1968年1月24日致合伙人信
1967 年合伙企业取得了良好业绩，但投机盛行，巴菲特分析了各类投资表现，并回顾了控股公司收购情况。
Our Performance in 1967
1967 年业绩
By most standards, we had a good year in 1967. Our overall performance was plus 35.9% compared to plus 19.0% for the Dow, thus surpassing our previous objective of performance ten points superior to the Dow. Our overall gain was $19,384,250 which, even under accelerating inflation, will buy a lot of Pepsi. And, due to the sale of some longstanding large positions in marketable securities, we had realized taxable income of $27,376,667 which has nothing to do with 1967 performance but should give all of you a feeling of vigorous participation in The Great Society on April 15th.
无论以何种标准衡量，1967 年我们都度过了不错的一年。我们的整体收益为 35.9%，相比之下道指为 19.0%，因此超出了我们此前设定的跑赢道指十个百分点的目标。总收益为 19,384,250 美元，即便在加速通胀的情况下，也能买很多百事可乐。而且，由于出售了一些长期持有的大量公开市场头寸，我们实现了 27,376,667 美元的应税收入，这与 1967 年的业绩无关，但应该会让各位在 4 月 15 日时切实感受到自己是“伟大社会”的积极参与者。
The minor thrills described above are tempered by any close observation of what really took place in the stock market during 1967. Probably a greater percentage of participants in the securities markets did substantially better than the Dow last year than in virtually any year in history. In 1967, for many, it rained gold and it paid to be out playing the bass tuba. I don't have a final tabulation at this time but my guess is that at least 95% of investment companies following a common stock program achieved better results than the Dow - in many cases by very substantial amounts. It was a year when profits achieved were in inverse proportion to age - and I am in the geriatric ward, philosophically.
上述小兴奋，如果对 1967 年股票市场的真实情况稍加审视，就会降温不少。去年，证券市场参与者跑赢道指的比例，可能比历史上任何一年都高。1967 年，对许多人来说，天上掉金子，出去吹低音大号很合算。我现在还没有最终统计，但我估计至少 95% 的股票型投资公司业绩都超过了道指，很多幅度还很大。这一年，利润与年龄成反比——而从理念上讲，我已处于养老病房。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
以下是道指、合伙企业（未扣除普通合伙人分成，即超出 6% 部分的四分之一）以及有限合伙人逐年收益的汇总：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 年份 | 道指整体收益率(1) | 合伙企业收益率(2) | 有限合伙人收益率(3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(1) 基于道指每年价值变化加上持有道指所获得的股息。表格包括合伙企业运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957-61 年为所有前身有限合伙企业在该年度完整运营后的合并结果，扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957-61 年基于合伙企业收益率根据现行合伙协议计算普通合伙人分成，但未扣除有限合伙人月度提款。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
按累计或复利基础计算，结果如下：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.3% | 29.4% | 23.6% |
| 年份 | 道指整体收益 | 合伙企业收益 | 有限合伙人收益 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 年复合增长率 | 9.3% | 29.4% | 23.6% |
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they have stood at the top in size since BPL was formed - this year, however, Dreyfus Fund overtook them) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
以下是通常的对照表，显示了过去最大的两家共同基金（自 BPL 成立以来一直位居规模榜首——但今年 Dreyfus Fund 超过了它们）的业绩，它们通常将 95-100% 投资于普通股，以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| Cumulative Results | 162.3% | 147.6% | 206.2% | 181.5% | 165.3% | 932.6% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.2% | 8.6% | 10.7% | 9.9% | 9.3% | 23.6% |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托(1) | 投资者股票基金(1) | 雷曼公司(2) | 三洲公司(2) | 道指 | 有限合伙人 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 累计结果 | 162.3% | 147.6% | 206.2% | 181.5% | 165.3% | 932.6% |
| 年复合增长率 | 9.2% | 8.6% | 10.7% | 9.9% | 9.3% | 23.6% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1967 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1966. Estimated for 1967.
(1) 根据年内资产价值变化加上对记录持有人的分配计算。
(2) 1957-1966 年数据来自 1967 年 Moody's 银行与金融手册，1967 年为估计值。
Last year I said:
去年我曾说过：
> “A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
> “少数共同基金和一些私人投资机构取得了远优于道指的业绩，在某些情况下甚至大幅超越了巴菲特合伙有限公司。它们的投资方法与我们的通常大相径庭，也超出了我的能力范围。”
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks -but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
1967 年，这种情况愈演愈烈。许多投资机构的表现大幅优于 BPL，收益高达 100% 以上。由于这些惊人的业绩，资金、人才和精力都汇聚在一起，全力追求快速获取巨额股市利润。在我看来，这看起来像是大幅加剧的投机，伴随相应风险——但许多倡导者坚称并非如此。
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).” During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’t have some discomfort.
