1999 年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%. Over the last 35 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,987, a rate of 24.0% compounded annually.*

1999年，我们的净值增长了3.58亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增加了0.5%。在过去35年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到37,987美元，年复合增长率为24.0%。*

The numbers on the facing page show just how poor our 1999 record was. We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and, compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well. Relative results are what concern us: Over time, bad relative numbers will produce unsatisfactory absolute results.

对面那页的数字显示了我们1999年的业绩有多糟糕。这是我任期内绝对表现最差的一年，也是相对于标普500指数最差的相对表现。我们关心的是相对结果：随着时间的推移，糟糕的相对数字会产生令人不满意的绝对结果。

Even Inspector Clouseau could find last year's guilty party: your Chairman. My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose report card showed four Fs and a D but who nonetheless had an understanding coach. "Son," he drawled, "I think you're spending too much time on that one subject."

即使是克鲁索探长也能找到去年的罪魁祸首：你们的主席。我的表现让我想起了那个成绩单上有四个F和一个D的四分卫，但他有一位善解人意的教练。“孩子，”他慢吞吞地说，“我觉得你在那一门课上花的时间太多了。”

My "one subject" is capital allocation, and my grade for 1999 most assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior performance of Berkshire's equity portfolio — and responsibility for that portfolio, leaving aside the small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the market in 1999 because they've had disappointing operating results. We still like these businesses and are content to have major investments in them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it's no sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride.

我的“那一门课”就是资本配置，我1999年的成绩毫无疑问是D。这一年对我们伤害最大的是伯克希尔股票组合的糟糕表现——而对该组合的责任，除了盖可保险的卢·辛普森管理的一小部分外，完全在我。我们几个最大的被投资方在1999年严重落后于市场，因为它们的经营业绩令人失望。我们仍然喜欢这些企业，并满足于对它们进行重大投资。但它们的失足损害了我们去年的业绩，而且它们能否迅速重振旗鼓还很难说。

The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more-than-commensurate drop in our stock price. In 1998, to go back a bit, the stock outperformed the business. Last year the business did much better than the stock, a divergence that has continued to the date of this letter. Over time, of course, the performance of the stock must roughly match the performance of the business.

我们1999年疲弱业绩的后果是股价出现了超比例的下跌。回顾一下1998年，股票的表现优于业务表现。去年业务表现远好于股票，这种分化一直持续到这封信写成的日子。当然，随着时间的推移，股票的表现必须大致匹配业务的表现。

Despite our poor showing last year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect that the gain in Berkshire's intrinsic value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P. We can't guarantee that, of course. But we are willing to back our conviction with our own money. To repeat a fact you've heard before, well over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire. Neither my wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire and — unless our checks stop clearing — we have no intention of doing so.

尽管我们去年的表现不佳，但查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人）和我预计，未来十年伯克希尔内在价值的增长将适度超过持有标普500指数的收益。当然，我们无法保证这一点。但我们愿意用自己的钱来支持我们的信念。重复一个你以前听过的事实，超过99%的个人净资产在伯克希尔。我和我的妻子从未卖过一股伯克希尔的股票——除非我们的支票无法兑现——我们也没有这样做的打算。

Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P "modestly." For Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are available to us today.

请注意，我说的是希望“适度”击败标普500。对于伯克希尔来说，真正大幅超越该指数的日子已经过去。那时之所以存在这种优势，是因为我们可以以比现在更具吸引力的价格购买企业和股票，还因为那时的资本基础小得多，这使我们能够考虑比现在更广泛的投资机会。

Our optimism about Berkshire's performance is also tempered by the expectation — indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty — that the S&P will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has done since 1982. A recent article in Fortune expressed my views as to why this is inevitable, and I'm enclosing a copy with this report.

我们对伯克希尔业绩的乐观情绪也受到以下预期的抑制——事实上，在我们心中几乎是肯定的——标普500指数在未来一二十年的表现将远逊于自1982年以来的表现。最近《财富》杂志的一篇文章阐述了我认为这为何不可避免的观点，我随信附上了副本。

Our goal is to run our present businesses well — a task made easy because of the outstanding managers we have in place — and to acquire additional businesses having economic characteristics and managers comparable to those we already own. We made important progress in this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordan's Furniture and contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares. Deals of that kind aren't always possible, but that is the method of acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer.

我们的目标是经营好我们现有的业务——由于我们有出色的经理人，这项任务变得容易——并收购具有与我们已有业务相当的经济特征和管理者的额外业务。1999年，我们通过收购乔丹家具和签约购买中美能源的大部分股份，在这方面取得了重要进展。我们将在报告后面详细讨论这些公司，但在这里让我强调一点：我们都是以现金购买的，没有发行伯克希尔的股票。这种交易并非总是可行，但这是查理和我非常偏爱的收购方式。

Guides to Intrinsic Value

内在价值指南

I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key, though far from precise, measurement we utilize in our acquisitions of businesses and common stocks. (For an extensive discussion of this, and other investment and accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our Owner's Manual on pages 55 - 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 60.)

我经常在这些页面中谈论内在价值，这是我们在收购企业和普通股时使用的一个关键但远非精确的衡量标准。（关于这个以及其他投资和会计术语和概念的广泛讨论，请参阅我们第55-62页的《所有者手册》。内在价值在第60页讨论。）

In our last four reports, we have furnished you a table that we regard as useful in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding assets held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on page 61), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在我们过去的四份报告中，我们提供了我们认为有助于估算伯克希尔内在价值的表格。在下面更新的表格中，我们追踪了价值的两个关键组成部分。第一列列出了我们的每股投资额（包括现金及等价物，但不包括金融产品业务中持有的资产），第二列显示了伯克希尔运营业务在扣除利息和所有公司费用后、但在税前和购买会计调整（第61页讨论）之前的每股收益。第二列排除了我们从第一列所列投资中实现的股息、利息和资本收益。实际上，这些列显示了如果将伯克希尔拆分为两部分——一个实体持有我们的投资，另一个实体经营我们所有的业务并承担所有公司成本——伯克希尔会是什么样子。

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

以下是以十年为间隔的两个部分的增长率：

Annual Growth Rate, 1969-1999: 25.4% (Investments Per Share), N.A. (Earnings)

1969-1999年年增长率：25.4%（每股投资额），不适用（收益）

In 1999, our per-share investments changed very little, but our operating earnings, affected by negatives that overwhelmed some strong positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers deserve a grade of A for delivering fine results and for having widened the difference between the intrinsic value of their businesses and the value at which these are carried on our balance sheet. But, offsetting this, we had a huge — and, I believe, aberrational — underwriting loss at General Re. Additionally, GEICO's underwriting profit fell, as we had predicted it would. GEICO's overall performance, though, was terrific, outstripping my ambitious goals.

1999年，我们的每股投资变化很小，但我们的营业收益被一些负面因素压倒了，这些负面因素压倒了一些强劲的积极因素，导致亏损。我们的大多数运营经理人都应该得到A的评级，因为他们交付了良好的业绩，并扩大了其业务内在价值与资产负债表上账面价值之间的差距。但是，与此抵消的是，我们在通用再保险遭受了巨大的——我相信是反常的——承保亏损。此外，盖可保险的承保利润如我们预料的那样下降了。不过，盖可保险的整体表现非常出色，超过了我雄心勃勃的目标。

We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve in any dramatic way this year. Though GEICO's intrinsic value should grow by a highly satisfying amount, its underwriting performance is almost certain to weaken. That's because auto insurers, as a group, will do worse in 2000, and because we will materially increase our marketing expenditures. At General Re, we are raising rates and, if there is no mega-catastrophe in 2000, the company's underwriting loss should fall considerably. It takes some time, however, for the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and General Re is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory underwriting year.

我们不期望今年的承保利润会有任何显著改善。尽管盖可保险的内在价值应该会以非常令人满意的幅度增长，但其承保业绩几乎肯定会减弱。这是因为汽车保险公司作为一个整体，在2000年将会表现更差，而且我们将大幅增加营销支出。在通用再保险，我们正在提高费率，如果2000年没有特大灾难，该公司的承保亏损应该会大幅下降。然而，费率上调的全部效果需要一段时间才能显现，因此通用再保险很可能又有一个不令人满意的承保年份。

You should be aware that one item regularly working to widen the amount by which intrinsic value exceeds book value is the annual charge against income we take for amortization of goodwill — an amount now running about $500 million. This charge reduces the amount of goodwill we show as an asset and likewise the amount that is included in our book value. This is an accounting matter having nothing to do with true economic goodwill, which increases in most years. But even if economic goodwill were to remain constant, the annual amortization charge would persistently widen the gap between intrinsic value and book value.

你应该意识到，有一个项目定期地扩大内在价值超过账面价值的幅度，那就是我们每年从收入中计提的商誉摊销费用——目前约为5亿美元。这笔费用减少了我们列为资产的商誉金额，同样也减少了计入账面价值的金额。这是一个会计事项，与真正的经济商誉无关，后者在大多数年份都在增长。但即使经济商誉保持不变，每年的摊销费用也会持续扩大内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。

Though we can't give you a precise figure for Berkshire's intrinsic value, or even an approximation, Charlie and I can assure you that it far exceeds our $57.8 billion book value. Businesses such as See's and Buffalo News are now worth fifteen to twenty times the value at which they are carried on our books. Our goal is to continually widen this spread at all subsidiaries.

尽管我们无法给你一个伯克希尔内在价值的精确数字，甚至一个近似值，查理和我可以向你保证，它远远超过我们578亿美元的账面价值。像喜诗糖果和布法罗新闻这样的企业，现在的价值是其账面价值的十五到二十倍。我们的目标是不断在所有子公司扩大这一差距。

A Managerial Story You Will Never Read Elsewhere

你在他处永远不会读到的管理故事

Berkshire's collection of managers is unusual in several important ways. As one example, a very high percentage of these men and women are independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the businesses that they run. They work neither because they need the money nor because they are contractually obligated to — we have no contracts at Berkshire. Rather, they work long and hard because they love their businesses. And I use the word "their" advisedly, since these managers are truly in charge — there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures. We simply ask our managers to run their companies as if these are the sole asset of their families and will remain so for the next century.

伯克希尔的经理人群体在几个重要方面非同寻常。例如，这些人中有很高比例的人本身就非常富有，他们在自己经营的企业中发了财。他们工作既不是因为需要钱，也不是因为合同义务——我们在伯克希尔没有合同。相反，他们长时间努力工作是因为他们热爱自己的事业。我特意使用了“他们自己的”这个词，因为这些经理人是真正的负责人——奥马哈没有展示会，没有需要总部批准的预算，没有关于资本支出的指令。我们只是要求我们的经理人像经营家庭唯一资产那样经营他们的公司，并且在未来一个世纪都将如此。

Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshire's shareholders, treating both groups as we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. Though "working" means nothing to me financially, I love doing it at Berkshire for some simple reasons: It gives me a sense of achievement, a freedom to act as I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I like and trust. Why should our managers — accomplished artists at what they do — see things differently?

查理和我在对待我们的经理人时，就像我们试图对待伯克希尔的股东一样，设身处地地对待这两个群体。尽管“工作”在财务上对我来说毫无意义，但我喜欢在伯克希尔工作，原因很简单：它给了我成就感，给了我按自己认为合适的方式行事的自由，以及每天与我喜欢和信任的人互动的机会。为什么我们的经理人——他们所做的就是完成杰作——会有不同的看法呢？

In their relations with Berkshire, our managers often appear to be hewing to President Kennedy's charge, "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." Here's a remarkable story from last year: It's about R. C. Willey, Utah's dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this reason R. C. Willey's stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles -- and while doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954, when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.

在与伯克希尔的关系中，我们的经理人常常显得遵循肯尼迪总统的告诫：“不要问你的国家能为你做什么；要问你能为你的国家做什么。”这是去年一个非凡的故事：关于R.C. Willey，犹他州占主导地位的家居用品企业，伯克希尔于1995年从比尔·柴尔德及其家族手中收购。比尔和他的大多数经理人是摩门教徒，出于这个原因，R.C. Willey的商店从未在周日营业。这是一种艰难的经商方式：周日是许多客户最喜欢的购物日。尽管如此，比尔坚持他的原则——并在这样做的过程中，将他1954年接手时25万美元的年销售额业务发展到1999年的3.42亿美元。

Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week. Nevertheless, this was Bill's business to run. So, despite my reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his religious convictions.

