless we feel we are being adequately compensated for doing so. About as far as we will go down that path is to occasionally eat cottage cheese a day after the expiration date on the carton.

当我们找不到任何令人兴奋的投资标的时，我们的“默认”头寸是美国国债，包括短期国库券和回购协议。无论这些工具的收益率降到多低，我们从不为了多一点点收入而降低信用标准或延长期限。查理和我厌恶承担哪怕很小的风险，除非我们觉得这样做能得到充分补偿。我们在这条路上最多走到偶尔吃一下纸盒上保质期过了一天的干酪。

A 2003 book that investors can learn much from is Bull! by Maggie Mahar. Two other books I’d recommend are The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, and In an Uncertain World by Bob Rubin. All three are well-reported and well-written. Additionally, Jason Zweig last year did a first-class job in revising The Intelligent Investor, my favorite book on investing.

2003年有一本投资者能从中获益良多的书是玛吉·马哈尔的《牛市！》。我还要推荐另外两本书：贝瑟尼·麦克莱恩和彼得·埃尔金德的《房间里最聪明的人》，以及鲍勃·鲁宾的《不确定的世界》。这三本书都报道详实、文笔优美。此外，杰森·茨威格去年在修订我最喜欢的投资书籍《聪明的投资者》方面做了一流的工作。

Designated Gifts Program

指定捐赠计划

From 1981 through 2002, Berkshire administered a program whereby shareholders could direct Berkshire to make gifts to their favorite charitable organizations. Over the years we disbursed $197 million pursuant to this program. Churches were the most frequently named designees, and many thousands of other organizations benefited as well. We were the only major public company that offered such a program to shareholders, and Charlie and I were proud of it.

从1981年到2002年，伯克希尔管理着一个项目，股东可以指示伯克希尔向其喜爱的慈善组织捐款。多年来，我们根据该计划支付了1.97亿美元。教堂是最常被指定的对象，成千上万的其他组织也受益。我们是唯一一家向股东提供此类计划的大型上市公司，查理和我为此感到自豪。

We reluctantly terminated the program in 2003 because of controversy over the abortion issue. Over the years numerous organizations on both sides of this issue had been designated by our shareholders to receive contributions. As a result, we regularly received some objections to the gifts designated for pro-choice operations. A few of these came from people and organizations that proceeded to boycott products of our subsidiaries. That did not concern us. We refused all requests to limit the right of our owners to make whatever gifts they chose (as long as the recipients had 501(c)(3) status).

2003年，由于堕胎问题的争议，我们无奈终止了该计划。多年来，这一问题双方的大量组织都被我们的股东指定为捐款接受方。因此，我们定期收到一些反对为支持选择权的组织捐款的异议。其中一些来自个人和组织，他们进而抵制我们子公司的产品。这并不让我们担心。我们拒绝了所有限制所有者权利的要求，只要接受方具有501(c)(3)资格，所有者就可以选择任何捐赠。

In 2003, however, many independent associates of The Pampered Chef began to feel the boycotts. This development meant that people who trusted us – but who were neither employees of ours nor had a voice in Berkshire decision-making – suffered serious losses of income.

然而，在2003年，The Pampered Chef的许多独立合作伙伴开始感受到抵制的影响。这一进展意味着那些信任我们——但既不是我们的员工，也无法在伯克希尔决策中发声的人——遭受了严重的收入损失。

For our shareholders, there was some modest tax efficiency in Berkshire doing the giving rather than their making their gifts directly. Additionally, the program was consistent with our “partnership” approach, the first principle set forth in our Owner’s Manual. But these advantages paled when they were measured against damage done loyal associates who had with great personal effort built businesses of their own. Indeed, Charlie and I see nothing charitable in harming decent, hard-working people just so we and other shareholders can gain some minor tax efficiencies.

对股东而言，由伯克希尔进行捐赠而不是他们直接捐赠，有一些适度的税收效率。此外，该计划符合我们的“合伙”方式，这是我们的《所有者手册》中阐述的第一原则。但是，当这些优势与对那些通过巨大个人努力建立自己业务的忠诚伙伴所造成的损害相比时，就黯然失色了。事实上，查理和我认为，仅仅为了我们和其他股东获得一些微小的税收效率而伤害正派、勤奋的人，没有任何慈善可言。

Berkshire now makes no contributions at the parent company level. Our various subsidiaries follow philanthropic policies consistent with their practices prior to their acquisition by Berkshire, except that any personal contributions that former owners had earlier made from their corporate pocketbook are now funded by them personally.

伯克希尔现在在母公司层面不做任何捐赠。我们的各个子公司遵循与其被伯克希尔收购前做法一致的慈善政策，唯一例外是，前所有者原先从公司资金中做出的个人捐赠，现在由他们个人出资。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Last year, I asked you to vote as to whether you wished our annual meeting to be held on Saturday or Monday. I was hoping for Monday. Saturday won by 2 to 1. It will be a while before shareholder democracy resurfaces at Berkshire.

去年，我请你们投票决定是否希望我们的年度股东大会在周六还是周一举行。我希望是周一。周六以2比1获胜。股东民主在伯克希尔要过一段时间才会再次出现。

But you have spoken, and we will hold this year’s annual meeting on Saturday, May 1 at the new Qwest Center in downtown Omaha. The Qwest offers us 194,000 square feet for exhibition by our subsidiaries (up from 65,000 square feet last year) and much more seating capacity as well. The Qwest’s doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches will be available at the Qwest’s concession stands.) That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. We will tell you everything we know . . . and, at least in my case, more.

