1962年致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

January 24, 1962

巴菲特合伙有限公司
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基维特广场810号
1962年1月24日

Our Performance in 1961

1961年业绩表现

I have consistently told partners that it is my expectation and hope (it's always hard to tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general market.

我一直告诉合伙人，我期望并希望（两者往往难以区分）在下跌或持平的市场中，我们的表现会相对优于大盘，但在上涨的市场中，我们可能不会那么出色。在强劲上涨的市场中，我预计很难跟上大盘的步伐。

Although 1961 was certainly a good year for the general market, and in addition, a very good year for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.

尽管1961年大盘表现确实不错，而且无论是绝对还是相对来看，对我们都是非常出色的一年，但上一段中的预期保持不变。

During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to the general partner, averaged 45.9%. The details of this gain by partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the partnerships started during the year.

1961年，以道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）衡量的大盘，包括持有道指成分股所获得的股息，整体上涨22.2%。所有全年运营的合伙基金，在扣除全部运营费用、但尚未向有限合伙人支付或给普通合伙人计提之前，平均收益率为45.9%。各合伙基金的收益详情以及年内新设立的合伙基金业绩，见附录。

We have now completed five full years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described in the preceding paragraph; after expenses, but before division of gains among partners or payments to partners.

我们现已完成五个完整年度的合伙运营，以下以逐年和累计（或复利）的方式展示这五年的业绩。这些业绩基于上一段描述的基础：扣除费用后，但在合伙人之间分配收益或向合伙人支付之前。

Year Partnerships Operating Entire Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Industrials
Year Gain*
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%
1961 7 45.9% 22.2%

年份 全年运营的合伙基金数量 合伙基金收益率 道琼斯工业指数收益率*
1957 3 10.4% -8.4%
1958 5 40.9% 38.5%
1959 6 25.9% 19.9%
1960 7 22.8% -6.3%
1961 7 45.9% 22.2%

• Including dividends received through ownership of the Dow.

• 包括持有道指成分股所获得的股息。

On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:

以复利计算，累计业绩如下：

Year Partnership Gain Dow-Jones Industrials Gain
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1957-58 55.6% 26.9%
1057-59 95.9% 52.2%
1957-60 140.6% 42.6%
1957-61 251.0% 74.3%

年份 合伙基金收益率 道琼斯工业指数收益率
1957 10.4% -8.4%
1957-58 55.6% 26.9%
1957-59 95.9% 52.2%
1957-60 140.6% 42.6%
1957-61 251.0% 74.3%

These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the over-all net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of over-all performance.

上述结果并未衡量有限合伙人的收益，而那当然才是您最关心的数字。由于过去存在多种合伙协议，我采用合伙基金的整体净收益（基于年初与年末的市场价值）作为衡量整体业绩的最公平标准。

On a pro-forma basis adjusted to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership, Ltd. agreement, the results would have been:

若按照我们现行巴菲特合伙有限公司协议中的收益分配方式，进行模拟调整，结果将如下：

Year Limited Partners’ Gain Dow Gain
1957 9.3% -8.4%
1958 32.2% 38.5%
1959 20.9% 19.9%
1960 18.6% -6.3%
1961 35.9% 22.2%

年份 有限合伙人收益 道指收益
1957 9.3% -8.4%
1958 32.2% 38.5%
1959 20.9% 19.9%
1960 18.6% -6.3%
1961 35.9% 22.2%

COMPOUNDED

复利计算

1957 9.3% -8.4%
1957-58 44.5% 26.9%
1957-59 74.7% 52.2%
1957-60 107.2% 42.6%
1957-61 181.6% 74.3%

1957 9.3% -8.4%
1957-58 44.5% 26.9%
1957-59 74.7% 52.2%
1957-60 107.2% 42.6%
1957-61 181.6% 74.3%

A Word About Par

关于基准

The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.

在挑选合伙人以及后续交往中，最重要的一点是确保我们使用相同的衡量标准。如果我的业绩不佳，我预计合伙人会撤资，而事实上，我也应该为自己的资金寻找新的投资渠道。如果业绩良好，我肯定会做得很好，这种状况我相信自己能够适应。

The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.

