2020 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

Annual Percentage Change

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

伯克希尔的表现 vs. 标普 500 指数

年度百分比变化

注： 数据按日历年度统计，但有以下例外：1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度；1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月期间。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire earned $42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called "GAAP"). The four components of that figure are $21.9 billion of operating earnings, $4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a $26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an $11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.

根据公认会计原则（通常称为“GAAP”），伯克希尔 2020 年赚取了 425 亿美元。这个数字的四个组成部分是：219 亿美元的营业利润、49 亿美元的已实现资本利得、因我们持有的股票中存在的净未实现资本利得增加而产生的 267 亿美元收益，以及最后，因我们拥有的几家子公司和关联企业价值减记而产生的 110 亿美元亏损。所有项目均按税后基础列报。

Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.

营业利润是最重要的，即使在某些时期它不是我们 GAAP 总额中最大的项目。我们在伯克希尔的重点是既增加这部分收入，又收购规模庞大且处境有利的企业。然而，去年我们两个目标都没有实现：伯克希尔没有进行大规模收购，营业利润下降了 9%。不过，我们确实通过留存收益和回购约 5% 的股份，增加了伯克希尔的每股内在价值。

The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today's figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire's capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.

GAAP 中与资本利得或损失（无论是已实现还是未实现）相关的两个组成部分每年都反复无常地波动，反映了股市的波动。无论今天的数据如何，我的长期合伙人查理·芒格和我都坚信，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔从其投资组合中获得的资本收益将是可观的。

As I've emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire's holdings of marketable stocks - at yearend worth $281 billion - as a collection of businesses. We don't control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire's income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.

正如我多次强调的那样，查理和我将伯克希尔持有的可流通股票——年底价值 2810 亿美元——视为一系列企业。我们不控制这些公司的运营，但我们按比例分享它们的长期繁荣。然而，从会计角度来看，我们应占的盈利并未计入伯克希尔的收入。相反，只有这些被投资方支付给我们的股息才记入我们的账簿。根据 GAAP，被投资方代表我们留存的大笔资金变得不可见。

What's out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value - lots of value - for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country's history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.

然而，看不见的并不意味着可以忘记：那些未记录的留存收益通常正在为伯克希尔积累价值——大量的价值。被投资方使用留存资金来扩大业务、进行收购、偿还债务，并且经常回购自己的股票（这一行为增加了我们在他们未来盈利中的份额）。正如我们去年在这些信中所指出的，留存收益在我们国家的整个历史中一直推动着美国企业。对卡内基和洛克菲勒有效的方法，多年来对数百万股东也发挥了神奇的作用。

Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire's non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.

当然，我们的一些被投资方会令人失望，通过留存收益为其公司增加的价值很少（如果有的话）。但其他公司会超额实现，少数会非常出色。总的来说，我们预计伯克希尔的非控股企业（别人会称之为我们的股票投资组合）留存的大量收益中，我们应占的份额最终会为我们带来相等或更多的资本收益。在我们 56 年的任期内，这一期望一直得到满足。

The final component in our GAAP figure - that ugly $11 billion write-down - is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts ("PCC"), and I paid too much for the company.

我们 GAAP 数字中的最后一个组成部分——那笔糟糕的 110 亿美元减记——几乎完全是对我在 2016 年所犯错误的一个量化。那一年，伯克希尔收购了 Precision Castparts（“PCC”），而我为该公司支付了过高的价格。

No one misled me in any way - I was simply too optimistic about PCC's normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC's most important source of customers.

没有人以任何方式误导我——我只是对 PCC 的正常化利润潜力过于乐观了。去年，我的误判被整个航空航天业的不利发展暴露无遗，而航空航天业是 PCC 最重要的客户来源。

In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company - the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC's CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.

通过收购 PCC，伯克希尔买到一家好公司——业内最好的公司。PCC 的 CEO 马克·多尼根是一位充满热情的管理者，他持续地为业务投入与收购前同样的精力。我们能让他来运营是幸运的。

I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.

我相信我当初的结论——PCC 会随着时间推移，在其运营中运用的净有形资产上获得良好回报——是正确的。然而，我在判断未来平均收益金额上犯了错，因此，在计算为该业务支付合理价格时也犯了错。

PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it's a big one.

PCC 远非我这类错误的第一次，但它是一个大错。

Two Strings to Our Bow

我们的两把弦

Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire - but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let's review a little history.

伯克希尔经常被贴上“企业集团”的标签，这是一个用于形容拥有杂乱无章、互不相关业务的控股公司的贬义词。是的，这描述了伯克希尔——但只是部分描述。要理解我们如何以及为何与典型的企业集团不同，让我们回顾一点历史。

Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.

随着时间的推移，企业集团通常将自己局限于全盘收购企业。然而，这种策略带来了两个主要问题。一个是无法解决的：大多数真正伟大的企业都不愿让任何人收购它们。因此，渴望交易的集团经营者不得不专注于那些缺乏重要且持久竞争优势的一般公司。那不是钓鱼的好池塘。

Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering "control" premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this "overpayment" problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a "currency" for pricey acquisitions. ("I'll pay you $10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my $5,000 cats.")

除此之外，当集团经营者涉足这个平庸企业的领域时，他们常常发现自己需要支付惊人的“控制权”溢价来捕获猎物。有抱负的集团经营者知道这个“支付过高”问题的答案：他们只需要制造出自己股价被严重高估的股票，用作昂贵收购的“货币”。（“我会用两只我价值 5000 美元的猫来换你价值 1 万美元的狗。”）

Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate's stock involved promotional techniques and "imaginative" accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were "successful," the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.

通常，助长集团股票高估的工具包括推销技巧和“富有想象力”的会计操作，这些操作充其量是欺骗性的，有时越界成为欺诈。当这些伎俩“成功”时，集团会把自己的股票推高至例如其业务价值的三倍，以便向目标公司提供其价值两倍的报价。

Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the "proof" that an illusion is reality.