比尔觉得R.C. Willey可以在犹他州以外的市场成功运营，并于1997年建议我们在博伊西开一家店。我对将“周日不营业”政策带入一个我们一周七天都要与根深蒂固的对手竞争的新地区持高度怀疑态度。尽管如此，这是比尔的企业要经营。因此，尽管我有保留意见，我还是告诉他既要遵循他的商业判断，也要遵循他的宗教信仰。

Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personally buy the land and build the store — for about $9 million as it turned out — and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to take the blow personally.

然后比尔坚持了一个真正非凡的提议：他个人将购买土地并建造商店——结果花了大约900万美元——如果事实证明成功，他将按成本价卖给我们。另一方面，如果销售未达到他的预期，我们可以退出业务而无需支付比尔一分钱。当然，这种结果会让他将巨额投资砸在一个空置的建筑上。我告诉他我很欣赏他的提议，但觉得如果伯克希尔要获得上涨空间，也应该承担下跌风险。比尔说不行：如果因为他的宗教信仰而导致失败，他想要个人承受打击。

The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Bill thereupon turned the property over to us — including some extra land that had appreciated significantly — and we wrote him a check for his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied up over the two years.

这家店去年8月开业，立即取得了巨大成功。比尔随即把房产交给我们——包括一些已经大幅升值的地块——我们按照他的成本给他开了一张支票。还有：比尔拒绝为他这两年锁定的资本收取一分钱利息。

If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I haven't heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning.

如果还有其他上市公司的经理人有类似的行为，我没听说过。你会明白为什么与比尔·柴尔德这样的人合作的机会让我每天早晨都跳着舞步去上班。

A footnote: After our "soft" opening in August, we had a grand opening of the Boise store about a month later. Naturally, I went there to cut the ribbon (your Chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for something). In my talk I told the crowd how sales had far exceeded expectations, making us, by a considerable margin, the largest home furnishings store in Idaho. Then, as the speech progressed, my memory miraculously began to improve. By the end of my talk, it all had come back to me: Opening a store in Boise had been my idea.

一个脚注：在8月份“软”开业之后，大约一个月后我们举行了博伊西店的盛大开业。自然，我去那里剪彩了（我想强调，你们的主席还是有点用的）。在我的讲话中，我告诉听众销售如何远远超出预期，使我们以相当大的优势成为爱达荷州最大的家居用品店。然后，随着演讲的进行，我的记忆力奇迹般地开始改善。到演讲结束时，一切我都想起来了：在博伊西开店是我的主意。

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

财产/意外险的经济学

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们的核心业务——尽管我们还有其他非常重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解伯克希尔，你必须理解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：（1）业务产生的浮存金数量；（2）浮存金的成本；（3）所有因素中最关键的是，这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金的产生是因为保费在损失赔付之前收到，这个时间间隔有时会延续多年。在此期间，保险公司将资金进行投资。这种令人愉快的活动通常伴随着一个缺点：保险公司收取的保费通常无法覆盖其最终必须支付的损失和费用。这就导致了“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本随着时间的推移低于该公司为获得资金而可能承担的其他成本，那么这项保险业务就有价值。但如果其浮存金成本高于市场利率，那么这项业务就是一颗柠檬。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. In 1999 a number of insurers announced reserve adjustments that made a mockery of the "earnings" that investors had relied on earlier when making their buy and sell decisions. At Berkshire, we strive to be conservative and consistent in our reserving. Even so, we warn you that an unpleasant surprise is always possible.

这里需要提醒注意：由于损失成本必须估计，保险公司在计算其承保业绩时有很大的自由度，这使得投资者很难计算一家公司的真实浮存金成本。估计错误——通常是无意的，但有时并非如此——可能非常巨大。这些错误计算的结果直接流入收益。有经验的观察者通常能发现大规模的准备金错误，但普通公众通常只能接受所呈现的内容，有时我会对大牌审计师含蓄认可的数字感到惊讶。1999年，许多保险公司宣布了准备金调整，这使投资者在之前做出买卖决策时所依赖的“收益”成为笑柄。在伯克希尔，我们努力在准备金方面保持保守和一贯。即便如此，我们警告你，令人不快的意外总是可能的。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 33 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary"). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表显示了自33年前我们收购国民赔偿公司（其传统业务线包含在“其他主要保险”部分）进入保险业务以来，伯克希尔保险业务各板块产生的浮存金（每隔几年显示一次）。对于该表，我们通过将净损失准备金、损失调整准备金、分保业务下持有的资金和未到期保费准备金相加，然后减去代理人余额、预付收购成本、预付税款和适用于分入再保险的递延费用，来计算我们的浮存金——相对于保费规模，我们产生的浮存金数额很大。（明白了吗？）

Growth of float is important — but its cost is what's vital. Over the years we have usually recorded only a small underwriting loss — which means our cost of float was correspondingly low — or actually had an underwriting profit, which means we were being paid for holding other people's money. Indeed, our cumulative result through 1998 was an underwriting profit. In 1999, however, we incurred a $1.4 billion underwriting loss that left us with float cost of 5.8%. One mildly mitigating factor: We enthusiastically welcomed $400 million of the loss because it stems from business that will deliver us exceptional float over the next decade. The balance of the loss, however, was decidedly unwelcome, and our overall result must be judged extremely poor. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect float cost to fall in 2000, but any decline will be tempered by our aggressive plans for GEICO, which we will discuss later.

浮存金的增长很重要——但其成本才是关键。多年来，我们通常只记录很小的承保亏损——这意味着我们的浮存金成本相应较低——或者实际上有承保利润，这意味着我们持有别人的钱反而得到了报酬。事实上，我们截至1998年的累计结果是承保盈利。然而，1999年，我们遭受了14亿美元的承保亏损，使我们的浮存金成本达到5.8%。一个轻微的缓解因素：我们欣然接受了其中4亿美元的亏损，因为它源于将给我们带来未来十年非凡浮存金的业务。然而，剩余的亏损显然是不受欢迎的，我们的整体结果必须被认为非常糟糕。如果不发生特大灾难，我们预计2000年浮存金成本将下降，但任何下降都将因我们对盖可保险的激进计划而有所缓和，我们将在后面讨论。

There are a number of people who deserve credit for manufacturing so much "no-cost" float over the years. Foremost is Ajit Jain. It's simply impossible to overstate Ajit's value to Berkshire: He has from scratch built an outstanding reinsurance business, which during his tenure has earned an underwriting profit and now holds $6.3 billion of float.

有许多人值得称赞，多年来制造了这么多“零成本”浮存金。首当其冲的是阿吉特·贾因。阿吉特对伯克希尔的价值怎么强调都不为过：他从零开始建立了一家出色的再保险业务，在他的任期内一直盈利，现在拥有63亿美元的浮存金。

In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can't evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium is inadequate. It is rare to find a person possessing any one of these talents. For one person to have them all is remarkable.

在阿吉特身上，我们拥有一个智慧的承保人，能够正确评估大多数风险；能够现实地忘记那些他无法评估的风险；在保费合适时有勇气承保巨额保单；在保费不足时有纪律拒绝哪怕是最小的风险。拥有这些才能中的任何一种的人都是罕见的。一个人全部拥有真是了不起。

Since Ajit specializes in super-cat reinsurance, a line in which losses are infrequent but extremely large when they occur, his business is sure to be far more volatile than most insurance operations. To date, we have benefitted from good luck on this volatile book. Even so, Ajit's achievements are truly extraordinary.

由于阿吉特专门从事巨灾再保险，这类业务损失不频繁但发生时极其巨大，他的业务肯定比大多数保险业务波动大得多。迄今为止，我们在这个波动大的业务上受益于好运。即便如此，阿吉特的成就确实非凡。

In a smaller but nevertheless important way, our "other primary" insurance operation has also added to Berkshire's intrinsic value. This collection of insurers has delivered a $192 million underwriting profit over the past five years while supplying us with the float shown in the table. In the insurance world, results like this are uncommon, and for their feat we thank Rod Eldred, Brad Kinstler, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster.

以较小但仍然重要的方式，我们的“其他主要”保险业务也为伯克希尔的内在价值做出了贡献。这家保险公司集合在过去五年中实现了1.92亿美元的承保利润，同时提供了表中所示的浮存金。在保险界，这样的结果并不常见，我们感谢罗德·埃尔德雷德、布拉德·金斯特勒、约翰·凯泽、唐·托尔和唐·沃斯特的功绩。

As I mentioned earlier, the General Re operation had an exceptionally poor underwriting year in 1999 (though investment income left the company well in the black). Our business was extremely underpriced, both domestically and internationally, a condition that is improving but not yet corrected. Over time, however, the company should develop a growing amount of low-cost float. At both General Re and its Cologne subsidiary, incentive compensation plans are now directly tied to the variables of float growth and cost of float, the same variables that determine value for owners.

正如我之前提到的，通用再保险业务在1999年经历了特别糟糕的承保年度（尽管投资收入使公司保持盈利）。我们的业务在国内和国际上都定价过低，这种情况正在改善但尚未纠正。然而，随着时间的推移，该公司应该会发展出越来越多的低成本浮存金。在通用再保险及其科隆子公司，激励性薪酬计划现在直接与浮存金增长和浮存金成本这些变量挂钩，这些正是决定所有者价值的变量。

Even though a reinsurer may have a tightly focused and rational compensation system, it cannot count on every year coming up roses. Reinsurance is a highly volatile business, and neither General Re nor Ajit's operation is immune to bad pricing behavior in the industry. But General Re has the distribution, the underwriting skills, the culture, and — with Berkshire's backing — the financial clout to become the world's most profitable reinsurance company. Getting there will take time, energy and discipline, but we have no doubt that Ron Ferguson and his crew can make it happen.

即使再保险公司可能有严格而合理的薪酬体系，它也不能指望每年都一帆风顺。再保险是一项高度波动的业务，通用再保险和阿吉特的业务都无法免受行业内不良定价行为的影响。但通用再保险拥有分销渠道、承保技能、文化，以及在伯克希尔支持下拥有财务影响力，有潜力成为世界上最赚钱的再保险公司。实现这一目标需要时间、精力和纪律，但我们毫不怀疑罗恩·弗格森和他的团队能够做到。

GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)

盖可保险（1-800-847-7536 或 GEICO.com）

GEICO made exceptional progress in 1999. The reasons are simple: We have a terrific business idea being implemented by an extraordinary manager, Tony Nicely. When Berkshire purchased GEICO at the beginning of 1996, we handed the keys to Tony and asked him to run the operation exactly as if he owned 100% of it. He has done the rest. Take a look at his scorecard:

盖可保险在1999年取得了非凡的进展。原因很简单：我们有一个出色的商业理念，由一位非凡的经理人托尼·奈斯利执行。当伯克希尔在1996年初收购盖可保险时，我们把钥匙交给了托尼，并要求他像拥有公司100%股份一样经营。他完成了其余的工作。看看他的成绩单：

(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
(2) Revised to exclude policies moved from one GEICO company to another.

(1) 仅限“自愿”保单；不包括指定风险等。
(2) 已修订，排除从一个盖可保险公司转移到另一个的保单。

In 1995, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $242 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,631. And we are just starting: The pace will step up materially in 2000. Indeed, we would happily commit $1 billion annually to marketing if we knew we could handle the business smoothly and if we expected the last dollar spent to produce new business at an attractive cost.

