1993 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3% compounded annually.

1993 年我们的每股账面价值增长了 14.3%。在过去 29 年（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值从 19 美元增长到 8,854 美元，年复合增长率为 23.3%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5 billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free to fast-forward through this discussion:

年内，伯克希尔的净资产增加了 15 亿美元，这一数字受到两项负面和两项正面非营业项目的影响。为完整起见，我在此解释一下。如果你对会计不感兴趣，可以跳过这部分讨论：

1. The first negative was produced by a change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized appreciation in the securities we carry at market value. The old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place. Therefore, at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34% on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after 1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains generated before that. The new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains. The rate in the first quarter of 1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%. Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains reduced net worth by $70 million.

1. 第一项负面影响是由公认会计原则（GAAP）的一项变动引起的，该变动涉及我们对按市值入账的证券未实现增值所计提的税收。旧规则规定，使用的税率应为增值发生时的有效税率。因此，在 1992 年底，我们对 1986 年后产生的 64 亿美元收益使用 34% 的税率，对 1986 年前产生的 12 亿美元收益使用 28% 的税率。新规则规定，所有收益均应适用当前税率。1993 年第一季度该规则生效时的税率为 34%。将这一税率应用于我们 1987 年前的收益，使净资产减少了 7000 万美元。

1. The second negative, related to the first, came about because the corporate tax rate was raised in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This change required us to make an additional charge of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and that charge penalized net worth by $75 million. Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the one described above to be deducted from the earnings we report, even though the unrealized appreciation that gave rise to the charges was never included in earnings, but rather was credited directly to net worth.

1. 第二项负面影响与第一项相关，原因是公司税率在 1993 年第三季度提高到了 35%。这一变动要求我们对所有未实现收益额外计提 1% 的费用，这笔费用使净资产减少了 7500 万美元。奇怪的是，GAAP 要求将这笔费用和上述费用都从我们报告的利润中扣除，尽管引发这些费用的未实现增值从未计入利润，而是直接计入净资产。

1. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own. In recent years, both the common stocks and certain common-equivalent securities held by our insurance companies have been valued at market, whereas equities held by our non-insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company were carried at their aggregate cost or market, whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all common stocks should be carried at market, a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993. This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172 million.

1. 1993 年 GAAP 的另一项变动影响我们持仓证券的估值方式。近年来，我们保险公司持有的普通股和某些类普通股证券按市值估值，而非保险子公司或母公司持有的股票则按成本与市价孰低法估值。现在 GAAP 规定所有普通股都应按市值入账，我们从 1993 年第四季度开始遵循这一规则。这一变动使伯克希尔报告净资产增加了约 1.72 亿美元。

1. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a transaction described in last year's Annual Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46 million convertible debentures that we had called for redemption. Additionally, we issued 25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a purchase discussed later in this report. The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about $478 million. Per-share book value also grew, because the shares issued in these transactions carried a price above their book value.

1. 最后，我们去年发行了一些股票。在去年年报中描述的一笔交易中，我们于 1993 年 1 月初因 4600 万美元可转换债券被赎回而发行了 3,944 股。此外，我们在收购 Dexter 鞋业时发行了 25,203 股（本次收购将在后文讨论）。总体结果是，我们的流通股增加了 29,147 股，净资产增加了约 4.78 亿美元。由于这些交易中发行的股票价格高于其账面价值，每股账面价值也有所增长。

Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value, that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated. Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting.

当然，重要的是每股内在价值，而非账面价值。账面价值是一个会计术语，衡量投入企业的资本（包括留存收益）。内在价值是对企业剩余生命周期内可以提取的现金的现值估计。在大多数公司，这两者不相关。然而伯克希尔是个例外：我们的账面价值虽然远低于内在价值，但作为追踪这一关键数字的有用工具。1993 年，两个指标都增长了约 14%，这个进展我称之为令人满意但不够激动人心。

These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain - 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course, market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of these companies could not continuously overperform their businesses.

然而，这些收益被伯克希尔股价更大涨幅（39%）所超越。当然，长期来看，市场价格和内在价值会大致趋于一致。但短期两者经常出现严重背离，这一现象我过去讨论过。两年前，我们所持重仓股可口可乐和吉列的股价涨幅远超其盈利增长。在 1991 年年报中，我曾说这些公司的股票不可能持续跑赢其业务本身。

From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words, the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names. Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.

从 1991 年到 1993 年，可口可乐和吉列的每股年度营业收益分别增长了 38% 和 37%，但其股价仅上涨了 11% 和 6%。换句话说，公司的表现优于股票，这一结果无疑部分反映了华尔街对品牌的新担忧。无论原因如何，长期来看重要的是这些公司的盈利表现。如果它们繁荣，伯克希尔也会繁荣，尽管不会完全同步。

Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919 at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share, with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-run, the market is a weighing machine."

让我补充一个历史教训：可口可乐于 1919 年以每股 40 美元上市。到 1920 年底，市场冷冰冰地重新评估可口可乐的未来前景，将股价打压超过 50%，跌至 19.50 美元。到 1993 年底，这一股股票（股息再投资）价值超过 210 万美元。正如本·格雷厄姆所说：“短期来看，市场是一台投票机——反映的是一项只要求金钱、不要求智力或情绪稳定性的选民登记测试——但长期来看，市场是一台称重机。”

So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an ever-more difficult target to hit.

那么，应该如何看待伯克希尔去年股价超越基本面的表现？显然，1993 年底伯克希尔的股价相对于内在价值的比例高于年初。另一方面，在一个长期利率为 6% 或 7% 的世界里，如果——你们应该明白这是一个巨大的“如果”——查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长）和我能够实现我们长期以来的目标，即以平均每年 15% 的速度增长每股内在价值，那么伯克希尔的股价并非不合理。我们并未放弃这一目标。但我们再次强调，正如我们多年来一直强调的，资本基础的增长使得 15% 的目标越来越难以实现。

What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about this group.

我们拥有的优势是：一个不断增长的、规模可观且经营良好的企业群体，它们的经济特征从良好到出色不等，由绩效从出色到出色的管理者打理。你们无需为这一群体担心。

The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us, has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are happy to report an important success in 1993.

查理和我在母公司利用我们经理人交付的资金进行的资本配置工作，其结果不太确定：找到与我们现有业务和管理者相当的新业务和新管理者并非易事。尽管有困难，查理和我热爱这项搜寻工作，并很高兴地报告 1993 年取得了一项重要成功。

Dexter Shoe

Dexter 鞋业

What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H. H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of 1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again, results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine, which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes. Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business lifetimes.