投资幻觉可以持续相当长的时间。华尔街喜欢交易产生的费用，媒体喜欢富有魅力的推销员提供的故事。在某个时候，被鼓吹的股票价格飙升本身就可以成为幻觉就是现实的“证据”。

Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business "emperors" are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

当然，派对最终会结束，许多商业“皇帝”被发现没有穿衣服。金融史上充斥着著名集团经营者的名字，他们最初被记者、分析师和投资银行家誉为商业天才，但他们的创造最终却变成了商业垃圾场。

Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.

企业集团赢得了它们的可怕名声。

Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.

查理和我希望我们的企业集团拥有一个多元化的企业组合的全部或部分，这些企业具有良好的经济特征和优秀的管理者。然而，伯克希尔是否控制这些企业对我们来说并不重要。

It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie - and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire - finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.

我花了一段时间才明白过来。但查理——以及我在伯克希尔继承的纺织业务长达 20 年的挣扎——最终让我相信，拥有一家出色企业的非控股部分，比与一家边缘企业的 100% 股权作斗争更有利可图、更愉快，且工作量少得多。

For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company's durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.

基于这些原因，我们的企业集团将仍然是控股与非控股企业的集合。查理和我会根据一家公司的持久竞争优势、管理层的能力和品格以及价格，简单地将你们的资本配置到我们认为最合理的任何地方。

If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for "degree of difficulty." Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: "It's said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?"

如果这个策略需要我们付出很少或根本不付出努力，那就更好了。与跳水比赛中使用的计分系统不同，在商业活动中，“难度系数”不会给你加分。此外，正如罗纳德·里根所告诫的：“据说努力工作从未害死任何人，但我说何必冒险呢？”

The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems

家族珠宝以及我们如何增加你在这颗宝石中的份额

On page A-1 we list Berkshire's subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don't control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.

在 A-1 页，我们列出了伯克希尔的子公司，这是到年底雇佣了 36 万名员工的业务大杂烩。你可以在本报告后面部分的 10-K 中阅读更多关于这些受控业务的信息。我们在部分持有但不控制的公司中的主要头寸列在本信的第 7 页。那个业务组合也很大且多样化。

Most of Berkshire's value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.

然而，伯克希尔的大部分价值存在于四项业务中，三项是控股的，一项我们只持有 5.4% 的权益。这四项都是瑰宝。

The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.

价值最大的是我们的财产/意外险业务，53 年来一直是伯克希尔的核心。我们的保险公司家族在保险领域是独一无二的。其管理者阿吉特·贾因也同样独一无二，他于 1986 年加入伯克希尔。

Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.

总体而言，这支保险船队运营的资本远超其全球任何竞争对手部署的资本。这种财务实力，加上伯克希尔每年从其非保险业务中获得的巨额现金流，使得我们的保险公司能够安全地遵循以股票为主的投资策略，而绝大多数保险公司无法做到这一点。那些竞争对手，出于监管和信用评级的原因，必须专注于债券。

And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond - the yield was 0.93% at yearend - had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide - whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees - face a bleak future.

而如今债券并非好去处。你能相信最近从 10 年期美国国债获得的收益——年末收益率为 0.93%——比 1981 年 9 月可获得的 15.8% 的收益率下降了 94% 吗？在某些庞大而重要的国家，如德国和日本，投资者持有数万亿美元的主权债务却获得负回报。全球的固定收益投资者——无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休人员——都面临着黯淡的未来。

Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.

一些保险公司以及其他债券投资者，可能会试图通过将购买转向由不稳定借款人支持的债务，来提高目前微薄的回报。然而，风险贷款并不是应对利率不足的答案。三十年前，曾经强大的储蓄和贷款行业自我毁灭，部分原因就是忽视了这句格言。

Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance "float" - funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change - but, over time, I like our odds.

伯克希尔现在拥有 1380 亿美元的保险“浮存金”——这些资金不属于我们，但我们可以随意配置，无论是投资于债券、股票还是现金等价物如美国国库券。浮存金与银行存款有些相似：现金每天流入流出保险公司，而它们持有的总额变化很小。伯克希尔持有的这笔巨额资金很可能在未来许多年保持接近目前的水平，并且累积来看，对我们来说是没有成本的。当然，这种令人高兴的结果可能会改变——但随着时间的推移，我喜欢我们的胜算。

I have repetitiously - some might say endlessly - explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and "float" to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It's important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.

我已在每年的致股东信中反复——有人可能会说没完没了地——解释过我们的保险业务。因此，今年我将请希望更多了解我们保险业务和“浮存金”的新股东阅读 2019 年报告的相关部分，该部分转载于 A-2 页。了解我们保险活动中存在的风险和机遇非常重要。

Our second and third most valuable assets - it's pretty much a toss-up at this point - are Berkshire's 100% ownership of BNSF, America's largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy ("BHE"). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from $122 million to $3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.

我们第二大和第三大最有价值的资产——目前基本上不分伯仲——是伯克希尔 100% 拥有的 BNSF（按货运量计算是美国最大的铁路公司），以及我们 5.4% 的苹果公司股份。第四位是我们 91% 拥有的伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（“BHE”）。我们在这里拥有的是一家非常不寻常的公用事业业务，在我们 21 年的持有期内，其年收益已从 1.22 亿美元增长到 34 亿美元。

I'll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its "Big Four" as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.

我将在本信后面部分更多地谈到 BNSF 和 BHE。不过现在，我想重点关注伯克希尔将定期使用的一种做法，以增加你们在“四大”以及伯克希尔拥有的许多其他资产中的利益。

Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire's spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 "A" shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire's businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.

去年，我们通过回购相当于 80,998 股“A”类股，花费 247 亿美元，展示了对伯克希尔资产分布的热情。这一行动使你们在伯克希尔所有业务中的所有权增加了 5.2%，而无需你们动用自己的钱包。

Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.