那么，难点在于确保我们对什么是好、什么是坏持有相同的看法。我相信应在行动之前确立衡量标准；事后回顾，几乎任何东西都可以相对于某些参照物显得不错。

I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.

我一直采用道琼斯工业平均指数作为我们的基准。我认为三年是对业绩的极低限度测试，而最好的测试周期至少应达到这样长，并且在此期间道指的终点水平应与起点水平大致相当。

While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.

虽然道指作为业绩衡量标准并不完美（其他标准亦然），但其优势在于广为人知、具有长期连续性，并且能较为准确地反映投资者在市场上的普遍经历。我不反对使用其他衡量大盘表现的方法，例如其他股市平均指数、领先的多元化共同股票基金、银行普通信托基金等。

You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.

您可能会觉得我设定的基准过于宽松，因为跑赢一个由30只龙头股组成的无人管理指数似乎相当容易。实际上，这个指数通常被证明是一个相当难缠的对手。亚瑟·维森伯格的经典著作《投资公司》列举了1946-1960年15年间所有领先共同基金的业绩。目前共同基金的资产超过200亿美元，因此这些基金的经验整体上代表了数百万投资者的经历。我个人认为，虽然无法获得具体数字，但大多数领先的投资顾问机构和银行信托部门的投资组合，其业绩与这些共同基金相似。

Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.

维森伯格在其“图表与统计”中列出了70家自1946年以来有连续记录的基金。我出于各种原因排除了其中32家，因为它们属于平衡型基金（因此未能充分参与大盘上涨）、特定行业基金等。在被排除的32家基金（因为我认为比较不公）中，有31家表现逊于道指，所以排除它们绝不是为了偏袒下文的结论。

Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.

在剩余的38家我认为运营方式适合与道指比较的共同基金中，32家表现不及道指，6家表现更好。截至1960年底，这6家表现较好的基金资产约10亿美元，而32家表现较差的基金资产约65亿美元。这6家中没有一家跑赢道指超过每年几个百分点。

Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don't have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:

下面我列出在我们运营期间（不包括1961年，因其确切数据我尚未获得，但粗略数据表明与1957-60年的情况无差），两家最大的普通股开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的逐年业绩：

Year Mass. Inv. Investors Lehman Tri-Cont. Dow Limited
Trust Stock Partners
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1958 44.1% 47.6% 40.8% 33.2% 38.5% 32.2%
1959 8.2% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4% 19.9% 20.9%
1960 -0.9% -0.1% 2.6% 2.8% -6.3% 18.6%

年份 马萨诸塞投资信托 投资者股票基金 雷曼公司 Tri-Cont.公司 道指 有限合伙人
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1958 44.1% 47.6% 40.8% 33.2% 38.5% 32.2%
1959 8.2% 10.3% 8.1% 8.4% 19.9% 20.9%
1960 -0.9% -0.1% 2.6% 2.8% -6.3% 18.6%

(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)

（摘自穆迪银行与金融手册，1961年）

COMPOUNDED

复利计算

Year Mass. Inv. Investors Lehman Tri-Cont. Dow Limited
Trust Stock Partners
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1957-58 26.8% 29.3% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
1957-59 37.2% 42.6% 34.8% 40.9% 52.2% 74.7%
1957-60 36.0% 42.5% 38.3% 44.8% 42.6% 107.2%

年份 马萨诸塞投资信托 投资者股票基金 雷曼公司 Tri-Cont.公司 道指 有限合伙人
1957 -12.0% -12.4% -11.4% -2.4% -8.4% 9.3%
1957-58 26.8% 29.3% 24.7% 30.0% 26.9% 44.5%
1957-59 37.2% 42.6% 34.8% 40.9% 52.2% 74.7%
1957-60 36.0% 42.5% 38.3% 44.8% 42.6% 107.2%

Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.

马萨诸塞投资信托净资产约18亿美元；投资者股票基金约10亿美元；Tri-Continental公司约5亿美元；雷曼公司约3.5亿美元；合计超过35亿美元。

I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.

我列出上述表格和信息，并非为了批判投资公司。我本人在管理如此巨额资金时，若在投资对象公司中行动受限，业绩也不会更好，甚至可能更差。我提供这些数据是想表明，道指作为投资对手绝非等闲之辈，国内绝大部分投资基金将难以超越、甚至可能难以追平其表现。

Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.

