巴菲特 1984 年致股东信，涵盖伯克希尔净值增长、保险业困境、股票投资组合、股利政策及 WPPSS 债券投资等重要话题。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1984 was $152.6 million, or $133 per share. This sounds pretty good but actually it’s mediocre. Economic gains must be evaluated by comparison with the capital that produces them. Our twenty-year compounded annual gain in book value has been 22.1% (from $19.46 in 1964 to $1108.77 in 1984), but our gain in 1984 was only 13.6%.
1984 年我们的净值增加了 1.526 亿美元，每股增加 133 美元。这听起来相当不错，但实际上只是平庸。经济收益必须与产生它们的资本相比较才能评估。我们账面价值的二十年复合年增长率为 22.1%（从 1964 年的 19.46 美元到 1984 年的 1108.77 美元），但 1984 年的增长率仅为 13.6%。
As we discussed last year, the gain in per-share intrinsic business value is the economic measurement that really counts. But calculations of intrinsic business value are subjective. In our case, book value serves as a useful, although somewhat understated, proxy. In my judgment, intrinsic business value and book value increased during 1984 at about the same rate.
正如我们去年讨论过的，每股内在商业价值的增长才是真正重要的经济衡量标准。但内在商业价值的计算是主观的。对我们而言，账面价值是一个有用但略微偏低的替代指标。在我看来，1984 年内在商业价值和账面价值以大致相同的速度增长。
Using my academic voice, I have told you in the past of the drag that a mushrooming capital base exerts upon rates of return. Unfortunately, my academic voice is now giving way to a reportorial voice. Our historical 22% rate is just that - history. To earn even 15% annually over the next decade (assuming we continue to follow our present dividend policy, about which more will be said later in this letter) we would need profits aggregating about $3.9 billion. Accomplishing this will require a few big ideas - small ones just won’t do. Charlie Munger, my partner in general management, and I do not have any such ideas at present, but our experience has been that they pop up occasionally. (How’s that for a strategic plan?)
用我学术性的口吻，过去我曾告诉过你们，不断膨胀的资本基础对回报率会产生拖累。不幸的是，我学术性的口吻现在正让位于报告式的口吻。我们历史上 22% 的增长率已成往事。要在未来十年内实现每年 15% 的回报（假设我们继续遵循当前的股利政策，关于这一点后文会有更多讨论），我们需要总计约 39 亿美元的利润。实现这一目标需要几个大主意——小打小闹不行。我的总管理合伙人查理·芒格和我目前没有任何这样的主意，但根据我们的经验，它们偶尔会冒出来。（这作为一项战略计划怎么样？）
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告盈利来源
The table on the following page shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire’s net ownership interest in many of the constituent businesses changed at midyear 1983 when the Blue Chip merger took place. Because of these changes, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.
下一页的表格展示了伯克希尔报告盈利的来源。1983 年年中 Blue Chip 合并发生时，伯克希尔在许多组成业务中的净所有权发生了变化。由于这些变化，表格的前两列提供了衡量基础业务表现的最佳指标。
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.)
任何业务实体因异常资产出售所产生的所有重大收益和损失，都与证券交易汇总在表格底部附近的行中，不包含在营业收益中。（我们认为任何年度的已实现资本损益数字都毫无意义，但多年期间的已实现和未实现资本损益总额非常重要。）
Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is set forth as a separate item.
此外，商誉摊销不计入具体业务，而是根据我在 1983 年年报信函附录中概述的原因，作为一个单独项目列示。
(000s omitted)
----------------------------------------------------------
Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(48,060) $(33,872) $(48,060) $(33,872) $(25,955) $(18,400)
Net Investment Income ... 68,903 43,810 68,903 43,810 62,059 39,114
Buffalo News .............. 27,328 19,352 27,328 16,547 13,317 8,832
Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 14,511 3,812 11,609 3,049 5,917 1,521
See’s Candies ............. 26,644 27,411 26,644 24,526 13,380 12,212
Associated Retail Stores .. (1,072) 697 (1,072) 697 (579) 355
Blue Chip Stamps(2) (1,843) (1,422) (1,843) (1,876) (899) (353)
Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,456 (798) 1,166 (467) 3,151 1,917
Precision Steel ........... 4,092 3,241 3,278 2,102 1,696 1,136
Textiles .................. 418 (100) 418 (100) 226 (63)
Wesco Financial ........... 9,777 7,493 7,831 4,844 4,828 3,448
Amortization of Goodwill .. (1,434) (532) (1,434) (563) (1,434) (563)
Interest on Debt .......... (14,734) (15,104) (14,097) (13,844) (7,452) (7,346)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (3,179) (3,066) (3,179) (3,066) (1,716) (1,656)
Other ..................... 4,932 10,121 4,529 9,623 3,476 8,490
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .......... 87,739 61,043 82,021 51,410 70,015 48,644
Special GEICO Distribution .. -- 19,575 -- 19,575 -- 18,224
Special Gen. Foods Distribution 8,111 -- 7,896 -- 7,294 --
Sales of securities and
unusual sales of assets .. 104,699 67,260 101,376 65,089 71,587 45,298
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities $200,549 $147,878 $191,293 $136,074 $148,896 $112,166
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
(1) 1983 figures are those for October through December.
(2) 1984 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were transferred in the mid-year 1983 merger of Blue Chip Stamps. （省略 000）
----------------------------------------------------------
净收益
所得税前收益 税后
-------------------------------------- ------------------
总额 伯克希尔应占 伯克希尔应占
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
经营收益：
保险集团：
承保 .................... $(48,060) $(33,872) $(48,060) $(33,872) $(25,955) $(18,400)
净投资收入 .............. 68,903 43,810 68,903 43,810 62,059 39,114
Buffalo News .............. 27,328 19,352 27,328 16,547 13,317 8,832
Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 14,511 3,812 11,609 3,049 5,917 1,521
See’s Candies ............. 26,644 27,411 26,644 24,526 13,380 12,212
联营零售商店 .............. (1,072) 697 (1,072) 697 (579) 355
Blue Chip Stamps(2) (1,843) (1,422) (1,843) (1,876) (899) (353)
Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,456 (798) 1,166 (467) 3,151 1,917
Precision Steel ........... 4,092 3,241 3,278 2,102 1,696 1,136
纺织业务 .................. 418 (100) 418 (100) 226 (63)
Wesco Financial ........... 9,777 7,493 7,831 4,844 4,828 3,448
商誉摊销 .................. (1,434) (532) (1,434) (563) (1,434) (563)
债务利息 .................. (14,734) (15,104) (14,097) (13,844) (7,452) (7,346)
股东指定
捐款 ................... (3,179) (3,066) (3,179) (3,066) (1,716) (1,656)
其他 ...................... 4,932 10,121 4,529 9,623 3,476 8,490
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
经营收益 .................... 87,739 61,043 82,021 51,410 70,015 48,644
GEICO 特别分配 .............. -- 19,575 -- 19,575 -- 18,224
General Foods 特别分配 ...... 8,111 -- 7,896 -- 7,294 --
证券销售及
非常规资产销售 ........... 104,699 67,260 101,376 65,089 71,587 45,298
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
所有实体总收益 .............. $200,549 $147,878 $191,293 $136,074 $148,896 $112,166
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
(1) 1983 年数据为 10 月至 12 月。
(2) 1984 年和 1983 年数据不具有可比性；1983 年年中 Blue Chip 印花票合并时转移了重大资产。Sharp-eyed shareholders will notice that the amount of the special GEICO distribution and its location in the table have been changed from the presentation of last year. Though they reclassify and reduce “accounting” earnings, the changes are entirely of form, not of substance. The story behind the changes, however, is interesting.
眼尖的股东会注意到，特别 GEICO 分配的金额及其在表格中的位置与去年的列示有所不同。尽管这些变化重新分类并减少了“会计”收益，但这些变化完全是形式上的，而非实质性的。然而，这些变化背后的故事很有趣。
As reported last year: (1) in mid-1983 GEICO made a tender offer to buy its own shares; (2) at the same time, we agreed by written contract to sell GEICO an amount of its shares that would be proportionately related to the aggregate number of shares GEICO repurchased via the tender from all other shareholders; (3) at completion of the tender, we delivered 350,000 shares to GEICO, received $21 million cash, and were left owning exactly the same percentage of GEICO that we owned before the tender; (4) GEICO’s transaction with us amounted to a proportionate redemption, an opinion rendered us, without qualification, by a leading law firm; (5) the Tax Code logically regards such proportionate redemptions as substantially equivalent to dividends and, therefore, the $21 million we received was taxed at only the 6.9% inter-corporate dividend rate; (6) importantly, that $21 million was far less than the previously-undistributed earnings that had inured to our ownership in GEICO and, thus, from the standpoint of economic substance, was in our view equivalent to a dividend.
如去年所报告：（1）1983 年年中，GEICO 发出要约收购其自身股份；（2）同时，我们通过书面合同同意向 GEICO 出售一定数量的股份，该数量与 GEICO 通过要约从所有其他股东处回购的股份总数成比例；（3）要约完成时，我们向 GEICO 交付了 35 万股，收到 2100 万美元现金，并且我们对 GEICO 的持股比例与要约前完全相同；（4）一家领先律师事务所无条件向我们出具意见，认为 GEICO 与我们的交易相当于按比例赎回；（5）根据税法逻辑，此类按比例赎回被视为与股息基本等同，因此我们收到的 2100 万美元仅按 6.9% 的公司间股息税率纳税；（6）重要的是，这 2100 万美元远低于我们持有 GEICO 所有权期间积累的未分配利润，因此从经济实质的角度看，我们认为这相当于股息。
Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable quarterly report and in this section of the annual report. Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection, concurred with our dividend presentation.
由于这笔交易重大且异常，我们在去年的季度报告和年报的这一部分都向你们重点说明了 GEICO 的这笔分配。此外，我们也向我们的审计师 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 强调了这笔交易。Peat Marwick 的奥马哈办公室和负责审核的芝加哥合伙人均无异议，同意了我们对股息的列报方式。
In 1984, we had a virtually identical transaction with General Foods. The only difference was that General Foods repurchased its stock over a period of time in the open market, whereas GEICO had made a “one-shot” tender offer. In the General Foods case we sold to the company, on each day that it repurchased shares, a quantity of shares that left our ownership percentage precisely unchanged. Again our transaction was pursuant to a written contract executed before repurchases began. And again the money we received was far less than the retained earnings that had inured to our ownership interest since our purchase. Overall we received $21,843,601 in cash from General Foods, and our ownership remained at exactly 8.75%.
1984 年，我们与通用食品进行了一笔几乎相同的交易。唯一的区别是，通用食品是在一段时间内通过公开市场回购其股票，而 GEICO 是进行一次性的要约收购。在通用食品的交易中，我们在该公司回购股票的每一天都向其出售一定数量的股份，从而使我们的持股比例保持不变。这笔交易同样是根据回购开始前签署的书面合同进行的。我们收到的资金再次远低于我们买入后累积到我们所有权权益中的留存收益。总体而言，我们从通用食品收到了 21,843,601 美元现金，并且我们的持股比例保持在 8.75% 不变。
At this point the New York office of Peat Marwick came into the picture. Late in 1984 it indicated that it disagreed with the conclusions of the firm’s Omaha office and Chicago reviewing partner. The New York view was that the GEICO and General Foods transactions should be treated as sales of stock by Berkshire rather than as the receipt of dividends. Under this accounting approach, a portion of the cost of our investment in the stock of each company would be charged against the redemption payment and any gain would be shown as a capital gain, not as dividend income. This is an accounting approach only, having no bearing on taxes: Peat Marwick agrees that the transactions were dividends for IRS purposes.
此时，Peat Marwick 的纽约办公室介入。1984 年底，它表示不同意该公司奥马哈办公室和芝加哥审核合伙人的结论。纽约方面的观点是，GEICO 和通用食品的交易应视为伯克希尔出售股票，而非收到股息。按照这种会计处理方法，我们对每家公司的股票投资成本的一部分将冲减赎回付款，任何收益将显示为资本利得，而非股息收入。这仅仅是一种会计处理方法，与税收无关：Peat Marwick 同意，就美国国税局而言，这些交易属于股息。
We disagree with the New York position from both the viewpoint of economic substance and proper accounting. But, to avoid a qualified auditor’s opinion, we have adopted herein Peat Marwick’s 1984 view and restated 1983 accordingly. None of this, however, has any effect on intrinsic business value: our ownership interests in GEICO and General Foods, our cash, our taxes, and the market value and tax basis of our holdings all remain the same.
无论从经济实质还是从正确会计处理的角度，我们都不同意纽约方面的立场。但是，为了避免审计师出具保留意见，我们在本文中采纳了 Peat Marwick 1984 年的观点，并相应地重述了 1983 年的数据。然而，这一切对内在商业价值没有任何影响：我们在 GEICO 和通用食品的所有权权益、我们的现金、我们的税收、以及我们所持股票的市场价值和计税基础都保持不变。
This year we have again entered into a contract with General Foods whereby we will sell them shares concurrently with open market purchases that they make. The arrangement provides that our ownership interest will remain unchanged at all times. By keeping it so, we will insure ourselves dividend treatment for tax purposes. In our view also, the economic substance of this transaction again is the creation of dividend income. However, we will account for the redemptions as sales of stock rather than dividend income unless accounting rules are adopted that speak directly to this point. We will continue to prominently identify any such special transactions in our reports to you.