我们去年的行动是在 1991 年收购 H. H. Brown 的基础上进行的，这是一家管理出色的工作鞋、靴子和其他鞋类制造商。Brown 是一个真正的赢家：尽管我们一开始就抱有很高期望，但由于弗兰克·鲁尼、吉姆·伊斯勒以及与他们共事的有才华的管理者，这些期望已被大大超越。因为对弗兰克团队的信心，我们在 1992 年底又收购了 Lowell Shoe。Lowell 是一家历史悠久的女士和护士鞋制造商，但其业务需要一些调整。结果再次超出了我们的预期。因此，去年我们迅速抓住了收购缅因州 Dexter 的 Dexter 鞋业的机会，该公司生产价格实惠的男女鞋。我可以向你们保证，Dexter 不需要任何调整：它是查理和我在我们商业生涯中见过的最佳管理公司之一。

Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25 cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000 of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew. The two of them have since built a business that now produces over 7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H. Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all comers.

哈罗德·阿尔方德 20 岁时开始在鞋厂工作，时薪 25 美分。1956 年，他用 1 万美元资本创立了 Dexter。1958 年，他的侄子彼得·隆德加入。他们两人随后建立起一家企业，如今每年生产超过 750 万双鞋，大部分在缅因州生产，其余在波多黎各。你可能知道，一般认为美国国内鞋业无法与来自低工资国家的进口产品竞争。但似乎没人告诉 Dexter 和 H. H. Brown 富有创造力的管理层以及他们熟练的劳动大军，这两家公司在美国的工厂对所有竞争对手都具有高度竞争力。

Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output. Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.

Dexter 的业务包括 77 家零售店，主要位于东北部。该公司也是高尔夫球鞋的主要制造商，产量约占美国总产量的 15%。但它的看家本领是为传统零售商制造传统鞋，这项工作它做得非常出色：去年 Nordstrom 和 J.C. Penney 都因 Dexter 在 1992 年作为供应商的表现而授予其特别奖项。

Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.

我们 1993 年的业绩仅包括从合并日（11 月 7 日）起的 Dexter。1994 年，我们预计伯克希尔的鞋业业务销售额将超过 5.5 亿美元，如果这些业务的合计税前利润超过 8500 万美元，我们也不会感到惊讶。五年前，我们从未想过进入鞋业。现在我们在该行业有 7,200 名员工，我开车上班时会唱《没有比鞋业更好的生意》。这就是战略规划的写照。

At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.

在伯克希尔，我们对未来没有预设要进入哪些业务或行业的看法。事实上，我们认为如果一家企业巨头按照某种宏大愿景进行新的冒险，对其股东通常是有害的。我们更喜欢专注于我们希望拥有的业务的经济特征，以及我们希望合作的管理者的个人品质——然后希望我们运气好，能将两者结合。在 Dexter 身上，我们做到了。

And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect, was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can pursue varying financial paths without running into the complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a private business.

现在我们暂停一下，插播一则短广告：尽管他们拥有一颗企业宝石，但我们相信哈罗德和彼得（他们对现金不感兴趣）用 Dexter 的股票换取伯克希尔股份是一个明智的决定。他们实际上是用一项出色业务的 100% 权益换取了大量出色业务的一小部分权益。他们在这次交换中没有产生税收，现在拥有的证券可以轻松用于慈善或个人赠予，也可以按他们自己选择的金额和时间转换为现金。如果他们的家庭成员愿意，他们可以追求不同的财务路径，而不会遇到资产集中在私人企业中时常出现的复杂情况。

For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire, in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will always match that of all other owners.

出于税收和其他原因，私营公司通常也难以在其行业之外进行多元化。相比之下，伯克希尔可以轻松实现多元化。因此，将所有权转移到伯克希尔，Dexter 的股东解决了再投资问题。此外，尽管哈罗德和彼得现在持有的是伯克希尔的非控股股份，而非 Dexter 的控股股份，但他们知道他们会得到合作伙伴般的对待，我们会遵循以所有者为导向的做法。如果他们选择保留伯克希尔股份，从合并日起他们的投资结果将与我的结果完全一致。由于我将净资产的很大一部分终身投入伯克希尔股票——而且公司不会向我发行限制性股票或股票期权——我的盈亏方程将始终与所有其他所有者相同。

Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will get to run their business - an activity they dearly love - exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not tell .400 hitters how to swing.

此外，哈罗德和彼得知道在伯克希尔我们信守承诺：在未来几十年里，伯克希尔不会发生控制权或文化的变更。最后也是最重要的是，哈罗德和彼得可以肯定，他们将像合并前一样继续经营自己的业务——这是他们热爱的活动。在伯克希尔，我们不会告诉击球率 0.400 的击球手如何挥棒。

What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.

对哈罗德和彼得明智的做法，可能对其他一些大型私营企业的所有者也是明智的。所以，如果你有一家可能合适的企业，请与我联系。我们的收购标准在第 22 页的附录中列出。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告盈利来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在此列示中，商誉摊销和其他重大购买价格会计调整不分配到具体业务，而是汇总单独列示。这种处理让你可以看到我们业务的盈利，如同我们没有收购它们时报告的那样。在过去的报告中，我解释过为什么我们认为这种列示形式比使用 GAAP（要求逐项业务进行购买价格调整）对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，表中显示的总净利润与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

*Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired, November 7, 1993.
**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer Finance businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums paid on the early redemption of debt.

*包括 Dexter 自 1993 年 11 月 7 日收购之日起的盈利。
**不包括商业与消费金融业务的利息费用。1992 年包含提前赎回债务支付的 2250 万美元溢价。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.

关于这些业务的大量信息见第 38-49 页，你也可以在那里找到按 GAAP 报告的分部盈利。此外，在第 52-59 页，我们按非 GAAP 基础将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个分部，这种列示与查理和我的思维方式一致。我们的意图是提供我们希望在我们角色互换时你提供给我们的财务信息。

"Look-Through" Earnings

“透视”盈利

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges.

我们之前讨论过透视盈利，我们认为它比我们的 GAAP 结果更能准确描绘伯克希尔的盈利。按照我们的计算，透视盈利包括：（1）上一节报告的营业收益，加上；（2）主要被投资公司中根据 GAAP 会计未反映在我们利润中的留存营业收益，减去；（3）如果这些被投资公司的留存收益分配给我们，伯克希尔本应支付的税款准备金。我们在这里说的“营业收益”不包括资本利得、特殊会计项目和重大重组费用。

Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about $1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal. Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has risen to about $1.85 billion.

如果我们的内在价值要以 15% 的速度增长，那么随着时间的推移，我们的透视盈利也必须以大约同样的速度增长。去年，我解释说，要实现 15% 的目标，我们必须在 2000 年将透视盈利提高到约 18 亿美元。由于我们在 1993 年增发了股票，所需金额已增至约 18.5 亿美元。

That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target, centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.

这是一个艰难的目标，但我们希望你们以此要求我们。过去，我们曾批评过一些管理者的做法：先射出业绩之箭，然后再画靶子，把靶心画在箭落之处。我们将反其道而行之，先画靶子再射箭，甘冒尴尬的风险。

If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms. Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on the wrong road.