遵循查理和我长期推荐的标准，我们进行了这些回购，因为我们相信它们既能提高持续股东的每股内在价值，又能为伯克希尔留下充足的资金，以应对可能遇到的任何机会或问题。

In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.

我们绝不认为伯克希尔的股票应该在任何价格下都被回购。我强调这一点，因为美国 CEO 们有一个令人尴尬的记录：他们在股价上涨时用于回购的公司资金比股价暴跌时更多。我们的做法恰恰相反。

Berkshire's investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I'm referencing the investment held in Berkshire's general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire's general account owned 5.2% of Apple.

伯克希尔对苹果的投资生动地说明了回购的力量。我们在 2016 年底开始购买苹果股票，到 2018 年 7 月初，持有略多于 10 亿股苹果股票（经拆股调整）。我所说的，是指伯克希尔总账户中持有的投资，不包括随后被出售的非常小且单独管理的苹果股票。当我们在 2018 年中期完成购买时，伯克希尔的总账户持有苹果 5.2% 的股份。

Our cost for that stake was $36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about $775 million annually, and have also - in 2020 - pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.

我们这部分股份的成本是 360 亿美元。从那以后，我们既享受了定期股息，平均每年约 7.75 亿美元，并且在 2020 年还通过出售一小部分头寸获得了额外的 110 亿美元。

Despite that sale - voila! - Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.

尽管进行了那次出售——瞧！——伯克希尔现在拥有苹果 5.4% 的股份。这种增加对我们来说是零成本的，之所以发生是因为苹果持续回购其股票，从而大幅减少了其当前流通在外的股票数量。

But that's far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 2½ years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple's assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.

但这远非全部的好消息。因为我们还在那两年半期间回购了伯克希尔的股票，与 2018 年 7 月相比，你现在间接拥有的苹果资产和未来收益整整增加了 10%。

This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.

这种令人愉快的动态仍在继续。伯克希尔自年底以来又回购了更多股票，并且未来很可能进一步减少其股份数量。苹果也已公开表示有意回购其股票。随着这些减少的发生，伯克希尔的股东不仅将在我们的保险集团、BNSF 和 BHE 中拥有更大的权益，而且还将发现他们对苹果的间接所有权也在增加。

The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.

回购的数学运算缓慢推进，但随着时间的推移可以变得强大。这个过程为投资者提供了一种简单的方式，让他们拥有优秀企业中不断扩大的份额。

And as a sultry Mae West assured us: "Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful."

正如性感迷人的梅·韦斯特向我们保证的那样：“好东西太多也可能是……美妙的。”

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding - 325,442,152 shares - because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the "equity" method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.3 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire's share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz on December 31, 2020. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only $11.3 billion.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们排除了持有的卡夫亨氏股份——325,442,152 股——因为伯克希尔是一个控制集团的成员，因此必须使用“权益法”对该投资进行会计处理。在其资产负债表上，伯克希尔以 GAAP 数字 133 亿美元列示卡夫亨氏持股，这个金额代表了伯克希尔在 2020 年 12 月 31 日经审计的卡夫亨氏净资产中所占的份额。不过请注意，那天我们股票的市场价值仅为 113 亿美元。

\ Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. \ This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis. \ Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $9 billion.

\ 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金计划持有的股份。\ 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基。\ 包括对西方石油公司的 100 亿美元投资，由优先股和购买普通股的认股权证组成，目前该组合价值为 90 亿美元。

Success stories abound throughout America. Since our country's birth, individuals with an idea, ambition and often just a pittance of capital have succeeded beyond their dreams by creating something new or by improving the customer's experience with something old.

成功的故事在美国比比皆是。自我们国家诞生以来，那些拥有想法、雄心，往往只有微薄资本的个人，通过创造新事物或改善客户对旧事物的体验，取得了超出他们梦想的成功。

Charlie and I journeyed throughout the nation to join with many of these individuals or their families. On the West Coast, we began the routine in 1972 with our purchase of See's Candy. A full century ago, Mary See set out to deliver an age-old product that she had reinvented with special recipes. Added to her business plan were quaint stores staffed by friendly salespeople. Her first small outlet in Los Angeles eventually led to several hundred shops, spread throughout the West.

查理和我走遍全国，与许多这样的个人或他们的家庭合作。在西海岸，我们从 1972 年购买喜诗糖果开始。整整一个世纪前，玛丽·西开始提供一种古老的产品，她通过特殊的配方对其进行了重塑。她的商业计划还包括由友好的销售人员服务的古色古香的商店。她在洛杉矶的第一家小店铺最终导致了遍布西部的数百家商店。

Today, Mrs. See's creations continue to delight customers while providing life-long employment for thousands of women and men. Berkshire's job is simply not to meddle with the company's success. When a business manufactures and distributes a non-essential consumer product, the customer is the boss. And, after 100 years, the customer's message to Berkshire remains clear: "Don't mess with my candy." (The website is https://www.sees.com/; try the peanut brittle.)

如今，西夫人的作品继续让顾客愉悦，同时为成千上万的男女提供终身就业。伯克希尔的工作就是不干涉公司的成功。当一家企业制造和分销非必需消费品时，客户就是老板。100 年后，客户给伯克希尔的信息依然清晰：“别弄乱我的糖果。”(网址是 https://www.sees.com/；尝尝花生脆。)

Let's move across the continent to Washington, D.C. In 1936, Leo Goodwin, along with his wife, Lillian, became convinced that auto insurance - a standardized product customarily purchased from agents - could be sold directly at a much lower price. Armed with $100,000, the pair took on giant insurers possessing 1,000 times or more their capital. Government Employees Insurance Company (later shortened to GEICO) was on its way.

让我们横跨大陆来到华盛顿特区。1936 年，利奥·古德温和他的妻子莉莲确信，汽车保险——一种通常从代理人处购买的标准化产品——可以直接以更低的价格销售。凭借 10 万美元，这对夫妇挑战了拥有他们资本 1000 倍或更多的巨型保险公司。政府雇员保险公司（后简称为 GEICO）就此诞生。

By luck, I was exposed to the company's potential a full 70 years ago. It instantly became my first love (of an investment sort). You know the rest of the story: Berkshire eventually became the 100% owner of GEICO, which at 84 years of age is constantly fine-tuning - but not changing - the vision of Leo and Lillian.