今年我们再次与通用食品签订了合同，我们将根据合同在他们进行公开市场购买的同时向他们出售股份。该安排规定我们的所有权权益始终保持不变。通过保持这种状态，我们能够确保在税务上获得股息待遇。在我们看来，这笔交易的经济实质同样是产生股息收入。然而，除非有直接针对这一点的会计准则被采用，否则我们将把赎回作为股票出售而非股息收入进行会计处理。我们将继续在给你们的报告中显著标识任何此类特殊交易。
While we enjoy a low tax charge on these proportionate redemptions, and have participated in several of them, we view such repurchases as at least equally favorable for shareholders who do not sell. When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases.
尽管我们从这些按比例赎回中享受了较低的税负，并且参与了几次这样的交易，但我们认为这种回购对于不卖出的股东来说至少同样有利。当拥有出色业务和稳健财务状况的公司发现其股价在市场上远低于内在价值时，没有任何其他行动能像回购一样确定地使股东受益。
(Our endorsement of repurchases is limited to those dictated by price/value relationships and does not extend to the “greenmail” repurchase - a practice we find odious and repugnant. In these transactions, two parties achieve their personal ends by exploitation of an innocent and unconsulted third party. The players are: (1) the “shareholder” extortionist who, even before the ink on his stock certificate dries, delivers his “your- money-or-your-life” message to managers; (2) the corporate insiders who quickly seek peace at any price - as long as the price is paid by someone else; (3) the shareholders whose money is used by (2) to make (1) go away. As the dust settles, the mugging, transient shareholder gives his speech on “free enterprise”, the muggee management gives its speech on “the best interests of the company”, and the innocent shareholder standing by mutely funds the payoff.)
（我们对回购的支持仅限于那些由价格/价值关系决定的情况，不包括“绿票讹诈”式回购——我们认为这种做法令人憎恶和反感。在这些交易中，两方通过利用无辜且未被征求意见的第三方来实现个人目的。参与者包括：（1）作为敲诈者的“股东”，甚至在其股票证书上的墨迹未干之前，就向管理层传递“要么给钱，要么没命”的信息；（2）公司内部人士，他们急于以任何代价换取和平——只要代价由别人支付；（3）股东，他们的钱被（2）用来打发（1）。尘埃落定之后，打劫的短期股东发表关于“自由企业”的演说，被打劫的管理层发表关于“公司最佳利益”的演说，而旁观的无辜股东默默地为 payoff 买单。）
The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurhases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons - one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.
我们投资最多的那些公司，在价格与价值之间存在巨大差距时，都进行了大规模的股票回购。作为股东，我们觉得这令人鼓舞且有益，原因有两条——一条显而易见，另一条则微妙且并非总是被理解。显而易见的一点涉及基本算术：以远低于每股内在商业价值的价格进行大规模回购，会立即显著地提升该价值。当公司购买自己的股票时，它们往往能轻松地用 1 美元买到 2 美元的现值。公司收购计划则几乎从未达到同样的效果，而且在数量多得令人沮丧的情况下，每花费 1 美元连接近 1 美元的价值都得不到。
The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?)
回购的另一个好处不太容易精确衡量，但随着时间的推移可能会同样重要。当公司市值远低于其商业价值时进行回购，管理层清楚地表明他们倾向于采取增加股东财富的行动，而不是那些扩大管理层势力范围但对股东毫无益处（甚至有害）的行动。看到这一点，现有股东和潜在股东会提高他们对企业未来回报的预期。这种预期的上调反过来会使市场价格更接近内在商业价值。这些价格是完全理性的。投资者应该为一个由已被证明亲股东的管理者掌控的企业支付更高的价格，而不是为一个由自私自利、特立独行的管理者掌控的企业支付高价。（极端地讲，你愿意花多少钱成为一家由 Robert Wesco 控制的公司的少数股东？）
The key word is “demonstrated”. A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as “maximizing shareholder wealth” (this season’s favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth - and, after a while, neither will the market.
关键词是“已被证明”。一个管理者，在回购明显符合所有者利益时却一再拒绝，这暴露了他自己都未必意识到的动机。无论他多么频繁或多么雄辩地念叨一些受公关启发的短语，比如“股东财富最大化”（本季度的最爱），市场都会正确地对他掌管的资产打折。他的心不在听他的嘴——用不了多久，市场也不会听。
We have prospered in a very major way - as have other shareholders - by the large share repurchases of GEICO, Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings. (Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we have only recently established our position.) In each of these companies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain prices. We feel very comfortable owning interests in businesses such as these that offer excellent economics combined with shareholder-conscious managements.
通过 GEICO、华盛顿邮报和通用食品（我们三大重仓股）的大规模股票回购，我们和其他股东一样获得了巨大的收益。（埃克森是我们第四大重仓股，它也明智而积极地进行股份回购，但在这个案例中，我们是最近才建立的头寸。）在这些公司中，通过以 bargain 价格进行回购，股东们在杰出业务中的利益得到了显著提升。我们非常安心地持有这类企业的权益，它们兼具卓越的经济效益和具有股东意识的管理层。
The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
下表显示了我们 1984 年底持有的可流通股票净额。所有数字均排除了归属于韦斯科金融和内布拉斯加家具卖场少数股东的部分。
No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ....... $ 3,516 $ 32,908
740,400 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 44,416 46,738
3,895,710 Exxon Corporation ................... 173,401 175,307
4,047,191 General Foods Corporation ........... 149,870 226,137
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................... 45,713 397,300
2,379,200 Handy & Harman ...................... 27,318 38,662
818,872 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 2,570 28,149
555,949 Northwest Industries 26,581 27,242
2,553,488 Time, Inc. .......................... 89,327 109,162
1,868,600 The Washington Post Company ......... 10,628 149,955
---------- ----------
$573,340 $1,231,560
All Other Common Stockholdings 11,634 37,326
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks $584,974 $1,268,886
========== ==========持股数量 成本 市值
------------- ---------- ----------
（单位：千美元）
690,975 附属出版公司 $ 3,516 $ 32,908
740,400 美国广播公司 44,416 46,738
3,895,710 埃克森公司 173,401 175,307
4,047,191 通用食品公司 149,870 226,137
6,850,000 GEICO 公司 45,713 397,300
2,379,200 Handy & Harman 27,318 38,662
818,872 国际公共集团有限公司 2,570 28,149
555,949 西北工业公司 26,581 27,242
2,553,488 时代公司 89,327 109,162
1,868,600 华盛顿邮报公司 10,628 149,955
---------- ----------
$573,340 $1,231,560
所有其他普通股持股 11,634 37,326
---------- ----------
普通股总计 $584,974 $1,268,886
========== ==========It’s been over ten years since it has been as difficult as now to find equity investments that meet both our qualitative standards and our quantitative standards of value versus price. We try to avoid compromise of these standards, although we find doing nothing the most difficult task of all. (One English statesman attributed his country’s greatness in the nineteenth century to a policy of “masterly inactivity”. This is a strategy that is far easier for historians to commend than for participants to follow.)
已经有十多年没有像现在这样难以找到同时满足我们定性标准和价值与价格之间定量标准的股权投资了。我们尽量避免妥协这些标准，尽管我们发现什么都不做是最困难的任务。（一位英国政治家将他的国家在 19 世纪的伟大归功于“巧妙不作为”的政策。这是一种历史学家称赞起来远比参与者遵循起来容易得多的策略。）
In addition to the figures supplied at the beginning of this section, information regarding the businesses we own appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 42-47. An amplified discussion of Wesco’s businesses appears in Charlie Munger’s report on pages 50-59. You will find particularly interesting his comments about conditions in the thrift industry. Our other major controlled businesses are Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s, Buffalo Evening News, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.
除了本节开头的数字之外，有关我们所拥有的业务的信息出现在管理层讨论的第 42-47 页。对韦斯科金融业务的更详细讨论出现在查理·芒格报告的第 50-59 页。你会发现他对储蓄行业状况的评论特别有趣。我们其他主要控股业务是内布拉斯加家具卖场、时思糖果、布法罗晚报以及保险集团，我们在此将对保险集团给予一些特别关注。
Nebraska Furniture Mart
内布拉斯加家具卖场
Last year I introduced you to Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her family. I told you they were terrific, and I understated the case. After another year of observing their remarkable talents and character, I can honestly say that I never have seen a managerial group that either functions or behaves better than the Blumkin family.
去年我向你们介绍了 B 夫人（Rose Blumkin）和她的家人。我告诉你们他们非常出色，而且我还说轻了。在又一年观察到他们非凡的才能和品格之后，我可以诚实地说，我从未见过比 Blumkin 家族运作或行为更出色的管理团队。
Mrs. B, Chairman of the Board, is now 91, and recently was quoted in the local newspaper as saying, “I come home to eat and sleep, and that’s about it. I can’t wait until it gets daylight so I can get back to the business”. Mrs. B is at the store seven days a week, from opening to close, and probably makes more decisions in a day than most CEOs do in a year (better ones, too).
B 夫人是董事会主席，现年 91 岁，最近当地报纸援引她的话说：“我回家就是吃饭睡觉，仅此而已。我等不及天亮，好回去做生意。”B 夫人每周七天都在店里，从开门到关门，她一天做出的决定可能比大多数 CEO 一年做出的还要多（而且更明智）。
In May Mrs. B was granted an Honorary Doctorate in Commercial Science by New York University. (She’s a “fast track” student: not one day in her life was spent in a school room prior to her receipt of the doctorate.) Previous recipients of honorary degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary, then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and, most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)
五月，B 夫人被纽约大学授予商学荣誉博士学位。（她是一名“速成”学生：在获得博士学位之前，她一生中没有一天在教室度过。）此前获得纽约大学商学荣誉学位的人包括：埃克森公司 CEO Clifton Garvin, Jr.；时任花旗公司 CEO Walter Wriston；时任 IBM CEO Frank Cary；时任通用汽车 CEO Tom Murphy；以及最近的 Paul Volcker。（她和他们为伍，不丢人。）
The Blumkin blood did not run thin. Louie, Mrs. B’s son, and his three boys, Ron, Irv, and Steve, all contribute in full measure to NFM’s amazing success. The younger generation has attended the best business school of them all - that conducted by Mrs. B and Louie - and their training is evident in their performance.
Blumkin 家族的血脉没有变淡。B 夫人的儿子 Louie，以及他的三个儿子 Ron、Irv 和 Steve，都为 NFM 惊人的成功做出了充分的贡献。年轻一代上过了所有商学院中最好的一所——由 B 夫人和 Louie 执教的学校——他们的培训效果在他们的表现中显而易见。
Last year NFM’s net sales increased by $14.3 million, bringing the total to $115 million, all from the one store in Omaha. That is by far the largest volume produced by a single home furnishings store in the United States. In fact, the gain in sales last year was itself greater than the annual volume of many good-sized successful stores. The business achieves this success because it deserves this success. A few figures will tell you why.
去年，NFM 的净销售额增长了 1430 万美元，总额达到 1.15 亿美元，全部来自奥马哈的一家门店。这远远是美国单一家居家具店创造的最大销售额。事实上，去年的销售额增长本身就超过了许多规模不错的成功商店的年销售额。这项业务取得这样的成功是因为它配得上这种成功。一些数字会告诉你原因。
In its fiscal 1984 10-K, the largest independent specialty retailer of home furnishings in the country, Levitz Furniture, described its prices as “generally lower than the prices charged by conventional furniture stores in its trading area”. Levitz, in that year, operated at a gross margin of 44.4% (that is, on average, customers paid it $100 for merchandise that had cost it $55.60 to buy). The gross margin at NFM is not much more than half of that. NFM’s low mark-ups are possible because of its exceptional efficiency: operating expenses (payroll, occupancy, advertising, etc.) are about 16.5% of sales versus 35.6% at Levitz.
在其 1984 财年的 10-K 报告中，美国最大的独立家居家具专业零售商 Levitz Furniture 将其价格描述为“通常低于其交易区域内传统家具商店的价格”。那一年，Levitz 的毛利率为 44.4%（也就是说，顾客平均支付 100 美元购买成本为 55.60 美元的商品）。NFM 的毛利率还不到它的一半。NFM 能够维持如此低的加价是因为其非凡的效率：运营费用（工资、租金、广告等）约为销售额的 16.5%，而 Levitz 为 35.6%。
None of this is in criticism of Levitz, which has a well- managed operation. But the NFM operation is simply extraordinary (and, remember, it all comes from a $500 investment by Mrs. B in 1937). By unparalleled efficiency and astute volume purchasing, NFM is able to earn excellent returns on capital while saving its customers at least $30 million annually from what, on average, it would cost them to buy the same merchandise at stores maintaining typical mark-ups. Such savings enable NFM to constantly widen its geographical reach and thus to enjoy growth well beyond the natural growth of the Omaha market.