我们的投资组合与道指大相径庭。我们的操作方式也与共同基金有本质区别。

However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.

然而，大多数合伙人若不投资于本合伙基金，其资金或许会投向产生与道指相当收益的媒介，因此，我认为以道指作为业绩考核标准是公平的。

Our Method of Operation

我们的操作方法

Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.

我们的投资途径分为三大类。这些类别具有不同的行为特征，资金在它们之间的分配方式将对我们在任何年度的相对道指表现产生重要影响。各类别的实际百分比分配在一定程度上是有计划的，但在很大程度是偶然的，取决于可获性因素。

The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called "generals") where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.

第一类是通常被低估的证券（以下简称“普通股投资”），我们对公司政策无发言权，也无纠正低估的时间表。多年来，这一直是我们最大的投资类别，从中赚取的利润也多于其他两类。我们通常在五到六只普通股上持有较大仓位（占总资产的5%至10%），并在另外十到十五只上持有较小仓位。

Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.

有时这类投资很快见效；许多时候则需数年。购买时，很难知晓其价格为何应当上涨的特定原因。然而，正因缺乏魅力或任何可能立即引发市场追捧的催化剂，它们的售价极其低廉。支付的价格能换来大量价值。这种显著的价值剩余为每笔交易创造了舒适的安全边际。这种个人的安全边际，加上多样化的投资组合，构成了极具吸引力的安全与升值潜力组合。多年来，我们买入的时机远好于卖出的时机。我们买入这类股票，并非为了赚尽最后一个铜板，通常乐于在买入价与我们认定的私人所有者合理价值之间的某个中间水平卖出。

The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.

这类普通股在市场表现上往往与道指高度同步。仅仅因为某物便宜，并不意味着它不会下跌。在市场急跌时，这类投资很可能百分比的跌幅与道指相当。纵观若干年，我相信普通股将跑赢道指，而在像1961年这样大幅上涨的年份，正是我们投资组合中表现最佳的部分。当然，在下跌市场中它也是最脆弱的部分。

Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.

第二类是“套利类”。这类证券的财务结果取决于公司行动，而非证券买卖双方的供需因素。换言之，它们是有时间表的证券，我们能在合理误差范围内预测何时会获得多少收益，以及什么会打乱计划。兼并、清算、重组、分拆等公司事件催生套利。近年来一个重要来源是石油生产商向大型一体化石油公司的出售。

This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.

这一类别的收益在不同年度相对稳定，在很大程度上与道指走势无关。显然，如果我们在一年中大部分投资组合都是套利类，当道指下跌时我们会表现极佳，而当道指强劲上涨时则会相当糟糕。多年来，套利类一直是我们的第二大类别。在任何时候，我们可能持有十到十五个此类投资；有些刚刚开始，有些则处于后期阶段。我相信使用借入资金来抵消部分套利组合，因为这类投资在最终结果和中期市场行为方面都具有高度安全性。除去借贷带来的收益，此类投资通常的年化回报在10%至20%之间。我自定的借款上限为合伙人净值的25%。我们经常无借款，即便有，也仅作为套利类的对冲。

The final category is "control" situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.

最后一类是“控股”情形，我们或者控制该公司，或者持有大量股份并试图影响公司政策。这类操作无疑应基于数年时间衡量。在某个年份，它们可能毫无产出，因为通常在我们收购期间让股价长期低迷反而对我们有利。这类情形也与道指走势关联甚小。当然，有时我们买入普通股时脑中便怀有它可能演变为控股情形的想法。若股价长期足够低，这完全可能发生。若在我们取得可观持股比例之前股价就已上涨，我们会在更高位卖出，完成一次成功的普通股操作。目前我们正在收购一些股票，它们可能在未来数年演变为控股情形。

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

邓普斯特风车制造公司

We are presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went on the Board about four years ago. In August 1961, we obtained majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not exactly of the "overnight" variety.

我们目前正在控股内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯的邓普斯特风车制造公司。我们的第一批股票是五年前作为普通股投资购入的。后来有一大笔股票可买，大约四年前我进入董事会。1961年8月，我们取得了多数控制权，这表明我们的许多操作绝非“一夜之间”的类型。

Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for a controlling block. Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the quoted price.

