1965年1月18日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

巴菲特合伙公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
奥马哈31，内布拉斯加州

January 18, 1965

1965年1月18日

Our Performance in 1964

1964年的业绩

Although we had an overall gain of $4,846,312.37 in 1964, it was not one of our better years as judged by our fundamental yardstick, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow"). The overall result for BPL was plus 27.8% compared to an overall plus 18.7% for the Dow. The overall result for limited partners was plus 22.3%. Both the advantage of 9.1 percentage points on a partnership basis and 3.6 points by the limited partners were the poorest since 1959, which was a year of roughly comparable gains for the Dow.

尽管我们在1964年实现了4,846,312.37美元的总收益，但按照我们的基本衡量标准——道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）来看，这并不是我们表现最好的年份之一。BPL整体收益为+27.8%，而道指整体收益为+18.7%。有限合伙人整体收益为+22.3%。合伙基金领先9.1个百分点，有限合伙人领先3.6个百分点，这两项优势都是自1959年以来最小的，而1959年道指涨幅与今年大致相当。

Nevertheless, I am not depressed. It was a strong year for the general market, and it is always tougher for us to outshine the Dow in such a year. We are certain to have years when the Dow gives us a drubbing and, in some respects, I feel rather fortunate that 1964 wasn't the year. Because of the problems that galloping markets pose for us, a Dow repeat in 1965 of 1964 results would make it most difficult for us to match its performance, let alone surpass it by a decent margin.

不过，我并不感到沮丧。今年是整体市场表现强劲的一年，在这样的年份里，我们要想跑赢道指总是更加困难。肯定会有那么几年，道指会把我们打得落花流水，从某些方面来说，我很庆幸1964年不是这样的年份。由于快速上涨的市场给我们带来的问题，如果1965年道指重演1964年的表现，我们将很难赶上它的表现，更不用说以可观的幅度超越了。

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partner's results:

为了更新我们的记录，下表总结了道指逐年表现、合伙基金在向普通合伙人分配前的表现，以及有限合伙人的结果：

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(1) 基于道指价值在当年的变化加上持有道指成分股将获得的股息。表格包含合伙基金所有完整运营年份。
(2) 1957-61年数据为所有前身有限合伙在整个年度的合并结果，扣除所有费用后但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分配前。
(3) 1957-61年数据基于前一列合伙基金收益，按现行合伙协议计算普通合伙人分配后，但扣除有限合伙人月度提款前。

On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

按累计或复利计算的结果为：

Investment Companies

投资公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about $4.5 billion, are owned by about 550,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金，通常保持95-100%投资于普通股）以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行比较。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、Tri-Continental公司和莱曼公司——管理着约45亿美元资金，拥有约55万股东，可能是整个300亿美元投资公司行业的代表。我认为，它们的业绩大致反映了绝大多数其他投资咨询机构（这些机构管理的资金总额远高于此）的表现。

The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.

下面这张表格的目的在于说明，道指作为一个投资成就指标并非易事。仅管理这四家公司所展示的顾问人才，年费就超过800万美元，而这只代表了专业投资管理行业很小的一部分。这些高薪且备受尊敬的人才的公开表现（平均打击率）显示，其业绩略低于未经管理的道指。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.

(1) 根据资产价值的变化加上年内向在册持有人分配的任何收益计算。
(2) 1957-63年数据来自1964年《穆迪银行与金融手册》。1964年为估计值。

The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read "one year's experience -twenty times.")

这些表格的反复出现让合伙人问："为什么这种事会发生在非常聪明的管理层身上，他们拥有（1)聪明、精力充沛的员工，(2)几乎无限的资源，(3)最广泛的人脉关系，以及(4)加起来几个世纪的投资经验？"（最后一条让人想起那个求职者，说他拥有二十年经验——前雇主纠正为“一年经验重复二十次”。）

This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.

这个问题至关重要，你可能会期望投资经理和大型投资者对此进行大量研究。毕竟，对300亿美元而言，每一个百分点就是每年3亿美元。奇怪的是，华尔街的文献中几乎没有任何关于这个问题的分析，证券分析师协会会议、研讨会等场合也几乎没有讨论。我认为，任何投资管理机构的首要工作应该是分析自己的方法和结果，然后再对美国主要公司的管理能力和业绩发表评判。

In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.

在绝大多数情况下，未能超越甚至跑平非管理指数，绝非智力或诚信不足的体现。我认为这更多是以下原因造成的：(1) 集体决策——也许我的偏激看法是，任何规模的群体如果所有成员都真正参与决策，几乎不可能产生杰出的投资管理；(2) 希望遵循其他受人尊敬的大型机构的政策和（在一定程度上）投资组合；(3) 一种制度框架，在其中“平均水平”是安全的，独立行动的个人回报与总体风险完全不相称；(4) 遵循某些不合理的分散化做法；最后也是重要的一点，(5) 惯性。

Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long-term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.

