2023 年致股东信

Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.

查理·芒格于 11 月 28 日去世，距离他的 100 岁生日只有 33 天。

Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him. In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management.

尽管他在奥马哈出生并长大，但他一生中 80% 的时间都住在别处。因此，直到 1959 年他 35 岁时，我才第一次见到他。1962 年，他决定从事资金管理。

Three years later he told me - correctly! - that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.

三年后他告诉我——他说得对！——我买入伯克希尔控股权是一个愚蠢的决定。但他向我保证，既然我已经迈出了这一步，他会告诉我如何纠正我的错误。

In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.

在接下来的叙述中，请记住查理和他的家人并没有在我当时管理的小型投资合伙企业中投过一分钱，而我就是用那家合伙企业的钱买入了伯克希尔。此外，我们谁都没有料到查理有一天会持有伯克希尔的股票。

Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: "Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale." With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.

尽管如此，查理在 1965 年还是立刻给了我建议：“沃伦，忘了再买另一家像伯克希尔这样的公司吧。但现在你控制了伯克希尔，就要以合理的价格买入出色的企业，放弃以美妙的价格买入一般的企业。换句话说，抛弃你从你的英雄本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切。他的方法有效，但只在小规模操作时才行。” 我后来虽然多次反复，最终还是遵循了他的指示。

Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.

多年以后，查理成了我经营伯克希尔的合伙人，当我的旧习惯再次出现时，他一次又一次地把我拉回理智。直到他去世前，他一直扮演着这个角色。我们两人，以及早期和我们一起投资的人，最终过得比查理和我曾经梦想的还要好得多。

In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-to-day construction of his vision.

事实上，查理是如今伯克希尔的“建筑师”，而我是“总承包商”，负责每日落实他的愿景。

Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never - never - reminded me of my mistake.

查理从不试图因自己作为创建者的角色而邀功，而是让我去鞠躬领赏。在某种程度上，他与我的关系既是兄长，又是慈父。即使他知道自己是对的，他也会把缰绳交给我；而当我犯错时，他从不——从不——提醒我自己的失误。

In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.

在物理世界中，伟大的建筑会与它的建筑师联系在一起，而那些浇灌混凝土或安装窗户的人很快就会被遗忘。伯克希尔已经成为一家伟大的公司。虽然我长期以来一直负责施工团队，但查理应该永远被认为是建筑师。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.

伯克希尔拥有超过三百万个股东账户。我每年都有责任写一封信，对这群多样化且不断变化的股东——其中许多人希望更多地了解他们的投资——有所帮助。

Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.

查理·芒格，几十年来管理伯克希尔的合伙人，对此责任有着相同的看法，并期望我今年以惯常的方式与你们沟通。在对待伯克希尔股东的责任上，我和他意见一致。

Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or "hot" stocks).

作者们发现，设想起所要寻求的读者是有用的，而且他们通常希望吸引大众读者。在伯克希尔，我们的目标更有限：那些将自己的积蓄托付给伯克希尔、不期望转卖（态度上类似于为了购买农场或出租物业而储蓄的人，而不是宁愿用多余资金购买彩票或“热门”股票的人）的投资者。

Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such "lifetime" shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.

多年来，伯克希尔吸引了大量这样的“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的存在，并相信他们有权每年听到好消息和坏消息，由他们的 CEO 直接传达，而不是由永远提供乐观和甜腻废话的投资者关系官员或沟通顾问来传达。

In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.

在设想伯克希尔所寻求的股东时，我很幸运有一个完美的心理模型——我的妹妹伯蒂。让我介绍一下她。

For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.

首先，伯蒂聪明、睿智，喜欢挑战我的想法。不过，我们从未有过争吵，也从未有过任何接近关系破裂的事情。将来也永远不会。

Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.

此外，伯蒂和她的三个女儿，她们的大部分积蓄都投在了伯克希尔的股票上。她们的持股跨越了几十年，每年伯蒂都会读我要说的话。我的工作就是预判她的问题，并给出诚实的回答。

Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news - reading four newspapers daily - but doesn't consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible - very sensible - instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow's winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.

伯蒂和你们大多数人一样，理解许多会计术语，但她还没准备好参加 CPA 考试。她关注商业新闻——每天读四份报纸——但她不认为自己是经济专家。她通情达理——非常通情达理——本能地知道专家的话应该总是被忽略。毕竟，如果她能够可靠地预测明天的赢家，她会自由分享她宝贵的见解，从而增加竞争性买入吗？那就像找到了黄金，然后把地图交给邻居，告诉他们金矿的位置。

Bertie understands the power - for good or bad - of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the "tells" that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is "selling" and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody's fool.

伯蒂理解激励的力量——无论好坏——人类的弱点，以及在观察人类行为时可以识别的“信号”。她知道谁在“推销”，谁可以信任。简而言之，她不会轻易上当。

So, what would interest Bertie this year?

