1967年10月9日致合伙人信

Over the past eleven years, I have consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal an average advantage in our performance of ten percentage points per annum in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Under the environment that existed during that period. I have considered such an objective difficult but obtainable.

在过去的十一年里，我一直将巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的投资目标设定为：年均表现领先道琼斯工业平均指数十个百分点。在当时的市场环境下，我认为这一目标虽困难但可以实现。

The following conditions now make a change in yardsticks appropriate:

1. The market environment has changed progressively over the past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution in the number of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available;
2. Mushrooming interest in investment performance (which has its ironical aspects since I was among a lonely few preaching the importance of this some years ago) has created a hyper-reactive pattern of market behavior against which my analytical techniques have limited value;
3. The enlargement of our capital base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing trickle of good investment ideas has continued to present the problems mentioned in the January, 1967 letter; and
4. My own personal interests dictate a less compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I was younger and leaner.

下列情况使得调整衡量标准成为必要：
1. 过去十年中，市场环境逐渐变化，导致显而易见的基于定量分析的投资机会急剧减少；
2. 对投资业绩日益高涨的关注（这具有讽刺意味，因为多年前我几乎是少数几个宣扬其重要性的人之一）催生出一种过度反应的市场行为模式，而我的分析技术对此价值有限；
3. 我们的资本基础扩大到约6500万美元，而好的投资想法只涓涓细流，这继续带来了我在1967年1月信中提到的那些问题；
4. 与年轻时我身无长物的时候相比，我个人的志趣决定我不必再以那种强迫式的方式追求卓越的投资成果。

Let's look at each of these factors in more detail.

我们来逐一详细讨论这些因素。

The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.

在投资中评估证券和企业，总是要结合定性因素与定量因素。一个极端是，偏重定性分析的分析师会说：“买入正确的公司（具备正确的远景、内在行业环境、管理层等），价格自然会照顾好自己。”另一个极端，偏重定量的发言者会说：“以正确的价格买入，公司（和股票）会照顾好自己。”在证券界，令人欣慰的是，两种方法都能赚到钱。当然，每个分析师都会在某种程度上结合两者——他属于哪个学派，取决于他对不同因素的相对倚重程度，而非他是否完全只考虑某类因素而忽略另一类。

Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.

有趣的是，尽管我自认主要属于定量学派（在我写这封信时，还没有人从课间休息回来——我可能是班上仅剩的一个），但这些年来我真正绝妙的点子都严重偏向定性一侧，因为在那里我拥有“高概率的洞见”。正是这些洞见让收银机叮当作响。然而，这并不常有，洞见本就稀罕，而在定量方面则完全不需要洞见——数字应该像棒球棍一样直接砸到你头上。所以，真正赚大钱的往往是那些在定性决策上做对的投资者，但至少在我看来，更稳妥的钱则是来自那些显而易见的定量决策。

Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively – and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.

这些统计意义上的便宜货，这些年来已趋于消失。这或许是因为过去二十年间投资研究的不断梳理，而又没有发生如三十年代那样的经济崩溃，来制造对股票的负面偏见并催生成百上千的新便宜证券。也可能是因为收购要约（它们天然聚焦于低估股票）日渐被社会接受并因此被广泛采用（也许因果相反——我留待行为学家去探究）。还可能是证券分析师队伍的爆炸式增长，带来了对股票远超多年前的密集审视。不管原因为何，结果是，定量上确定的便宜股票几乎绝迹——它们曾是我们的面包和黄油。偶尔可能还会冒出一两只。另外，在极少情况下，我也能真正胜任对某只证券做出重要的定性判断。这将是我们获取巨额利润的最佳机会。不过，这类情况将极为罕见。过去三年我们的良好业绩，很大部分就归功于一个这样的点子。

The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in investment performance. For years I have preached the importance of measurement. Consistently I have told partners that unless our performance was better than average, the money should go elsewhere. In recent years this idea has gained momentum throughout the investment (or more importantly, the investing) community. In the last year or two it has started to look a bit like a tidal wave. I think we are witnessing the distortion of a sound idea.

下一个难点是对投资业绩兴趣的激增。多年来，我一直宣扬衡量业绩的重要性，并始终告诉合伙人，如果我们的表现不能优于平均水平，钱应该投到别处。近年来，这一观念在整个投资（更重要的是投资者）圈子中广获认同。最近一两年，它已如一股洪流。我认为，我们正在目睹一个合理理念被扭曲。

I have always cautioned partners that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether we were "performing". Naturally, as the investment public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of expectations has been consistently reduced to the point where investment performance by large aggregates of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly, and perhaps sometimes even more frequently (leading to what is known as "instant research"). The payoff for superior short term performance has become enormous, not only in compensation for results actually achieved, but in the attraction of new money for the next round. Thus a self-generating type of activity has set in which leads to larger and larger amounts of money participating on a shorter and shorter time span. A disturbing corollary is that the vehicle for participation (the particular companies or stocks) becomes progressively less important - at times virtually incidental - as the activity accelerates.