幸运的是，整整 70 年前我就接触到了这家公司的潜力。它立刻成为了我的初恋（投资方面的）。你知道剩下的故事：伯克希尔最终成为 GEICO 的 100% 所有者，这家 84 岁的公司不断微调——但从未改变——利奥和莉莲的愿景。

There has been, however, a change in the company's size. In 1937, its first full year of operation, GEICO did $238,288 of business. Last year the figure was $35 billion.

然而，公司的规模发生了变化。1937 年，其第一个完整运营年度，GEICO 的业务量为 238,288 美元。去年这个数字是 350 亿美元。

Today, with much of finance, media, government and tech located in coastal areas, it's easy to overlook the many miracles occurring in middle America. Let's focus on two communities that provide stunning illustrations of the talent and ambition existing throughout our country.

如今，由于大部分金融、媒体、政府和技术位于沿海地区，人们很容易忽视美国中部发生的许多奇迹。让我们聚焦于两个社区，它们为我们国家各地存在的人才和雄心提供了惊人的例证。

You will not be surprised that I begin with Omaha.

我从奥马哈开始，你不会感到惊讶。

In 1940, Jack Ringwalt, a graduate of Omaha's Central High School (the alma mater as well of Charlie, my dad, my first wife, our three children and two grandchildren), decided to start a property/casualty insurance company funded by $125,000 in capital.

1940 年，杰克·林沃尔特，奥马哈中央中学（也是查理、我父亲、我的第一任妻子、我们的三个孩子和两个孙子的母校）的毕业生，决定用 12.5 万美元的资本创办一家财产/意外险保险公司。

Jack's dream was preposterous, requiring his pipsqueak operation - somewhat pompously christened as National Indemnity - to compete with giant insurers, all of which operated with abundant capital. Additionally, those competitors were solidly entrenched with nationwide networks of well-funded and long-established local agents. Under Jack's plan, National Indemnity, unlike GEICO, would itself use whatever agencies deigned to accept it and consequently enjoy no cost advantage in its acquisition of business. To overcome those formidable handicaps, National Indemnity focused on "odd-ball" risks, which were deemed unimportant by the "big boys." And, improbably, the strategy succeeded.

杰克的梦想是荒谬的，要求他这家不起眼的公司——被有些夸耀地命名为国民赔偿公司——与那些资本充裕的巨型保险公司竞争。此外，这些竞争对手拥有由资金充足、历史悠久的本地代理商组成的全国性网络，根基牢固。根据杰克的计划，国民赔偿公司不像 GEICO，它本身将使用任何屈尊接受它的代理机构，因此在业务获取上没有成本优势。为了克服这些巨大的障碍，国民赔偿公司专注于那些被“大公司”认为不重要的“古怪”风险。而且，不可思议的是，这个策略成功了。

Jack was honest, shrewd, likeable and a bit quirky. In particular, he disliked regulators. When he periodically became annoyed with their supervision, he would feel an urge to sell his company.

杰克诚实、精明、讨人喜欢，还有点古怪。尤其是，他不喜欢监管者。当他周期性地对他们的监管感到恼火时，他会产生卖掉公司的冲动。

Fortunately, I was nearby on one of those occasions. Jack liked the idea of joining Berkshire, and we made a deal in 1967, taking all of 15 minutes to reach a handshake. I never asked for an audit.

幸运的是，在其中一个场合，我就在附近。杰克喜欢加入伯克希尔的想法，我们在 1967 年达成了交易，只用了 15 分钟就握手成交。我从未要求审计。

Today National Indemnity is the only company in the world prepared to insure certain giant risks. And, yes, it remains based in Omaha, a few miles from Berkshire's home office.

如今，国民赔偿公司是世界上唯一一家准备承保某些巨灾风险的公司。而且，是的，它仍然总部设在奥马哈，距离伯克希尔的总部办公室只有几英里。

Over the years, we have purchased four additional businesses from Omaha families, the best known among them being Nebraska Furniture Mart ("NFM"). The company's founder, Rose Blumkin ("Mrs. B"), arrived in Seattle in 1915 as a Russian emigrant, unable to read or speak English. She settled in Omaha several years later and by 1936 had saved $2,500 with which to start a furniture store.

多年来，我们又从奥马哈家族手中购买了另外四家企业，其中最著名的是内布拉斯加家具城。公司的创始人罗斯·布鲁姆金（“B 夫人”）于 1915 年作为俄罗斯移民抵达西雅图，不会读也不会说英语。几年后她在奥马哈定居，到 1936 年已攒下 2500 美元，用它开了一家家具店。

Competitors and suppliers ignored her, and for a time their judgment seemed correct: World War II stalled her business, and at yearend 1946, the company's net worth had grown to only $72,264. Cash, both in the till and on deposit, totaled $50 (that's not a typo).

竞争对手和供应商都忽视她，有一段时间他们的判断似乎是正确的：第二次世界大战阻碍了她的生意，到 1946 年底，公司的净资产仅增长到 72,264 美元。钱柜里和存款中的现金总计 50 美元（这不是笔误）。

One invaluable asset, however, went unrecorded in the 1946 figures: Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B's only son, had rejoined the store after four years in the U.S. Army. Louie fought at Normandy's Omaha Beach following the D-Day invasion, earned a Purple Heart for injuries sustained in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally sailed home in November 1945.

然而，有一笔无价的资产没有记录在 1946 年的数字中：B 夫人的独子路易·布鲁姆金在美国陆军服役四年后重新加入了店铺。路易在诺曼底登陆日后在诺曼底的奥马哈海滩作战，因在突出部战役中受伤获得紫心勋章，最终于 1945 年 11 月乘船回国。

Once Mrs. B and Louie were reunited, there was no stopping NFM. Driven by their dream, mother and son worked days, nights and weekends. The result was a retailing miracle.