目前我们持有邓普斯特70%的股份，另外10%由少数关联方持有。由于仅剩约150名其他股东，该股票的市场几乎不存在，无论如何对控股股权而言也无意义。我们自身在这种市场中的行动可能剧烈影响报价。

Therefore, it is necessary for me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest. This is of particular importance since, in effect, new partners are buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a portion of their interest based upon the same price. The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etc., but what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.

因此，我有必要在年底估算我们控股权益的价值。这一点尤为重要，因为实际上新合伙人正是基于此价格购入，而老合伙人也基于相同价格卖出部分权益。估算价值不应是我们期望的价值，或者对于急切买家的价值等等，而应是我估计在现行条件下、合理短时间内卖出时所能获得的价值。我们将致力于提升这一价值，并认为有不错的前景可以实现。

Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of about $9 million. Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation to invested capital during recent years. This reflected a poor management situation, along with a fairly tough industry situation. Presently, consolidated net worth (book value) is about $4.5 million, or $75 per share, consolidated working capital about $50 per share, and at yearend we valued our interest at $35 per share. While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners. Certainly, if even moderate earning power can be restored, a higher valuation will be justified, and even if it cannot, Dempster should work out at a higher figure. Our controlling interest was acquired at an average price of about $28, and this holding currently represents 21% of partnership net assets based on the $35 value.

邓普斯特是农具和水系统制造商，1961年销售额约900万美元。近年来，相对于投入资本，运营仅产生了微薄利润。这反映出管理不善以及行业状况相当艰难。目前，合并净资产（账面价值）约450万美元，合每股75美元，合并营运资本约每股50美元，而年底我们给所持权益的估值为每股35美元。虽然我在此类问题上并无神谕般的远见，但我认为这对新老合伙人都是公允估值。当然，若哪怕仅恢复中等盈利能力，更高的估值也将合理；即便不能，邓普斯特也应能以更高数值变现。我们控股权益的平均收购价约为28美元，基于35美元估值，此持仓目前占合伙人净资产的21%。

Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull market, operations in control situations will seem like a very difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from these dangers.

当然，我们投资组合中的这一部分不会仅仅因为通用汽车、美国钢铁等股价上涨而变得更值钱。在汹涌的牛市当中，控股操作似乎会是一种非常艰难的赚钱方式，相比之下只需买入大盘即可。然而，我对当前市场水平所呈现的危险比机遇更为警觉。控股情形，连同套利类投资，为我们的部分投资组合提供了免受这些危险的手段。

The Question of Conservatism

保守主义的问题

The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.

上述对我们不同操作领域的描述或可提供一些线索，以了解我们的投资组合是何等保守。多年前，许多人认为购买中期或长期市政或政府债券是最保守的行为。这种策略在许多情况下导致了显著的市场贬值，并且无疑未能保持或提升实际购买力。

Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.

意识到、或许过度意识到通胀，许多人现在觉得，几乎不管市盈率、股息率等，买入蓝筹证券便是保守行事。即便没有债券案例的事后之明，我也感到这种行动路线充满危险。在我看来，投机于贪婪善变的大众会给利润附上多高的乘数，这一点也不保守。

You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.

你并非仅仅因为许多人暂时同意你就正确。你也并非仅仅因为重要人物同意你就正确。在许多圈子里，上述两个因素同时出现便足以让一项行动路线通过保守性的检验。

You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.

经许多交易之后，如果你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确，你就会正确。真正的保守只有通过知识和理性才能实现。

I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.

我还可以补充，我们的投资组合非传统，绝不证明我们比标准投资方法更保守或不保守。这只能通过审视方法或审视结果来确定。

I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 0.5% of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.

我认为，衡量我们投资方法究竟有多保守的最客观检验，来自于下跌市场中的表现评估。最好能包含道指的大幅下跌。我们在1957年和1960年那种相对温和的下跌中的表现，将证实我的假设：我们以极度保守的方式进行投资。我欢迎任何合伙人提出关于保守性的客观测试，看看我们表现如何。我们从未遭受过超过总净资产0.5%的已实现损失，而已实现总收益与已实现总损失的比率约为100比1。当然，这反映了我们总体上一直处于上升市场。然而，即便在这样的市场中也有许多亏损交易的机会（你们自己或许也经历过一些），因此我认为上述事实具有一定的意义。

The Question of Size

规模的问题

Aside from the question as to what happens upon my death (which with a metaphysical twist, is a subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most often: "What affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going to have upon performance?”