1995年，盖可保险在营销上花费了3300万美元，拥有652名电话顾问。去年，该公司花费了2.42亿美元，顾问人数增加到2,631人。而我们才刚刚开始：2000年的步伐将显著加快。事实上，如果我们知道能够顺利处理业务，并且预计最后一美元支出的新业务获取成本具有吸引力，我们很乐意每年投入10亿美元用于营销。

Currently two trends are affecting acquisition costs. The bad news is that it has become more expensive to develop inquiries. Media rates have risen, and we are also seeing diminishing returns — that is, as both we and our competitors step up advertising, inquiries per ad fall for all of us. These negatives are partly offset, however, by the fact that our closure ratio — the percentage of inquiries converted to sales — has steadily improved. Overall, we believe that our cost of new business, though definitely rising, is well below that of the industry. Of even greater importance, our operating costs for renewal business are the lowest among broad-based national auto insurers. Both of these major competitive advantages are sustainable. Others may copy our model, but they will be unable to replicate our economics.

目前有两个趋势影响获取成本。坏消息是开发咨询变得更加昂贵。媒体费率上升了，我们也看到了收益递减——也就是说，随着我们和竞争对手都增加广告投放，每个广告带来的咨询量都在下降。然而，这些负面影响被我们销售转化率（咨询转化为销售的百分比）稳步提高的事实部分抵消。总体而言，我们相信我们的新业务成本虽然在上升，但仍远低于行业水平。更重要的是，我们在续保业务上的运营成本是全国性汽车保险公司中最低的。这两个主要的竞争优势都是可持续的。其他人可能复制我们的模式，但他们无法复制我们的经济性。

The table above makes it appear that GEICO's retention of policyholders is falling, but for two reasons appearances are in this case deceiving. First, in the last few years our business mix has moved away from "preferred" policyholders, for whom industrywide retention rates are high, toward "standard" and "non-standard" policyholders for whom retention rates are much lower. (Despite the nomenclature, the three classes have similar profit prospects.) Second, retention rates for relatively new policyholders are always lower than those for long-time customers — and because of our accelerated growth, our policyholder ranks now include an increased proportion of new customers. Adjusted for these two factors, our retention rate has changed hardly at all.

上表似乎显示盖可保险的投保人留存率在下降，但有两个原因使得表面现象具有欺骗性。首先，在过去几年中，我们的业务组合已经从“优选”投保人（行业留存率高）转向“标准”和“非标准”投保人（留存率低得多）。（尽管名称不同，这三类投保人的利润前景相似。）其次，相对较新投保人的留存率总是低于长期客户——由于我们的加速增长，我们的投保人群体中新客户的比例增加了。针对这两个因素调整后，我们的留存率几乎没有变化。

We told you last year that underwriting margins for both GEICO and the industry would fall in 1999, and they did. We make a similar prediction for 2000. A few years ago margins got too wide, having enjoyed the effects of an unusual and unexpected decrease in the frequency and severity of accidents. The industry responded by reducing rates — but now is having to contend with an increase in loss costs. We would not be surprised to see the margins of auto insurers deteriorate by around three percentage points in 2000.

去年我们告诉过你，盖可保险和整个行业的承保利润率将在1999年下降，事实确实如此。我们对2000年也做出类似的预测。几年前，由于事故频率和严重程度出现异常和意外的下降，利润率变得过高。行业通过降低费率来回应——但现在不得不应对损失成本的增加。如果2000年汽车保险公司的利润率恶化约三个百分点，我们不会感到惊讶。

Two negatives besides worsening frequency and severity will hurt the industry this year. First, rate increases go into effect only slowly, both because of regulatory delay and because insurance contracts must run their course before new rates can be put in. Second, reported earnings of many auto insurers have benefitted in the last few years from reserve releases, made possible because the companies overestimated their loss costs in still-earlier years. This reservoir of redundant reserves has now largely dried up, and future boosts to earnings from this source will be minor at best.

除了频率和严重程度的恶化之外，还有两个负面因素今年将损害该行业。首先，费率上调生效缓慢，既因为监管延迟，也因为保险合约必须到期后才能适用新费率。其次，许多汽车保险公司近年来的报告收益得益于准备金释放，这是因为它们在更早的年份高估了损失成本。这个冗余准备金的蓄水池现已基本干涸，未来来自这方面的收益提振充其量是微乎其微的。

In compensating its associates — from Tony on down — GEICO continues to use two variables, and only two, in determining what bonuses and profit-sharing contributions will be: 1) its percentage growth in policyholders and 2) the earnings of its "seasoned" business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. We did outstandingly well on both fronts during 1999 and therefore made a profit-sharing payment of 28.4% of salary (in total, $113.3 million) to the great majority of our associates. Tony and I love writing those checks.

在补偿其员工——从托尼往下——盖可保险继续使用两个且只有两个变量来确定奖金和利润分享的金额：1）投保人增长率；2）“成熟”业务的收益，即我们持有一年以上的保单。1999年，我们在两方面都做得非常出色，因此向绝大多数员工支付了相当于工资28.4%的利润分成（总计1.133亿美元）。托尼和我喜欢开支票。

At Berkshire, we want to have compensation policies that are both easy to understand and in sync with what we wish our associates to accomplish. Writing new business is expensive (and, as mentioned, getting more expensive). If we were to include those costs in our calculation of bonuses — as managements did before our arrival at GEICO — we would be penalizing our associates for garnering new policies, even though these are very much in Berkshire's interest. So, in effect, we say to our associates that we will foot the bill for new business. Indeed, because percentage growth in policyholders is part of our compensation scheme, we reward our associates for producing this initially-unprofitable business. And then we reward them additionally for holding down costs on our seasoned business.

在伯克希尔，我们希望薪酬政策既简单易懂，又与我们希望员工实现的目标同步。获取新业务成本高昂（而且，如前所述，越来越昂贵）。如果我们像我们来到盖可保险之前管理层那样，将这些成本计入奖金计算，我们就会因为员工获得新保单而惩罚他们，尽管这些新保单非常符合伯克希尔的利益。因此，实际上，我们告诉员工，我们将为新业务买单。事实上，因为投保人增长率是我们薪酬方案的一部分，我们奖励员工产生这种最初无利可图的业务。然后我们再额外奖励他们控制成熟业务的成本。

Despite the extensive advertising we do, our best source of new business is word-of-mouth recommendations from existing policyholders, who on the whole are pleased with our prices and service. An article published last year by Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine gives a good picture of where we stand in customer satisfaction: The magazine's survey of 20 state insurance departments showed that GEICO's complaint ratio was well below the ratio for most of its major competitors.

尽管我们做了大量的广告，但我们最好的新业务来源还是现有投保人的口碑推荐，他们总体上对我们的价格和服务感到满意。去年《Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine》发表的一篇文章很好地说明了我们在客户满意度方面的地位：该杂志对20个州保险部门的调查显示，盖可保险的投诉率远低于其大多数主要竞争对手。

Our strong referral business means that we probably could maintain our policy count by spending as little as $50 million annually on advertising. That's a guess, of course, and we will never know whether it is accurate because Tony's foot is going to stay on the advertising pedal (and my foot will be on his). Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a major percentage of the $300-$350 million we will spend in 2000 on advertising, as well as large additional costs we will incur for sales counselors, communications and facilities, are optional outlays we choose to make so that we can both achieve significant growth and extend and solidify the promise of the GEICO brand in the minds of Americans.

我们强大的推荐业务意味着我们可能只需每年花费5000万美元的广告费就能维持保单数量。当然，这只是一个猜测，我们永远不会知道它是否准确，因为托尼的脚将一直踩在广告踏板上（我的脚将踩在他的脚上）。尽管如此，我想强调的是，我们2000年将在广告上花费的3-3.5亿美元中的很大一部分，以及我们将为销售顾问、通信和设施承担的巨额额外成本，都是我们选择做出的可自由支配支出，以便我们能够实现显著增长，并扩展和巩固盖可保险品牌在美国人心中承诺的价值。

Personally, I think these expenditures are the best investment Berkshire can make. Through its advertising, GEICO is acquiring a direct relationship with a huge number of households that, on average, will send us $1,100 year after year. That makes us — among all companies, selling whatever kind of product — one of the country's leading direct merchandisers. Also, as we build our long-term relationships with more and more families, cash is pouring in rather than going out (no Internet economics here). Last year, as GEICO increased its customer base by 766,256, it gained $590 million of cash from operating earnings and the increase in float.

个人而言，我认为这些支出是伯克希尔能做的最佳投资。通过广告，盖可保险正在与大量家庭建立直接关系，这些家庭平均每年会寄给我们1,100美元。这使得我们——在所有销售任何类型产品的公司中——成为全国领先的直接销售商之一。此外，随着我们与越来越多的家庭建立长期关系，现金是流入而不是流出（这里没有互联网经济）。去年，随着盖可保险增加766,256名客户，它从营业收益和浮存金增加中获得了5.9亿美元的现金。

In the past three years, we have increased our market share in personal auto insurance from 2.7% to 4.1%. But we rightfully belong in many more households — maybe even yours. Give us a call and find out. About 40% of those people checking our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographic areas or work at certain occupations. Our closure rate indicates, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. Just be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that our sales counselor can make the appropriate adjustment.

在过去三年中，我们在个人汽车保险的市场份额从2.7%增加到4.1%。但我们理应进入更多的家庭——甚至可能是你的家庭。给我们打个电话，查一查。大约40%查询我们费率的人发现，与我们合作可以省钱。这个比例不是100%，因为保险公司在承保判断上有所不同，有些公司比我们更青睐住在特定地理区域或从事特定职业的司机。然而，我们的成交率表明，我们比任何其他向所有来者销售保险的全国性承运商更频繁地提供低价。此外，在40个州，我们可以向股东提供特别折扣——通常为8%。务必表明自己是伯克希尔的所有者，以便我们的销售顾问做出适当的调整。

It's with sadness that I report to you that Lorimer Davidson, GEICO's former Chairman, died last November, a few days after his 97th birthday. For GEICO, Davy was a business giant who moved the company up to the big leagues. For me, he was a friend, teacher and hero. I have told you of his lifelong kindnesses to me in past reports. Clearly, my life would have developed far differently had he not been a part of it. Tony, Lou Simpson and I visited Davy in August and marveled at his mental alertness — particularly in all matters regarding GEICO. He was the company's number one supporter right up to the end, and we will forever miss him.

我怀着悲伤的心情告诉你们，盖可保险的前董事长洛里默·戴维森去年11月去世，就在他97岁生日几天后。对盖可保险来说，戴维是一位商业巨人，他将公司带入了大联盟。对我来说，他是朋友、老师和英雄。在过去的报告中，我告诉过你们他一生对我的善意。显然，如果没有他出现在我的生命中，我的人生轨迹会大不相同。托尼、卢·辛普森和我在8月份拜访了戴维，对他的思维敏捷感到惊叹——尤其是在所有关于盖可保险的事情上。直到最后，他都是公司的头号支持者，我们将永远怀念他。

Aviation Services

航空服务

Our two aviation services companies — FlightSafety International ("FSI") and Executive Jet Aviation ("EJA") — are both runaway leaders in their field. EJA, which sells and manages the fractional ownership of jet aircraft, through its NetJets® program, is larger than its next two competitors combined. FSI trains pilots (as well as other transportation professionals) and is five times or so the size of its nearest competitor.

我们的两家航空服务公司——飞安国际和Executive Jet Aviation——都是各自领域遥遥领先的领导者。Executive Jet Aviation 通过其 NetJets® 项目销售和管理喷气飞机的分时所有权，其规模超过其接下来两个竞争对手的总和。飞安国际培训飞行员（以及其他运输专业人员），其规模是最接近竞争对手的五倍左右。

Another common characteristic of the companies is that they are still managed by their founding entrepreneurs. Al Ueltschi started FSI in 1951 with $10,000, and Rich Santulli invented the fractional-ownership industry in 1986. These men are both remarkable managers who have no financial need to work but thrive on helping their companies grow and excel.

