2008 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份除外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）来计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的结果已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正收益的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负收益的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our decrease in net worth during 2008 was $11.5 billion, which reduced the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 9.6%. Over the last 44 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,530, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*

2008 年，我们的净资产减少了 115 亿美元，使得 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值下降了 9.6%。在过去 44 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 70,530 美元，年复合增长率为 20.3%。*

The table on the preceding page, recording both the 44-year performance of Berkshire's book value and the S&P 500 index, shows that 2008 was the worst year for each. The period was devastating as well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and commodities. By year end, investors of all stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.

前一页的表格记录了伯克希尔账面价值和标普 500 指数 44 年的表现，显示 2008 年是两者表现最差的一年。这段时间对企业债券和市政债券、房地产和大宗商品也具有破坏性。到了年底，各类投资者都伤痕累累、困惑不已，就像误入羽毛球比赛的小鸟。

As the year progressed, a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world's great financial institutions was unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned non-functional. The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was young: "In God we trust; all others pay cash."

随着一年时间的推移，世界上许多大型金融机构内部一系列危及生存的问题被揭露出来。这导致了信贷市场功能失调，在重要方面很快变得无法运作。全国的口号变成了我年轻时在餐馆墙上看到的信条：“我们信靠上帝；其余人等，现金交易。”

By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country. A freefall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before witnessed. The U.S. - and much of the world - became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.

到了第四季度，信贷危机加上房屋和股票价格暴跌，产生了一种席卷全国的瘫痪性恐惧。随后商业活动急剧下滑，其加速程度是我前所未见的。美国——以及世界大部分地区——陷入了恶性的负反馈循环。恐惧导致商业收缩，而商业收缩又导致更大的恐惧。

This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone "all in." Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone's guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won't leave willingly.

这种令人衰弱的螺旋式发展促使我们的政府采取了大规模行动。用扑克术语来说，财政部和美联储已经“全押”。以前按杯计量的经济药物最近已按桶投放。这些曾经不可想象的剂量几乎肯定会带来不良的副作用。其确切性质谁也说不准，但一个可能的后果是通货膨胀的冲击。此外，主要行业已经依赖联邦援助，紧随其后的将是城市和州提出令人难以置信的要求。让这些实体摆脱公共奶水将是一个政治挑战。他们不会心甘情愿地离开。

Whatever the downsides may be, strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown. Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of our economy would have been cataclysmic. Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and the various Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.

无论缺点是什么，如果金融体系要避免彻底崩溃，政府去年采取强有力的立即行动是必要的。如果发生崩溃，对我们经济每个领域的后果都将是灾难性的。无论喜欢与否，华尔街、主街和美国各小巷的居民都在同一条船上。

Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 21½% prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges.

然而，在这些坏消息中，永远不要忘记我们的国家在过去曾面临过更糟糕的磨难。仅在 20 世纪，我们就经历了两次世界大战（其中一次最初我们似乎处于败势）；十几次恐慌和衰退；导致 1980 年最优惠利率达到 21.5% 的恶性通货膨胀；以及 1930 年代的大萧条，当时失业率多年维持在 15% 至 25% 之间。美国从不缺少挑战。

Without fail, however, we've overcome them. In the face of those obstacles - and many others - the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497. Compare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which humans secured only tiny gains, if any, in how they lived. Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America's best days lie ahead.

然而，我们无一例外地战胜了它们。面对这些障碍以及许多其他障碍，美国人的实际生活水平在 20 世纪提高了近七倍，而道琼斯工业指数从 66 点上升到 11,497 点。将这一时期的记录与人类数十个世纪中生活水平仅获得微小（如果有的话）进步的时期相比较。尽管道路并非平坦，但随着时间的推移，我们的经济体系运转得异常出色。它以前所未有的方式释放了人类潜能，并将继续这样做。美国最好的日子还在前方。

Take a look again at the 44-year table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44. But neither Charlie Munger, my partner in running Berkshire, nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance. (In our usual opinionated view, we don't think anyone else can either.) We're certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 - and, for that matter, probably well beyond - but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.

再看一下第 2 页的 44 年表格。在这些年份中有 75% 的时间，标普 500 股票录得上涨。我猜，在未来 44 年中，大致相似的百分比年份将为正。但是，无论是我的合伙人查理·芒格还是我，都无法提前预测哪一年会赢、哪一年会输。（以我们通常坚持己见的观点，我们认为其他人也无法预测。）例如，我们确信经济在 2009 年全年将一片混乱——甚至可能更长时间——但这个结论并不能告诉我们股市会涨还是会跌。

In good years and bad, Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
(1) maintaining Berkshire's Gibraltar-like financial position, which features huge amounts of excess liquidity, near-term obligations that are modest, and dozens of sources of earnings and cash;
(2) widening the "moats" around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive advantages;
(3) acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
(4) expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who, over the years, have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.

无论好坏年份，查理和我只是专注于四个目标：
（1）保持伯克希尔直布罗陀式的财务状况，其特点是拥有大量的超额流动性、适度的短期债务以及数十个盈利和现金来源；
（2）拓宽我们运营业务的“护城河”，使其具有持久的竞争优势；
（3）收购和发展新的、多样化的盈利来源；
（4）扩大和培养一批多年来为伯克希尔带来卓越业绩的杰出运营经理。

Berkshire in 2008

伯克希尔 2008 年回顾

Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as well. Our retailers were hit particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential construction. In aggregate, however, our manufacturing, service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them - particularly the larger ones - continue to strengthen their competitive positions. Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire's two most important businesses - our insurance and utility groups - produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy. Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and have excellent prospects.

伯克希尔旗下业绩受经济显著影响的大部分业务去年的盈利低于其潜力，2009 年也将如此。我们的零售业务以及与住宅建设相关的业务受到尤其严重的打击。然而，总的来说，我们的制造、服务和零售业务赚取了可观的利润，并且其中大部分——尤其是较大的业务——继续加强其竞争地位。此外，我们很幸运，伯克希尔两项最重要的业务——我们的保险和公用事业集团——产生的收益与整体经济不相关。这两项业务在 2008 年都取得了出色的业绩，并且前景极佳。

As predicted in last year's report, the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008. Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year. This means that our $58.5 billion of insurance "float" - money that doesn't belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit - cost us less than zero. In fact, we were paid $2.8 billion to hold our float during 2008. Charlie and I find this enjoyable.

正如去年报告中所预测的那样，我们的保险业务在 2007 年实现的异常承保利润在 2008 年没有重现。尽管如此，保险集团连续第六年实现了承保利润。这意味着我们 585 亿美元的保险“浮存金”——不属于我们、但我们可以持有并为其利益进行投资的资金——对我们来说成本低于零。事实上，2008 年我们因持有浮存金而获得了 28 亿美元的报酬。查理和我对此感到愉快。

Over time, most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes their economics far different from ours. Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses in some years. But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business, and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing. Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is an economic powerhouse.

随着时间的推移，大多数保险公司都会经历重大的承保亏损，这使得它们的经济状况与我们的截然不同。当然，我们在某些年份也会经历承保亏损。但我们拥有保险业最好的管理团队，而且在大多数情况下，他们监管着根深蒂固且有价值的特许经营权。考虑到这些优势，我相信我们将多年实现承保利润，因此我们的浮存金将对我们零成本。我们的保险业务是伯克希尔的核心业务，是一台经济动力强劲的机器。

Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains. Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the managers of this operation, have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry. I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.

查理和我对我们的公用事业业务同样充满热情，该业务去年盈利创纪录，并准备在未来获得收益。该业务的经理戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔取得了公用事业行业其他地方无法比拟的成果。当他们提出新项目时，我很喜欢，因为在这个资本密集型业务中，这些项目通常很大。这些项目为伯克希尔提供了以可观回报投入大量资金的机会。

Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities, and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy.

去年资本配置方面也进展顺利。伯克希尔一直是企业和证券的买家，市场的混乱为我们的购买提供了顺风。在投资时，悲观是你的朋友，狂喜是你的敌人。

In our insurance portfolios, we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets. These should add about $1½ billion pre-tax to Berkshire's annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well. We also closed on our Marmon acquisition (we own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years). Additionally, certain of our subsidiaries made "tuck-in" acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.

在我们的保险投资组合中，我们以正常市场无法提供的条件进行了三项重大投资。这些投资应为伯克希尔每年增加约 15 亿美元的税前利润，并提供资本收益的可能性。我们还完成了对 Marmon 的收购（我们现在拥有该公司 64% 的股份，并将在未来六年内购买其剩余股份）。此外，我们的一些子公司进行了“补强”收购，这将增强它们的竞争地位和盈利能力。

That's the good news. But there's another less pleasant reality: During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt. I will tell you more about these later. Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.

这是好消息。但还有另一个不那么愉快的现实：2008 年我在投资方面做了一些愚蠢的事情。我至少犯了一个主动的重大错误和几个造成损失的小错误。稍后我会告诉你更多。此外，我还犯了一些疏忽的错误，当出现应该让我重新审视自己的想法并迅速采取行动的新的事实时，我却犹豫不决。

Additionally, the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market. This does not bother Charlie and me. Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions. Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that "Price is what you pay; value is what you get." Whether we're talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.

此外，我们继续持有的债券和股票的市场价值与大盘一起经历了显著下跌。这并不会困扰查理和我。事实上，如果我们有资金可以增加头寸，我们反而喜欢这种价格下跌。很久以前，本·格雷厄姆教会我：“价格是你支付的，价值是你得到的。”无论我们谈论的是袜子还是股票，我都喜欢在打折时购买优质商品。

Yardsticks

衡量标尺

Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend those totaled $122 billion (not counting the investments held by our finance and utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value). About $58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.

伯克希尔有两个主要的价值领域。第一个是我们的投资：股票、债券和现金等价物。到年底，这些投资总额为 1,220 亿美元（不包括我们金融和公用事业业务持有的投资，这些投资我们归入第二个价值桶）。其中约 585 亿美元是由我们的保险浮存金提供资金的。

Berkshire's second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 67 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 96. We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates, and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.

伯克希尔的第二个价值组成部分是来自投资和保险以外来源的收益。这些收益由我们的 67 家非保险公司提供，详见第 96 页。我们从该计算中排除了保险收益，因为我们保险业务的价值来自于其产生的可投资资金，而我们已经将这个因素包含在第一个价值桶中。

In 2008, our investments fell from $90,343 per share of Berkshire (after minority interest) to $77,793, a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of $4,093 per Berkshire share to $3,921 (again after minority interest).

2008 年，我们的投资从每股伯克希尔 90,343 美元（扣除少数股东权益后）下降到 77,793 美元，这一下降是由市场价格下跌引起的，而不是由股票或债券的净卖出引起的。我们的第二个价值领域从每股伯克希尔税前利润 4,093 美元下降到 3,921 美元（同样扣除少数股东权益后）。

Both of these performances are unsatisfactory. Over time, we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire's intrinsic value at an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for several decades. We like buying underpriced securities, but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.

这两种表现都不令人满意。随着时间的推移，如果我们要以可接受的速度增加伯克希尔的内在价值，我们需要在每个领域都取得可观的收益。然而，展望未来，我们的重点将放在收益板块，就像过去几十年一样。我们喜欢购买低估的证券，但我们更喜欢购买定价合理的运营业务。

Now, let's take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们看看伯克希尔的四个主要运营板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入账户特征都截然不同。因此，像标准财务报表中那样将它们混在一起会妨碍分析。所以我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。

Insurance

保险

Let's look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

让我们先看看保险，伯克希尔的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。

Property-casualty ("P/C") insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire's benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，我们持有的浮存金金额与保费收入相比保持非常稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。

If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.

