2014 年副董事长思考 —— 过去与未来

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future

副董事长思考 —— 过去与未来

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

我密切关注了伯克希尔在沃伦·巴菲特领导下取得非凡成功的50年历史。现在，我认为独立补充一些他可能会说的庆祝性评论是合适的。我将尝试做五件事。

(1) Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,

(1) 描述管理体系和政策，这些体系与政策使一家规模小、注定无法挽救的大宗商品纺织企业，蜕变为如今强大的伯克希尔；

(2) Explain how the management system and policies came into being,

(2) 解释管理体系和政策是如何形成的；

(3) Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,

(3) 在一定程度上解释伯克希尔为何如此成功；

(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and

(4) 预测如果巴菲特很快离开，异常出色的业绩是否会持续；

(5) Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

(5) 思考伯克希尔过去50年的卓越成就，是否可能在其他地方产生有用的启示。

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

巴菲特领导下伯克希尔的管理体系和政策（本文统称为“伯克希尔体系”）很早便固定下来，具体描述如下：

(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.

(1) 伯克希尔将成为一个分散化的综合企业，只厌恶那些它无法做出有用预测的活动。

(2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.

(2) 其母公司几乎全部业务将通过独立注册的子公司进行，子公司的CEO将享有极大的自主经营权。

(3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.

(3) 综合企业总部几乎空无一物，只有一间小型办公室，内设一位董事长、一位首席财务官，以及几位主要协助首席财务官进行审计、内部控制等工作的助理。

(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.

(4) 伯克希尔的子公司中，财产险公司始终占据重要地位。这些保险公司作为一个整体，预计将在适当的时候产生可靠的承保利润，同时产生大量可用于投资的“浮存金”（来自未付保险负债）。

(5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.

(5) 不会有任何重要的全公司范围的人事制度、股票期权制度、其他激励制度、退休制度等，因为子公司会有自己的制度，且往往各不相同。

(6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.

(6) 伯克希尔董事长只为亲自保留少数几项活动。

(i) He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.

(i) 他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，这些投资通常存放于伯克希尔的财产险子公司。

(ii) He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.

(ii) 他将选择所有重要子公司的CEO，确定他们的薪酬，并从每位CEO那里获取一份私密的继任者推荐，以备不时之需。

(iii) He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.

(iii) 在子公司增强其竞争优势之后，他将部署子公司不需要的大部分现金，理想的部署是利用这些现金收购新的子公司。

(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.

(iv) 他将随时准备回应任何子公司CEO希望的任何接触，并且几乎不要求额外的联系。

(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.

(v) 他将撰写一封冗长、逻辑清晰且有用的信函，纳入年度报告，其内容就如同他只是一名被动股东时所期望看到的那样；他还将在年度股东大会上花数小时回答提问。

(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.

(vi) 他将努力成为一种文化的典范，这种文化能在其离开之前和之后的很长时间内，为客户、股东和其他在职者良好地运作。

(vii) His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and

(vii) 他的首要任务是留出大量时间进行安静的阅读和思考，尤其是那些可能促进他坚定学习的内容，无论他年纪多大；

(viii) He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.

(viii) 他还会花大量时间热忱地欣赏他人所取得的成就。

(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.

(7) 新子公司通常用现金收购，而非新发行的股票。

(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.

(8) 只要每留存一美元能为股东创造超过一美元的市场价值，伯克希尔就不支付股息。

(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.

(9) 在收购新的子公司时，伯克希尔会寻求为一个董事长能够很好理解的好企业支付公平的价格。伯克希尔还希望已经有一位优秀的CEO在位，此人预计会长期留任，并在无需总部帮助的情况下管理良好。

(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.

(10) 在选择子公司CEO时，伯克希尔会努力确保其值得信赖、技能娴熟、精力充沛，并热爱其所处的业务和环境。

(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.

(11) 作为重要的行为偏好，伯克希尔几乎从不出售子公司。

(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.

(12) 伯克希尔几乎从不将一家子公司的CEO调往另一家不相关的子公司。

(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.

(13) 伯克希尔绝不会仅仅因为年龄而强迫子公司的CEO退休。

(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.

(14) 伯克希尔将保持较低的未偿债务，努力维持 (i) 在任何情况下都近乎完美的信誉，以及 (ii) 在出现异常机遇时能够轻松获得现金和信贷用于部署。

(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

(15) 伯克希尔对大型企业的潜在卖家始终保持友好。此类企业的出售提议将得到迅速关注。如果提议没有促成交易，除了董事长和伯克希尔的一两位其他人之外，没有人会知道该提议。并且他们永远不会告诉局外人。

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.

伯克希尔体系的各个要素及其整体规模都相当不寻常。据我所知，没有其他大型公司能具备其中一半的要素。

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?