两家公司的另一个共同特点是，它们仍然由其创始企业家经营。阿尔·乌尔奇于1951年用1万美元创办了飞安国际，里奇·桑图利于1986年发明了分时所有权行业。这两人都是非凡的经理人，没有财务上的工作需求，但乐于帮助公司成长和卓越。

Though these two businesses have leadership positions that are similar, they differ in their economic characteristics. FSI must lay out huge amounts of capital. A single flight simulator can cost as much as $15 million — and we have 222. Only one person at a time, furthermore, can be trained in a simulator, which means that the capital investment per dollar of revenue at FSI is exceptionally high. Operating margins must therefore also be high, if we are to earn a reasonable return on capital. Last year we made capital expenditures of $215 million at FSI and FlightSafety Boeing, its 50%-owned affiliate.

尽管这两家企业的领导地位相似，但它们的经济特征不同。飞安国际必须投入巨额资本。一台飞行模拟器的成本可能高达1500万美元——我们有222台。此外，一次只能有一人在模拟器上接受培训，这意味着飞安国际每美元收入的资本投资非常高。因此，如果我们要获得合理的资本回报，运营利润率也必须很高。去年，我们在飞安国际及其持股50%的关联公司 FlightSafety Boeing 的资本支出为2.15亿美元。

At EJA, in contrast, the customer owns the equipment, though we, of course, must invest in a core fleet of our own planes to ensure outstanding service. For example, the Sunday after Thanksgiving, EJA's busiest day of the year, strains our resources since fractions of 169 planes are owned by 1,412 customers, many of whom are bent on flying home between 3 and 6 p.m. On that day, and certain others, we need a supply of company-owned aircraft to make sure all parties get where they want, when they want.

相比之下，在Executive Jet Aviation，客户拥有设备，尽管我们当然必须投资于自己的核心机队以确保卓越的服务。例如，感恩节后的周日是Executive Jet Aviation一年中最繁忙的一天，由于169架飞机的份额由1,412名客户拥有，其中许多人都想在下午3点到6点之间飞回家，这考验了我们的资源。在那一天以及其他某些天，我们需要供应公司拥有的飞机，以确保所有各方都能在他们想要的时间到达他们想要的地方。

Still, most of the planes we fly are owned by customers, which means that modest pre-tax margins in this business can produce good returns on equity. Currently, our customers own planes worth over $2 billion, and in addition we have $4.2 billion of planes on order. Indeed, the limiting factor in our business right now is the availability of planes. We now are taking delivery of about 8% of all business jets manufactured in the world, and we wish we could get a bigger share than that. Though EJA was supply-constrained in 1999, its recurring revenues — monthly management fees plus hourly flight fees — increased 46%.

尽管如此，我们飞行的大部分飞机归客户所有，这意味着这项业务适度的税前利润率可以产生良好的股本回报。目前，我们的客户拥有价值超过20亿美元的飞机，此外我们还有42亿美元的飞机订单。事实上，我们当前业务的限制因素是飞机的可用性。我们现在接收了全球制造的约8%的公务机，我们希望能获得更大的份额。尽管Executive Jet Aviation在1999年受到供应限制，但其经常性收入——月度管理费加上小时飞行费——增长了46%。

The fractional-ownership industry is still in its infancy. EJA is now building critical mass in Europe, and over time we will expand around the world. Doing that will be expensive — very expensive — but we will spend what it takes. Scale is vital to both us and our customers: The company with the most planes in the air worldwide will be able to offer its customers the best service. "Buy a fraction, get a fleet" has real meaning at EJA.

分时所有权行业仍处于起步阶段。Executive Jet Aviation目前正在欧洲建立临界规模，随着时间的推移，我们将向全球扩张。那样做将是昂贵的——非常昂贵——但我们将不惜一切代价。规模对我们和我们的客户都至关重要：在全球拥有最多空中飞机的公司将能够为客户提供最好的服务。“购买一份，获得一支机队”在Executive Jet Aviation具有实际意义。

EJA enjoys another important advantage in that its two largest competitors are both subsidiaries of aircraft manufacturers and sell only the aircraft their parents make. Though these are fine planes, these competitors are severely limited in the cabin styles and mission capabilities they can offer. EJA, in contrast, offers a wide array of planes from five suppliers. Consequently, we can give the customer whatever he needs to buy — rather than his getting what the competitor's parent needs to sell.

Executive Jet Aviation 还享有另一个重要优势：它的两个最大竞争对手都是飞机制造商的子公司，只销售其母公司制造的飞机。尽管这些飞机不错，但这些竞争对手在客舱样式和任务能力方面受到严重限制。相比之下，Executive Jet Aviation 提供来自五家供应商的多种飞机。因此，我们可以给客户任何他需要购买的东西——而不是他得到竞争对手母公司需要出售的东西。

Last year in this report, I described my family's delight with the one-quarter (200 flight hours annually) of a Hawker 1000 that we had owned since 1995. I got so pumped up by my own prose that shortly thereafter I signed up for one-sixteenth of a Cessna V Ultra as well. Now my annual outlays at EJA and Borsheim's, combined, total ten times my salary. Think of this as a rough guideline for your own expenditures with us.

在去年的这份报告中，我描述了我们一家人对我们从1995年起拥有的一架豪客1000的四分之一份额（每年200飞行小时）的喜悦。我被自己的文字激励得热血沸腾，不久之后我又注册了一架塞斯纳V Ultra的十六分之一份额。现在，我每年在Executive Jet Aviation和博希姆珠宝的总支出是我年薪的十倍。请将此作为您与我们合作的个人支出的大致指南。

During the past year, two of Berkshire's outside directors have also signed on with EJA. (Maybe we're paying them too much.) You should be aware that they and I are charged exactly the same price for planes and service as is any other customer: EJA follows a "most favored nations" policy, with no one getting a special deal.

在过去的一年中，伯克希尔有两位外部董事也加入了Executive Jet Aviation。（也许我们付给他们太多了。）你应该知道，他们和我在飞机和服务上被收取的费用与其他任何客户完全相同：Executive Jet Aviation遵循“最惠国”政策，没有人得到特殊待遇。

And now, brace yourself. Last year, EJA passed the ultimate test: Charlie signed up. No other endorsement could speak more eloquently to the value of the EJA service. Give us a call at 1-800-848-6436 and ask for our "white paper" on fractional ownership.

现在，做好准备。去年，Executive Jet Aviation通过了终极考验：查理也加入了。没有什么比这更能雄辩地证明Executive Jet Aviation服务的价值了。请致电1-800-848-6436，索取我们关于分时所有权的“白皮书”。

Acquisitions of 1999

1999年的收购

At both GEICO and Executive Jet, our best source of new customers is the happy ones we already have. Indeed, about 65% of our new owners of aircraft come as referrals from current owners who have fallen in love with the service.

在盖可保险和Executive Jet，我们新客户的最佳来源是我们已有的满意客户。事实上，约65%的新飞机所有者是由爱上这项服务的现有所有者推荐而来的。

Our acquisitions usually develop in the same way. At other companies, executives may devote themselves to pursuing acquisition possibilities with investment bankers, utilizing an auction process that has become standardized. In this exercise the bankers prepare a "book" that makes me think of the Superman comics of my youth. In the Wall Street version, a formerly mild-mannered company emerges from the investment banker's phone booth able to leap over competitors in a single bound and with earnings moving faster than a speeding bullet. Titillated by the book's description of the acquiree's powers, acquisition-hungry CEOs — Lois Lanes all, beneath their cool exteriors — promptly swoon.

我们的收购通常以同样的方式发展。在其他公司，高管们可能会致力于与投资银行家一起寻找收购机会，利用一种已经标准化的拍卖流程。在这个过程中，银行家们准备了一本“书”，让我想起年轻时的超人漫画。在华尔街版本中，一个从前温和的公司从投资银行家的电话亭中走出来，一跃能越过竞争对手，收益比飞驰的子弹还快。被书中对被收购方力量的描述所刺激，渴望收购的CEO们——外表冷静下的露易丝·莱恩们——立即神魂颠倒。

What's particularly entertaining in these books is the precision with which earnings are projected for many years ahead. If you ask the author-banker, however, what his own firm will earn next month, he will go into a protective crouch and tell you that business and markets are far too uncertain for him to venture a forecast.

这些书特别有趣的是，它们对未来许多年的盈利预测精确无比。然而，如果你问这位银行家作者他自己的公司下个月会赚多少钱，他会采取防护姿态，告诉你业务和市场太不确定，他无法冒险做出预测。

Here's one story I can't resist relating: In 1985, a major investment banking house undertook to sell Scott Fetzer, offering it widely — but with no success. Upon reading of this strikeout, I wrote Ralph Schey, then and now Scott Fetzer's CEO, expressing an interest in buying the business. I had never met Ralph, but within a week we had a deal. Unfortunately, Scott Fetzer's letter of engagement with the banking firm provided it a $2.5 million fee upon sale, even if it had nothing to do with finding the buyer. I guess the lead banker felt he should do something for his payment, so he graciously offered us a copy of the book on Scott Fetzer that his firm had prepared. With his customary tact, Charlie responded: "I'll pay $2.5 million not to read it."

这里有一个我忍不住要讲的故事：1985年，一家大型投资银行承销Scott Fetzer的出售，广泛推销——但没有成功。读到这次失败的消息后，我写信给拉尔夫·谢伊（当时和现在都是Scott Fetzer的CEO），表示有兴趣收购该公司。我从未见过拉尔夫，但一周之内我们就达成了交易。不幸的是，Scott Fetzer与这家银行签订的聘用函规定，即使银行与寻找买家无关，在出售时也要支付250万美元的费用。我想首席银行家觉得他应该为他的报酬做点什么，于是他慷慨地向我们提供了一份他的公司准备的关于Scott Fetzer的“书”。查理以他一贯的机智回应道：“我愿意付250万美元不读它。”

At Berkshire, our carefully-crafted acquisition strategy is simply to wait for the phone to ring. Happily, it sometimes does so, usually because a manager who sold to us earlier has recommended to a friend that he think about following suit.

在伯克希尔，我们精心策划的收购策略就是等待电话响起。令人高兴的是，它有时确实会响，通常是因为之前卖给我们公司的经理人向朋友推荐，让他考虑采取同样的做法。

Which brings us to the furniture business. Two years ago I recounted how the acquisition of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983 and my subsequent association with the Blumkin family led to follow-on transactions with R. C. Willey (1995) and Star Furniture (1997). For me, these relationships have all been terrific. Not only did Berkshire acquire three outstanding retailers; these deals also allowed me to become friends with some of the finest people you will ever meet.

这就把我们带到了家具业务。两年前，我讲述了1983年收购内布拉斯加家具卖场以及随后与布鲁姆金家族的合作，如何导致了与R. C. Willey（1995年）和Star Furniture（1997年）的后续交易。对我来说，这些关系都非常棒。伯克希尔不仅收购了三家出色的零售商；这些交易还让我与一些你能遇到的最好的人成为朋友。

Naturally, I have persistently asked the Blumkins, Bill Child and Melvyn Wolff whether there are any more out there like you. Their invariable answer was the Tatelman brothers of New England and their remarkable furniture business, Jordan's.

很自然地，我一直问布鲁姆金家族、比尔·柴尔德和梅尔文·沃尔夫，还有没有像你们一样的人。他们不变的回答是新英格兰的塔特尔曼兄弟和他们非凡的家具业务——乔丹家具。

I met Barry and Eliot Tatelman last year and we soon signed an agreement for Berkshire to acquire the company. Like our three previous furniture acquisitions, this business had long been in the family — in this case since 1927, when Barry and Eliot's grandfather began operations in a Boston suburb. Under the brothers' management, Jordan's has grown ever more dominant in its region, becoming the largest furniture retailer in New Hampshire as well as Massachusetts.

去年我见到了巴里和艾略特·塔特尔曼，我们很快就签署了伯克希尔收购该公司的协议。像我们之前的三次家具收购一样，这项业务长期由家族拥有——这次是自1927年以来，当时巴里和艾略特的祖父在波士顿郊区开始经营。在兄弟俩的管理下，乔丹家具在其地区变得越来越占主导地位，成为新罕布什尔州以及马萨诸塞州最大的家具零售商。

The Tatelmans don't just sell furniture or manage stores. They also present customers with a dazzling entertainment experience called "shoppertainment." A family visiting a store can have a terrific time, while concurrently viewing an extraordinary selection of merchandise. The business results are also extraordinary: Jordan's has the highest sales per square foot of any major furniture operation in the country. I urge you to visit one of their stores if you are in the Boston area — particularly the one at Natick, which is Jordan's newest. Bring money.