这些都不是在批评 Levitz，它的运营管理良好。但 NFM 的运营简直是非凡的（而且，请记住，这一切都源于 B 夫人在 1937 年的 500 美元投资）。通过无与伦比的效率和精明的批量采购，NFM 能够在获得卓越资本回报的同时，每年为顾客节省至少 3000 万美元——这是他们在维持典型加价率的商店购买相同商品所需的平均成本。这些节省使 NFM 能够不断扩大其地理覆盖范围，从而获得远超奥马哈市场自然增长的增长。
I have been asked by a number of people just what secrets the Blumkins bring to their business. These are not very esoteric. All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism their area of special competence and act decisively on all matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4) unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal with. (Mrs. B boils it down to “sell cheap and tell the truth”.)
很多人问我 Blumkin 家族给他们的生意带来了什么秘诀。这些秘诀并不深奥。家族所有成员：（1）投入的热情和精力会让本·富兰克林和霍雷肖·阿尔杰看起来像辍学生；（2）以非凡的现实主义定义自己的特殊能力领域，并果断采取行动处理该领域内的一切事务；（3）即使是最诱人的提议，如果不在该特殊能力领域内，也会忽略；（4）始终以高尚的态度对待每一个与他们打交道的人。（B 夫人将其归结为“卖得便宜，实话实说”。）
Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was demonstrated when we purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never had an audit and we did not request one; we did not take an inventory nor verify the receivables; we did not check property titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gave us her word. That made for an even exchange.
当我们购买该业务 90% 的股份时，我们对 B 夫人及其家人诚信的评价得到了体现：NFM 从未接受过审计，而我们也没有要求审计；我们没有盘点存货，也没有核实应收账款；我们没有检查产权。我们给了 B 夫人一张 5500 万美元的支票，她给了我们她的承诺。这是一笔公平的交易。
You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.
你我有幸能与 Blumkin 家族成为合伙人。
See’s Candy Shops, Inc.
时思糖果公司
Below is our usual recap of See’s performance since the time of purchase by Blue Chip Stamps:
以下是自 Blue Chip 印花票收购以来，我们通常对时思糖果业绩的回顾：
52-53 Week Year Operating Number of Number of
Ended About Sales Profits Pounds of Stores Open
December 31 Revenues After Taxes Candy Sold at Year End
------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- -----------
1984 .............. $135,946,000 $13,380,000 24,759,000 214
1983 (53 weeks) ... 133,531,000 13,699,000 24,651,000 207
1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202
1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199
1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191
1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188
1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182
1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179
1976 (53 weeks) ... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173
1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172
1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170
1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169
1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167财年截止约 销售收入 税后利润 糖果销售量（磅） 年底门店数
12月31日 （美元） （美元） （家）
------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- -----------
1984 .............. 135,946,000 13,380,000 24,759,000 214
1983 (53周) ....... 133,531,000 13,699,000 24,651,000 207
1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202
1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199
1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191
1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188
1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182
1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179
1976 (53周) ....... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173
1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172
1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170
1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169
1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167This performance has not been produced by a generally rising tide. To the contrary, many well-known participants in the boxed-chocolate industry either have lost money in this same period or have been marginally profitable. To our knowledge, only one good-sized competitor has achieved high profitability. The success of See’s reflects the combination of an exceptional product and an exceptional manager, Chuck Huggins.
这一业绩并非得益于普遍上涨的行情。相反，盒装巧克力行业的许多知名参与者在同一时期要么亏损，要么微利。据我们所知，只有一家规模相当的竞争对手实现了高盈利。时思的成功反映了卓越产品与卓越管理者 Chuck Huggins 的结合。
During 1984 we increased prices considerably less than has been our practice in recent years: per-pound realization was $5.49, up only 1.4% from 1983. Fortunately, we made good progress on cost control, an area that has caused us problems in recent years. Per-pound costs - other than those for raw materials, a segment of expense largely outside of our control - increased by only 2.2% last year.
1984 年，我们的提价幅度远低于近年来的惯例：每磅实际售价为 5.49 美元，仅比 1983 年上涨 1.4%。幸运的是，我们在成本控制方面取得了良好进展，而近年成本控制一直给我们带来问题。每磅成本——不包括原材料成本，这部分费用很大程度上不受我们控制——去年仅上涨了 2.2%。
Our cost-control problem has been exacerbated by the problem of modestly declining volume (measured by pounds, not dollars) on a same-store basis. Total pounds sold through shops in recent years has been maintained at a roughly constant level only by the net addition of a few shops annually. This more-shops-to-get- the-same-volume situation naturally puts heavy pressure on per- pound selling costs.
我们在成本控制上的问题因同店销量（按磅计算，而非金额）的温和下降而加剧。近年来，通过门店销售的总磅数仅靠每年净增几家门店才得以维持在大致不变的水平。这种需要更多门店才能维持相同销量的局面自然给每磅销售成本带来了巨大压力。
In 1984, same-store volume declined 1.1%. Total shop volume, however, grew 0.6% because of an increase in stores. (Both percentages are adjusted to compensate for a 53-week fiscal year in 1983.)
1984 年，同店销量下降了 1.1%。然而，由于门店增加，总门店销量增长了 0.6%。（这两个百分比均已调整，以弥补 1983 年 53 周的财年影响。）
See’s business tends to get a bit more seasonal each year. In the four weeks prior to Christmas, we do 40% of the year’s volume and earn about 75% of the year’s profits. We also earn significant sums in the Easter and Valentine’s Day periods, but pretty much tread water the rest of the year. In recent years, shop volume at Christmas has grown in relative importance, and so have quantity orders and mail orders. The increased concentration of business in the Christmas period produces a multitude of managerial problems, all of which have been handled by Chuck and his associates with exceptional skill and grace.
时思的业务每年都变得更加季节性。在圣诞节前的四周里，我们完成全年 40% 的销量，赚取全年约 75% 的利润。我们在复活节和情人节期间也赚了不少，但一年中的其余时间基本持平。近年来，圣诞季的门店销量相对重要性增加，批量订单和邮购订单也是如此。业务越来越集中在圣诞节期间带来了众多管理问题，而 Chuck 和他的同事们以非凡的技巧和风度处理了所有这些问题。
Their solutions have in no way involved compromises in either quality of service or quality of product. Most of our larger competitors could not say the same. Though faced with somewhat less extreme peaks and valleys in demand than we, they add preservatives or freeze the finished product in order to smooth the production cycle and thereby lower unit costs. We reject such techniques, opting, in effect, for production headaches rather than product modification.
他们的解决方案绝不涉及服务质量或产品质量的妥协。我们大多数规模较大的竞争对手则不然。尽管他们面临的需求峰谷没有我们那么极端，但他们添加防腐剂或冷冻成品，以平滑生产周期，从而降低单位成本。我们拒绝这些技术，实际上选择了生产上的麻烦，而不是产品上的妥协。
Our mall stores face a host of new food and snack vendors that provide particularly strong competition at non-holiday periods. We need new products to fight back and during 1984 we introduced six candy bars that, overall, met with a good reception. Further product introductions are planned.
我们的商场门店面临大量新的食品和零食供应商，它们在非节假日期间提供了特别强劲的竞争。我们需要新产品来反击，1984 年我们推出了六种糖果棒，总体反响不错。计划推出更多新产品。
In 1985 we will intensify our efforts to keep per-pound cost increases below the rate of inflation. Continued success in these efforts, however, will require gains in same-store poundage. Prices in 1985 should average 6% - 7% above those of 1984. Assuming no change in same-store volume, profits should show a moderate gain.
1985 年，我们将加大努力，使每磅成本的涨幅低于通货膨胀率。然而，这些努力要持续成功，需要同店磅数增长。1985 年的平均价格应比 1984 年高出 6% - 7%。假设同店销量不变，利润应会温和增长。
Buffalo Evening News
布法罗晚报
Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than we expected. As at See’s, excellent progress was made in controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the industry.
1984 年《新闻报》的利润远高于我们的预期。与时思一样，在控制成本方面取得了卓越进展。除去新闻编辑室的工作时间，总工作时间减少了约 2.8%。随着生产率的提高，总成本仅增加了 4.9%。Stan Lipsey 及其管理团队的这一表现是行业内最好的之一。
However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984 we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for a large “catch-up” wage increase. This catch-up is entirely appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the unprofitable 1977-1982 period was an important factor in our success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express. Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might well have been different.
然而，我们现在面临成本加速上升。1984 年年中，我们签订了新的多年期工会合同，其中规定了大幅的“追赶性”工资增长。这种追赶是完全合理的：在 1977-1982 年亏损期间，我们工会的合作精神是我们能够保持与《信使快报》成本竞争力的一个重要因素。如果我们没有控制住成本，那场竞争的结果很可能不同。
Because our new union contracts took effect at varying dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984 costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985 and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors, we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.
由于我们的新工会合同生效日期不同，追赶性增长中只有一小部分反映在 1984 年的成本中。但这种增长将在 1985 年几乎完全生效，因此我们今年的单位劳动力成本将以远高于行业水平的速度上升。我们希望通过持续的小幅生产率提升来缓解这一增长，但无法避免今年工资成本的大幅上升。新闻纸的价格趋势现在也比 1984 年不利。主要由于这两个因素，我们预计《新闻报》的利润率至少会略有收缩。
Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major economic importance:
在《新闻报》方面，有两个具有重大经济意义的因素对我们有利：
(1) Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers. “Regional” newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on the other hand, have a significant portion of their circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are offering to sell via a classified ad - nor for the grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area. “Wasted” circulation - as the advertisers call it - hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are determined largely by gross circulation while advertising revenues (usually 70% - 80% of total revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation;
（1）我们的发行量异常集中在对广告商效用最大的区域。另一方面，发行范围广泛的“区域性”报纸，其发行量的很大一部分位于对大多数广告商效用可忽略不计的区域。几百英里外的订户，对于你通过分类广告出售的小狗来说，不是个好目标——对于仅在都市区有门店的杂货商来说也是如此。广告商所说的“浪费发行量”会损害盈利能力：报纸的支出主要由总发行量决定，而广告收入（通常占总收入的 70%-80%）仅对有效发行量有反应；
(2) Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their potential customers using only the News.
（2）我们对布法罗零售市场的渗透率非常高；广告商只需使用《新闻报》就能接触到几乎所有的潜在客户。
Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance: among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)
去年我告诉过你们这种非同寻常的读者接受度：在全美 100 家最大的报纸中，我们当时的渗透率在工作日排名第一，在周日排名第三。最新数据显示，我们在工作日的渗透率排名第一，周日排名第二。（即便如此，布法罗的家庭数量已经下降，所以我们当前的工作日发行量略有下降；周日则保持不变。）
I told you also that one of the major reasons for this unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in our size range. In 1984 our “news hole” ratio was 50.9%, (versus 50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35% - 40%. We will continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again, will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.
我还告诉过你们，读者如此异常接受的一个主要原因是我们为他们提供了异常多的新闻：我们报纸用于新闻的版面比例高于我们规模范围内任何其他主导性报纸。1984 年，我们的“新闻版面”比例为 50.9%（1983 年为 50.4%），远高于典型的 35%-40%。我们将继续将这一比例维持在 50% 左右。此外，尽管我们去年减少了其他部门的总工作时间，但我们保持了新闻编辑室的雇佣水平，并且我们将继续这样做。1984 年新闻编辑室成本增长了 9.1%，远高于我们 4.9% 的总成本增长率。
Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference between “high” and “low” news costs at papers of comparable size runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins are often ten times that amount.
我们的新闻版面政策使我们花费了相当多的额外新闻纸成本。因此，我们的新闻成本（新闻版面的新闻纸加上新闻编辑室的工资和支出）占收入的比例高于我们规模范围内大多数主导性报纸。然而，对于我们的报纸或任何其他主导性报纸来说，有足够的空间来承受这些成本：规模相当的报纸之间的“高”与“低”新闻成本差异可能约为三个百分点，而税前利润率通常是这个数字的十倍。
The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better - as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.
主导性报纸的经济效益非常出色，是商界最好的之一。所有者们自然愿意相信，他们出色的盈利能力仅仅是因为他们始终如一地生产出出色的产品。这个令人舒适的理论在面对一个不舒服的事实时会枯萎。虽然一流报纸能赚取丰厚的利润，但只要任何一类报纸在其社区内占据主导地位，三流报纸的利润也一样好甚至更好。当然，产品质量可能对报纸取得主导地位至关重要。我们认为《新闻报》就是这种情况，在很大程度上要归功于像我们的前任 Alfred Kirchhofer 这样的人。
Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its “bulletin board” value. Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command the attention of advertisers.
