1967年1月25日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110

巴菲特合伙有限公司
奥马哈市基维特广场610号
内布拉斯加州 68131
电话 042-4110

January 25, 1967

1967年1月25日

The First Decade

第一个十年

The Partnership had its tenth anniversary during 1966. The celebration was appropriate -an all-time record (both past and future) was established for our performance margin relative to the Dow. Our advantage was 36 points which resulted from a plus 20.4% for the Partnership and a minus 15.6% for the Dow.

合伙公司在1966年迎来了它的十周年纪念。这次庆祝确实恰如其分——我们相对于道琼斯指数的业绩优势创下了历史新高（无论过去还是将来都无法复制）。我们领先了36个百分点，合伙公司盈利20.4%，而道琼斯指数下跌15.6%。

This pleasant but non-repeatable experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the Dow. Virtually all investment managers outperformed it during the year. The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the thirty stocks involved. Several of the highest priced components, which thereby carry disproportionate weight (Dupont, General Motors), were particularly poor performers in 1966. This, coupled with the general aversion to conventional blue chips, caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment experience, particularly during the last quarter.

这种令人愉快但不可复制的经历，部分是由于道指表现平淡。几乎所有的投资经理在这一年都跑赢了道指。道指是按30只成分股的股价加权计算的。几只高价成分股（杜邦、通用汽车）因此权重过高，它们在1966年表现尤其糟糕。再加上市场普遍回避传统的蓝筹股，导致道指相对于整体投资经验而言表现不佳，尤其是在最后一个季度。

The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:

下面汇总了道琼斯指数的逐年表现、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配前（超过6%的部分的四分之一）的表现，以及有限合伙人的结果：

Cumulative Results | 141.1% | 1028.7% | 641.5% |
Annual Compounded Rate | 9.7% | 29.0% | 23.5% |

累计结果 | 141.1% | 1028.7% | 641.5% |
年复合收益率 | 9.7% | 29.0% | 23.5% |

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

(1) 基于道指价值每年的变化加上当年持有道指所能获得的股息。该表包含合伙公司所有完整的运营年度。

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(2) 1957-61年包含所有前身有限合伙公司在全年运营中的合并结果，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分成。

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(3) 1957-61年根据前栏合伙公司结果计算，已按现行合伙协议计提普通合伙人分成，但未扣除有限合伙人每月提取的资金。

On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

以累计或复利计算的结果如下：

Annual Compounded Rate | 11.4% | 29.8% | 23.9% |

年复合收益率 | 11.4% | 29.8% | 23.9% |

Investment Companies

投资公司

On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

下页照例列出了两家最大的遵循通常95-100%投资于普通股策略的开放式投资公司（共同基金），以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩。

Cumulative Results | 118.1% | 106.3% | 142.8% | 126.9% | 141.1% | 641.5% |
Annual Compounded Rate | 8.6% | 7.9% | 9.8% | 9.0% | 9.7% | 23.5% |

累计结果 | 118.1% | 106.3% | 142.8% | 126.9% | 141.1% | 641.5% |
年复合收益率 | 8.6% | 7.9% | 9.8% | 9.0% | 9.7% | 23.5% |

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 根据资产价值变化加上当年对登记持有人的分配计算。

(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for 1966.

(2) 1957-1965年数据来自1966年《穆迪银行与金融手册》，1966年为估计值。

These investment company performance figures have been regularly reported here to show that the Dow is no patsy as an investment standard. It should again be emphasized that the companies were not selected on the basis of comparability to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. There are important differences including: (1) investment companies operate under both internally and externally imposed restrictions on their investment actions that are not applicable to us; (2) investment companies diversify far more than we do and, in all probability, thereby have less chance for a really bad performance relative to the Dow in a single year; and (3) their managers have considerably less incentive for abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.

这里定期报告这些投资公司的业绩数据，旨在表明道琼斯指数作为投资标准绝非软柿子。必须再次强调，这些公司并非基于与巴菲特合伙有限公司的可比性而挑选。存在重要差异，包括：（1）投资公司的投资行为受到内部和外部限制，而这些限制不适用于我们；（2）投资公司的分散投资程度远高于我们，因此很可能在单一年份出现大幅落后于道指的情况几率更低；（3）它们的经理人追求超常业绩的动机明显较弱，而遵循传统的动机更强。

However, the records above do reveal what well-regarded, highly paid, full-time professional investment managers have been able to accomplish while working with common stocks. These managers have been favorites of American investors (more than 600,000) making free choices among many alternatives in the investment management field. It is probable that their results are typical of the overwhelming majority of professional investment managers.