如果保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。这种结合让我们能够享受免费资金的使用——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。唉，这种快乐结果的希望吸引了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。通常这种成本相当低，但在一些灾难频发的年份，承保亏损的成本超过了使用浮存金带来的收入。

In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most - though certainly not all - future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.

在我可能有偏见的观点中，伯克希尔拥有世界上最好的大型保险业务。而且我绝对要说，我们拥有最好的经理人。我们的浮存金从 1967 年我们进入该行业时的 1,600 万美元增长到 2009 年底的 620 亿美元。此外，我们已经连续七年实现承保利润。我相信，在未来大多数（尽管肯定不是全部）年份，我们很可能会继续盈利承保。如果我们做到了，我们的浮存金将是无成本的，就好像有人将 620 亿美元存入我们这里，我们可以为自己的利益投资而不支付利息。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry's overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire's value. It's a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个财产意外险行业可以预期的结果：在大多数年份，保费不足以覆盖损失加费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形股本回报率远低于标普 500 的回报率。伯克希尔卓越的经济状况之所以存在，是因为我们有一些杰出的管理者在运营一些不寻常的业务。我们的保险 CEO 们值得你们的感谢，他们为伯克希尔的价值增加了数十亿美元。我很高兴向你们介绍这些全明星。

Let's start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.

我们从 GEICO 开始，它因每年 8 亿美元的广告预算而为你们所熟知（几乎是汽车保险领域排名第二的广告商的两倍）。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司。现年 66 岁的托尼仍然每天跳着踢踏舞去办公室，就像 79 岁的我一样。我们俩都觉得自己很幸运，能在自己热爱的事业中工作。

GEICO's customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here's proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they've stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.

GEICO 的客户也对公司有热情。证据如下：自伯克希尔 1996 年获得 GEICO 控股权以来，其市场份额从 2.5% 增长到 8.1%，这一增长反映了净增加了 700 万保单持有人。也许他们联系我们是因为觉得我们的壁虎很可爱，但他们从我们这里购买是为了节省重要的钱。（也许你也可以；请致电 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com。）他们留下来了，因为他们喜欢我们的服务和价格。

Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company's stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.

伯克希尔分两个阶段收购了 GEICO。在 1976-80 年，我们以 4,700 万美元购买了该公司约三分之一的股票。多年来，该公司大量回购自己的股票，使我们的持股比例在没有再购买任何股票的情况下增长到了约 50%。然后，在 1996 年 1 月 2 日，我们以 23 亿美元现金收购了 GEICO 剩余的 50%，约是我们最初购买成本的 50 倍。

An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it's up to 18.
Broker: Yes, and that's just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it's an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.

一个古老的华尔街笑话接近我们的经历：
客户：谢谢你让我在 5 元买了 XYZ 股票。我听说它涨到 18 了。
经纪人：是的，这还只是开始。事实上，公司现在做得非常好，在 18 元买入甚至比你当初买入时更好。
客户：该死，我就知道我应该等一下的。

GEICO's growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That's illegal almost everywhere, but if you've lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our "low-cost producer" status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country's sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company's float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.

GEICO 的增长可能在 2010 年放缓。由于汽车销售低迷，美国的车辆登记量实际上在下降。此外，高失业率导致越来越多的司机不投保。（这几乎在任何地方都是非法的，但如果你丢了工作还想开车……）然而，我们的“低成本生产商”地位必将确保我们在未来获得显著收益。1995 年，GEICO 是美国第六大汽车保险公司；现在我们排名第三。该公司的浮存金从 27 亿美元增长到 96 亿美元。同样重要的是，在伯克希尔拥有 GEICO 的 14 年中，有 13 年它实现了承保利润。

I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I'm even more excited today.

1951 年 1 月，当我作为一名 20 岁的学生第一次访问 GEICO 时，我就对它感到兴奋。多亏了托尼，我今天更加兴奋。

A hugely important event in Berkshire's history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha - and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)

伯克希尔历史上一个极其重要的事件发生在 1985 年的一个星期六。阿吉特·贾因走进了我们在奥马哈的办公室——我立刻就知道我们找到了一位超级巨星。（他是被迈克·戈德堡发现的，现在迈克已被提升为圣·迈克。）

We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity's small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.

我们立即让阿吉特负责国民赔偿公司规模小且举步维艰的再保险业务。多年来，他将这项业务打造成了保险界独一无二的巨头。

Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit's operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits - and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants ("names") who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.

阿吉特的业务如今只有 30 名员工，却在保险业的多个领域创下了交易规模的记录。阿吉特承保数十亿美元的保额——然后将每一分钱的风险都保留下来，而不是将其分摊给其他保险公司。三年前，他接过了劳合社的巨额负债，使其能够清理与 27,972 名参与者（“成员”）的关系，这些成员承保了问题重重的保单，曾一度威胁到这家拥有 322 年历史的机构的生存。单单那份合同的保费就高达 71 亿美元。2009 年，他谈判了一份寿险再保险合同，可能在未来 50 年左右为我们带来 500 亿美元的保费。

Ajit's business is just the opposite of GEICO's. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.

阿吉特的业务与 GEICO 正好相反。在 GEICO，我们有数百万份小保单，基本上每年续保。阿吉特承保的保单相对较少，而且组合每年变化很大。在全世界，当需要为某些既非常大又不寻常的事情提供保险时，他是大家会打电话找的人。

If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat - and you can only save one of us - swim to Ajit.

如果查理、我和阿吉特在同一艘沉船上——而你只能救我们中的一个——请游向阿吉特。

Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.

我们的第三大保险巨头是通用再保险。几年前这个业务陷入困境；现在它已成为我们保险皇冠上一颗闪亮的宝石。

Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re's P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.

在塔德·蒙特罗斯的领导下，通用再保险在 2009 年取得了出色的承保业绩，同时每美元保费产生的浮存金也异常庞大。除了通用再保险的财产意外险业务，塔德和他的同事还发展了一项日益宝贵的大型人寿再保险业务。

Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key - though only partially-owned - part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.

去年，通用再保险终于实现了对科隆再保险的 100% 所有权。自 1995 年以来，科隆再保险一直是我们全球业务中的关键部分——尽管只是部分拥有。塔德和我将于 9 月访问科隆，感谢其经理们对伯克希尔的重要贡献。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数专注于保险领域的小众角落。总的来说，它们一直盈利，并且如下表所示，它们为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们财产意外险和人寿保险业务四个板块的记录：

And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.

现在是一个痛苦的坦白：去年，你们的主席为一个完全由他自己造成的、代价非常昂贵的商业惨败画上了句号。

For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right - but of the wrong type.

多年来，我一直努力想找出我们可以为数百万忠诚的 GEICO 客户提供的附加产品。不幸的是，我终于成功了，有了一个绝妙的见解：我们应该推销自己的信用卡。我推断，GEICO 的保单持有人很可能是良好的信用风险，而且如果我们提供一张有吸引力的卡，他们很可能会把生意给我们。我们确实得到了生意——但是错误的类型。

Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.

在我们最终醒悟之前，信用卡业务的税前亏损约为 630 万美元。然后，我们以每美元 55 美分的价格出售了 9,800 万美元的不良应收账款组合，又损失了 4,400 万美元。

GEICO's managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO's customers we would get the - - - - - well, let's call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

应该强调的是，GEICO 的经理们从未对我的想法表现出热情。他们警告我，我们得到的不会是 GEICO 客户的精华，而是——好吧，我们称之为非精华。我含蓄地表示，我年纪更大、更明智。

I was just older.

我只是更老而已。

Regulated Utility Business

受监管的公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.'s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

伯克希尔持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 89.5% 的权益，后者拥有各种各样的公用事业业务。其中最大的是：（1）Yorkshire Electricity 和 Northern Electric，其 380 万终端用户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；（2）MidAmerican Energy，主要为爱荷华州的 725,000 名电力客户提供服务；（3）Pacific Power 和 Rocky Mountain Power，为西部六个州的约 170 万电力客户提供服务；（4）Kern River 和 Northern Natural 管道，运输美国约 8% 的天然气消耗量。

MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn't have better partners. They are truly a dream team.

MidAmerican 有两位出色的经理，戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔。此外，我的老朋友沃尔特·斯科特及其家族在公司拥有重要所有权。沃尔特为任何业务都带来了非凡的商业头脑。与戴夫、格雷格和沃尔特共事十年，强化了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能有更好的合作伙伴。他们真是一个梦之队。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.

有些不太协调的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过 21 家本地品牌公司运营，拥有 16,000 名经纪人。尽管去年又是房屋销售糟糕的一年，但 HomeServices 还是赚了一点钱。它还收购了芝加哥的一家公司，并将在价格合理时增加其他优质的经纪业务。十年后，HomeServices 很可能会大得多。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican's operations:

以下是 MidAmerican 运营的一些关键数据：

\ Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million. \* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $72 in 2008 and $70 in 2007.

\ 包括 1.75 亿美元的终止费和 9.17 亿美元的投资利润。\* 包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后），2008 年为 7,200 万美元，2007 年为 7,000 万美元。

MidAmerican's record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding. Here's some backup for that claim.

MidAmerican 在其受监管的电力公用事业和天然气管道方面的运营记录确实非常出色。以下是一些支持这一说法的证据。

Our two pipelines, Kern River and Northern Natural, were both acquired in 2002. A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction. Among the 44 rated, Kern River came in 9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39th. There was work to do.

我们的两条管道 Kern River 和 Northern Natural 都是在 2002 年收购的。一家名为 Mastio 的公司定期对管道进行客户满意度排名。在我们购买时，Kern River 在 44 条受评管道中排名第 9，Northern Natural 排名第 39。有很多工作要做。

In Mastio's 2009 report, Kern River ranked 1st and Northern Natural 3rd. Charlie and I couldn't be more proud of this performance. It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.

在 Mastio 2009 年的报告中，Kern River 排名第一，Northern Natural 排名第三。查理和我为这一表现感到无比自豪。这是因为每个运营部门都有数百人致力于一种新的文化，然后兑现了他们的承诺。

Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive. In 1995, MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa. By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency, the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.

我们的电力公用事业的成就同样令人印象深刻。1995 年，MidAmerican 成为爱荷华州的主要电力供应商。通过明智的规划和对效率的热情，该公司自我们收购以来一直保持电价不变，并承诺将其稳定到 2013 年。

MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind. Since our purchase, MidAmerican's wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.

MidAmerican 在保持这种非凡价格稳定性的同时，使爱荷华州的风力发电容量占比位居全美第一。自我们收购以来，MidAmerican 的风力发电设施从零增长到总容量的近 20%。

Similarly, when we purchased PacificCorp in 2006, we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts. It's now 794, with more coming. (Arriving at PacificCorp, we found "wind" of a different sort: The company had 98 committees that met frequently. Now there are 28. Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.)

类似地，当我们在 2006 年收购 PacificCorp 时，我们积极扩大风力发电。当时风电装机容量为 33 兆瓦。现在已是 794 兆瓦，并且还有更多在建。（到达 PacificCorp 后，我们发现了一种不同类型的“风”：该公司有 98 个频繁开会的委员会。现在有 28 个。与此同时，我们生产和输送了更多的电力，而员工人数却减少了 2%。）

In 2008 alone, MidAmerican spent $1.8 billion on wind generation at our two operations, and today the company is number one in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind capacity. By the way, compare that $1.8 billion to the $1.1 billion of pre-tax earnings of PacificCorp (shown in the table as "Western") and Iowa. In our utility business, we spend all we earn, and then some, in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas. Indeed, MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early 2000. Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve. In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested. It's a great partnership for all concerned.