伯克希尔为何会形成如此与众不同的企业个性？

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.

嗯，巴菲特即使只有34岁时，也控制了伯克希尔约45%的股份，并受到所有其他大股东的完全信任。他可以随心所欲地建立任何体系。他这么做了，创造了伯克希尔体系。

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.

几乎每个要素之所以被选中，是因为巴菲特相信，在他领导下，这些要素将有助于最大化伯克希尔的成就。他并没有试图为其他公司创造一个“一刀切”的体系。事实上，伯克希尔的子公司并未被要求在其自身运营中使用伯克希尔体系。有些子公司在使用不同体系的情况下也蓬勃发展。

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

巴菲特在设计伯克希尔体系时，目标是什么？

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

嗯，多年来我分析出了几个重要主题：

(1) He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.

(1) 他特别希望体系中最重要的成员——从他自己开始——其理性、技能和奉献精神能够持续最大化。

(2) He wanted win/win results everywhere--in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.

(2) 他希望处处实现双赢的结果——例如，通过给予忠诚来获得忠诚。

(3) He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.

(3) 他希望决策能够最大化长期结果，并且这些决策来自通常在位时间足够长、能够承担决策后果的决策者。

(4) He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.

(4) 他希望最小化总部大型官僚机构几乎不可避免地带来的负面影响。

(5) He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

(5) 他希望像本·格雷厄姆教授一样，亲自为所获智慧的传播做出贡献。

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

巴菲特在发展伯克希尔体系时，是否预见了随之而来的所有好处？没有。巴菲特是通过实践演进偶然发现了一些好处。但是，当他看到有益的后果时，他会强化其原因。

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?

为什么巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔如此成功？

Only four large factors occur to me:

我想到只有四大因素：

(1) The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,

(1) 巴菲特建设性的独特之处；

(2) The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,

(2) 伯克希尔体系建设性的独特之处；

(3) Good luck, and

(3) 好运；

(4) The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.

(4) 一些股东和其他崇拜者（包括一些媒体人士）那种异常强烈、具有感染力的狂热。

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

我相信这四个因素都存在且都有帮助。但重担是由建设性的独特之处、那种狂热的忠诚以及它们的相互作用来承担的。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

尤其是，巴菲特决定将自己的活动限制在少数几种类型上，并最大化对这些活动的关注，并且持续这样做了50年，这简直是一个“大爆炸”。巴菲特成功的道理，与罗杰·费德勒擅长网球的道理相同。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

实际上，巴菲特使用的是著名篮球教练约翰·伍登的致胜方法。伍登在学会将几乎全部上场时间分配给七名最好的球员之后，便经常获胜。这样一来，对手面对的始终是他的最佳球员，而不是次佳的球员。而且，由于额外的上场时间，最佳球员的进步也超过了正常水平。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而巴菲特比伍登还要“伍登”得多，因为在他的案例中，技能的运用集中在一个人身上，而不是七个人，并且在50年的时间里，他的技能随着年龄增长而不断提高，不像篮球运动员那样技能会衰退。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

此外，通过将如此多的权力和权威集中在重要子公司那些通常任期很长的CEO身上，巴菲特也在那里创造了强烈的伍登式效应。这种效应提升了CEO们的技能和子公司的成就。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

随后，随着伯克希尔体系将许多子公司及其CEO们梦寐以求的自主权给予他们，并且伯克希尔变得成功和闻名，这些结果吸引了更多、更好的子公司加入伯克希尔，也吸引了更好的CEO。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

然后，更好的子公司和CEO们需要的总部关注更少，这就创造了常说的“良性循环”。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

伯克希尔始终将财产险公司作为重要子公司，效果如何？

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

出奇地好。伯克希尔的雄心壮志是不合理地极端，即便如此，它还是得到了它想要的。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

财产险公司通常投资于价值大致相当于其股东权益的普通股，伯克希尔的保险子公司也是如此。过去50年，标普500指数产生了每年约10%的税前收益率，创造了显著的顺风。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

在巴菲特时代的最初几十年里，伯克希尔保险子公司持有的普通股远远跑赢指数，完全符合巴菲特的预期。后来，当伯克希尔的持股规模过大以及所得税的考虑，使得跑赢指数的部分回报变得微不足道（或许不是永远）时，其他更好的优势出现了。阿吉特·贾因白手起家，创建了庞大的再保险业务，既产生了巨额的“浮存金”，也带来了巨大的承保利润。随后，GEICO完全并入伯克希尔，市场份额翻了两番。伯克希尔其余保险业务的业绩也大幅提升，主要凭借声誉优势、承保纪律、寻找并坚守良好的利基市场，以及招聘和留住杰出人才。