一旦 B 夫人和路易重聚，NFM 就势不可挡。在梦想的驱使下，母子二人日夜兼程，周末无休。结果是一个零售业的奇迹。

By 1983, the pair had created a business worth $60 million. That year, on my birthday, Berkshire purchased 80% of NFM, again without an audit. I counted on Blumkin family members to run the business; the third and fourth generation do so today. Mrs. B, it should be noted, worked daily until she was 103 - a ridiculously premature retirement age as judged by Charlie and me.

到 1983 年，他们创造了一个价值 6000 万美元的企业。那一年，在我生日那天，伯克希尔购买了 NFM 80% 的股份，再次没有进行审计。我依靠布鲁姆金家族的成员来经营企业；第三代和第四代如今仍在这样做。应该指出，B 夫人每天都工作，直到 103 岁——在查理和我看来，这是一个荒谬地过早的退休年龄。

NFM now owns the three largest home-furnishings stores in the U.S. Each set a sales record in 2020, a feat achieved despite the closing of NFM's stores for more than six weeks because of COVID-19.

NFM 现在拥有美国最大的三家家居用品商店。尽管因为疫情，NFM 的商店关闭了六个多星期，但每家店在 2020 年都创下了销售记录。

A post-script to this story says it all: When Mrs. B's large family gathered for holiday meals, she always asked that they sing a song before eating. Her selection never varied: Irving Berlin's "God Bless America."

这个故事的后记说明了一切：当 B 夫人的大家庭聚在一起吃节日大餐时，她总是要求他们在吃饭前唱一首歌。她的选择从未改变：欧文·柏林的《天佑美国》。

Let's move somewhat east to Knoxville, the third largest city in Tennessee. There, Berkshire has ownership in two remarkable companies - Clayton Homes (100% owned) and Pilot Travel Centers (38% owned now, but headed for 80% in 2023).

让我们向东一点到诺克斯维尔，田纳西州第三大城市。在那里，伯克希尔拥有两家了不起的公司——克莱顿家园（100% 拥有）和 Pilot 旅行中心（目前拥有 38%，但 2023 年将达到 80%）。

Each company was started by a young man who had graduated from the University of Tennessee and stayed put in Knoxville. Neither had a meaningful amount of capital nor wealthy parents.

每家公司都是由一位从田纳西大学毕业并留在诺克斯维尔的年轻人创办的。两人都没有大量资本，也没有富有的父母。

But, so what? Today, Clayton and Pilot each have annual pre-tax earnings of more than $1 billion. Together they employ about 47,000 men and women.

但是，那又怎样？如今，克莱顿和 Pilot 每年的税前利润都超过 10 亿美元。它们总共雇佣了约 47,000 名员工。

Jim Clayton, after several other business ventures, founded Clayton Homes on a shoestring in 1956, and Big Jim Haslam started what became Pilot Travel Centers in 1958 by purchasing a service station for $6,000. Each of the men later brought into the business a son with the same passion, values and brains as his father. Sometimes there is a magic to genes.

吉姆·克莱顿在经历了几次其他商业尝试后，于 1956 年白手起家创办了克莱顿家园；而“大吉姆”哈斯拉姆在 1958 年以 6000 美元购买了一个加油站，创办了后来的 Pilot 旅行中心。他们每个人后来都把自己的儿子带入企业，这些儿子拥有与父亲相同的热情、价值观和智慧。有时基因有一种魔力。

"Big Jim" Haslam, now 90, has recently authored an inspirational book in which he relates how Jim Clayton's son, Kevin, encouraged the Haslams to sell a large portion of Pilot to Berkshire. Every retailer knows that satisfied customers are a store's best salespeople. That's true when businesses are changing hands as well.

现年 90 岁的“大吉姆”哈斯拉姆最近写了一本鼓舞人心的书，书中讲述了吉姆·克莱顿的儿子凯文如何鼓励哈斯拉姆家族将 Pilot 的大部分股份出售给伯克希尔。每个零售商都知道，满意的顾客是商店最好的推销员。企业易手时也是如此。

When you next fly over Knoxville or Omaha, tip your hat to the Claytons, Haslams and Blumkins as well as to the army of successful entrepreneurs who populate every part of our country. These builders needed America's framework for prosperity - a unique experiment when it was crafted in 1789 - to achieve their potential. In turn, America needed citizens like Jim C., Jim H., Mrs. B and Louie to accomplish the miracles our founding fathers sought.

下次你飞过诺克斯维尔或奥马哈时，向克莱顿家族、哈斯拉姆家族和布鲁姆金家族，以及遍布我们国家各地的成功企业家大军致敬。这些建设者需要美国的繁荣框架——1789 年制定时是一项独特的实验——来实现他们的潜力。反过来，美国也需要像吉姆·C、吉姆·H、B 夫人和路易这样的公民，来完成我们的开国元勋们所追求的奇迹。

Today, many people forge similar miracles throughout the world, creating a spread of prosperity that benefits all of humanity. In its brief 232 years of existence, however, there has been no incubator for unleashing human potential like America. Despite some severe interruptions, our country's economic progress has been breathtaking.

如今，世界各地有许多人在创造类似的奇迹，创造出一片惠及全人类的繁荣。然而，在其短短 232 年的历史中，没有像美国这样释放人类潜能的孵化器。尽管经历了一些严重的中断，我们国家的经济进步一直令人惊叹。

Beyond that, we retain our constitutional aspiration of becoming "a more perfect union." Progress on that front has been slow, uneven and often discouraging. We have, however, moved forward and will continue to do so.

除此之外，我们仍然保持着宪法所追求的成为“一个更完美的合众国”的愿望。这方面的进展缓慢、不均衡，常常令人沮丧。然而，我们一直在前进，并将继续前进。

Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.

我们坚定不移的结论是：永远不要做空美国。

The Berkshire Partnership

伯克希尔合伙关系

Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state's laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.