一旦占据主导地位，决定报纸质量好坏的就不是市场，而是报纸本身。无论好坏，它都会繁荣。大多数企业并非如此：劣质通常导致差劲的经济效益。但即使是一份糟糕的报纸，对大多数市民来说也是物有所值，仅仅因为其“公告板”价值。在其他条件相同的情况下，劣质产品不会达到一流产品那样的读者水平。然而，劣质产品对大多数市民来说仍然是必不可少的，而能引起他们注意的东西就能引起广告商的注意。
Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace, management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above- average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.
由于高标准不是由市场强加的，管理层必须自己强加。我们对新闻投入高于平均水平的承诺代表了一个重要的量化标准。我们有信心 Stan Lipsey 和 Murray Light 将继续应用更为重要的定性标准。查理和我认为报纸在社会中是非常特殊的机构。我们为《新闻报》感到自豪，并希望在未来几年证明我们能有更强烈的自豪感。
Insurance Operations
保险业务
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
下面是我们通常列出的保险业两个关键数据表格的更新版本：
Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums after Policy-holder
Written (%) Dividends
------------- -------------------
1972 .............................. 10.2 96.2
1973 .............................. 8.0 99.2
1974 .............................. 6.2 105.4
1975 .............................. 11.0 107.9
1976 .............................. 21.9 102.4
1977 .............................. 19.8 97.2
1978 .............................. 12.8 97.5
1979 .............................. 10.3 100.6
1980 .............................. 6.0 103.1
1981 .............................. 3.9 106.0
1982 .............................. 4.4 109.7
1983 (Revised) .................... 4.5 111.9
1984 (Estimated) .................. 8.1 117.7
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages 保费收入年变动率（%） 扣除保单持有人红利后的综合比率
------------- -------------------
1972 .............................. 10.2 96.2
1973 .............................. 8.0 99.2
1974 .............................. 6.2 105.4
1975 .............................. 11.0 107.9
1976 .............................. 21.9 102.4
1977 .............................. 19.8 97.2
1978 .............................. 12.8 97.5
1979 .............................. 10.3 100.6
1980 .............................. 6.0 103.1
1981 .............................. 3.9 106.0
1982 .............................. 4.4 109.7
1983 (修订) ....................... 4.5 111.9
1984 (估计) ....................... 8.1 117.7
来源：Best 汇总与平均值Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
Best 的数据反映了几乎所有行业的经验，包括股份公司、互助公司和互惠公司。综合比率代表保险总成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入之比；比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。
For a number of years, we have told you that an annual increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance policy.
多年来，我们一直告诉你们，行业保费收入的年增长率需要达到约 10%，综合比率才能大致保持不变。我们在做出这一断言时假设，费用占保费收入的比例将保持相对稳定，并且由于业务量增长、通货膨胀以及扩大保单承保范围的司法裁决的共同影响，损失将以每年约 10% 的速度增长。
Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in 1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year percentage change in industry premium volume.
我们的观点正被证明准确得令人沮丧：如果自 1979 年以来保费每年增长 10%，那么到 1984 年的累计增长将为 61%，1984 年的综合比率将与 1979 年的 100.6 几乎相同。然而，行业的保费增长仅为 30%，1984 年的综合比率为 117.7。如今，我们仍然认为，承保盈利能力趋势的关键指标是行业保费收入的同比变动百分比。
It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a “normal” level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually), five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly- competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios in the 108-113 range.
现在看来，1985 年的保费收入增长将远超过 10%。因此，假设巨灾处于“正常”水平，我们预计综合比率将在年底开始向下缓和。然而，根据我们全行业的损失假设（即每年增长 10%），需要连续五年每年 15% 的保费增长才能使综合比率回到 100。这意味着到 1989 年行业规模翻倍，我们认为这一结果极不可能。相反，我们预计会有几年的保费增长略高于 10%，随后是高度竞争性的定价，通常会产生 108-113 区间的综合比率。
Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much additional detail, including the effect of discontinued operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average results during the past several years, and that circumstance has begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some. With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of 1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines with little loss of business.
我们自己的综合比率在 1984 年是令人汗颜的 134。（此处，如同本报告其他地方，我们在报告该比率时排除了结构性结算和损失准备金假设。更多细节，包括已终止业务对比率的影响，见第 42-43 页）。这是连续第三年我们的承保业绩远逊于行业水平。我们预计 1985 年综合比率将有所改善，并且预计我们的改善幅度将大大超过行业。Mike Goldberg 在他接手保险业务之前，已经纠正了我犯下的许多错误。此外，我们的业务集中在过去几年表现低于平均水平的险种上，这种情况已经开始抑制甚至淘汰我们的一些竞争对手。随着竞争动摇，我们在 1984 年下半年得以在某些重要险种上大幅提价，而几乎没有损失业务。
For some years I have told you that there could be a day coming when our premier financial strength would make a real difference in the competitive position of our insurance operation. That day may have arrived. We are almost without question the strongest property/casualty insurance operation in the country, with a capital position far superior to that of well-known companies of much greater size.
多年来我一直在告诉你们，总有一天我们卓越的财务实力会真正改变我们保险业务的竞争地位。那一天可能已经到来。毫无疑问，我们是全国最强大的财产/意外险保险公司，资本状况远远优于规模大得多的知名公司。
Equally important, our corporate policy is to retain that superiority. The buyer of insurance receives only a promise in exchange for his cash. The value of that promise should be appraised against the possibility of adversity, not prosperity. At a minimum, the promise should appear able to withstand a prolonged combination of depressed financial markets and exceptionally unfavorable underwriting results. Our insurance subsidiaries are both willing and able to keep their promises in any such environment - and not too many other companies clearly are.
同样重要的是，我们的公司政策是保持这种优势。保险的买家拿现金换来的仅仅是一个承诺。这个承诺的价值应该根据逆境而非繁荣的可能性来评估。这个承诺至少应该看起来能够承受金融市场低迷和承保业绩异常不利的长期组合。我们的保险子公司既愿意也有能力在任何这样的环境中信守承诺——而其他明确能做到的公司并不多。
Our financial strength is a particular asset in the business of structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions that we reported on last year. The claimant in a structured settlement and the insurance company that has reinsured loss reserves need to be completely confident that payments will be forthcoming for decades to come. Very few companies in the property/casualty field can meet this test of unquestioned long-term strength. (In fact, only a handful of companies exists with which we will reinsure our own liabilities.)
我们的财务实力在我们去年报告过的结构性结算和损失准备金假设业务中是一项特别的资产。结构性结算中的索赔人以及已对损失准备金进行再保险的保险公司需要完全确信，未来几十年内付款将源源不断。财产/意外险领域很少有公司能够满足这种无可置疑的长期实力的考验。（事实上，我们只愿与少数几家公司进行我们自己负债的再保险。）
We have grown in these new lines of business: funds that we hold to offset assumed liabilities grew from $16.2 million to $30.6 million during the year. We expect growth to continue and perhaps to greatly accelerate. To support this projected growth we have added substantially to the capital of Columbia Insurance Company, our reinsurance unit specializing in structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions. While these businesses are very competitive, returns should be satisfactory.
我们在这些新业务上取得了增长：我们为抵销假定负债而持有的资金从 1620 万美元增长到 3060 万美元。我们预计增长将继续，甚至可能大幅加速。为了支持这一预期增长，我们已大幅增加了哥伦比亚保险公司的资本，该公司是我们的再保险部门，专门从事结构性结算和损失准备金假设。尽管这些业务竞争非常激烈，但回报应该令人满意。
At GEICO the news, as usual, is mostly good. That company achieved excellent unit growth in its primary insurance business during 1984, and the performance of its investment portfolio continued to be extraordinary. Though underwriting results deteriorated late in the year, they still remain far better than those of the industry. Our ownership in GEICO at yearend amounted to 36% and thus our interest in their direct property/casualty volume of $885 million amounted to $320 million, or well over double our own premium volume.
在 GEICO 方面，消息一如既往大多是好的。该公司在 1984 年的主要保险业务中实现了出色的单位增长，其投资组合的表现继续非同凡响。尽管年末承保结果恶化，但仍远好于行业水平。年底我们对 GEICO 的所有权达到 36%，因此我们在其 8.85 亿美元直接财产/意外险业务量中的权益达到 3.2 亿美元，远远超过我们自己的保费收入。
I have reported to you in the past few years that the performance of GEICO’s stock has considerably exceeded that company’s business performance, brilliant as the latter has been. In those years, the carrying value of our GEICO investment on our balance sheet grew at a rate greater than the growth in GEICO’s intrinsic business value. I warned you that over performance by the stock relative to the performance of the business obviously could not occur every year, and that in some years the stock must under perform the business. In 1984 that occurred and the carrying value of our interest in GEICO changed hardly at all, while the intrinsic business value of that interest increased substantially. Since 27% of Berkshire’s net worth at the beginning of 1984 was represented by GEICO, its static market value had a significant impact upon our rate of gain for the year. We are not at all unhappy with such a result: we would far rather have the business value of GEICO increase by X during the year, while market value decreases, than have the intrinsic value increase by only 1/2 X with market value soaring. In GEICO’s case, as in all of our investments, we look to business performance, not market performance. If we are correct in expectations regarding the business, the market eventually will follow along.
在过去几年中，我曾向你们报告，GEICO 股票的表现已大大超过该公司业务的表现，尽管后者已经非常出色。在那些年份，我们资产负债表上 GEICO 投资的账面价值增长速度超过了 GEICO 内在商业价值的增长速度。我警告过你们，股票表现相对于业务表现的过度领先显然不可能每年都发生，在某些年份股票的表现必然落后于业务。1984 年这种情况发生了，我们在 GEICO 权益的账面价值几乎没有任何变化，而该权益的内在商业价值却大幅增加。由于 GEICO 占伯克希尔 1984 年初净资产的 27%，其停滞的市值对我们当年的回报率产生了重大影响。我们对这样的结果一点也不不高兴：我们宁愿 GEICO 的商业价值一年增长 X，而市值下降，也不愿内在价值仅增长 1/2 X 而市值飙升。在 GEICO 的案例中，就像我们所有的投资一样，我们关注的是业务表现，而不是市场表现。如果我们对业务的预期是正确的，市场最终会跟随。
You, as shareholders of Berkshire, have benefited in enormous measure from the talents of GEICO’s Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder, and Lou Simpson. In its core business - low-cost auto and homeowners insurance - GEICO has a major, sustainable competitive advantage. That is a rare asset in business generally, and it’s almost non-existent in the field of financial services. (GEICO, itself, illustrates this point: despite the company’s excellent management, superior profitability has eluded GEICO in all endeavors other than its core business.) In a large industry, a competitive advantage such as GEICO’s provides the potential for unusual economic rewards, and Jack and Bill continue to exhibit great skill in realizing that potential.
作为伯克希尔的股东，你们从 GEICO 的 Jack Byrne、Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson 的才能中获益巨大。在其核心业务——低成本汽车和房主保险——GEICO 拥有一个重要的、可持续的竞争优势。这在一般商业中是稀缺资产，在金融服务领域几乎不存在。（GEICO 本身也说明了这一点：尽管公司管理出色，但在核心业务之外的所有努力中，GEICO 都未能获得卓越的盈利能力。）在一个庞大的行业中，像 GEICO 这样的竞争优势提供了非凡经济回报的潜力，而 Jack 和 Bill 继续展现出实现这一潜力的高超技巧。
Most of the funds generated by GEICO’s core insurance operation are made available to Lou for investment. Lou has the rare combination of temperamental and intellectual characteristics that produce outstanding long-term investment performance. Operating with below-average risk, he has generated returns that have been by far the best in the insurance industry. I applaud and appreciate the efforts and talents of these three outstanding managers.
GEICO 核心保险业务产生的大部分资金都提供给 Lou 进行投资。Lou 拥有性情和才智的罕见结合，能够产生出色的长期投资业绩。他在低于平均风险的水平下运作，所创造的回报迄今是保险行业中最好的。我赞赏并感谢这三位杰出经理人的努力和才能。
Errors in Loss Reserving
损失准备金中的错误
Any shareholder in a company with important interests in the property/casualty insurance business should have some understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the reporting of current earnings in that industry. Phil Graham, when publisher of the Washington Post, described the daily newspaper as “a first rough draft of history”. Unfortunately, the financial statements of a property/casualty insurer provide, at best, only a first rough draft of earnings and financial condition.
任何在财产/意外险业务中拥有重大权益的公司的股东，都应该对该行业当前收益报告中的固有弱点有所了解。《华盛顿邮报》的前发行人 Phil Graham 曾将日报描述为“历史的初稿”。不幸的是，财产/意外险保险公司的财务报表充其量只能提供收益和财务状况的初稿。
The determination of costs is the main problem. Most of an insurer’s costs result from losses on claims, and many of the losses that should be charged against the current year’s revenue are exceptionally difficult to estimate. Sometimes the extent of these losses, or even their existence, is not known for decades.