要击中靶心，我们需要市场允许以合理条件购买企业和证券。目前市场困难，但市场能够——而且将会——以意想不到的方式、在意想不到的时间发生变化。与此同时，我们将努力抵制诱惑，不要仅仅因为手头现金充裕就去做一些边缘性的事情。如果你跑错了路，跑步是没有用的。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表显示了我们如何计算透视盈利，但我要提醒你，这些数字必然非常粗略。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已包含在第 8 页分项列出的营业收益中，主要是在“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest at Wesco
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives

(1) 不包括 Wesco 少数股东权益应占的股份
(2) 按年平均持股计算
(3) 不包括已实现资本利得，该利得既是经常性的大额的
(4) 使用的税率为 14%，即伯克希尔就所收股息支付的税率

We have told you that we expect the undistributed, hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297 million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million. In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our look-through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to these shares.

我们曾告诉你们，我们预期被投资公司未分配（假设已税）的盈利至少会产生等值的伯克希尔内在价值增长。迄今为止，我们远远超过了这一预期。例如，1986 年我们以每股 172.50 美元购买了 300 万股大都会/ABC 股票，去年底以每股 630 美元卖出了其中三分之一。在支付 35% 的资本利得税后，我们从这笔出售中实现了 2.97 亿美元的利润。相比之下，在我们持有这些股票的八年里，归属于它们的大都会留存收益——按照我们的透视方法假设以较低的 14% 税率征税——仅为 1.52 亿美元。换句话说，我们支付的税款远远高于我们的透视列示所假设的金额，但实现的利润却远远超过可分配至这些股票的未分配收益。

We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.

我们预计这种令人愉快的结果未来会经常出现，因此相信我们的透视盈利是对伯克希尔真实经济盈利的保守体现。

Taxes

税收

As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993 federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400 million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's 1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total paid last year by all American corporations.

正如我们出售大都会所凸显的，伯克希尔是联邦所得税的大额纳税人。我们 1993 年支付的联邦所得税总额为 3.9 亿美元，其中约 2 亿美元来自营业收益，1.9 亿美元来自已实现资本利得。此外，我们应占的被投资公司在 1993 年支付的联邦和外国所得税远超过 4 亿美元，这个数字你不会在我们的财务报表上看到，但却是真实存在的。直接和间接地，伯克希尔 1993 年支付的联邦所得税将约占去年所有美国公司支付总额的 0.5%。

Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.

就我们自己的股份而言，查理和我对这些税收毫无怨言。我们知道，我们在一个市场经济中工作，它对我们努力的回报远远比对那些对社会贡献相同或更大的人的回报更为丰厚。税收应该（也确实）部分纠正这种不公。但我们仍然受到非同寻常的优待。

Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S" corporation, two structures often used for business activities. For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do. However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated - though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes are due only when gains are realized.

如果伯克希尔作为合伙企业或“S”公司（两种常用于商业活动的结构）运营，伯克希尔及其股东合计缴纳的税款会少得多。由于多种原因，这对伯克希尔不可行。然而，我们的长期投资策略减轻了——但远未消除——公司形式带来的惩罚。即使我们经营的是免税机构，查理和我也可能坚持买入并持有的策略。我们认为这是最稳健的投资方式，也符合我们的个性。然而，支持这一政策的第三个原因是：只有在实现收益时才需要缴税。

Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior, Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage: Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2, 4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).

通过我最喜欢的连环漫画《L'il Abner》，我在年轻时有机会看到延迟纳税的好处，尽管我当时错过了这个教训。为了让读者感到优越，L'il Abner 在 Dogpatch 里快乐地、愚笨地度过了一生。有一次，他迷恋上了纽约的诱惑者 Appassionatta Van Climax，但由于他只有一枚银元，而她只对百万富翁感兴趣，他对娶她感到绝望。沮丧的 Abner 把他的问题带到了 Dogpatch 的知识源泉 Old Man Mose 那里。圣人说：把你的钱翻倍 20 次，Appassionatta 就是你的了（1, 2, 4, 8……1,048,576）。

My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse, dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.

我对这部漫画的最后记忆是 Abner 走进一家路边酒馆，把他的美元投入老虎机，中了一个头奖，钱洒了一地。Abner 一丝不苟地遵循 Mose 的建议，捡起两美元，然后去寻找下一次翻倍的机会。于是我抛弃了 Abner，开始阅读本·格雷厄姆。

Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35% federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370. Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a 35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the $1 million required to win Appassionatta.

Mose 作为大师显然被高估了：他不仅没有预料到 Abner 对指令的盲从，还忘记了税收。如果 Abner 适用伯克希尔支付的 35% 的联邦税率，并且他每年翻倍一次，那么 20 年后他只能累积到 22,370 美元。实际上，如果他继续每年翻倍并每次都支付 35% 的税，他需要再多花 7 年半才能达到赢得 Appassionatta 所需的 100 万美元。

But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or, after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130 million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million is another question.

但是，如果 Abner 将他的美元投入一项单一投资并持有直到它翻同样的 27.5 倍呢？那样的话，他的税前收益约为 2 亿美元，或者在最后一年支付 7000 万美元税款后，税后约为 1.3 亿美元。那样的话，Appassionatta 就会爬到 Dogpatch 来。当然，27.5 年过去了，Appassionatta 对一个坐拥 1.3 亿美元的人来说看起来如何，那是另一个问题了。

What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.

这个小故事告诉我们，纳税的投资者从一项以给定利率内部复利的单一投资中获得的收益，将远远大于从一系列以相同利率复利的投资中获得的收益。但我猜想许多伯克希尔股东早就明白这一点了。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

At this point in the report we've customarily provided you with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during the year.

在报告的此处，我们通常会向你们提供一张显示过去十年保险业年度“综合成本率”的表格。该比率将保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入进行比较。多年来，该比率一直高于 100，这表明承保亏损。也就是说，该行业每年从保单持有人那里收取的钱少于支付营业费用和年度内发生损失事件所需支付的金额。

Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice, many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.

与这一严峻等式相抵消的是一个更令人高兴的事实：保险公司在支付之前可以持有一段时间保单持有人的资金。原因是大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，解决理赔通常需要时间。实际上，对于某些险种，如产品责任或职业过失，损失事件发生到赔付之间可能相隔多年。

To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-but-not-yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and still break even from its insurance writings because of the earnings derived from investing this float.

简化来说，保单持有人预付的资金加上为已发生未付赔款留出的资金总和称为“浮存金”。过去，由于投资这些浮存金产生的收益，该行业能够承受 107 至 111 的综合成本率，仍能从保险承保中实现盈亏平衡。

As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business than it did then.

然而，随着利率下降，浮存金的价值已大幅降低。因此，我们过去提供的数据不再适用于行业盈利能力的逐年比较。一家公司现在以与 1980 年代相同的综合成本率承保，其业务的吸引力远不如当年。

Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect, their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to the investment operation - should be determined simply by the risk-free, long-term rate of interest.

只有将承保结果和目前可从浮存金获得的无风险收益结合起来分析，才能评估财产意外保险公司承保业务的真实经济状况。当然，保险公司利用浮存金和股东资金实现的实际投资结果也非常重要，投资者在评估管理层绩效时应仔细审查。但这应该与我们现在讨论的分析分开。浮存金的价值——实际上就是它们从保险业务转移到投资业务时的转移价格——应该简单地由无风险的长期利率决定。

On the next page we show the numbers that count in an evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.

