2017 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500.

伯克希尔与标准普尔 500 指数的表现对比。

Annual percentage change: Berkshire's per-share book value, Berkshire's per-share market value, and the S&P 500 with dividends included.

年度百分比变化：伯克希尔每股账面价值、伯克希尔每股市值，以及包含股息的标准普尔 500 指数。

Note: Data are for calendar years with exceptions for 1965, 1966 and 1967. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurers to value equity securities at market rather than at the lower of cost or market; Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated accordingly. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax, while Berkshire's numbers are after-tax.

注：数据为日历年度，但 1965、1966 和 1967 年有例外。自 1979 年起，会计规则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法计量所持股票，表中伯克希尔 1978 年及以前数据已按新规则重述。标普 500 数据为税前口径，伯克希尔数据为税后口径。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2017 was $65.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 23%. Over the last 53 years, per-share book value has grown from $19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually. All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares; B shares are 1/1500th of those figures.

2017 年，伯克希尔的净资产增加了 653 亿美元，使 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值均增长 23%。过去 53 年，也就是现任管理层接手以来，每股账面价值从 19 美元增至 211,750 美元，复合年增长率为 19.1%。本报告中所有每股数字均指伯克希尔 A 类股；B 类股为这些数字的 1/1500。

The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: a large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire. The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real. Only $36 billion came from Berkshire's operations; the remaining $29 billion arrived in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code.

这段开场白的格式 30 年来一直如此。但 2017 年远非寻常：我们收益中的很大一部分并非来自伯克希尔自身完成的经营成果。不过，这 650 亿美元的收益是真实的。只有 360 亿美元来自伯克希尔的经营；其余 290 亿美元是在 12 月美国国会重写税法时带来的。

Before discussing Berkshire's operations, I must tell you about a new GAAP accounting rule that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire's net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.

在讨论伯克希尔的经营之前，我必须先告诉你们一项新的 GAAP 会计规则。它将在未来的季度和年度报告中严重扭曲伯克希尔的净利润数字，并且常常误导评论人士和投资者。

The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report. That requirement will produce wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks, not including Kraft Heinz, and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarter. For analytical purposes, Berkshire's bottom line will be useless.

新规则规定，我们所持股票的未实现投资收益和损失的净变动，必须计入所有对外报告的净利润数字。这个要求会让我们的 GAAP 净利润出现剧烈而任性的波动。伯克希尔持有 1,700 亿美元的可交易股票（不包括卡夫亨氏），这些持仓的价值在一个季度内轻易就可能波动 100 亿美元甚至更多。就分析而言，伯克希尔的“底线”利润将变得毫无用处。

The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had with realized gains or losses that accounting rules require us to include in net income. We sell securities when that seems intelligent, not to influence earnings. Therefore, we sometimes report large realized gains in a period when the overall portfolio performed poorly, or the reverse.

长期以来，会计规则要求我们把已实现收益或损失计入净利润，这已经给沟通带来麻烦；新规则又进一步加剧了问题。我们出售证券，是因为那样做看起来明智，而不是为了影响利润。因此，有时我们的投资组合整体表现不佳，却报告了巨额已实现收益；反过来也可能发生。

We will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments needed to make sense of our numbers. But commentary on earnings releases is often instant, and headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Media reports can therefore highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage readers and viewers.

我们每个季度都会努力解释，哪些调整对于理解我们的数字是必要的。但业绩发布后的电视评论往往即时出现，报纸标题也几乎总是聚焦 GAAP 净利润的同比变化。因此，媒体报道有时会突出一些数字，不必要地吓到或鼓舞读者和观众。

We will continue publishing financial reports late on Friday after markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That timing gives you maximum time for analysis and allows investment professionals to provide informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.

我们将继续在周五市场收盘后较晚时候，或周六清晨发布财务报告。这样可以让你们有尽可能多的时间分析，也让投资专业人士在周一开盘前给出有见地的评论。尽管如此，我预计那些不熟悉会计语言的股东仍会相当困惑。

At Berkshire, what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That is the metric Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on, and we hope you do, too.