成本确定是主要问题。保险公司的大部分成本来自索赔损失，而许多应计入当年收入的损失极难估计。有时这些损失的程度，甚至其是否存在，要过几十年才能知晓。
The loss expense charged in a property/casualty company’s current income statement represents: (1) losses that occurred and were paid during the year; (2) estimates for losses that occurred and were reported to the insurer during the year, but which have yet to be settled; (3) estimates of ultimate dollar costs for losses that occurred during the year but of which the insurer is unaware (termed “IBNR”: incurred but not reported); and (4) the net effect of revisions this year of similar estimates for (2) and (3) made in past years.
财产/意外险公司当期损益表中列支的损失费用包括：（1）当年发生并已支付的损失；（2）当年发生并已报告给保险公司但尚未结案的损失的估计；（3）当年发生但保险公司尚未知晓的损失的最终金额估计（称为“IBNR”：已发生未报告）；（4）对过去年份中针对（2）和（3）所做类似估计进行本年修订的净影响。
Such revisions may be long delayed, but eventually any estimate of losses that causes the income for year X to be misstated must be corrected, whether it is in year X + 1, or X + 10. This, perforce, means that earnings in the year of correction also are misstated. For example, assume a claimant was injured by one of our insureds in 1979 and we thought a settlement was likely to be made for $10,000. That year we would have charged $10,000 to our earnings statement for the estimated cost of the loss and, correspondingly, set up a liability reserve on the balance sheet for that amount. If we settled the claim in 1984 for $100,000, we would charge earnings with a loss cost of $90,000 in 1984, although that cost was truly an expense of 1979. And if that piece of business was our only activity in 1979, we would have badly misled ourselves as to costs, and you as to earnings.
此类修订可能会延迟很久，但最终，任何导致 X 年收入被错报的损失估计都必须得到修正，无论修正发生在 X+1 年还是 X+10 年。这必然意味着修正当年的收益也被错报。例如，假设某索赔人在 1979 年被我们的某个被保险人伤害，我们当时认为可能以 10,000 美元和解。那一年，我们会在损益表中计入 10,000 美元的估计损失成本，并在资产负债表上相应设立该金额的负债准备金。如果我们在 1984 年以 100,000 美元和解该索赔，我们将在 1984 年计入 90,000 美元的损失成本，尽管该成本实际上是 1979 年的费用。如果这笔业务是我们在 1979 年的唯一活动，那么我们在成本上会严重误导自己，而你们在收益上也会被误导。
The necessarily-extensive use of estimates in assembling the figures that appear in such deceptively precise form in the income statement of property/casualty companies means that some error must seep in, no matter how proper the intentions of management. In an attempt to minimize error, most insurers use various statistical techniques to adjust the thousands of individual loss evaluations (called case reserves) that comprise the raw data for estimation of aggregate liabilities. The extra reserves created by these adjustments are variously labeled “bulk”, “development”, or “supplemental” reserves. The goal of the adjustments should be a loss-reserve total that has a 50-50 chance of being proved either slightly too high or slightly too low when all losses that occurred prior to the date of the financial statement are ultimately paid.
在编制财产/意外险公司损益表中那些以看似精确的形式出现的数字时，必然广泛使用估计，这意味着无论管理层的意图多么恰当，都必定会渗入一些误差。为了尽量减少误差，大多数保险公司使用各种统计技术来调整构成估计总负债原始数据的数千个逐案损失评估（称为个案准备金）。这些调整产生的额外准备金有不同的标签，如“批量”、“发展”或“补充”准备金。调整的目标应该是使损失准备金总额在财务报表日期之前发生的所有损失最终支付完毕后，有 50% 的可能性被证明略微偏高，50% 的可能性略微偏低。
At Berkshire, we have added what we thought were appropriate supplemental reserves but in recent years they have not been adequate. It is important that you understand the magnitude of the errors that have been involved in our reserving. You can thus see for yourselves just how imprecise the process is, and also judge whether we may have some systemic bias that should make you wary of our current and future figures.
在伯克希尔，我们增加了我们认为适当的补充准备金，但近年来这些准备金一直不足。重要的是，你们要了解我们准备金计提中所涉及误差的严重程度。这样你们就可以亲自看到这个过程有多么不精确，也可以判断我们是否存在某种系统性偏差，从而让你们对我们当前和未来的数字保持警惕。
The following table shows the results from insurance underwriting as we have reported them to you in recent years, and also gives you calculations a year later on an “if-we-knew-then-what-we think-we-know-now” basis. I say “what we think we know now” because the adjusted figures still include a great many estimates for losses that occurred in the earlier years. However, many claims from the earlier years have been settled so that our one-year-later estimate contains less guess work than our earlier estimate:
下表显示了近年来我们向你们报告的保险承保结果，并在一年后按“如果我们当时知道我们现在所知道的”的基础给出了计算。我说“我们现在所知道的”，是因为调整后的数字仍然包含对早年发生损失的诸多估计。然而，早年的许多索赔已经结案，因此我们一年后的估计比我们早期的估计包含更少的猜测：
```
Underwriting Results Corrected Figures
as Reported After One Year’s
Year to You Experience
---- -------------------- -----------------
1980 $ 6,738,000 $ 14,887,000
1981 1,478,000 (1,118,000)
1982 (21,462,000) (25,066,000)
1983 (33,192,000) (50,974,000)
1984 (45,413,000) ?
```
报告的承保结果 一年经验后的修正数字
年份 向你们报告
---- -------------------- -----------------
1980 $ 6,738,000 $ 14,887,000
1981 1,478,000 (1,118,000)
1982 (21,462,000) (25,066,000)
1983 (33,192,000) (50,974,000)
1984 (45,413,000) ?
Our structured settlement and loss-reserve assumption
businesses are not included in this table. Important
additional information on loss reserve experience appears
on pages 43-45.
我们的结构性结算和损失准备金假设业务未包含在此表中。关于损失准备金经验的其他重要信息见第 43-45 页。
To help you understand this table, here is an explanation of the most recent figures: 1984’s reported pre-tax underwriting loss of $45.4 million consists of $27.6 million we estimate that we lost on 1984’s business, plus the increased loss of $17.8 million reflected in the corrected figure for 1983.
为了帮助你们理解这张表，这里对最新数字进行解释：1984 年报告的税前承保亏损 4540 万美元，包括我们估计在 1984 年业务上亏损的 2760 万美元，加上 1983 年修正数字中反映的 1780 万美元的损失增加。
As you can see from reviewing the table, my errors in reporting to you have been substantial and recently have always presented a better underwriting picture than was truly the case. This is a source of particular chagrin to me because: (1) I like for you to be able to count on what I say; (2) our insurance managers and I undoubtedly acted with less urgency than we would have had we understood the full extent of our losses; and (3) we paid income taxes calculated on overstated earnings and thereby gave the government money that we didn’t need to. (These overpayments eventually correct themselves, but the delay is long and we don’t receive interest on the amounts we overpaid.)
正如你们从回顾表格中可以看到的，我在向你们报告时的错误是严重的，而且最近总是呈现出比实际情况更好的承保状况。这让我特别懊恼，因为：（1）我希望你们能够信赖我的话；（2）我们保险经理和我无疑没有我们原本在完全了解损失规模时会采取的那种紧迫感；（3）我们缴纳了基于夸大收益计算的所得税，从而把本不必交的钱给了政府。（这些多缴的税款最终会自行纠正，但延迟很长，而且我们不会收到多缴金额的利息。）
Because our business is weighted toward casualty and reinsurance lines, we have more problems in estimating loss costs than companies that specialize in property insurance. (When a building that you have insured burns down, you get a much faster fix on your costs than you do when an employer you have insured finds out that one of his retirees has contracted a disease attributable to work he did decades earlier.) But I still find our errors embarrassing. In our direct business, we have far underestimated the mushrooming tendency of juries and courts to make the “deep pocket” pay, regardless of the factual situation and the past precedents for establishment of liability. We also have underestimated the contagious effect that publicity regarding giant awards has on juries. In the reinsurance area, where we have had our worst experience in under reserving, our customer insurance companies have made the same mistakes. Since we set reserves based on information they supply us, their mistakes have become our mistakes.
由于我们的业务偏重于责任险和再保险业务，我们在估计损失成本方面比专门从事财产险的公司有更多问题。（当你承保的一栋建筑物烧毁时，你确定成本的速度要比当你承保的一个雇主发现其一名退休人员患了与几十年前工作有关的疾病时快得多。）但我仍然为我们的错误感到尴尬。在我们的直接业务中，我们大大低估了陪审团和法院让“深口袋”买单的趋势——无论事实情况和确定责任的过往先例如何。我们也低估了关于巨额赔偿的新闻报道对陪审团的传染效应。在我们准备金计提不足经验最糟糕的再保险领域，我们的客户保险公司也犯了同样的错误。由于我们根据他们提供的信息设定准备金，他们的错误变成了我们的错误。
I heard a story recently that is applicable to our insurance accounting problems: a man was traveling abroad when he received a call from his sister informing him that their father had died unexpectedly. It was physically impossible for the brother to get back home for the funeral, but he told his sister to take care of the funeral arrangements and to send the bill to him. After returning home he received a bill for several thousand dollars, which he promptly paid. The following month another bill came along for $15, and he paid that too. Another month followed, with a similar bill. When, in the next month, a third bill for $15 was presented, he called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh”, she said. “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”
我最近听到一个故事，适用于我们的保险会计问题：一个男人在国外旅行时接到他姐姐的电话，告诉他他们的父亲意外去世了。哥哥无法赶回家参加葬礼，但他告诉姐姐安排葬礼事宜，并把账单寄给他。回家后他收到一张几千美元的账单，他立刻付了。第二个月又来了一张 15 美元的账单，他也付了。又过了一个月，又来了类似的账单。再下个月，第三张 15 美元的账单寄来时，他打电话给姐姐问怎么回事。“哦”，她说。“我忘了告诉你。我们把爸爸埋在一套租来的西装里。”
If you’ve been in the insurance business in recent years - particularly the reinsurance business - this story hurts. We have tried to include all of our “rented suit” liabilities in our current financial statement, but our record of past error should make us humble, and you suspicious. I will continue to report to you the errors, plus or minus, that surface each year.
如果你近年来从事保险业务——尤其是再保险业务——这个故事会让人心痛。我们已试图将所有“租来的西装”负债纳入当前的财务报表，但我们过去的错误记录应使我们谦卑，使你们怀疑。我将继续向你们报告每年浮出水面的错误，无论是正是负。
Not all reserving errors in the industry have been of the innocent-but-dumb variety. With underwriting results as bad as they have been in recent years - and with managements having as much discretion as they do in the presentation of financial statements - some unattractive aspects of human nature have manifested themselves. Companies that would be out of business if they realistically appraised their loss costs have, in some cases, simply preferred to take an extraordinarily optimistic view about these yet-to-be-paid sums. Others have engaged in various transactions to hide true current loss costs.
并非业内所有的准备金错误都是无辜但愚蠢的那种。由于近年来承保结果如此糟糕——并且管理层在财务报表列报方面拥有如此大的自由裁量权——人性中一些不讨喜的方面已经显现出来。如果现实地评估其损失成本就会倒闭的公司，在某些情况下，干脆选择对这些尚未支付的金额采取极其乐观的看法。其他公司则进行各种交易来掩盖真实的当期损失成本。
Both of these approaches can “work” for a considerable time: external auditors cannot effectively police the financial statements of property/casualty insurers. If liabilities of an insurer, correctly stated, would exceed assets, it falls to the insurer to volunteer this morbid information. In other words, the corpse is supposed to file the death certificate. Under this “honor system” of mortality, the corpse sometimes gives itself the benefit of the doubt.
这两种方法都能在相当长的时间内“奏效”：外部审计师无法有效监督财产/意外险保险公司的财务报表。如果保险公司的负债（正确列报后）将超过资产，那么由保险公司自愿提供这一病态信息。换句话说，尸体应该自己提交死亡证明。在这种死亡的“荣誉制度”下，尸体有时会让自己获得疑点利益。
In most businesses, of course, insolvent companies run out of cash. Insurance is different: you can be broke but flush. Since cash comes in at the inception of an insurance policy and losses are paid much later, insolvent insurers don’t run out of cash until long after they have run out of net worth. In fact, these “walking dead” often redouble their efforts to write business, accepting almost any price or risk, simply to keep the cash flowing in. With an attitude like that of an embezzler who has gambled away his purloined funds, these companies hope that somehow they can get lucky on the next batch of business and thereby cover up earlier shortfalls. Even if they don’t get lucky, the penalty to managers is usually no greater for a $100 million shortfall than one of $10 million; in the meantime, while the losses mount, the managers keep their jobs and perquisites.