塔特尔曼兄弟不仅仅是销售家具或管理商店。他们还为客户提供一种被称为“购物娱乐”的令人眼花缭乱的娱乐体验。一个家庭在参观商店时可以玩得很开心，同时还能看到非凡的商品选择。业务成果也是非凡的：乔丹家具的每平方英尺销售额是全国所有主要家具业务中最高的。我劝你如果在波士顿地区，一定要去他们的商店看看——尤其是内蒂克的那家，那是乔丹家具最新的店。带上钱。

Barry and Eliot are classy people — just like their counterparts at Berkshire's three other furniture operations. When they sold to us, they elected to give each of their employees at least 50¢ for every hour that he or she had worked for Jordan's. This payment added up to $9 million, which came from the Tatelmans' own pockets, not from Berkshire's. And Barry and Eliot were thrilled to write the checks.

巴里和艾略特是优雅的人——就像伯克希尔其他三家家具业务的管理者一样。当他们卖给我们时，他们选择给每位员工在乔丹家具工作的每小时至少50美分。这笔款项总计900万美元，来自塔特尔曼家族自己的口袋，而不是伯克希尔的。巴里和艾略特开支票时非常激动。

Each of our furniture operations is number one in its territory. We now sell more furniture than anyone else in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas, Nebraska, Utah and Idaho. Last year Star's Melvyn Wolff and his sister, Shirley Toomim, scored two major successes: a move into San Antonio and a significant enlargement of Star's store in Austin.

我们的每个家具业务在其区域内都是第一。我们现在在马萨诸塞州、新罕布什尔州、得克萨斯州、内布拉斯加州、犹他州和爱达荷州销售的家具比任何其他人都多。去年，Star的梅尔文·沃尔夫和他的妹妹雪莉·图米姆取得了两大成功：进入圣安东尼奥市场以及大幅扩建Star在奥斯汀的店铺。

There's no operation in the furniture retailing business remotely like the one assembled by Berkshire. It's fun for me and profitable for you. W. C. Fields once said, "It was a woman who drove me to drink, but unfortunately I never had the chance to thank her." I don't want to make that mistake. My thanks go to Louie, Ron and Irv Blumkin for getting me started in the furniture business and for unerringly guiding me as we have assembled the group we now have.

在家具零售业务中，没有任何一个能与伯克希尔组建的集团相提并论。这对我来说很有趣，对你来说也有利可图。W.C.菲尔兹曾经说过：“是女人把我灌醉的，但不幸的是我从未有机会感谢她。”我不想犯那个错误。我要感谢路易、罗恩和厄夫·布鲁姆金让我进入家具行业，并在我们组建现有集团的过程中精准地指导我。

Now, for our second acquisition deal: It came to us through my good friend, Walter Scott, Jr., chairman of Level 3 Communications and a director of Berkshire. Walter has many other business connections as well, and one of them is with MidAmerican Energy, a utility company in which he has substantial holdings and on whose board he sits. At a conference in California that we both attended last September, Walter casually asked me whether Berkshire might be interested in making a large investment in MidAmerican, and from the start the idea of being in partnership with Walter struck me as a good one. Upon returning to Omaha, I read some of MidAmerican's public reports and had two short meetings with Walter and David Sokol, MidAmerican's talented and entrepreneurial CEO. I then said that, at an appropriate price, we would indeed like to make a deal.

现在，谈谈我们的第二笔收购交易：这是通过我的好朋友、Level 3 Communications的董事长兼伯克希尔董事小沃尔特·斯科特带来的。沃尔特还有许多其他商业联系，其中之一是与中美能源的关系，他在这家公用事业公司持有大量股份并担任董事。在去年9月我们都参加的一次加利福尼亚州会议上，沃尔特随意地问我伯克希尔是否有兴趣对中美能源进行大笔投资，从一开始，与沃尔特合作的想法在我看来就是个好主意。回到奥马哈后，我阅读了一些中美能源的公开报告，并与沃尔特和中美能源才华横溢、富有企业家精神的CEO戴维·索科尔进行了两次简短的会面。然后我说，如果价格合适，我们确实想做这笔交易。

Acquisitions in the electric utility industry are complicated by a variety of regulations including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Therefore, we had to structure a transaction that would avoid Berkshire gaining voting control. Instead we are purchasing an 11% fixed-income security, along with a combination of common stock and exchangeable preferred that will give Berkshire just under 10% of the voting power of MidAmerican but about 76% of the equity interest. All told, our investment will be about $2 billion.

电力公用事业行业的收购因各种法规而变得复杂，包括1935年的《公共事业控股公司法案》。因此，我们必须构建一项交易以避免伯克希尔获得投票控制权。相反，我们正在购买11%的固定收益证券，以及普通股和可交换优先股的组合，这将使伯克希尔获得中美能源略低于10%的投票权，但约76%的股权。总的来说，我们的投资将约为20亿美元。

Walter characteristically backed up his convictions with real money: He and his family will buy more MidAmerican stock for cash when the transaction closes, bringing their total investment to about $280 million. Walter will also be the controlling shareholder of the company, and I can't think of a better person to hold that post.

沃尔特一如既往地用真金白银支持自己的信念：交易完成后，他和他的家人将用现金购买更多的中美能源股票，使他们的总投资达到约2.8亿美元。沃尔特还将成为公司的控股股东，我想不出有更好的人选担任这一职位。

Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility industry, it's possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.

尽管公用事业行业有许多监管限制，但我们有可能在该领域做出更多的投入。如果这样做，涉及的金额可能很大。

Acquisition Accounting

收购会计

Once again, I would like to make some comments about accounting, in this case about its application to acquisitions. This is currently a very contentious topic and, before the dust settles, Congress may even intervene (a truly terrible idea).

再一次，我想谈一些关于会计的评论，这次是关于它在收购中的应用。这目前是一个非常有争议的话题，在尘埃落定之前，国会甚至可能介入（这真是一个可怕的想法）。

When a company is acquired, generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") currently condone two very different ways of recording the transaction: "purchase" and "pooling". In a pooling, stock must be the currency; in a purchase, payment can be made in either cash or stock. Whatever the currency, managements usually detest purchase accounting because it almost always requires that a "goodwill" account be established and subsequently written off — a process that saddles earnings with a large annual charge that normally persists for decades. In contrast, pooling avoids a goodwill account, which is why managements love it.

当一家公司被收购时，公认会计原则目前容忍两种截然不同的记录交易的方式：“购买法”和“权益联营法”。在权益联营法中，必须以股票作为支付手段；在购买法中，可以用现金或股票支付。无论支付手段是什么，管理层通常厌恶购买法会计，因为它几乎总是要求设立“商誉”账户并随后进行摊销——这一过程使收益背负通常持续几十年的年度大额费用。相比之下，权益联营法避免了商誉账户，这就是管理层喜欢它的原因。

Now, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") has proposed an end to pooling, and many CEOs are girding for battle. It will be an important fight, so we'll venture some opinions. To begin with, we agree with the many managers who argue that goodwill amortization charges are usually spurious. You'll find my thinking about this in the appendix to our 1983 annual report, which is available on our website, and in the Owner's Manual on pages 55 - 62.

现在，财务会计准则委员会提议终止权益联营法，许多CEO正准备战斗。这将是一场重要的斗争，所以我们将冒昧地发表一些意见。首先，我们同意许多经理人的观点，即商誉摊销费用通常是虚假的。你可以在我们1983年年报的附录（可在我们网站上找到）以及第55-62页的《所有者手册》中找到我的想法。

For accounting rules to mandate amortization that will, in the usual case, conflict with reality is deeply troublesome: Most accounting charges relate to what's going on, even if they don't precisely measure it. As an example, depreciation charges can't with precision calibrate the decline in value that physical assets suffer, but these charges do at least describe something that is truly occurring: Physical assets invariably deteriorate. Correspondingly, obsolescence charges for inventories, bad debt charges for receivables and accruals for warranties are among the charges that reflect true costs. The annual charges for these expenses can't be exactly measured, but the necessity for estimating them is obvious.

会计规则强制要求摊销，这在通常情况下与现实相冲突，是非常麻烦的：大多数会计费用都与实际发生的事情相关，即使它们不能精确衡量。例如，折旧费用无法精确校准有形资产价值的下降，但这些费用至少描述了一些真实发生的事情：有形资产必然在衰退。相应地，存货的陈废费用、应收账款的坏账费用和保修应计项目都属于反映真实成本的费用。这些费用的年度金额无法精确衡量，但估算它们的必要性是显而易见的。

In contrast, economic goodwill does not, in many cases, diminish. Indeed, in a great many instances — perhaps most — it actually grows in value over time. In character, economic goodwill is much like land: The value of both assets is sure to fluctuate, but the direction in which value is going to go is in no way ordained. At See's, for example, economic goodwill has grown, in an irregular but very substantial manner, for 78 years. And, if we run the business right, growth of that kind will probably continue for at least another 78 years.

相比之下，经济商誉在许多情况下并不会减少。事实上，在很多情况下——也许是大多数——它实际上随着时间推移而增值。从特征上看，经济商誉很像土地：两种资产的价值肯定会波动，但价值走向绝无定数。例如，喜诗糖果的经济商誉在78年间以不规则但非常可观的方式增长。而且，如果我们经营得当，这种增长很可能至少还会持续78年。

To escape from the fiction of goodwill charges, managers embrace the fiction of pooling. This accounting convention is grounded in the poetic notion that when two rivers merge their streams become indistinguishable. Under this concept, a company that has been merged into a larger enterprise has not been "purchased" (even though it will often have received a large "sell-out" premium). Consequently, no goodwill is created, and those pesky subsequent charges to earnings are eliminated. Instead, the accounting for the ongoing entity is handled as if the businesses had forever been one unit.

为了逃避商誉费用的虚幻，管理层拥抱了权益联营法的虚幻。这种会计惯例基于一种诗意的概念：当两条河流合并时，它们的流水变得无法区分。在这种概念下，一家被并入更大企业的公司并未被“购买”（尽管它通常会获得一笔巨额的“出售”溢价）。因此，不会产生商誉，那些后续令人烦恼的收益费用也被消除了。相反，存续实体的会计处理就好像这些业务永远是一个整体。

So much for poetry. The reality of merging is usually far different: There is indisputably an acquirer and an acquiree, and the latter has been "purchased," no matter how the deal has been structured. If you think otherwise, just ask employees severed from their jobs which company was the conqueror and which was the conquered. You will find no confusion. So on this point the FASB is correct: In most mergers, a purchase has been made. Yes, there are some true "mergers of equals," but they are few and far between.

诗意到此为止。合并的现实通常是完全不同的：无疑有一个收购方和一个被收购方，而后者被“购买”了，无论交易如何构建。如果你不这么认为，就去问问那些被解雇的员工，哪家公司是征服者，哪家是被征服者。你会发现没有混淆。因此在这一点上，财务会计准则委员会是正确的：在大多数合并中，都发生了购买。是的，存在一些真正的“对等合并”，但它们少之又少。

Charlie and I believe there's a reality-based approach that should both satisfy the FASB, which correctly wishes to record a purchase, and meet the objections of managements to nonsensical charges for diminution of goodwill. We would first have the acquiring company record its purchase price — whether paid in stock or cash — at fair value. In most cases, this procedure would create a large asset representing economic goodwill. We would then leave this asset on the books, not requiring its amortization. Later, if the economic goodwill became impaired, as it sometimes would, it would be written down just as would any other asset judged to be impaired.