仅在 2008 年，MidAmerican 就在我们的两个业务部门花费了 18 亿美元用于风力发电，如今该公司在受监管公用事业中拥有全国第一的风电装机容量。顺便说一下，将这 18 亿美元与 PacificCorp（表中显示为“Western”）和爱荷华州 11 亿美元的税前利润进行比较。在我们的公用事业业务中，我们花费我们赚取的一切，甚至更多，以满足我们服务区域的需求。事实上，自 2000 年初伯克希尔入股以来，MidAmerican 从未支付过股息。相反，其收益被再投资于开发我们的客户需要和应得的公用事业系统。作为交换，我们被允许从我们投入的巨额资金中获得公平的回报。这对所有相关方来说都是一个伟大的合作伙伴关系。

Our long-avowed goal is to be the "buyer of choice" for businesses - particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker).

我们长期宣称的目标是成为企业的“首选买家”——尤其是那些由家族建立和拥有的企业。实现这一目标的方法就是配得上它。这意味着我们必须信守承诺；避免对被收购企业加杠杆；给予我们的管理者不同寻常的自主权；并与收购的公司同甘共苦（尽管我们更喜欢共甘）。

Our record matches our rhetoric. Most buyers competing against us, however, follow a different path. For them, acquisitions are "merchandise." Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these operators are contemplating "exit strategies." We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.

我们的记录与我们的言辞相符。然而，与我们竞争的大多数买家走的是一条不同的路。对他们来说，收购是“商品”。在购买合同的墨迹未干之前，这些经营者已经在考虑“退出策略”。因此，当我们遇到真正关心自己企业未来的卖家时，我们拥有决定性的优势。

Some years back our competitors were known as "leveraged-buyout operators." But LBO became a bad name. So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change their moniker. What they did not change, though, were the essential ingredients of their previous operations, including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.

几年前，我们的竞争对手被称为“杠杆收购运营商”。但 LBO 变成了一个坏名声。所以，以奥威尔式的方式，收购公司决定更改他们的名称。然而，他们没有改变的是他们以前运营的基本要素，包括他们珍视的费用结构和对杠杆的热爱。

Their new label became "private equity," a name that turns the facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree's capital structure compared to that previously existing. A number of these acquirees, purchased only two to three years ago, are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling below 70¢ on the dollar, and the public debt has taken a far greater beating. The private-equity firms, it should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need. Instead, they're keeping their remaining funds very private.

他们的新标签变成了“私募股权”，这是一个颠倒事实的名字：这些公司对企业进行的收购几乎总是导致被收购方资本结构中的股权部分与之前相比急剧减少。许多这些被收购方（仅在两到三年前被收购）现在因为私募股权买家堆积在他们身上的债务而面临致命危险。大部分银行贷款以低于面值 70 美分的价格交易，而公共债务受到的打击更大。应该指出的是，私募股权公司并没有急于注入他们的被投资方现在急需的股权。相反，他们将其剩余资金保持得非常“私募”。

In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses. Here, Berkshire hopes to be the "buyer of choice" of regulators. It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.

在受监管的公用事业领域，没有大型家族企业。在这里，伯克希尔希望成为监管者的“首选买家”。当交易被提议时，正是监管者（而不是出售股份的股东）判断购买者的适合性。

There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators. They can - and do - call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.

当你站在这些监管者面前时，无法隐藏你的历史。他们可以——并且确实会——打电话给你运营所在其他州的同行，询问你在业务各个方面的表现，包括是否愿意投入足够的股权资本。

When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in 2005, regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities. We passed this examination, just as we expect to pass future ones.

当 MidAmerican 在 2005 年提议收购 PacifiCorp 时，我们将要服务的六个新州的监管者立即检查了我们在爱荷华州的记录。他们还仔细评估了我们的融资计划和能力。我们通过了这次审查，正如我们期望通过未来的审查一样。

There are two reasons for our confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner. They don't know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future – and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.

我们的信心有两个原因。首先，戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔将以一流的方式经营与他们相关的任何业务。他们不知道有其他运营方式。除此之外，我们希望未来购买更多的受监管公用事业——我们知道我们今天在运营的司法管辖区的业务行为将决定我们明天如何被新的司法管辖区欢迎。

Insurance

保险

Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire's growth since we first entered the business in 1967. This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry. During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14.0% for the Fortune 500. Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back. Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days. Why do I love them? Let me count the ways.

自 1967 年首次进入保险业务以来，我们的保险集团推动了伯克希尔的增长。这一令人高兴的结果并非由于该行业的普遍繁荣。在截至 2007 年的 25 年里，保险公司的净资产收益率平均为 8.5%，而财富 500 强的平均为 14.0%。显然，我们的保险 CEO 们并没有顺风。然而，这些经理们的卓越程度是查理和我在早期做梦也想不到的。我为什么爱他们？让我一一列举。

At GEICO, Tony Nicely – now in his 48th year at the company after joining it when he was 18 – continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting. When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2.0% of the auto insurance market, a level at which the company had long been stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up from 7.2% in 2007.

在 GEICO，托尼·奈斯利——他 18 岁加入公司，现已在该公司工作第 48 年——在保持严格承保纪律的同时继续吞噬市场份额。当托尼在 1993 年成为 CEO 时，GEICO 在汽车保险市场占有 2.0% 的份额，这是该公司长期停滞的水平。现在我们拥有 7.7% 的份额，高于 2007 年的 7.2%。

The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire purchased control, GEICO was number seven. Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.

新业务的增长加上现有业务续保率的提高，使 GEICO 在汽车保险中跃居第三位。1995 年，当伯克希尔购买控股权时，GEICO 排名第七。现在我们仅次于 State Farm 和 Allstate。

GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But virtually everyone likes to drive. So, sensibly, drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost, and efficiency is Tony's specialty. Five years ago the number of policies per employee was 299. In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity.

GEICO 的增长是因为它为驾驶者省钱。没有人喜欢购买汽车保险。但几乎每个人都喜欢开车。因此，明智地，驾驶者寻找与一流服务相符的最低成本保险。效率是低成本的关键，而效率正是托尼的专长。五年前，每名员工处理的保单数量为 299 份。2008 年，这个数字是 439 份，生产率大幅提高。

As we view GEICO's current opportunities, Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp. Juicy targets are everywhere. First, and most important, our new business in auto insurance is now exploding. Americans are focused on saving money as never before, and they are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a monthly record – by a wide margin – for growth in policyholders. That record will last exactly 28 days: As we go to press, it's clear February's gain will be even better.

审视 GEICO 当前的机会，托尼和我感觉就像在天体营里的两只饥饿的蚊子。到处都是多汁的目标。首先，也是最重要的，我们的汽车保险新业务正在爆发。美国人前所未有地专注于省钱，他们纷纷涌向 GEICO。2009 年 1 月，我们以巨大优势创下了保单持有人增长的月度记录。这个记录将正好持续 28 天：在我们付印时，很明显 2 月的增长会更好。

Beyond this, we are gaining ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base. And, finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos, a big market that offers real promise.

除此之外，我们还在相关领域取得进展。去年，我们的摩托车保单增加了 23.4%，使我们的市场份额从约 6% 提高到 7% 以上。我们的房车和全地形车业务也在快速增长，尽管基数很小。最后，我们最近开始承保商业汽车保险，这是一个有真正前景的大市场。

GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans. Go to GEICO.com or call 1-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.

GEICO 现在为数百万美国人省钱。请访问 GEICO.com 或致电 1-800-847-7536，看看我们是否也能为您省钱。

General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re's culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster.

我们的大型国际再保险公司通用再保险在 2008 年也取得了出色的业绩。早些时候，该公司曾出现严重问题（我们在 1998 年底收购时完全未能发现）。到 2001 年，乔·布兰登在合伙人塔德·蒙特罗斯的协助下接任 CEO 时，通用再保险的文化进一步恶化，在承保、准备金和费用方面表现出纪律的缺失。乔和塔德接掌后，这些问题得到了果断而成功的解决。如今，通用再保险已重拾光彩。

Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re's future is in the best of hands.

去年春天，乔卸任，塔德成为 CEO。查理和我感谢乔力挽狂澜，并确信在塔德的领导下，通用再保险的未来掌握在最佳人选手中。

Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That's where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, "It's difficult for an empty sack to stand upright." That's no worry for General Re clients.

再保险是一项涉及长期承诺的业务，有时长达五十年或更久。过去的一年再次教会客户一个关键原则：承诺的价值取决于做出承诺的人或机构。这正是通用再保险的强项：它是唯一由 AAA 级公司支持的再保险公司。本·富兰克林曾说过：“空袋子很难直立。”这对通用再保险的客户来说不是问题。

Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain's reinsurance division, headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only 31 employees. This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world, hard to characterize but easy to admire.

我们的第三大保险业务是阿吉特·贾因的再保险部门，总部设在斯坦福，只有 31 名员工。这可能是世界上最卓越的业务之一，难以描述但易于欣赏。

From year to year, Ajit's business is never the same. It features very large transactions, incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads. When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured, Ajit is almost certain to be called.

阿吉特的业务每年都不相同。它的特点是巨额交易、令人难以置信的执行速度以及愿意为让其他人挠头的保单报价。当存在巨大且不寻常的风险需要投保时，几乎肯定会打电话给阿吉特。

Ajit came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly, I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing: I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course, I knew the answer before writing. There isn't anyone like Ajit.

阿吉特于 1986 年加入伯克希尔。很快，我意识到我们获得了一位非凡的人才。于是我做了合乎逻辑的事情：我给他在新德里的父母写信，问他们家里是否还有一个像他这样的人。当然，我在写信之前就知道答案。没有像阿吉特这样的人。

Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the "big three," regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost. We aggregate their results below under "Other Primary." For space reasons, we don't discuss these insurers individually. But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.

我们的小型保险公司以自己的方式与“三巨头”一样出色，定期以负成本向我们提供宝贵的浮存金。我们在下面的“其他主要业务”中汇总了它们的结果。由于篇幅原因，我们不逐一讨论这些保险公司。但请放心，查理和我感谢它们的每一份贡献。

Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance. But, overall, I expect us to average an underwriting profit. If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.

以下是我们的保险四脚凳的记录。承保利润表明，与 2007 年一样，所有四项都在去年为伯克希尔提供了无成本资金。而且在这两年中，我们的承保盈利能力都远高于行业水平。当然，我们自己也会定期在保险业遭遇糟糕的年份。但总的来说，我预计我们的平均承保利润将为正。如果是这样，我们将在无限期的未来使用大量的免费资金。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/08 (in millions)

2008年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

| Assets | | Liabilities and Equity | |
|--------|--|------------------------|--|
| Cash and equivalents | $2,497 | Notes payable | $2,212 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | $5,047 | Other current liabilities | $8,087 |
| Inventory | $7,500 | Total current liabilities | $10,299 |
| Other current assets | $752 | | |
| Total current assets | $15,796 | | |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | $16,515 | Deferred taxes | $2,786 |
| Fixed assets | $16,338 | Term debt and other liabilities | $6,033 |
| Other assets | $1,248 | Equity | $30,779 |
| Total | $49,897 | Total | $49,897 |

| 资产 | | 负债与权益 | |
|------|--|------------|--|
| 现金及等价物 | 2,497 | 应付票据 | 2,212 |
| 应收账款及票据 | 5,047 | 其他流动负债 | 8,087 |
| 存货 | 7,500 | 流动负债合计 | 10,299 |
| 其他流动资产 | 752 | | |
| 流动资产合计 | 15,796 | | |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | 16,515 | 递延税款 | 2,786 |
| 固定资产 | 16,338 | 长期债务及其他负债 | 6,033 |
| 其他资产 | 1,248 | 权益 | 30,779 |
| 总计 | 49,897 | 总计 | 49,897 |

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

\* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

\* 不包括购买会计调整。

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned an impressive 17.9% on average tangible net worth last year. It's also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth - a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet - and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 8.1%.

