1990 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Last year we made a prediction: "A reduction [in Berkshire's net worth] is almost certain in at least one of the next three years." During much of 1990's second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or 7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06, or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.

去年我们曾预测：“至少在未来三年中的某一年，伯克希尔的净资产几乎肯定会下降。”在 1990 年下半年的大部分时间里，我们正在快速证明这一预测的准确性。但年底股价有所走强，使我们在 1990 年结束时净资产增加了 3.62 亿美元，增幅为 7.3%。在过去 26 年（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到 4,612.06 美元，年复合增长率为 23.2%。

Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market value. Last year I told you that though these companies - Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post - had fine businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The market prices of the two media companies have since fallen significantly - for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss later - and the price of Coca-Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our "permanent four," though far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier.

1990 年我们的增长率乏善可陈，因为我们的四大重仓股合计市值变化不大。去年我告诉过你们，尽管这些公司——大都会/ABC、可口可乐、GEICO 和华盛顿邮报——业务出色、管理卓越，但市场对这些特质的广泛认可已将它们的股价推至高位。此后两家媒体公司的股价大幅下跌——原因与行业演进相关，我将在后面讨论——而可口可乐的股价则大幅上涨，我认为也有充分理由。总体而言，我们的“四大永久持股”在 1990 年底的价格虽然远谈不上诱人，但已比一年前略有吸引力。

Berkshire's 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.

伯克希尔 26 年的记录在预测未来业绩方面毫无意义；我们希望一年的记录也同样如此。我们继续以内在价值平均每年增长 15% 为目标。但是，正如我们不厌其烦地告诉你们的，随着我们的净资产基础（目前为 53 亿美元）增加，这个目标变得越来越难以实现。

If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well. However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10% premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded. (The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.

如果我们确实实现了 15% 的平均增长，我们的股东应该会获得不错的回报。但是，伯克希尔公司的收益只有在其最终以买入时相对于内在价值相同的价格出售时，才会为特定股东带来相同的收益。例如，如果你以比内在价值高 10% 的价格买入；之后内在价值每年增长 15%；然后你以高 10% 的价格卖出，你自己的回报率也将相应地是 15% 的复利。（该计算假设不支付股息。）然而，如果你以溢价买入，而以较低的溢价卖出，你的结果将略低于公司实现的业绩。

Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell 23%.

理想情况下，每位伯克希尔股东在其持有期间的业绩应该与公司的业绩密切相关。这就是为什么伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格和我希望伯克希尔的股价始终围绕内在价值交易。我们更喜欢这种稳定，而不是过去两年那种忽略价值的波动：1989 年，内在价值的增长低于账面价值（增长 44%），而市场价格上涨了 85%；1990 年，账面价值和内在价值只有小幅增长，而市场价格下跌了 23%。

Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact, differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books.

伯克希尔的内在价值仍然大幅超过账面价值。我们无法告诉你确切的差额，因为内在价值必然是一种估计；事实上，查理和我的评估可能会有 10% 的差异。但我们知道，我们拥有一些出色的企业，其价值远高于它们在账面上的价值。

Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent deployment of these funds.

我们业务中大部分额外价值是由现任管理者创造的。查理和我可以随意吹捧这一群体，因为我们与他们所拥有的技能的发展无关：这些超级明星天生如此。我们的工作只是识别有才华的管理者，并提供一个让他们能够发挥才能的环境。他们完成任务后，将现金送到总部，我们面临唯一另一项任务：对这些资金进行明智的配置。

My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.

我自己在运营中的角色，最好用一个小故事来说明：关于我的孙女艾米丽和她去年秋天的四岁生日派对。参加派对的有其他孩子、崇拜的亲戚以及小丑比默，他是一位表演魔术的当地艺人。

Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a "magic wand" over "the box of wonders." Green handkerchiefs went into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones. Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily, emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face aglow, she exulted: "Gee, I'm really good at this."

魔术开始时，比默请艾米丽帮忙，让她在“奇迹盒”上挥动“魔法棒”。绿色手帕放进盒子，艾米丽挥动魔棒，比默取出了蓝色手帕。散开的手帕放进去，艾米丽庄严地挥动后，出来时已打成结。经过四次这样的转变，每一次都比上一次更神奇，艾米丽按捺不住了。她满脸放光，欣喜若狂：“哎呀，我真是太擅长这个了！”

And that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire's business magicians - the Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph Schey. They deserve your applause.

这正好总结了我对伯克希尔的商业魔术师们的贡献——布朗金家族、弗里德曼家族、迈克·戈德堡、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊。他们值得你们的掌声。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告盈利来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在此列示中，商誉摊销和其他重大购买价格会计调整不分配到具体业务，而是汇总单独列示。这种处理让你可以看到我们业务的盈利，如同我们没有收购它们时报告的那样。在过去的报告中，我解释过为什么我们认为这种列示形式比使用公认会计原则（GAAP，要求逐项业务进行购买价格调整）对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，表中显示的总净利润与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包括 Scott Fetzer 金融集团和 Mutual 储蓄贷款公司的利息费用。

Much additional information about these businesses is given on pages 39-46, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 56. His letter also contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking industry that I have seen.

关于这些业务的大量额外信息见第 39-46 页，你也可以在那里找到按 GAAP 报告的分部盈利。关于 Wesco 业务的信息，我敦促你阅读查理·芒格的信，从第 56 页开始。他的信中还包含了我所见过的关于银行业最清晰、最有洞察力的讨论。

We refer you also to pages 47-53, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non- operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non- operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase- price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们还请你参阅第 47-53 页，在那里我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个部分。这与查理和我的思维方式一致，应该比合并数据更有助于你估计伯克希尔的内在价值。这些页面显示了以下部分的资产负债表和利润表：（1）我们的保险业务，按明细列示主要投资头寸；（2）我们的制造、出版和零售业务，不包括某些非营业资产和购买价格会计调整；（3）从事金融业务的子公司，即 Mutual 储蓄和 Scott Fetzer 金融公司；（4）一个“其他”类别，包括第（2）部分公司持有的非营业资产（主要是有价证券）、所有购买价格会计调整，以及 Wesco 和伯克希尔母公司的各种资产和债务。

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.

如果你将这四个部分的收益和净资产相加，得出的总数将与我们 GAAP 报表中显示的总额一致。但我想强调，这种四类列示不在我们审计师的范围内，他们绝不对其认可。

"Look-Through" Earnings

“透视”盈利

The term "earnings" has a precise ring to it. And when an earnings figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate, a naive reader might think it comparable in certitude to pi, calculated to dozens of decimal places.

“盈利”这个词听起来很精确。当盈利数字附有无保留意见的审计师证书时，天真的读者可能会认为它的确定性堪比计算到小数点后几十位的圆周率。

In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually truth will surface, but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands. Indeed, some important American fortunes have been created by the monetization of accounting mirages.

然而在现实中，当一个骗子领导报告盈利的公司时，盈利可以像油灰一样可塑。真相最终会浮出水面，但在此期间大量金钱可能会易手。事实上，美国一些重要的财富就是通过将会计幻影货币化而创造的。

Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of chicanery, I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in 1936. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many times since found their way into the financial statements of major American corporations and been duly certified by big-name auditors. Clearly, investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true "economic earnings" accruing to them.

会计中的猫腻并不新鲜。对于诡计的行家，我在第 22 页的附录 A 中附上了本·格雷厄姆在 1936 年写的一篇以前未发表的关于会计实践的讽刺文章。唉，与他当时讽刺的类似过度行为此后多次进入美国大公司的财务报表，并得到知名审计师的认证。显然，投资者必须始终保持警惕，将会计数字作为计算应归属于他们的真实“经济盈利”的起点，而不是终点。

Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different, but important, way: We have huge investments in companies ("investees") whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we receive. The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Our 17% share of the company's earnings amounted to more than $83 million last year. Yet only about $530,000 ($600,000 of dividends it paid us less some $70,000 of tax) is counted in Berkshire's GAAP earnings. The residual $82 million-plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings, which work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books.

伯克希尔自身报告的盈利在另一种不同但重要的方式上具有误导性：我们在被投资公司中拥有巨额投资，这些公司的盈利远远超过其股息，而我们仅在报表中记录收到股息的份额。最极端的例子是大都会/ABC 公司。去年我们应占该公司 17% 的盈利超过 8300 万美元。但只有大约 53 万美元（它支付给我们的 60 万美元股息减去约 7 万美元税款）计入伯克希尔的 GAAP 盈利。剩余的 8200 多万美元留在大都会作为留存收益，这些收益为我们的利益服务，但未记录在我们的账面上。

Our perspective on such "forgotten-but-not-gone" earnings is simple: The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their ownership and subsequent utilization is all-important. We care not whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest; we do care who owns the tree and what's next done with it.

我们对这种“被遗忘但未消失”的盈利的视角很简单：它们的会计处理方式不重要，但它们的所有权和后续使用至关重要。我们不关心审计师是否听到森林里一棵树倒下；我们关心的是谁拥有这棵树，以及接下来如何处理它。

When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares, the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable franchise in the world. (Coke also, of course, uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing ways.) Instead of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to us in dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares. That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would report far greater "earnings."

当可口可乐使用留存收益回购其股票时，该公司增加了我们在其股份中的比例，而我将其视为世界上最有价值的特许经营权。（当然，可口可乐也以许多其他增值方式使用留存收益。）可口可乐不回购股票，而是可以将这些资金以股息形式支付给我们，然后我们可以用这些股息购买更多可口可乐股票。这将是一个效率较低的方案：由于我们要为股息收入缴税，我们无法像可口可乐代表我们那样提高我们的持股比例。然而，如果采取这种效率较低的程序，伯克希尔报告的“盈利”将大得多。

I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of "look-through" results, calculated as follows: Take $250 million, which is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our investees; subtract $30 million, for the incremental taxes we would have owed had that $250 million been paid to us in dividends; and add the remainder, $220 million, to our reported operating earnings of $371 million. Thus our 1990 "look-through earnings" were about $590 million.

我认为思考我们盈利的最佳方式是使用“透视”结果，计算如下：取 2.5 亿美元，这大致是我们应占的被投资公司 1990 年留存营业收益；减去 3000 万美元，这是如果这 2.5 亿美元以股息形式支付给我们我们本应缴纳的增量税款；然后将余额 2.2 亿美元加到我们报告的 3.71 亿美元营业收益上。因此我们 1990 年的“透视盈利”约为 5.9 亿美元。

As I mentioned last year, we hope to have look-through earnings grow about 15% annually. In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate but in 1991 we will fall far short of it. Our Gillette preferred has been called and we will convert it into common stock on April 1. This will reduce reported earnings by about $35 million annually and look-through earnings by a much smaller, but still significant, amount. Additionally, our media earnings - both direct and look-through - appear sure to decline. Whatever the results, we will post you annually on how we are doing on a look-through basis.

正如我去年提到的，我们希望透视盈利每年增长约 15%。1990 年我们大幅超过了这一比率，但 1991 年我们将远低于它。我们的吉列优先股已被赎回，我们将于 4 月 1 日将其转换为普通股。这将使报告盈利每年减少约 3500 万美元，透视盈利减少的数额小得多但仍然显著。此外，我们的媒体盈利——无论是直接还是透视——似乎肯定会下降。无论结果如何，我们将每年向你们通报我们在透视基础上的表现。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险业务

Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.

再看一下第 51 页的数字，它汇总了我们非保险业务的收益和资产负债表。1990 年的平均权益税后收益率为 51%，这一结果将使该集团在 1989 年《财富》500 强中排名第 20 位左右。

Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First, leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned, not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on assets - a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns - our group would rank in Fortune's top ten.

有两个因素使这一回报更加引人注目。第一，杠杆并未产生这一结果：我们几乎所有的主要设施都是自有而非租赁，这些业务所拥有的少量债务基本上被它们持有的现金所抵消。事实上，如果衡量的是资产收益率——一种消除债务对回报影响的计算——我们的集团将排在《财富》前十名。

Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing, candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating managers, not fortuitous industry economics.

同样重要的是，我们的回报并非来自像香烟或网络电视台那样对所有参与者都具有惊人经济效益的行业。相反，它来自一群在诸如家具零售、糖果、吸尘器甚至钢铁仓储等平淡无奇领域中运营的企业。解释很明确：我们非凡的回报来自于出色的运营管理者，而不是偶然的行业经济。

Let's look at the larger operations:

让我们看看较大规模的业务：

It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items - but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up 18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since Borsheim's operates but one establishment.