除了我死后会发生什么这个问题（带有形而上学色彩，我对此极感兴趣），或许我最常被问到：“合伙基金规模的快速增长将对业绩产生何种影响？”

Larger funds tug in two directions. From the standpoint of "passive" investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust department investing in securities with very broad markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General Motors is only slightly more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying 1,000 or 100 shares.

更大的资金向两个方向拉扯。从“被动”投资的角度看，即我们不试图以投资规模影响公司政策时，较大的资金会损害业绩。对于投资于市场极广的证券的共同基金或信托部门，大额资金对业绩的惩罚应非常轻微。购买10,000股通用汽车的股票，仅比买1,000股或100股略微昂贵（基于数学期望）。

In some of the securities in which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible. Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This category includes most of our work-outs and some generals.

在我们交易的部分证券中（绝非全部），购买10,000股比买100股困难得多，有时甚至不可能。因此，对于我们的部分投资组合，较大资金绝对是不利因素。对于更大部分的投资组合，我认为资金增加只有轻微不利。这一类别包括我们大多数套利投资和部分普通股投资。

However, in the case of control situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A "Sanborn Map" cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase. This is due to the sharp fall-off in competition as the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists between increased size of company and lack of concentrated ownership of that company's stock.

然而，在控股情形中，资金增加是明确的优势。没有足够的资金，便无法完成“桑伯恩地图”那样的操作。我确信，随着资金增加，这一领域的机会也在增多。这是因为随着赌注加大，竞争急剧减少，加上公司规模增大与其股权缺乏集中之间存在重要的正相关关系。

Which is more important -- the decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the increasing prospects in control investments? I can't give a definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say, most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of 1956 and 1957.

哪个更重要——被动投资盈利前景的下降还是控股投资前景的增加？我无法给出确切答案，因为这很大程度上取决于我们所处市场的类型。我目前的观点是，没有理由认为它们不应是相互抵消的因素；若我的观点改变，你们会被告知。我可以非常肯定地说，如果我们在1960和1961年用1956、1957年那么小的资金操作，我们的业绩并不会更好。

And a Prediction

一项预测

Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

定期读者（我或许是在自夸）会感到当我开始谈论预测时，我已偏离轨道。这是我一直回避的事情，在通常意义上我依然如此。

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.

我当然不会预测未来一两年总体商业或股市的走势，因为我对此毫无概念。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

我想你们完全可以确信，未来十年中会有几年大盘上涨20%或25%，有几年下跌幅度相当，而多数年份介于两者之间。我对这些年份出现的顺序毫无概念，也不认为这对长期投资者有何重大意义。

Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

在任何较长的年份里，我认为道指很可能从股息和市值增长中产生每年约5%至7%的复利回报。尽管近年有所经历，但任何期待大盘回报远高于此的人或许会失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

我们的工作是在道指表现之上逐年积累优势，而无需过于担忧某年绝对结果是正还是负。我会认为我们下跌15%而道指下跌25%的年份，远优于合伙基金和道指都上涨20%的年份。我在与合伙人交谈时强调过这一点，并看到他们以不同程度的热情点头。对我而言最重要的是，你们充分理解我这方面的推理，并不仅在理智上，而且在心底深处同意我。

For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

基于我在操作方法中阐述的理由，我们相对道指表现最佳的年份很可能出现在下跌或持平的市场。因此，我们所追求的优势或许会以大幅波动的方式到来。必定有些年份我们会落后于道指，但如果长期来看我们平均每年能跑赢它10个百分点，我将对结果感到满意。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

具体而言，如果某年市场下跌35%或40%（我觉这在未来十年中某一年发生概率很高——无人知道是哪一年），我们应仅下跌15%或20%。如果一年中市场基本不变，我们希望上涨大约10个百分点。如果市场上涨20%或更多，我们将奋力跟上同样的涨幅。如此连年表现的后果将是，如果道指产生每年5%至7%的总体复利收益，我期望我们的结果或许能达到每年15%至17%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!