在伯克希尔，最重要的是我们正常化每股盈利能力的增长。这正是我的长期伙伴查理·芒格和我所关注的指标，我们也希望你们同样关注它。

Acquisitions

收购

There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: sizable stand-alone acquisitions; bolt-on acquisitions that fit businesses we already own; internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many businesses; and investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds.

有四块基石能够为伯克希尔增加价值：大规模的独立收购；与我们现有业务相匹配的补强型收购；众多业务的内部销售增长和利润率改善；以及我们庞大股票和债券组合带来的投资收益。

In searching for new stand-alone businesses, we seek durable competitive strengths, able and high-grade management, good returns on required net tangible assets, opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns, and finally a sensible purchase price.

在寻找新的独立业务时，我们看重持久的竞争优势、能干且品格高尚的管理层、在所需有形净资产上取得良好回报、能够以有吸引力的回报进行内部增长的机会，最后还要有合理的收购价格。

That last requirement blocked virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent but far from spectacular businesses hit an all-time high. Price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers.

最后这一条在 2017 年阻挡了我们几乎所有看过的交易，因为那些还算不错但远称不上卓越的企业，价格已经达到历史高位。对于一大群乐观的买家来说，价格似乎几乎不再重要。

Why the purchasing frenzy? Partly because the CEO job self-selects for can-do types. Once a CEO hungers for a deal, forecasts will never be lacking. Subordinates cheer for larger domains and compensation. Investment bankers applaud huge fees. If history does not validate the acquisition, large synergies will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.

为什么会出现收购狂热？部分原因在于，CEO 这个职位本身会筛选出“我能做到”的人。一旦 CEO 渴望交易，就永远不会缺少支持收购的预测。下属会为更大的地盘和通常随公司规模上升的薪酬欢呼；投资银行家也会为巨额费用鼓掌。如果目标公司的历史业绩不足以证明收购合理，人们就会预测巨大的“协同效应”。电子表格从不令人失望。

The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchasing. Berkshire evaluates acquisitions on an all-equity basis, because our taste for overall debt is very low and assigning a large portion of debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious. We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.

2017 年极其廉价的债务资金供应充足，进一步助长了收购活动。伯克希尔则以全股本口径评估收购，因为我们对整体债务的偏好很低，而且把大量债务分摊给某一个单独业务通常是错误的。我们也从不把协同效应计入估值，而且也很少真正发现协同效应。

Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. We believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don't need. We held this view 50 years ago when we ran investment partnerships, and we hold it today after a million or so partners have joined us at Berkshire.

多年来，我们对杠杆的厌恶压低了我们的回报。但查理和我睡得很安稳。我们认为，为了得到自己并不需要的东西，而拿自己已经拥有且需要的东西去冒险，是疯狂的。50 年前我们各自管理投资合伙企业时如此认为；如今大约一百万“合伙人”加入伯克希尔后，我们仍然如此认为。

Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe Berkshire will from time to time have opportunities to make very large purchases. Meanwhile, we will stick with a simple guideline: the less prudence others show in their affairs, the more prudence we must show in ours.

尽管我们近期收购稀少，查理和我相信，伯克希尔不时仍会有机会进行非常大的收购。在此期间，我们会坚持一条简单准则：别人行事越不审慎，我们就越必须审慎行事。

We made one sensible stand-alone purchase last year: a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying J, the nation's leading travel-center operator with about $20 billion in annual volume. It has long been run by the Haslam family. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest to 80% in 2023; Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%.

去年我们做成了一项合理的独立收购：取得 Pilot Flying J 38.6% 的合伙权益。该公司年销售额约 200 亿美元，是美国领先的旅行中心运营商，长期由 Haslam 家族经营。伯克希尔已签署合同，将在 2023 年把合伙权益提高到 80%；届时 Haslam 家族成员将持有剩余 20%。

When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it's been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.

当你在州际公路上开车时，不妨进去看看。PFJ 既卖汽油，也卖柴油，而且食物不错。如果那是漫长的一天，也别忘了，我们的场站有 5,200 间淋浴间。

In bolt-on acquisitions, Clayton Homes bought two conventional homebuilders in 2017: Oakwood Homes in Colorado and Harris Doyle in Birmingham. Clayton's emphasis remains manufactured homes, both construction and financing. In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled 26,706 units to independent retailers, accounting for 49% of the manufactured-home market.