也许上面的评论不公正。也许我们的统计对比也不公正。我们的投资组合和操作方式与表中的投资公司有很大不同。但我相信，无论是我们的合伙人还是这些公司的股东，都认为他们的管理层追求相同的目标——在持续投资于股票的计划下，以最低的永久损失风险获得最大的长期平均资本回报。既然我们应该有共同的目标，而且大多数合伙人如果没有投资于BPL，可能会将资金投向收益与这些投资公司相当的渠道，我认为它们的业绩记录对于衡量我们自身的结果是有意义的。

There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.

毫无疑问，投资公司、投资顾问、信托部门等为投资者提供了重要服务。这些服务包括实现充分的分散化、保持长期视角、简化投资决策和操作便利，最重要的是，避免那些明显劣质、似乎吸引某些个人的投资技术。这些机构中除了少数几家外，并不明确承诺提供卓越的投资业绩，尽管公众从它们对专业管理的宣传中得出这样的推论或许并非不合理。

One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.

作为你们的合伙人，我向你们承诺一件事——正如我现在认为上述业绩对比是有意义的，未来无论发生什么，我也将如此认为。相应地，我要求你们，如果觉得这样的标准不相关，现在就提出异议，并建议其他可以前瞻性而非回顾性应用的标准。

One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it's you.

另外一点想法——我的表格中没有包含世界上使用最广泛的投资顾问——贝尔管理层（指电话公司管理层）。关注体重、高尔夫分数和燃油费的人似乎回避对其投资管理技能进行量化评估，尽管这涉及世界上最重要的客户——他们自己。评估马萨诸塞投资者信托或莱曼公司的管理成就可能具有学术意义，但客观评估实际管理你资金的人（即使是你自己）的成就，则具有巨大的金钱意义。

The Question of Conservatism

关于保守性的问题

In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: "Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.

在审视投资公司的业绩表时，可能会有人问："是的，但那些公司的运作难道不比合伙基金更保守吗？"如果你问投资公司的管理层，他们会非常诚实地说自己更保守。如果你问遇到的前100位证券分析师，我相信绝大多数也会支持投资公司。我不同意。我个人净资产的90%以上都在BPL中，我家族的大部分人也比例相当，但这当然只能证明我观点的真诚，而非其正确性。

It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.

毫无疑问，投资公司比我们更常规地配置资金。对许多人来说，常规就是保守。在我看来，这是错误的思维。常规或非常规方法本身并不等于保守。

Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts, but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.

真正保守的行为源于合理的假设、正确的事实和严谨的推理。这些特质可能导致常规行为，但也有很多时候导致了非正统的做法。在世界某个角落，可能还有扁平地球协会定期开会。

We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether other conventional or unconventional - whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.

我们不会因为重要人物、喧闹人士或众多人同意我们而感到安慰。也不会因为不同意而感到安慰。民意调查不能替代思考。当我们真正能安心坐着微笑的时候，是当我们遇到一个我们能理解的情况，事实可查且清晰，行动方案显而易见的时候。在这种时候——无论是常规还是非常规——无论他人同意与否——我们都会觉得我们在以保守的方式前进。

The above may seem highly subjective. It is. You should prefer an objective approach to the question. I do. My suggestion as to one rational way to evaluate the conservativeness of past policies is to study performance in declining markets. We have only three years of declining markets in our table and unfortunately (for purposes of this test only) they were all moderate declines. In all three of these years we achieved appreciably better investment results than any of the more conventional portfolios.

以上可能显得非常主观。确实如此。你应该偏好客观的方法来看待这个问题。我也是。我建议的一种理性方式来评估过去政策的保守性，是研究在下跌市场中的表现。我们的表格中只有三年下跌市场，而且不幸的是（仅限于本测试目的），它们的跌幅都较温和。在这三年中，我们都取得了明显优于所有更常规投资组合的投资结果。

Specifically, if those three years had occurred in sequence, the cumulative results would have been:

具体来说，如果那三年连续发生，累计结果将是：

We don't think this comparison is all important, but we do think it has some relevance. We certainly think it makes more sense than saying "We own (regardless of price) A.T. &T., General Electric, IBM and General Motors and are therefore conservative." In any event, evaluation of the conservatism of any investment program or management (including self-management) should be based upon rational objective standards, and I suggest performance in declining markets to be at least one meaningful test.

我们不认为这个对比至关重要，但我们确实认为具有一定的相关性。我们当然认为，这比说“我们持有（不管价格）AT&T、通用电气、IBM和通用汽车，因此是保守的”更有意义。无论如何，对任何投资计划或管理（包括自我管理）的保守性评估，应基于理性的客观标准，我建议在下跌市场中的表现至少是一个有意义的测试。

The Joys of Compounding

复利的乐趣

Readers of our early annual letters registered discontent at a mere recital of contemporary investment experience, but instead hungered for the intellectual stimulation that only could be provided by a depth study of investment strategy spanning the centuries. Hence, this section.