然而，上述记录确实揭示了那些备受推崇、薪酬优厚的全职专业投资经理在操作普通股时所能实现的成果。这些经理是美国投资者（超过60万）在众多投资管理选项中自由选择时的宠儿。他们的结果很可能代表了绝大多数专业投资经理的典型表现。

It is not true, however, that these are the best records achieved in the investment field. A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities. However, they are generally managed by very bright, motivated people and it is only fair that I mention the existence of such superior results in this general discussion of the record of professional investment management.

然而，这些并非投资领域的最佳记录。少数共同基金和一些私人投资操作的业绩远胜道指，在某些情况下甚至大幅优于巴菲特合伙有限公司。它们的投资手法通常与我们的截然不同，也超出了我的能力范围。但它们通常由非常聪明、充满动力的人管理，在讨论专业投资管理整体记录时，提及如此卓越的成绩才公平。

Trends in Our Business

我们的业务趋势

A keen mind working diligently at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of wrong conclusions.

若有人绞尽脑汁解读第一页的数据，很可能得出许多错误结论。

The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.

第一个十年的业绩在未来十年绝无可能重现，甚至连勉强接近都不可能。说不定会有某个雄心勃勃的二十五岁年轻人，以10.51万美元的初始合伙资本，在一个有利于成功实践其投资理念的十年商业和市场环境中做到。

They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.

但绝不会由现在这个三十六岁、营养更好、管理着5406.5345万美元合伙资本的我来实现，因为我现在能找到的真正好主意只有从前的五分之一到十分之一。

Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri, May 5, 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)

巴菲特联合有限公司（巴菲特合伙有限公司的前身）于1956年5月5日在密苏里河西岸成立，初始成员包括四位家族成员、三位挚友和10.51万美元。（我本想从1957年1月那封一页半的年度致信中找到关于未来或现状的灵光一闪，摘引于此。然而，显然有人篡改了我的存档副本，把我那些真知灼见删掉了。）

At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.

那时以及随后的几年，有大量证券的交易价格远低于我们用于筛选一般市场投资时采用的“私人所有者价值”标准。我们还遇到了源源不断的“套利”机会，其百分率非常合我们胃口。问题始终在于选择哪个，而非有没有。因此，我们能够持有15到25只证券，并对所有持仓的潜在回报充满热情。

In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3) substantially more competition.

过去几年，这种情况发生了巨大变化。我们现在几乎找不到我能理解、规模适中且有望实现每年跑赢道指10个百分点的证券。最近三年，我们每年只能找到两三个符合这种超额收益预期的新点子。幸运的是，其中一些我们抓住了。但早些年，投入更少的精力就能发现数十个类似机会。很难客观看待自身生产力下降的原因。三个明显的因素是：（1）市场环境有所改变；（2）我们的规模扩大；（3）竞争大幅加剧。

It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest (million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bank accounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.

显然，仅靠涓涓细流般少量好点子支撑的业务，前景不如拥有稳定涌现的想法。至今，这涓流提供的养分与洪流不相上下。之所以如此，一是因为一个人的消化能力有限（百万美元的想法对千美元账户毫无裨益——我很早就深刻体会到了这一点），二是因为点子有限会促使人们更深入利用手头已有的。后一个因素近年对我们确实起了作用。但涓流完全枯竭的可能性远大于洪流。

These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't go for the "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick 'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz. (That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)

这些状况不会让我试图在自己理解范围之外做投资决策（我不信奉“打不过就加入”的理念——我自己更倾向于“如果加入不了，那就打败它”）。我们不会涉足那些技术远超我能力范畴、且对投资决策至关重要的行业。我对半导体或集成电路的了解，就跟对chrzaszcz（一种波兰五月虫，同学们，如果觉得发音难，就跟thrzaszcz押韵）交配习性的了解差不多。

Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.