在补强型收购方面，Clayton Homes 于 2017 年收购了两家传统住宅建筑商：科罗拉多州的 Oakwood Homes 和伯明翰的 Harris Doyle。Clayton 的重点仍是预制住宅，包括建造和融资。2017 年，Clayton 通过自有零售体系销售 19,168 套，并向独立零售商批发 26,706 套，占预制住宅市场的 49%。

Shaw Industries acquired U.S. Floors, a fast-growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF's managers delivered a 40% sales increase in 2017 while integrating with Shaw. With the purchase, Shaw strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire.

Shaw Industries 收购了 U.S. Floors，这是一家快速增长的豪华乙烯基地板经销商。USF 的管理者在与 Shaw 整合的同时，2017 年实现了 40% 的销售增长。通过这项收购，Shaw 进一步巩固了其作为伯克希尔重要且持久盈利来源的地位。

HomeServices, our real estate brokerage operation, grew sharply. In 2017 we acquired Long and Foster, Houlihan Lawrence and Gloria Nilson, adding 12,300 agents and raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices participated in $127 billion of transaction sides during 2017 and still has only about 3% of the country's home-brokerage business, leaving 97% to go.

我们的房地产经纪业务 HomeServices 大幅增长。2017 年，我们收购了 Long and Foster、Houlihan Lawrence 和 Gloria Nilson，增加 12,300 名经纪人，总数达到 40,950 人。HomeServices 在 2017 年参与了 1,270 亿美元的交易“边”，但仍只占美国住宅经纪业务约 3%，还有 97% 的空间。

Finally, Precision Castparts bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a German maker of corrosion-resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision, is an extraordinary manufacturing executive. Betting on people can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets.

最后，Precision Castparts 收购了德国公司 Wilhelm Schulz GmbH，后者生产耐腐蚀接头、管道系统和部件。Precision 的 CEO Mark Donegan 是一位非凡的制造业管理者。有时，押注于人比押注于实物资产更可靠。

Insurance

保险

Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, recall how and why we entered the field. We purchased National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for $8.6 million in early 1967. With that purchase we received $6.7 million of tangible net worth that, because of the nature of insurance, we could deploy in marketable securities. The $1.9 million premium over net worth brought us an insurance business that usually delivered an underwriting profit and, more importantly, $19.4 million of float.

在讨论 2017 年保险业绩前，请回想我们如何以及为何进入这个领域。1967 年初，我们以 860 万美元收购了 National Indemnity 及其一家较小的姐妹公司。通过这项收购，我们获得了 670 万美元有形净资产；由于保险业务的性质，这些资产可以配置到可交易证券中。超过净资产的 190 万美元溢价，则让我们得到了一项通常能产生承保利润的保险业务，更重要的是，还带来了 1,940 万美元浮存金。

Float has ever since been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends, interest and gains belong to Berkshire, while investment losses are also on our tab. Float arises because premiums are generally paid upfront while losses are paid later, sometimes over many years or even decades.

从那以后，浮存金对伯克希尔一直极为重要。当我们投资这些资金时，所有股息、利息和收益都归伯克希尔所有；当然，投资损失也由我们承担。浮存金之所以产生，是因为保费通常先收，而赔款较晚支付，有时要经过许多年甚至几十年。

Berkshire has long been a leader in long-tail insurance, especially jumbo reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other insurers. We are now the country's second-largest P/C company measured by premium volume and the clear leader in float.

伯克希尔长期以来一直是长尾保险业务的领导者，尤其擅长大型再保险保单，即承担其他保险公司已经发生的长尾损失。按保费规模衡量，我们如今是美国第二大财产/意外险公司；按浮存金衡量，我们则遥遥领先。

Here is the record:

以下是历史记录：

Our 2017 volume was boosted by a huge deal in which we reinsured up to $20 billion of long-tail losses incurred by AIG. Our premium was $10.2 billion, a world record that we will not come close to repeating. Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When it eventually declines, the decline should be modest, at most about 3% in any single year.