我们早期年度信件的读者对仅仅罗列当代投资经历感到不满，而是渴望只有通过跨世纪的深度投资策略研究才能提供的智力刺激。因此，有了这一部分。

Our last two excursions into the mythology of financial expertise have revealed that purportedly shrewd investments by Isabella (backing the voyage of Columbus) and Francis I (original purchase of Mona Lisa) bordered on fiscal lunacy. Apologists for these parties have presented an array of sentimental trivia. Through it all, our compounding tables have not been dented by attack.

我们前两次涉足金融传说领域，揭示了据称精明的投资——伊莎贝拉（资助哥伦布航行）和弗朗索瓦一世（最初购买《蒙娜丽莎》）——几乎就是财政上的疯狂。这些事件的辩护者提出了一系列情感上的琐碎理由。尽管如此，我们的复利表格依然坚不可摧。

Nevertheless, one criticism has stung a bit. The charge has been made that this column has acquired a negative tone with only the financial incompetents of history receiving comment. We have been challenged to record on these pages a story of financial perspicacity which will be a bench mark of brilliance down through the ages.

不过，有一项批评确实有点刺痛。有人指责这个专栏变得消极，只评论历史上的金融无能者。我们被要求在版面上记下一个反映长远金融智慧的标杆故事。

One story stands out. This, of course, is the saga of trading acumen etched into history by the Manhattan Indians when they unloaded their island to that notorious spendthrift, Peter Minuit in 1626. My understanding is that they received $24 net. For this, Minuit received 22.3 square miles which works out to about 621,688,320 square feet. While on the basis of comparable sales, it is difficult to arrive at a precise appraisal, a $20 per square foot estimate seems reasonable giving a current land value for the island of $12,433,766,400 ($12 1/2 billion). To the novice, perhaps this sounds like a decent deal. However, the Indians have only had to achieve a 6 1/2% return (The tribal mutual fund representative would have promised them this.) to obtain the last laugh on Minuit. At 6 1/2%, $24 becomes $42,105,772,800 ($42 billion) in 338 years, and if they just managed to squeeze out an extra half point to get to 7%, the present value becomes $205 billion.

有一个故事非常突出。这当然是曼哈顿印第安人凭借交易智慧载入史册的传奇，他们在1626年将岛屿卖给了臭名昭著的挥霍者彼得·米努伊特。我的理解是，他们净得24美元。以此，米努伊特获得了22.3平方英里，约合621,688,320平方英尺。虽然根据可比销售难以得出精确评估，但每平方英尺20美元的估价似乎合理，由此得出该岛当前土地价值为12,433,766,400美元（约125亿美元）。对新手来说，这听起来也许是一笔不错的交易。然而，印第安人只需实现6.5%的回报率（部落的共同基金代表会向他们承诺这一回报），就能笑到最后。按6.5%计算，24美元在338年后变成421亿多美元，如果他们将回报率再提高0.5个百分点至7%，现值将达2050亿美元。

So much for that.

就到这儿吧。

Some of you may view your investment policies on a shorter term basis. For your convenience, we include our usual table indicating the gains from compounding $100,000 at various rates:

你们中的一些人也许用更短期的视角看待投资政策。为方便起见，我们照例提供下表，显示以各种利率复利10万美元的收益：

This table indicates the financial advantages of:

该表表明了以下因素的财务优势：

(1) A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methusalah Technique)
(2) A high compound rate
(3) A combination of both (especially recommended by this author)

(1) 长寿（用金融精明的词汇来说，这被称为玛土撒拉技巧）
(2) 高复利利率
(3) 两者结合（本作者特别推荐）

To be observed are the enormous benefits produced by relatively small gains in the annual earnings rate. This explains our attitude which while hopeful of achieving a striking margin of superiority over average investment results, nevertheless, regards every percentage point of investment return above average as having real meaning.

需注意年收益率相对较小的提高所带来的巨大收益。这解释了我们的态度：尽管希望取得远超平均的卓越业绩，但我们将每个高于平均水平的投资回报百分点都视为有实质意义。

Our Goal

我们的目标

You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don't worry about me "holding back" to substantiate this prophecy.)

你们会注意到，前面的表格中没有列出合伙基金成立八年来27.7%的平均收益率，也没有列出有限合伙人22.3%的平均收益率。这些数字从长期来看是荒谬的，原因如下：（别担心我会为了证实这个预言而“留一手”。）

(1) Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
(2) During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – "If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen." It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the "kitchen."
(3) We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.