那么，今年伯蒂会对什么感兴趣呢？

Operating Results, Fact and Fiction

经营业绩：事实与虚构

Let's begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information - some important, some trivial.

让我们从数字开始。正式的年度报告从 K-1 页开始，长达 124 页。里面充满了大量的信息——有些重要，有些琐碎。

Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial "bottom line" labeled "Net earnings (loss)." The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.

在其披露的信息中，许多股东以及财经记者会关注 K-72 页。在那里，他们会看到众所周知的“底线”，标为“净利润（亏损）”。数字显示：2021 年 900 亿美元，2022 年（230 亿美元），2023 年 960 亿美元。

What in the world is going on?

这到底是怎么回事？

You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these "earnings" are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche ("D&T"). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: "In our opinion, the financial statements . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . and the results of its operations . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . ."

你寻求指导，得到的答案是：计算这些“利润”的程序是由严肃且有资质的美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）颁布的，由敬业且勤奋的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）授权，并由德勤（D&T）的世界级专业人士审计。在 K-67 页，德勤毫不含糊地写道：“我们认为，上述财务报表……在所有重大方面（斜体为我所加）公允列报了公司……的财务状况……以及……的经营成果……涵盖了截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日的三年期间内的每一年……”

So sanctified, this worse-than-useless "net income" figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job - and, legally, they have.

经过如此“神圣化”，这个比无用还糟糕的“净利润”数字迅速通过互联网和媒体传遍全世界。各方都相信他们已经完成了工作——从法律上讲，确实如此。

We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that "earnings" should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful - but only as a starting point - in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call "operating earnings." Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.

然而，我们感到不安。在伯克希尔，我们认为“利润”应该是一个明智的概念，伯蒂在评估一家企业时会觉得它有一定用处——但仅仅作为一个起点。因此，伯克希尔也向伯蒂和你们报告我们所谓的“营业利润”。它们所讲述的故事是：2021 年 276 亿美元；2022 年 309 亿美元；2023 年 374 亿美元。

The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.

法定数字与伯克希尔偏好的数字之间的主要区别在于，我们排除了未实现的资本利得或损失——这些有时一天之内就可能超过 50 亿美元。具有讽刺意味的是，直到 2018 年“改进”被强制执行之前，我们的偏好几乎就是当时的规则。几个世纪前伽利略的经历应该已经教会我们不要与高层的指令作对。但在伯克希尔，我们可能很固执。

Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire's value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie's) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?

不要误解资本利得的重要性：我预计它们将是伯克希尔未来几十年价值增长中一个非常重要的组成部分。否则，我们为什么要像我在整个投资生涯中用我自己的资金所做的那样，将巨额资金（你和伯蒂的）投入到有价股票上呢？

I can't remember a period since March 11, 1942 - the date of my first stock purchase - that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.

我记不起自 1942 年 3 月 11 日——我第一次购买股票的那天——以来的任何时期，我的净资产大部分不是配置在股票上，而且是美国股票。到目前为止，一切顺利。在 1942 年那个决定性的日子里，当我“扣动扳机”时，道琼斯工业平均指数跌破了 100 点。到放学时，我已经亏了大约 5 美元。但情况很快好转，如今该指数徘徊在 38,000 点左右。对美国投资者来说，美国一直是一个了不起的国家。他们所需要做的就是安静地坐着，不听任何人的话。

It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire's investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”

然而，根据包含了股票市场反复无常的每日——甚至每年——波动的“利润”来判断伯克希尔的投资价值，不仅仅是愚蠢。正如本·格雷厄姆教我的：“短期来看，市场是一台投票机；长期来看，它变成了一台称重机。”

What We Do

我们所做的事

Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It's harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.

我们在伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们希望全资或部分拥有那些具有基础且持久良好经济特性的企业。在资本主义体系中，一些企业会繁荣非常长的时间，而另一些则会被证明是无底洞。预测哪些会是赢家、哪些会是输家，比你想象的要难。而那些告诉你他们知道答案的人，通常要么是自欺欺人，要么是卖蛇油的推销员。

At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies - and simply sitting tight - can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can - ugh! - sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.

在伯克希尔，我们尤其青睐那种罕见的、能够在未来以高回报配置额外资本的企业。仅仅拥有其中一家公司——然后老老实实拿着——就能带来几乎无法衡量的财富。即使是这种持股的继承人也能够——唉！——有时也能悠闲地度过一生。

We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.

我们也希望这些受青睐的企业由能干且值得信赖的管理者经营，不过这是一个更难做出的判断，而且伯克希尔也有过不少失望。

In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.

1863 年，美国第一任审计长休·麦卡洛克给所有国民银行发了一封信。他的指示中包含这样的警告：“永远不要指望你能阻止一个流氓欺骗你而与他打交道。” 许多以为可以“管理”流氓问题的银行家都领悟到了麦卡洛克先生建议的智慧——我也是。人没那么容易读懂。真诚和同理心很容易被伪造。这一点在今天和 1863 年一样真实。

This combination of the two necessities I've described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one - and I missed plenty - another always came along.