2017 年的保费规模受到一笔大型交易推动：我们为 AIG 已发生的长尾损失提供最高 200 亿美元的再保险。我们收取的保费为 102 亿美元，这是世界纪录，而且我们不太可能再接近这一水平。浮存金至少在未来几年可能会缓慢增长。等到它最终下降时，降幅也应当温和，任何单一年份最多约 3%。

Charlie and I will never operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers, or even friends facing their own liquidity problems. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having loads of Treasury Bills. We have intentionally built Berkshire to withstand economic discontinuities, including extended market closures.

查理和我永远不会以依赖陌生人善意的方式经营伯克希尔，即使是可能自身也面临流动性问题的朋友也不行。2008-2009 年危机期间，我们很庆幸持有大量国库券。我们有意把伯克希尔构造成能够从容承受经济中断的企业，包括市场长时间关闭这样的极端情况。

The downside of float is risk, sometimes oceans of risk. Berkshire's insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, operating in a culture that has long prioritized those qualities. That discipline has produced underwriting profits in most years and, in those years, our cost of float was less than zero.

浮存金的负面一面是风险，有时是汪洋大海般的风险。伯克希尔的保险经理人都是保守而谨慎的承保人，并在一种长期重视这些品质的文化中工作。这种纪律让我们在大多数年份取得了承保利润；在这些年份里，我们的浮存金成本低于零。

September 2017 reminded the industry that catastrophe-light years are not the new norm, as three significant hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico. We currently estimate industry insured losses at about $100 billion and Berkshire's losses at $3 billion, or about $2 billion after tax.

2017 年 9 月提醒整个行业，灾害较少的年份并不是新的常态，因为三场重大飓风袭击了德克萨斯、佛罗里达和波多黎各。我们目前估计行业承保损失约为 1,000 亿美元，伯克希尔的损失约为 30 亿美元，税后约 20 亿美元。

No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a $400 billion mega-catastrophe. Our share of such a loss might be $12 billion or so, far below the annual earnings we expect from non-insurance activities. Much of the P/C world might be out of business, which explains why other insurers come to Berkshire when they need very large reinsurance coverages.

在为 4,000 亿美元级别的超级灾难做财务准备方面，没有哪家公司能接近伯克希尔。我们在这类损失中的份额可能约为 120 亿美元，远低于我们预计非保险业务的年度盈利。与此同时，财产/意外险行业中很多公司可能会倒闭。这解释了为什么其他保险公司在需要巨额再保险保障时，会来找伯克希尔。

Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits totaling $28.3 billion pre-tax. I have regularly said that Berkshire should attain an underwriting profit in a majority of years, but also experience losses from time to time. That warning became fact in 2017, when we lost $3.2 billion pre-tax from underwriting.

在 2017 年之前，伯克希尔连续 14 年取得承保利润，税前合计 283 亿美元。我经常说，伯克希尔应当在多数年份实现承保利润，但也会不时发生亏损。这个提醒在 2017 年成为现实，当年我们的承保税前亏损为 32 亿美元。

Non-insurance operations

非保险业务

Excluding investment income, Berkshire's operations other than insurance delivered pre-tax income of $20 billion in 2017, an increase of $950 million over 2016. About 44% came from BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy, of which we owned 90.2%.

不计投资收益，伯克希尔保险以外业务在 2017 年实现税前利润 200 亿美元，比 2016 年增加 9.5 亿美元。其中约 44% 来自我们的铁路 BNSF 和我们持有 90.2% 股权的 Berkshire Hathaway Energy。

The next five non-insurance businesses by earnings - Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts - had aggregate pre-tax income of $5.5 billion in 2017, little changed from $5.4 billion in 2016. The next five - Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI - earned $2.1 billion, up from $1.7 billion.

按盈利排名的接下来五家非保险业务——Clayton Homes、International Metalworking Companies、Lubrizol、Marmon 和 Precision Castparts——2017 年合计税前利润为 55 亿美元，与 2016 年的 54 亿美元相比变化不大。再往后的五家公司——Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw 和 TTI——盈利 21 亿美元，高于 2016 年的 17 亿美元。

The remaining businesses recorded pre-tax income of $3.7 billion in 2017 versus $3.5 billion in 2016. Depreciation charges for all non-insurance operations totaled $7.6 billion, while capital expenditures were $11.5 billion. Berkshire regularly incurs capital expenditures far exceeding depreciation, and almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America's economic soil remains fertile.