对零售业来说这是糟糕的一年——尤其是高价位商品——但似乎没人告诉 Borsheim 的艾克·弗里德曼。销售额增长了 18%。这既是同店也是全店的百分比，因为 Borsheim 只经营一家店。

But, oh, what an establishment! We can't be sure about the fact (because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the U.S., except for Tiffany's New York store.

但是，哦，这是怎样的一家店！我们无法确定（因为大多数高档珠宝零售商是私人所有），但我们相信这家珠宝店的销售额在美国仅次于蒂芙尼纽约店。

Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about 600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha's jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically. Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.

如果我们的顾客只来自奥马哈都市区（人口约 60 万），Borsheim 不可能做得那么好。长期以来，我们在大奥马哈地区的珠宝业务中占有巨大份额，因此该市场的增长必然有限。但来自中西部以外地区的顾客每年都在急剧增长。许多人亲自到店参观。然而，还有大量顾客通过邮寄方式购买，这种方式你会觉得很有趣。

These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and value - say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range - and we then send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

这些顾客要求某种类型和价值的珠宝选择——例如，1 万到 2 万美元范围内的祖母绿——然后我们寄给他们五到十件符合他们规格的商品供其挑选。去年我们邮寄了大约 1,500 个各种类型的选品组合，价值从 1,000 美元以下到数十万美元不等。

The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no one at Borsheim's has ever met. (They must always have been well recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades. Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our "honor-system" works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.

这些选品被寄往全国各地，有些寄给 Borsheim 从未见过的人。（不过，他们一定都有良好的推荐。）尽管 1990 年的邮寄数量创了纪录，但艾克几十年来一直在向各地广泛寄送商品。厌世者得知我们的“荣誉系统”运作得多么好时会感到沮丧：我们从未因顾客不诚实而遭受过损失。

We attract business nationwide because we have several advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18% are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include in "cost of goods sold.") Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs, sells at prices that high-cost competitors can't touch and thereby constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works with diapers works with diamonds.

我们吸引全国业务是因为我们拥有竞争对手无法匹敌的几个优势。方程式中最重要的项目是我们的运营成本，约占销售额的 18%，而典型竞争对手约为 40%。（这 18% 中包括场地和采购成本，一些上市公司将其计入“销售成本”。）正如沃尔玛以 15% 的运营成本，以高成本竞争对手无法企及的价格销售，从而不断增加市场份额，Borsheim 也是如此。在尿布上有效的，在钻石上也有效。

Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry phenomenon from an Omaha location.

我们的低价创造了巨大的销量，进而使我们能够维持极其广泛的商品库存，是典型高档珠宝店库存的十倍或更多。将我们选择的广度和低价与卓越的服务相结合，你就能理解艾克和他的家人如何从奥马哈打造出一个全国性的珠宝奇迹。

And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy - that's often - they are joined by Ike's wife, Roz, and his daughters, Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike's cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally, you'll find Ike's 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs rings around competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o'clock will arrive?

而且这是一个家族企业。艾克的团队总是包括儿子艾伦和女婿马文·科恩与唐纳德·耶鲁。在忙碌的时候——这经常发生——艾克的妻子罗兹、女儿贾尼斯和苏茜也会加入。此外，路易（内布拉斯加家具店董事长、艾克的表弟）的妻子弗兰·布朗金也经常帮忙。最后，你会发现艾克 89 岁的母亲丽贝卡大多数下午都在店里，手里拿着《华尔街日报》。有这样家族投入，竞争对手的管理者们想着下午五点快点到来，而 Borsheim 却把他们远远甩在后面，这有什么奇怪的吗？

While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though again the fact can't be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close to double the volume of any other home furnishings store in the country.

当弗兰·布朗金帮助弗里德曼家族在 Borsheim 创造纪录时，她的儿子伊夫和罗恩以及丈夫路易正在内布拉斯加家具店创造纪录。我们唯一店面的销售额为 1.59 亿美元，比 1989 年增长 4%。尽管同样无法最终证明，但我们相信 NFM 的销售额几乎是全国任何其他家居用品店的两倍。

The NFM formula for success parallels that of Borsheim's. First, operating costs are rock-bottom - 15% in 1990 against about 40% for Levitz, the country's largest furniture retailer, and 25% for Circuit City Stores, the leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances. Second, NFM's low costs allow the business to price well below all competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain prices allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise available anywhere.

NFM 的成功公式与 Borsheim 相似。第一，运营成本极低——1990 年为 15%，而全国最大的家具零售商 Levitz 约为 40%，领先的电子产品折扣零售商家电城为 25%。第二，NFM 的低成本使其能够以远低于所有竞争对手的价格销售。事实上，主要连锁店知道他们将面临什么，都避开奥马哈。第三，我们低价产生的巨大销量使我们能够提供任何地方最广泛的商品选择。

Some idea of NFM's merchandising power can be gleaned from a recent report of consumer behavior in Des Moines, which showed that NFM was Number 3 in popularity among 20 furniture retailers serving that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that 19 of those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is 130 miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that between Washington and Philadelphia in order to shop with us, even though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, NFM, like Borsheim's, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves - not by the traditional method of opening new stores but rather by creating an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the crowds.

从最近一份关于得梅因消费者行为的报告中可以看出 NFM 的销售能力。报告显示，在该市 20 家家具零售商中，NFM 的受欢迎程度排名第三。这听起来可能没什么大不了，但你要考虑到其中 19 家零售商位于得梅因，而我们的店在 130 英里之外。这意味着即使隔壁就有众多选择，顾客也要驱车相当于华盛顿到费城的距离来找我们购物。实际上，NFM 和 Borsheim 一样，极大地扩展了其服务范围——不是通过开新店的传统方式，而是通过创造一个利用价格和选择的不可抗拒的磁铁来吸引人群。

Last year at the Mart there occurred an historic event: I experienced a counterrevelation. Regular readers of this report know that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better: In Berkshire's first synergistic explosion, NFM put a See's candy cart in the store late last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the full-fledged stores See's operates in California. This success contradicts all tenets of retailing. With the Blumkins, though, the impossible is routine.

去年在 Mart 发生了一个历史性事件：我经历了一次“反启示”。本报告的长期读者知道，我一直蔑视企业高管关于协同效应的自夸，嘲笑这种说法是为愚蠢收购辩护的无赖的最后避难所。但现在我明白了：在伯克希尔的第一次协同效应爆发中，NFM 去年底在店里放了一辆喜诗糖果车，卖出的糖果比喜诗在加利福尼亚经营的一些正规店还要多。这一成功违背了零售业的所有原则。但对布朗金家族来说，不可能的事是家常便饭。

At See's, physical volume set a record in 1990 - but only barely and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell. Our poundage volume at Christmas dropped slightly, though our dollar sales were up because of a 5% price increase.

在喜诗糖果，1990 年的实物销量创下了纪录——但只是勉强，而且仅仅是因为年初销售良好。科威特被入侵后，西部购物中心的客流量下降。圣诞节期间我们的磅数销量略有下降，但由于提价 5%，美元销售额有所上升。

That increase, and better control of expenses, improved profit margins. Against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the nineteen years we have owned See's. Chuck's imprint on the business - a virtual fanaticism about quality and service - is visible at all of our 225 stores.

这次提价以及对费用的更好控制，提高了利润率。在疲软的零售环境下，查克·哈金斯取得了出色的业绩，就像我们拥有喜诗的十九年中每一年一样。查克在业务上留下的印记——对质量和服务的近乎狂热——在我们所有的 225 家商店中都可见到。

One happening in 1990 illustrates the close bond between See's and its customers. After 15 years of operation, our store in Albuquerque was endangered: The landlord would not renew our lease, wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall and even so to pay a much higher rent. These changes would have wiped out the store's profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set a date for closing the store.

1990 年发生的一件事说明了喜诗与其顾客之间的紧密联系。经营 15 年后，我们在阿尔伯克基的店面面临危险：房东不愿续租，而是要求我们搬到商场内一个较差的位置，即使如此还要支付高得多的租金。这些变动将使该店利润化为乌有。经过长时间的谈判毫无进展后，我们设定了关闭该店的日期。

On her own, the store's manager, Ann Filkins, then took action, urging customers to protest the closing. Some 263 responded by sending letters and making phone calls to See's headquarters in San Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott the mall. An alert reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied with this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a satisfactory deal. (He, too, proved susceptible to a counterrevelation.)

店长安·菲尔金斯主动采取行动，敦促顾客抗议关闭店铺。大约 263 人响应，向喜诗在旧金山的总部寄信并打电话，有人甚至威胁要抵制该商场。阿尔伯克基报纸的一位警觉的记者报道了这个故事。有了消费者抗议的证据，我们的房东提出了一个令人满意的方案。（他也证明了对“反启示”敏感。）

Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every loyalist and sent each a gift certificate. He repeated his thanks in a newspaper ad that listed the names of all 263. The sequel: Christmas sales in Albuquerque were up substantially.

查克随后给每一位忠诚者写了亲笔感谢信，并寄去了礼券。他还在报纸广告中再次致谢，列出了全部 263 人的名字。结果是：阿尔伯克基的圣诞节销售额大幅增长。

Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News. The business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle - to be fully made up in the next upturn - or whether the business has slipped in a way that permanently reduces intrinsic business values.

查理和我们对过去一年媒体行业的发展感到惊讶，包括像我们的布法罗新闻报这样的报纸。该业务在经济衰退早期表现出的脆弱性远超以往。问题是这种侵蚀只是一个反常周期的一部分——将在下一次好转中完全弥补——还是业务已经下滑，从而永久性地降低了内在商业价值。

Since I didn't predict what has happened, you may question the value of my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I'll proffer a judgment: While many media businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.

既然我没有预测到已经发生的事情，你可以质疑我对将要发生的事情的预测价值。尽管如此，我还是给出一个判断：尽管与美国工业整体相比，许多媒体企业仍将是经济奇迹，但与仅仅几年前我、业界或贷款机构所认为的情况相比，它们将远没有那么神奇。

The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News - though all remain fine businesses.

过去媒体业务如此出色的原因不是实物增长，而是大多数参与者拥有的不寻常的定价能力。然而现在，广告费增长缓慢。此外，很少或根本不进行媒体广告（尽管有时使用邮政服务）的零售商，在某些商品类别中逐渐获得了市场份额。最重要的是，印刷和电子广告渠道的数量都大幅增加。其结果是，广告费更加分散，广告供应商的定价能力已经减弱。这些情况大大降低了我们主要媒体投资的内在价值，也降低了我们的运营单位布法罗新闻报的价值——不过它们仍然是优秀的企业。

Notwithstanding the problems, Stan Lipsey's management of the News continues to be superb. During 1990, our earnings held up much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only 5%. In the last few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was far greater.

尽管存在问题，斯坦·利普西对新闻报的管理仍然出色。1990 年，我们的盈利比大多数都市报纸保持得好得多，仅下降了 5%。然而在当年最后几个月，下降幅度要大得多。

I can safely make two promises about the News in 1991: (1) Stan will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers; and (2) earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown in the demand for newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991 and the paper's labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real squeeze.

我可以就 1991 年的新闻报做出两个有把握的承诺：（1）斯坦将再次在报纸出版商中名列前茅；（2）盈利将大幅下降。尽管新闻纸需求放缓，但每吨价格在 1991 年的平均水平将显著提高，报纸的劳动力成本也将大幅提高。由于收入可能同时下降，我们面临着真正的挤压。

Profits may be off but our pride in the product remains. We continue to have a larger "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the increase resulted from a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages. Regardless of earnings pressures, we will maintain at least a 50% news hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.

利润可能下降，但我们对产品的自豪感依旧。我们的“新闻版面率”（报纸专门用于新闻的部分）一直高于任何同类报纸。1990 年，这一比例从 1989 年的 50.1% 上升到 52.3%。唉，这一增长源于广告版面减少，而非新闻版面增加。无论盈利压力多大，我们都会保持至少 50% 的新闻版面率。降低产品质量不是应对逆境的正确方法。

The news at Fechheimer, our manufacturer and retailer of uniforms, is all good with one exception: George Heldman, at 69, has decided to retire. I tried to talk him out of it but he had one irrefutable argument: With four other Heldmans - Bob, Fred, Gary and Roger - to carry on, he was leaving us with an abundance of managerial talent.