(1) 任何大额资金以这样的速度复利，将以惊人速度达到国债规模。
(2) 在我们八年的历史中，整个普通股领域的证券全面重估带来了整体平均年收益率，我认为这在未来几十年是无法实现的。在20到30年的时间里，我预计道指的整体年收益率将更接近6%-7%，而不是我们短暂历史中的11.1%。仅此一项，就会使我们的年复合率降低约4个百分点。只要1965年道指下跌20.5%，就能将九年均值拉低至7%。这种（或更糟的）年份，持有股票投资的人应时不时预料到。如果你的股票持仓（如BPL）市值下跌20%或30%会带来情绪或财务压力，你就应该干脆避开普通股投资。用诗人哈里·杜鲁门的话来说：“如果你受不了热，就别进厨房。”当然，最好在进“厨房”之前就考虑好。
(3) 我们认为，长期维持合伙基金领先道指16.6个百分点、有限合伙人领先11.2个百分点的优势是不可能的。我们已经连续八年跑赢道指，尽管其中有一年利润分配安排使有限合伙人跑输了道指。我们肯定会遇到合伙基金业绩跑输道指的年份（注意复数），即使普通合伙人咬牙切齿（希望有限合伙人不要太过失望）。当这种情况发生时，我们的平均领先优势将大幅下降。但我认为我们还会继续有一些年份取得非常不错的优势。然而，到目前为止，我们受益于平均业绩中没有出现真正平庸（或更糟）的年份，这显然不能指望是永久性的。

So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.

那我们可以期待什么结果呢？当然，我所说的任何东西都很大程度上只是猜测，我个人的投资哲学是建立在这样一个理论之上的：预言更多地揭示了预言者的弱点，而非未来的情况。

Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:

不过，作为合伙人，你们有权知道我的预期，尽管这些预期可能很薄弱。我希望我们更长期的经历将按以下基础展开：

(1) An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average -- say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
(2) An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks; and
(3) The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).

(1) 道指的整体收益（包括股息，当然）平均在每年7%左右，实现这一平均值的过程中通常会有大幅波动——比如，极端波幅在-40%到+50%之间，多数年份在-10%到+20%的区间内；
(2) BPL在向普通合伙人分配前，每年平均领先10个百分点——同样，优势幅度也有大幅波动，从糟糕的年份跑输道指10个百分点，到一切顺利时领先25个百分点；
(3) 这两个假设的乘积得出BPL平均收益为17%，有限合伙人约为14%。这个数字每年会有很大变化；最终的波幅当然取决于(1)和(2)中假设的极端情况之间的相互作用。

I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.

我想强调，以上纯属猜想，可能严重受到自利、自负等因素的影响。任何懂一点金融史的人都知道这种猜测极易出错。或许这部分最好不要写进信里，但这是合伙人经常且合理提出的问题。长期可预期回报是我们所有BPL成员的首要考量，将我自己的展望公之于众是合理的，即便日后看来愚蠢。我有一种清教徒式的观点：任何投资经理，无论是作为经纪人、投资顾问、信托部、投资公司等，都应愿意明确说明他打算努力实现什么目标，并如何衡量目标完成的程度。

Our Method of Operation

我们的运作方法

In past annual letters I have always utilized three categories to describe investment operations we conduct. I now feel that a four-category division is more appropriate. Partially, the addition of a new section - "Generals Relatively Undervalued" - reflects my further consideration of essential differences that have always existed to a small extent with our "Generals" group. Partially, it reflects the growing importance of what once was a very small sub-category but is now a much more significant part of our total portfolio. This increasing importance has been accompanied by excellent results to date justifying significant time and effort devoted to finding additional opportunities in this area. Finally, it partially reflects the development and implementation of a new and somewhat unique investment technique designed to improve the expectancy and consistency of operations in this category. Therefore, our four present categories are:

在以往的年度信中，我一直用三类来描述我们进行的投资操作。我现在认为分成四类更为合适。新增“相对低估类”这一部分，部分反映了我对一直少量存在于我们“低估类”中的本质差异的更深入思考；部分反映了这一曾经很小的子类别在我们整个投资组合中日趋重要。这一日益增长的重要性伴随着迄今为止优异的成果，证明我们应该投入大量时间和精力去寻找该领域的新机会。最后，它部分反映了一种新颖而有些独特的投资技巧的开发和实施，旨在提高该类别的预期收益和操作一致性。因此，我们当前的四个类别是：

1. "Generals -Private Owner Basis" - a category of generally undervalued stocks, determined by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation of the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again, let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of "ferment" in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But, we demand value.

1. “低估类（基于私人所有者角度）”——这类股票普遍被低估，由量化标准确定，但同时也非常注重定性因素。通常几乎没有或毫无迹象表明股价会立即回升。这些股票缺乏魅力或市场支持。其主要条件是价格低廉；即企业的整体估值远低于审慎分析所示其对私人所有者而言的价值。再次强调，虽然量化标准优先且至关重要，但定性也很重要。我们喜欢优秀的管理层——我们喜欢体面的行业——我们喜欢先前沉寂的管理层或股东群体中出现一定的“躁动”。但我们要求的是价值。

Many times in this category we have the desirable "two strings to our bow" situation where we should either achieve appreciation of market prices from external factors or from the acquisition of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. While the former happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter represents an insurance policy most investment operations don't have. We have continued to enlarge the positions in the three companies described in our 1964 midyear report where we are the largest stockholder. All three companies are increasing their fundamental value at a very satisfactory rate, and we are completely passive in two situations and active only on a very minor scale in the third. It is unlikely that we will ever take a really active part in policy-making in any of these three companies, but we stand ready if needed.