其余业务 2017 年税前利润为 37 亿美元，2016 年为 35 亿美元。所有非保险业务的折旧费用合计 76 亿美元，资本支出为 115 亿美元。伯克希尔经常发生远超折旧的资本支出，且我们近 90% 的投资都在美国完成。美国的经济土壤依然肥沃。

At yearend, Berkshire held $116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills, up from $86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we redeploy excess funds into more productive assets.

年末，伯克希尔持有 1,160 亿美元现金和美国国库券，高于 2016 年末的 864 亿美元。这种异常高的流动性只赚取微薄收益，远超查理和我希望伯克希尔持有的水平。等我们把多余资金重新配置到更具生产力的资产上时，我们的笑容会更灿烂。

Investments

投资

Below are Berkshire's fifteen common-stock investments with the largest yearend market value. Kraft Heinz is excluded because Berkshire is part of a control group and accounts for that investment under the equity method.

以下列出伯克希尔年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。卡夫亨氏未列入，因为伯克希尔属于控制集团的一部分，必须按权益法核算该项投资。

Some of these stocks are managed by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, each of whom independently manages more than $12 billion. Included in the $25 billion they manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries; those pension investments are not included in the preceding table.

表中部分股票由 Todd Combs 或 Ted Weschler 负责管理。他们各自独立管理超过 120 亿美元资产。在他们合计管理的 250 亿美元中，包括伯克希尔若干子公司的 80 多亿美元养老金信托资产；这些养老金投资未列入上表。

Charlie and I view Berkshire's marketable common stocks as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on charts, target prices, pundit opinions or other noise. If the businesses of the investees are successful, our investments should be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs will be modest, occasionally the cash register will ring loudly, and sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall and over time, we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.

查理和我把伯克希尔持有的可交易普通股视为企业权益，而不是根据图形走势、目标价、评论人士观点或其他噪音买卖的股票代码。如果被投资企业经营成功，我们的投资也应当成功。有时回报会很平淡；偶尔收银机会大响；有时我也会犯下昂贵错误。但总体而言，随着时间推移，我们应当取得不错结果。在美国，股票投资者有顺风相助。

Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends from its stock portfolio in 2017. That figure, however, far understates the true earnings from our stock holdings. We expect the undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings through subsequent capital gains, though recognition of those gains and losses will be lumpy.

2017 年，伯克希尔从股票组合中收到 37 亿美元股息。然而，这个数字大大低估了我们股票持仓产生的真实收益。我们预期，被投资企业的未分配收益最终至少会通过随后的资本利得为我们带来相当的收益，尽管这些收益和损失的确认会很不规则。

The short-term connection between retained earnings and value-building is impossible to detect. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to year-to-year increases in underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham's maxim proves true: in the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, it becomes a weighing machine.

留存收益与价值创造之间的短期联系不可能被清楚识别。股票会上涨也会下跌，看起来似乎与其内在价值逐年累积并无关联。然而长期来看，本·格雷厄姆的名言会得到验证：短期内，市场是投票机；长期看，它会变成称重机。

Berkshire itself provides vivid examples of how short-term price randomness can obscure long-term value growth. For 53 years, the company has reinvested earnings and allowed compound interest to work. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four truly major dips.

伯克希尔本身就生动说明，短期价格的随机波动如何遮蔽长期价值增长。53 年来，公司不断再投资收益，让复利发挥魔力。尽管如此，伯克希尔股票仍经历过四次真正重大的下跌。

This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if borrowings are small, your mind may be rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. An unsettled mind will not make good decisions.

这张表给出了我所能提出的、反对借钱买股票的最有力论据。没人知道股票在短期内能跌多远。即使借款很少，你的头脑也可能被可怕的标题和令人窒息的评论搅乱。而一个不安定的头脑不会做出好决定。

In the next 53 years, our shares and others will experience similar declines. No one can tell you when. When major declines occur, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those not handicapped by debt. That is the time to heed Kipling's If: if you can keep your head, wait without tiring, think without making thoughts your aim, and trust yourself when all men doubt you, yours is the Earth and everything in it.