此外，我们不会追随那种常见的、试图预测市场走势而轻视企业估值的投资方法。这种所谓的“时尚”投资近年（包括我在一月份写这封信时）经常带来丰厚且快速的利润。这是一种我既无法肯定也无法否认其有效性的投资技巧。它不能完全满足我的理智（或许是我的偏见），也绝对不符合我的秉性。我自己不会据此方法投入自有资金，因此，更不会用你们的钱这么做。

Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.

最后，我们不会介入那些虽然预期利润可观，但很可能出现重大人际问题的投资活动。

What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.

作为合伙人，我向你们承诺的是，我会努力维持这股想法涓流，并尽可能从中榨取最大收益——但如果它完全枯竭，我会诚实、及时地告知你们，以便我们都能采取其他行动。

Analysis of 1966 Results

1966年业绩分析

All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1966. Specifically, we had a total overall gain of $8,906,701 derived as follows:

我们投资业务的四大主要类别在1966年都表现良好。具体来说，我们实现的总收益为8,906,701美元，来源如下：

A few caveats are necessary before we get on with the main discussion:

在深入讨论之前，有几点需要提醒：

1. An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition, we'll be glad to give you a copy.

1. 1965年1月18日的信中已对上述各类别进行了解释。如果你的记忆需要刷新，而你常去的报摊没有口袋版，我们很乐意给你一份。

1. The classifications are not iron-clad. Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.

1. 这些分类并非严格不变。不会事后修改，但最初归类有时带有随意性。

1. Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.

1. 按类别平均投资额计算的收益率，相对于按期初投资额计算的合伙公司收益率而言会被低估。上述数据中，若我们在1月1日以100元买入某证券，年内匀速增值至12月31日的150元，平均投资额为125元，收益率为40%，而传统算法为50%。换言之，上表在计算平均投资额时采用月度市价均值。

1. All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable average investment category.

1. 所有结果均基于100%自有、无杠杆的假设。利息及其他一般费用从总收益中扣除，不按类别分摊。与特定投资操作直接相关的费用（如做空股票支付的股息）按类别扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资额（多头减空头）计入相应类别的平均投资额。

1. The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.

1. 上表用途有限。各类别的结果主要取决于一两项投资。它们不代表大量稳定数据（如全美男性死亡率之类）的集合，不能据此得出可靠结论或进行预测。相反，它们反映的是偶发、非均质现象，只能为各种行动方案提供非常粗略的参考，我们也是这么使用的。

1. Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.

1. 最后，这些计算的精细程度远不及我们数钱时的认真，且可能因无法完全自检而存在笔误或计算错误。

Controls

控股类

There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies. These arose through: (1) retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to $2,600,838 in 1966.

1966年，控股公司收益主要有三个来源：（1）归属于我们持仓的留存业务收益；（2）在公开市场以低于我们控股权益估值的价格增持股份；（3）控股公司所持证券的未实现增值。1966年，所有正项合计为2,600,838美元。

However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by $1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation applicable to controlling interests as of December 31, 1966. Thus the overall gain in the control category was reduced to $1,566,058 for the year.

然而，由于我在1966年11月1日信中提到的因素、特定行业状况以及其他相关估值项目，在确定1966年12月31日控股权益的公允估值时，该收益被调减了1,034,780美元。因此，控股类全年的总收益降至1,566,058美元。

We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss, perhaps substantial, during the year. This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation will prevail during 1967.

1966年，我们无疑很幸运，净资产中有较高比例投资于企业而非股票。同样的资金若投入普通市场持仓，当年很可能会产生亏损，甚至可能相当严重。这并非有意为之，如果当年股市大幅上涨，这个类别反而会严重拖累整体业绩。1967年仍将如此。

Generals - Private Owner

低估类（私人所有者价值）

Our performance here falls in the "twenty-one dollars a day, once a month" category. In the middle of 1965 we started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get $10 million or more invested at the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers, suppliers, ex-employees, etc. Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.

我们此类别的表现属于“每天21美元，每月一次”那种类型。1965年中，我们开始买入一只非常诱人的大规模流通证券，其交易价格远低于对私人所有者的价值。我们希望在两到三年内，能以当时有利的价格累积投入1000万美元以上。该公司经营的各项业务我们都理解，并且可以通过竞争对手、经销商、客户、供应商、前员工等全面核实其竞争优劣势。该股独有的市场条件让我们相信，只要有耐心，我们就能在不扰动股价的情况下买入大量股票。

At yearend 1965 we had invested $1,956,980 and the market value of our holding was $2,358,412 so that $401,432 was contributed to performance luring 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett Partnerships Ltd.’s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners (psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been floating) but would have enhanced long term performance. The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.