在这类投资中，我们多次遇到理想的“一箭双雕”局面：要么通过外部因素实现股价上涨，要么以低价收购控股权。虽然前者在绝大多数情况下发生，但后者代表了一种大多数投资操作所没有的保险。我们继续增加在1964年年中报告中描述的三家公司中的持股，我们是其最大股东。这三家公司都以非常令人满意的速度提升其基本价值，在其中两家我们完全被动，在第三家我们只在极小规模上活跃。我们不太可能在这三家公司中任何一家真正积极参与决策，但如有需要，我们已做好准备。

1. "Generals -Relatively Undervalued" - this category consists of securities selling at prices relatively cheap compared to securities of the same general quality. We demand substantial discrepancies from current valuation standards, but (usually because of large size) do not feel value to a private owner to be a meaningful concept. It is important in this category, of course, that apples be compared to apples - and not to oranges, and we work hard at achieving that end. In the great majority of cases we simply do not know enough about the industry or company to come to sensible judgments - in that situation we pass.

1. “相对低估类”——这类证券包括与其总体质量相似的证券相比，价格相对便宜的股票。我们要求与当前估值标准之间存在显著差异，但（通常由于规模较大）认为对私人所有者而言的价值概念并无意义。当然，在这类投资中，确保是同类比较——而非将苹果比作橙子——我们努力做到这一点。在绝大多数情况下，我们对行业或公司的了解不足以做出明智判断——在这种情况下，我们选择放弃。

As mentioned earlier, this new category has been growing and has produced very satisfactory results. We have recently begun to implement a technique, which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards; e.g., if we buy something at 12 times earnings when comparable or poorer quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so the latter only sell at 10 times. This risk has always bothered us enormously because of the helpless position in which we could be left compared to the "Generals -Private Owner" or "Workouts" types. With this risk diminished, we think this category has a promising future.

如前所述，这个新类别一直在增长，并取得了非常令人满意的结果。我们最近开始实施一种技巧，有望极大降低因估值标准整体变动带来的风险；例如，如果我们以12倍市盈率买入某公司，而可比或质量更差的公司市盈率为20倍，但随后出现重大重估，使得后者仅以10倍市盈率出售。这种风险一直让我们非常困扰，因为与“低估类（基于私人所有者角度）”或“套利类”相比，我们可能处于无助的境地。随着这种风险的降低，我们认为这一类别前景良好。

1. "Workouts" - these are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. It's a little like looking for parking meters with some time left on them. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent average annual rates of return after allowance for the occasional substantial loss. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline it should usually pile up a big edge for us; during bull markets it will probably be a drag on performance. On a long-term basis, I expect the workouts to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.

1. “套利类”——这些是有时间表的证券。它们源于公司活动——出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在这一类别中，我们谈论的不是围绕这些发展的谣言或“内幕信息”，而是公开宣布的此类活动。我们要等到见报时才行动。风险主要不在于整体市场行为（尽管有时在一定程度上相关），而在于某件事搅黄了计划，使预期的发展未能实现。这类扫兴的事情可能包括反垄断或其他政府不利行动、股东否决、税务裁定不予批准等。许多套利交易的毛利润看起来很小。这有点像寻找还有剩余时间的停车计时器。不过，可预测性加上短持有期，在考虑偶尔的重大损失后，能产生相当不错的年化回报率。这一类别比低估类年复一年地产生更稳定的绝对利润。在下跌市场年份，它通常能为我们积累很大的优势；在牛市中则可能拖累表现。长期来看，我预计套利类将取得与低估类同样的、领先道指的幅度。

1. "Controls" - these are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general - private owner category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing pricewise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume a degree of or perhaps complete control of the company's activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company's future and the management's capabilities.

1. “控制类”——这类很罕见，但发生时往往规模可观。除非我们从购买大宗股票开始，否则控制类通常发源于低估类（基于私人所有者角度）。它们的产生是因为一只廉价证券长期没有价格表现，以至于我们能够买入公司相当比例的股票。到那时，我们很可能有能力一定程度上甚至完全控制公司的活动。我们是活跃还是保持相对被动，取决于我们对公司未来和管理层能力的评估。

We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal, I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital, you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.

我们不想仅仅为了活跃而活跃。其他条件相同，我更愿意让别人做事。但是，当需要积极角色来优化资本运用时，你们可以确信我们不会置身事外。

Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the market place.

无论是积极还是被动，在控制类情况下，应该存在内在利润。这一操作的必要条件是诱人的购买价格。一旦获得控制权，我们的投资价值就由企业的价值决定，而不是常常非理性的市场。

Any of the three situations where we are now the largest stockholders mentioned under Generals - Private Owner could, by virtue of the two-way stretch they possess, turn into controls. That would suit us fine, but it also suits us if they advance in the market to a price more in line with intrinsic value enabling us to sell them, thereby completing a successful generals - private owner operation.