未来 53 年，我们的股票以及其他股票还会经历类似下跌。没人能告诉你何时会发生。但重大下跌出现时，对那些没有被债务束缚的人来说，它们提供了非凡机会。那正是应当记住吉卜林《如果》之时：如果你能在众人失去理智时保持清醒，能等待而不厌倦，能思考却不以空想为目标，能在众人怀疑你时仍相信自己，那么世界和其中的一切都将属于你。

The Bet is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson

赌局结束，并带来了一堂意想不到的投资课

Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave a detailed report on a ten-year bet I made on December 19, 2007. I made the bet to turn my $318,250 outlay into a larger sum for Girls Inc. of Omaha and to publicize my conviction that a virtually cost-free unmanaged S&P 500 index fund would, over time, beat most investment professionals.

去年，在十年赌局进行到 90% 时，我详细汇报了自己在 2007 年 12 月 19 日立下的赌局。我打这个赌有两个原因：一是把我投入的 318,250 美元放大为更大金额，捐给奥马哈 Girls Inc.；二是公开表达我的信念，即一个几乎没有成本、无人管理的标普 500 指数基金，长期来看会战胜大多数投资专业人士。

Protégé Partners, my counterparty, selected five funds-of-funds expected to outperform the S&P 500. Those five in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds. Everyone on Protégé's side was highly incentivized, and even if the funds lost money, managers could grow rich because fixed fees averaging about 2.5% of assets were paid every year.

我的对手 Protégé Partners 选择了五只基金中的基金，认为它们会跑赢标普 500。这五只基金中的基金又持有 200 多只对冲基金的权益。Protégé 一方的每个参与者都有很强激励；即使基金亏钱，管理人也可能变得富有，因为投资者每年都要支付平均约资产 2.5% 的固定费用。

Final scorecard for the bet:

赌局最终成绩如下：

The five funds-of-funds started fast, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a group trailed the index fund. Wall Street helpers earned staggering sums, while many of their investors experienced a lost decade. Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.

这五只基金中的基金开局很快，2008 年每一只都跑赢了指数基金。随后屋顶塌了下来。在之后的九年里，这些基金中的基金作为一个整体每一年都落后于指数基金。华尔街“帮手”赚取了惊人的钱，而他们的许多投资者却经历了失去的十年。业绩来来去去，费用从不动摇。

The bet also taught another lesson: markets are generally rational, but occasionally do crazy things. Seizing those opportunities does not require great intelligence, an economics degree or Wall Street jargon. Investors need the ability to disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and focus on simple fundamentals. They must also be willing to look unimaginative, or even foolish, for a sustained period.

这场赌局还带来另一课：市场通常是理性的，但偶尔会做疯狂的事。抓住这些机会并不需要非凡智力、经济学学位，或熟悉华尔街的 alpha、beta 术语。投资者需要的是能够无视群体恐惧或狂热，专注于几个简单基本面；他们还必须愿意在相当长时间里显得缺乏想象力，甚至看起来愚蠢。

Protégé and I originally funded the $1 million prize by buying $500,000 face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds each. They cost $318,250 and would pay $500,000 in ten years, delivering a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity.

Protégé 和我最初各自购买了面值 50 万美元的零息美国国债，为最终 100 万美元奖金提供资金。这些债券花费 318,250 美元，十年后支付 50 万美元，若持有到期，年收益率为 4.56%。

By November 2012, however, our bonds had about five years remaining and were selling at 95.7% of face value, yielding only 0.88% annually. Compared with American equities, they had become a dumb investment. Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds and buy 11,200 Berkshire B shares. Girls Inc. of Omaha consequently received $2,222,279 rather than the originally hoped-for $1 million.

然而到 2012 年 11 月，我们的债券还剩约五年到期，却按面值 95.7% 的价格交易，年化到期收益率仅 0.88%。与美国股票相比，它们已成为一项愚蠢的投资。Protégé 和我同意卖出债券，买入 11,200 股伯克希尔 B 类股。因此，奥马哈 Girls Inc. 最终收到 2,222,279 美元，而不是原先希望的 100 万美元。

Berkshire did not need brilliance after the 2012 switch. Its gain only had to beat the 0.88% bond bogey, hardly a Herculean achievement. I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 did not produce at least $1 million.