我们制服制造商和零售商 Fechheimer 的消息全都很好，只有一个例外：69 岁的乔治·赫尔德曼决定退休。我试图劝他改变主意，但他有一个无可辩驳的理由：还有其他四位赫尔德曼——鲍勃、弗雷德、加里和罗杰——可以继续经营，他给我们留下了丰富的管理人才。

Fechheimer's operating performance improved considerably in 1990, as many of the problems we encountered in integrating the large acquisition we made in 1988 were moderated or solved. However, several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the "Sources" table to be flat. In the retail operation, we continue to add stores and now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for Fechheimer.

Fechheimer 的运营表现在 1990 年显著改善，我们在整合 1988 年大型收购时遇到的许多问题得到了缓解或解决。然而，几个不寻常的项目导致“来源”表中报告的盈利持平。在零售业务方面，我们继续增加门店，现已在美国 22 个州拥有 42 家店。总体而言，Fechheimer 的前景非常好。

At Scott Fetzer, Ralph Schey runs 19 businesses with a mastery few bring to running one. In addition to overseeing three entities listed on page 6 - World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturing - Ralph directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.

在 Scott Fetzer，拉尔夫·谢伊经营着 19 项业务，其精通程度很少有人能经营一项。除了监督第 6 页列出的三个实体——世界图书、Kirby 和 Scott Fetzer 制造——拉尔夫还指导一个金融业务，该业务 1990 年实现创纪录的 1220 万美元税前利润。

Were Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.

如果 Scott Fetzer 是一家独立公司，其净资产收益率将在《财富》500 强中名列前茅，尽管它所在的行业并非人们预期中的经济冠军。优异的业绩直接归功于拉尔夫。

At World Book, earnings improved on a small decrease in unit volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less in 1990 than 1989 and the benefits of decentralization are being realized. World Book remains far and away the leader in United States encyclopedia sales and we are growing internationally, though from a small base.

在世界图书，单位销量略有下降，但盈利有所改善。我们分权化改革的成本在 1990 年远低于 1989 年，分权化的好处正在实现。世界图书仍然是美国百科全书销售的绝对领导者，我们正在国际范围内增长，尽管基数很小。

Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our new vacuum cleaner, The Generation 3, which was an unqualified success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both start-up expenditures and "learning-curve" problems we encountered in manufacturing the new product. International business, whose dramatic growth I described last year, had a further 20% sales gain in 1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent earnings at Kirby in 1991.

Kirby 的单位销量在 1990 年大幅增长，得益于我们的新型吸尘器“第三代”，它取得了完全的成功。由于启动支出和制造新产品时遇到的“学习曲线”问题，盈利增长没有销售额增长快。国际业务（我去年描述过其惊人增长）在 1990 年又取得了 20% 的销售增长。在最近一次提价的帮助下，我们预计 Kirby 在 1991 年将有出色的盈利。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Campbell Hausfeld, its largest unit, had a particularly fine year. This company, the country's leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million, more than 30% of which came from products introduced during the last five years.

在 Scott Fetzer 制造集团内，其最大的单位 Campbell Hausfeld 度过了特别出色的一年。该公司是美国中小型空气压缩机的领先生产商，实现了 1.09 亿美元的创纪录销售额，其中超过 30% 来自过去五年内推出的产品。

In looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990 although earnings were $133 million. This does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote growth. Indeed, they diligently pursue both goals.

在查看我们非保险业务的数据时，你会发现尽管盈利为 1.33 亿美元，但净资产在 1990 年仅增加了 4700 万美元。这并不意味着我们的管理者在加强业务特许经营权或促进增长的投资上有任何吝啬。事实上，他们勤奋地追求这两个目标。

But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result: In the past five years they have funneled well over 80% of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities.

但他们也从不无缘无故地配置资本。结果是：在过去五年中，他们将超过 80% 的盈利输送给查理和我，用于新的业务和投资机会。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

下面是我们通常表格的更新版本，展示了财产意外保险行业的关键数据：

Source: A.M. Best Co.

来源：A.M. Best 公司。

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率表示保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入的比较：低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。比率越高，年份越差。当考虑保险公司从持有保单持有人资金（“浮存金”）中获得的投资收益时，综合比率在 107-111 范围内通常会产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供资金所赚取的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.

基于先前报告中阐述的原因，即使在总体通胀率大幅降低的时期，我们预计行业的已发生损失平均每年增长 10%。（在过去 25 年中，已发生损失实际以更快的速度增长，达 11%。）如果同时保费增长大幅落后于 10% 的水平，承保损失将会增加，尽管行业在业务恶化时准备金不足的倾向可能会暂时掩盖其规模。

Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10% and underwriting results therefore worsened. (In our table, however, the severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry's 1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trendline.) The combined ratio will again increase in 1991, probably by about two points.

去年保费增长远未达到所需的 10%，因此承保结果恶化。（但在我方的表中，1990 年恶化的严重程度被掩盖了，因为行业因 1989 年雨果飓风造成的损失使该年比率略高于趋势线。）综合比率在 1991 年将再次上升，可能上升约两个百分点。

Results will improve only when most insurance managements become so fearful that they run from business, even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist. At some point these managements will indeed get the message: The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging. But so far that point hasn't gotten across: Insurance managers continue to dig - sullenly but vigorously.

只有当大多数保险管理层变得如此恐惧以至于他们逃离业务时，结果才会改善，即使业务可以以比现在高得多的价格进行。在某个时候，这些管理层确实会明白这个道理：当你发现自己身处坑中时，最重要的事情是停止挖掘。但到目前为止，这一点尚未被理解：保险经理们继续挖掘——闷闷不乐但充满干劲。

The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur. Absent such a shock, one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses become large enough to raise management fear to a level that would spur major price increases. When that moment arrives, Berkshire will be ready - both financially and psychologically - to write huge amounts of business.

如果发生重大的物理或金融灾难，局面会迅速改变。如果没有这样的冲击，可能还需要一到两年时间，承保损失才会大到足以将管理层的恐惧提升到促使价格大幅上涨的水平。当那一刻到来时，伯克希尔将做好准备——无论在财务上还是心理上——承保大量业务。

In the meantime, our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory. In the next section of this report we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results. From that discussion, you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager, Mike Goldberg, and his cadre of stars, Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, and Don Wurster.

与此同时，我们的保险业务量仍然不大但令人满意。在本报告的下一部分，我们将给你一个评估保险结果的框架。通过该讨论，你将理解为什么我对我们的保险经理迈克·戈德堡及其明星团队——罗德·埃尔德里德、迪诺斯·约尔达努、阿吉特·贾恩和唐·沃斯特的表现如此热情。

In assessing our insurance results over the next few years, you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile. If this line of business expands, as it may, our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you might expect: In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations and in an occasional year we will fall far below them.

在评估我们未来几年的保险业绩时，你应该意识到我们正在追求的一种业务可能会导致业绩异常波动。如果这一业务线扩大（这是可能的），我们的承保经验将偏离你可能预期的趋势线：在大多数年份，我们会略高于预期，而在个别年份，我们会远低于预期。

The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have become a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes ("super-cats"), which could for example be hurricanes, windstorms or earthquakes. The buyers of these policies are reinsurance companies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers and that wish to "lay off," or rid themselves, of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity. Because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress - perhaps even chaos - in the insurance business, they seek financially strong sellers. And here we have a major competitive advantage: In the industry, our strength is unmatched.

我预测的波动反映了这样一个事实：我们已成为针对真正重大灾难（“超级巨灾”）——例如飓风、风暴或地震——保险的大额卖方。这些保单的买方是再保险公司，它们自身从事为原保险公司承保灾难风险的业务，并希望“分保”或消除自身对特别严重灾难的部分风险敞口。由于这些买方需要依据此类保单获得赔付的时机仅出现在保险业务极度紧张——甚至可能混乱——的时刻，因此他们寻求财务实力雄厚的卖方。而在这里我们有一个主要的竞争优势：在行业中，我们的实力无与伦比。

A typical super-cat contract is complicated. But in a plain- vanilla instance we might write a one-year, $10 million policy providing that the buyer, a reinsurer, would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results: (1) specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount; and (2) aggregate losses for the insurance industry of, say, more than $5 billion. Under virtually all circumstances, loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met.

一份典型的超级巨灾合同很复杂。但以一个简单例子来说，我们可以签一份一年期 1000 万美元的保单，约定只有当一场灾难导致两个结果时，买方（一家再保险公司）才会获得赔付：（1）再保险公司的特定损失超过一个阈值；（2）保险业的合计损失（例如）超过 50 亿美元。在几乎所有情况下，满足第二个条件的损失水平也必然导致第一个条件被满足。

For this $10 million policy, we might receive a premium of, say, $3 million. Say, also, that we take in annual premiums of $100 million from super-cat policies of all kinds. In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to $100 million or a loss of well over $200 million. Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do; we are concentrating it. Therefore, our yearly combined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100 - 120, but will instead be close to either zero or 300%.

对于这份 1000 万美元的保单，我们可能收取 300 万美元的保费。再假设我们从各类超级巨灾保单中每年收取 1 亿美元的保费。那么在任何给定年份，我们极有可能报告接近 1 亿美元的利润，或者远超过 2 亿美元的亏损。请注意，我们不像典型的保险公司那样分散风险；我们是在集中风险。因此，我们这项业务每年的综合比率几乎永远不会落在行业 100-120 的范围内，而是要么接近零，要么接近 300%。

Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings. And if they have the ability to do so, they often lack the desire. They may back away, for example, because they write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on super- cat reinsurance. In addition, most corporate managements believe that their shareholders dislike volatility in results.

大多数保险公司在财务上无法承受这种波动。即使有能力，他们也常常缺乏意愿。例如，他们可能会退缩，因为他们承保了大量原财产保险，这将使他们在因超级巨灾再保险遭受重大损失的同时，自身业绩也非常糟糕。此外，大多数公司管理层认为股东不喜欢业绩波动。

We can take a different tack: Our business in primary property insurance is small and we believe that Berkshire shareholders, if properly informed, can handle unusual volatility in profits so long as the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long-term results. (Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.)

我们可以采取不同的策略：我们的原财产保险业务很小，而且我们相信，如果得到充分告知，伯克希尔的股东可以承受利润的异常波动，只要这种波动伴随着卓越长期结果的前景。（查理和我总是更喜欢起伏不定的 15% 回报，而不是平滑的 12%。）

We want to emphasize three points: (1) While we expect our super-cat business to produce satisfactory results over, say, a decade, we're sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an occasional year; (2) Our expectations can be based on little more than subjective judgments - for this kind of insurance, historical loss data are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today; and (3) Though we expect to write significant quantities of super-cat business, we will do so only at prices we believe to be commensurate with risk. If competitors become optimistic, our volume will fall. This insurance has, in fact, tended in recent years to be woefully underpriced; most sellers have left the field on stretchers.

我们想强调三点：（1）尽管我们预计，比如说在十年内，超级巨灾业务会产生令人满意的结果，但我们确信，至少偶尔会有一年产生绝对糟糕的结果；（2）我们的预期只能建立在主观判断之上——对于这类保险，历史损失数据在我们决定今天的费率时价值非常有限；（3）尽管我们预计会承保大量超级巨灾业务，但只有在价格我们认为与风险相称时才会这样做。如果竞争对手变得乐观，我们的业务量就会下降。事实上，近年来这类保险的价格一直低得可悲；大多数卖方都是被抬着离开这个领域的。

At the moment, we believe Berkshire to be the largest U.S. writer of super-cat business. So when a major quake occurs in an urban area or a winter storm rages across Europe, light a candle for us.

目前，我们认为伯克希尔是美国最大的超级巨灾业务承保商。所以，当城市地区发生大地震或冬季风暴席卷欧洲时，请为我们点上一支蜡烛。

Measuring Insurance Performance

衡量保险业绩

In the previous section I mentioned "float," the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth - that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.

在上一节中我提到了“浮存金”，即保险公司在经营过程中暂时持有的他人资金。由于这些资金可用于投资，典型的财产意外保险公司可以吸收超过保费 7% 到 11% 的损失和费用，仍能实现业务盈亏平衡。再次说明，这一计算不包括保险公司在净资产（即股东提供的资金）上实现的收益。

However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.

然而，7% 到 11% 的区间存在许多例外。例如，冰雹损害农作物保险几乎不产生任何浮存金。这类业务的保费在冰雹风暴构成威胁之前支付给保险公司，如果农民遭受损失，他几乎会立即得到赔付。因此，农作物冰雹保险 100 的综合比率不会为保险公司带来利润。

At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance "long- tail" business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer's lawyers as well).