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

再后来，随着伯克希尔几乎独一无二且相当可靠的企业个性及其庞大规模广为人知，其保险子公司获得并抓住了许多他人无法获得的、购买私募发行证券的诱人机会。这些证券中的大多数都有固定期限，并产生了出色的回报。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔在保险业的非凡成果并非自然结果。通常情况下，财产险业务即使管理得很好，也只能产生平庸的结果。而这种结果没什么用。伯克希尔的优异成果大得惊人，以至于我相信，如果巴菲特回到一个小起点，同时保留他的智慧和重获青春，他现在也无法重现这一成果。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希尔作为一个分散化的综合企业，是否因此受损？没有，其运营领域拓宽后，机会也得到了有益的扩大。而其他地方常见的负面影响，则被巴菲特的技能所阻止。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

为什么伯克希尔更倾向于用现金而不是自己的股票购买公司？嗯，因为很难用伯克希尔的股票换来与被放弃之物同等价值的东西。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

为什么伯克希尔对保险业以外公司的收购，对其股东效果如此之好，而通常情况下此类收购对收购方的股东是不利的？

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

嗯，伯克希尔在设计上就拥有方法论上的优势来补充其更好的机会。它从来没有什么承受压力必须购买的“收购部门”。它也从不依赖那些注定会偏向交易的“帮手”的建议。巴菲特抑制了自我欺骗，他从不夸耀自己的专长，但凭借长期作为被动投资者的经验，他比大多数公司高管更清楚商业中什么行得通、什么行不通。最后，即使伯克希尔得到的机会远比大多数公司好，巴菲特也常常表现出近乎非人的耐心，很少出手。例如，在他控制伯克希尔的头十年里，巴菲特目睹了一项业务（纺织）走向死亡，两项新业务加入，净增一项。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

巴菲特领导下伯克希尔犯过的大错是什么？嗯，虽然“作为之错”很常见，但几乎所有巨大的错误都是“不作为之错”，包括没有购买沃尔玛的股票，而当时买入本注定会取得巨大成功。不作为的错误非常重要。如果伯克希尔抓住几个它当时不够聪明、没能识别为近乎确定的机会，其净资产现在至少会多出500亿美元。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.

我清单上的倒数第二个任务是：预测如果巴菲特很快离开，异常出色的业绩是否会在伯克希尔持续。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

答案是肯定的。伯克希尔在其子公司中已经具备了强大的业务动力，这种动力建立在持久的竞争优势之上。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

此外，其铁路和公用事业子公司现在提供了大量投资于新固定资产的理想机会。许多子公司现在正忙于进行明智的“补强型”收购。

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.

只要伯克希尔体系的大部分保持不变，目前存在的综合动力和机会是如此之大，以至于即使 (1) 巴菲特明天离开，(2) 他的继任者能力一般，(3) 伯克希尔再也不收购大型企业，伯克希尔也几乎肯定会在一段很长的时间内仍然是一家优于普通水平的公司。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.

但是，在这种巴菲特很快离开的假设下，他的继任者不会是“能力一般”的人。例如，阿吉特·贾因和格雷格·阿贝尔是久经考验的业绩创造者，用“世界级”来形容他们可能都嫌不够。我会选择“世界领先”这个词。在某些重要方面，他们每个人都是比巴菲特更出色的企业管理者。

And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.

而且我相信，无论是贾因还是阿贝尔，都不会 (1) 离开伯克希尔，无论别人提供什么条件；也不会 (2) 希望大幅改变伯克希尔体系。

Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.

我也不认为对新企业的理想收购会随着巴菲特的离开而结束。鉴于伯克希尔如今如此庞大，且我们正处于激进主义的时代，我认为一些理想的收购机会将会出现，伯克希尔的600亿美元现金也将建设性地减少。

My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

我的最后一个任务是思考伯克希尔过去50年的卓越成就，是否可能在其他地方产生有用的启示。

The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.

答案显然是肯定的。在巴菲特入主后的早期，伯克希尔面临着一项艰巨任务：将一小笔积蓄变成一家庞大而有用的公司。它通过避免官僚主义，并且在很长很长的时间里高度依赖一位深思熟虑的领导者（此人不断进步，并引进了更多像他一样的人）解决了这个问题。

Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.

相比之下，典型的大公司体系则是：总部官僚主义盛行，CEO们一长串，大约59岁上任，此后几乎没时间安静思考，很快又被固定的退休年龄逼走。

I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.

我相信，伯克希尔体系的变体应该更频繁地在其他地方尝试，而官僚主义最恶劣的属性，应该更频繁地像对待它们所酷似的癌症一样加以处理。乔治·马歇尔树立了一个解决官僚主义的好榜样：他从国会获得在挑选将军时忽略资历的权利，从而帮助赢得了第二次世界大战。

Sincerely,

真诚的，

Charles T. Munger

查理·T·芒格