伯克希尔是一家特拉华州公司，我们的董事必须遵守该州的法律。其中一项要求是，董事会成员必须为公司和股东的最佳利益行事。我们的董事们拥护这一原则。

In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.

当然，此外，伯克希尔的董事们也希望公司让客户满意，培养和奖励其 36 万名员工的才能，与贷款人诚信相处，并被视为我们运营所在许多城市和州的良好公民。我们珍视这四个重要的群体。

None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire's directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.

然而，这些群体在决定股息、战略方向、CEO 选择、收购和资产剥离等事项上都没有投票权。这些责任完全落在伯克希尔的董事身上，他们必须忠实地代表公司及其所有者的长期利益。

Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.

除了法律要求之外，查理和我觉得对伯克希尔的众多个人股东负有一种特殊的义务。一点个人历史可能有助于你理解我们不同寻常的依恋以及它如何塑造我们的行为。

Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. ("BPL").

在我的伯克希尔时代之前，我通过一系列合伙企业管理了许多个人的资金，最早的三个成立于 1956 年。随着时间的推移，使用多个实体变得笨拙，于是在 1962 年，我们将 12 个合伙企业合并成一个单一实体——巴菲特合伙有限公司（“BPL”）。

By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% "bogey.") As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.

到那一年，我自己的钱和我妻子的钱，实际上都已与我的许多有限合伙人的资金一起投资。我没有领取薪水或费用。相反，作为普通合伙人，我只有在有限合伙人获得超过年化 6% 门槛的回报后才能得到补偿。如果回报未达到该水平，缺口将从我将来的利润份额中扣除。（幸运的是，这从未发生：合伙企业的回报总是超过 6% 的“目标”。）随着时间的推移，我的父母、兄弟姐妹、姑姑、叔叔、表亲以及姻亲的大部分资源都投入了合伙企业。

I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL's 70.5% interest in Berkshire.

在 BPL 于 1965 年获得伯克希尔控制权后，我无意中进入了企业管理领域。再后来，1969 年，我们决定解散 BPL。年底后，合伙企业按比例分配了其所有现金以及三只股票，其中价值最大的是 BPL 持有的伯克希尔 70.5% 的权益。

Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.

与此同时，查理在 1977 年结束了他的业务。他分配给合伙人的资产中包括 Blue Chip Stamps 的主要权益，这家公司由他的合伙企业、伯克希尔和我共同控制。Blue Chip 也是我的合伙企业在解散时分配的三只股票之一。

In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire's base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone - old, new and prospective shareholders - to be on the same page.

1983 年，伯克希尔和 Blue Chip 合并，从而将伯克希尔的注册股东基础从 1,900 人扩大到 2,900 人。查理和我希望每个人——老的、新的和潜在的股东——都能达成共识。

Therefore, the 1983 annual report - up front - laid out Berkshire's "major business principles." The first principle began: "Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership." That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I - and our directors as well - believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.

因此，1983 年的年度报告——在前面——列出了伯克希尔的“主要经营原则”。第一条原则以这样一句话开始：“虽然我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。”这定义了我们在 1983 年的关系；今天它仍然定义着这种关系。查理和我——以及我们的董事们——相信这句格言将在未来几十年为伯克希尔服务。

Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large "buckets," one occupied by me as a "founder" of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.

伯克希尔的所有权现在分布在五个大的“桶”中，其中一个由我作为某种“创始人”占据。随着我持有的股份每年被分配给各种慈善机构，这个桶肯定会变空。

Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people's money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.

其余四个桶中有两个由机构投资者占据，每个都管理着他人的资金。然而，这些桶之间的相似之处到此为止：它们的投资程序截然不同。

In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for "weighting" purposes.

一个机构桶是指数基金，这是投资界一个庞大且迅速增长的领域。这些基金简单地模仿它们跟踪的指数。指数投资者最喜欢的是标普 500 指数，伯克希尔是其成分股之一。应该强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔股票仅仅是因为它们必须这样做。它们处于自动驾驶状态，买卖股票仅仅是为了“权重”目的。

In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients' money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.

另一个机构桶是管理客户资金的专业人士，无论这些资金属于富人、大学、退休人员还是其他人。这些专业经理人的任务是根据他们对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一项投资转移到另一项投资。这是一个光荣，尽管困难，的职业。

We are happy to work for this "active" group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.

我们很高兴为这个“主动”群体工作，同时他们也在寻找更好的地方来配置客户资金。当然，有些管理者专注于长期，交易频率很低。其他人使用计算机，利用算法可能在纳秒内指导股票的买卖。一些专业投资者会根据他们的宏观经济判断来来去去。

Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I've just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.

我们的第四个桶由个人股东组成，他们的运作方式类似于我刚刚描述的那些主动机构经理。可以理解，当这些股东看到另一个令他们兴奋的投资时，他们会把伯克希尔的股票视为可能的资金来源。我们对此态度没有异议，这与我们看待伯克希尔持有的某些股票的方式类似。

All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.

话虽如此，如果我们对第五个桶没有一种特殊的亲切感，那就不够人性了：那就是超过一百万的个人投资者，他们只是相信我们会代表他们的利益，无论未来如何。他们加入我们时没有离开的意图，采取了类似于我们最初合伙人的心态。事实上，我们合伙时代的许多投资者和/或他们的后代，仍然是伯克希尔的重要股东。

A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.

这些老将的典型代表是斯坦·特鲁尔森，一位开朗慷慨的奥马哈眼科医生，也是我的私人朋友，他在 2020 年 11 月 13 日年满 100 岁。1959 年，斯坦与其他 10 位年轻的奥马哈医生一起，与我组成了一个合伙企业。这些医生创造性地将他们的企业命名为 Emdee 有限公司。每年，他们都会与我和我的妻子在我家共进庆祝晚宴。

When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.

当我们的合伙企业在 1969 年分配伯克希尔股票时，所有医生都保留了他们收到的股票。他们可能不了解投资或会计的来龙去脉，但他们确实知道在伯克希尔，他们会被当作合伙人对待。

Two of Stan's comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group's startling durability - along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively - serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?