这个五花八门的集团销售从棒棒糖到房车的各种产品，去年平均有形净资产收益率达到令人印象深刻的 17.9%。同样值得注意的是，这些业务在实现这一回报时只使用了很少的财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有一些出色的业务。然而，我们购买其中许多业务时支付了远超净资产的价格——这一点体现在我们资产负债表上的商誉项目中——这一事实将我们平均账面价值的收益率降低到了 8.1%。

Though the full-year result was satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year's fourth quarter. Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains strong earning power even under today's conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company. Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year, partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions. In contrast, many competitors were treading water (or sinking).

尽管全年业绩令人满意，但该集团中许多业务在去年第四季度的盈利急剧下滑。2009 年的前景看起来更糟。尽管如此，即使在当前条件下，该集团仍保持强劲的盈利能力，并将继续向母公司提供大量现金。总的来说，这些公司去年提高了竞争地位，部分原因是我们的财务实力使我们能够进行有利的补强收购。相比之下，许多竞争对手都在停滞不前（或下沉）。

The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar's late-November purchase of Tungaloy, a leading Japanese producer of small tools. Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment - and appreciation! - at the accomplishments of Iscar's management. To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing. Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown. Iscar's growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations - which were high - and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.

这些收购中最引人注目的是 Iscar 在 11 月底对日本领先的小型工具生产商 Tungaloy 的收购。查理和我继续以惊讶——和欣赏！——的目光看待 Iscar 管理层的成就。在收购一家公司时，能获得像 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 或 Danny Goldman 这样的一位经理是一种福气。获得三位就像是赢得了三冠王。自我们收购以来，Iscar 的增长超出了我们本来就很高的预期，Tungaloy 的加入将把业绩提升到一个新的水平。

MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in 2002. At that time, we paid $140 million for the company. Last year its pre-tax earnings were $89 million. Vic Mancinelli, its CEO, followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival. He focuses on blocking and tackling, day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course. Ten years from now, Vic will be running a much larger operation and, more important, will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.

MiTek、Benjamin Moore、Acme Brick、Forest River、Marmon 和 CTB 也在这一年进行了一次或多次收购。CTB 在全球农业设备领域运营，自 2002 年被我们收购以来，已经收购了六家小公司。当时，我们为该公司支付了 1.4 亿美元。去年，其税前利润为 8,900 万美元。其 CEO Vic Mancinelli 在我们到来之前很久就遵循了伯克希尔式的经营原则。他专注于基础工作，日复一日地把小事做好，从不偏离航向。十年后，Vic 将经营一家更大的公司，更重要的是，将获得出色的投入资本回报。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton's recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.

我将在这里花些篇幅讨论 Clayton Homes 的抵押贷款业务，并跳过任何财务评论，这些评论在本节末尾的表格中总结。我这样做是因为 Clayton 近期的经验可能对有关住房和抵押贷款的公共政策辩论有用。但首先介绍一点背景。

Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry's 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.

Clayton 是活动房屋行业最大的公司，去年交付了 27,499 套。这约占行业总量 81,889 套的 34%。2009 年，我们的份额可能会增长，部分原因是该行业的其他大部分企业都处于严重困境中。全行业来看，自 1998 年达到 372,843 套的峰值以来，销售量一直在稳步下降。

At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving "borrowers who shouldn't have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn't have lent."

那时，该行业的大部分销售行为都很糟糕。稍后回顾那段时期，我将其描述为涉及“不应该借款的借款者被不应该放贷的贷款者提供融资”。

To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. ("That certainly looks like a $2,000 cat to me" says the salesman who will receive a $3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged ("securitized") and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.

首先，有意义的首付要求经常被忽视。有时还涉及欺诈。（“在我看来，那确实像一只 2,000 美元的猫，”如果贷款通过将获得 3,000 美元佣金的推销员说。）此外，借款人同意无法承受的月供，因为他们没有什么可失去的。由此产生的抵押贷款通常被打包（“证券化”）并由华尔街公司出售给不知情的投资者。这一连串的愚蠢行为必然以糟糕的结局告终，事实也如此。

Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.

应该强调的是，Clayton 在那段时间里在自己的贷款中遵循了远为明智的做法。事实上，它发起并证券化的抵押贷款的购买者从未损失过一分钱的本金或利息。但 Clayton 是个例外；行业损失惨重。这种后遗症一直持续到今天。

This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn't repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on "house-price appreciation" to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O'Hara all over again: "I'll think about it tomorrow." The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.

1997-2000 年的这场惨败本应作为对规模大得多的传统住房市场的煤矿金丝雀预警。但投资者、政府和评级机构完全没有从活动房屋的崩溃中学到任何东西。相反，在 2004-07 年期间，同样的错误在传统房屋上重演，令人毛骨悚然：贷款人高兴地发放借款人收入无法偿还的贷款，借款人也同样高兴地同意偿还这些款项。双方都依靠“房价升值”使这种不可能的安排得以运作。这完全是斯嘉丽·奥哈拉再世：“明天再想吧。”这种行为的后果现在正在我们经济的每一个角落产生反响。

Clayton's 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated "sub-prime." Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.

然而，Clayton 的 198,888 名借款人在整个房地产崩盘期间继续正常还款，没有给我们带来意外的损失。这并不是因为这些借款人异常信用良好，FICO 评分（信用风险的标准衡量指标）证明了这一点。他们的 FICO 中位数是 644，而全国中位数是 723，约 35% 的人低于 620，即通常被指定为“次级”的区间。许多传统房屋的灾难性抵押贷款池中的借款人的信用要好得多，如 FICO 评分所示。

Yet at year end, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we've also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton's foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.

然而，到年底，我们发起贷款的拖欠率为 3.6%，仅比 2006 年的 2.9% 和 2004 年的 2.9% 略有上升。（除了我们发起的贷款，我们还从其他金融机构购买了各种类型的批量投资组合。）2008 年，Clayton 的止赎率占发起贷款的 3.0%，而 2006 年为 3.8%，2004 年为 5.3%。

Why are our borrowers - characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores - performing so well? The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual - not hoped-for - income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home prices.

为什么我们的借款人——通常是收入不高、信用评分远非优秀的人——表现得如此出色？答案很简单，直接回到了贷款 101。我们的借款人只是衡量了全额抵押贷款还款额与他们实际（而非希望）收入的比较，然后决定他们是否能接受这种承诺。简而言之，他们贷款的目的是还清它，无论房价走势如何。

Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing. They did not sign up for "teaser" rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.

同样重要的是我们的借款人没有做什么。他们不指望通过再融资来偿还贷款。他们没有选择在重置后相对于收入来说过大的“诱饵”利率。他们也没有假设如果抵押贷款变得沉重，他们总能卖掉房子获利。吉米·斯图尔特会喜欢这些人的。

Of course, a number of our borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits. The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job, but death, divorce and medical expenses all cause problems. If unemployment rates rise - as they surely will in 2009 - more of Clayton's borrowers will have troubles, and we will have larger, though still manageable, losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.

当然，我们的一些借款人会遇到麻烦。当逆境来袭时，他们通常只有很少的积蓄来渡过难关。拖欠或止赎的主要原因是失业，但死亡、离婚和医疗费用也都会造成问题。如果失业率上升——2009 年肯定会如此——Clayton 的更多借款人将遇到麻烦，我们将面临更大但仍然可控的损失。但我们的问题不会受到房价趋势的任何影响。

Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage (so-called "upside-down" loans). Rather, foreclosures take place because borrowers can't pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay. Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment – derived from savings and not from other borrowing – seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage. Instead, they walk when they can't make the monthly payments.

关于当前住房危机的评论常常忽略一个关键事实：大多数止赎的发生并不是因为房屋价值低于其抵押贷款（所谓的“倒挂”贷款）。相反，止赎的发生是因为借款人无法支付他们同意支付的月供。那些以储蓄（而非其他借款）支付了可观首付的房主，很少仅仅因为房屋当前价值低于抵押贷款就放弃主要居所。相反，他们是在无法支付月供时才会放弃。

Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.

拥有住房是一件美好的事情。我和我的家人已经在现在的房子里住了 50 年，还将继续住下去。但享受和实用性应该是购买的主要动机，而不是利润或再融资的可能性。购买的房子应该适合购买者的收入。

The present housing debacle should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future. Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower's income. That income should be carefully verified.

当前的住房崩溃应该教会购房者、贷款人、经纪人和政府一些简单的教训，以确保未来的稳定。购房应该涉及至少 10% 的真实首付，以及借款人收入能够轻松应对的月供。收入应仔细核实。

Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn't be our country's primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.

让人们拥有住房，虽然是一个可取的目标，但不应该是我们国家的主要目标。让他们留在自己的家中才应该是目标。

Clayton's lending operation, though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers, is nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis. Funders that have access to any sort of government guarantee - banks with FDIC-insured deposits, large entities with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve, and others who are using imaginative methods (or lobbying skills) to come under the government's umbrella - have money costs that are minimal. Conversely, highly-rated companies, such as Berkshire, are experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury rates, are at record levels. Moreover, funds are abundant for the government-guaranteed borrower but often scarce for others, no matter how creditworthy they may be.

Clayton 的贷款业务虽然未受借款人表现的影响，但仍受到信贷危机某一因素的威胁。能够获得某种政府担保的融资方——拥有 FDIC 保险存款的银行、拥有现在由美联储支持的商业票据的大型实体，以及使用想象方法（或游说技巧）进入政府保护伞的其他机构——其资金成本极低。相反，像伯克希尔这样高评级的公司，其借款成本相对于国债利率处于创纪录的高位。此外，对于有政府担保的借款人来说，资金充足，但对于其他人来说，无论他们的信用状况如何，资金往往稀缺。

This unprecedented "spread" in the cost of money makes it unprofitable for any lender who doesn't enjoy government-guaranteed funds to go up against those with a favored status. Government is determining the "haves" and "have-nots." That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank holding companies, not a course feasible for Berkshire.

这种前所未有的资金成本“利差”，使得任何没有政府担保资金的贷款者都无法与那些享有优惠地位的人竞争。政府正在决定“富者”和“贫者”。这就是为什么公司争相转换为银行控股公司，而这对伯克希尔来说不可行。

Though Berkshire's credit is pristine - we are one of only seven AAA corporations in the country - our cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing. At the moment, it is much better to be a financial cripple with a government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.

尽管伯克希尔的信用是纯净的——我们是美国仅有的七家 AAA 公司之一——但我们的借款成本现在远高于资产负债表不稳但有政府支持的竞争对手。目前，作为一个有政府担保的财务跛脚鸭，远比作为一个没有担保的直布罗陀要好得多。

Today's extreme conditions may soon end. At worst, we believe we will find at least a partial solution that will allow us to continue much of Clayton's lending. Clayton's earnings, however, will surely suffer if we are forced to compete for long against government-favored lenders.