当然，在大多数企业中，资不抵债的公司会耗尽现金。保险则不同：你可能已经破产，但现金依然充裕。由于现金在保单生效时就进来，而损失在很久以后才支付，资不抵债的保险公司在净值耗尽后很久才会耗尽现金。事实上，这些“行尸走肉”常常加倍努力地承保业务，接受几乎任何价格或风险，仅仅是为了保持现金流入。抱着类似将挪用资金赌光的贪污犯的心态，这些公司希望他们能以某种方式在下一批业务中走运，从而掩盖之前的亏空。即使他们不走运，对管理者的惩罚通常也不会因为 1 亿美元的亏空而比 1000 万美元的亏空更重；与此同时，随着损失的增加，管理者们仍然保住了工作和特权。
The loss-reserving errors of other property/casualty companies are of more than academic interest to Berkshire. Not only does Berkshire suffer from sell-at-any-price competition by the “walking dead”, but we also suffer when their insolvency is finally acknowledged. Through various state guarantee funds that levy assessments, Berkshire ends up paying a portion of the insolvent insurers’ asset deficiencies, swollen as they usually are by the delayed detection that results from wrong reporting. There is even some potential for cascading trouble. The insolvency of a few large insurers and the assessments by state guarantee funds that would follow could imperil weak-but- previously-solvent insurers. Such dangers can be mitigated if state regulators become better at prompt identification and termination of insolvent insurers, but progress on that front has been slow.
其他财产/意外险公司的损失准备金错误对伯克希尔而言不仅仅是学术兴趣。伯克希尔不仅要忍受“行尸走肉”式的任何价格都卖的竞争，而且在它们的资不抵债最终被承认时，我们也会遭受损失。通过各种征收评估费的州担保基金，伯克希尔最终要支付资不抵债保险公司资产缺口的一部分——这些缺口通常因错误报告导致的延迟发现而膨胀。甚至还有可能引发连锁问题。几家大型保险公司的破产以及随后州担保基金的评估，可能会危及弱小但之前尚能偿付的保险公司。如果州监管机构能更善于迅速识别和终止资不抵债的保险公司，这种危险可以减轻，但这一领域的进展缓慢。
Washington Public Power Supply System
华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）
From October, 1983 through June, 1984 Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries continuously purchased large quantities of bonds of Projects 1, 2, and 3 of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”). This is the same entity that, on July 1, 1983, defaulted on $2.2 billion of bonds issued to finance partial construction of the now-abandoned Projects 4 and 5. While there are material differences in the obligors, promises, and properties underlying the two categories of bonds, the problems of Projects 4 and 5 have cast a major cloud over Projects 1, 2, and 3, and might possibly cause serious problems for the latter issues. In addition, there have been a multitude of problems related directly to Projects 1, 2, and 3 that could weaken or destroy an otherwise strong credit position arising from guarantees by Bonneville Power Administration.
从 1983 年 10 月到 1984 年 6 月，伯克希尔的保险子公司持续购买了华盛顿公共电力供应系统（“WPPSS”）1、2、3 号项目的大量债券。这个实体于 1983 年 7 月 1 日对为现已放弃的 4、5 号项目部分建设融资而发行的 22 亿美元债券违约。虽然这两类债券的债务人、承诺和基础资产存在重大差异，但 4、5 号项目的问题给 1、2、3 号项目蒙上了巨大阴影，并可能给后者带来严重问题。此外，还存在许多与 1、2、3 号项目直接相关的问题，这些问题可能削弱或摧毁原本由邦纳维尔电力管理局担保带来的强劲信用地位。
Despite these important negatives, Charlie and I judged the risks at the time we purchased the bonds and at the prices Berkshire paid (much lower than present prices) to be considerably more than compensated for by prospects of profit.
尽管存在这些重要的不利因素，查理和我在购买债券时判断，以伯克希尔支付的价格（远低于当前价格），风险被盈利前景远远超过补偿。
As you know, we buy marketable stocks for our insurance companies based upon the criteria we would apply in the purchase of an entire business. This business-valuation approach is not widespread among professional money managers and is scorned by many academics. Nevertheless, it has served its followers well (to which the academics seem to say, “Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory.”) Simply put, we feel that if we can buy small pieces of businesses with satisfactory underlying economics at a fraction of the per-share value of the entire business, something good is likely to happen to us - particularly if we own a group of such securities.
如你们所知，我们为保险公司购买可流通股票时，依据的是我们在购买整个企业时会应用的标准。这种企业估值方法在专业资金管理人中并不普遍，并且受到许多学者的嘲笑。尽管如此，它为其追随者提供了良好的服务（对此学者们似乎会说：“嗯，在实践中可能没问题，但在理论上永远行不通。”）简而言之，我们觉得，如果我们能够以远低于整个企业每股价值的价格，购买到具有令人满意的基础经济特征的小块业务，那么好事很可能就会发生在我们身上——尤其是当我们持有一组这样的证券时。
We extend this business-valuation approach even to bond purchases such as WPPSS. We compare the $139 million cost of our yearend investment in WPPSS to a similar $139 million investment in an operating business. In the case of WPPSS, the “business” contractually earns $22.7 million after tax (via the interest paid on the bonds), and those earnings are available to us currently in cash. We are unable to buy operating businesses with economics close to these. Only a relatively few businesses earn the 16.3% after tax on unleveraged capital that our WPPSS investment does and those businesses, when available for purchase, sell at large premiums to that capital. In the average negotiated business transaction, unleveraged corporate earnings of $22.7 million after-tax (equivalent to about $45 million pre-tax) might command a price of $250 - $300 million (or sometimes far more). For a business we understand well and strongly like, we will gladly pay that much. But it is double the price we paid to realize the same earnings from WPPSS bonds.
我们甚至将这种企业估值方法延伸到像 WPPSS 这样的债券购买。我们将年底对 WPPSS 投资的 1.39 亿美元成本，与对一家运营企业的类似 1.39 亿美元投资进行比较。在 WPPSS 的情况下，这个“企业”合同约定税后赚取 2270 万美元（通过债券支付的利息），并且这些收益以现金形式立即为我们所得。我们无法买到经济特征接近这样的运营企业。只有相对较少的企业能像我们的 WPPSS 投资那样，在无杠杆资本上赚取 16.3% 的税后回报，而且这些企业在可供购买时，其售价相对于该资本有巨大溢价。在普通的谈判企业交易中，2270 万美元的税后无杠杆企业收益（相当于约 4500 万美元税前）可能需要 2.5 亿至 3 亿美元（有时甚至更高）的价格。对于一家我们非常了解且非常喜欢的企业，我们乐意支付那么多。但这比我们为实现同样来自 WPPSS 债券的收益所支付的价格高出一倍。
However, in the case of WPPSS, there is what we view to be a very slight risk that the “business” could be worth nothing within a year or two. There also is the risk that interest payments might be interrupted for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the most that the “business” could be worth is about the $205 million face value of the bonds that we own, an amount only 48% higher than the price we paid.
然而，在 WPPSS 的情况下，我们认为存在非常小的风险，即这个“企业”在一两年内可能一文不值。还存在利息支付可能中断相当长一段时间的风险。此外，这个“企业”最多能值我们所持债券约 2.05 亿美元的面值，这个金额仅比我们支付的价格高出 48%。
This ceiling on upside potential is an important minus. It should be realized, however, that the great majority of operating businesses have a limited upside potential also unless more capital is continuously invested in them. That is so because most businesses are unable to significantly improve their average returns on equity - even under inflationary conditions, though these were once thought to automatically raise returns.
上涨潜力的上限是一个重要的减分项。然而，应该认识到，绝大多数运营企业的上涨潜力也有限，除非有更多的资本持续投入其中。这是因为大多数企业无法显著提高其平均净资产收益率——即使在通货膨胀条件下也是如此，尽管人们曾认为通胀会自动提高收益。
(Let’s push our bond-as-a-business example one notch further: if you elect to “retain” the annual earnings of a 12% bond by using the proceeds from coupons to buy more bonds, earnings of that bond “business” will grow at a rate comparable to that of most operating businesses that similarly reinvest all earnings. In the first instance, a 30-year, zero-coupon, 12% bond purchased today for $10 million will be worth $300 million in 2015. In the second, a $10 million business that regularly earns 12% on equity and retains all earnings to grow, will also end up with $300 million of capital in 2015. Both the business and the bond will earn over $32 million in the final year.)
（让我们把债券即企业的例子再推进一步：如果你选择利用息票收益购买更多债券来“保留”12% 债券的年收益，那么该债券“企业”的收益将以与大多数类似地将所有收益再投资的运营企业相当的速度增长。第一种情况，一张今天以 1000 万美元购买的 30 年期、零息票、12% 的债券，到 2015 年将价值 3 亿美元。第二种情况，一家 1000 万美元的企业，常规赚取 12% 的净资产收益率并且保留所有收益用于增长，到 2015 年也将最终拥有 3 亿美元的资本。该企业和该债券在最后一年都将赚取超过 3200 万美元。）
Our approach to bond investment - treating it as an unusual sort of “business” with special advantages and disadvantages - may strike you as a bit quirky. However, we believe that many staggering errors by investors could have been avoided if they had viewed bond investment with a businessman’s perspective. For example, in 1946, 20-year AAA tax-exempt bonds traded at slightly below a 1% yield. In effect, the buyer of those bonds at that time bought a “business” that earned about 1% on “book value” (and that, moreover, could never earn a dime more than 1% on book), and paid 100 cents on the dollar for that abominable business.
我们的债券投资方法——将其视为一种具有特殊优势和劣势的不寻常“企业”——可能让你觉得有点古怪。然而，我们相信，如果投资者以企业家的视角看待债券投资，许多惊人的错误本可以避免。例如，1946 年，20 年期 AAA 免税债券的交易收益率略低于 1%。实际上，当时那些债券的买家购买了一个大约在“账面价值”上赚取 1% 的“企业”（而且，这个企业永远不可能在账面上多赚一分钱），为这个糟糕的企业支付了 100 美分兑 1 美元的价格。
If an investor had been business-minded enough to think in those terms - and that was the precise reality of the bargain struck - he would have laughed at the proposition and walked away. For, at the same time, businesses with excellent future prospects could have been bought at, or close to, book value while earning 10%, 12%, or 15% after tax on book. Probably no business in America changed hands in 1946 at book value that the buyer believed lacked the ability to earn more than 1% on book. But investors with bond-buying habits eagerly made economic commitments throughout the year on just that basis. Similar, although less extreme, conditions prevailed for the next two decades as bond investors happily signed up for twenty or thirty years on terms outrageously inadequate by business standards. (In what I think is by far the best book on investing ever written - “The Intelligent Investor”, by Ben Graham - the last section of the last chapter begins with, “Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” This section is called “A Final Word”, and it is appropriately titled.)
如果投资者具有足够的商业头脑，以那样的方式思考——而这正是所达成交易的精确现实——他会对这个提议付之一笑，然后走开。因为，与此同时，具有出色未来前景的企业可以以账面价值或接近账面价值的价格买到，同时还能赚取 10%、12% 或 15% 的税后账面回报。1946 年，美国大概没有哪家企业以账面价值易手时，买家会认为它缺乏赚取超过 1% 账面回报的能力。但是，有购买债券习惯的投资者却全年都在此基础上 eagerly 做出经济承诺。在接下来的二十年里，类似但不那么极端的情况普遍存在，债券投资者欣然以按照商业标准严重不足的条件锁定二十年或三十年。（在我看来，有史以来最好的投资书籍——本·格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》——最后一章的最后一节以“投资最明智的时候，正是它最具有商业性的时候”开头。这一节叫做“结语”，名副其实。）
We will emphasize again that there is unquestionably some risk in the WPPSS commitment. It is also the sort of risk that is difficult to evaluate. Were Charlie and I to deal with 50 similar evaluations over a lifetime, we would expect our judgment to prove reasonably satisfactory. But we do not get the chance to make 50 or even 5 such decisions in a single year. Even though our long-term results may turn out fine, in any given year we run a risk that we will look extraordinarily foolish. (That’s why all of these sentences say “Charlie and I”, or “we”.)
我们要再次强调，WPPSS 的承诺无疑存在一些风险。这也是那种难以评估的风险。如果查理和我在一生中处理 50 次类似的评估，我们预计我们的判断会被证明是相当令人满意的。但我们不可能在一年内做出 50 次甚至 5 次这样的决定。即使我们的长期结果可能不错，但在任何一年，我们都面临着看起来非常愚蠢的风险。（这就是为什么所有这些句子都说“查理和我”或“我们”。）
Most managers have very little incentive to make the intelligent-but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot decision. Their personal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if an unconventional decision works out well, they get a pat on the back and, if it works out poorly, they get a pink slip. (Failing conventionally is the route to go; as a group, lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad press.)
大多数管理者几乎没有动力去做出明智但有一定概率看起来像白痴的决定。他们个人的得失比太明显了：如果一个非常规决策结果良好，他们会得到表扬；如果结果糟糕，他们会被解雇。（以传统方式失败才是正道；旅鼠作为一个群体可能形象不佳，但没有单个旅鼠曾受到过负面报道。）
Our equation is different. With 47% of Berkshire’s stock, Charlie and I don’t worry about being fired, and we receive our rewards as owners, not managers. Thus we behave with Berkshire’s money as we would with our own. That frequently leads us to unconventional behavior both in investments and general business management.