斯坦在 Emdee 的两位战友现在都已 90 多岁，并继续持有伯克希尔的股票。这个群体惊人的持久性——加上查理和我分别是 97 岁和 90 岁的事实——提出了一个有趣的问题：难道持有伯克希尔能促进长寿吗？

Berkshire's unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don't think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.

伯克希尔非同寻常且受到珍视的个人股东大家庭，可能有助于你理解我们为何不愿讨好华尔街分析师和机构投资者。我们已经拥有了我们想要的投资者，并且我们认为，总体而言，他们不会被替代者升级。

There are only so many seats - that is, shares outstanding - available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.

可供伯克希尔所有权使用的座位——即流通股——是有限的。我们非常喜欢已经入座的人。

Of course, some turnover in "partners" will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?

当然，“合伙人”中会出现一些流动。然而，查理和我希望这种流动是最小的。毕竟，谁会在朋友、邻居或婚姻中寻求快速的更替呢？

In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.

1958 年，菲尔·费舍写了一本关于投资的极好的书。在书中，他将经营一家上市公司比作管理一家餐厅。他说，如果你在寻找食客，你可以通过提供汉堡配可乐，或者法式大餐配异国葡萄酒，来吸引顾客并繁荣发展。但是，费舍警告说，你绝不能随意从一种切换到另一种：你向潜在顾客传递的信息，必须与他们进入你的场所后所看到的一致。

At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.

在伯克希尔，我们提供汉堡和可乐已经 56 年了。我们珍视这种食物所吸引的顾客。

The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and "stories," they will not lack suitors. "Technicians" will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock's next move. The calls for action will never stop.

美国及其他地区数以千万计的其他投资者和投机者有各种各样的股票选择来满足他们的口味。他们会找到拥有诱人想法的 CEO 和市场大师。如果他们想要价格目标、可管理的盈利和“故事”，他们不会缺乏追求者。“技术分析师”会自信地指导他们，图表上的某些波动预示着股票的下一步走势。那些催促行动的声音永远不会停止。

Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a "positive-sum" game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will - over time - enjoy dividends and capital gains, as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original "selections."

我应该补充一点，这些投资者中的许多人会做得相当好。毕竟，股票所有权在很大程度上是一个“正和”游戏。事实上，一只耐心而头脑冷静的猴子，通过向列有所有标普 500 指数的板上投掷 50 支飞镖来构建一个投资组合，只要它永远不会被诱惑去改变其最初的“选择”，随着时间的推移，它将享受股息和资本收益。

Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth - lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that's required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street's income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.

生产性资产，如农场、房地产，还有企业所有权，能产生财富——大量的财富。这些资产的大多数所有者都会得到回报。所需的一切就是时间的流逝、内心的平静、充分的多样化以及交易和费用的最小化。尽管如此，投资者绝不能忘记，他们的花费就是华尔街的收入。而且，与我的猴子不同，华尔街的人不会为了花生米而工作。

When seats open up at Berkshire - and we hope they are few - we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.

当伯克希尔的席位空缺时——我们希望这种情况很少——我们希望它们被那些理解并渴望我们所提供东西的新来者占据。经过几十年的管理，查理和我仍然无法承诺结果。然而，我们能够并且确实承诺将你视为合伙人。

And so, too, will our successors.

我们的继任者也将如此。

A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You

一个可能会让你惊讶的伯克希尔数字

Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment - the sort of assets that make up the "business infrastructure" of our country - with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company. Berkshire's depreciated cost of these domestic "fixed assets" is $154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant and equipment of $127 billion.

最近，我了解到一个关于我们公司的、我从未想到过的事实：伯克希尔拥有的位于美国的不动产、厂房和设备——构成我们国家“商业基础设施”的那类资产——其 GAAP 估值超过了任何其他美国公司。伯克希尔对这些国内“固定资产”的折旧后成本为 1540 亿美元。在这份名单上紧随其后的是 AT&T，其不动产、厂房和设备为 1270 亿美元。

Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not, in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses - and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.

我应该补充说，我们在固定资产所有权方面的领先地位本身并不标志着投资胜利。最好的结果出现在那些需要最少资产来开展高利润业务——并且提供的商品或服务只需少量额外资本就能扩大销售额——的公司。事实上，我们确实拥有几家这样的杰出企业，但它们相对较小，并且充其量增长缓慢。

Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants - BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire's first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of $4.2 billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned $8.3 billion.

然而，重资产公司也可以是好的投资。事实上，我们对我们的两大巨头——BNSF 和 BHE——感到非常满意：2011 年，伯克希尔拥有 BNSF 的第一个完整年度，这两家公司的总盈利为 42 亿美元。2020 年，对许多企业来说是艰难的一年，它们却赚了 83 亿美元。

BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.

BNSF 和 BHE 在未来几十年将需要大量的资本支出。好消息是，两者都可能在增量投资上带来适当的回报。

Let's look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By a significant margin, BNSF's loads top those of any other carrier.

我们先来看 BNSF。你们的铁路承载了美国所有非本地货物运输（无论是通过铁路、卡车、管道、驳船还是飞机）中约 15% 的吨英里（一吨货物移动一英里）。BNSF 的运载量明显高于任何其他承运商。

The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.

美国铁路的历史引人入胜。经过大约 150 年的疯狂建设、欺诈、过度建设、破产、重组和合并，铁路行业终于在几十年前呈现出成熟和理性的面貌。

BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company's extensive lineage is laid out at http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf.

BNSF 于 1850 年开始运营，在伊利诺伊州东北部拥有一条 12 英里的线路。如今，它有 390 家前身公司的铁路被收购或合并。该公司广泛的谱系可在 http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf 上查阅。

Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested $41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay $20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.