今天的极端情况可能很快结束。在最坏的情况下，我们相信至少会找到部分解决方案，使我们能够继续 Clayton 的大部分贷款业务。然而，如果我们被迫长期与受政府青睐的贷款人竞争，Clayton 的收益肯定会受到影响。

\* Includes $92 million in 2008 and $85 million in 2007 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire's credit.

\* 包括伯克希尔为使用其信用向 Clayton 收取的费用，2008 年为 9,200 万美元，2007 年为 8,500 万美元。

Early in 2008, we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company ("BHAC") as an insurer of the tax-exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local entities. BHAC insures these securities for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the public (primary transactions) and later, when the bonds are already owned by investors (secondary transactions).

2008 年初，我们成立了伯克希尔·哈撒韦担保公司，作为州、市和其他地方实体发行的免税债券的保险公司。BHAC 在发行人将债券出售给公众时（一级交易）以及后来当债券已由投资者持有时（二级交易），为这些证券提供保险。

By year end 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had all fallen into big trouble. The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

到 2007 年底，该业务中大约六家主要参与者都已陷入大麻烦。他们问题的原因早被梅·韦斯特捕捉到：“我是白雪公主，但我随波逐流了。”

The monoline (as the bond insurers are called) initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were low-risk. But over the years competition for this business intensified, and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of stagnating or declining earnings, the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions. Some of these involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations. When housing prices plummeted, the monoline industry quickly became a basket case.

单一险种保险公司最初只承保低风险的免税债券。但多年来，这项业务的竞争加剧，费率下降。面对盈利停滞或下降的前景，单一险种保险公司的管理者转向了风险越来越高的项目。其中一些涉及承保住宅抵押贷款义务。当房价暴跌时，单一险种保险行业迅速成为一个烂摊子。

Early in the year, Berkshire offered to assume all of the insurance issued on tax-exempts that was on the books of the three largest monolines. These companies were all in life-threatening trouble (though they said otherwise.) We would have charged a 1/2% rate to take over the guarantees on about $822 billion of bonds. If our offer had been accepted, we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by investors who owned these bonds - a guarantee stretching for 40 years in some cases. Ours was not a frivolous proposal: For reasons we will come to later, it involved substantial risk for Berkshire.

年初，伯克希尔提出接管三大单一险种保险公司账面上所有已发行的免税债券保险。这些公司都处于危及生命的困境中（尽管它们声称并非如此）。我们将收取 0.5% 的费率来接管约 8,220 亿美元债券的担保。如果我们的提议被接受，我们将需要支付拥有这些债券的投资者遭受的任何损失——在某些情况下担保期长达 40 年。我们不是轻率的提议：出于我们后面会讲到的一些原因，这对伯克希尔来说涉及重大风险。

The monolines summarily rejected our offer, in some cases appending an insult or two. In the end, though, the turndowns proved to be very good news for us, because it became apparent that I had severely underpriced our offer.

单一险种保险公司断然拒绝了我们的提议，有些还加上了一两句侮辱。然而，最终，被拒绝被证明对我们来说是非常好的消息，因为很明显我严重低估了我们提议的价格。

Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the secondary market. And here's the punch line: About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already insured, largely by the three aforementioned monolines. In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do so.

此后，我们在二级市场承保了约 156 亿美元的保险。关键点是：这项业务中约 77% 的债券已经由前述三家单一险种保险公司担保。在这些协议中，只有在原保险公司财务上无力支付的情况下，我们才需要支付违约。

We wrote this "second-to-pay" insurance for rates averaging 3.3%. That's right; we have been paid far more for becoming the second to pay than the 1.5% we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay. In one extreme case, we actually agreed to be fourth to pay, nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium charged by the monoline that remains first to pay. In other words, three other monolines have to first go broke before we need to write a check.

我们以平均 3.3% 的费率承保了这种“第二支付”保险。没错，我们作为第二支付获得的报酬远高于我们之前作为第一支付收取的 1.5%。在一个极端案例中，我们实际上同意作为第四支付，但仍然收到了约三倍于仍然是第一支付的单一险种保险公司收取的 1% 的保费。换句话说，在我们需要开支票之前，其他三家单一险种保险公司必须首先破产。

Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital. This, of course, directly helps us, since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at least in the near term, any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail. In addition to our book of secondary business, we have also written $3.7 billion of primary business for a premium of $96 million. In primary business, of course, we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.

我们最初批量报价的三家单一险种保险公司中有两家后来筹集了大量资本。这当然直接对我们有帮助，因为它降低了我们至少在短期内因这两家单一险种保险公司倒闭而需要支付任何第二支付保险索赔的可能性。除了我们的二手业务外，我们还以 9,600 万美元的保费承保了 37 亿美元的一手业务。在一手业务中，当然，如果发行人遇到麻烦，我们是第一支付者。

We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other monoline. Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs. This explains why many sophisticated investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another monoline. BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference, but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to bondholders.

我们为所承保的保险提供的资本倍数远远超过任何其他单一险种保险公司。因此，我们的担保远比它们的更有价值。这解释了为什么许多经验丰富的投资者已经向我们购买了第二支付保险，即使他们已经被另一家单一险种保险公司承保。BHAC 不仅成为了首选保险公司，而且在许多情况下成为了债券持有人唯一接受的保险公司。

Nevertheless, we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us. The reason is simple, though I have never seen even a passing reference to it by any financial analyst, rating agency or monoline CEO.

尽管如此，我们对自己承保的业务仍然非常谨慎，并认为这项保险最终能否为我们带来利润远非确定。原因很简单，尽管我从未在任何金融分析师、评级机构或单一险种保险公司 CEO 那里看到过哪怕只是顺便提及。

The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have historically been few. But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn't exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds remained uninsured.

免税债券保险费率极低的基本原理是，历史上违约很少。但这一记录主要反映了发行无担保债券的实体的经验。免税债券保险在 1971 年之前并不存在，即使在那之后，大多数债券仍然是无担保的。

A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured, but otherwise similar bonds, the only question being how different. To understand why, let's go back to 1975 when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time its bonds - virtually all uninsured - were heavily held by the city's wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions. These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city's fiscal problems. So before long, concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution. Without one, it was apparent to all that New York's citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.

一个完全由保险覆盖的免税债券世界，其损失经历必然与一组无担保但在其他方面相似的债券有所不同，唯一的问题是不同的程度。要理解原因，让我们回到 1975 年，当时纽约市濒临破产。当时，其债券——几乎全部无担保——主要由该市较富裕的居民以及纽约银行和其他机构持有。这些当地债券持有人深切希望解决该市的财政问题。因此，不久之后，许多相关方的让步和合作产生了解决方案。如果没有解决方案，所有人都清楚，纽约市民和企业将因其持有的债券而遭受广泛而严重的财务损失。

Now, imagine that all of the city's bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire. Would similar belt-tightening, tax increases, labor concessions, etc. have been forthcoming? Of course not. At a minimum, Berkshire would have been asked to "share" in the required sacrifices. And, considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.

现在，想象一下，该市的所有债券都由伯克希尔承保。类似的紧缩措施、增税、劳工让步等等还会出现吗？当然不会。至少，伯克希尔会被要求“分担”所需的牺牲。而且，考虑到我们的财力雄厚，所需的贡献几乎肯定会很大。

Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year's report will be a huge contributor to these woes. Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend 2008. The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.

地方政府未来将面临比迄今更为严峻的财政问题。我在去年报告中谈到的养老金负债将是这些困境的巨大因素。许多城市和州在检查 2008 年底的资金状况时肯定感到震惊。资产与现实精算评估的现有负债之间的差距简直惊人。

When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop "solutions" less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents. Losses in the tax-exempt arena, when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers. If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow. What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?

当面临巨大的收入短缺时，所有债券都投保的社区将比那些有未投保债券（由当地银行和居民持有）的社区更倾向于制定对债券持有人不那么有利的“解决方案”。免税领域的损失一旦发生，也可能在发行人之间高度相关。如果少数社区让债权人受损并逍遥法外，那么其他社区跟风的机会就会增加。哪个市长或市议会会选择以大幅增税的形式给当地公民带来痛苦，而不是给遥远的债券保险公司带来痛苦？

Insuring tax-exempts, therefore, has the look today of a dangerous business - one with similarities, in fact, to the insuring of natural catastrophes. In both cases, a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits. We will try, therefore, to proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.

因此，当今的免税债券保险看起来是一项危险的业务——实际上，它与自然巨灾保险有相似之处。在这两种情况下，一连串无损失的年份之后，都可能出现一次毁灭性的经历，足以抹去之前所有的利润。因此，我们将努力在这一业务中谨慎行事，避开其他单一险种保险公司经常接受的许多类别债券。

The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance. "Back-tested" models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error. Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action. (If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

将过去从无担保债券世界的损失经历投射到一个看似相似但许多债券已投保的世界中所涉及的谬误，在金融的其他领域也会出现。许多种类的“回测”模型都容易出现这种错误。然而，它们在金融市场上经常被吹捧为未来行动的指南。（如果仅仅查阅过去的财务数据就能告诉你未来会发生什么，那么福布斯 400 强就会由图书管理员组成。）

Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen, rating agencies and investors. These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible. They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses. They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn't afford. In short, universe "past" and universe "current" had very different characteristics. But lenders, government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.

事实上，抵押贷款相关证券的惊人损失，很大程度上是由于销售员、评级机构和投资者使用了有缺陷的、基于历史的模型。他们考察了房价仅温和上涨、住房投机可以忽略不计的时期的损失经历。然后，他们将这段经历作为评估未来损失的标尺。他们愉快地忽略了这样一个事实：最近房价飙升，贷款行为恶化，许多购房者选择了他们买不起的房子。简而言之，“过去”的世界和“当前”的世界有着截然不同的特征。但贷款人、政府和媒体基本上未能认识到这个至关重要的事实。

Investors should be skeptical of history-based models. Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta, gamma, sigma and the like, these models tend to look impressive. Too often, though, investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols. Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.

投资者应该对基于历史的模型持怀疑态度。这些模型由听起来像书呆子的祭司阶层使用诸如 beta、gamma、sigma 等深奥术语构建，往往看起来很令人印象深刻。然而，投资者常常忘记审视符号背后的假设。我们的建议：当心带着公式来的极客。

A final post-script on BHAC: Who, you may wonder, runs this operation? While I help set policy, all of the heavy lifting is done by Ajit and his crew. Sure, they were already generating $24 billion of float along with hundreds of millions of underwriting profit annually. But how busy can that keep a 31-person group? Charlie and I decided it was high time for them to start doing a full day's work.

关于 BHAC 的最后一个附言：你可能会问，谁在经营这个业务？虽然我帮助制定政策，但所有繁重的工作都是由阿吉特和他的团队完成的。当然，他们已经产生了 240 亿美元的浮存金以及每年数亿美元的承保利润。但这对一个 31 人的团队来说能有多忙呢？查理和我决定，是时候让他们开始做一整天的工作了。

Investments

投资

Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.

由于会计准则，我们今年将大量持有的普通股分为两类。下表展示了第一类，列出了以市值计入资产负债表、且年底价值超过 5 亿美元的投资。

\* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP 成本因要求的增记或减记而有所不同。

In addition, we have holdings in Moody's and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at "equity value" - our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.