2012 年转换后，伯克希尔并不需要表现辉煌。它的收益只需要超过 0.88% 的债券基准，这几乎不是赫拉克勒斯式的壮举。为消除慈善机构的风险，我同意如果 2017 年末出售伯克希尔股票所得不足 100 万美元，我会补足差额。

Investing means forgoing consumption today in an attempt to allow greater consumption later. By that standard, supposedly risk-free long-term bonds in 2012 were far riskier than a long-term investment in common stocks. For any day, week or even year, stocks are far riskier than short-term U.S. bonds. But as an investor's horizon lengthens, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming sensible purchase prices relative to interest rates.

投资意味着放弃今天的消费，试图在未来获得更多消费。按这个标准，2012 年所谓“无风险”的长期债券，远比长期投资普通股风险更高。在任何一天、一周甚至一年里，股票都远比短期美国债券风险高。但随着投资者期限拉长，一个分散的美国股票组合会逐渐比债券风险更低，前提是买入价格相对于当时利率是合理的。

It is a terrible mistake for long-term investors - pension funds, endowments and savings-minded individuals among them - to measure investment risk by the ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.

对于长期投资者——包括养老金、大学捐赠基金和注重储蓄的个人——用债券与股票比例来衡量投资风险是严重错误。很多时候，投资组合中的高等级债券反而会增加风险。

A final lesson from the bet: stick with big, easy decisions and eschew activity. During ten years, more than 200 hedge-fund managers likely made tens of thousands of decisions. Protégé and I made only one investment decision: selling bonds priced at more than 100 times earnings and moving into Berkshire, a single security owning a diversified group of solid businesses.

赌局的最后一课是：坚持重大而简单的决策，避开频繁活动。十年里，200 多位对冲基金经理很可能做了数万次买卖决策。Protégé 和我只做了一次投资决策：卖出以超过 100 倍“盈利”定价的债券，转入伯克希尔这一单一证券，而它本身拥有一组多元化且稳健的企业。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting falls on May 5 and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, going live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Interviews and the meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin. The partnership with Yahoo! began in 2016 and shareholders have responded enthusiastically; last year real-time viewership increased 72% to about 3.1 million and replays of short segments totaled 17.1 million.

年度股东大会将于 5 月 5 日举行，并再次由 Yahoo! 进行网络直播，直播将于中部夏令时间上午 8:45 开始。访谈和会议都将同步翻译成普通话。我们与 Yahoo! 的合作始于 2016 年，股东反响热烈；去年实时观看人数增长 72%，约达 310 万人，短片回放总数达 1,710 万次。

For those attending in person, CenturyLink doors open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. The shareholder movie begins at 8:30, the Q&A runs from 9:15 to 3:30 with a one-hour lunch break, and the formal shareholder meeting begins at 3:45. On Friday, May 4, Berkshire exhibitors will be open from noon to 5 p.m.

对于现场参会者，CenturyLink 会场周六上午 7:00 开门。股东电影 8:30 开始；问答环节从 9:15 到 3:30，中间有一小时午餐休息；正式股东大会 3:45 开始。5 月 4 日周五，伯克希尔展商将从中午开放至下午 5 点。

The shopping venue will be a 194,300-square-foot hall adjoining the meeting. Products from dozens of subsidiaries will be for sale. Brooks will again offer a commemorative running shoe, GEICO will quote insurance and in most jurisdictions offer a shareholder discount, and the Bookworm will sell more than 40 books and DVDs.

购物场地是一个紧邻会议大厅、面积 194,300 平方英尺的展厅，数十家子公司的产品将在那里出售。Brooks 将再次提供纪念跑鞋；GEICO 将提供保险报价，并在多数辖区给予股东折扣；Bookworm 将销售 40 多种书籍和 DVD。

Nebraska Furniture Mart will again offer Berkshire Weekend discount pricing from May 1 through May 7. Last year the Omaha store's one-week volume was $44.6 million. Borsheims will host shareholder-only events, including a Friday cocktail reception and Sunday gala, with shareholder prices available from April 30 through May 12.