我们现在作为最大股东的三家公司（在低估类中提及）中的任何一家，由于它们具有的双向伸缩性，都可能转变为控制类。这对我们来说很好，但如果它们股价上涨至更接近内在价值的水平，使我们能够卖出，从而完成一次成功的低估类投资，那也很好。

Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit - if it appears at all close, we quitclaim.

控制类的投资结果至少要用几年的时间来衡量。适当的买入需要时间。如果需要加强管理、重新配置资本、或许实现满意的出售或合并等，这些也都是使其成为以年而非月衡量的业务的原因。因此，在控制类投资中，我们寻求的是宽广的利润空间——如果看起来非常接近，我们就放弃。

Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.

处于购买阶段的控制类投资，其价格走势大致与道指同步。在后期阶段，它们的表现则更趋向于套利类。

You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the "Bigger Fool Theory") is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.

你们或许有兴趣知道，我们之前控制过的Dempster Mill Manufacturing公司的新买家似乎经营得很好。这符合我们的预期，也令我们满意。一项依赖于最终买家做亏本买卖（在华尔街这被称为“更大的傻瓜理论”）的投资操作是极不可靠的。以真正的便宜价格买入，仅凭平均水平的出售就能带来愉快结果，要让人满意得多。

As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why single year's performance is of minor importance and good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.

如我以前所说，我们投资组合在各类别间的分配主要由机会的偶然性决定。因此，在任何给定年份，低估类、套利类或控制类之间的组合在很大程度上是运气的产物，这个变幻无常的因素将极大影响我们相对道指的表现。这也是为什么单一年份的业绩并不重要、无论好坏都决不应过于看重的原因之一。

To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows:

为了举例说明类别分配偶然性的重要性，我以过去三年为例。我们采用与衡量BPL整体业绩完全不同的计算方法，即按类别利用每月平均市场价值投入，排除借款和办公运营费用等（这为组间比较提供了最准确的基础，但并不能反映BPL的整体业绩），低估类（现两类别合计）、套利类和道指的表现如下：

Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories.

显然，1962年套利类（连同控制类）挽救了局面，如果那年我们该类别的仓位较轻，最终结果会差得多，尽管考虑到当年的市场状况，仍然相当不错。1962年，我们投资组合中套利类的比例也可能小得多；是机会决定的，而不是我对市场走势的任何看法。因此，重要的是要认识到，1962年我们在类别组合上纯粹是运气好。

In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn't our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations.

1963年我们有一个惊人的套利操作，对业绩产生了巨大影响，低估类表现也不错，因而成就了一个辉煌的年份。如果套利类表现正常（比如更像1962年），我们相对道指就会逊色得多。这里，帮助我们的并非我们的类别组合，而是极好的机会。

Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don't play the game in retrospect.

最后，1964年套利类严重拖累了业绩。在道指大幅上涨的年份（如1964年），这本来也是正常的，但由于套利类的平庸表现，其拖累程度甚至超出预期。事后看来，全部投入低估类会很愉快，但我们从不做事后诸葛亮。

I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables - some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category.

我希望前面的表格能让人明白，某一年的业绩受诸多变量影响——有些我们几乎无法控制或预见。我们认为所有类别都是好生意，我们很高兴能依赖多个类别而不是单一类别。这使我们在每个类别内都能更挑剔，也减少因单一类别机会消失而完全停摆的风险。

Taxes

税收

We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners' tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank.

今年关于合伙人税负的抱怨声一片。当然，如果税单空空如也，我们可能也会有抱怨。

More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "tax considerations" than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life's errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainly the case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes enters the picture (I have another friend -a noted East Coast philosopher who says it isn't the lack of representation he minds -it's the taxation).

其他方面很聪明的人，可能因为“税收考虑”而犯下的投资错误，恐怕比其他任何原因都多。我的一位朋友——一位著名的西海岸哲学家认为，人生中大多数错误都是因为忘记了真正想做的事情。当税收这样一个情绪化因素掺入其中时，情况无疑正是如此（我还有另一位朋友——一位著名的东海岸哲学家说，他介意的不是没有代表权——而是征税）。

Let's get back to the West Coast. What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn't the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.

回到西海岸的话题。一个人在投资界真正想做什么？不是缴纳最少的税，尽管那可能是实现目标时需要考虑的一个因素。然而，手段和目的不可混淆，目的是获得最高的税后复利回报。十分明显，如果两种行动方案承诺相同的税前复利率，而一种涉及纳税，另一种不涉及，那么后一种方案更优。但我们发现这种情况很少见。

It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices. And, with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully "tax-generating" change).

从3000个选择中选出的20支股票，极不可能证明既是现在也是未来一年的最优投资组合，届时价格（所选股票和备选股票的价格）将完全不同。如果我们的目标是实现税后复利最大化，我们就只能持有在当前价格下可获得的最具吸引力的证券。而且，在3000个变动相当迅速的变量下，这必然意味着变化（希望是“产生税收”的变化）。

It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.