此外，我们持有的穆迪和伯灵顿北方圣太菲现在以“权益价值”入账——即我们的成本加上自购买以来的留存收益，再减去如果这些收益作为股息支付给我们将缴纳的税款。这种会计处理通常在被投资公司的所有权达到 20% 时需要。

We purchased 15% of Moody's some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody's, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.

我们几年前购买了穆迪 15% 的股份，此后未再购买一股。然而，穆迪回购了自己的股票，到 2008 年底，这些回购减少了其流通股，以至于我们的持股比例上升到 20% 以上。伯灵顿北方圣太菲也回购了股票，但我们的持股比例增加到 20% 主要是因为我们在继续购买这只股票。

Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at "equity accounting" values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.

除非事实或规则改变，否则您将看到这些持股以“权益会计”价值反映在我们的资产负债表中，无论其市场价格如何。您还将看到我们应占的收益（减去适用税款）定期包含在我们的季度和年度收益中。

I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current $40-$50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.

我在本报告的前面部分告诉过你，去年我犯了一个主动的重大错误（可能还有更多；这个特别突出）。在没有任何人（查理或其他任何人）催促的情况下，我在石油和天然气价格接近峰值时购买了大量康菲石油股票。我完全没有预料到去年下半年能源价格的大幅下跌。我仍然认为未来油价远高于当前 40-50 美元价格的可能性很大。但到目前为止，我大错特错了。此外，即使价格确实上涨，我购买的糟糕时机也已经使伯克希尔损失了数十亿美元。

I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At year end we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes "unforced errors."

我还犯了一些其他已经可以识别的错误。它们较小，但不幸的是并没有那么小。2008 年，我花了 2.44 亿美元购买了两家爱尔兰银行的股票，它们在我看来很便宜。年底，我们将这些持股减记至市场价值：2,700 万美元，损失 89%。此后，这两只股票进一步下跌。网球界会称我的错误为“非受迫性失误”。

On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged - to you, the rating agencies and myself - to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow's obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night's sleep for the chance of extra profits.

从积极的一面看，去年我们购买了箭牌、高盛和通用电气发行的总计 145 亿美元的固定收益证券。我们非常喜欢这些投资，它们具有较高的当前收益率，本身就使这些投资令人满意。而且，在这三次购买中，我们还获得了可观的股权参与作为额外奖励。为了为这些大额购买提供资金，我不得不卖出了一些我本想保留的持股（主要是强生、宝洁和康菲石油）。然而，我已经向你们、评级机构和我自己承诺，始终以充足的现金运营伯克希尔。我们从不希望依靠陌生人的善意来履行明天的义务。当被迫选择时，我不会为了额外利润的机会而牺牲哪怕一夜的安眠。

The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today's could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.

投资世界已经从低估风险转为高估风险。这种变化不是微小的；钟摆划出了一个非凡的弧线。几年前，即使无风险的政府提供接近零的短期债券回报和微不足道的长期债券回报，能在优质市政或公司债券上获得今天这样的收益率似乎是不可想象的。当这十年的金融历史被书写时，它肯定会谈到 1990 年代末的互联网泡沫和 2000 年代初的房地产泡沫。但 2008 年末的美国国债泡沫可能被认为几乎同样非凡。

Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable - in fact, almost smug - in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim "cash is king," even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.

如果长期持续，在当前收益率下持有现金等价物或长期政府债券几乎肯定是一个糟糕的政策。这些工具的持有者，当然，随着金融动荡加剧，对这种政策感到越来越自在——事实上，几乎是沾沾自喜。当他们听到评论员宣称“现金为王”时，他们认为自己的判断得到了确认，尽管那美妙的现金几乎赚不到什么，而且随着时间的推移，其购买力肯定会受到侵蚀。

Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.

然而，认可并不是投资的目标。事实上，认可往往是适得其反的，因为它会使大脑迟钝，使其对新事实或对先前形成的结论进行重新审视不那么敏感。当心引起掌声的投资活动；伟大的举措通常会招来呵欠。

Derivatives

衍生品

Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.

衍生品是危险的。它们极大地增加了我们金融体系中的杠杆和风险。它们使投资者几乎不可能理解和分析我们最大的商业银行和投资银行。它们使房利美和房地美多年来能够大规模地误报收益。房地美和房利美如此难以解读，以至于它们的联邦监管机构 OFHEO，其 100 多名员工的唯一工作就是监督这两个机构，却完全错过了它们对账本的粉饰。

Indeed, recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs (or former CEOs) at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives. Include Charlie and me in this hapless group: When Berkshire purchased General Re in 1998, we knew we could not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives contracts, made with 884 counterparties (many of which we had never heard of). So we decided to close up shop. Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400 million in losses to largely complete the task. Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: "I liked you better before I got to know you so well."

事实上，最近的事件表明，大型金融机构的某些知名 CEO（或前任 CEO）根本无法管理拥有庞大、复杂衍生品账本的业务。查理和我都属于这个不幸的群体：当伯克希尔在 1998 年收购通用再保险时，我们知道我们无法理解它的 23,218 份衍生品合同，这些合同与 884 个交易对手签订（其中许多我们从未听说过）。所以我们决定关闭该业务。尽管我们在退出时没有压力，并且在良性市场中运营，但我们花了五年时间和超过 4 亿美元的损失才基本完成这项任务。离开时，我们对这项业务的感情反映了一首乡村歌曲中的一句歌词：“在我如此了解你之前，我更喜欢你。”

Improved "transparency" - a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks - won't cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can't audit these contracts, and regulators can't regulate them. When I read the pages of "disclosure" in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don't know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).

提高“透明度”——政治家、评论员和金融监管者最喜欢用来避免未来灾难的补救措施——无法解决衍生品带来的问题。我不知道有任何报告机制能够接近描述和衡量庞大而复杂的衍生品投资组合中的风险。审计师无法审计这些合同，监管者无法监管它们。当我阅读那些与这些工具纠缠不清的公司 10-K 报告中的“披露”页面时，我最终知道的只是我不知道他们的投资组合中发生了什么（然后我会去拿一些阿司匹林）。

For a case study on regulatory effectiveness, let's look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress, which retained control over them, dictating what they could and could not do. To aid its oversight, Congress created OFHEO in 1992, admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves. With that move, Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.

作为一个监管有效性的案例研究，让我们更深入地看看房地美和房利美的例子。这些庞大的机构是由国会创建的，国会保留了对它们的控制权，规定了它们可以和不可以做什么。为了帮助监督，国会在 1992 年成立了 OFHEO，告诫它确保这两个庞然大物行为端正。通过这一步，房利美和房地美成为了我所知道的最受严格监管的公司，以分配到此任务的人力来衡量。

On June 15, 2003, OFHEO (whose annual reports are available on the Internet) sent its 2002 report to Congress - specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other than Messrs. Sarbanes and Oxley. The report's 127 pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line: "Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence." The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired. No mention of their departures was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as it always did, that "Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed."

2003 年 6 月 15 日，OFHEO（其年度报告可在互联网上查阅）向国会——具体是向参众两院的四位负责人，其中不乏萨班斯和奥克斯利先生——提交了其 2002 年报告。该报告共 127 页，其中包括一句自我祝贺的封面标题：“庆祝卓越十年”。这份附函和报告是在房地美 CEO 和 CFO 名誉扫地辞职、COO 被解雇九天后送达的。信中完全没有提及他们的离职，即使报告的结论一如既往地写道：“两家企业财务稳健，管理良好。”

In truth, both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time. Finally, in 2006, OFHEO issued a 340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that, more or less, blamed the fiasco on every party but - you guessed it - Congress and OFHEO.

事实上，两家企业一段时间以来一直在进行大规模的会计操纵。最终，在 2006 年，OFHEO 发布了一份长达 340 页的严厉记录，记录了房利美的罪行，或多或少地将这场惨败归咎于每一方，但——你猜对了——国会和 OFHEO 除外。

The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions, a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire's 2002 report. On April 3, 2008, Tim Geithner, then the able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a rescue: "The sudden discovery by Bear's derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear's counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets." This is Fedspeak for "We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude." In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.

贝尔斯登的倒闭凸显了衍生品交易中嵌入的交易对手问题，这是我首次在伯克希尔 2002 年报告中讨论的一颗定时炸弹。2008 年 4 月 3 日，时任纽约联储能干的主席蒂姆·盖特纳解释了救援的必要性：“贝尔斯登的衍生品交易对手突然发现，他们为保护自己免受金融风险而设立的重要头寸不再有效，这将引发市场的进一步严重混乱。这将促使贝尔斯登的交易对手急于清算他们针对这些头寸持有的抵押品，并试图在已经非常脆弱的市场中复制这些头寸。”这是美联储的说法，意思是“我们介入以避免一场规模不可预测的金融连锁反应。”在我看来，美联储这样做是正确的。

A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means credit problems can't accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in 1995.

正常的股票或债券交易在几天内完成，一方获得现金，另一方获得证券。因此，交易对手风险很快消失，这意味着信用问题不会积累。这种快速结算过程是维护市场完整性的关键。事实上，这也是纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克在 1995 年将结算期从五天缩短到三天的一个原因。

Derivatives contracts, in contrast, often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims against each other. "Paper" assets and liabilities - often hard to quantify - become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It's not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.

相比之下，衍生品合同通常多年甚至几十年无法结算，交易对手之间会积累巨额相互索赔。通常难以量化的“表内”资产和负债成为财务报表的重要组成部分，尽管这些项目多年内都不会得到确认。此外，大型金融机构之间会形成一张可怕的相互依赖网。数十亿美元的应收应付款项集中在少数几家大型交易商手中，这些交易商也可能在其他方面具有高杠杆。寻求规避麻烦的参与者面临着与试图避免性病的人相同的问题：这不仅关乎你和谁睡，还关乎他们和谁睡。

Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives deals because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood - I won't mention names - are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I'm sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won't do; it's mindboggling screw-ups that are required.

继续我们的比喻，到处睡实际上可能对大型衍生品交易有用，因为如果遇到麻烦，它会确保它们获得政府援助。换句话说，只有那些问题可能感染整个社区的公司——我不点名——才一定会成为国家的关注对象（我遗憾地说，这个结果是恰当的）。从这个令人恼火的现实中，产生了雄心勃勃的 CEO 们堆积杠杆并运营庞大而深不可测的衍生品账本的公司生存第一定律：轻微的无能根本不行；需要的是令人难以置信的搞砸。

Considering the ruin I've pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault.

考虑到我所描绘的毁灭性景象，你可能会问为什么伯克希尔是 251 份衍生品合同（除了 MidAmerican 用于运营目的的以及 Gen Re 剩下的少数合同之外）的一方。答案很简单：我相信我们拥有的每一份合同在成立时都被错误定价，有时是严重错误定价。我既发起了这些头寸，也负责监控它们，这一系列责任符合我的信念：任何大型金融组织的 CEO 也必须同时是首席风险官。如果我们在衍生品上亏钱，那将是我的错。

Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid - our derivatives "float," so to speak - totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.

我们的衍生品交易要求在合同签订时交易对手向我们付款。因此伯克希尔总是持有资金，这使得我们不承担任何有意义的交易对手风险。截至年底，付给我们的款项减去我们已支付的损失——即我们的衍生品“浮存金”——总计 81 亿美元。这种浮存金类似于保险浮存金：如果我们在基础交易上实现盈亏平衡，我们将长期享受免费资金的使用。我们的期望（尽管远非确定）是我们将获得好于盈亏平衡的结果，而我们通过资金获得的可观投资收益将是锦上添花。

Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year's fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).