我的导师本·格雷厄姆曾说：“投机既不违法、不道德，也不会让人（财务上）长肉。”过去一年，一直吃投机糖果可能会让财务变得虚胖。我们继续吃燕麦，但如果大家普遍消化不良，指望我们毫无不适是不现实的。
Analysis of 1967 Results
1967 年业绩分析
The overall figures given earlier conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio category during 1967.
前面给出的总体数据掩盖了 1967 年投资组合各类别盈利能力之间的巨大差异。
We had our worst performance in history in the “Workout” section. In the 1965 letter, this category was defined as,
我们在“套利类”方面经历了历史上最差的业绩。1965 年的信中将这一类别定义为：
> “...securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity -- sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category, we are not talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk does not pertain primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected corporate development does not materialize.”
> “……有明确时间表的证券。它们源于公司活动——出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在这一类别中，我们谈论的不是关于此类发展的谣言或内幕消息，而是公开宣布的此类活动。我们等到可以从报纸上读到。风险主要不在于整体市场行为（尽管有时在一定程度上相关），而在于打乱计划的因素使预期的公司发展未能实现。”
The streets were filled with upset applecarts - our applecarts - during 1967. Thus, on an average investment of $17,246,879, our overall gain was $153,273. For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of 1%. While I don't have complete figures. I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year. As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments in the workout category in just a few situations per year. This technique gives more variation in yearly results than would be the case if we used an across-the-board approach. I believe our approach will result in as great (or greater) profitability on a long-term basis, but you can't prove it by 1967.
1967 年，街上到处都是被打翻的苹果车——我们的苹果车。因此，在平均投资 17,246,879 美元的情况下，我们的总收益仅为 153,273 美元。对于那些计算尺量不到如此侮辱性深度的人来说，这意味着 0.89% 的回报率。虽然我没有完整的数字，但我怀疑我们在以往任何一年低于过 10%。与其他类别一样，我们倾向于将套利类投资集中在每年仅有的几个情况上。与采用全面分散的方法相比，这种技巧会导致年度业绩波动更大。我相信我们的方法在长期会带来同样（或更高）的盈利能力，但 1967 年无法证明这一点。
Our investment in controlled companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967, but this is to be expected in strong markets. On an average investment of $20,192,776 we had an overall gain of $2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of performance, even though this category will continue to underperform if the market continues strong during 1968. Through our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway), we acquired two new enterprises in 1967. Associated Cotton Shops and National Indemnity (along with National Fire & Marine, an affiliated company). These acquisitions couldn't be more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or better. The principal selling executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt, have continued to do a superb job (the only kind they know), and in every respect have far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.
我们在控股公司上的投资同样拖累了 1967 年的相对业绩，但这在强劲的市场中是意料之中的。在平均投资 20,192,776 美元的情况下，我们的总收益为 2,894,571 美元。我对这种表现感到满意，尽管如果市场在 1968 年继续走强，这一类别仍将表现落后。通过我们的两家控股公司（多元化零售公司和伯克希尔·哈撒韦），我们于 1967 年收购了两家新企业：联合棉布商店和国家赔偿公司（连同其关联公司国家火险与海事保险公司）。这些收购令人无比满意。一切都符合宣传甚至更好。主要销售高管本·罗斯纳和杰克·林格沃特继续出色地工作（他们只会如此），在各方面都远远超出了他们的承诺。
The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives discussed in the October 9th letter. When I am dealing with people I like, in businesses I find stimulating (what business isn't ?), and achieving worthwhile overall returns on capital employed (say, 10-12%), it seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible to me to trade known pleasant personal relationships with high grade people, at a decent rate of return, for possible irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns. Hence, we will continue to keep a portion of our capital (but not over 40% because of the possible liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our partnership agreement) invested in controlled operating businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in an aggressive stock market operation.