Nebraska Furniture Mart 将在 5 月 1 日至 5 月 7 日再次提供“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年奥马哈门店一周销售额高达 4,460 万美元。Borsheims 将举办仅限股东参加的活动，包括周五鸡尾酒会和周日庆典，并从 4 月 30 日至 5 月 12 日提供股东价格。

At Borsheims on Sunday afternoon, bridge experts Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg will be available to play with shareholders. Ariel Hsing, who represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics, will take on table-tennis challengers. Gorat's will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6.

周日下午，在 Borsheims 楼上，桥牌专家 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg 将与股东打牌。曾代表美国参加 2012 年奥运会的 Ariel Hsing 将接受乒乓球挑战。Gorat's 将于 5 月 6 日周日专门为伯克希尔股东开放。

The same three financial journalists will lead the Q&A: Carol Loomis, Becky Quick and Andrew Ross Sorkin. Three analysts will also ask questions: Gary Ransom for insurance, and Jonathan Brandt and Gregg Warren for non-insurance operations. Neither Charlie nor I will receive any clue about the questions in advance. Our goal is for you to leave knowing more about Berkshire and to have a good time in Omaha.

同样三位财经记者将主持问答：Carol Loomis、Becky Quick 和 Andrew Ross Sorkin。三位分析师也会提问：Gary Ransom 负责保险相关问题，Jonathan Brandt 和 Gregg Warren 负责非保险业务问题。查理和我事先不会得到任何问题提示。我们的目标是让你离开时比来时更了解伯克希尔，并在奥马哈度过愉快时光。

We try to release financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays so all shareholders simultaneously receive new information and have time to digest it before trading. We do not speak one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts. No shareholder is more important to us than the person of limited means who trusts us with a substantial part of his or her savings.

我们尽量在周五较晚或周六清晨发布财务数据，让所有股东能够同时获得新信息，并在交易前有时间消化。我们不与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一沟通。对我们来说，没有谁比那位收入有限、却把自己大部分积蓄托付给我们的股东更重要。

Our operating managers are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if those businesses were the only asset owned by their families. Many have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business home runs means as much to them as their paycheck. If managers or directors own Berkshire shares, it is because they bought them in the open market or received them when selling businesses to us. None gets the upside without risking the downside.

我们的经营经理人是真正的全明星。他们经营自己的业务，就像那些业务是其家族唯一资产一样。许多人在财务上并不需要工作；打出商业本垒打的快乐，对他们而言与薪水同样重要。如果经理人或董事持有伯克希尔股票，那是因为他们在公开市场买入，或是在把企业卖给我们时取得。没有人只享受上涨而不承担下跌风险。

We continue to have a wonderful headquarters team. They efficiently handle SEC and regulatory requirements, a 32,700-page federal income tax return, 3,935 state tax returns, shareholder and media inquiries, the annual report, the annual meeting, board coordination, fact-checking this letter, university visits, my travel, and even hamburgers and French fries with Heinz ketchup for lunch. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.

我们总部仍然拥有一支出色团队。他们高效处理 SEC 和其他监管要求、32,700 页的联邦所得税申报表、3,935 份州税申报表、股东和媒体询问、年报、年度股东大会、董事会协调、本信件事实核查、大学来访、我的旅行，甚至还帮我准备午餐的汉堡和蘸 Heinz 番茄酱的薯条。他们为在伯克希尔工作而自豪，我也为他们自豪。

I have saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire's board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors and designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation.

我把最好的消息留到了最后。2018 年初，伯克希尔董事会选举 Ajit Jain 和 Greg Abel 为董事，并任命两人为副董事长。Ajit 现在负责保险业务，Greg 负责其余业务。查理和我将专注于投资和资本配置。

You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and Berkshire's blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all.

你我都很幸运，有 Ajit 和 Greg 为我们工作。他们都已在伯克希尔工作数十年，伯克希尔的血液流淌在他们的血管里。两人的品格与才华相称。这就说明了一切。

Come to Omaha - the cradle of capitalism - on May 5 and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to your visit.

5 月 5 日，请来到奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——见见伯克希尔这一大家子。我们所有人都期待你的到来。

February 24, 2018

2018 年 2 月 24 日

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席