我们的合同中只有一小部分要求在市场对我们不利时提供抵押品。即使在去年第四季度混乱的条件下，我们也只需要提供不到证券投资组合 1% 的抵押品。（当我们提供抵押品时，我们将它存入第三方，同时保留存入证券的投资收益。）在我们 2002 年的年度报告中，我们警告了抵押品要求带来的致命威胁，去年我们在各种金融机构（就此而言，还有星座能源，当 MidAmerican 赶来救援时，它距离破产只有几个小时）目睹了现实生活中的例子。

Our contracts fall into four major categories. With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them in excruciating detail.

我们的合同分为四大类。向那些对金融工具不感兴趣的人表示歉意，我将极其详细地解释它们。

We have added modestly to the "equity put" portfolio I described in last year's report. Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20. We must make a payment to our counterparty at maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of the contract. Neither party can elect to settle early; it's only the price on the final day that counts.

我们在去年报告中描述的“股票看跌期权”组合中略有增加。我们的一些合同在 15 年后到期，另一些在 20 年后。如果在到期时看跌期权所挂钩的参考指数低于合同签订时的水平，则我们必须向交易对手支付款项。任何一方都不能选择提前结算；只有最后一天的价格才算数。

To illustrate, we might sell a $1 billion 15-year put contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at, say, 1300. If the index is at 1170 - down 10% - on the day of maturity, we would pay $100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe nothing. For us to lose $1 billion, the index would have to go to zero. In the meantime, the sale of the put would have delivered us a premium - perhaps $100 million to $150 million - that we would be free to invest as we wish.

举例说明，我们可能会在标普 500 指数处于例如 1300 点时卖出一份 15 年期 10 亿美元看跌期权合约。如果在到期日指数为 1170 点——下跌 10%——我们将支付 1 亿美元。如果高于 1300 点，我们无需支付。对我们来说，要损失 10 亿美元，指数必须跌到零。与此同时，卖出看跌期权将为我们带来一笔溢价——可能在 1 亿至 1.5 亿美元之间——我们可以随意投资。

Our put contracts total $37.1 billion (at current exchange rates) and are spread among four major indices: the S&P 500 in the U.S., the FTSE 100 in the U.K., the Euro Stoxx 50 in Europe, and the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on September 9, 2019 and our last on January 24, 2028. We have received premiums of $4.9 billion, money we have invested. We, meanwhile, have paid nothing, since all expiration dates are far in the future. Nonetheless, we have used Black-Scholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of $10 billion, an amount that will change on every reporting date. The two financial items - this estimated loss of $10 billion minus the $4.9 billion in premiums we have received - means that we have so far reported a mark-to-market loss of $5.1 billion from these contracts.

我们未平仓的看跌期权合约总额为 371 亿美元（按当前汇率计算），分布在四个主要指数中：美国标普 500 指数、英国富时 100 指数、欧洲 Euro Stoxx 50 指数和日本日经 225 指数。我们的第一份合同将于 2019 年 9 月 9 日到期，最后一份于 2028 年 1 月 24 日到期。我们已收到 49 亿美元的溢价，这些钱我们已经投资。与此同时，我们一无所付，因为所有到期日都在遥远的未来。尽管如此，我们使用布莱克-斯科尔斯估值方法记录了年底 100 亿美元的负债，这个金额将在每个报告日发生变化。这两个财务项目——估计损失 100 亿美元减去我们已收到的 49 亿美元溢价——意味着到目前为止，我们从这些合同中报告的按市值计算的损失为 51 亿美元。

We endorse mark-to-market accounting. I will explain later, however, why I believe the Black-Scholes formula, even though it is the standard for establishing the dollar liability for options, produces strange results when the long-term variety are being valued.

我们支持按市值计价的会计。然而，我将在后面解释为什么我相信布莱克-斯科尔斯公式，尽管它是确定期权美元负债的标准，但在对长期期权进行估值时会产生奇怪的结果。

One point about our contracts that is sometimes not understood: For us to lose the full $37.1 billion we have at risk, all stocks in all four indices would have to go to zero on their various termination dates. If, however - as an example - all indices fell 25% from their value at the inception of each contract, and foreign-exchange rates remained as they are today, we would owe about $9 billion, payable between 2019 and 2028. Between the inception of the contract and those dates, we would have held the $4.9 billion premium and earned investment income on it.

关于我们的合同，有一点有时不被理解：要让我们损失全部 371 亿美元的风险敞口，四个指数的所有股票必须在各自的终止日期跌至零。然而，举例来说，如果所有指数都比每份合同签订时的价值下跌 25%，且汇率保持不变，我们将欠约 90 亿美元，支付时间为 2019 年至 2028 年之间。在合同签订日和这些日期之间，我们将持有 49 亿美元的溢价并从中获得投资收益。

The second category we described in last year's report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay when credit losses occur at companies that are included in various high-yield indices. Our standard contract covers a five-year period and involves 100 companies. We modestly expanded our position last year in this category. But, of course, the contracts on the books at the end of 2007 moved one year closer to their maturity. Overall, our contracts now have an average life of 2½ years, with the first expiration due to occur on September 20, 2009 and the last on December 20, 2013.

我们在去年报告中描述的第二类衍生品涉及当包含在各种高收益指数中的公司发生信用损失时我们需要支付的合同。我们的标准合同覆盖五年期，涉及 100 家公司。去年我们在这个类别中适度扩大了头寸。但当然，2007 年底账面上的合同离到期日又近了一年。总体而言，我们的合同现在的平均剩余期限为 2.5 年，第一个到期日为 2009 年 9 月 20 日，最后一个到期日为 2013 年 12 月 20 日。

By yearend we had received premiums of $3.4 billion on these contracts and paid losses of $542 million. Using mark-to-market principles, we also set up a liability for future losses that at yearend totaled $3.0 billion. Thus we had to that point recorded a loss of about $100 million, derived from our $3.5 billion total in paid and estimated future losses minus the $3.4 billion of premiums we received. In our quarterly reports, however, the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of $327 million in the second quarter of 2008 to a loss of $693 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.

到年底，我们已收到这些合同的保费 34 亿美元，并支付了 5.42 亿美元的损失。使用按市值计价原则，我们还为未来损失设立了 30 亿美元的负债。因此，到目前为止，我们记录了约 1 亿美元的损失，来自我们支付的损失和估计的未来损失总额 35 亿美元减去我们收到的 34 亿美元保费。然而，在我们的季度报告中，损益金额波动剧烈，从 2008 年第二季度的盈利 3.27 亿美元变为 2008 年第四季度的亏损 6.93 亿美元。

Surprisingly, we made payments on these contracts of only $97 million last year, far below the estimate I used when I decided to enter into them. This year, however, losses have accelerated sharply with the mushrooming of large bankruptcies. In last year's letter, I told you I expected these contracts to show a profit at expiration. Now, with the recession deepening at a rapid rate, the possibility of an eventual loss has increased. Whatever the result, I will keep you posted.

令人惊讶的是，我们去年只支付了 9,700 万美元的合同款项，远低于我决定签订合同时使用的估计。然而，今年随着大型破产案的增多，损失急剧加速。在去年的信中，我告诉你们我预计这些合同在到期时会显示盈利。现在，随着经济衰退迅速加深，最终亏损的可能性增加了。无论结果如何，我都会及时通知你们。

In 2008 we began to write "credit default swaps" on individual companies. This is simply credit insurance, similar to what we write in BHAC, except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations rather than of tax-exempt issuers.

2008 年，我们开始针对单个公司签订“信用违约互换”。这其实就是信用保险，类似于我们在 BHAC 中承保的业务，不同之处在于这里我们承担的是公司的信用风险，而不是免税发行人的信用风险。

If, say, the XYZ company goes bankrupt, and we have written a $100 million contract, we are obligated to pay an amount that reflects the shrinkage in value of a comparable amount of XYZ's debt. (If, for example, the company's bonds are selling for 30 after default, we would owe $70 million.) For the typical contract, we receive quarterly payments for five years, after which our insurance expires.

例如，如果 XYZ 公司破产，而我们签订了一份 1 亿美元的合同，我们有义务支付反映同等金额 XYZ 债务价值缩水的金额。（例如，如果公司违约后债券售价为 30，我们将欠 7,000 万美元。）对于典型的合同，我们每季度收取一次付款，为期五年，之后我们的保险到期。

At yearend we had written $4 billion of contracts covering 42 corporations, for which we receive annual premiums of $93 million. This is the only derivatives business we write that has any counterparty risk; the party that buys the contract from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe us over the five years. We are unlikely to expand this business to any extent because most buyers of this protection now insist that the seller post collateral, and we will not enter into such an arrangement.

到年底，我们已经签订了 40 亿美元的合同，涵盖 42 家公司，每年收取 9,300 万美元的保费。这是我们唯一一笔涉及任何交易对手风险的衍生品业务；从我们这里购买合同的一方必须能够支付未来五年内每季度欠我们的保费。我们不太可能将这项业务扩展到任何程度，因为这种保护的大多数购买者现在坚持要求卖方提供抵押品，而我们不会接受这样的安排。

At the request of our customers, we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are similar to those written at BHAC, but that are structured as derivatives. The only meaningful difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.

应客户要求，我们承保了一些与 BHAC 承保类似的免税债券保险合同，但以衍生品的形式构建。这两种合同之间唯一有意义的区别在于，衍生品需要按市值计价，而 BHAC 需要标准权责发生制会计。

But this difference can produce some strange results. The bonds covered - in effect, insured - by these derivatives are largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about them. At yearend, however, mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC, and used the accrual accounting required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small profit for the year. The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting result. In the short term, however, the variance in reported profits can be substantial.

但这种差异可能产生一些奇怪的结果。这些衍生品所覆盖（实际上是被保险）的债券主要是州的一般责任债券，我们对它们感觉良好。然而，到年底，按市值计价要求我们在这些衍生品合同上记录 6.31 亿美元的损失。如果我们改为在 BHAC 中以相同的价格承保相同的债券，并使用保险公司要求的权责发生制会计，那么我们当年将会记录一笔小额利润。我们为债券提供保险的这两种方法最终将产生相同的会计结果。然而，在短期内，报告利润的差异可能很大。

We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as they are to mark-to-market accounting, will produce wild swings in the earnings we report. The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. Indeed, the "downs" can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms. I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.

我们之前已经告诉过你们，我们的衍生品合同由于采用按市值计价会计，将导致我们报告的收益出现剧烈波动。这种起伏既不会让查理和我高兴，也不会困扰我们。事实上，“下跌”可能是有益的，因为它们给了我们以有利条件扩大头寸的机会。我希望对我们交易的解释能引导你们也这样思考。

The Black-Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance, and we use it when valuing our equity put options for financial statement purposes. Key inputs to the calculation include a contract's maturity and strike price, as well as the analyst's expectations for volatility, interest rates and dividends.

布莱克-斯科尔斯公式在金融界已接近圣经的地位，我们在为财务报表目的对股票看跌期权进行估值时也使用它。计算的关键输入包括合同的到期日、行权价，以及分析师对波动率、利率和股息的预期。

If the formula is applied to extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results. In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well. But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.