我所描述的收购企业所需的两大要素的结合，长期以来一直是我们购买时的目标。曾有一段时间，我们有大量的候选者可以评估。如果我错过了一个——我错过过很多——总会有另一个出现。

Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.

那些日子早已一去不复返了；是我们的规模拖累了我们，尽管收购竞争的加剧也是一个因素。

Berkshire now has - by far - the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies - a who's who of American business - was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)

伯克希尔目前拥有——迄今为止——美国企业有记录以来最大的 GAAP 净资产。创纪录的营业利润和强劲的股市导致年末数字达到 5610 亿美元。2022 年，其他 499 家标普公司（美国商界的名人堂）的 GAAP 净资产总额为 8.9 万亿美元。（标普 2023 年的数字尚未统计，但不太可能大幅超过 9.5 万亿美元。）

By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately jukes net worth).

按此衡量，伯克希尔现在占据了其运营领域近 6% 的份额。在五年内将我们如此庞大的基础翻倍根本不可能，尤其是因为我们非常厌恶发行股票（这种行为会立即扭曲净资产）。

There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can't. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.

这个国家只剩下少数几家公司能够真正推动伯克希尔的业绩指针，而且它们已经被我们和其他人无数次审视过了。有些我们可以估值，有些我们不能。而且，即使我们能估值，它们也必须价格有吸引力。在美国以外，基本上没有对伯克希尔资本配置有意义的候选对象。总而言之，我们不可能有令人瞠目结舌的业绩表现。

Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.

尽管如此，管理伯克希尔大多是愉快的，而且总是很有趣。从积极的方面看，经过 59 年的组合，公司现在拥有多家企业的部分或 100% 股权，按加权计算，这些企业的前景比大多数美国大公司要好一些。凭借运气和勇气，从几十个决策中涌现出了几个巨大的赢家。我们现在拥有一小批长期任职的管理者，他们从不考虑去别处，并且把 65 岁仅仅当作又一个生日。

Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well - who wouldn't wish to do so? - our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.

伯克希尔受益于非同寻常的恒心和清晰的目标。虽然我们强调善待我们的员工、社区和供应商——谁不愿意这样做呢？——但我们的忠诚始终属于我们的国家和我们的股东。我们永远不会忘记，尽管你们的资金与我们的资金混在一起，但它不属于我们。

With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.

有了这一专注，以及我们当前的业务组合，伯克希尔的业绩应该会比普通美国公司好一点，更重要的是，永久性资本损失的风险也要低得多。然而，任何“略好一点”之外的表现都是痴心妄想。当伯蒂全力投入伯克希尔时，情况并非如此——但现在是这样了。

Our Not-So-Secret Weapon

我们不算秘密的武器

Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can - and will - unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won't happen often - but they will happen.

偶尔，市场和/或经济会导致一些规模庞大且基本面良好的企业的股票和债券出现惊人的错误定价。事实上，市场可能——而且将会——不可预测地冻结甚至消失，就像 1914 年的四个月和 2001 年的几天那样。如果你认为美国投资者现在比过去更稳定，回想一下 2008 年 9 月。通信速度和技术的奇迹促成了即时的全球瘫痪，自烟雾信号时代以来，我们已经走了很长一段路。这种即时恐慌不会经常发生——但一定会发生。

Berkshire's ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today's active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.

伯克希尔能够以巨额资金和确定的执行力立即应对市场失灵，这可能会为我们提供偶尔的大规模机会。尽管股票市场比我们早年时大得多，但今天的活跃参与者既没有比我上学时更情绪稳定，也没有受过更好的教育。无论出于何种原因，现在的市场表现出比年轻时更多的赌场般行为。赌场如今 reside 在许多家庭中，每天诱惑着住户。

One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street - to use the term in its figurative sense - would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens' juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed - not by everyone but always by someone.

金融生活中的一个事实永远不应忘记。华尔街——用这个词的比喻意义——希望它的客户赚钱，但真正让其居民热血沸腾的是狂热的交易活动。在这种时候，任何能够被推销的愚蠢行为都会被大力推销——不是所有人都会这么做，但总有人会。

Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.

偶尔，场面会变得丑陋。政客们随后变得愤怒；最恶劣的不法行为者带着财富逍遥法外，不受惩罚；而你家隔壁的朋友变得困惑、更穷，有时还充满报复心。他明白了，金钱战胜了道德。

One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been - and will be - rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.

伯克希尔有一条投资规则没有也不会改变：永远不要冒永久性资本损失的风险。得益于美国的顺风和复利的力量，我们所处的舞台一直——也将继续——是有回报的，只要你在生命中做出几个好的决策并避免严重的错误。

I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire's goal will be to function as an asset to the country - just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 - and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.