伯克希尔于 2010 年初收购了 BNSF。自我们收购以来，该铁路已在固定资产上投资了 410 亿美元，这一支出比其折旧费用高出 200 亿美元。铁路是一项户外运动，其特点是一英里长的火车必须在严寒和酷暑中可靠运行，同时它们始终会遇到从沙漠到山脉的各种地形。大规模的洪水周期性发生。BNSF 拥有 23,000 英里的轨道，遍布 28 个州，并且必须不惜一切代价在其庞大的系统中最大限度地提高安全性和服务。

Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire - $41.8 billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after it both fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about $2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.

尽管如此，BNSF 已经向伯克希尔支付了可观的股息——总计 418 亿美元。然而，铁路只在其满足业务需求并保持约 20 亿美元现金余额后，才将剩余部分支付给我们。这种保守的政策使 BNSF 能够以低利率借款，而无需伯克希尔对其债务提供任何担保。

One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF's profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.

关于 BNSF 还有一点：去年，其 CEO 卡尔·艾斯和他手下的凯蒂·法默，在应对业务大幅下滑的同时，在控制开支方面做出了非凡的工作。尽管货物运量下降了 7%，他们实际上将 BNSF 的利润率提高了 2.9 个百分点。卡尔按照长期计划，在年底退休，凯蒂接任 CEO。你们的铁路掌握在合适的人手中。

BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country's electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE's earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.

BHE 与 BNSF 不同，它对其普通股不支付股息，这在电力公用事业行业是一种非常不寻常的做法。在我们 21 年的所有权期间，这种简朴的政策一直如此。与铁路不同，我们国家的电力公用事业需要进行大规模改造，其最终成本将是惊人的。这项努力将吸收 BHE 未来几十年的全部盈利。我们欢迎这一挑战，并相信额外的投资将得到适当的回报。

Let me tell you about one of BHE's endeavors - its $18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 - yes, 2030.

让我告诉你 BHE 的一项努力——它承诺投入 180 亿美元，对目前在整个西部地区输电的过时电网进行大规模改造和扩建。BHE 于 2006 年启动该项目，预计要到 2030 年才能完成——是的，2030 年。

The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project's cost.

可再生能源的出现使我们的项目成为社会必需。历史上，长期盛行的以煤为基础的发电厂靠近庞大的人口中心。然而，风能和太阳能发电新世界的最佳地点往往在偏远地区。当 BHE 在 2006 年评估情况时，必须对西部输电线路进行巨额投资已不是什么秘密。然而，很少有公司或政府实体在计算项目成本后，有财力举手。

BHE's decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America's political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.

应该指出，BHE 继续进行的决定是基于其对美国政治、经济和司法系统的信任。在有意义的收入流入之前，需要投入数十亿美元。输电线路必须跨越州和其他司法管辖区的边界，每个州都有自己的规则和选区。BHE 还需要与数百名土地所有者打交道，并与产生可再生能源的供应商以及将电力分配给其客户的遥远公用事业公司执行复杂的合同。竞争性利益和旧秩序的捍卫者，以及渴望立即进入新世界的不切实际的梦想家，都必须被拉拢过来。

Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.

意外和延误是肯定的。然而，同样肯定的是，BHE 拥有管理人才、制度承诺和财力来履行其承诺。尽管我们的西部输电项目还需要很多年才能完成，我们今天已经在寻找其他类似规模的项目来承担。

Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.

无论障碍是什么，BHE 都将是提供更清洁能源的领导者。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.

去年 2 月 22 日，我写信告诉你们我们举行盛大年度股东大会的计划。不到一个月，这个计划就被取消了。

Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg, Berkshire's CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked. Greg Abel, one of Berkshire's Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before "showtime."

我们总部团队在 Melissa Shapiro 和伯克希尔 CFO Marc Hamburg 的领导下迅速重组。奇迹般地，他们的即兴发挥奏效了。伯克希尔的副董事长之一 Greg Abel 与我同台，面对一个黑暗的会场、18,000 个空座位和一台摄像机。没有排练：Greg 和我在“演出时间”前大约 45 分钟到达。

I displayed slides showing various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.

我展示了我在家中整理的显示各种事实和数据的幻灯片。一支匿名但能力很强的计算机和摄像操作员团队按顺序将幻灯片投影到屏幕上。

Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See's peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.

雅虎将会议过程直播给了创纪录规模的国际观众。CNBC 的 Becky Quick 在她新泽西的家中工作，从股东事先提交的数千个问题或观众在 Greg 和我上台的四小时内发邮件给她的问题中挑选问题。喜诗的花生脆和软糖，以及可口可乐，为我们提供了营养。

This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time ("EDT"). Simply navigate to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream.

今年 5 月 1 日，我们计划做得更好。我们将再次依靠雅虎和 CNBC 完美地执行。雅虎将在美国东部夏令时间下午 1 点开始直播。只需访问 https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。

Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.

我们的正式会议将在美国东部夏令时间下午 5 点开始，应在下午 5:30 前结束。在此之前，下午 1:30 到 5:00，我们将回答由 Becky 转达的问题。一如既往，我们不会预先知道会被问到什么问题。请将你的尖锐问题发送至 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com。雅虎将在下午 5:30 后结束直播。

And now - drum roll, please - a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 3½-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.

现在——请击鼓——一个惊喜。今年我们的会议将在洛杉矶举行……查理将与我一起在台上，在整个三个半小时的问答环节中提供答案和见解。我去年想念他了，更重要的是，你们显然也想念他了。我们其他两位宝贵的副董事长阿吉特·贾因和 Greg Abel 将与我们在一起，回答与其领域相关的问题。

Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well.

通过雅虎加入我们。把你真正棘手的问题直接抛给查理！我们会很有趣，希望你们也如此。

Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can't wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.

当然，更美好的是我们与你们面对面相见的那一天。我希望并期待那是在 2022 年。奥马哈市民、我们的参展子公司以及我们总部的所有人都迫不及待地想让你们回来，参加一场真正的、伯克希尔风格的年度股东大会。

February 27, 2021

2021 年 2 月 27 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席