很明显，股票去年或上个月的表现本身，并不构成现在持有或不持有的理由。很明显，在一只已经下跌的股票上无法“回本”并不重要。很明显，因去年持有赢家而产生的内心温暖感，在决定它今年是否属于最优投资组合时毫无意义。

If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).

如果涉及盈利，更换投资组合就要交税。除了极不寻常的情况（我乐意承认有些情况），如果预期表现的差异显著，税款的数额就微不足道了。我一直无法理解为什么税收对许多人来说是如此沉重的打击，因为长期资本利得税率低于大多数行业的税率（税收政策表明，挖沟被视为比倒腾股票证书更不合社会期望）。

I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that's a little too ultimate for me even the zealots would have to view this "cure" with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away - you certainly don't pay any taxes this way, but of course you don't pay for any groceries, rent, etc., either; and (3) lose back the gain if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you -you certainly have the courage of your convictions.

听众中有大量实用主义者，所以我最好别再说那些理想主义的话了。避免最终纳税的方法只有三种：(1) 带着资产死去——这对我来说有点太终极，即使狂热者也不得不以五味杂陈的心情看待这种“疗法”；(2) 把资产送人——这样你肯定不用交税，但当然你也付不起买食品、房租等；(3) 跌回盈利——如果你对这个节税方法垂涎欲滴，我不得不佩服你——你确实有信念的勇气。

So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury -at the lowest rates the rules will allow.

因此，BPL将继续奉行最大化投资收益而非最小化税收的政策。我们将尽最大努力为财政部创造最大收入——以规则允许的最低税率。

An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-à-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called "swap funds" which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company's shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund's shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates.

关于税收与投资管理这一整个话题，过去几年出现了一个有趣的侧面。这源于所谓“互换基金”的创立，这种投资公司通过用公司股份换取潜在投资者持有的普通市场证券而成立。其主要的销售说辞是递延（在热情的销售人员口中，递延有时听起来很像免除）资本利得税，同时用单一证券换得多元化的投资组合。只有当互换基金份额被赎回时，才最终缴税。对于幸运者来说，如果前述两段中提到的那些令人愉快的替代方案之一发生，则完全避免缴税。

The reasoning implicit in the swapee's action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn't really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn't jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually up to $100,000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio they have a chance to back out but I understand a relatively small proportion do so.

互换参与者行为中隐含的逻辑相当有趣。他显然并不真正想持有他手中的证券，否则他不会抓住机会将其换掉（并支付一笔相当可观的佣金——通常高达10万美元），换成一篮子其他税收麻木的投资者持有的类似烫手山芋。公平地说，我应该指出，在所有参与者提交其交换证券并有机会审查拟议投资组合后，他们有机会退出，但我了解到这样做的比例相对较小。

There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over $600 million. All of the funds retain an investment manager to whom they usually pay 1/2 of 1% of asset value. This investment manager faces an interesting problem; he is paid to manage the fund intelligently (in each of the five largest funds this fee currently ranges from $250,000 to $700,000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn't own shares in the swap fund in the first place.

自1960年这一概念提出以来，据我所知已有十二家此类基金成立，还有几家正在筹备中。该想法并非没有吸引力，因为总销售额远超过6亿美元。所有基金都聘请一位投资经理，通常按资产价值的0.5%支付费用。这位投资经理面临一个有趣的问题：他受雇明智地管理基金（在最大的五家基金中，该费用目前每年在25万至70万美元之间），但由于从证券贡献者继承的低税基，他的几乎每一个动作都会产生资本利得税负债。而且，他当然知道，如果他导致这些负债，他是在为那些很可能对税收非常敏感的人这样做，否则他们一开始就不会持有互换基金的份额。

I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual's combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes.

我有些言重了，而且我确信在某些情况下，互换基金可能是个别解决税收和投资组合问题的最佳答案。不过，我觉得它们提供了一个非常有趣的试验管，来衡量一些最受尊敬的投资顾问在不（显著）考虑税收的情况下管理资金的能力。

The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One of these, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis which makes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar year comparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and Westminster Fund (respectively first and third largest in the group) are managed by investment advisors who oversee at least $2 billion of institutional money.

最大的三家互换基金均成立于1961年，目前合计资产约3亿美元。其中一家，多元化基金，按财年报告，这使得提取日历年度比较数据相当困难。另外两家，联邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（分别是该集团第一大和第三大），由管理着至少20亿美元机构资金的投资顾问管理。

Here's how they shape up for all full years of existence:

它们在整个全年运作期间的表现如下：

This is strictly the management record. No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance.

这仅是管理记录。未计入进入时的佣金，并且基金代表股东支付的任何税款都已加回到业绩中。

Anyone for taxes?

还有人喜欢税收吗？

Miscellaneous

杂项

In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 1/4 square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965.