查理和我相信有一种基于现实的方法既能满足财务会计准则委员会（它正确地希望记录购买），又能满足管理层对商誉减值的无意义费用的反对。我们将首先让收购公司按公允价值记录其购买价格——无论是以股票还是现金支付。在大多数情况下，这一程序将产生一项代表经济商誉的大型资产。然后我们将这项资产保留在账簿上，不需要摊销。以后，如果经济商誉发生减值（有时会发生），它将像任何其他被判断为减值的资产一样被减记。

If our proposed rule were to be adopted, it should be applied retroactively so that acquisition accounting would be consistent throughout America — a far cry from what exists today. One prediction: If this plan were to take effect, managements would structure acquisitions more sensibly, deciding whether to use cash or stock based on the real consequences for their shareholders rather than on the unreal consequences for their reported earnings.

如果我们提议的规则被采纳，它应该被追溯适用，以便美国的收购会计保持一致——这与今天的情况相去甚远。一个预测：如果这个计划生效，管理层将更明智地构建收购，根据对股东的真实后果而不是对他们报告收益的非真实后果来决定使用现金还是股票。

In our purchase of Jordan's, we followed a procedure that will maximize the cash produced for our shareholders but minimize the earnings we report to you. Berkshire purchased assets for cash, an approach that on our tax returns permits us to amortize the resulting goodwill over a 15-year period. Obviously, this tax deduction materially increases the amount of cash delivered by the business. In contrast, when stock, rather than assets, is purchased for cash, the resulting writeoffs of goodwill are not tax-deductible. The economic difference between these two approaches is substantial.

在我们收购乔丹家具时，我们遵循的程序是最大化为我们股东产生的现金，但最小化向你们报告的收益。伯克希尔以现金购买资产，这种方法在我们的纳税申报表上允许我们在15年内摊销由此产生的商誉。显然，这种税收减免大大增加了业务产生的现金量。相比之下，当用现金购买股票而非资产时，由此产生的商誉核销不能抵扣税款。这两种方法的经济差异是巨大的。

From the economic standpoint of the acquiring company, the worst deal of all is a stock-for-stock acquisition. Here, a huge price is often paid without there being any step-up in the tax basis of either the stock of the acquiree or its assets. If the acquired entity is subsequently sold, its owner may owe a large capital gains tax (at a 35% or greater rate), even though the sale may truly be producing a major economic loss.

从收购公司的经济角度来看，最糟糕的交易是股票换股票的收购。在这种情况下，通常支付了高昂的价格，而被收购方股票或其资产的计税基础没有任何提高。如果被收购实体随后被出售，其所有者可能欠下巨额资本利得税（税率为35%或更高），即使出售可能实际上造成了重大经济损失。

We have made some deals at Berkshire that used far-from-optimal tax structures. These deals occurred because the sellers insisted on a given structure and because, overall, we still felt the acquisition made sense. We have never done an inefficiently-structured deal, however, in order to make our figures look better.

我们在伯克希尔做过一些使用了远非最优税务结构的交易。这些交易之所以发生，是因为卖方坚持某种结构，而且总体而言，我们仍然认为收购是有意义的。然而，我们从未为了让数据好看而做过效率低下的交易。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 61, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此报告中，购买会计调整未分配到适用的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这种程序让你可以看到如果我们没有购买这些业务，它们本会报告的收益情况。出于第61页讨论的原因，我们认为这种报告形式比使用公认会计原则（要求逐项业务摊销购买溢价）对投资者和经理人更有用。当然，表中显示的总收益与我们的经审计财务报表中的公认会计原则总额相同。

(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998.
(2) Includes Jordan's Furniture from November 13, 1999.
(3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
(4) Includes General Re operations for ten days in 1998.

(1) 包括 Executive Jet 自1998年8月7日起。
(2) 包括 乔丹家具 自1999年11月13日起。
(3) 不包括金融业务的利息费用。
(4) 包括通用再保险1998年10天的运营。

Almost all of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses had excellent results in 1999. The exception was Dexter Shoe, and there the shortfall did not occur because of managerial problems: In skills, energy and devotion to their work, the Dexter executives are every bit the equal of our other managers. But we manufacture shoes primarily in the U.S., and it has become extremely difficult for domestic producers to compete effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of the 1.3 billion pairs of shoes purchased in this country came from abroad, where extremely low-cost labor is the rule.

我们的大部分制造、零售和服务业务在1999年都取得了优异的成绩。唯一的例外是Dexter鞋业，而那里的短缺并非由管理问题造成：在技能、精力和对工作的奉献方面，Dexter的高管与我们其他经理人完全不相上下。但我们主要在美国生产鞋子，国内生产商要想有效竞争已变得极其困难。1999年，美国购买的13亿双鞋中约有93%来自国外，国外普遍采用极低成本的劳动力。

Counting both Dexter and H. H. Brown, we are currently the leading domestic manufacturer of shoes, and we are likely to continue to be. We have loyal, highly-skilled workers in our U.S. plants, and we want to retain every job here that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally. In doing that, we have incurred significant severance and relocation costs that are included in the earnings we show in the table.

算上Dexter和H.H. Brown，我们目前是国内领先的鞋类制造商，并且很可能会继续保持下去。我们在美国工厂拥有忠诚、高技能的工人，我们希望尽可能地保留这里的每一份工作。尽管如此，为了保持生存能力，我们正在从国际采购更多的产量。这样做，我们产生了大量的遣散和搬迁成本，这些成本包含在我们表格中显示的收益中。

A few years back, Helzberg's, our 200-store jewelry operation, needed to make operating adjustments to restore margins to appropriate levels. Under Jeff Comment's leadership, the job was done and profits have dramatically rebounded. In the shoe business, where we have Harold Alfond, Peter Lunder, Frank Rooney and Jim Issler in charge, I believe we will see a similar improvement over the next few years.

几年前，我们的200家珠宝店业务赫尔茨伯格需要进行运营调整，以将利润率恢复到适当水平。在杰夫·科门的领导下，这项任务完成了，利润大幅反弹。在鞋业业务中，我们有哈罗德·阿尔丰德、彼得·隆德、弗兰克·鲁尼和吉姆·伊斯勒负责，我相信未来几年我们将会看到类似的改善。

See's Candies deserves a special comment, given that it achieved a record operating margin of 24% last year. Since we bought See's for $25 million in 1972, it has earned $857 million pre-tax. And, despite its growth, the business has required very little additional capital. Give the credit for this performance to Chuck Huggins. Charlie and I put him in charge the day of our purchase, and his fanatical insistence on both product quality and friendly service has rewarded customers, employees and owners.

喜诗糖果值得特别一提，因为去年它实现了24%的创纪录营业利润率。自1972年我们以2500万美元收购喜诗糖果以来，它已经赚取了8.57亿美元的税前利润。而且，尽管它有所增长，业务所需的额外资本却非常少。这一业绩归功于查克·哈金斯。查理和我在收购当天就让他负责，他对产品质量和友好服务的狂热坚持，回报了客户、员工和所有者。

Chuck gets better every year. When he took charge of See's at age 46, the company's pre-tax profit, expressed in millions, was about 10% of his age. Today he's 74, and the ratio has increased to 100%. Having discovered this mathematical relationship — let's call it Huggins' Law — Charlie and I now become giddy at the mere thought of Chuck's birthday.

查克每年都在进步。当他46岁接管喜诗糖果时，公司的税前利润（以百万计）约为他年龄的10%。现在他74岁，这个比例已经上升到100%。发现了这个数学关系——让我们称之为哈金斯定律——查理和我现在一想到查克的生日就头晕目眩。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39 - 54, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 63 - 69, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

关于我们各项业务的更多信息在第39-54页给出，在那里你也会找到按公认会计原则报告的业务分部收益。此外，在第63-69页，我们以非公认会计原则基础将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个部分，这种呈现方式与查理和我的思维方式相符。

Look-Through Earnings

穿透收益

Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason for our thinking is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?

报告收益是衡量伯克希尔经济进展的不充分指标，部分原因在于前面表格中显示的数字只包括我们从被投资方收到的股息——尽管这些股息通常只占我们所有权应占收益的一小部分。我们并不介意这种资金分配方式，因为总体上我们认为被投资方的未分配收益对我们来说比已支付的部分更有价值。我们这样想的原因很简单：我们的被投资方通常有机会以高回报率再投资收益。那么我们为什么希望它们被分配出来呢？

To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.

然而，为了描绘比报告收益更接近伯克希尔经济现实的情况，我们采用了“穿透收益”的概念。我们计算这些收益时包括：（1）上一节报告的营业收益；加上（2）我们在主要被投资方留存营业收益中的份额，这些收益根据GAAP会计不反映在我们的利润中，减去；（3）如果这些被投资方的留存收益分配给我们，伯克希尔将支付的税款准备金。在编制这里的“营业收益”时，我们排除了购买会计调整以及资本利得和其他主要的非经常性项目。

The following table sets forth our 1999 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 13, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表列出了我们1999年的穿透收益，但我警告你，这些数字只能是近似值，因为它们基于许多判断。（这些被投资方支付给我们的股息已包含在第13页详细列出的营业收益中，主要是在“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）

(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives

(1) 不包括可分配给少数股东权益的股份
(2) 按年度平均持股计算
(3) 使用的税率为14%，这是伯克希尔对收到的大部分股息支付的税率

Investments

投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $750 million at the end of 1999 are itemized.

下面我们列出普通股投资。那些在1999年底市值超过7.5亿美元的项目被逐项列出。

• Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $691 million less than GAAP cost.

• 代表计税成本，总计比GAAP成本少6.91亿美元。

We made few portfolio changes in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, several of the companies in which we have large investments had disappointing business results last year. Nevertheless, we believe these companies have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. This attribute, which makes for good long-term investment results, is one Charlie and I occasionally believe we can identify. More often, however, we can't — not at least with a high degree of conviction. This explains, by the way, why we don't own stocks of tech companies, even though we share the general view that our society will be transformed by their products and services. Our problem — which we can't solve by studying up — is that we have no insights into which participants in the tech field possess a truly durable competitive advantage.

我们在1999年对投资组合变动不大。正如我之前提到的，我们大额投资的几家公司去年的业务业绩令人失望。尽管如此，我们相信这些公司拥有持久的、重要的竞争优势。这种特质有助于产生良好的长期投资结果，查理和我偶尔相信我们能够识别出来。然而，更多时候我们无法识别——至少没有高度确信。顺便说一句，这解释了为什么我们不持有科技公司的股票，尽管我们认同普遍观点，即它们的产品和服务将改变我们的社会。我们的问题——无法通过学习解决——是我们无法洞察科技领域中的哪些参与者拥有真正持久的竞争优势。

Our lack of tech insights, we should add, does not distress us. After all, there are a great many business areas in which Charlie and I have no special capital-allocation expertise. For instance, we bring nothing to the table when it comes to evaluating patents, manufacturing processes or geological prospects. So we simply don't get into judgments in those fields.

我们应该补充说，我们缺乏科技洞察力并没有让我们感到困扰。毕竟，查理和我在很多商业领域并没有特别的资本配置专长。例如，在评估专利、制造工艺或地质前景方面，我们提不出任何见解。所以我们干脆不涉足这些领域的判断。

If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter. If others claim predictive skill in those industries — and seem to have their claims validated by the behavior of the stock market — we neither envy nor emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand. If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted hope for rationality. Fortunately, it's almost certain there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do well within the circle we've staked out.

如果说我们有优势，那就是能够认识到何时在自己的能力圈内运作良好，何时接近边界。预测在快速变化的行业中经营的公司的长期经济状况，完全超出了我们的能力圈。如果其他人声称在这些行业中有预测能力——并且似乎得到了股票市场行为的验证——我们既不羡慕也不模仿他们。相反，我们只坚持我们理解的东西。如果我们偏离了，那也是无意中发生的，而不是因为我们变得焦躁不安，用希望代替了理性。幸运的是，几乎可以肯定，伯克希尔会不时有机会在我们划定的圈内做得很好。

Right now, the prices of the fine businesses we already own are just not that attractive. In other words, we feel much better about the businesses than their stocks. That's why we haven't added to our present holdings. Nevertheless, we haven't yet scaled back our portfolio in a major way: If the choice is between a questionable business at a comfortable price or a comfortable business at a questionable price, we much prefer the latter. What really gets our attention, however, is a comfortable business at a comfortable price.