控股公司活动的令人满意的性质，是 10 月 9 日信中讨论缓和的投资目标的一个次要原因。当我与我喜欢的人打交道，在我觉得刺激的行业（什么行业不是呢？），并且能获得可观的资本回报（比如 10-12%）时，为了多赚几个百分点而四处奔波显得很愚蠢。在我看来，为了可能更高的回报，用已知的愉快的人际关系和高素质的人来换取可能的烦恼、激怒甚至更糟，也是不明智的。因此，我们将继续将一部分资本（但不超过 40%，因为合伙协议的性质可能产生流动性要求）投资于控股运营企业，预期回报率低于积极股票市场操作的内在水平。
With a combined total of $37,439,655 in workouts and controls producing an overall gain of only $3,047,844, the more alert members of the class will have already concluded we had a whale of a year in the "Generals - Relatively Undervalued" category. On a net average investment of $19,487,996, we had an overall gain of $14,096,593, or 72%. Last year I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed the general market in 1964, 1965 and 1966 and because of its size (the largest proportion we have ever had in anything - we hit our 40% limit) had a very material impact on our overall results and, even more so, this category. This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this single security. Our holdings of this security have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.
套利类和控股类合计投资 37,439,655 美元，总收益仅为 3,047,844 美元，班上较敏锐的成员应该已经得出结论，我们在“低估类（相对低估）”类别上大获丰收。在平均净投资 19,487,996 美元的情况下，我们获得了 14,096,593 美元的总收益，即 72%。去年我提到过一项投资，它在 1964、1965 和 1966 年大幅跑赢大盘，并且由于其规模（我们在任何投资中持有过的最大比例——达到了 40% 的上限），对我们的整体业绩产生了重大影响，对这一类别的影响更大。这一优异表现在 1967 年持续，总收益的很大一部分再次来自这只证券。我们已大幅减持该证券，目前这一类别中没有任何投资在规模或潜力上能与之相媲美。
The "Generals - Private Owner" section produced good results last year ($1,297,215 on $5,141,710 average investment), and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in this area at present.
“低估类（私人所有者）”部分去年产生了良好收益（平均投资 5,141,710 美元，收益 1,297,215 美元），目前我们在这一领域有一些略有趣味的可能性。
Miscellaneous
其他事项
We begin the new year with net assets of $68,108,088. We had partners with capital of about $1,600,000 withdraw at yearend, primarily because of the reduced objectives announced in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them, since most of them have the ability and motivation to surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for results that I probably can't attain under present conditions.
新年伊始，我们的净资产为 68,108,088 美元。年终约有 1,600,000 美元的合伙人资本撤出，主要因为 10 月 9 日信中宣布了降低的目标。这对他们来说很合理，因为他们中的大多数人有能力和动力超越我们的目标，而我也从追求在当前条件下可能无法达到的结果中解脱出来。
Some of those who withdrew (and many who didn't) asked me, "What do you really mean?" after receiving the October 9th letter. This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author, but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said. I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is, “Definitely, no”. As long as partners want to put up their capital alongside of mine and the business is operationally pleasant (and it couldn't be better), I intend to continue to do business with those who have backed me since tennis shoes.
一些撤资的合伙人（以及许多未撤资的）在收到 10 月 9 日信后问我：“你到底是什么意思？”这种问题对任何作者来说都有点伤人，但我向他们保证我说的就是字面意思。也有人问我这是不是合伙企业逐步解散的初始阶段。答案是：“绝对不是。”只要合伙人愿意与我共同出资，且业务运营愉快（简直不能再好了），我打算继续与那些从我穿网球鞋时就开始支持我的人共事。
Gladys Kaiser has joined us and is doing the same sort of top-notch job that we have long received from Donna, Bill and John. The office group, spouses and children have over $15 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1968, so we have not had a need for NoDoz during business hours.
格拉迪斯·凯泽加入了我们，她的工作同样出色，就像我们长期以来从唐娜、比尔和约翰那里得到的一样。办公室团队、配偶和子女在 1968 年 1 月 1 日持有超过 1500 万美元的 BPL 投资，因此我们在工作时间不需要 NoDoz 提神。
Within a few days, you will receive:
几天之内，你将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1967 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1967, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1968. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封税务信，提供你 1967 年联邦所得税申报所需的 BPL 全部信息。该信函是唯一具有税务效力的文件。
- 皮特·马威克·米切尔会计师事务所出具的 1967 年审计报告（他们又一次出色地完成了工作），列明 BPL 的运营和财务状况以及你的个人资本账户。
- 一封由我签署的信，载明截至 1968 年 1 月 1 日你的 BPL 权益状况，与审计数据完全一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July15th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果本信或年内发生的任何事情需要澄清，请告知我。我的下一封信将在 7 月 15 日左右，总结今年上半年情况。
Cordially,
谨上，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特