在下一页，我们列出了评估伯克希尔保险业务的重要数字。我们通过加总损失准备金、理赔费用准备金和未到期保费准备金，再减去代理人余额、预付收购成本和分保业务相关的递延费用，计算了我们的浮存金（相对于保费收入，我们产生的浮存金数额异常大）。浮存金的成本由我们的承保损失或利润决定。在我们有承保利润的年份（包括 1993 年），浮存金成本为负，我们将承保利润与浮存金收入相加来确定保险收益。

As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31 million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.

正如你所见，去年我们的保险业务无偿使用了 26 亿美元；实际上，我们持有这些资金还获得了 3100 万美元（我们的承保利润）的报酬。这听起来不错——也确实不错——但远没有听起来那么好。

We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of "super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega-catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers.

我们之所以抑制热情，是因为我们承保了大量“超级巨灾”保单（其他保险公司和再保险公司购买这类保单以弥补其遭受特大灾害的部分损失），而去年的这项活动没有产生重大损失。正如这一事实所表明的，1993 年中西部真正灾难性的洪水并未引发超级巨灾损失，原因是从私人保险公司购买洪水保单的人非常少。

It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this single-year result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy: Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century. If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year, you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will eventually go broke.

然而，从这一年的结果就得出超级巨灾业务很出色甚至令人满意的结论，将是错误的。一个简单的例子就能说明这种谬误：假设有一个事件每世纪发生 25 次。如果你每年以 5 比 1 的赔率赌它当年不会发生，你赢的年份会远远多于输的年份。事实上，你可能连续六、七年甚至更久没有损失。但最终你会破产。

At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on super-cat coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.

在伯克希尔，我们自然认为我们获得了足够的保费，给出的赔率更像是 3.5 比 1。但我们——或任何其他人——都无法计算超级巨灾保障的真实赔率。事实上，我们需要几十年的时间才能知道我们的承保判断是否正确。

What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600 million.

我们知道的是，当损失发生时，很可能会是一个大麻烦。很可能在某些年份，伯克希尔因超级巨灾业务遭受的损失将相当于 1993 年我们从该业务中获得的利润的三到四倍。当 1992 年安德鲁飓风来袭时，我们支付了约 1.25 亿美元。由于此后我们扩大了超级巨灾业务，今天类似的风暴可能会让我们损失 6 亿美元。

So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter, we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8, it would have been a different story.

到目前为止，我们在 1994 年还是幸运的。在我写这封信时，我们估计洛杉矶地震的损失将是名义上的。但如果地震是 7.5 级而不是 6.8 级，情况就不同了。

Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies. In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business. Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the super-cat business. So these competitors are forced into offering far smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence of smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.

伯克希尔在承保超级巨灾保单方面拥有得天独厚的优势。我们拥有阿吉特·贾恩，他是目前该业务中最出色的管理者。此外，承保这些保单的公司需要巨额资本，而我们的净资产比主要竞争对手高出 10 到 20 倍。在大多数保险业务中，庞大的资源并不那么重要：保险公司可以分散其承保的风险，并在必要时分保以降低投资组合的集中度。这在超级巨灾业务中是不可能的。因此，这些竞争对手只能提供比我们小得多的限额。如果它们更大胆，就会面临特大灾难——或一系列较小灾难——将其摧毁的风险。

One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things look rosy.

我们卓越实力和声誉的一个标志是，世界上最大的四家再保险公司都从伯克希尔购买了相当可观的再保险保障。这些巨头比任何人都更清楚，检验一家再保险公司的标准是在艰难环境下赔付损失的能力和意愿，而不是在形势大好时收取保费的积极性。

One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994 operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large, sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.

一个警示：最近再保险承保能力大幅增加。再保险公司（几乎都是新成立的实体）筹集了近 50 亿美元的股本。这些新进入者自然渴望承保业务，以证明他们在吸引资本时使用的预测是合理的。这种新竞争不会影响我们 1994 年的业务；我们已经满额，主要是 1993 年承保的业务。但现在我们看到了价格恶化的迹象。如果这一趋势持续下去，我们将接受业务量大幅减少的现实，但仍会为那些需要大容量、有确切赔付能力的大型、成熟买家提供服务。

In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent results. In combination, these four units produced a significant underwriting profit and substantial float.

在我们保险业务的其他领域，我们的本州业务由罗德·埃尔德里德领导；工人赔偿业务由布拉德·金斯勒负责；信用卡业务由凯泽家族管理；National Indemnity 的传统汽车和一般责任业务由唐·沃斯特领导——所有这些都取得了出色业绩。这四个部门合计产生了显著的承保利润和可观的浮存金。

All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

总而言之，我们拥有一流的保险业务。尽管其业绩会高度波动，但该业务拥有远超其账面价值的内在价值——事实上，比伯克希尔任何其他业务都更大。

Common Stock Investments

普通股投资

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面列出我们市值超过 2.5 亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不到 100% 的子公司。

Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last, you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace.

考虑到今年的名单与去年相似，你们可能会认为管理层已经无可救药地陷入了昏睡。但我们仍然认为，放弃一家既可理解又持久出色的企业的权益通常是愚蠢的。这类企业的权益实在太难取代了。

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously - move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.

有趣的是，企业管理者在关注自己经营的业务时，都能毫不费力地理解这一点：拥有卓越长期经济价值子公司的母公司，不太可能不管价格如何就出售该实体。“为什么，”CEO 会问，“我要放弃我的皇冠明珠？”然而，同一个 CEO，在管理自己的个人投资组合时，会在经纪人的肤浅论点下随意地——甚至冲动地——从一个业务跳到另一个业务。其中最糟糕的说法可能是：“获利了结不会让你破产。”你能想象一个 CEO 用这句话来敦促董事会出售明星子公司吗？我们认为，商业上合理的做法，在股票上也同样合理：投资者通常应该以所有者拥有整家企业时表现出的同样韧性，持有一家优秀企业的一小部分。

Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938, more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before him."

之前我提到，1919 年投资 40 美元购买可口可乐公司股票可能取得的财务结果。1938 年，在可口可乐推出 50 多年后，在该饮料早已确立美国偶像地位很久之后，《财富》杂志对该公司做了一篇出色的报道。在第二段中，作者写道：“每年都有好几次，一位举足轻重的严肃投资者长时间地、满怀敬意地审视可口可乐的记录，但遗憾地得出结论：他看到的太晚了。饱和与竞争的幽灵在他面前升起。”

Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the 192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend 1993.

是的，1938 年有竞争，1993 年也有竞争。但值得注意的是，1938 年可口可乐公司销售了 2.07 亿箱软饮料（如果将其当时的加仑数换算成今天使用的 192 盎司装计算），而 1993 年它销售了约 107 亿箱，对于一个在 1938 年已经在其非常重要的行业中占据主导地位的公司来说，实物量增长了 50 倍。对于投资者来说，1938 年派对也没有结束：尽管 1919 年投资 40 美元购买一股（股息再投资）到 1938 年底已变成 3,277 美元，但如果在 1938 年新投资 40 美元购买可口可乐股票，到 1993 年底将增长到 25,000 美元。

I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story: "It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55 years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.