1965年底，我们已投入1,956,980美元，持仓市值为2,358,412美元，因此为1965年业绩贡献了401,432美元。当然，我们更希望市价低于成本，因为我们的目标是继续买入而非卖出。那样会压制巴菲特合伙有限公司1965年的业绩，或许还会降低有限合伙人的亢奋感（从心理上讲，所有合伙人的净结果将是不赚不赔，因为普通合伙人会浮盈），但会提升长期业绩。股价已经略高于成本这一事实，已然拖慢了我们的买入计划，从而降低了最终利润。

An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long term results occurred in 1966. Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wisest course (it may not have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of $1,269,181 in February, of which $867,749 was applicable to 1966.

1966年，短期业绩与长期结果最大化之间的冲突出现了一个更戏剧性的例子。一个此前我完全不了解的第三方发出了要约收购，彻底断送了未来低价买入的机会。我认定最明智的做法（或许并非如此）是卖出我们的持仓，于是我们在2月份实现了总计1,269,181美元的利润，其中867,749美元归属于1966年。

While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can be sure I don't delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results. However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year's market environment.

尽管在1966年最终形成的市场环境下，任何收益都显得格外好看，但你们放心，我绝不喜欢把大山变成小丘。这个小丘当然反映在了1966年的业绩中。然而从长期角度看，如果1966年业绩再差5个百分点，而我们继续以今年市场环境中可能出现的低迷价格大量买入该股，我们的境况会好得多。

Good ideas were a dime a dozen, such a premature ending would not be unpleasant. There is something to be said, of course, for a business operation where some of the failures produce moderate profits. However, you can see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas by examining our average investment in the Private Owner category - we came up with nothing during the remainder of the year despite lower stock prices, which should have been conducive to finding such opportunities.

假如好点子唾手可得，这种提前结束倒也无妨。当然，一个即使有些失败也能产生适度利润的业务操作自有其可取之处。但你们看看我们在私人所有者类别上的平均投资额，就知道寻找替代主意有多难——尽管后续股价更低，本应有利于发现此类机会，我们在年内剩余时间里却一无所获。

Generals - Relatively Undervalued

低估类（相对低估）

Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966. This investment has substantially out-performed the general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year's performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices. Such constant evaluation and comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.

我们在此类别中的相对表现是有史以来最好的——这归功于一只持仓，它既是1965年末也是1966年末我们的最大投资。在我们持有它的每一年（1964、1965、1966），该投资都大幅跑赢了整体市场。尽管单一年份的表现可能极不稳定，但我们认为，未来三到四年内取得优异表现的概率非常高。正是这只特定证券的吸引力和相对确定性，促使我在1965年11月引入了第七条基本规则，允许单只持仓最高占我们净资产的40%。我们投入大量精力持续评估该公司的方方面面，并不断检验“该证券优于现有其他投资选择”这一假设。这种随价格变化而不断评估和比较的过程，对我们的投资运作至关重要。

It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which outperformed the market. We simply don't have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the relative merits of our largest holding. Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.

如果能报告说，我们在相对低估类的业绩来自十个行业的十五只证券，且它们几乎全都跑赢市场，那会令人愉快得多（也预示着更美好的未来）。但我们确实没有那么多好点子。如前所述，新想法会不断与现有想法进行比较，如果换仓会降低预期收益，我们就不会行动。这一政策导致近年来交易活动偏少，因为我们对自己最大持仓的相对优势感受强烈。这种情况意味着，已实现收益在总业绩中的占比，远低于好点子大量涌现的早年。

The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.

我们在该类别的集中持仓，必然导致短期业绩的大幅波动——其中有些无疑会令人不快。在比我对合伙人报告更短的时间跨度里，已经出现过这种波动。这也是我认为频繁报告很愚蠢，并且在我们这种长期导向业务中可能产生误导的原因之一。

Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.