我相信伯克希尔能够处理规模超出以往任何经历的金融灾难。这种能力是我们不会放弃的。当经济动荡发生时（它们总会发生），伯克希尔的目标将是充当国家的一项资产——就像它在 2008-09 年以非常微小的方式所做的那样——帮助扑灭金融大火，而不是成为众多无意或以其他方式点燃大火的公司之一。

Our goal is realistic. Berkshire's strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA" is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.

我们的目标是现实的。伯克希尔的实力来自于扣除利息成本、税收以及大额折旧和摊销费用后（“EBITDA”在伯克希尔是被禁止的衡量标准）源源不断的多元化盈利。即使国家遭遇长期全球经济疲软、恐慌和近乎瘫痪，我们也能以最低的现金需求运营。

Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.

伯克希尔目前不支付股息，其股票回购是 100% 酌情决定的。年度到期债务从不重大。

Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.

你的公司还持有远超传统观念认为必要的现金和美国国库券头寸。在 2008 年恐慌期间，伯克希尔通过运营产生现金，并未以任何方式依赖商业票据、银行信贷额度或债务市场。我们没有预测到经济瘫痪的时间，但我们始终为之一做准备。

Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years - indeed in most decades - our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior - akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage - quotational shrinkage for extended periods can't be avoided - on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.

极端的财务保守主义是我们向那些加入我们、成为伯克希尔所有者的人做出的企业承诺。在大多数年份——实际上在大多数几十年里——我们的谨慎可能被证明是不必要的行为——就像为一座被认为防火的堡垒式建筑购买保险一样。但伯克希尔不想给伯蒂或任何将积蓄托付给我们的个人造成永久性的财务损失——报价的长期缩水是无法避免的。

Berkshire is built to last.

伯克希尔是为持久而建的。

Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable

让我们感到舒适的非控股企业

Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire's long-duration partial-ownership positions - Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire's GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.

去年我提到了伯克希尔两个长期的部分持股头寸——可口可乐和美国运通。它们不像我们的苹果头寸那样庞大。每个仅占伯克希尔 GAAP 净资产的 4-5%。但它们是重要的资产，也说明了我们的思考过程。

American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past - but definitely not now - both were even mismanaged.

美国运通于 1850 年开始运营，可口可乐于 1886 年在亚特兰大的一家药店诞生。（伯克希尔对新来者不太感兴趣。）两家公司多年来都曾尝试扩展到不相关的领域，但几乎没有成功。在过去——但肯定不是现在——两家公司甚至曾被管理不善。

But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.

但每一家在其基础业务上都取得了巨大成功，根据条件的要求在各地进行了重塑。而且，关键是，它们的产品“走向了世界”。可口可乐和美国运通以及它们的核心产品都成为了全球知名的名字，液态饮品的消费和对毫无疑问的金融信任的需求是我们这个世界永恒的基本要素。

During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke - extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.

2023 年，我们没有买入或卖出一股美国运通或可口可乐——延续了我们自己长达二十多年的 Rip Van Winkle 式沉睡。两家公司去年再次以增加盈利和股息的方式回报了我们的不作为。事实上，2023 年我们应占的美国运通盈利，已经大大超过了我们很久以前买入所花费的 13 亿美元成本。

Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 - about 16% in the case of AMEX - and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: "No way."

美国运通和可口可乐几乎肯定会在 2024 年增加股息——美国运通大约增加 16%——而我们几乎肯定会在全年保持持股不变。我能创造出比这两家拥有的更好的全球性业务吗？正如伯蒂会告诉你的：“绝无可能。”

Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.

虽然伯克希尔在 2023 年没有购买这两家公司的股票，但由于我们在伯克希尔进行的股票回购，你们对可口可乐和美国运通的间接所有权去年略有增加。这种回购的作用是增加你们在伯克希尔拥有的每一项资产中的参与度。对于这个显而易见但经常被忽视的事实，我要加上我惯常的警告：所有股票回购都应当取决于价格。在相对于企业价值有折扣时回购是明智的，而在溢价时回购就是愚蠢的。

The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.

从可口可乐和美国运通身上学到的教训是什么？当你找到一家真正出色的企业时，就坚持下去。耐心会有回报，一家出色的企业可以抵消许多不可避免的平庸决策。

This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.

今年，我想描述另外两项我们预计无限期持有的投资。像可口可乐和美国运通一样，这些头寸相对于我们的资源来说并不巨大。不过，它们是有价值的，而且我们在 2023 年得以增持了这两项头寸。

At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum's common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country's interest.