我们的情况不同。持有伯克希尔 47% 的股票，查理和我不担心被解雇，我们作为所有者而非管理者获得回报。因此，我们对待伯克希尔的资金就像对待自己的资金一样。这经常导致我们在投资和一般业务管理上采取非常规行为。
We remain unconventional in the degree to which we concentrate the investments of our insurance companies, including those in WPPSS bonds. This concentration makes sense only because our insurance business is conducted from a position of exceptional financial strength. For almost all other insurers, a comparable degree of concentration (or anything close to it) would be totally inappropriate. Their capital positions are not strong enough to withstand a big error, no matter how attractive an investment opportunity might appear when analyzed on the basis of probabilities.
我们在集中保险公司投资（包括 WPPSS 债券）的程度方面仍然非常规。这种集中之所以合理，仅仅是因为我们的保险业务是在异常强大的财务实力基础上进行的。对于几乎所有其他保险公司来说，同等程度（或接近同等程度）的集中是完全不合适的。它们的资本状况不足以承受一个重大错误，无论从概率角度分析一个投资机会看起来多么有吸引力。
With our financial strength we can own large blocks of a few securities that we have thought hard about and bought at attractive prices. (Billy Rose described the problem of over- diversification: “If you have a harem of forty women, you never get to know any of them very well.”) Over time our policy of concentration should produce superior results, though these will be tempered by our large size. When this policy produces a really bad year, as it must, at least you will know that our money was committed on the same basis as yours.
凭借我们的财务实力，我们可以持有少数几种我们深思熟虑并以有吸引力价格买入的证券的大量头寸。（Billy Rose 曾描述过度多元化的问题：“如果你有一个由四十个女人组成的后宫，你永远不会对其中任何一个了解得很深。”）随着时间的推移，我们的集中政策应该会产生卓越的结果，尽管这些结果会因我们的庞大规模而有所缓和。当这项政策带来一个非常糟糕的年份（这是必然的）时，至少你们会知道，我们是用和你们一样的基础投入资金的。
We made the major part of our WPPSS investment at different prices and under somewhat different factual circumstances than exist at present. If we decide to change our position, we will not inform shareholders until long after the change has been completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and even a modest amount of added competition on either side can cost us a great deal of money. Our WPPSS purchases illustrate this principle. From October, 1983 through June, 1984, we attempted to buy almost all the bonds that we could of Projects 1, 2, and 3. Yet we purchased less than 3% of the bonds outstanding. Had we faced even a few additional well-heeled investors, stimulated to buy because they knew we were, we could have ended up with a materially smaller amount of bonds, purchased at a materially higher price. (A couple of coat-tail riders easily could have cost us $5 million.) For this reason, we will not comment about our activities in securities - neither to the press, nor shareholders, nor to anyone else - unless legally required to do so.
我们 WPPSS 投资的主要部分是在不同的价格和与目前存在的事实情况略有不同的条件下进行的。如果我们决定改变头寸，我们将在变更完成很久之后才通知股东。（当你们读到这段话时，我们可能正在买入或卖出。）证券的买卖是一项竞争激烈的业务，即使是任何一方增加一点点竞争，也可能让我们损失大量金钱。我们的 WPPSS 购买说明了这一原则。从 1983 年 10 月到 1984 年 6 月，我们试图购买尽可能多的 1、2、3 号项目债券。然而，我们只购买了不到 3% 的流通债券。如果我们面临哪怕多几个资金雄厚的投资者，他们因为知道我们在买而受刺激也买入，我们最终可能只买到少得多的债券，而且是以高得多的价格。（几个搭便车的人可能轻易让我们损失 500 万美元。）出于这个原因，除非法律要求，否则我们将不会评论我们在证券方面的活动——不对媒体、不对股东、也不对任何其他人。
One final observation regarding our WPPSS purchases: we dislike the purchase of most long-term bonds under most circumstances and have bought very few in recent years. That’s because bonds are as sound as a dollar - and we view the long-term outlook for dollars as dismal. We believe substantial inflation lies ahead, although we have no idea what the average rate will turn out to be. Furthermore, we think there is a small, but not insignificant, chance of runaway inflation.
关于我们 WPPSS 购买的最后一个观察：在大多数情况下，我们不喜欢购买大多数长期债券，并且近年来购买得很少。这是因为债券和美元一样可靠——而我们认为美元的长期前景黯淡。我们相信未来会有显著的通货膨胀，尽管我们不知道平均通胀率会是多少。此外，我们认为存在很小但并非微不足道的恶性通货膨胀的可能性。
Such a possibility may seem absurd, considering the rate to which inflation has dropped. But we believe that present fiscal policy - featuring a huge deficit - is both extremely dangerous and difficult to reverse. (So far, most politicians in both parties have followed Charlie Brown’s advice: “No problem is so big that it can’t be run away from.”) Without a reversal, high rates of inflation may be delayed (perhaps for a long time), but will not be avoided. If high rates materialize, they bring with them the potential for a runaway upward spiral.
考虑到通货膨胀率已经下降，这种可能性似乎很荒谬。但我们认为，当前的财政政策——以巨额赤字为特征——既极其危险又难以逆转。（到目前为止，两党的大多数政客都遵循了查理·布朗的建议：“没有哪个问题大到不能逃避。”）如果不逆转，高通胀可能会被推迟（也许很长一段时间），但不会被避免。如果高通胀成为现实，它们会带来螺旋式上升失控的潜力。
While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks (as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range, runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a small but unacceptable “wipe out” risk, and we require any purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely to be few and far between.
当年通货膨胀率在 5%-10% 之间时，债券和股票（作为一个类别）之间没有太多选择，但恶性通货膨胀则另当别论。在这种情况下，一个多元化的股票投资组合几乎肯定会遭受巨大的实际价值损失。但已有的债券遭受的损失会大得多。因此，我们认为一个全债券投资组合携带一个虽小但无法接受的“毁灭”风险，我们要求任何长期债券的购买都必须通过一个特殊的门槛。只有当债券购买明显优于其他商业机会时，我们才会参与。这样的机会可能很少，而且间隔很长。
Dividend Policy
股利政策
Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A company will say something like, “Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI”. And that’s it - no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is, we believe managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.
股利政策常常被报告给股东，但很少得到解释。一家公司可能会说：“我们的目标是将 40% 到 50% 的收益用于分红，并以至少等于 CPI 涨幅的速度增加股息。”仅此而已——没有分析为什么该特定政策对所有者的最佳。然而，资本配置对企业和投资管理至关重要。正因为如此，我们认为管理者和所有者应该认真思考在什么情况下应该保留收益，在什么情况下应该分配收益。
The first point to understand is that all earnings are not created equal. In many businesses particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios - inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion - let’s call these earnings “restricted” - cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.
首先要理解的是，并非所有收益都是平等的。在许多企业，特别是那些资产/利润比率较高的企业，通货膨胀会导致部分或全部报告收益变成虚假的。虚假的部分——我们称这些收益为“受限收益”——如果企业要维持其经济地位，就不能作为股息分配。如果这些收益被支付出去，企业将在一个或多个方面失去优势：维持其销售单位数量的能力、长期竞争地位、财务实力。无论其派息率多么保守，一家持续分配受限收益的公司，除非另有权益资本注入，否则注定被遗忘。
Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company’s stock to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value. But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners. Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, “Dig We Must”.)
受限收益对所有者来说很少毫无价值，但它们通常必须被大幅折价。实际上，它们被企业征用，无论其经济潜力多么糟糕。（这种无论回报多么没有吸引力都保留收益的情况，在十年前被 Consolidated Edison 以一种绝妙的讽刺方式无意中传达出来。当时，惩罚性的监管政策是导致该公司股价低至账面价值四分之一的一个主要因素；也就是说，每一美元用于再投资的留存收益，只转化为 25 美分的市场价值。但是，尽管有这个点金成铅的过程，大部分收益还是被再投资于企业，而不是支付给所有者。与此同时，在纽约各地的建筑和维护工地上，标志牌自豪地宣告着公司口号：“我们必须挖掘”。）
Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this dividend discussion. Let’s turn to the much-more-valued unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion, management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.
在本次股利讨论中，我们无需进一步关注受限收益。让我们转向更有价值的非受限收益。这些收益可以同样可行地保留或分配。在我们看来，管理层应该选择对企业的所有者更有意义的方案。
This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders - to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect - backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future - that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners. This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.
这一原则并未被普遍接受。管理者出于多种原因喜欢扣留非受限、易于分配的收益，不给股东——以扩大管理者统治的公司帝国，从异常舒适的财务地位运作，等等。但我们认为只有一个合理的保留理由。只有在有合理前景的情况下——最好有历史证据支持，或在适当时有对未来深思熟虑的分析支持——公司每保留一美元，至少为所有者创造一美元的市场价值时，才应该保留非受限收益。只有当保留的资本产生的增量收益等于或高于投资者普遍可获得的收益时，这种情况才会发生。
To illustrate, let’s assume that an investor owns a risk- free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms; i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or- reinvest option. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest rate on long-term, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100 cents on the dollar. Under these circumstances, the investor wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that, he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest rates, not even those bondholders needing cash for living purposes.
为了说明，假设一个投资者持有一张无风险的 10% 永续债券，它有一个非常不寻常的特点。每年投资者可以选择以现金形式获取 10% 的息票，或者将息票再投资于更多相同条款的 10% 债券；即永续期限和提供相同现金或再投资选择的息票。如果在任何一年，长期无风险债券的普遍利率是 5%，投资者以现金形式获取息票将是愚蠢的，因为他可以选择获得的 10% 债券的价值将远高于 100 美分兑 1 美元。在这种情况下，想要获得现金的投资者应该以额外债券的形式获取息票，然后立即卖出。通过这样做，他实际获得的现金将比直接以现金获取息票更多。假设所有债券都由理性投资者持有，在 5% 利率的时代，没有人会选择现金，即使是那些需要现金用于生活目的的债券持有人也不会。
If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course - reinvestment of the coupon - would give an investor additional bonds with market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a large discount.
然而，如果利率是 15%，理性的投资者都不会希望自己的钱被以 10% 的回报进行投资。相反，投资者会选择以现金形式获取息票，即使他个人的现金需求为零。相反的做法——息票再投资——会给投资者带来额外的债券，但其市场价值远低于他本可以选择获得的现金。如果他想要 10% 的债券，他可以直接拿着收到的现金在市场上购买，这些债券在市场上会有很大的折扣。
An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a company’s unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out. Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are the likely outcome of reinvestment.
与我们假想的债券持有人所做的类似分析，适用于所有者思考公司的非受限收益是应该保留还是支付。当然，分析要困难得多，并且容易出错，因为再投资收益的回报率不像我们的债券案例那样是一个合同数字，而是一个波动的数字。所有者必须猜测在中期未来平均回报率会是多少。然而，一旦做出了有根据的猜测，剩下的分析就很简单了：如果预期收益能获得高回报，你希望你的收益被再投资；如果再投资的可能结果是低回报，你希望它们被支付给你。
Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to their parent company. At that level,. the managers have no trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions at the parent company level often are a different story. Here managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes of their shareholder-owners.
许多公司管理者在决定子公司是否应该向其母公司分配收益时，其推理思路与这些思路非常相似。在那个层面，管理者像聪明的所有者一样思考没有困难。但在母公司层面的支付决策往往情况不同。在这里，管理者常常难以设身处地地为股东-所有者着想。
With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all available earnings in order that they may be invested in Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected to be 15%. The CEO’s business school oath will allow no lesser behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental capital is 5% - and market rates are 10% - he is likely to impose a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern. Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be retained in their operations rather than distributed to the parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.
采用这种分裂的方法，一个多部门公司的 CEO 会指示子公司 A（其增量资本回报率预计平均为 5%）分配所有可用收益，以便它们可以投资于子公司 B（其增量资本回报率预计为 15%）。CEO 的商学院誓言不允许更差的行为。但是，如果他自己在增量资本上的长期记录是 5%——而市场利率是 10%——他很可能会对母公司的股东施加一种仅仅遵循某些历史或行业范围的派息模式的股利政策。此外，他会期望子公司的管理者向他充分说明，为什么收益保留在他们的运营中而不是分配给母公司所有者是有道理的。但他很少会向他的所有者提供关于整个公司的类似分析。
In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return (as was discussed in last year’s section on Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company’s overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incrementally invested in the core business. The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team’s best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.
在判断管理者是否应该保留收益时，股东不应简单地将近年来的总增量收益与总增量资本进行比较，因为这种关系可能会被核心业务的情况所扭曲。在通货膨胀期间，拥有具有非凡经济特征的核心业务的公司，可以在该业务中以非常高的回报率使用少量增量资本（正如去年关于商誉的部分所讨论的）。但是，除非它们经历巨大的单位增长，否则出色的业务按定义会产生大量过剩现金。如果一家公司将大部分资金投入到其他低回报的业务中，那么该公司的整体留存资本回报率可能看起来仍然很好，因为增量投资于核心业务的收益部分正在获得非凡的回报。这种情况类似于职业-业余高尔夫比赛：即使所有的业余选手都是无可救药的菜鸟，由于职业选手的主导技能，球队的最佳成绩仍将可观。
Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisitions of businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The managers at fault periodically report on the lessons they have learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.)