在另一个极端，涵盖医生、律师和会计师潜在责任的职业责任保险，与年保费规模相比产生非常高的浮存金。浮存金之所以出现，是因为索赔往往在被指控的不当行为发生很久之后才提出，而且由于漫长的诉讼，赔付可能会进一步延迟。业界将职业责任保险和某些其他类型的责任保险称为“长尾”业务，因为保险公司持有大额资金的时间很长，而这些资金最终将流向索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）。

In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that "long-tail" means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.

在长尾情况下，115（甚至更高）的综合比率可以证明是盈利的，因为浮存金产生的收益将超过索赔和费用超预算的 15%。然而，问题在于“长尾”正是这个意思：某一特定年份承保的责任业务起初假设产生 115 的综合比率，但当岁月流逝、所有索赔最终解决后，可能最终给保险公司带来 200、300 甚至更糟糕的结果。

The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110 - 115 is business suicide.

这项业务的陷阱要求一条经常被忽视的经营原则：尽管某些长尾险种在 110 或 115 的综合比率下可能被证明是盈利的，但保险公司总会发现以这些比率为目标定价是不盈利的。相反，价格必须提供足够的安全边际，以抵御那些总是给保险业带来昂贵意外的社会趋势。将目标设定为 100 本身就可能导致重大损失；瞄准 110-115 则是商业自杀。

All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio - and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.

尽管如此，衡量保险公司盈利能力的标准应该是什么？分析师和管理者通常看综合比率——确实，这个尺度通常是衡量公司在盈利能力方面排名的一个良好指标。然而，我们相信更好的衡量标准是承保损失与产生的浮存金的比较。

This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.

这种损失/浮存金比率，就像用于评估保险业绩的任何统计数据一样，在短期内毫无意义：季度承保数据甚至年度数据都过于依赖估计，作用不大。但当该比率涵盖数年的时间段时，它可以粗略显示保险业务产生的资金成本。低资金成本意味着好业务；高成本则意味着坏业务。

On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data we have computed a "cost of funds developed from insurance."

在下一页，我们展示了自进入保险业以来，我们保险集团每年的承保损失（如有），并将这一利润底线与当年持有的平均浮存金联系起来。根据这些数据，我们计算了“保险业务产生的资金成本”。

The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.

浮存金数字来自损失准备金、理赔费用准备金和未到期保费准备金的总和，减去代理人余额、预付收购成本和分保业务适用的递延费用。对于一些保险公司，其他项目也应计入计算，但在我们的情况下这些不重要，已被忽略。

During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.

1990 年我们持有约 16 亿美元的浮存金，这些资金最终将流向他人。当年我们发生的承保损失为 2700 万美元，因此我们的保险业务以约 1.6% 的成本为我们提供了资金。如表所示，我们在某些年份实现了承保盈利，在这些情况下我们的资金成本低于零。在其他年份，例如 1984 年，我们为浮存金支付了非常高的代价。但在我从事保险业的 24 年中有 19 年，我们以低于政府借款成本的成本获得了资金。

There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true 1967 - 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.

这个计算有两个重要的限定条件。第一，胖女人还没有漱口，更不用说唱歌了，直到几十年后本时期的所有损失都得到解决，我们才能知道我们在 1967-1990 年期间的真实资金成本。第二，浮存金对股东的价值在一定程度上被削弱，因为股东必须自掏腰包支持保险业务，并且这些资金赚取的投资收益要面临双重征税。直接投资会更节税。

The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.

间接投资给股东带来的税收惩罚实际上相当大。尽管计算必然不精确，但我估计，对于一般保险公司的所有者来说，税收惩罚会使其浮存金成本增加约一个百分点。我认为这也接近伯克希尔的正确数字。

Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive - and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.

计算保险业务的资金成本可以让任何分析者判断该业务对股东具有正面还是负面价值。如果这一成本（包括税收惩罚）高于其他资金来源的成本，则价值为负；如果成本较低，则价值为正；如果成本明显较低，则保险业务可被视为非常有价值的资产。

So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)

到目前为止，伯克希尔属于成本明显较低的阵营。GEICO 的数字更为惊人，我们现在拥有其 48% 的权益，并且它通常以承保利润运营。GEICO 的增长为投资产生了越来越多的资金，其有效成本远低于零。本质上，GEICO 的保单持有人总体上向公司支付浮存金的利息，而不是相反。（但漂亮取决于行动：GEICO 非凡的盈利能力源于其非凡的运营效率和对风险的仔细分类，这种组合反过来又为保单持有人提供了最低价格。）

Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance - and history indicates that is an almost impossible task - their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.

另一方面，许多知名保险公司发生的承保损失/浮存金成本，加上税收惩罚，为所有者带来负面结果。此外，这些公司和业内所有其他公司一样，容易遭受可能超过其再保险保障的灾难损失，使其浮存金成本直接飙升。除非这些公司能够显著改善其承保业绩——历史表明这几乎是不可能的任务——否则其股东将经历类似于一家银行存款利率高于贷款利率的银行所有者的结果。

All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.

总而言之，保险业务对我们非常友好。我们以平均合理的成本扩大了浮存金，并且由于我们以这些低成本资金赚取了良好的回报，我们进一步繁荣。诚然，我们的股东承担了额外的税收，但迄今为止，浮存金带来的收益已经超过了这一成本。

A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.

关于我们的记录，一个特别令人鼓舞的地方是：尽管你们的主席在迈克·戈德堡到来之前犯了一些巨大的错误，但我们仍然取得了这样的成绩。保险提供了大量的犯错机会，而当机会敲门时，我常常去应门。多年以后，这些错误的账单仍在不断寄来：在保险业务中，愚蠢没有诉讼时效。

The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one - among all the fine businesses we own - that has the greatest potential.

我们保险业务的内在价值将永远比我们的糖果或报业公司的价值更难计算。然而，无论以何种标准衡量，该业务的价值都远超其账面价值。此外，尽管这项业务时不时给我们带来问题，但它是我们拥有的所有优秀企业中潜力最大的。

Marketable Securities

有价证券

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面列出我们市值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不到 100% 的子公司。

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.

近乎懒惰的迟钝仍然是我们投资风格的基石：今年我们六大重仓股中的五只既没有买入也没有卖出一股。例外是富国银行，这是一家管理出色、高回报的银行，我们将持股比例提高到略低于 10%，这是未经美联储批准所能持有的上限。我们持仓中约有六分之一是在 1989 年购买的，其余在 1990 年。

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

银行业并非我们所爱。当资产是股本的 20 倍时（这是该行业的常见比率），只涉及一小部分资产的错误就可能摧毁大部分股本。而在许多大银行，错误已是一种常态而非例外。大多数错误源于我们去年在讨论“制度性强制力”时描述的管理层缺陷：高管们盲目模仿同行行为的倾向，无论这样做多么愚蠢。在放贷方面，许多银行家如同旅鼠般热情地跟风；现在他们正在经历旅鼠般的命运。

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

由于 20:1 的杠杆放大了管理层的优势与劣势，我们毫无兴趣以“便宜”的价格购买管理不善的银行股票。相反，我们唯一的兴趣是以公平的价格买入管理良好的银行。

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")

对于富国银行，我们认为我们得到了业内最佳管理者卡尔·赖卡特和保罗·哈森。卡尔和保罗的组合在许多方面让我想起另一对——大都会/ABC 的汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克。首先，每对组合都强于各自之和，因为搭档之间互相理解、信任和欣赏。其次，两个管理团队都向有能力的人支付高薪，但厌恶冗余的人员编制。第三，无论是在利润创纪录还是在压力之下，两者都同样积极地削减成本。最后，两者都坚持做自己理解的事情，让能力而非自负决定他们的尝试。（IBM 的老托马斯·J·沃森遵循同样的规则：“我不是天才，”他说。“我在某些方面聪明——但我待在这些方面。”）

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after- tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

我们在 1990 年对富国银行的购买得益于银行股票市场的混乱。这种混乱是合理的：曾经备受尊敬的银行所做的愚蠢贷款决策逐月被公之于众。当一个又一个巨额亏损被披露（往往紧随着管理层一切安好的保证之后），投资者理所当然地得出结论：没有一家银行的数据是可信的。借助他们逃离银行股，我们以 2.9 亿美元购买了富国银行 10% 的权益，不到税后利润的五倍，不到税前利润的三倍。

Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

富国银行规模庞大——拥有 560 亿美元资产——其股本回报率超过 20%，资产回报率为 1.25%。我们购买该银行十分之一的股份，大致相当于我们以相同的财务特征购买了一家 50 亿美元银行的 100% 股权。但如果我们进行这样的购买，我们将不得不支付大约是我们为富国银行支付的 2.9 亿美元的两倍。此外，那家 50 亿美元的银行虽然享有溢价，但会给我们带来另一个问题：我们找不到卡尔·赖卡特来管理它。近年来，富国银行的高管是银行业中最抢手的；然而，没有人能挖到这位院长。

Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business - is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

当然，拥有一家银行——或任何其他企业——远非没有风险。加利福尼亚的银行面临大地震的特定风险，这可能对借款人造成严重破坏，进而摧毁贷款给他们的银行。第二个风险是系统性的——经济收缩或金融恐慌的可能性如此严重，以至于几乎会危及每一个高杠杆机构，无论其管理多么明智。最后，市场目前的主要担忧是，由于过度建设，西海岸的房地产价值将暴跌，从而给为扩张提供融资的银行带来巨大损失。由于富国银行是主要的房地产贷款机构，人们认为它尤其脆弱。

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

这些可能情况都不能排除。然而，前两种发生的概率很低，即使是房地产价值的大幅下跌也不太可能给管理良好的机构带来重大问题。做一些数学计算：富国银行目前在扣除超过 3 亿美元的贷款损失费用后，每年税前利润远超过 10 亿美元。如果 1991 年该银行 480 亿美元贷款总额中的 10%——不仅仅是房地产贷款——出现问题，并且这些问题产生的损失（包括放弃的利息）平均为本金的 30%，公司大致会盈亏平衡。

A year like that - which we consider only a low-level possibility, not a likelihood - would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.

像那样的年份——我们认为只是低概率可能性，并非大概率事件——不会使我们感到困扰。事实上，在伯克希尔，我们乐意收购那些一年没有回报，但随后可望在增长的股本上赚取 20% 收益的企业或投资资本项目。然而，对类似于新英格兰经历的加州房地产灾难的担忧，导致富国银行股价在 1990 年的几个月内下跌了近 50%。尽管我们在下跌前的价格已经买入了一些股票，但我们欢迎这一下跌，因为它让我们能够以新的恐慌价格买入更多股票。

Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. (It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint - even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand - because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.

那些期望在其一生中持续买入投资的投资者，应该对市场波动采取类似的态度；但许多人却不合逻辑地在股价上涨时欣喜若狂，在下跌时郁郁寡欢。他们对食品价格的反应没有这种困惑：知道自己是食品的永久买家，他们欢迎价格下跌而痛恨价格上涨。（不喜欢价格下跌的是食品卖家。）同样，在布法罗新闻报，我们会为新闻纸价格下跌而欢呼——即使这意味着减记我们始终持有的大量新闻纸库存的价值——因为我们知道自己将永远购买该产品。

Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's investments. We will be buying businesses - or small parts of businesses, called stocks - year in, year out as long as I live (and longer, if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled). Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.

同样的推理指导着我们对伯克希尔投资的思考。只要我还活着（如果伯克希尔的董事们参加我安排的通灵会，甚至会更久），我们将年复一年地购买企业——或企业的小部分，称为股票。考虑到这些意图，企业价格下跌对我们有利，价格上涨则对我们有害。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

低价最常见的原因是悲观情绪——有时是普遍的，有时是针对特定公司或行业的。我们希望在这样的环境中做生意，不是因为我们喜欢悲观，而是因为我们喜欢它产生的价格。乐观才是理性买家的敌人。

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."

然而，这绝不意味着仅仅因为一项业务或股票不受欢迎就是明智的购买；逆向投资策略与随大流策略一样愚蠢。需要的是思考而非调查。不幸的是，伯特兰·罗素对一般生活的观察在金融界尤其适用：“大多数人宁愿死也不愿思考。他们中的许多人确实如此。”

Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this, however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)

我们去年投资组合的另一重大变化是大幅增持了 RJR 纳贝斯克债券，这些证券我们于 1989 年底首次购买。1990 年底，我们在这些证券上投资了 4.4 亿美元，大致等于市值。（然而，在我写这段话时，它们的市值已上涨超过 1.5 亿美元。）

Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly. (Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.")