在12月21日的《汽车新闻》上报道，福特汽车公司计划在1965年花费7亿美元，为其全球设施增加6,742,000平方英尺。巴菲特合伙公司，从不落后，计划在1965年春季为其设施增加227 1/4平方英尺。

Our growth in net assets from $105,100 (there's no prize for guessing who put in the $100) on May 5, 1956 when the first predecessor limited partnership (Buffett Associates, Ltd.) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 ¼ square feet, a highly capable person is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott's time for security analysis which is his forte. I'll have more to report on this in the midyear letter.

我们的净资产从1956年5月5日第一个前身有限合伙（巴菲特联合有限公司）成立时的105,100美元（谁投入了那100美元不难猜到）增长到1965年1月1日的26,074,000美元，这需要偶尔对内部常规进行重组。因此，几乎在办公面积从682平方英尺扩大到909¼平方英尺这一大胆举措的同时，一位能力极强的人物将加入我们的组织，负责行政（及某些其他）职能。此举尤其能让比尔·斯科特腾出更多时间进行他擅长的证券分析。我将在年中信中对此有更多报告。

Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of $298,749, a very large majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name is being withheld until his present employer has replaced him), along with his wife and children, has made an important investment in the Partnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of $3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1,942,592. So we all continue to eat home cooking.

比尔（工作依旧非常出色）和他的妻子在合伙基金中投资了298,749美元，占他们净资产绝大部分。我们的新伙伴（名字暂不透露，待其现任雇主找到接替者后再公布）与他的妻子和孩子一起，在合伙基金中进行了一笔重要投资。苏茜和我目前在BPL的权益为3,406,700美元，这几乎是我们全部净资产，除了我们继续持有的一家中部大陆制表卡公司的股份，这家本地公司是我在1960年买入的，当时其股东不足10人。此外，我的亲属，包括三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、四个姑姨、四个堂表亲和六个侄子侄女，直接或间接持有BPL权益，总计1,942,592美元。所以我们大家都继续吃自家做的饭。

We continue to represent the ultimate in seasonal businesses --open one day a year. This creates real problems in keeping the paper flowing smoothly, but Beth and Donna continue to do an outstanding job of coping with this and other problems.

我们仍然代表着最极端的季节性业务——每年开门一天。这给保持文书顺畅流动带来真正的问题，但贝丝和唐娜继续出色地处理着这个和其他问题。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has distinguished itself in its usual vital role of finding out what belongs to whom. We continue to throw impossible deadlines at them --and they continue to perform magnificently. You will note in their certificate this year that they have implemented the new procedure whereby they now pounce on us unannounced twice a year in addition to the regular year-end effort.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell会计师事务所一如既往地扮演着至关重要的角色，查明什么属于谁。我们持续给他们提出不可能完成的截止期限——而他们也持续表现出色。你们会在他们今年的认证书中注意到，他们实施了新程序，除常规年终审计外，现在每年还两次突然袭击检查我们。

Finally -and most sincerely - let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be -by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minutiae that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier.

最后，——也是最真诚地——让我感谢各位合伙人，你们极其出色地配合，将材料及时、准确地交给我们，从而最大限度地增加了我们投入到该去的地方——收银机旁——的工作时间。我极为幸运能够将绝大部分时间用于思考我们的资金应该投向哪里，而不是陷入似乎压倒许多商业实体的琐事之中。我们有一个组织结构，使这种效率成为可能，更重要的是，我们有一群合伙人使其成为现实。对此，我深怀感激，我们也因此都更加富有。

Our past policy has been to admit close relatives of present partners without a minimum capital limitation. This year a flood of children, grandchildren, etc., appeared which called this policy into question; therefore, I have decided to institute a $25,000 minimum on interests of immediate relatives of present partners.

我们过去的政策是允许现有合伙人的近亲加入，没有最低资本限制。今年一下子涌来了大量子女、孙辈等，这使得该政策受到质疑；因此，我决定对现有合伙人的直系亲属设立2.5万美元的最低投资额。

Within the coming two weeks you will receive:

在接下来两周内，你们将收到：

(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1964 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1964, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/65. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
(4) Schedule "A" to the partnership agreement listing all partners.

(1) 一封税务信，提供你的1964年联邦所得税申报所需的全部BPL信息。此信是税务目的唯一凭证。
(2) Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.出具的1964年审计报告，列明BPL的运营和财务状况以及你的个人资本账户。
(3) 由我签署的信函，载明你截至1965年1月1日的BPL权益状况。这与审计得出的数字一致。
(4) 合伙协议附表“A”，列出所有合伙人。

Let Bill or me know if anything needs clarifying. Even with our splendid staff our growth means there is more chance of missing letters, overlooked instructions, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if you have any question at all that we might have erred. My next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half of this year.

如果有什么需要澄清的，请告诉比尔或我。即使有出色的团队，我们的增长意味着更多可能遗漏信件、忽视指示、跳过姓名、数字错位等情况，所以如果你有任何哪怕是可能出错的疑问，请提出来。我的下一封信大概在7月15日左右，总结今年上半年的情况。

Cordially,

谨上，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特