但你们已经表达了意见，我们将于今年5月1日星期六在奥马哈市中心的新Qwest中心举行年度股东大会。Qwest为我们提供了194,000平方英尺的展厅供子公司展示（去年为65,000平方英尺），还有更多的座位容量。Qwest的门将在早上7点打开，电影将在8:30开始，会议本身将在9:30开始。中午将有短暂的休息时间供应食物。（Qwest的售货亭将有三明治供应。）除此之外，查理和我会回答问题直到3:30。我们会告诉你们我们所知道的一切……至少对我来说，还会更多。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.

本报告附带的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与美国运通签约（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。他们每年都为我们做了出色的工作，我为此感谢他们。

In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the vans will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

按照惯例，我们将从较大的酒店提供面包车前往会场。之后，面包车将返回酒店以及内布拉斯加家具市场、波仙珠宝店和机场。即便如此，您可能会发现有一辆车很有用。

Our exhibition of Berkshire goods and services will blow you away this year. On the floor, for example, will be a 1,600 square foot Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns-Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings, and outfitted with NFM furniture). You’ll find it a far cry from the mobile-home stereotype of a few decades ago.

今年我们伯克希尔商品和服务的展览将让你惊叹不已。例如，展厅内将有一个1,600平方英尺的克莱顿住宅（采用Acme砖、肖地毯、Johns-Manville保温材料、MiTek紧固件、Carefree遮阳篷，并配备NFM家具）。你会发现它与几十年前的活动房屋刻板印象相去甚远。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.

GEICO将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的顶尖顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为您提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO能够为您提供特别的股东折扣（通常为8%）。在我们运营的49个司法管辖区中，有41个允许此项特别优惠。带上您现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为您省钱。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.

周六，在奥马哈机场，我们将有NetJets®的常规飞机可供您参观。到Qwest的NetJets展位了解如何观看这些飞机。如果您在周末购买了我们认为适当数量的物品，您很可能需要自己的飞机把它们带回家。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM seven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $17.3 million in 2003. Every year has set a new record.

在内布拉斯加家具市场，位于道奇街和太平洋街之间的第72街一个77英亩的场地上，我们将再次实行“伯克希尔周末”定价，这意味着我们将向股东提供通常只给员工的折扣。我们七年前在NFM启动了这一特别定价，“周末”期间的销售额从1997年的530万美元增长到2003年的1,730万美元。每年都创下新纪录。

To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29 and Monday, May 3 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque and drinking Coke.

要获得折扣，您必须在4月29日周四至5月3日周一期间（含首尾）购物，并出示您的会议凭证。该期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有反对打折的铁律，但本着股东周末的精神，为您破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM的营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日上午10点至下午6点。今年周六下午5:30至晚上8点，我们将为股东举办一场特别活动。我会在那里，吃烧烤，喝可乐。

Borsheim’s ⎯ the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store ⎯ will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 2. Ask Charlie to autograph your sales ticket.

波仙珠宝店——美国除蒂芙尼曼哈顿店外最大的珠宝店——将举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是4月30日周五晚上6点至10点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于5月2日周日上午9点至下午4点举行。请查理在你的销售收据上签名。

Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save – at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me. (Both were impressed early in life by the story of the boy who, after missing a street car, walked home and proudly announced that he had saved 5¢ by doing so. His father was irate: “Why didn’t you miss a cab and save 85¢?”)

股东价格将在周四至周一期间有效，因此如果您想避开周五晚上和周日的拥挤人群，可以在其他时间前来并表明股东身份。周六我们营业至下午6点。波仙的毛利率比其主要竞争对手低整整20个百分点，所以你买得越多，省得越多——至少我妻子和女儿是这么告诉我的。（她们俩早年都对一个故事印象深刻：一个男孩没赶上电车，步行回家，并自豪地宣布这样做省了5美分。他父亲勃然大怒：“你怎么不没赶上出租车，省85美分呢？”）

In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Additionally, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will be in the mall, taking on all comers ⎯ blindfolded! I’ve watched, and he doesn’t peek.

在波仙外面的商场里，我们将有鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，两位世界顶级桥牌专家，周日下午与我们的股东一起玩牌。此外，两届美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫将在商场里蒙着眼睛接受所有人的挑战！我看过，他不偷看。

Gorat’s ⎯ my favorite steakhouse ⎯ will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Flaunt your mastery of fine dining by ordering, as I do, a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.

戈拉特牛排馆——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将在5月2日周日再次独家向伯克希尔股东开放，供应时间为下午4点至晚上10点。请记住，周日来戈拉特必须提前预订。请在4月1日（但不要提前）致电402-551-3733预订。如果周日订满，可以尝试您在城里的其他晚上去戈拉特。像我一样点一份三分熟的T骨牛排和双份土豆饼，炫耀您对美食的掌握。

We will have a special reception on Saturday afternoon from 4:00 to 5:00 for shareholders who come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally meet those who have come so far. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given special credentials and instructions for attending this function.

周六下午4:00至5:00，我们将为来自北美以外的股东举办一场特别招待会。每年我们的会议都会吸引来自全球的许多人，查理和我想确保能与远道而来的股东亲自见面。任何来自美国和加拿大以外的股东将获得特别凭证和参加此活动的说明。

Charlie and I have a great time at the annual meeting. And you will, too. So join us at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.

查理和我年度股东大会都过得很愉快。你们也会的。因此，请加入我们在Qwest举行的年度“资本家伍德斯托克”盛会。

Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 2004
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
2004年2月27日
董事会主席