就像买入银行业务对我们来说不寻常一样，购买投资级别以下的债券也是如此。但是，既让我们感兴趣又大到足以对伯克希尔的业绩产生有意义影响的机会很少。因此，我们将关注任何类别的投资，只要我们理解所购买的业务，并相信价格与价值可能存在显著差异。（伍迪·艾伦在另一个语境中指出开放性思维的优势：“我不明白为什么更多的人不是双性恋，因为这让你周六晚上约会的机会翻倍。”）

In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade bonds with success, though these were all old- fashioned "fallen angels" - bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the Washington Public Power Supply System.

过去我们成功购买过一些投资级别以下的债券，尽管这些都是老式的“堕落天使”——最初是投资级别，但当发行人陷入困境时被降级的债券。在 1984 年的年报中，我们描述了购买一个堕落天使——华盛顿公共电力供应系统——的理由。

A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s - "junk bonds" that were far below investment- grade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990 - even before the recession dealt its blows - the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.

一种变种的堕落天使在 1980 年代闯入投资舞台——“垃圾债券”，发行时远低于投资级别。随着十年推进，新发行的人造垃圾变得越来越垃圾，最终可预见的结果发生了：垃圾债券名副其实。1990 年——甚至在经济衰退打击之前——金融的天空就因失败公司的尸体而变得黑暗。

The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence would be a deadly - and unnecessary - accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.

债务的信徒向我们保证这种崩溃不会发生：我们被告知，巨额债务将促使运营经理前所未有地集中精力，就像汽车方向盘上装一把匕首，可以预期司机会加倍小心。我们承认这种引起注意的东西会产生一个非常警觉的司机。但另一个确定性的后果是，如果汽车撞上哪怕最小的坑洼或一点儿冰，就会发生致命且不必要的意外。商业道路上布满了坑洼；一个需要避开所有坑洼的计划就是灾难计划。

In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.

在《聪明的投资者》的最后一章中，本·格雷厄姆强烈驳斥了匕首论：“面对将稳健投资秘诀浓缩为三个词的挑战，我们大胆提出座右铭：安全边际。”读完这段话 42 年后，我仍然认为这三个词是正确的。投资者未能注意这一简单信息，导致他们在 1990 年代初遭受巨大损失。

At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill- 'em-at-birth" case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode - or else the station was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)

在债务狂热的顶峰时期，人们炮制出注定失败的资本结构：在某些情况下，发行的债务太多，即使极其有利的业绩也无法产生偿付债务的资金。几年前一个特别恶劣的“出生即扼杀”案例涉及购买坦帕的一家成熟电视台，收购所用债务之多，以至于利息超过了该台的总收入。即使你假设所有劳动力、节目和服务都是赠送而非购买的，这种资本结构也要求收入大幅增长——否则电视台注定破产。（为收购提供资金的许多债券卖给了现已破产的储蓄贷款协会；作为纳税人，你在为这种愚蠢行为买单。）

All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the "scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds. (Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

现在这一切似乎不可能。但在这些不当行为发生时，销售“匕首”的投资银行家们援引了学术界的“学术”研究，该研究表明多年来从低等级债券中获得的较高利率足以弥补其较高的违约率。因此，友好的推销员说，垃圾债券的多元化投资组合将比高等级债券投资组合产生更高的净回报。（当心金融中的历史绩效“证据”：如果历史书是致富的关键，福布斯 400 富豪榜将由图书管理员组成。）

There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic - one that a first- year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version served at Jonestown.)

推销员的逻辑有一个缺陷——统计学一年级学生就能学会识别。他们假设新发行的垃圾债券群体与低等级堕落天使群体相同，因此后者的违约经验对于预测新发行债券的违约经验有意义。（这类似于在喝琼斯镇版本的酷爱饮料之前，检查酷爱饮料的历史死亡率。）

The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.

这两个群体在几个重要方面当然不同。首先，堕落天使的管理者几乎总是渴望重获投资级别地位，并为此努力。垃圾债券经营者通常是完全不同的品种。他的行为就像海洛因使用者一样，其精力不是用于寻找摆脱债务缠身的方法，而是寻找另一剂“注射”。此外，管理典型堕落天使的高管的受托人敏感性通常（尽管并非总是）比发行垃圾债券的金融病态者更为健全。

Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no shortage of either.

华尔街对这种区别毫不在意。一如既往，华尔街对某个想法的热情与其优点不成比例，而是与其产生的收入成正比。成堆的垃圾债券被那些不在乎的人卖给了那些不思考的人——而这两种人都不缺。

Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the field, now that it is in disarray.

垃圾债券仍然是一个雷区，即使目前的价格往往只有发行价的一小部分。正如我们去年所说，我们从未购买过新发行的垃圾债券。（购买这些债券的唯一时机是“y”字母不在其中的日子。）然而，既然这个领域现在一片混乱，我们愿意看一看。

In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company's credit is considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of equity, and in general is being run well.

就 RJR 纳贝斯克而言，我们认为该公司的信用状况比一段时间以来普遍认为的要好得多，并且我们获得的收益率以及资本增值潜力，足以补偿我们所承担的风险（尽管风险远非为零）。RJR 以有利价格进行了资产出售，增加了大量股本，总体而言经营良好。

However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as the junk market continues to unravel.

然而，当我们审视整个领域时，大多数低等级债券仍然看起来缺乏吸引力。1980 年代华尔街的手艺比我们想象的还要糟糕：许多重要的企业已经受到了致命伤害。不过，随着垃圾市场的继续崩溃，我们会继续寻找机会。

Convertible Preferred Stocks

可转换优先股

We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. and $300 million of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1. Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.

我们继续持有之前报告中描述的可转换优先股：所罗门公司 7 亿美元、吉列公司 6 亿美元、全美航空集团 3.58 亿美元和冠军国际公司 3 亿美元。我们的吉列持仓将于 4 月 1 日转换为 1200 万股普通股。综合考量利率、信用质量和相关普通股价格，我们评估 1990 年底在所罗门和冠军的持仓价值约等于购买成本，吉列略高一些，而全美航空则低得多。

In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post- merger difficulties it encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil.

在购买全美航空时，你们的主席展现了绝佳的时机：我几乎就在该业务陷入严重问题的同一时刻一头扎了进去。（没有人推我；用网球术语说，我犯了一个“非受迫性失误”。）公司的麻烦既源于行业状况，也源于合并后在整合 Piedmont 时遇到的困难——我应该预料到这种痛苦，因为几乎所有航空公司的合并之后都会出现运营混乱。

In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor.

很快，埃德·科洛德尼和塞思·斯科菲尔德解决了第二个问题：该航空公司的服务现在获得了好评。行业性的问题被证明要严重得多。自我们购买以来，航空业的经济状况以惊人的速度恶化，某些航空公司的神风式定价策略加剧了这一趋势。这种定价给所有航空公司带来的麻烦说明了一个重要事实：在销售大宗商品型产品的业务中，你不可能比最愚蠢的竞争对手聪明多少。

However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made it.

然而，除非该行业在未来几年被摧毁，否则我们在全美航空的投资应该会顺利实现。埃德和塞思通过大幅调整运营，果断应对了当前的动荡。即便如此，我们的投资现在比当初做出时更不安全了。

Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred, convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.

我们的可转换优先股是相对简单的证券，但我应该警告你们，如果过去可作参考，你们可能会不时读到关于它们的不准确或误导性陈述。例如，去年几位新闻界人士计算我们所有优先股的价值等于它们可转换成的普通股的价值。按照他们的逻辑，我们持有的可转换价格为 38 美元所罗门优先股，如果所罗门普通股售价为 22.80 美元，其价值将为面值的 60%。但这种推理有一个小问题：使用它，人们必须得出结论：可转换优先股的全部价值在于转换特权，而所罗门的不可转换优先股的价值将为零，无论其票面利率或赎回条款如何。

The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may be worth more because of their conversion options.

你应该记住的要点是：我们的可转换优先股的大部分价值来自其固定收益特征。这意味着这些证券的价值不可能低于它们作为不可转换优先股所具有的价值，并且由于转换期权可能价值更高。

I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in January. No description better fitted Colman than "gentleman" - a word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will miss Colman so much.

我深感遗憾地必须用关于我的朋友、吉列公司 CEO 小科尔曼·莫克勒的短讯结束本部分，他于一月去世。没有比“绅士”更适合科尔曼的描述——这个词意味着正直、勇气和谦逊。将这些品质与科尔曼拥有的幽默感和非凡的商业能力结合起来，你就能够理解为什么我认为与他共事是一种纯粹的快乐，以及为什么我以及所有认识他的人会如此怀念科尔曼。

A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company's success in shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus its energies on coming up with something better, even though its existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.

在科尔曼去世前几天，吉列在《福布斯》封面故事中受到高度赞扬。主题很简单：该公司在剃须产品上的成功并非来自营销天赋（尽管它反复展现出这种才能），而是源于对质量的专注。这种心态使其始终将精力集中在推出更好的产品上，即使其现有产品已经是业内一流。在这样描绘吉列时，《福布斯》实际上描绘了科尔曼的画像。

Help! Help!

救命！救命！

Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire. And, as we constantly preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work: Several businesses have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages of our interest in making acquisitions. (Any good ad salesman will tell you that trying to sell something without advertising is like winking at a girl in the dark.)

老读者知道，我不知羞耻地利用年报来尝试为伯克希尔收购企业。而且，正如我们在《布法罗新闻报》不断宣扬的，广告确实有效：几家企业因为我们在这份报告中表达了对收购的兴趣而主动找上门来。（任何优秀的广告推销员都会告诉你，不通过广告试图销售东西，就像在黑暗中向女孩眨眼一样。）

In Appendix B (on pages 26-27) I've reproduced the essence of a letter I wrote a few years back to the owner/manager of a desirable business. If you have no personal connection with a business that might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can pass this report along to him.

在附录 B（第 26-27 页）中，我重现了几年前写给一家理想业务的所有者/管理者的信的精髓。如果你本人与可能引起我们兴趣的业务没有联系，但有朋友有这样的联系，也许你可以把这份报告转交给他。

Here's the sort of business we are looking for:

我们正在寻找的业务类型如下：

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

（1）大规模收购（税后利润至少 1000 万美元）；

(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),

（2）已被证明具有持续的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，也不对“扭亏为盈”的情况感兴趣）；

(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

（3）在很少或没有负债的情况下获得良好的股权回报的企业；

(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),

（4）已有管理层就位（我们无法提供）；

(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),

（5）简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们将无法理解）；

(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

（6）提供报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下讨论交易，即使是初步讨论，浪费我们或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会从事敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并非常快速地（通常在五分钟内）答复我们是否感兴趣。我们更倾向于现金购买，但如果我们获得的内在商业价值与我们所给予的相当，也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin- Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner- managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的收购形式是符合布朗金-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的。在这些情况下，公司的所有者-管理者希望产生大量现金，有时是为了自己，但通常是为了家人或不活跃的股东。同时，这些管理者希望继续作为重要所有者，像过去一样经营公司。我们认为我们特别适合有此类目标的所有者。我们邀请潜在的卖家通过联系我们过去打过交道的人来考察我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."

查理和我经常接到一些远未达到我们测试标准的收购提议：我们发现，如果你宣传有兴趣购买牧羊犬，很多人会打电话希望能卖给你他们的可卡犬。一首乡村歌曲的歌词表达了我们对新企业、扭亏为盈或类似拍卖的销售的感受：“当电话不响时，你就知道是我。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.

除了对上述业务购买感兴趣外，我们还对协商购买大额但非控股的股票感兴趣，类似于我们在资本城市、所罗门、吉列、全美航空和冠军持有的股份。但我们不接受关于我们在普通股票市场上可能进行的购买的建议。

Miscellaneous

杂项

Ken Chace has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age for directors at Berkshire (and won't!), but Ken, at 75 and living in Maine, simply decided to cut back his activities.

肯·蔡斯已决定不在我们即将举行的年度股东大会上竞选连任董事。我们在伯克希尔没有强制性的董事退休年龄（而且永远不会有！），但 75 岁且居住在缅因州的肯只是决定减少活动。

Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after Buffett Partnership, Ltd. assumed control of Berkshire early in 1965. Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken: He ran the operation well, he was always 100% straight with me about its problems, and he generated the funds that allowed us to diversify into insurance.