截至年底，伯克希尔持有西方石油公司 27.8% 的普通股，同时还拥有认股权证，可以在五年多的时间里以固定价格大幅增持我们的股份。尽管我们非常喜欢我们的持股以及认股权证，但伯克希尔对购买或管理西方石油没有兴趣。我们尤其喜欢其在美国拥有的大量石油和天然气资产，以及其在碳捕获计划方面的领先地位，尽管该技术的经济可行性尚未得到证实。这两项活动都非常符合我们国家的利益。

Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day ("BOEPD"), a level far short of the country's needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign - potentially unstable - suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.

不久前，美国还严重依赖外国石油，而碳捕获没有有意义的支持者。事实上，1975 年美国的日产量为 800 万桶油当量，远低于国家的需求。美国从二战期间利于动员的有利能源地位，倒退到了严重依赖外国——可能不稳定——的供应商。当时预测石油产量将进一步下降，同时使用量将进一步增加。

For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve ("SPR") in 1975 to alleviate - though not come close to eliminating - this erosion of American self-sufficiency.

在很长一段时间里，悲观情绪似乎是正确的，到 2007 年产量降至 500 万桶油当量/日。与此同时，美国政府在 1975 年建立了战略石油储备，以缓解——尽管远未消除——对美国自给自足能力的侵蚀。

And then - Hallelujah! - shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very - very - nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.

然后——哈利路亚！——页岩油经济在 2011 年变得可行，我们的能源依赖结束了。现在，美国产量超过 1300 万桶油当量/日，欧佩克不再占据上风。西方石油公司本身的美国年石油产量，每年都接近整个战略石油储备的总量。如果今天国内产量仍停留在 500 万桶油当量/日，并且发现自己严重依赖非美国来源，我们的国家将会非常非常紧张。在那个水平上，如果外国石油无法获得，战略石油储备将在几个月内被清空。

Under Vicki Hollub's leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that's an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.

在 Vicki Hollub 的领导下，西方石油正在为它的国家和它的所有者做正确的事情。没有人知道未来一个月、一年或十年油价会怎样。但 Vicki 知道如何从岩石中分离出石油，这是一项不凡的才能，对她的股东和她的国家都很有价值。

Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.

此外，伯克希尔继续持有五家规模非常大的日本公司的被动且长期权益，每家公司都以高度多元化的方式运营，某种程度上类似于伯克希尔自身的运营方式。在 Greg Abel 和我前往东京与他们的管理层交流之后，我们去年增持了所有五家公司的股份。

Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.

伯克希尔现在持有这五家公司各约 9% 的股份。（一个小问题：日本公司计算流通股的方式与美国不同。）伯克希尔还向每家公司承诺，不会购买会使我们持股超过 9.9% 的股份。我们对这五家公司的总成本为 1.6 万亿日元，年底五家公司的市值为 2.9 万亿日元。然而，近年来日元走弱，我们年底以美元计算的未实现收益为 61%，即 80 亿美元。

Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don't believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.

Greg 和我都不相信我们能够预测主要货币的市场价格。我们也不相信我们能雇到有此能力的人。因此，伯克希尔用发行 1.3 万亿日元债券的收益为其大部分日本头寸提供了融资。这笔债务在日本非常受欢迎，我相信伯克希尔未偿还的日元计价债务比任何其他美国公司都多。日元走弱为伯克希尔带来了 19 亿美元的年底收益，根据 GAAP 规则，这笔收益在 2020-23 年期间已定期被确认为收入。

In certain important ways, all five companies - Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo - follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.

在某些重要方面，这五家公司——伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友——都遵循股东友好的政策，这些政策远优于美国通常的做法。自从我们开始买入日本股票以来，这五家公司每家公司都以有吸引力的价格减少了其流通股数量。

Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1/3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.

与此同时，这五家公司的管理层在自己的薪酬方面远比美国典型做法要克制得多。还要注意，这五家公司每家只将其盈利的约 1/3 用于分红。它们留存的大笔资金既用于发展它们的众多业务，也在较小程度上用于回购股票。像伯克希尔一样，这五家公司都不愿发行股票。

An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.

对伯克希尔来说，另一个好处是，我们的投资可能会带来机会，让我们与五家规模庞大、管理良好、受人尊敬的公司开展全球合作。它们的业务范围远比我们广泛。而对日本的 CEO 们来说，他们可以安心地知道，伯克希尔始终拥有巨大的流动性资源，可以随时用于此类合作，无论合作规模有多大。

Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire's present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of "friendly" prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.