以上预期或许听来有些轻率，毫无疑问，从1965年或1970年的制高点回望时会更显如此。最终可能证明我完全错了。然而，我觉得合伙人当然有权知道我这方面的想法，即便业务性质导致此类预期极有可能出错。在任何一个年度，偏差都可能相当大。1961年便是如此，但幸运的是偏差出现在令人愉快的一边。并非年年如此！

Miscellaneous

其他事项

We are now installed in an office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no "vicuna coat" situation.
Overall, I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than 0.5 of 1% of net assets. We should get our money's worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is being spent.

我们现在在基维特广场810号设有办公室，有一位一流的秘书贝丝·亨利，以及一位在我这种证券类型上经验丰富的同事比尔·斯科特。我父亲与我们合租办公室（也分摊费用），从事证券经纪业务。我们没有通过他进行任何交易，因此不存在“羊驼毛外套”的情况。
总体而言，我预计我们的运营费用（不包括借款利息和内布拉斯加州无形资产税）将低于净资产的0.5%。我们应该让这笔钱花得值，并热忱欢迎你们随时来访，看看钱是如何花掉的。

With over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the details.

拥有90多位合伙人和约40只证券，你们可以理解，能从一些琐事中解脱出来对我而言是多么令人欣慰。

We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $ 7,178,500.00. Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00, and other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling $782,600.00. The minimum for new partners last year was $25,000, but I am giving some thought to increasing it this year.

目前我们有合伙人居住在从加利福尼亚到佛蒙特州等地，1962年初净资产为7,178,500.00美元。苏茜和我持有合伙权益1,025,000.00美元，我的其他亲属合计持有782,600.00美元。去年新合伙人的最低参与额为25,000美元，但我今年正考虑提高这一数额。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this performance can be continued.

毕马威会计师事务所出色地加快了审计工作，比往年更早地提供了税务数字。他们向我保证这一表现可以持续。

Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit, status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle you.

关于您对本信任何方面、您的审计、合伙权益状况等的疑问，请随时告知我。

Cordially Warren E. Buffett.

诚挚的 沃伦·巴菲特

APPENDIX

附录

Partnerships Operating Throughout 1961

1961年全年运营的合伙基金

Partnership 1/1/61 Capital at Overall Gain in 1961* Percentage Gain
Market
Buffett Associates 486,874.27 225,387.80 46.3%
Buffett Fund 351,839.29 159,696.93 45.4%
Dacee 235,480.31 116,504.47 49.5%
Emdee 140,005.24 67,387.28 48.1%
Glenoff 78,482.70 39,693.80 50.5%
Mo-Buff 325,844.71 149,163.71 45.8%
Underwood 582,256.82 251,951.26 43.3%
2,200,783.34 1,009,785.25 45.9%

合伙基金 1961年1月1日市场价值 1961年总收益* 收益百分比
巴菲特合伙公司 486,874.27 225,387.80 46.3%
巴菲特基金 351,839.29 159,696.93 45.4%
Dacee 235,480.31 116,504.47 49.5%
Emdee 140,005.24 67,387.28 48.1%
Glenoff 78,482.70 39,693.80 50.5%
Mo-Buff 325,844.71 149,163.71 45.8%
Underwood 582,256.82 251,951.26 43.3%
2,200,783.34 1,009,785.25 45.9%

Partnerships Started in 1961

1961年新设立的合伙基金

Partnership Paid-in Overall Gain in 1961 Percentage Gain
Ann Investments 100,100 (1-30-61) 35,367.93 35.3%
Buffett-TD 250,100 ($200,100 on 3-8- 70,294.08 28.1%
61, $50,000 on 5-31-61)
Buffett-Holland 125,100 (5-17-61) 16,703.76 13.3%

合伙基金 实缴资本 1961年总收益 收益百分比
安投资 100,100 (1-30-61) 35,367.93 35.3%
巴菲特-TD 250,100 (200,100于3-8-61, 70,294.08 28.1%
50,000于5-31-61)
巴菲特-荷兰 125,100 (5-17-61) 16,703.76 13.3%

• Gain in net assets at market values plus payments to limited partners during year.

• 按市场价值计算的净资产收益加上年内向有限合伙人支付的款项。