在巴菲特合伙公司于 1965 年初取得伯克希尔控制权后，肯是我立即选择的纺织业务负责人。尽管坚持纺织业务是一个经济上的错误，但选择肯并没有错：他把业务经营得很好，总是 100% 坦诚地告诉我问题所在，并且他创造了资金，使我们能够多元化进入保险业。

My wife, Susan, will be nominated to succeed Ken. She is now the second largest shareholder of Berkshire and if she outlives me will inherit all of my stock and effectively control the company. She knows, and agrees, with my thoughts on successor management and also shares my view that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses and important investments should be sold simply because some very high bid is received for one or all.

我的妻子苏珊将被提名接替肯。她现在已是伯克希尔的第二大股东，如果她比我长寿，将继承我所有的股份并实际控制公司。她知道并同意我对继任管理的看法，也认同我的观点：不应仅仅因为收到某个或所有业务的高额报价就出售伯克希尔或其子公司业务和重要投资。

I feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers should not depend on my health - which, it should be added, is excellent - and I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead, both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning the fortune to society.

我强烈认为，我们的业务及其管理者的命运不应取决于我的健康状况——补充一句，我目前健康状况极佳——并且我已据此做了规划。我的遗产计划和我妻子的都不是为了保留家族财富；相反，两者都旨在保留伯克希尔的品格并将财富回馈社会。

Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things: (1) None of my stock would have to be sold; (2) Both a controlling shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would follow me; and (3) Berkshire's earnings would increase by $1 million annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, The Indefensible (ignoring my wish that it be buried with me).

如果我明天去世，你们可以确信三件事：（1）我的股票都不必出售；（2）一个具有与我相似理念的控股股东和管理者将接替我；（3）伯克希尔的盈利将每年增加 100 万美元，因为查理会立即卖掉我们的公司专机“不可辩解号”（忽略我希望它与我一起埋葬的愿望）。

About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1990 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.8 million, and 2,600 charities were recipients.

约 97.3% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1990 年股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划捐赠的金额为 580 万美元，共有 2,600 家慈善机构受益。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54-55. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1991 will be ineligible for the 1991 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第 54-55 页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。要参与未来的计划，你必须确保你的股票以实际所有人的名义登记，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记。在 1991 年 8 月 31 日之前未如此登记的股票将没有资格参加 1991 年的计划。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除了伯克希尔分配的股东指定捐赠外，我们经营业务的管理者每年平均进行约 150 万美元的捐赠（包括商品）。这些捐赠支持当地慈善机构，如联合劝募会，并为我们的业务带来大致相应的利益。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

但是，我们的运营管理者或母公司的高管都不会使用伯克希尔的资金向全国性项目或他们个人特别感兴趣的慈善活动捐款，除非他们作为股东。如果你的员工（包括你的 CEO）希望对母校或其他他们个人有感情归属的机构捐款，我们相信他们应该用自己的钱，而不是你的。

The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 29, 1991. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,300, about a 100-fold increase from ten years ago.

今年的年度股东大会将于 1991 年 4 月 29 日星期一上午 9:30 在奥马哈市中心的奥菲姆剧院举行。去年的参会人数达到创纪录的 1,300 人，比十年前增长了约 100 倍。

We recommend getting your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting, and return after it ends.

我们建议你们尽早预定以下酒店之一：（1）Radisson-Redick Tower，一家小巧（88 间房）但不错的酒店，位于奥菲姆剧院对面；（2）更大的红狮酒店，距离奥菲姆剧院步行约五分钟；（3）万豪酒店，位于西奥马哈，距离 Borsheim 约 100 码，距市中心 20 分钟车程。万豪酒店将有巴士在 8:30 和 8:45 出发前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理和我总是很享受这场会议，我们希望能看到你。我们股东的质量体现在我们所收到问题的质量上：我们在任何地方参加过的年度股东大会中，从未有过如此持续高水平的、与所有者相关的聪明问题。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.

我们的代理材料附件说明了如何获取进入会议所需的卡片。由于工作日奥菲姆剧院周围停车可能紧张，我们已经为股东安排了附近的一些停车场。附件中也包含相关信息。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's Candy cart and see for yourself the dawn of synergism at Berkshire.

像往常一样，我们将安排巴士在会议后送你们去内布拉斯加家具店和 Borsheim，然后再送你们去市中心酒店或机场。我希望你留出充足的时间充分探索两家店的魅力。提前到达的股东可以在任何一天参观家具店；周六营业时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日为中午至下午 5:30。在那里，请在喜诗糖果车旁停一停，亲眼看看伯克希尔协同效应的曙光。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 28. At our Sunday opening last year you made Ike very happy: After totaling the day's volume, he suggested to me that we start holding annual meetings quarterly. Join us at Borsheim's even if you just come to watch; it's a show you shouldn't miss.

Borsheim 通常在周日关门，但我们将在 4 月 28 日周日中午至下午 6 点为股东及其嘉宾开放。去年我们在周日开业时，你们让艾克非常高兴：在统计了当天的销量后，他向我建议我们开始每季度举行一次年度股东大会。即使只是来看看，也来 Borsheim 加入我们吧；这是一场你不应错过的表演。

Last year the first question at the annual meeting was asked by 11-year-old Nicholas Kenner, a third- generation shareholder from New York City. Nicholas plays rough: "How come the stock is down?" he fired at me. My answer was not memorable.

去年年会的第一个问题是由来自纽约市的 11 岁股东尼古拉斯·肯纳提出的，他是第三代股东。尼古拉斯来势汹汹：“为什么股票跌了？”他向我发问。我的回答不值得一提。

We hope that other business engagements won't keep Nicholas away from this year's meeting. If he attends, he will be offered the chance to again ask the first question; Charlie and I want to tackle him while we're fresh. This year, however, it's Charlie's turn to answer.

我们希望其他业务不会让尼古拉斯缺席今年的会议。如果他出席，他将再次获得提出第一个问题的机会；查理和我想趁我们状态好的时候应对他。不过，今年轮到查理来回答了。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 1991

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1991年3月1日

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APPENDIX A

附录 A

U. S. STEEL ANNOUNCES SWEEPING MODERNIZATION SCHEME*

美国钢铁公司宣布全面现代化方案*

*An unpublished satire by Ben Graham, written in 1936 and given by the author to Warren Buffett in 1954.

*本·格雷厄姆 1936 年撰写的一篇未发表的讽刺文章，由作者于 1954 年交给沃伦·巴菲特。

Myron C. Taylor, Chairman of U. S. Steel Corporation, today announced the long awaited plan for completely modernizing the world's largest industrial enterprise. Contrary to expectations, no changes will be made in the company's manufacturing or selling policies. Instead, the bookkeeping system is to be entirely revamped. By adopting and further improving a number of modern accounting and financial devices the corporation's earning power will be amazingly transformed. Even under the subnormal conditions of 1935, it is estimated that the new bookkeeping methods would have yielded a reported profit of close to $50 per share on the common stock. The scheme of improvement is the result of a comprehensive survey made by Messrs. Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts; it includes the following six points:
1. Writing down of Plant Account to Minus $1,000,000,000.
2. Par value of common stock to be reduced to 1¢.
3. Payment of all wages and salaries in option warrants.
4. Inventories to be carried at $1.
5. Preferred Stock to be replaced by non-interest bearing bonds redeemable at 50% discount.
6. A $1,000,000,000 Contingency Reserve to be established.

美国钢铁公司董事长迈伦·C·泰勒今天宣布了期待已久的全面现代化计划。与预期相反，公司的制造或销售政策不会发生任何变化。相反，簿记系统将被彻底改造。通过采用和进一步改进若干现代会计和财务手段，该公司的盈利能力将发生惊人转变。即使在 1935 年的非正常条件下，据估计新的簿记方法也能使普通股报告的利润接近每股 50 美元。该改进方案是 Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts 公司进行全面调查的结果；它包含以下六点：
1. 将工厂账户减记至负 10 亿美元。
2. 将普通股面值降至 1 美分。
3. 所有工资和薪水以期权权证支付。
4. 存货按 1 美元计价。
5. 优先股替换为按 50% 折价赎回的无息债券。
6. 设立 10 亿美元或有准备金。

The official statement of this extraordinary Modernization Plan follows in full:

这一非凡现代化方案的官方声明全文如下：

The Board of Directors of U. S. Steel Corporation is pleased to announce that after intensive study of the problems arising from changed conditions in the industry, it has approved a comprehensive plan for remodeling the Corporation's accounting methods. A survey by a Special Committee, aided and abetted by Messrs. Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts, revealed that our company has lagged somewhat behind other American business enterprises in utilizing certain advanced bookkeeping methods, by means of which the earning power may be phenomenally enhanced without requiring any cash outlay or any changes in operating or sales conditions. It has been decided not only to adopt these newer methods, but to develop them to a still higher stage of perfection. The changes adopted by the Board may be summarized under six heads, as follows:

美国钢铁公司董事会欣然宣布，经过对行业变化所带来的问题的深入研究，公司批准了一项重塑公司会计方法的全面计划。特别委员会在 Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts 公司的协助下进行的一项调查显示，我们公司在利用某些先进的簿记方法方面已经落后于其他美国企业，这些方法可以在不需要任何现金支出或改变经营或销售条件的情况下，极大地提升盈利能力。公司不仅决定采用这些新方法，而且要将它们发展到更完善的阶段。董事会通过的变更可概括为以下六点：

1. Fixed Assets to be written down to Minus $1,000,000,000.
2. Many representative companies have relieved their income accounts of all charges for depreciation by writing down their plant account to $1. The Special Committee points out that if their plants are worth only $1, the fixed assets of U. S. Steel Corporation are worth a good deal less than that sum. It is now a well- recognized fact that many plants are in reality a liability rather than an asset, entailing not only depreciation charges, but taxes, maintenance, and other expenditures. Accordingly, the Board has decided to extend the write-down policy initiated in the 1935 report, and to mark down the Fixed Assets from $1,338,522,858.96 to a round Minus $1,000,000,000.

The advantages of this move should be evident. As the plant wears out, the liability becomes correspondingly reduced. Hence, instead of the present depreciation charge of some $47,000,000 yearly there will be an annual appreciation credit of 5%, or $50,000,000. This will increase earnings by no less than $97,000,000 per annum.

1) 将固定资产减记至负 10 亿美元。

许多代表性公司通过将工厂账户减记至 1 美元，免除了利润表中的所有折旧费用。特别委员会指出，如果他们的工厂仅值 1 美元，那么美国钢铁公司的固定资产价值远远低于这个数字。现在公认的事实是，许多工厂实际上是负债而非资产，不仅产生折旧费用，还带来税收、维护和其他支出。因此，董事会决定扩展 1935 年报告中启动的减记政策，将固定资产从 1,338,522,858.96 美元减记为整数负 10 亿美元。

此举的好处显而易见。随着工厂的磨损，负债相应减少。因此，不再有目前每年约 4700 万美元的折旧费用，而是每年有 5% 的增值贷项，即 5000 万美元。这将使每年利润增加不少于 9700 万美元。

2) Reduction of Par Value of Common Stock to 1¢, and

2) 将普通股面值降至 1 美分，以及

3) Payment of Salaries and Wages in Option Warrants.

3) 以期权权证支付薪金和工资。

Many corporations have been able to reduce their overhead expenses substantially by paying a large part of their executive salaries in the form of options to buy stock, which carry no charge against earnings. The full possibilities of this modern device have apparently not been adequately realized. The Board of Directors has adopted the following advanced form of this idea:

许多公司通过将高管薪酬的很大一部分以购买股票的期权形式支付，从而大幅减少了管理费用，期权不计入利润。这种现代手段的全部可能性显然尚未被充分认识。董事会采用了该想法的以下高级形式：

The entire personnel of the Corporation are to receive their compensation in the form of rights to buy common stock at $50 per share, at the rate of one purchase right for each $50 of salary and/or wages in their present amounts. The par value of the common stock is to be reduced to 1¢.

公司的全体员工将以购买普通股的权利形式获得报酬，每股购买价 50 美元，每 50 美元的现有薪金和/或工资可获得一份购买权。普通股面值将降至 1 美分。

The almost incredible advantages of this new plan are evident from the following:

这一新计划几乎令人难以置信的好处从以下几点可见：

A. The payroll of the Corporation will be entirely eliminated, a saving of $250,000,000 per annum, based on 1935 operations.