我们对日本股票的购买始于 2019 年 7 月 4 日。考虑到伯克希尔目前的规模，通过公开市场购买建立头寸需要大量的耐心和一段较长时间的“友好”价格。这个过程就像转动一艘战舰。这是我们在伯克希尔早期没有遇到的一个重要劣势。

The Scorecard in 2023

2023 年的成绩单

Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:

每个季度我们都会发布一份新闻稿，以类似于下表的方式报告我们汇总的营业利润（或亏损）。以下是全年汇总表：

At Berkshire's annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter's results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year:

在 2023 年 5 月 6 日的伯克希尔年会上，我公布了当天早上发布的第一季度业绩。随后我对全年展望做了一个简短总结：

(1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023;

（1）2023 年我们大多数非保险业务面临盈利下降；

(2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE") which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022;

（2）这一下降将由我们最大的两个非保险业务 BNSF 和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）的良好业绩所缓冲，这两家公司在 2022 年合计占营业利润的 30% 以上；

(3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and

（3）我们的投资收益肯定会大幅增长，因为伯克希尔持有的大量美国国库券终于开始为我们支付远高于我们过去所获得的微薄收益；

(4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.

（4）保险业务可能会表现良好，既因为其承保收益与经济其他部分的收益不相关，除此之外，财产意外险的定价也已经走强。

Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let's take a look at each.

保险业务一如预期。然而，我错误地判断了 BNSF 和 BHE 的预期。让我们分别看一看。

Rail is essential to America's economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way - measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity - of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can't run without rail, and the industry's capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.

铁路对美国的经济未来至关重要。以成本、燃料使用和碳强度来衡量，它是将重型物资运往遥远目的地的最有效方式。卡车运输在短途运输上取胜，但美国人需要的许多商品必须运送到数百甚至数千英里外的客户手中。没有铁路，这个国家就无法运转，并且该行业的资本需求将始终巨大。事实上，与大多数美国企业相比，铁路是吞噬资本的。

BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.

BNSF 是覆盖北美的六大铁路系统之首。我们铁路的资产负债表上列有 23,759 英里的主干线、99 条隧道、13,495 座桥梁、7,521 台机车以及各类其他固定资产，账面价值 700 亿美元。但我猜，要复制这些资产至少需要 5000 亿美元，并且需要几十年才能完成。

BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.

BNSF 每年仅仅为了维持当前的业务水平，就必须花费超过其折旧费用的资金。这一现实对所有者不利，无论他们投资于哪个行业，但在资本密集型行业中尤其不利。

At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $1.5 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF's reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad's debt. And that we do not intend to do.

在 BNSF，自我们 14 年前购买以来，超出 GAAP 折旧费用的支出总额已达到惊人的 220 亿美元，即每年超过 15 亿美元。哎哟！这种差距意味着 BNSF 向其所有者伯克希尔支付的股息将经常远低于 BNSF 的报告利润，除非我们定期增加铁路的债务。而我们不打算那样做。

Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That's no surprise to me or Berkshire's board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.

因此，伯克希尔从其购买价格中获得了尚可接受的回报，尽管比看起来的要少，并且从资产的替代价值中获得的回报微乎其微。这对我和伯克希尔的董事会来说并不意外。这解释了为什么我们能在 2010 年以替代价值的一小部分买下 BNSF。

North America's rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.

北美的铁路系统单向长途运输大量煤炭、谷物、汽车、进出口商品等，而这些运输通常会给回程带来收入问题。天气条件极端，经常阻碍甚至阻止轨道、桥梁和设备的利用。洪水可能是一场噩梦。这些都不令人意外。当我坐在始终舒适的办公室里时，铁路运营是一项户外活动，许多员工在艰苦、有时甚至危险的条件下工作。

An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can't be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.

一个逐渐显现的问题是，越来越多的美国人不愿意从事某些铁路运营固有的艰苦且常常孤独的工作条件。工程师必须面对这样一个事实：在 3.35 亿美国人口中，会有一些绝望或精神失常的人选择卧轨自杀，躺在由 100 节车厢组成的、异常沉重的、制动距离至少一英里的火车前面。你想成为那个无助的工程师吗？这种创伤在北美每天大约发生一次；在欧洲更为常见，并且将永远伴随着我们。

Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.

铁路行业的工资谈判最终可能落到总统和国会手中。此外，美国的铁路被要求每天运输许多该行业宁愿避免的危险产品。“公共承运人”这个词定义了铁路的责任。

Last year BNSF's earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country's inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.

去年，由于收入下降，BNSF 的利润下降幅度超过我的预期。尽管燃料成本也下降了，但由华盛顿颁布的工资增长远远超出了国家的通胀目标。这种差异可能会在未来的谈判中再次出现。

Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.

尽管 BNSF 运输的货物量比北美其他五大铁路公司中的任何一家都多，资本支出也更多，但自我们购买以来，它的利润率相对于所有五家都下降了。我相信我们广阔的服务区域是无与伦比的，因此我们的利润率比较能够而且应该改善。

I am particularly proud of both BNSF's contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America's commercial arteries open. Railroads don't get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.

我尤其为 BNSF 对国家的贡献，以及在北达科他州和蒙大拿州冬季在零度以下的户外工作以保持美国商业动脉畅通的人们感到自豪。铁路在运行时不会得到太多关注，但如果它们不可用，整个美国会立即注意到这一空白。

A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.