我忍不住再引用一句 1938 年《财富》文章中的话：“很难找出任何一家规模与可口可乐相当、销售着像可口可乐那样不变的产品、并且能拿出像可口可乐那样的十年记录的公司。”在随后的 55 年里，可口可乐的产品线有所拓宽，但令人惊讶的是，这段描述仍然如此贴切。

Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)

查理和我很久以前就得出结论，在一个投资生涯中做出数百个明智决策实在太难了。随着伯克希尔的资本急剧膨胀，能够显著影响我们业绩的投资范围急剧缩小，这一判断变得愈发有说服力。因此，我们采取了一种策略，要求我们只是在极少数时候做到聪明——而且不必太聪明。事实上，我们现在每年只满足于一个好主意。（查理说轮到我了。）

The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."

我们采取的策略排除了遵循标准分散化教条。因此许多权威人士会说，该策略一定比更传统的投资者采用的策略风险更大。我们不同意。我们认为，集中投资组合的策略如果能像应该做到的那样，提高投资者在购买前思考业务的强度以及对其经济特征的舒适度，那么它很可能会降低风险。在陈述这一观点时，我们使用词典中的定义来定义风险：“损失或受伤的可能性”。

Academics, however, like to define investment "risk" differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the "beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

然而，学术界喜欢以不同的方式定义投资“风险”，声称它是股票或股票投资组合的相对波动性——即它们与广大的股票市场相比的波动性。利用数据库和统计技能，这些学者精确地计算股票的“贝塔”——它过去的相对波动性——然后围绕这一计算结果构建晦涩的投资和资本配置理论。但是，在渴望用一个单一的统计数据来衡量风险时，他们忘记了一个基本原则：大致正确比精确错误更好。

For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 - becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?

对于企业的所有者——我们正是这样看待股东的——学术界的风险定义离题甚远，甚至产生荒谬的结果。例如，根据基于贝塔的理论，一只股价相对市场大幅下跌的股票——就像我们在 1973 年买入时的华盛顿邮报——在较低的价格下比在较高的价格下变得“风险更大”。对于一个以大幅降低的价格被提供整个公司的人来说，这种描述当时有任何意义吗？

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

事实上，真正的投资者欢迎波动。本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》第 8 章解释了原因。他介绍了“市场先生”，一个乐于助人的家伙，每天都会出现，要么从你那里买，要么卖给你，随你选择。这位先生越是躁郁，投资者可用的机会就越大。这是真的，因为剧烈波动的市场意味着稳健的企业会周期性地出现不合理的低价。无法理解这样的低价出现，怎么会被认为增加了投资者的风险——投资者完全可以忽视市场或利用其愚蠢。

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

在评估风险时，贝塔纯粹主义者会不屑于检查公司生产什么、竞争对手在做什么、或者公司使用了多少借入资金。他甚至可能更愿意不知道公司的名字。他珍视的是股票的价格历史。相比之下，我们愿意放弃了解价格历史，转而寻求任何能增进我们对公司业务理解的信息。因此，在我们买入股票后，如果市场关闭一两年，我们也不会不安。我们不需要每天报价来验证我们持有 100% 的喜诗糖果或 H. H. Brown 的幸福感。那么，我们为什么需要对我们持有的 7% 的可口可乐权益有报价呢？

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:

我们认为，投资者必须评估的真正风险是：在他预期的持有期内，他从一项投资中获得的税后总收入（包括出售时获得的收入）能否让他获得至少与最初相同的购买力，再加上初始本金适度的利息。尽管这种风险无法用工程精度计算，但在某些情况下，可以用有用的准确度来进行判断。影响这一评估的主要因素是：

1) The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;
4) The purchase price of the business;
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.

1) 能够评估业务长期经济特征的确信程度；
2) 能够评估管理层的确信程度，包括其实现业务全部潜力的能力以及明智运用现金流的能力；
3) 能够信赖管理层将业务回报输送给股东而非自己的确信程度；
4) 业务的购买价格；
5) 将经历的税收和通货膨胀水平，它们将决定投资者的购买力回报从总回报中减少的程度。

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.

这些因素可能会让许多分析师觉得模糊得难以忍受，因为它们无法从任何类型的数据库中提取。但精确量化这些事项的难度并不否定它们的重要性，也不是无法克服的。正如斯图尔特法官发现无法为淫秽制定一个测试标准，但仍然断言“我看到它就知道它”，投资者同样可以——以一种不精确但有用的方式——在不参考复杂方程或价格历史的情况下，“看到”某些投资中固有的风险。

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

真的很难得出结论说，可口可乐和吉列的长期经营风险远低于任何一家电脑公司或零售商吗？在全球范围内，可口可乐销售了所有软饮料的约 44%，吉列在刀片市场拥有超过 60% 的价值份额。撇开箭牌占主导的口香糖不谈，我不知道还有哪些重要的业务中，龙头公司长期享有如此全球性的力量。

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."

此外，可口可乐和吉列近年来实际上都增加了它们的全球市场份额。其品牌的力量、产品的属性以及分销系统的优势，赋予了它们巨大的竞争优势，在经济城堡周围筑起了保护性护城河。相比之下，普通公司每天都在没有任何此类保护手段的情况下战斗。正如彼得·林奇所说，销售大宗商品类产品的公司股票应该附带一个警告标签：“竞争可能对人的财富造成危害。”

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured? Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company - its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.

即使是随意观察商业的人，也能明显看出可口可乐或吉列的竞争优势。然而，它们股票的贝塔值与许多几乎或完全没有竞争优势的普通公司相似。我们应该从这种相似性得出结论：在衡量经营风险时，可口可乐和吉列的竞争优势对它们毫无益处吗？还是我们应该得出结论：持有一家公司一部分（其股票）的风险，在某种程度上与其业务运营中固有的长期风险脱钩？我们认为这两种结论都不合理，将贝塔等同于投资风险也没有任何意义。

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

在贝塔理论下培养出来的理论家，无法区分销售宠物石或呼啦圈的单品玩具公司与唯一产品是大富翁或芭比娃娃的另一玩具公司的内在风险。但是，如果普通投资者对消费者行为以及创造长期竞争优势或劣势的因素有合理的理解，他们完全有可能做出这样的区分。显然，每个投资者都会犯错。但是，通过将自己限制在相对较少、易于理解的案例中，一个相当聪明、见多识广且勤奋的人可以以有用的准确度判断投资风险。

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?