A. 公司的工资单将完全消失，根据 1935 年的运营情况，每年节省 2.5 亿美元。

B. At the same time, the effective compensation of all our employees will be increased severalfold. Because of the large earnings per share to be shown on our common stock under the new methods, it is certain that the shares will command a price in the market far above the option level of $50 per share, making the readily realizable value of these option warrants greatly in excess of the present cash wages that they will replace.

B. 同时，所有员工的实际报酬将增加数倍。由于新方法下我们普通股显示的每股收益很高，股票在市场上的价格必将远高于期权行使价每股 50 美元，这使这些期权权证的快速变现价值大大超过它们将取代的现有现金工资。

C. The Corporation will realize an additional large annual profit through the exercise of these warrants. Since the par value of the common stock will be fixed at 1¢, there will be a gain of $49.99 on each share subscribed for. In the interest of conservative accounting, however, this profit will not be included in the income account, but will be shown separately as a credit to Capital Surplus.

C. 公司将通过行使这些权证获得额外的大额年利润。由于普通股面值将固定为 1 美分，每股认购将产生 49.99 美元的收益。然而，为保守起见，此项利润将不计入收入账户，而是单独作为资本公积贷项列示。

D. The Corporation's cash position will be enormously strengthened. In place of the present annual cash outgo of $250,000,000 for wages (1935 basis), there will be annual cash inflow of $250,000,000 through exercise of the subscription warrants for 5,000,000 shares of common stock. The Company's large earnings and strong cash position will permit the payment of a liberal dividend which, in turn, will result in the exercise of these option warrants immediately after issuance which, in turn, will further improve the cash position which, in turn, will permit a higher dividend rate -- and so on, indefinitely.

D. 公司的现金状况将极大增强。取代目前每年 2.5 亿美元的工资现金支出（按 1935 年基准），通过行使 500 万股普通股的认购权证，每年将有 2.5 亿美元的现金流入。公司的大额利润和强劲的现金状况将允许支付丰厚的股息，这反过来又将导致这些期权权证在发行后立即被行使，进而进一步改善现金状况，从而允许更高的股息率——如此循环，周而复始。

4) Inventories to be carried at $1.

4) 存货按 1 美元计价。

Serious losses have been taken during the depression due to the necessity of adjusting inventory value to market. Various enterprises -- notably in the metal and cotton-textile fields -- have successfully dealt with this problem by carrying all or part of their inventories at extremely low unit prices. The U. S. Steel Corporation has decided to adopt a still more progressive policy, and to carry its entire inventory at $1. This will be effected by an appropriate write-down at the end of each year, the amount of said write-down to be charged to the Contingency Reserve hereinafter referred to.

在大萧条期间，由于必须将存货调整为市场价值，公司遭受了严重损失。各种企业——特别是在金属和棉纺织领域——通过将其全部或部分存货以极低单价计价，成功解决了这一问题。美国钢铁公司决定采取更为进步的政策，将其全部存货按 1 美元计价。这将通过每年年末进行适当减记来实现，减记金额计入下文所述的有待准备金。

The benefits to be derived from this new method are very great. Not only will it obviate all possibility of inventory depreciation, but it will substantially enhance the annual earnings of the Corporation. The inventory on hand at the beginning of the year, valued at $1, will be sold during the year at an excellent profit. It is estimated that our income will be increased by means of this method to the extent of at least $150,000,000 per annum which, by a coincidence, will about equal the amount of the write-down to be made each year against Contingency Reserve.

从这一新方法中获得的益处非常大。它不仅能消除存货贬值的所有可能性，而且将大大增加公司的年利润。年初持有的存货以 1 美元计价，将在年内以丰厚的利润售出。据估计，通过这种方法，我们的收入每年将至少增加 1.5 亿美元，巧合的是，这将大致等于每年从或有准备金中减记的金额。

A minority report of the Special Committee recommends that Accounts Receivable and Cash also be written down to $1, in the interest of consistency and to gain additional advantages similar to those just discussed. This proposal has been rejected for the time being because our auditors still require that any recoveries of receivables and cash so charged off be credited to surplus instead of to the year's income. It is expected, however, that this auditing rule -- which is rather reminiscent of the horse-and-buggy days -- will soon be changed in line with modern tendencies. Should this occur, the minority report will be given further and favorable consideration.

特别委员会的少数派报告建议，为了一致性并获得类似于刚才讨论的额外优势，应收账款和现金也应减记至 1 美元。该提议暂被拒绝，因为我们的审计师仍然要求，任何已核销的应收款项和现金的回收额应记入盈余而非当年的收入。然而，预计这一相当令人回想起马车时代的审计规则很快就会按照现代潮流而改变。如果发生这种情况，少数派报告将得到进一步和有利的考虑。

5) Replacement of Preferred Stock by Non-Interest-Bearing Bonds Redeemable at 50% Discount.

During the recent depression many companies have been able to offset their operating losses by including in income profits arising from repurchases of their own bonds at a substantial discount from par. Unfortunately the credit of U. S. Steel Corporation has always stood so high that this lucrative source of revenue has not hitherto been available to it. The Modernization Scheme will remedy this condition.

It is proposed that each share of preferred stock be exchanged for $300 face value of non-interest-bearing sinking-fund notes, redeemable by lot at 50% of face value in 10 equal annual installments. This will require the issuance of $1,080,000,000 of new notes, of which $108,000,000 will be retired each year at a cost to the Corporation of only $54,000,000, thus creating an annual profit of the same amount.

Like the wage-and/or-salary plan described under 3. above, this arrangement will benefit both the Corporation and its preferred stockholders. The latter are assured payment for their present shares at 150% of par value over an average period of five years. Since short-term securities yield practically no return at present, the non-interest-bearing feature is of no real importance. The Corporation will convert its present annual charge of $25,000,000 for preferred dividends into an annual bond-retirement profit of $54,000,000 -- an aggregate yearly gain of $79,000,000.

5) 用按 50% 折价赎回的无息债券取代优先股。

在最近的大萧条期间，许多公司能够通过以远低于面值的价格回购自己的债券所产生的利润抵消经营亏损。不幸的是，美国钢铁公司的信用一直如此之高，以至于迄今无法获得这一利润丰厚的收入来源。现代化方案将纠正这一状况。

提议将每股优先股转换为面值300美元的无息偿债基金票据，该票据分10年等额抽签赎回，赎回价为面值的50%。这将需要发行10.8亿美元的新票据，每年赎回1.08亿美元，而公司仅需支付5400万美元，从而产生同等金额的年度利润。与上述第3条中的工资/薪酬计划类似，这一安排将使公司和优先股股东双方受益。后者可确保在平均五年内以面值150%的价格收回其现有股份。由于目前短期证券几乎无收益，无息条款实际上无关紧要。公司可将目前每年2500万美元的优先股股息支出，转变为每年5400万美元的债券赎回利润——每年合计净赚7900万美元。

6) Establishment of a Contingency Reserve of $1,000,000,000.

6) 设立 10 亿美元的或有准备金。

The Directors are confident that the improvements hereinbefore described will assure the Corporation of a satisfactory earning power under all conditions in the future. Under modern accounting methods, however, it is unnecessary to incur the slightest risk of loss through adverse business developments of any sort, since all these may be provided for in advance by means of a Contingency Reserve.

董事们相信，前述改进将确保公司在未来所有条件下都具有令人满意的盈利能力。然而，根据现代会计方法，完全没有必要承担因任何不利商业发展而导致哪怕是最轻微损失的风险，因为所有这些都可以通过或有准备金提前预备。

The Special Committee has recommended that the Corporation create such a Contingency Reserve in the fairly substantial amount of $1,000,000,000. As previously set forth, the annual write-down of inventory to $1 will be absorbed by this reserve. To prevent eventual exhaustion of the Contingency Reserve, it has been further decided that it be replenished each year by transfer of an appropriate sum from Capital Surplus. Since the latter is expected to increase each year by not less than $250,000,000 through the exercise of the Stock Option Warrants (see 3. above), it will readily make good any drains on the Contingency Reserve.

特别委员会建议公司设立金额相当可观的 10 亿美元或有准备金。如前所述，存货每年减记至 1 美元的金额将由该准备金吸收。为防止或有准备金最终枯竭，进一步决定每年从资本公积中划转适当金额予以补充。由于后者预期通过股票期权权证的行使每年至少增加 2.5 亿美元（参见上文第 3 点），它将很容易弥补或有准备金的任何消耗。

In setting up this arrangement, the Board of Directors must confess regretfully that they have been unable to improve upon the devices already employed by important corporations in transferring large sums between Capital, Capital Surplus, Contingency Reserves and other Balance Sheet Accounts. In fact, it must be admitted that our entries will be somewhat too simple, and will lack that element of extreme mystification that characterizes the most advanced procedure in this field. The Board of Directors, however, have insisted upon clarity and simplicity in framing their Modernization Plan, even at the sacrifice of possible advantage to the Corporation's earning power.

在制定这一安排时，董事会不得不遗憾地承认，他们无法改进大公司已经在使用的在资本、资本公积、或有准备金和其他资产负债表账户之间转移大笔资金的手段。事实上，必须承认我们的分录会有些过于简单，并且缺乏该领域最先进程序所具有的那种极端神秘化的元素。然而，董事会在制定现代化方案时坚持了清晰和简单，即使牺牲公司盈利能力的可能优势也在所不惜。

In order to show the combined effect of the new proposals upon the Corporation's earning power, we submit herewith a condensed Income Account for 1935 on two bases, viz:

为了显示新提案对公司盈利能力的综合影响，我们随函提交一份 1935 年的简明利润表，基于两种基础：

In accordance with a somewhat antiquated custom there is appended herewith a condensed pro-forma Balance Sheet of the U. S. Steel Corporation as of December 31, 1935, after giving effect to proposed changes in asset and liability accounts.

                                                                ASSETS
Fixed Assets, net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     ($1,000,000,000)
Cash Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     142,000,000
Receivables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     56,000,000
Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1
Miscellaneous Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        27,000,000
             Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .($774,999,999)

                                                           LIABILITIES
Common Stock Par 1¢ (Par Value $87,032.52) Stated Value*                       ($3,500,000,000)
Subsidiaries' Bonds and Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             113,000,000
New Sinking Fund Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             1,080,000,000
Current Liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    69,000,000
Contingency Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          1,000,000,000
Other Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       74,000,000
Initial Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    389,000,001
             Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($774,999,999)

*Given a Stated Value differing from Par Value, in accordance with the laws of the State of Virginia, where the company will be re-incorporated.

依照一种稍显过时的习俗，随函附上美国钢铁公司在资产和负债账户拟议变更生效后，截至 1935 年 12 月 31 日的简明备考资产负债表。

                                                                资产
固定资产净值 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .              ($1,000,000,000)
现金资产 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           142,000,000
应收账款 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           56,000,000
存货 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          1
其他资产 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               27,000,000
             合计 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($774,999,999)

                                                           负债
普通股 面值1美分（面值 $87,032.52）设定价值*                                         ($3,500,000,000)
子公司债券和股票 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                 113,000,000
新偿债基金票据 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             1,080,000,000
流动负债 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        69,000,000
或有准备金 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               1,000,000,000
其他准备金 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            74,000,000
初始盈余 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            389,000,001
             合计 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   ($774,999,999)

*设定价值与面值不同，这是根据弗吉尼亚州法律的规定，公司将在该州重新注册。

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out to our stockholders that modern accounting methods give rise to balance sheets differing somewhat in appearance from those of a less advanced period. In view of the very large earning power that will result from these changes in the Corporation's Balance Sheet, it is not expected that undue attention will be paid to the details of assets and liabilities.

也许没有必要向我们的股东指出，现代会计方法产生的资产负债表在形式上与较不发达时期的资产负债表有些不同。鉴于公司资产负债表的这些变化将带来巨大的盈利能力，预计不会对资产和负债的细节给予过分关注。

In conclusion, the Board desires to point out that the combined procedure, whereby plant will be carried at a minus figure, our wage bill will be eliminated, and inventory will stand on our books at virtually nothing, will give U. S. Steel Corporation an enormous competitive advantage in the industry. We shall be able to sell our products at exceedingly low prices and still show a handsome margin of profit. It is the considered view of the Board of Directors that under the Modernization Scheme we shall be able to undersell all competitors to such a point that the anti-trust laws will constitute the only barrier to 100% domination of the industry.