就我个人而言，在去年信中关于分散投资的限度内，我愿意忍受（且不论享受）短期大幅波动的痛苦，以换取长期业绩的最大化。但我不愿为了追求更好的长期业绩而承担永久性重大资本损失的风险。说得更明白些——在我们的集中持仓政策下，合伙人应完全准备好迎接大幅落后市场的时期（这在急剧上涨的市场中更易发生），以此作为我们偶尔跑赢（如1965、1966年的情况）的对冲，也是我们为期望中的良好长期业绩付出的代价。

All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held under water." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.

这番关于长期视角的谈论，让一位合伙人评论道：“若脑袋被按在水下，即便五分钟也漫长难熬。”当然，这正是我们在操作中极少使用杠杆的原因。1966年，我们的平均银行贷款远低于平均净值的10%。

One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about $1.6 million (it could be bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock price up to a point where it was not relatively attractive. Though our overall gain was $728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.

最后再提一下低估类（相对低估）。在这一板块，我们也有过一段经历：它提升了1966年的业绩，却损害了我们的长期前景。1966年，我们在此类别中仅有一个真正重要的新想法。我们从春末开始买入，但才累积到约160万美元（虽可稳定买入，但速度只能中等），外部因素就将股价推高至不再具备相对吸引力的水平。尽管我们在约六个半月的平均持有期内获得了728,141美元的总收益，但如果该股长期横盘，让我们能建立真正可观的仓位，那会理想得多。

Workouts

套利类

In last year's letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some past years, I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of $7,666,314 employed in this category. Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout section so that our net equity capital employed was really something under this figure and our return was somewhat better than the 22.4% indicated on page six. Here, too, we ran into substantial variation. At June 30, our overall profit on this category was $16,112 on an average investment of $7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily good second half offsetting a poor first half.

在去年的信中，我预测套利类的重要性会下降。尽管没有过去某些年份那么重要，我们对1966年的经历颇感惊喜，全年在此类别的平均投入达到7,666,314美元。此外，我们倾向于将借款归入套利部分，因此实际运用的净权益资本低于此数，收益率也略高于前文显示的22.4%。这里同样波动巨大。截至6月30日，我们在此类别的总利润仅为16,112美元，平均投资额为7,870,151美元，所以完全是靠极好的下半年扭转了糟糕的上半年。

In past years, sometimes as much as 30-40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.

过去，有时多达30-40%的净值会投入到套利类中，但这种情况未来极不可能重演。不过，它们仍可能以适度的资本投入产生一些不错的回报。

Miscellaneous

杂项

Operationally, we continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John, Elizabeth and Donna all contributing excellent performances. At Buffett Partnership. Ltd. we have never had to divert investment effort to offset organizational shortcomings and this has been an important ingredient in the performance over the years.

运营方面，我们的运作依然远超额定产能，比尔、约翰、伊丽莎白和唐娜都贡献了出色的表现。在巴菲特合伙有限公司，我们从未需要分散投资精力去弥补组织上的不足，这是多年来取得业绩的重要因素。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., aided for the second year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient and comprehensive job.

毕马威会计师事务所在其计算机的第二年辅助下，一如既往地完成了快速、高效且全面的工作。

We all continue to maintain more than an academic interest in the Partnership. The employees and I, our spouses and children, have a total of over $10 million invested at January 1, 1967. In the case of my family, our Buffett Partnership, Ltd. investment represents well over 90% of our net worth.

我们所有人对合伙公司的兴趣依然远超学术层面。截至1967年1月1日，员工和我本人，以及我们的配偶和子女，总投入超过1000万美元。就我的家庭而言，我们在巴菲特合伙有限公司的投资占我们净值的90%以上。

Within the coming two weeks you will receive:

在未来两周内，你会收到：

1. A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.

1. 一封税务信函，提供你申报1966年联邦所得税所需的全部BPL信息。这封信是唯一作税务用途的文件。

1. An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1966, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.

1. 毕马威会计师事务所出具的1966年审计报告，列明BPL的运营及财务状况，以及你的个人资本账户。

1. A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1967. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.

1. 一封由我签署的信，说明截至1967年1月1日你在BPL的权益状况。这与审计得出的数字一致。

Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 15 summarizing the first half of this year.

如果信中有任何内容，或年内发生任何需要澄清的事项，请告知我。我的下一封信大约在7月15日左右，总结今年上半年的情况。

Cordially,

谨上，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WEB eh

WEB：eh