当然，在许多行业中，查理和我无法判断我们是在处理“宠物石”还是“芭比娃娃”。而且，即使我们花数年时间深入研究这些行业，我们也无法解决这个问题。有时是我们自己的智力缺陷阻碍了理解，其他情况下则是行业性质本身成为障碍。例如，一个必须应对快速变化技术的企业，不适合对其长期经济效益进行可靠评估。我们 30 年前预见到电视制造业或计算机行业会发生什么吗？当然没有。（大多数热情进入这些行业的投资者和企业管理者也没有。）那么，为什么查理和我现在认为我们可以预测其他快速发展的行业的未来呢？我们宁愿坚持容易的案例。当一根针就在眼前时，为什么要去干草堆里找针呢？

Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

当然，有些投资策略——例如，我们多年来的套利努力——需要广泛的分散化。如果单笔交易存在重大风险，整体风险应通过将该笔购买作为众多相互独立的承诺之一来降低。因此，你可以有意识地购买一项风险投资——一项确实有重大可能造成损失或伤害的投资——如果你认为按概率加权的收益大大超过同样加权的损失，并且如果你能承诺进行许多类似但不相关的机会。大多数风险资本家采用这种策略。如果你选择走这条路，你应该采纳拥有轮盘赌的赌场的观点，它希望看到大量行动，因为它在概率上占优，但会拒绝接受单一的巨大赌注。

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases. By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

另一种需要广泛分散化的情况是：当投资者不理解具体业务的经济特征，但仍认为长期持有美国产业符合其利益时。这类投资者应该既持有大量股票，又分批次购买。例如，通过定期投资指数基金，一无所知的投资者实际上可以超越大多数投资专业人士。矛盾的是，当“笨钱”承认自己的局限性时，它就不再是笨钱了。

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."

另一方面，如果你是一个有所了解的投资者，能够理解商业经济特征，并找到五到十家价格合理且具有重要长期竞争优势的公司，那么传统的分散化对你来说没有意义。它只会损害你的业绩，增加你的风险。我无法理解为什么这样的投资者会选择将资金投入到他的第 20 个选择，而不是简单地将这笔钱加到他的首选——那些他最了解、风险最小、同时盈利潜力最大的公司。用女先知梅·韦斯特的话说：“好东西太多可以很美妙。”

Corporate Governance

公司治理

At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What happens to this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they are still asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the query becomes: "What happens to this place if you don't get hit by a truck?"

在我们的年度股东大会上，通常会有人问：“如果你被卡车撞了，这个地方会怎么样？”我很高兴他们仍然以这种形式提出问题。不久之后，问题就会变成：“如果你没有被卡车撞，这个地方会怎么样？”

Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into the third, we will discuss all three variations.

无论如何，这些问题给了我一个讨论公司治理的理由，这是过去一年的热门话题。总的来说，我相信董事们最近已经挺直了腰杆，股东们现在比不久前更像真正的所有者。然而，公司治理的评论者很少区分上市公司中存在的三种根本不同的管理者/所有者情况。尽管董事的法律责任在所有情况下都是相同的，但他们在每种情况下促成改变的能力却不同。关注点通常落在第一种情况，因为它在企业界占主导地位。由于伯克希尔属于第二类，而且总有一天会落入第三类，我们将讨论所有三种情况。

The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case, I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders' pockets, directors must slap their hands.

第一种，也是迄今为止最常见的情况，是公司没有控股股东。在这种情况下，我认为董事们应该表现得好像有一个单一的缺席所有者，他们应该以一切恰当的方式推进其长期利益。不幸的是，“长期”给了董事们很大的回旋余地。如果他们缺乏诚信或独立思考的能力，他们可能会对股东造成巨大伤害，同时仍声称自己在为长期利益行事。但假设董事会运作良好，并且必须面对平庸或更差的管理层。那么董事们有责任更换管理层，就像一个聪明的所有者如果亲自在场会做的那样。如果有能力但贪婪的管理者越界，试图把手伸进股东的口袋太深，董事必须打他们的手。

In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational causes.

在这种简单情况下，看到自己不喜欢的东西的董事应该试图说服其他董事接受他的观点。如果他成功了，董事会将有力量做出适当的改变。但是，假设不满的董事无法让其他董事同意他。那么他应该自由地将自己的观点告知缺席的所有者。当然，董事们很少这样做。事实上，许多董事的气质与那种批判性行为不相容。但我认为，假设问题严重，这类行为并无不当。自然，抱怨的董事可以预期未被说服的董事会有力的反驳，这种前景应该会阻止持不同意见者追求琐碎或非理性的理由。

For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and ought to come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his performance against those standards.

对于刚刚讨论的董事会，我认为董事人数应该相对较少——比如说，十个或更少——并且应该主要来自外部。外部董事会成员应该为 CEO 的绩效制定标准，并且应该定期在没有他在场的情况下开会，根据这些标准评估他的表现。

The requisites for board membership should be business savvy, interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security.

董事会成员的资格应该是商业头脑、对工作的兴趣以及所有者导向。太多时候，董事的选择仅仅是因为他们有名望或能为董事会增加多样性。这种做法是错误的。此外，选择董事的错误尤其严重，因为任命很难撤销：讨人喜欢但空洞的董事永远不必担心职位安全。

The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations, it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners and management and that the directors cannot effect change except through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director can do about it except object. If the directors having no connections to the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some effect. More likely it will not.

第二种情况是伯克希尔现有的情况，即控股所有者同时也是管理者。在一些公司，这种安排通过存在拥有不成比例投票权的两类股票而得以实现。在这些情况下，董事会显然不作为所有者和管理层之间的代理人，董事除了通过说服之外无法促成改变。因此，如果所有者/管理者平庸或更差——或者越界——除了反对，董事几乎无能为力。如果与所有者/管理者没有联系的董事提出统一的论点，可能会产生一些效果。但更可能不会。

If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's shortcomings.

如果改变没有发生，且问题足够严重，外部董事应该辞职。他们的辞职将表明他们对管理层的怀疑，并将强调没有外部人士能够纠正所有者/管理者的缺点。

The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.

第三种治理情况发生在存在不参与管理的控股所有者时。这种情况的案例包括好时食品和道琼斯，它使外部董事处于潜在有用的位置。如果他们不满意于管理者的能力或诚信，他们可以直接去找所有者（可能也在董事会中）并报告他们的不满。这种情况对外部董事来说是理想的，因为他只需要向单个、可能感兴趣的所有者陈述理由，如果论点有说服力，所有者可以立即促成改变。即便如此，不满的董事也只有这一条行动路线。如果他对某个关键事项仍然不满，他别无选择，只能辞职。

Logically, the third case should be the most effective in insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds unfettered.

从逻辑上讲，第三种情况在确保一流管理方面应该是最有效的。在第二种情况下，所有者不会解雇自己；在第一种情况下，董事们往往发现很难应对平庸或轻微的越界行为。除非不满的董事能够赢得董事会的多数支持——这是一项尴尬的社交和后勤任务，特别是当管理层的行为仅仅是令人厌恶而非恶劣时——否则他们的手脚实际上被绑住了。在实践中，陷入这种情况的董事通常说服自己，留下来至少能做点好事。与此同时，管理层不受约束地继续运作。

In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder. Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily correct any mistake he makes.