总之，董事会希望指出，这些综合程序——工厂以负数入账、工资单被取消、存货账面价值几乎为零——将使美国钢铁公司在行业内获得巨大的竞争优势。我们将能够以极低的价格销售产品，同时仍能获得可观的利润。董事会经深思熟虑认为，在现代化方案下，我们将能够以低于所有竞争对手的价格销售，以至于反垄断法将成为我们实现 100% 行业主导地位的唯一障碍。

In making this statement, the Board is not unmindful of the possibility that some of our competitors may seek to offset our new advantages by adopting similar accounting improvements. We are confident, however, that U. S. Steel will be able to retain the loyalty of its customers, old and new, through the unique prestige that will accrue to it as the originator and pioneer in these new fields of service to the user of steel. Should necessity arise, moreover, we believe we shall be able to maintain our deserved superiority by introducing still more advanced bookkeeping methods, which are even now under development in our Experimental Accounting Laboratory.

在发表此声明时，董事会并非没有意识到某些竞争对手可能试图通过采用类似的会计改进来抵消我们的新优势。然而，我们相信，美国钢铁将能够凭借其作为这些服务钢铁用户的新领域的开创者和先驱而获得的独特声望，保留新老客户的忠诚。此外，如有必要，我们相信我们将能够通过引入更先进的簿记方法（目前正在我们的实验会计实验室中开发）来维持我们应得的优势。

APPENDIX B

附录 B

Some Thoughts on Selling Your Business

关于出售企业的几点思考

*This is an edited version of a letter I sent some years ago to a man who had indicated that he might want to sell his family business. I present it here because it is a message I would like to convey to other prospective sellers. -- W.E.B.

*这是我几年前写给一位表示可能想出售其家族企业的人的信的编辑版本。我在此呈现，因为这是我想要传达给其他潜在卖家的信息。—— W.E.B.

Dear _____________:

尊敬的 _____________：

Here are a few thoughts pursuant to our conversation of the other day.

根据我们前几天的谈话，我有以下几点思考。

Most business owners spend the better part of their lifetimes building their businesses. By experience built upon endless repetition, they sharpen their skills in merchandising, purchasing, personnel selection, etc. It's a learning process, and mistakes made in one year often contribute to competence and success in succeeding years.

大多数企业主一生中大部分时间都在建设自己的企业。通过无数次重复积累的经验，他们磨练了在商品销售、采购、人员选拔等方面的技能。这是一个学习的过程，某一年的错误往往有助于其后几年的能力和成功。

In contrast, owner-managers sell their business only once -- frequently in an emotionally-charged atmosphere with a multitude of pressures coming from different directions. Often, much of the pressure comes from brokers whose compensation is contingent upon consummation of a sale, regardless of its consequences for both buyer and seller. The fact that the decision is so important, both financially and personally, to the owner can make the process more, rather than less, prone to error. And, mistakes made in the once-in-a-lifetime sale of a business are not reversible.

相比之下，所有者-管理者只出售一次他们的企业——通常是在情绪激动、来自不同方向的多种压力之下。压力往往大部分来自经纪人，他们的报酬取决于交易的完成，而不管交易对买家和卖家的后果如何。这个决定对所有者而言在财务和个人方面都如此重要，这一事实可能使过程更容易出错，而不是更少。而且，在一生一次的企业出售中所犯的错误是不可逆转的。

Price is very important, but often is not the most critical aspect of the sale. You and your family have an extraordinary business -- one of a kind in your field -- and any buyer is going to recognize that. It's also a business that is going to get more valuable as the years go by. So if you decide not to sell now, you are very likely to realize more money later on. With that knowledge you can deal from strength and take the time required to select the buyer you want.

价格非常重要，但往往不是交易中最关键的方面。您和您的家人拥有一家非凡的企业——在您所在的领域独一无二——任何买家都会认识到这一点。这也是一家会随着时间的推移而变得更有价值的企业。所以，如果您现在决定不卖，以后很可能会获得更多的资金。有了这个认知，您可以从强势地位出发，花必要的时间选择您想要的买家。

If you should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers some advantages that most other buyers do not. Practically all of these buyers will fall into one of two categories:

如果您决定出售，我认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦提供了一些大多数其他买家没有的优势。几乎所有这类买家都属于以下两类之一：

(1) A company located elsewhere but operating in your business or in a business somewhat akin to yours. Such a buyer -- no matter what promises are made -- will usually have managers who feel they know how to run your business operations and, sooner or later, will want to apply some hands-on "help." If the acquiring company is much larger, it often will have squads of managers, recruited over the years in part by promises that they will get to run future acquisitions. They will have their own way of doing things and, even though your business record undoubtedly will be far better than theirs, human nature will at some point cause them to believe that their methods of operating are superior. You and your family probably have friends who have sold their businesses to larger companies, and I suspect that their experiences will confirm the tendency of parent companies to take over the running of their subsidiaries, particularly when the parent knows the industry, or thinks it does.

（1）位于其他地方但经营与您的业务相同或类似业务的公司。这样的买家——无论做出什么承诺——通常都会有认为自己知道如何经营您业务的管理者，迟早会想提供一些亲力亲为的“帮助”。如果收购公司规模大得多，它通常会拥有成团队的管理者，这些管理者多年来的招募部分是基于他们将来能够经营被收购业务的承诺。他们有自己的做事方式，即使您的业务记录无疑比他们好得多，人性在某个时刻会使他们认为自己的运营方法更优越。您和您的家人可能有一些朋友曾将企业卖给大公司，我猜想他们的经历会证实母公司接管子公司运营的倾向，尤其是当母公司了解该行业或自认为了解时。

(2) A financial maneuverer, invariably operating with large amounts of borrowed money, who plans to resell either to the public or to another corporation as soon as the time is favorable. Frequently, this buyer's major contribution will be to change accounting methods so that earnings can be presented in the most favorable light just prior to his bailing out. I'm enclosing a recent article that describes this sort of transaction, which is becoming much more frequent because of a rising stock market and the great supply of funds available for such transactions.

（2）金融操纵者，总是使用大量借入资金操作，计划在时机有利时尽快转售给公众或另一家公司。通常，这类买家的主要贡献是在他退出之前改变会计方法，以便以最有利的方式呈现盈利。我随信附上一篇描述此类交易的文章，由于股市上涨和可用于此类交易的大量资金供应，这类交易正变得越来越频繁。

If the sole motive of the present owners is to cash their chips and put the business behind them -- and plenty of sellers fall in this category -- either type of buyer that I've just described is satisfactory. But if the sellers' business represents the creative work of a lifetime and forms an integral part of their personality and sense of being, buyers of either type have serious flaws.

如果当前所有者的唯一动机是兑现筹码并将业务抛在身后——很多卖家属于这一类——那么我刚刚描述的任何一类买家都是可以接受的。但是，如果卖家的业务代表了一生的创造性工作，并构成其个性和存在感不可或缺的一部分，那么任何一类买家都有严重的缺陷。

Berkshire is another kind of buyer -- a rather unusual one. We buy to keep, but we don't have, and don't expect to have, operating people in our parent organization. All of the businesses we own are run autonomously to an extraordinary degree. In most cases, the managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have not been to Omaha or even met each other. When we buy a business, the sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale; we adapt to their methods rather than vice versa.

伯克希尔是另一种买家——一个相当不寻常的买家。我们为持有而购买，但我们的母公司组织中没有、也不期望有运营人员。我们所拥有的所有业务都以非常高的程度自主运营。在大多数情况下，我们持有多年重要业务的管理者从未去过奥马哈，甚至从未见过面。当我们收购一家企业时，卖家继续像出售前一样经营它；我们适应他们的方法，而不是相反。

We have no one -- family, recently recruited MBAs, etc. -- to whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought from owner-managers. And we won't have.

我们没有向任何人——家庭成员、新招聘的 MBA 等——承诺有机会经营我们从所有者-管理者那里购买的企业。而且我们永远不会有。

You know of some of our past purchases. I'm enclosing a list of everyone from whom we have ever bought a business, and I invite you to check with them as to our performance versus our promises. You should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under difficult conditions.

您知道我们过去的一些收购。我附上一份我们曾购买过业务的每个人的名单，并邀请您向他们核实我们的表现与我们的承诺。您应该特别有兴趣与那些业务表现不佳的少数人核实，以确定我们在困难条件下的行为。

Any buyer will tell you that he needs you personally -- and if he has any brains, he most certainly does need you. But a great many buyers, for the reasons mentioned above, don't match their subsequent actions to their earlier words. We will behave exactly as promised, both because we have so promised, and because we need to in order to achieve the best business results.

任何买家都会告诉您，他个人需要您——如果他有点脑子，他肯定需要您。但是，由于上述原因，很多买家后续的行动与他们先前的话并不一致。我们将完全按照承诺行事，既因为我们已经这样承诺，也因为我们需要这样做才能取得最好的业务成果。

This need explains why we would want the operating members of your family to retain a 20% interest in the business. We need 80% to consolidate earnings for tax purposes, which is a step important to us. It is equally important to us that the family members who run the business remain as owners. Very simply, we would not want to buy unless we felt key members of present management would stay on as our partners. Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest; we would simply rely on your word.

这种需求解释了为什么我们希望您的家族中负责运营的成员保留企业 20% 的权益。出于税务目的，我们需要 80% 的份额来合并收益，这对我们来说是很重要的一步。同样重要的是，经营企业的家族成员仍然作为所有者。很简单，除非我们认为现有管理层的关键成员会留下来作为我们的合伙人，否则我们不会想买。合同无法保证您持续的投入；我们只会相信您的承诺。

The areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and compensation of the top man. Other personnel decisions, operating strategies, etc. are his bailiwick. Some Berkshire managers talk over some of their decisions with me; some don't. It depends upon their personalities and, to an extent, upon their own personal relationship with me.

我参与的领域是资本配置以及最高负责人的选拔和薪酬。其他人事决策、运营策略等是他的职责范围。有些伯克希尔管理者会和我讨论他们的一些决定；有些人则不。这取决于他们的性格，在某种程度上也取决于他们与我的个人关系。

If you should decide to do business with Berkshire, we would pay in cash. Your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by Berkshire. There would be no brokers involved.

如果您决定与伯克希尔交易，我们将以现金支付。您的业务不会用作伯克希尔任何贷款的抵押品。不会有经纪人介入。

Furthermore, there would be no chance that a deal would be announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting adjustments (with apologies, of course, and with an explanation that banks, lawyers, boards of directors, etc. were to be blamed). And finally, you would know exactly with whom you are dealing. You would not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else in charge a few years later, or have the president regretfully tell you that his board of directors required this change or that (or possibly required sale of your business to finance some new interest of the parent's).

此外，绝不会有交易宣布后买家反悔或开始建议调整的情况发生（当然会道歉，并解释银行、律师、董事会等应受责备）。最后，您会确切地知道您在跟谁打交道。您不会遇到一位高管谈判交易，几年后却由另一个人负责，或者总裁遗憾地告诉您他的董事会要求这样或那样的变更（或者可能要求出售您的业务以资助母公司的某些新兴趣）。

It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale than now. The ownership of your business already makes you wealthy and soundly invested. A sale would change the form of your wealth, but it wouldn't change its amount. If you sell, you will have exchanged a 100%-owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable asset -- cash -- that will probably be invested in small pieces (stocks) of other businesses that you understand less well. There is often a sound reason to sell but, if the transaction is a fair one, the reason is not so that the seller can become wealthier.

有必要坦诚地告诉您，您在出售后并不会比现在更富有。拥有您的企业已经使您富有并且投资稳健。出售会改变您财富的形式，但不会改变其数量。如果您出售，您将把一个您完全拥有且理解的有价值资产换成另一个有价值资产——现金——而现金很可能被分散投资于其他您不那么了解的企业的零星股份（股票）。出售通常有合理的理由，但如果交易是公平的，理由并不是为了让卖家变得更富有。

I will not pester you; if you have any possible interest in selling, I would appreciate your call. I would be extraordinarily proud to have Berkshire, along with the key members of your family, own _______; I believe we would do very well financially; and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you have had during the past 20.

我不会缠着您；如果您有任何出售的可能兴趣，我将感谢您的来电。如果能让伯克希尔与您家族的关键成员共同拥有 _______，我将感到无比自豪；我相信我们在财务上会做得非常好；而且我相信在未来的 20 年里，您经营这家企业的乐趣将与过去 20 年一样多。

Sincerely,

真诚的，

/s/ Warren E. Buffett

/s/ 沃伦·E·巴菲特