目前，我们已经拥有的优秀企业的价格并不那么有吸引力。换句话说，我们对这些企业的感觉比对它们的股票好得多。这就是为什么我们没有增持现有持仓。尽管如此，我们还没有大幅缩减投资组合：如果要在价格舒适但有问题的企业和价格有问题但舒适的企业之间选择，我们更倾向于后者。然而，真正引起我们注意的是价格舒适且企业舒适。

Our reservations about the prices of securities we own apply also to the general level of equity prices. We have never attempted to forecast what the stock market is going to do in the next month or the next year, and we are not trying to do that now. But, as I point out in the enclosed article, equity investors currently seem wildly optimistic in their expectations about future returns.

我们对所持证券价格的保留态度也适用于股票价格的整体水平。我们从未试图预测股市在未来一个月或未来一年会做什么，现在也不打算这样做。但是，正如我在随附的文章中指出的那样，股票投资者目前对他们未来回报的期望似乎过于乐观。

We see the growth in corporate profits as being largely tied to the business done in the country (GDP), and we see GDP growing at a real rate of about 3%. In addition, we have hypothesized 2% inflation. Charlie and I have no particular conviction about the accuracy of 2%. However, it's the market's view: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) yield about two percentage points less than the standard treasury bond, and if you believe inflation rates are going to be higher than that, you can profit by simply buying TIPS and shorting Governments.

我们认为企业利润的增长在很大程度上与国内生产总值挂钩，我们看到国内生产总值的实际增长率约为3%。此外，我们假设通货膨胀率为2%。查理和我对2%的准确性没有特别的信心。然而，这是市场的观点：通胀保护国债的收益率比标准国债低约两个百分点，如果你认为通胀率会高于这个水平，你可以通过买入通胀保护国债并卖空普通国债来获利。

If profits do indeed grow along with GDP, at about a 5% rate, the valuation placed on American business is unlikely to climb by much more than that. Add in something for dividends, and you emerge with returns from equities that are dramatically less than most investors have either experienced in the past or expect in the future. If investor expectations become more realistic — and they almost certainly will — the market adjustment is apt to be severe, particularly in sectors in which speculation has been concentrated.

如果利润确实随着GDP增长，大约以5%的速度增长，那么对美国企业的估值不太可能比这高多少。再加上一些股息，你得到的股票回报率将大大低于大多数投资者过去经历或未来预期的回报率。如果投资者的预期变得更加现实——几乎肯定会这样——那么市场调整可能会很剧烈，尤其是在投机集中的领域。

Berkshire will someday have opportunities to deploy major amounts of cash in equity markets — we are confident of that. But, as the song goes, "Who knows where or when?" Meanwhile, if anyone starts explaining to you what is going on in the truly-manic portions of this "enchanted" market, you might remember still another line of song: "Fools give you reasons, wise men never try."

伯克希尔终有一天会有机会在股市中部署大量现金——我们对此有信心。但是，正如歌中所唱，“谁知道在哪里或何时？”与此同时，如果有人开始向你解释这个“迷幻”市场中真正疯狂的板块正在发生什么，你或许应该记住另一句歌词：“傻瓜给你理由，智者从不尝试。”

Share Repurchases

股票回购

Recently, a number of shareholders have suggested to us that Berkshire repurchase its shares. Usually the requests were rationally based, but a few leaned on spurious logic.

最近，一些股东向我们建议伯克希尔回购其股票。通常这些请求是有理性依据的，但有些依赖于虚假的逻辑。

There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available funds — cash plus sensible borrowing capacity — beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their interests at a fraction of true worth. We have, on rare occasions, seen that happen. Usually, of course, chicanery is employed to drive stock prices up, not down.

只有一种事实组合使得公司回购股票是可取的：第一，公司有超出业务近期需求的可动用资金——现金加上合理的借贷能力——第二，发现其股票市场价格低于保守计算的内在价值。对此我们附加一个警告：股东应该已经获得估算该价值所需的所有信息。否则，内部人士可以利用不知情的合伙人，以真实价值的一小部分买断他们的权益。我们偶尔见过这种情况。当然，通常诡计是用来推高股价，而不是压低股价。

The business "needs" that I speak of are of two kinds: First, expenditures that a company must make to maintain its competitive position (e.g., the remodeling of stores at Helzberg's) and, second, optional outlays, aimed at business growth, that management expects will produce more than a dollar of value for each dollar spent (R. C. Willey's expansion into Idaho).

我所谈论的业务“需求”有两种：第一，公司为维持其竞争地位必须进行的支出（例如，赫尔茨伯格的店铺翻新）；第二，为业务增长而进行的选择性支出，管理层期望每花一美元能产生超过一美元的价值（例如 R.C. Willey 向爱达荷州的扩张）。

When available funds exceed needs of those kinds, a company with a growth-oriented shareholder population can buy new businesses or repurchase shares. If a company's stock is selling well below intrinsic value, repurchases usually make the most sense. In the mid-1970s, the wisdom of making these was virtually screaming at managements, but few responded. In most cases, those that did made their owners much wealthier than if alternative courses of action had been pursued. Indeed, during the 1970s (and, spasmodically, for some years thereafter) we searched for companies that were large repurchasers of their shares. This often was a tipoff that the company was both undervalued and run by a shareholder-oriented management.

当可用资金超过这些需求时，以增长为导向的股东群体的公司可以购买新企业或回购股票。如果公司的股票价格远低于内在价值，回购通常是最有意义的。在20世纪70年代中期，这样做的明智性几乎是在向管理层尖叫，但很少有人回应。在大多数情况下，那些做出回应的人比采取其他行动方案的人使他们的所有者富裕得多。事实上，在20世纪70年代（以及其后不时地），我们寻找大量回购自己股份的公司。这通常是一个信号，表明该公司既被低估，又由面向股东的管理层经营。

That day is past. Now, repurchases are all the rage, but are all too often made for an unstated and, in our view, ignoble reason: to pump or support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to sell today, of course, is benefitted by any buyer, whatever his origin or motives. But the continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value. Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around.

那个时代已经过去了。现在，回购风靡一时，但常常是出于一个未言明且在我们看来不光彩的原因：拉抬或支撑股价。当然，今天选择出售的股东会从任何买家中受益，无论买家来源或动机如何。但继续持股的股东会受到高于内在价值回购的惩罚。以1.10美元购买1美元钞票对留下来的人可不是好生意。

Charlie and I admit that we feel confident in estimating intrinsic value for only a portion of traded equities and then only when we employ a range of values, rather than some pseudo-precise figure. Nevertheless, it appears to us that many companies now making repurchases are overpaying departing shareholders at the expense of those who stay. In defense of those companies, I would say that it is natural for CEOs to be optimistic about their own businesses. They also know a whole lot more about them than I do. However, I can't help but feel that too often today's repurchases are dictated by management's desire to "show confidence" or be in fashion rather than by a desire to enhance per-share value.

查理和我承认，我们只对一部分交易证券有信心估算其内在价值，并且只有在采用价值范围而不是伪精确数字时才如此。尽管如此，在我们看来，现在很多进行回购的公司是在以牺牲留守股东的利益为代价，向离场的股东支付过高价格。为这些公司辩护的话，我会说CEO对自己的业务感到乐观是正常的。他们对此也比我了解得多。然而，我忍不住觉得，今天的回购往往是出于管理层“展示信心”或赶时髦的欲望，而不是为了提升每股价值。

Sometimes, too, companies say they are repurchasing shares to offset the shares issued when stock options granted at much lower prices are exercised. This "buy high, sell low" strategy is one many unfortunate investors have employed — but never intentionally! Managements, however, seem to follow this perverse activity very cheerfully.

有时，公司也会说他们回购股票是为了抵消以较低价格授予的股票期权行权时所发行的股份。这种“高买低卖”策略是许多不幸投资者所采用的——但绝不是故意的！然而，管理层似乎非常乐意地遵循这种反常行为。

Of course, both option grants and repurchases may make sense — but if that's the case, it's not because the two activities are logically related. Rationally, a company's decision to repurchase shares or to issue them should stand on its own feet. Just because stock has been issued to satisfy options — or for any other reason — does not mean that stock should be repurchased at a price above intrinsic value. Correspondingly, a stock that sells well below intrinsic value should be repurchased whether or not stock has previously been issued (or may be because of outstanding options).

当然，期权授予和回购都可能是有意义的——但即便如此，也不是因为这两项活动在逻辑上相关。理性地说，公司回购或发行股票的决定应独立做出。仅仅因为为了满足期权（或任何其他原因）发行了股票，并不意味着应该以高于内在价值的价格回购股票。相应地，价格远低于内在价值的股票应该被回购，无论之前是否发行过股票（或可能是由于未行使的期权）。

You should be aware that, at certain times in the past, I have erred in not making repurchases. My appraisal of Berkshire's value was then too conservative or I was too enthused about some alternative use of funds. We have therefore missed some opportunities — though Berkshire's trading volume at these points was too light for us to have done much buying, which means that the gain in our per-share value would have been minimal. (A repurchase of, say, 2% of a company's shares at a 25% discount from per-share intrinsic value produces only a ½% gain in that value at most — and even less if the funds could alternatively have been deployed in value-building moves.)

你应该知道，在过去的一些时候，我犯了不进行回购的错误。我当时对伯克希尔价值的评估过于保守，或者我对其他资金用途过于热衷。因此，我们错过了一些机会——尽管在这些时刻伯克希尔的交易量太小，我们无法大量买入，这意味着我们每股价值的增长将是微乎其微的。（例如，在比每股内在价值折价25%的情况下回购公司2%的股份，最多只能使该价值增加0.5%——如果资金本来可以用在能增加价值的举措上，增加幅度甚至更小。）

Some of the letters we've received clearly imply that the writer is unconcerned about intrinsic value considerations but instead wants us to trumpet an intention to repurchase so that the stock will rise (or quit going down). If the writer wants to sell tomorrow, his thinking makes sense — for him! — but if he intends to hold, he should instead hope the stock falls and trades in enough volume for us to buy a lot of it. That's the only way a repurchase program can have any real benefit for a continuing shareholder.

我们收到的一些信件明确暗示，写信人不关心内在价值的考量，而是希望我们吹嘘回购意图，以便股票上涨（或停止下跌）。如果写信人想明天卖出，他的想法是合理的——对他而言！——但如果他打算持有，那么他反而应该希望股票下跌，并且有足够的成交量供我们大量买入。这是回购计划对继续持股的股东产生任何实际利益的唯一途径。

We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Nor will we attempt to talk the stock up or down. (Neither publicly or privately have I ever told anyone to buy or sell Berkshire shares.) Instead we will give all shareholders — and potential shareholders — the same valuation-related information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed.

除非我们相信伯克希尔的股票价格远低于保守计算的内在价值，否则我们不会回购股票。我们也不会试图将股票哄抬或压低。（我从未公开或私下告诉任何人买入或卖出伯克希尔的股票。）相反，我们将向所有股东——以及潜在股东——提供如果我们的位置互换我们希望能够获得的相同估值相关信息。

Recently, when the A shares fell below $45,000, we considered making repurchases. We decided, however, to delay buying, if indeed we elect to do any, until shareholders have had the chance to review this report. If we do find that repurchases make sense, we will only rarely place bids on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Instead, we will respond to offers made directly to us at or below the NYSE bid. If you wish to offer stock, have your broker call Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. When a trade occurs, the broker can either record it in the "third market" or on the NYSE. We will favor purchase of the B shares if they are selling at more than a 2% discount to the A. We will not engage in transactions involving fewer than 10 shares of A or 50 shares of B.

最近，当A股跌破45,000美元时，我们考虑过进行回购。但是，我们决定推迟购买（如果确实选择购买的话），直到股东有机会审阅本报告。如果我们确实发现回购有意义，我们将很少在纽约证券交易所出价。相反，我们将回应以等于或低于纽交所买价直接向我们提出的卖盘。如果你想出售股票，请让你的经纪人致电马克·米勒德，电话402-346-1400。当交易发生时，经纪人可以在“第三市场”或纽交所记录交易。如果B股相对于A股有超过2%的折扣，我们将倾向于购买B股。我们不参与少于10股A股或50股B股的交易。

Please be clear about one point: We will never make purchases with the intention of stemming a decline in Berkshire's price. Rather we will make them if and when we believe that they represent an attractive use of the Company's money. At best, repurchases are likely to have only a very minor effect on the future rate of gain in our stock's intrinsic value.