一个世纪后，BNSF 将继续成为国家和伯克希尔的主要资产。你可以对此确信无疑。

Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California's largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.

我们去年的第二个、甚至更严重的盈利失望出现在 BHE。其大部分大型电力公用事业业务以及广泛的天然气管道，表现大致符合预期。但少数几个州的监管环境引发了零盈利甚至破产的幽灵（加州最大公用事业公司的实际结果，以及夏威夷当前的威胁）。在这些司法管辖区，曾经被认为是美国最稳定的行业之一，现在很难预测盈利和资产价值。

For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE's extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.

一个多世纪以来，电力公司通过州政府逐州承诺的固定股权回报率（有时对优异表现给予小额奖励）筹集巨额资金来为其增长提供融资。通过这种方法，针对几年后可能需要的能力进行了大规模投资。这种前瞻性的监管反映了公用事业公司建设发电和输电资产通常需要多年时间的事实。BHE 在西部的广泛多州输电项目于 2006 年启动，距离完工还有几年。最终，它将服务于 10 个州，占美国本土面积的 30%。

With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory-return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?

在私人和公共电力系统都采用这种模式的情况下，即使用户增长或工业需求超出预期，灯光也从未熄灭。这种“安全边际”的做法对监管者、投资者和公众来说似乎是明智的。如今，固定但令人满意的回报契约在几个州被打破，投资者开始担心这种破裂可能会蔓延。气候变化加剧了他们的担忧。可能需要地下输电，但几十年前，谁愿意为这种建设支付惊人的费用？

At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased - and will likely continue to increase - if convective storms become more frequent.

在伯克希尔，我们对已发生的损失金额做出了最佳估计。这些成本源于森林火灾，如果对流风暴变得更加频繁，森林火灾的频率和强度已经增加，并且可能还会继续增加。

It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE's forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.

我们需要很多年才能知道 BHE 森林火灾损失的最终数字，并能够明智地决定未来在脆弱的西部各州进行投资的合意性。其他地方的监管环境是否会改变，还有待观察。

Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.

其他电力公司可能面临类似于太平洋天然气和电力公司以及夏威夷电力公司的生存问题。对我们当前问题的没收性解决方案显然会对 BHE 不利，但该公司和伯克希尔本身的结构设计都能够承受负面冲击。我们在保险业务中经常遇到这种情况，因为我们的基本产品就是风险承担，并且这种情况也会发生在其他地方。伯克希尔能够承受财务上的意外，但我们不会明知故犯地把好钱扔进坏钱。

Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.

无论伯克希尔的情况如何，公用事业行业的最终结果可能是不祥的：某些公用事业公司可能不再吸引美国公民的储蓄，并将被迫采用公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 1930 年代做出了这一选择，并且全国各地有许多公共电力运营机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。

When the dust settles, America's power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire's two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.

当尘埃落定时，美国的电力需求以及随之而来的资本支出将是惊人的。我没有预料到甚至没有考虑到监管回报的不利发展，并且与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两个合作伙伴一起，我因为没有这样做而犯了一个代价高昂的错误。

Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance ("P/C") provides the core of Berkshire's well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume - from $17 million to $83 billion - we have much room to grow.

关于问题的部分就到此为止：我们的保险业务去年表现异常出色，在销售额、浮存金和承保利润方面都创下了纪录。财产意外险是伯克希尔福祉和增长的核心。我们已经在这个行业经营了 57 年，尽管我们的业务量增长了近 5000 倍——从 1700 万美元到 830 亿美元——我们仍有很大的增长空间。

Beyond that, we have learned - too often, painfully - a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can't be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.

除此之外，我们学到了——往往是以痛苦的方式——很多关于应该避免哪些类型的保险业务以及哪些类型的人。最重要的教训是，我们的核保人员可以瘦、胖、男、女、年轻、年长、外国人或本国人。但他们在办公室不能是乐观主义者，无论这种品质在生活中通常是多么可取。

Surprises in the P/C business - which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired - are almost always negative. The industry's accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation - both monetary and the "legal" variety - is a wild card.

财产意外险业务中的意外——可能在六个月或一年期保单到期几十年后发生——几乎总是负面的。该行业的会计制度旨在认识到这一现实，但估计错误可能非常巨大。而当骗子介入时，发现往往既缓慢又代价高昂。伯克希尔将始终努力准确估计未来的赔付金额，但通货膨胀——无论是货币性的还是“法律”性的——都是一张万能牌。

I've told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day - aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end - I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.

我已经讲过很多次我们保险业务的故事了，这里我只是简单地把新读者引导到第 18 页。在这里，我只想重复一点：如果没有 Ajit Jain 在 1986 年加入伯克希尔，我们的境况就不会是今天这样。在那个幸运的日子之前——除了 1951 年初开始的与 GEICO 的几乎难以置信的美好经历，这种经历永远不会结束——我在努力建立我们的保险业务时，基本上是在荒野中徘徊。

Ajit's achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire's lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown's honorees are to baseball.