许多持续显示出良好的净资产收益率和整体增量资本回报率的公司，实际上将其大部分留存收益用于经济上不具吸引力、甚至是灾难性的地方。然而，它们出色的核心业务——其收益年复一年地增长——掩盖了其他地方资本配置的反复失败（通常涉及对固有经济平庸的企业进行高价收购）。有错的管理者会定期报告他们从最近的失望中学到的教训。然后他们通常会寻求未来的教训。（失败似乎冲昏了他们的头脑。）
In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business, with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock (an action that increases the owners’ interest in the exceptional business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses). Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with low returns should be held to account for those allocation decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise is.
在这种情况下，如果收益只保留用于扩展高回报业务，而余额以股息形式支付或用于回购股票（这一行动增加了所有者在杰出业务中的权益，同时使他们免于参与低劣业务），股东的状况会好得多。高回报业务的管理者如果持续将这些业务产生的大量现金用于低回报的其他企业，那么无论整个企业多么盈利，他们都应该为这些分配决策负责。
Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate outlook changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been unwisely retained.
本次讨论中没有任何内容旨在主张股息应随着收益或投资机会的每一次波动而每季度波动。上市公司的股东更喜欢股息具有一致性和可预测性，这是可以理解的。因此，派息应反映对收益和增量资本回报率的长期预期。由于公司的长期前景变化不频繁，股息模式的变化也不应更频繁。但随着时间的推移，管理者扣留的可分配收益应该证明其保留是值得的。如果收益被不明智地保留，那么管理者很可能也被不明智地保留了。
Let’s now turn to Berkshire Hathaway and examine how these dividend principles apply to it. Historically, Berkshire has earned well over market rates on retained earnings, thereby creating over one dollar of market value for every dollar retained. Under such circumstances, any distribution would have been contrary to the financial interest of shareholders, large or small.
现在让我们转向伯克希尔·哈撒韦，看看这些股息原则如何适用于它。历史上，伯克希尔在留存收益上赚取了远高于市场水平的回报，因此每一美元留存收益创造了超过一美元的市场价值。在这种情况下，任何分配都将违背所有股东（无论大小）的财务利益。
In fact, significant distributions in the early years might have been disastrous, as a review of our starting position will show you. Charlie and I then controlled and managed three companies, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., and Blue Chip Stamps (all now merged into our present operation). Blue Chip paid only a small dividend, Berkshire and DRC paid nothing. If, instead, the companies had paid out their entire earnings, we almost certainly would have no earnings at all now - and perhaps no capital as well. The three companies each originally made their money from a single business: (1) textiles at Berkshire; (2) department stores at Diversified; and (3) trading stamps at Blue Chip. These cornerstone businesses (carefully chosen, it should be noted, by your Chairman and Vice Chairman) have, respectively, (1) survived but earned almost nothing, (2) shriveled in size while incurring large losses, and (3) shrunk in sales volume to about 5% its size at the time of our entry. (Who says “you can’t lose ‘em all”?) Only by committing available funds to much better businesses were we able to overcome these origins. (It’s been like overcoming a misspent youth.) Clearly, diversification has served us well.
事实上，早年的重大分配可能是灾难性的，回顾我们的起点就会明白。查理和我当时控制并管理着三家公司：伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司、多元化零售公司以及 Blue Chip 印花票（现已全部合并到我们当前的运营中）。Blue Chip 只支付少量股息，伯克希尔和 DRC 不支付股息。相反，如果这些公司支付了全部收益，我们现在几乎肯定根本没有收益——可能也没有资本。这三家公司最初都依靠单一业务赚钱：（1）伯克希尔的纺织业务；（2）多元化的百货商店；（3）Blue Chip 的交易印花票。这些基石业务（值得注意的是，由你们的董事长和副董事长精心挑选）分别：（1）幸存下来但几乎没赚到钱，（2）规模萎缩并遭受巨额亏损，（3）销售额缩减至我们进入时规模的 5% 左右。（谁说“你不能全输”？）只有将可用资金投入到更好的业务中，我们才能克服这些起源。（这就像克服一个被挥霍的青春。）显然，多元化对我们大有裨益。
We expect to continue to diversify while also supporting the growth of current operations though, as we’ve pointed out, our returns from these efforts will surely be below our historical returns. But as long as prospective returns are above the rate required to produce a dollar of market value per dollar retained, we will continue to retain all earnings. Should our estimate of future returns fall below that point, we will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe can not be effectively used. In making that judgment, we will look at both our historical record and our prospects. Because our year-to-year results are inherently volatile, we believe a five-year rolling average to be appropriate for judging the historical record.
我们期望继续多元化，同时支持现有业务的增长，不过，正如我们已经指出的，我们从这些努力中获得的回报肯定低于我们历史上的回报。但只要预期回报率高于产生每保留一美元创造一美元市场价值所需的比率，我们将继续保留所有收益。如果我们对未来回报的估计低于该水平，我们将分配我们认为无法有效利用的所有非受限收益。在做出这一判断时，我们将同时考察我们的历史记录和前景。由于我们的年度结果天生具有波动性，我们认为五年滚动平均值适合用于判断历史记录。
Our present plan is to use our retained earnings to further build the capital of our insurance companies. Most of our competitors are in weakened financial condition and reluctant to expand substantially. Yet large premium-volume gains for the industry are imminent, amounting probably to well over $15 billion in 1985 versus less than $5 billion in 1983. These circumstances could produce major amounts of profitable business for us. Of course, this result is no sure thing, but prospects for it are far better than they have been for many years.
我们目前的计划是利用留存收益进一步建立我们保险公司的资本。我们的大多数竞争对手财务状况疲弱，不愿大幅扩张。然而，行业保费收入的大幅增长即将到来，1985 年可能远超 150 亿美元，而 1983 年不到 50 亿美元。这些情况可能为我们带来大量的盈利业务。当然，这并非板上钉钉，但其前景比过去许多年要好得多。
Miscellaneous
杂项
This is the spot where each year I run my small “business wanted” ad. In 1984 John Loomis, one of our particularly knowledgeable and alert shareholders, came up with a company that met all of our tests. We immediately pursued this idea, and only a chance complication prevented a deal. Since our ad is pulling, we will repeat it in precisely last year’s form:
这是每年我刊登小型“求购企业”广告的地方。1984 年，John Loomis，我们一位特别知识渊博且警觉的股东，找到了一家符合我们所有测试标准的公司。我们立即跟进这个想法，只是一个偶然的复杂情况阻止了交易。既然我们的广告有效，我们将完全以去年的形式重复它：
We prefer:
(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们偏好：
（1）大规模收购（税后收益至少 500 万美元）；
（2）已证明的持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们没什么兴趣，“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感冒）；
（3）在很少或没有债务的情况下获得良好净资产收益率的业务；
（4）已有管理层（我们无法提供）；
（5）简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们将无法理解）；
（6）提供报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步讨论交易，浪费我们或卖家的时间）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内——关于我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于用现金购买，但如果我们获得的内在商业价值等于我们付出的，也会考虑发行股票。我们邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去曾与之打交道的商业伙伴来了解我们。对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们可以提供一个好归宿。
A record 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1984 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through this program were $3,179,000, and 1,519 charities were recipients. Our proxy material for the annual meeting will allow you to cast an advisory vote expressing your views about this program - whether you think we should continue it and, if so, at what per-share level. (You may be interested to learn that we were unable to find a precedent for an advisory vote in which management seeks the opinions of shareholders about owner-related corporate policies. Managers who put their trust in capitalism seem in no hurry to put their trust in capitalists.)
创纪录的 97.2% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1984 年股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划进行的捐款总额为 3,179,000 美元，有 1,519 家慈善机构受益。我们在年度股东大会的代理材料中将允许你们进行咨询性投票，表达你们对该计划的看法——你们是否认为我们应该继续该计划，如果继续，每股的捐款水平应该是多少。（你们可能有兴趣了解，我们未能找到管理层就所有者相关的公司政策征求股东意见的咨询性投票的先例。信任资本主义的管理者似乎并不急于信任资本家。）
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 60 and 61. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street” name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1985 will be ineligible for the 1985 program.
我们敦促新股东阅读第 60 和 61 页上关于我们股东指定捐款计划的描述。如果你们希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议你们立即确保你们的股份以实际所有者的名义登记，而不是以“街名”或名义持有人的名义登记。在 1985 年 9 月 30 日之前没有这样登记的股份将没有资格参与 1985 年的计划。
Our annual meeting will be on May 21, 1985 in Omaha, and I hope that you attend. Many annual meetings are a waste of time, both for shareholders and for management. Sometimes that is true because management is reluctant to open up on matters of business substance. More often a nonproductive session is the fault of shareholder participants who are more concerned about their own moment on stage than they are about the affairs of the corporation. What should be a forum for business discussion becomes a forum for theatrics, spleen-venting and advocacy of issues. (The deal is irresistible: for the price of one share you get to tell a captive audience your ideas as to how the world should be run.) Under such circumstances, the quality of the meeting often deteriorates from year to year as the antics of those interested in themselves discourage attendance by those interested in the business.
我们的年度股东大会将于 1985 年 5 月 21 日在奥马哈举行，我希望你们能参加。许多年度股东大会浪费了股东和管理层的时间。有时是因为管理层不愿就实质性的业务问题开诚布公。更多时候，会议没有成效是股东与会者的错，他们更关心自己在台上的时刻，而不是公司的事务。本应是业务讨论的论坛变成了戏剧表演、发泄情绪和倡导议题的论坛。（这个交易令人难以抗拒：只需付出一股的价格，你就可以向一群没有选择余地的听众讲述你对世界应该如何运转的想法。）在这种情况下，会议的质量常常逐年下降，因为那些只顾自己表演的滑稽举动，让那些关心业务的人不愿参加。
Berkshire’s meetings are a different story. The number of shareholders attending grows a bit each year and we have yet to experience a silly question or an ego-inspired commentary. Instead, we get a wide variety of thoughtful questions about the business. Because the annual meeting is the time and place for these, Charlie and I are happy to answer them all, no matter how long it takes. (We cannot, however, respond to written or phoned questions at other times of the year; one-person-at-a time reporting is a poor use of management time in a company with 3000 shareholders.) The only business matters that are off limits at the annual meeting are those about which candor might cost our company real money. Our activities in securities would be the main example.
伯克希尔的会议则不同。出席的股东人数每年略有增加，我们还没有遇到过一个愚蠢的问题或一个以自我为中心的评论。相反，我们得到了各种各样关于业务的有思想的问题。因为年度股东大会是讨论这些问题的合适时间和地点，查理和我乐意回答所有问题，无论需要多长时间。（然而，我们无法在一年中的其他时间回答书面或电话提问；在一家拥有 3000 名股东的公司里，一次一人的汇报是对管理时间的不良利用。）年度股东大会上唯一禁止讨论的业务事项是那些坦诚可能会给公司造成实际金钱损失的事项。我们在证券方面的活动是主要例子。
We always have bragged a bit on these pages about the quality of our shareholder-partners. Come to the annual meeting and you will see why. Out-of-towners should schedule a stop at Nebraska Furniture Mart. If you make some purchases, you’ll save far more than enough to pay for your trip, and you’ll enjoy the experience.
我们总是喜欢在这些页面上稍微吹嘘一下我们的股东-合伙人的质量。来参加年度股东大会，你们就会明白为什么。外地的股东应该安排在内布拉斯加家具卖场停留一下。如果你们买些东西，省下的钱将远远超过你们的旅行费用，而且你们会享受这次体验。
Warren E. Buffett
February 25, 1985
Chairman of the Board
沃伦·E·巴菲特
1985 年 2 月 25 日
董事会主席
Subsequent Event: On March 18, a week after copy for this report went to the typographer but shortly before production, we agreed to purchase three million shares of Capital Cities Communications, Inc. at $172.50 per share. Our purchase is contingent upon the acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. by Capital Cities, and will close when that transaction closes. At the earliest, that will be very late in 1985. Our admiration for the management of Capital Cities, led by Tom Murphy and Dan Burke, has been expressed several times in previous annual reports. Quite simply, they are tops in both ability and integrity. We will have more to say about this investment in next year’s report.
后续事件：3 月 18 日，在本报告稿件送交排字工一周后，但在制作前不久，我们同意以每股 172.50 美元的价格购买 Capital Cities Communications, Inc. 的 300 万股股票。我们的购买取决于 Capital Cities 收购美国广播公司，并将在该交易完成时交割。最早也要到 1985 年底。我们对以 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke 为首的 Capital Cities 管理层的钦佩之情，已在此前的年度报告中多次表达。简而言之，他们在能力和诚信方面都是一流的。我们将在明年的报告中对这项投资进行更多说明。