我一直提醒合伙人，判断我们是否“表现良好”至少需要三年时间。自然而然，当投资大众全力以赴时，期望的时间周期就不断缩短，以至于大规模资金的投资业绩开始按年、按季度、按月甚至有时更频繁地衡量（从而催生了所谓的“即时研究”）。短期业绩出色带来的回报已极其丰厚，不仅是基于实际业绩的报酬，更在于能吸引新一轮的更多资金。于是，一种自循环的活动由此产生：越来越多的资金在越来越短的时间框架内参与进来。一个令人不安的推论是，随着这类活动加速，投资的工具（特定的公司或股票）变得愈发不重要——有时几乎成了附带的。

In my opinion what is resulting is speculation on an increasing scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon; however, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of professional (in many cases formerly quite docile) investors who feel they must “get aboard”. The game is dignified, of course, by appropriate ceremonies, personages and lexicon. To date it has been highly profitable. It may also be that this is going to be the standard nature of the market in the future. Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not do particularly well. As I said on page five of my last annual letter,

在我看来，其结果就是愈演愈烈的投机。这并非全新现象；然而，不断壮大的专业投资者（其中许多以前相当顺从）队伍，他们感觉必须“上车”，这增添了新的维度。当然，这场游戏通过合适的仪式、人物和词汇被包装得冠冕堂皇。迄今为止，它利润丰厚。这也可能是未来市场的标准形态。尽管如此，我肯定我不特别擅长这种活动。正如我在上一封年度信第5页所说：

"Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called 'fashion' investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach – hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money."

“此外，我们不会遵循当前盛行的那种试图以预测市场走势来凌驾于商业评估之上的证券投资方法。这种所谓的‘时尚’投资在近年来（包括我写这封信的一月份）经常带来极为可观且迅速的利润。这种投资技巧，其合理性我既不能肯定也不能否定。它无法完全满足我的理智（或者说是我的偏见），也绝对不符合我的性情。我不会基于这种方法投资自己的钱——因此，我当然也不会用你们的钱这样做。”

Any form of hyper-activity with large amounts of money in securities markets can create problems for all participants. I make no attempt to guess the action of the stock market and haven't the foggiest notion as to whether the Dow will be at 600, 900 or 1200 a year from now. Even if there are serious consequences resulting from present and future speculative activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are meaningless. However, I do believe certain conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in markets more difficult for us for the intermediate future.

在证券市场上任何以大量资金进行的过度活跃行为，都可能给所有参与者带来问题。我不试图预测股票市场的走势，对一年后道琼斯指数会在600点、900点还是1200点毫无概念。即使当前和未来的投机活动带来严重恶果，经验表明，对时机的估计毫无意义。不过，我确实相信，目前存在的某些状况可能会在中期内让我们在市场上的活动更加困难。

The above may simply be "old-fogeyism" (after all, I am 37). When the game is no longer being played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etc. I have been scornful of such behavior by others in the past. I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate conditions as they were - not as they are. Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.

以上可能只是“老顽固”的言论（毕竟我37岁了）。当游戏不再按你的方式玩时，说新方法全是错的、注定会出问题等等，这也是人之常情。过去我曾对他人的这种行为嗤之以鼻。我也见过那些按照事物过去而非现在的状况来评估的人所付出的代价。本质上，我与现状不合拍。但有一点我很清楚：我不会放弃一个我理解其逻辑的旧方法（即便我发现它难以运用），即使这意味着放弃看似唾手可得的大笔利润，而去采用一个我并不完全理解、未曾成功实践、且可能导致资本永久性重大损失的方法。

The third point of difficulty involves our much greater base of capital. For years my investment ideas were anywhere from 110% to 1000% of our capital. It was difficult for me to conceive that a different condition could ever exist. I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January, 1967 letter had to make good on that promise. Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned, our greater capital is now something of a drag on performance. I believe it is the least significant factor of the four mentioned, and that if we were operating with one-tenth of our present capital our performance would be little better. However, increased funds are presently a moderately negative factor.

第三个难点在于我们规模大增的资本基础。多年来，我的投资点子通常占到我们资本的110%到1000%。当时我很难想象另一种情况可能存在。我曾向合伙人承诺，如果情况有变我会告知，在1967年1月的信里我不得不兑现这一承诺。主要由于前述的两个条件，如今规模变大的资本对业绩构成了一定拖累。我认为在提到的四个因素中，这是最不重要的一个，如果我们只经营现有资本的十分之一，业绩也好不了多少。不过，增加的资金目前是个中等程度的负面因素。

The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at "ten points better than the DOW". I was younger, poorer and probably more competitive. Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance. I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill.

最后，也是最重要的考量，关乎个人动机。当我创立合伙公司时，我把跑步机的调节器设定在“领先道指十个百分点”。那时我比较年轻，比较穷，可能也好胜心更强。即使没有前面讨论的三个导致业绩变差的外部因素，我仍觉得个人状况的变化已使得降低跑步机的速度成为明智之举。

I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English countryside. He received assenting nods and continued stealing.