在第三种情况下，所有者既不是在评判自己，也没有争取多数支持的问题。他还可以确保选出的外部董事能为董事会带来有用的素质。这些董事反过来会知道，他们给出的好建议会传到正确的耳朵里，而不是被顽固的管理层扼杀。如果控股所有者聪明且自信，他会在管理层决策上采取精英主义和亲股东的方式。此外——这一点至关重要——他可以随时纠正自己犯的任何错误。

At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent. For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager for some time.

伯克希尔目前以第二种模式运作，只要我还能正常工作，就会继续如此。补充一点，我的健康状况非常好。不管好坏，你们很可能在相当长一段时间内继续让我担任所有者/管理者。

After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie, should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do. In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of consequential amounts of stock.

我去世后，如果我妻子苏茜比我活得长，我所有的股票将归她；如果她比我先去世，则归一家基金会。在任何一种情况下，税收和遗产继承都不需要出售大量股票。

When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me. Most of our other directors are also significant owners of Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in all, we're prepared for "the truck."

当我的股票转移给我妻子或基金会时，伯克希尔将进入第三种治理模式，未来将拥有一位极其感兴趣但不参与管理的所有者，以及必须为该所有者表现的管理层。为了准备那个时刻，苏茜几年前当选为董事，1993 年我们的儿子霍华德也加入了董事会。这些家庭成员未来不会成为公司的管理者，但如果我出事，他们将代表控股权益。我们的大多数其他董事也是伯克希尔股票的重要所有者，每个人都具有很强的所有者导向。总而言之，我们已经为“卡车”做好了准备。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were recipients.

约 97% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1993 年股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划捐赠的金额为 940 万美元，共有 3,110 家慈善机构受益。

Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy - as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are clearly related to the company's business activities - differs significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations. There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures), employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching gifts or requests they make of the CEO).

伯克希尔在酌情慈善捐赠方面的做法——与其关于明显与公司业务活动相关的捐赠的政策不同——与其他上市公司显著不同。在其他公司，大多数公司捐赠是根据 CEO 的意愿（他们通常会回应社会压力）、员工（通过配捐）或董事（通过配捐或向 CEO 提出的要求）进行的。

At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is the charities favored by our owners that should receive them. We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot the bill for his picks?

在伯克希尔，我们相信公司的钱是股东的钱，就像在封闭公司、合伙企业或独资企业中一样。因此，如果要将资金用于与伯克希尔业务活动无关的事业，应该由其所有者偏爱的慈善机构来接收。我们还没有发现哪个 CEO 认为自己应该个人出资支持股东偏爱的慈善机构。那么，为什么股东要为他的选择买单呢？

Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall, for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500 registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie, however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)

补充一点，我们的计划易于管理。去年秋天，我们向 National Indemnity 借了一个人，花了两个月时间帮助我们执行来自 7,500 名注册股东的指示。我猜测，一般公司那种员工配捐计划的管理成本要高得多。事实上，我们整个公司的管理费还不到我们慈善捐赠额的一半。（然而，查理坚持要我告诉你们，我们 490 万美元管理费中有 140 万美元来自我们的公司专机“不可辩解号”。）

Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our shareholders have steered their contributions.

下面列出了股东捐赠最多的几个类别。

(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-third religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split about equally between Christian and Jewish) received 411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40% youth-related) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received 320 gifts

(a) 347 所教堂和犹太会堂收到 569 笔捐赠
(b) 283 所学院和大学收到 670 笔捐赠
(c) 244 所 K-12 学校（约三分之二世俗，三分之一宗教）收到 525 笔捐赠
(d) 288 个致力于艺术、文化或人文的机构收到 447 笔捐赠
(e) 180 个宗教社会服务机构（基督教和犹太教大致各半）收到 411 笔捐赠
(f) 445 个世俗社会服务机构（约 40% 与青年相关）收到 759 笔捐赠
(g) 153 家医院收到 261 笔捐赠
(h) 186 个健康相关组织（美国心脏协会、美国癌症协会等）收到 320 笔捐赠

Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these institutions are what many shareholders would like to support. Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30 gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that discourage or are opposed to abortion.

关于这份清单，有三点在我看来特别有趣。第一，它在某种程度上表明了人们在自主行动、不受募捐者压力或慈善机构情感诉求时选择捐款的对象。第二，上市公司的捐赠计划几乎从不允许向教堂和犹太会堂捐赠，但显然这些机构正是许多股东希望支持的。第三，我们股东的捐赠显示了相互冲突的理念：130 笔捐赠指向了认为应为女性提供便捷堕胎服务的组织，30 笔捐赠指向了不鼓励或反对堕胎的组织（教会除外）。

Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated-contributions program and asked for your comments. We received a few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several shareholders who have given stock to their children or grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per share to $10.

去年我曾告诉你们，我正在考虑提高伯克希尔股东在指定捐赠计划下可以捐赠的金额，并征求你们的意见。我们收到了一些文笔不错的反对信，理由是管理公司是我们的工作，而不是强迫股东做慈善捐赠。然而，大多数回应的股东都指出了该计划的税收效率，并敦促我们提高指定金额。几位将股票赠予子女或孙辈的股东告诉我，他们认为该计划是让年轻人从小思考捐赠话题的一个特别好方式。换句话说，这些人认为该计划既是一种教育工具，也是一种慈善工具。结果是我们确实在 1993 年将金额从每股 8 美元提高到了 10 美元。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除了伯克希尔分配的股东指定捐赠外，我们的运营业务每年平均进行约 250 万美元的捐赠（包括商品）。这些捐赠支持当地慈善机构，如联合劝募会，并为我们的业务带来大致相应的利益。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第 50-51 页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。要参与未来的计划，你必须确保你的股票以实际所有人的名义登记，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记。在 1994 年 8 月 31 日之前未如此登记的股票将没有资格参加 1994 年的计划。

A Few Personal Items

几件个人事项

Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December 3, 1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a day on which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B, who works seven days a week, for however many hours the store operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She simply postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.

B 夫人——罗斯·布朗金——于 1993 年 12 月 3 日度过了她的 100 岁生日。（蜡烛比蛋糕还贵。）那天商店原计划晚上营业。每周工作七天、商店营业多久她就工作多久的 B 夫人认为正确的决定显而易见：她只是把派对推迟到商店关门的晚上。

Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales of $200 million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any other home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in all of this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining audited financial statements, checking real estate records, or getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us.

B 夫人的故事广为人知，但值得再讲一遍。她 77 年前来到美国，不会说英语，没有受过正规教育。1937 年，她用 500 美元创立了内布拉斯加家具店。去年，该店销售额达到 2 亿美元，远远超过美国任何其他家居用品商店。我们在这一切中的角色始于十年前，当时 B 夫人将企业的控股权卖给了伯克希尔·哈撒韦，这笔交易我们没有获得经审计的财务报表、没有检查房地产记录，也没有取得任何保证。简而言之，我们相信她的话。

Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party. After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.