Ajit 加入伯克希尔以来取得的成就，得到了我们各个财产意外险业务部门一大批才华横溢的保险高管的支持。他们的名字和面孔不为大多数媒体和公众所知。然而，伯克希尔的管理者阵容之于财产意外险，就如同库珀stown 的荣誉者之于棒球。

Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.

伯蒂，你可以感到高兴的是，你拥有一家不可思议的财产意外险业务的一部分，它现在在全球范围内运营，拥有无与伦比的财务资源、声誉和人才。它在 2023 年取得了胜利。

What is it with Omaha?

奥马哈到底有什么特别？

Come to Berkshire's annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don't look alike. Let's dig deeper.

来参加 2024 年 5 月 4 日的伯克希尔年度股东大会吧。在台上，你会看到现在承担领导公司主要责任的三位管理者。你可能会想，这三位有什么共同点？他们看起来肯定不像。让我们更深入地了解一下。

Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire - and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow - was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.

Greg Abel 负责伯克希尔所有非保险业务的运营——并且在各方面都准备好明天就成为伯克希尔的 CEO——他在加拿大出生并长大（他仍然打曲棍球）。然而，在 1990 年代，Greg 在奥马哈住了六年，离我家只有几个街区。在那段时间里，我从未见过他。

A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I've lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it's been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).

大约十年前，Ajit Jain 在印度出生、长大并接受教育，他曾与家人在奥马哈居住，离我家（我自 1958 年以来一直住在那里）只有大约一英里。Ajit 和他的妻子 Tinku 在奥马哈有很多朋友，尽管他们搬到纽约（为了去再保险业务活跃的地方）已经三十多年了。

Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn't meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America's 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)

今年将缺席舞台的是查理。我和他都出生在奥马哈，离我们五月聚会时你们将坐的地方大约两英里。在他生命中的头十年，查理住在离伯克希尔长期设办公室的地方大约半英里的地方。查理和我都在奥马哈的公立学校度过了我们的早年时光，并且被我们的奥马哈童年不可磨灭地塑造了。然而，我们直到很久以后才相遇。（一个可能会让你惊讶的脚注：查理见证了美国 45 位总统中的 15 位执政时期。人们称拜登总统为第 46 任，但这种编号把格罗弗·克利夫兰同时算作第 22 任和第 24 任，因为他的两届任期不是连续的。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。）

Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.

再来看公司层面，伯克希尔本身在 1970 年从它居住了 81 年的新英格兰搬迁到奥马哈定居，把麻烦抛在身后，在新家蓬勃发展。

As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie - yes that Bertie - spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country's great investors.

作为“奥马哈效应”的最后一个注脚，伯蒂——是的，就是那位伯蒂——在奥马哈的一个中产阶级社区度过了她早期的成长岁月，几十年后，她成为了美国伟大的投资者之一。

You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that's not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1/3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.

你可能会认为，她把所有的钱都投进了伯克希尔，然后只是坐着不动。但事实并非如此。1956 年组建家庭后，伯蒂在财务上活跃了 20 年：持有债券，将她资金的 1/3 投入一只公开持有的共同基金，并较为频繁地交易股票。她的潜力一直未被发现。

Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).

然后，在 1980 年，46 岁时，没有受到她哥哥的任何催促，伯蒂决定采取行动。她只保留了共同基金和伯克希尔，在接下来的 43 年里没有进行任何新的交易。在此期间，即使进行了大量的慈善捐赠（想想九位数），她变得非常富有。

Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.

数百万美国投资者本来可以遵循她的推理，这种推理仅仅涉及她小时候在奥马哈以某种方式吸收的常识。而且，为了确保万无一失，伯蒂每年五月都会回到奥马哈重新充电。

So what is going on? Is it Omaha's water? Is it Omaha's air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica's sprinters, Kenya's marathon runners, or Russia's chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?

那么，到底是怎么回事？是奥马哈的水？是奥马哈的空气？还是一种奇怪的行星现象，类似产生牙买加短跑运动员、肯尼亚马拉松运动员或俄罗斯国际象棋专家的那种现象？我们必须等到有一天人工智能给出这个谜题的答案吗？

Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.

保持开放的心态。五月来奥马哈，呼吸空气，喝水，向伯蒂和她漂亮的女儿们问好。谁知道呢？这没有坏处，无论如何，你会玩得很开心，并遇到一大群友好的人。

To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie's Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie's wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.

更棒的是，我们将提供新的第四版《穷查理宝典》。拿一本吧。查理的智慧会改善你的生活，就像它改善了我的生活一样。

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔 vs. 标普500 业绩表现

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注： 数据为日历年度，但以下例外：1965 和 1966 年截至 9 月 30 日；1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。