然而，如果将该公式应用于较长的时间段，它可能会产生荒谬的结果。公平地说，布莱克和斯科尔斯几乎肯定很理解这一点。但他们忠实的追随者可能忽略了这两人在首次提出该公式时所附带的任何警示。

It's often useful in testing a theory to push it to extremes. So let's postulate that we sell a 100-year $1 billion put option on the S&P 500 at a strike price of 903 (the index's level on 12/31/08). Using the implied volatility assumption for long-dated contracts that we do, and combining that with appropriate interest and dividend assumptions, we would find the "proper" Black-Scholes premium for this contract to be $2.5 million.

在测试一个理论时，将其推至极端通常是很有用的。因此，我们假设以 903 点（2008 年 12 月 31 日指数水平）的行权价卖出一份 100 年期、10 亿美元的标普 500 看跌期权。使用我们对长期合同的隐含波动率假设，并结合适当的利率和股息假设，我们会发现这份合同的“适当”布莱克-斯科尔斯溢价为 250 万美元。

To judge the rationality of that premium, we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a century from now at less than today. Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its present value (at only 2% inflation it will be worth roughly 14¢). So that will be a factor pushing the stated value of the index higher. Far more important, however, is that one hundred years of retained earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the companies in the index. In the 20th Century, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175-fold, mainly because of this retained-earnings factor.

为了判断该溢价的合理性，我们需要评估一个世纪后的标普 500 指数是否低于今天的价值。当然，届时美元的购买力将只是现在的一小部分（在 2% 的通胀率下，其价值大约为 14 美分）。因此，这将是一个推高指数名义价值的因素。然而，更重要的是，一百年的留存收益将极大地增加指数中大多数公司的价值。在 20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数上涨了约 175 倍，主要是由于这个留存收益因素。

Considering everything, I believe the probability of a decline in the index over a one-hundred-year period to be far less than 1%. But let's use that figure and also assume that the most likely decline - should one occur - is 50%. Under these assumptions, the mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be $5 million ($1 billion X 1% X 50%).

综合考虑，我相信该指数在一百年期间下跌的概率远低于 1%。但让我们使用这个数字，并假设最可能的下跌（如果发生）是 50%。在这些假设下，我们合同损失的数学期望将达到 500 万美元（10 亿美元 × 1% × 50%）。

But if we had received our theoretical premium of $2.5 million up front, we would have only had to invest it at 0.7% compounded annually to cover this loss expectancy. Everything earned above that would have been profit. Would you like to borrow money for 100 years at a 0.7% rate?

但是，如果我们提前收到了 250 万美元的理论溢价，我们只需要以每年 0.7% 的复利进行投资，就能弥补这一预期损失。在这之上赚到的一切都是利润。你愿意以 0.7% 的利率借钱 100 年吗？

Let's look at my example from a worst-case standpoint. Remember that 99% of the time we would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct. But even in the worst case among the remaining 1% of possibilities - that is, one assuming a total loss of $1 billion - our borrowing cost would come to only 6.2%. Clearly, either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is inappropriate.

让我们从最坏的角度来看我的例子。请记住，如果我的假设是正确的，那么在 99% 的情况下我们无需支付任何费用。但即使在剩余 1% 可能性中的最坏情况——即假设完全损失 10 亿美元——我们的借款成本也仅为 6.2%。显然，要么我的假设是疯狂的，要么公式是不合适的。

The ridiculous premium that Black-Scholes dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past period of days, months or years. This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probability-weighted range of values of American business 100 years from now. (Imagine, if you will, getting a quote every day on a farm from a manic-depressive neighbor and then using the volatility calculated from these changing quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that predicts a probability-weighted range of values for the farm a century from now.)

在我极端的例子中，布莱克-斯科尔斯公式得出的荒谬溢价，是由于公式中包含了波动率，而波动率是由股票在过去某些天数、月数或年数中的波动程度决定的。这个指标在估计 100 年后美国企业价值的概率加权区间时完全不相关。（请想象一下，每天从一个躁郁症的邻居那里得到农场的报价，然后使用从这些不断变化的报价中计算出的波动率，作为预测农场一个世纪后概率加权价值方程中的一个重要成分。）

Though historical volatility is a useful - but far from foolproof - concept in valuing short-term options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the option lengthens. In my opinion, the valuations that the Black-Scholes formula now place on our long-term put options overstate our liability, though the overstatement will diminish as the contracts approach maturity.

尽管历史波动率在评估短期期权时是一个有用——但远非万无一失——的概念，但随着期权期限的延长，其效用会迅速降低。在我看来，布莱克-斯科尔斯公式目前对我们长期看跌期权的估值高估了我们的负债，尽管随着合同接近到期，这种高估会减少。

Even so, we will continue to use Black-Scholes when we are estimating our financial-statement liability for long-term equity puts. The formula represents conventional wisdom and any substitute that I might offer would engender extreme skepticism. That would be perfectly understandable: CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric financial instruments have seldom erred on the side of conservatism. That club of optimists is one that Charlie and I have no desire to join.

即便如此，在估计我们长期股票看跌期权的财务报表负债时，我们仍将继续使用布莱克-斯科尔斯公式。该公式代表了传统智慧，而我可能提出的任何替代方案都会引起极端的怀疑。这是完全可以理解的：那些为深奥的金融工具炮制自己估值的 CEO 们很少会在保守方面出错。那个乐观主义者的俱乐部，是查理和我无意加入的。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 2nd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest's stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

今年的年会将于 5 月 2 日星期六举行。一如既往，Qwest Center 的门将在早上 7 点开放，8:30 将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节，中间在 Qwest 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:00。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:15 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I lock the exits.)

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将通过与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你购物。去年，31,000 名与会者尽了自己的一份力，几乎所有展位都创下了销售记录。但你可以做得更好。（一个友好的警告：如果我发现销售滞后，我会锁上出口。）

This year Clayton will showcase its new i-house that includes Shaw flooring, Johns Manville insulation and MiTek fasteners. This innovative "green" home, featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving products, is truly a home of the future. Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about $1 per day when the home is sited in an area like Omaha. After purchasing the i-house, you should next consider the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby. Make your neighbors jealous.

今年 Clayton 将展示其新的 i-house，其中包括 Shaw 地板、Johns Manville 保温材料和 MiTek 紧固件。这种创新的“绿色”住宅，以太阳能电池板和众多其他节能产品为特色，真正是未来的住宅。当房屋建在奥马哈这样的地区时，电力和供暖的预估成本每天仅约 1 美元。购买 i-house 后，你接下来应该考虑附近展出的 Forest River 房车和浮筒船。让你的邻居羡慕去吧。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务，所有人都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 50 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有 50% 的人，我们可以做到。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take along - with no fear of a strip search - the Ginsu knives that you've purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.

周六，在奥马哈机场，我们将有常规的 NetJets 飞机阵列供您参观。请在 Qwest 的 NetJets 展位驻足，了解如何参观这些飞机。乘巴士来奥马哈；开着你新的飞机离开。并且带着你在我们 Quikut 子公司展位购买的 Ginsu 刀具——不用担心被搜身。

Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.

接下来，如果你还有钱，就去拜访 Bookworm，它将出售约 30 本书和 DVD。对于那些求知欲超过携带能力的人，将提供邮寄服务。

Finally, we will have three fascinating cars on the exhibition floor, including one from the past and one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our subsidiary, TTI, will bring his 1935 Duesenberg, a car that once belonged to Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr., parent and grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase. The future will be represented by a new plug-in electric car developed by BYD, an amazing Chinese company in which we have a 10% interest.

最后，我们将在展厅展示三辆迷人的汽车，包括一辆来自过去和一辆来自未来。我们子公司 TTI 的 CEO 保罗·安德鲁斯将带来他的 1935 年 Duesenberg，这辆车曾经属于福雷斯特·马尔斯夫人，她是我们在箭牌收购中新合作伙伴的父母和祖父母。未来将由比亚迪开发的新型插电式电动汽车代表，我们在这家了不起的中国公司中持有 10% 的股份。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。关于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与美国运通签约（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。负责这些事务的 Carol Pedersen 每年都为我们做得很出色，我感谢她。酒店房间可能很难找，但与 Carol 合作，你会找到一间。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM twelve years ago, and sales during the "Weekend" grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to a record $33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend, we also set a single day record of $7.2 million. Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。我们十二年前在 NFM 发起了这一特别活动，“周末”期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2008 年创纪录的 3,330 万美元。在周末的星期六，我们还创下了 720 万美元的单日纪录。随便问哪个零售商，看他们对这样的销量作何感想。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 30th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a western cookout to which you are all invited.

要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 30 日（周四）至 5 月 4 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开放，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办西部烧烤，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 5 月 1 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 10 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 3 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 27 日（周一）持续到 5 月 9 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。

Gorat's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat's, which seats 240, served 975 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,448 including 702 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please don't embarrass me by ordering foie gras. Remember: To come to Gorat's on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).

Gorat's 将在 5 月 3 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，从下午 1 点营业到晚上 10 点。去年，可容纳 240 人的 Gorat's 在股东星期日供应了 975 份晚餐。三天的总数是 2,448 份，包括 702 份丁骨牛排，这是行家最青睐的主菜。请不要点鹅肝酱让我难堪。记住：要在那天来 Gorat's，你必须预订。请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733 预订。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from outside the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.

周六下午 4 点，我们将再次为来自北美以外的股东举行招待会。每年我们的会议都会吸引来自全球各地的许多人，查理和我希望确保我们亲自问候那些远道而来的人。去年，我们很高兴见到了来自数十个国家的 700 多位股东。任何来自美国或加拿大以外的股东都将获得特别证件和参加此活动的说明。

This year we will be making important changes in how we handle the meeting's question periods. In recent years, we have received only a handful of questions directly related to Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically none. So we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire's businesses.

今年，我们将对会议问答环节的处理方式做出重要改变。近年来，我们只收到了少数与伯克希尔及其运营直接相关的问题。去年几乎没有。因此，我们需要将讨论引回伯克希尔的业务。

In a related problem, there has been a mad rush when the doors open at 7 a.m., led by people who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for questioners. This is not desirable from a safety standpoint, nor do we believe that sprinting ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose questions. (At age 78, I've concluded that speed afoot is a ridiculously overrated talent.) Again, a new procedure is desirable.

在一个相关的问题上，早上 7 点开门时会出现疯狂的抢跑，由那些希望在 12 个提问麦克风前排在第一位的人带头。从安全角度来看，这是不可取的，我们也不认为短跑能力应该是决定谁能够提问的因素。（在 78 岁时，我得出的结论是，脚的速度是一种被荒谬高估的才能。）同样，需要一个新的程序。

In our first change, several financial journalists from organizations representing newspapers, magazines and television will participate in the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

在我们的第一个改变中，来自报社、杂志和电视台的几位财经记者将参与问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和重要的十几个问题。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that's the way we like it.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者们会选一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。

In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. At least half the questions - those selected by the panel from your submissions - are therefore certain to be Berkshire-related. We will meanwhile continue to get some good - and perhaps entertaining - questions from the audience as well.

在我们的第二个改变中，我们将在 8:15 在每个麦克风处为希望亲自提问的股东举行抽签。在会议上，我将交替采纳记者提问和获胜股东的提问。因此，至少一半的问题——由小组从你们提交的问题中选出的——肯定是与伯克希尔相关的。同时，我们也将继续从观众那里得到一些好的——也许是有趣的——问题。

So join us at our Woodstock for Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format. Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.

所以，请加入我们的资本家伍德斯托克，并告诉我们你喜欢新形式的哪些方面。查理和我期待着与你们见面。

February 27, 2009

2009 年 2 月 27 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席