自然，我很高兴参加 B 夫人的生日派对。毕竟，她答应来参加我的 100 岁生日。

Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title three years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company for about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company were good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly important because The Washington Post Company has two classes of stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.

凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆去年从华盛顿邮报公司董事长职位上退休，她早在三年前就已辞去 CEO 职务。1973 年，我们以约 1000 万美元购买了该公司的股票。我们现在每年从该持仓中获得 700 万美元的股息，市值超过 4 亿美元。在我们购买时，我们知道公司的经济前景良好。但同样重要的是，查理和我得出结论，凯将证明自己是一位出色的管理者，并会体面地对待所有股东。后一个考量尤其重要，因为华盛顿邮报公司有两类股票，我们见过一些管理者滥用这种结构。

All of our judgments about this investment have been validated by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors to the Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie and I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.

我们对这项投资的所有判断都得到了事件验证。凯作为管理者的技能在过去一年得到了强调，她被《财富》杂志编辑委员会选入商业名人堂。代表我们的股东，查理和我早就将她列入伯克希尔的名人堂。

Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola, although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about 14 hours." Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known - a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important, a man who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough to associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual, invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's impossible to think about Don without feeling good.

去年的另一位退休者是可口可乐的唐·基奥，尽管用他自己的话说，他的退休持续了“大约 14 个小时”。唐是我所认识的最非凡的人之一——一个拥有巨大商业才能的人，但更重要的是，他能激发出每个有幸与他交往的人的绝对最佳状态。可口可乐希望其产品出现在一个人生命中的幸福时刻。唐·基奥作为个体，总能增加周围人的幸福感。想到唐，不可能不感到愉快。

I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California for 45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from the house where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks away; and we have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don, in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine. He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small income.

我将通过为我奥马哈的社区打个小广告来切入我和唐是如何认识的：尽管查理在加利福尼亚住了 45 年，但他儿时的家离我现在住的房子大约 200 英尺；我的妻子苏茜在 1.5 个街区之外长大；在我家邮政编码区域内大约有 125 位伯克希尔股东。至于唐，他在 1958 年买下了我家正对面的房子。那时他是一名咖啡推销员，养着一大家子，收入微薄。

The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a factor in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion investment in Coca-Cola in 1988-89. Roberto Goizueta had become CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner. The two of them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to $58 billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair of managers like this makes, even when their product has been around for 100 years.

我在那些日子里对唐形成的印象，是促成我决定让伯克希尔在 1988-89 年对可口可乐创纪录地投资 10 亿美元的一个因素。罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔于 1981 年成为可口可乐的 CEO，唐作为他的搭档。他们两人接手了一家在过去十年停滞不前的公司，并在不到 13 年的时间里将其市值从 44 亿美元提升到 580 亿美元。像这样的两位管理者能带来多大的不同啊，即使他们的产品已经存在了 100 年。

Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to leading H. H. Brown to record profits - 35% above the 1992 high - he also was key to our merger with Dexter.

弗兰克·鲁尼去年承担了双重任务。除了带领 H. H. Brown 取得创纪录利润——比 1992 年的高点高出 35%——他还对我们与 Dexter 的合并起到了关键作用。

Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades, and shortly after our purchase of H. H. Brown, told me what a wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home" for Dexter, and that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision to join with us.

弗兰克认识哈罗德·阿尔方德和彼得·隆德已有几十年，在我们收购 H. H. Brown 后不久，他告诉我他们经营着多么出色的企业。他鼓励我们见面，之后我们适时达成了交易。弗兰克告诉哈罗德和彼得，伯克希尔将为 Dexter 提供一个理想的企业“家”，这一保证无疑促成了他们加入我们的决定。

I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record in building Melville Corp. during his 23 year tenure as CEO. Now, at 72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.

过去我曾提到过弗兰克在担任 Melville 公司 CEO 的 23 年间所取得的非凡业绩。现在，72 岁的他在伯克希尔正以更快的步伐前进。弗兰克行事低调、从容，但别被他骗了。当他挥棒时，球会远远飞出墙外。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 1994. A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year, but the theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray guns, shoes, cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites slated to be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's 100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than Mrs. See's, on the package.

今年的年度股东大会将于 1994 年 4 月 25 日星期一上午 9:30 在奥马哈市中心的奥菲姆剧院举行。去年会议创纪录地有 2,200 人参加，但剧院可以容纳更多人。我们将在门厅设置展台，展示我们的许多消费品——糖果、喷枪、鞋子、刀具、百科全书等。我最喜欢的展品之一是一种纪念 B 夫人 100 岁生日的喜诗糖果礼盒，包装上印着她的照片，而不是喜诗夫人的照片。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议你们立即在以下酒店之一预订房间：（1）Radisson-Redick Tower，一家小巧（88 间房）但不错的酒店，位于奥菲姆剧院对面；（2）更大的红狮酒店，距离奥菲姆剧院步行约五分钟；（3）万豪酒店，位于西奥马哈，距离 Borsheim 约 100 码，距市中心 20 分钟车程。万豪酒店将有巴士在 8:30 和 8:45 出发前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.

我们的代理材料附件说明了如何获取进入会议所需的卡片。随同入场卡，我们将附上奥菲姆剧院附近停车设施的信息。如果你开车来，请稍早一点到达。附近的停车场很快会满，你可能需要走几个街区。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 24.

像往常一样，我们将安排巴士在会议后送你们去内布拉斯加家具店和 Borsheim，然后再从那里送你们去市中心酒店或机场。提前到达的股东可以在任何一天参观家具店；周六营业时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日为中午至下午 5:30。Borsheim 通常在周日关门，但将在 4 月 24 日周日中午至下午 6 点为股东及其嘉宾开放。

In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO of the company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job that she took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined at Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.

在以往前往 Borsheim 的行程中，许多人已经见过苏珊·雅克。1994 年初，苏珊被任命为公司总裁兼 CEO，她 23 岁时在该店从事时薪 4 美元的工作，11 年内逐步晋升。周日，我们许多其他业务的管理者将和苏珊一起在 Borsheim，查理和我也将在那里。

On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael Jordan's team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of the Royals (a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become famous) and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a home stand at Annual Meeting time.

在前一天晚上，即 4 月 23 日星期六，罗森布拉特体育场将举行奥马哈皇家队对阵纳什维尔声音队的棒球比赛（纳什维尔队可能是迈克尔·乔丹所在的球队）。你可能知道，几年前我买下了皇家队 25% 的股份（我不会因为这项资本配置决策而出名），今年联盟很配合地在年会期间安排了主场比赛。

I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker" and I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what the catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them from scalpers.

我将在 23 日投出开场球，可以肯定，我会比去年羞辱性的表现有所提高。去年，接球手莫名其妙地要求我投“下沉球”，我尽职地投出了一球，差点砸到自己的脚。今年，无论接球手发出什么信号，我都要投出高速球，所以请带上你的测速设备。委托书中将包含获取球赛门票的信息。我很遗憾地报告，你们不必从黄牛那里买票了。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 1994

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1994年3月1日