请清楚一点：我们绝不会为了阻止伯克希尔股价下跌而进行购买。相反，只有在我们认为这些购买是对公司资金有吸引力的使用时，我们才会进行。回购充其量可能对我们股票内在价值未来增长率产生非常微小的影响。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠

About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1999 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $17.2 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 70 - 71.

约97.3%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1999年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐款总额为1,720万美元。该计划的完整描述在第70-71页。

Cumulatively, over the 19 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $147 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $13.8 million in 1999, including in-kind donations of $2.5 million.

在该计划开展的19年中，伯克希尔根据股东的指示累计捐款1.47亿美元。伯克希尔其余的捐赠由我们的子公司进行，它们坚持被收购前盛行的慈善模式（只是其前所有者自己承担个人慈善的责任）。总的来说，我们的子公司在1999年捐赠了1,380万美元，其中包括250万美元的实物捐赠。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2000, will be ineligible for the 2000 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

要参与未来的计划，你必须拥有以实际所有者名义注册的A类股票，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的名义注册。在2000年8月31日未如此注册的股票将没有资格参加2000年的计划。当你从我们这里收到捐款表格时，请及时寄回，以免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定将不被接受。

The Annual Meeting

年度会议

This year's Woodstock Weekend for Capitalists will follow a format slightly different from that of recent years. We need to make a change because the Aksarben Coliseum, which served us well the past three years, is gradually being closed down. Therefore, we are relocating to the Civic Auditorium (which is on Capitol Avenue between 18th and 19th, behind the Doubletree Hotel), the only other facility in Omaha offering the space we require.

今年资本家的伍德斯托克周末将采用与近年来略有不同的形式。我们需要做出改变，因为过去三年为我们提供良好服务的阿克萨本体育馆正在逐步关闭。因此，我们将搬迁到市民礼堂（位于国会大道18街和19街之间，双树酒店后面），这是奥马哈唯一能提供我们所需空间的另一设施。

The Civic, however, is located in downtown Omaha, and we would create a parking and traffic nightmare if we were to meet there on a weekday. We will, therefore, convene on Saturday, April 29, with the doors opening at 7 a.m., the movie beginning at 8:30 and the meeting itself commencing at 9:30. As in the past, we will run until 3:30 with a short break at noon for food, which will be available at the Civic's concession stands.

然而，市民礼堂位于奥马哈市中心，如果我们在工作日开会，会造成停车和交通的噩梦。因此，我们将在4月29日星期六召开会议，大门早上7点打开，电影8:30开始，会议本身9:30开始。与过去一样，我们将持续到下午3:30，中午有短暂的用餐休息时间，市民礼堂的食品摊位将提供食物。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

本报告随附的委托书材料附件解释了如何获得参加今年年会和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次签约美国运通（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。按照我们的惯例，我们将安排巴士从较大的酒店前往会场。会后，巴士将返回酒店以及内布拉斯加家具卖场、博希姆珠宝和机场。即便如此，您可能仍会发现汽车很有用。

We have scheduled the meeting in 2002 and 2003 on the customary first Saturday in May. In 2001, however, the Civic is already booked on that Saturday, so we will meet on April 28. The Civic should fit our needs well on any weekend, since there will then be more than ample parking in nearby lots and garages as well as on streets. We will also be able to greatly enlarge the space we give exhibitors. So, overcoming my normal commercial reticence, I will see that you have a wide display of Berkshire products at the Civic that you can purchase. As a benchmark, in 1999 shareholders bought 3,059 pounds of See's candy, $16,155 of World Book Products, 1,928 pairs of Dexter shoes, 895 sets of Quikut knives, 1,752 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo and 3,446 items of Berkshire apparel. I know you can do better.

我们已经将2002年和2003年的会议安排在了传统的五月第一个星期六。然而，2001年，市民礼堂在那个星期六已经被预订，所以我们将在4月28日开会。市民礼堂在任何周末都应该很好地满足我们的需求，因为届时附近停车场、车库以及街道上将有充足的停车位。我们还能大大增加给参展商的空间。所以，克服我通常的商业矜持，我将确保你在市民礼堂看到伯克希尔产品的广泛展示以供购买。作为参考，1999年股东们购买了3,059磅喜诗糖果、16,155美元的世界图书产品、1,928双Dexter鞋、895套Quikut刀具、1,752个带伯克希尔·哈撒韦标志的高尔夫球和3,446件伯克希尔服装。我知道你们可以做得更好。

Last year, we also initiated the sale of at least eight fractions of Executive Jet aircraft. We will again have an array of models at the Omaha airport for your inspection on Saturday and Sunday. Ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes.

去年，我们还开始销售至少八份Executive Jet飞机的份额。我们将再次在奥马哈机场展示一系列型号，供您周六和周日参观。请向市民礼堂的EJA代表询问观看这些飞机的事宜。

Dairy Queen will also be on hand at the Civic and again will donate all proceeds to the Children's Miracle Network. Last year we sold 4,586 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be staffed by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder's discount. Bring the details of your existing insurance, and check out whether we can save you some money.

冰雪皇后也将在市民礼堂现场，并再次将所有收益捐赠给儿童奇迹网络。去年我们卖出了4,586根Dilly®冰棒、软糖棒和香草/橙味棒。此外，盖可将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的许多顶级顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为您提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，盖可能够为您提供特别的股东折扣。带上您现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮您省钱。

Finally, Ajit Jain and his associates will be on hand to offer both no-commission annuities and a liability policy with jumbo limits of a size rarely available elsewhere. Talk to Ajit and learn how to protect yourself and your family against a $10 million judgment.

最后，阿吉特·贾因和他的同事们将到场提供免佣金年金以及一份巨额头寸责任险，其额度在其他地方很少见。与阿吉特谈谈，了解如何保护您和您的家人免受1,000万美元的判决。

NFM's newly remodeled complex, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can't-be-beat prices. In 1999 NFM did more than $300 million of business at its 72nd Street location, which in a metropolitan area of 675,000 is an absolute miracle. During the Thursday, April 27 to Monday, May 1 period, any shareholder presenting his or her meeting credential will receive a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We have offered this break to shareholders the last couple of years, and sales have been amazing. In last year's five-day "Berkshire Weekend," NFM's volume was $7.98 million, an increase of 26% from 1998 and 51% from 1997.

NFM新装修的综合体位于道奇街和太平洋街之间第72街占地75英亩，周一至周五上午10点至晚上9点开放，周六和周日上午10点至下午6点开放。这家店提供无与伦比的商品种类——家具、电子产品、电器、地毯和电脑——价格无与伦比。1999年，NFM在其第72街店址的业务超过3亿美元，这在一个人口67.5万的大都市地区绝对是一个奇迹。在4月27日星期四至5月1日星期一期间，任何出示会议凭证的股东都将获得通常只给员工的折扣。过去几年我们为股东提供了这一优惠，销售情况一直惊人。在去年的五天“伯克希尔周末”中，NFM的销售额为798万美元，比1998年增长26%，比1997年增长51%。

Borsheim's — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany's Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a champagne and dessert party from 6 p.m.-10 p.m. on Friday, April 28. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 30. On that day, Charlie and I will be on hand to sign sales tickets. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the largest crowds, which will form on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 7 p.m. Borsheim's operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so be prepared to be blown away by both our prices and selection.

博希姆珠宝——除蒂芙尼曼哈顿店外全国最大的珠宝店——将举办两场股东专属活动。第一场是4月28日星期五晚上6点到10点的香槟和甜点派对。第二场是主要盛会，将于4月30日星期日上午9点至下午6点举行。那一天，查理和我会在场为销售凭证签名。股东价格将从周四到周一有效，因此如果您想避开周五晚上和周日的最大人流，可以在其他时间光临并表明您的股东身份。周六，我们将营业至晚上7点。博希姆珠宝的毛利率比其主要竞争对手低整整20个百分点，因此准备好被我们的价格和选择所震撼吧。

In the mall outside of Borsheim's, we will again have Bob Hamman — the best bridge player the game has ever seen — available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. We will also have a few other experts playing at additional tables. In 1999, we had more demand than tables, but we will cure that problem this year.

在博希姆珠宝外的商场里，我们将再次邀请鲍勃·哈曼——史上最伟大的桥牌选手——在周日与我们的股东打牌。我们还会安排其他几位专家在额外的牌桌上打牌。1999年，我们的需求超过了牌桌，但今年我们将解决这个问题。

Patrick Wolff, twice US chess champion, will again be in the mall playing blindfolded against all comers. He tells me that he has never tried to play more than four games simultaneously while handicapped this way but might try to bump that limit to five or six this year. If you're a chess fan, take Patrick on — but be sure to check his blindfold before your first move.

两次美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫将再次在商场里，蒙着眼睛接受所有挑战者的挑战。他告诉我，他从未尝试过在这种劣势下同时进行超过四盘棋，但今年可能会尝试将限制提高到五或六盘。如果你是国际象棋爱好者，接受帕特里克的挑战吧——但一定要在下第一步之前检查他的眼罩。

Gorat's — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 30, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until about midnight. Please remember that you can't come to Gorat's on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 3 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat's on one of the other evenings you will be in town. I make a "quality check" of Gorat's about once a week and can report that their rare T-bone (with a double order of hash browns) is still unequaled throughout the country.

戈拉特牛排馆——我最喜欢的牛排餐厅——将于4月30日星期日再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至午夜左右。请记住，周日去戈拉特必须预订。预订请于4月3日（但不能提前）致电402-551-3733。如果周日售罄，请在您在该市的其他晚上尝试戈拉特。我大约每周对戈拉特进行一次“质量检查”，可以报告说他们的三分熟T骨牛排（配双份土豆煎饼）在全国仍然无与伦比。

The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the Iowa Cubs. Come early, because that's when the real action takes place. Those who attended last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks.

周六晚上7点，在罗森布拉特体育场将举行例行的棒球比赛。今年奥马哈金刺队将对阵爱荷华小熊队。早点来，因为那是真正精彩发生的时候。去年参加的人看到了你们的主席向厄尼·班克斯投球。

This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.

这次对决被证明是体育界期待已久的泰坦之战。在最初的几球之后——那些球不是我的最佳状态，但是我什么时候投过最佳状态呢？——我向厄尼投了一个近身球，只是让他知道谁说了算。厄尼冲向投手丘，我冲向本垒板。但冲突避免了，因为我们在到达对方之前都已经筋疲力尽了。

Ernie was dissatisfied with his performance last year and has been studying the game films all winter. As you may know, Ernie had 512 home runs in his career as a Cub. Now that he has spotted telltale weaknesses in my delivery, he expects to get #513 on April 29. I, however, have learned new ways to disguise my "flutterball." Come and watch this matchup.

厄尼对自己去年的表现不满意，整个冬天都在研究比赛录像。你可能知道，厄尼作为小熊队球员职业生涯有512个本垒打。既然他已经发现了我的投球弱点，他期望在4月29日打出第513个。然而，我学会了伪装我的“蝴蝶球”的新方法。来看看这场比赛吧。

I should add that I have extracted a promise from Ernie that he will not hit a "come-backer" at me since I would never be able to duck in time to avoid it. My reflexes are like Woody Allen's, who said his were so slow that he was once hit by a car being pushed by two guys.

我应该补充说，我已经从厄尼那里得到了一个承诺，他不会朝我打一个“平直球”，因为我永远无法及时躲避。我的反应就像伍迪·艾伦一样，他说他的反应太慢，以至于曾经被两个人推着的车撞到。

Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. Join us at the Capitalist Caper on Capitol Avenue.

我们的委托书包含获取比赛门票的说明以及大量其他信息，应该有助于您享受在奥马哈的访问。加入我们在国会大道上的资本主义冒险吧。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 2000

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2000年3月1日