我观察到，在生活的所有领域，尤其是商业中，许多习惯模式在早已失去意义之后仍延续不断（并随着岁月流逝愈发强化）。伯特兰·罗素曾讲过两个立陶宛女孩的故事，她们在一战之后住在他的庄园里。每晚天黑后，她们都会溜出去偷邻居家的蔬菜，囤在自己房间里；尽管罗素家的餐桌上食物丰盛。罗素勋爵对女孩们解释说，在战争时期的立陶宛，这种行为也许很有意义，可在英国乡间却有些不合时宜。女孩们频频点头称是，然后继续偷菜。

He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.

他最终宽慰自己道，尽管邻居们看起来觉得奇怪，她们的行为其实跟老洛克菲勒没什么两样。

Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.

简单的自我分析告诉我，一旦向托付资金给我的人们公开宣告了一个目标，我就无法不全心全意去实现它。而全力以赴正变得越来越没有意义。我想要设定一个经济目标，它允许我进行大量非经济活动。这可能意味着投资领域之外的活动，或者仅仅是在投资领域内追求那些承诺经济回报不高的事情。后者的一个例子可能是，持续投资一家满意（但远非出色）的控股企业，我喜欢那里的人和业务性质，即使其他投资可能提供更高的预期回报率。以诱人的价格买入企业然后转手卖出，也许能赚更多钱。然而，持续持有并有望通过一些涉及财务策略的决定来小幅改善其业绩（尤其在增量资本的个人价值降低时），可能会更令人愉快。

Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.

因此，我可能会把自己局限在那些相当容易、安全、有利可图且令人愉快的事情上。这并不会让我们的运作比过去更保守，因为我确信（无疑带有偏见）我们历来就以相当保守的方式运作。长期下行风险不会变小；只是上行潜力会变小。

Specifically, our longer term goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or a five percentage point advantage over the Dow. Thus, if the Dow averages -2% over the next five years, I would hope to average +3% but if the Dow averages +12%, I will hope to achieve an average of only +9%. These may be limited objectives, but I consider it no more likely that we will achieve even these more modest results under present conditions than I formerly did that we would achieve our previous goal of a ten percentage point average annual edge over the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort (I'm quite sure the converse is true).

具体来说，我们的长期目标将是实现年化9%与领先道指5个百分点两者中的较低值。因此，如果未来五年道指年均下跌2%，我希望我们年均增长3%；但如果道指年均上涨12%，我希望我们仅能实现9%的年均增长。这些可能是比较有限的目标，但我认为在当前条件下能达成这些更为温和的结果的可能性，不会比我过去惯常认为我们能实现年均领先道指十个百分点的原目标的可能性更高。而且，我希望有限的目标能带来更有限的努力（我十分肯定反过来也成立）。

I will incorporate this new goal into the Ground Rules to be mailed you about November 1, along with the 1968 Commitment Letter. I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so you would have ample time to consider your personal situation, and if necessary get in touch with me to clear up some of the enclosed, before making a decision on 1968. As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my capital (excluding Data Documents stock), along with that of my family, in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and achievable may well be different from what you consider so. Partners with attractive alternative investment opportunities may logically decide that their funds can be better employed elsewhere, and you can be sure I will be wholly in sympathy with such a decision.

我会把这个新目标纳入基本准则，连同1968年的承诺书一起在11月1日左右寄给你们。我之所以在此之前先发出这封信，是为了让你们有充足的时间考虑自己的个人情况，如有必要可在为1968年做决定之前联系我澄清信中的内容。和往常一样，我打算继续把我自己（Data Documents的股票除外）及家人的几乎全部资本留在BPL中。我眼中认为满意和可达成的目标，可能与你们眼中的完全不同。合伙人们若有更好的其他投资机会，合理地认为资金可以在别处得到更妥善运用，那么请放心，我完全理解这样的决定。

I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly announces one set of goals and motivations when actually an entirely different set of factors prevails. Therefore, I have always tried to be l00% candid with you about my goals and personal feelings so you aren't making important decisions pursuant to phony proclamations (I've run into a few of these in our investment experience). Obviously all the conditions enumerated in this letter haven't appeared overnight. I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a long period of time. You can understand, I am sure, that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been achieved to set forth a reduction in future goals. I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I had fulfilled my objectives to this point.

我一直非常反感那种公开宣布一套目标和动机，而实际上却是完全另一套因素在主导的行为。因此，我一直试图对你百分之百坦诚我的目标和个人感受，这样你们就不会根据虚假的宣言做出重要决定（在我们的投资经历中，我也遇到过几次这种虚假宣言）。显然，这封信中所列举的种种状况并非一夜之间出现的。其中有些问题我已经思考了很长时间。我相信你们能理解，我之所以选择在过往目标已经达成的时候来阐述降低未来目标，是因为我不想在完成到这一步的目标之前，就降低跑步机的速度。

Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any portion of this letter.

如果信中有任何费解之处，请一定告诉我。

Cordially,

真诚的，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WEB eh

WEB eh