2007 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份除外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的结果已按变更后的规则重新列报。其他所有方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数显示正回报的年份，其业绩将落后于标普500；在指数显示负回报的年份，其业绩将超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2007 was $12.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 11%. Over the last 43 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $78,008, a rate of 21.1% compounded annually.*

2007年，我们的净值增长了123亿美元，这使得我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增加了11%。在过去43年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到78,008美元，年复合增长率为21.1%。*

Overall, our 76 operating businesses did well last year. The few that had problems were primarily those linked to housing, among them our brick, carpet and real estate brokerage operations. Their setbacks are minor and temporary. Our competitive position in these businesses remains strong, and we have first-class CEOs who run them right, in good times or bad.

总体而言，我们的76家运营业务去年表现良好。少数遇到问题的业务主要与住房相关，包括我们的砖块、地毯和房地产经纪业务。它们遇到的挫折是轻微且暂时的。我们在这些业务中的竞争地位依然强大，并且拥有一流的CEO，无论时局好坏，都能正确经营。

Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the "weakened lending practices" I described in last year's letter. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: "It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine."

然而，一些主要金融机构因为采取了我在去年信中描述的“弱化的贷款操作”，而遇到了惊人的问题。富国银行的CEO约翰·斯坦普夫恰当地剖析了许多贷款机构近期的行为：“有趣的是，在旧方法似乎运作良好的时候，这个行业却发明了亏钱的新方法。”

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, "Please, God, Just One More Bubble." Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower's income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA - house price appreciation - would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out - and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

你可能还记得2003年硅谷的一条汽车保险杠贴纸恳求道：“上帝啊，再来一个泡沫吧。”不幸的是，这个愿望很快实现了，因为几乎所有美国人都开始相信房价会永远上涨。这种信念使得借款人的收入和现金股权对贷款机构来说似乎无关紧要，他们大肆放贷，相信房价升值能解决所有问题。今天，我们的国家正因为这个错误的信念而经历广泛的痛苦。随着房价下跌，大量的金融愚蠢行为正被曝光。只有当潮水退去，你才能发现谁在裸泳——而我们在一些最大金融机构所目睹的景象，颇为不堪。

Turning to happier thoughts, we can report that Berkshire's newest acquisitions of size, TTI and Iscar, led by their CEOs, Paul Andrews and Jacob Harpaz respectively, performed magnificently in 2007. Iscar is as impressive a manufacturing operation as I've seen, a view I reported last year and that was confirmed by a visit I made in the fall to its extraordinary plant in Korea.

转向更愉快的话题，我们可以报告，伯克希尔最新的大型收购对象——由各自CEO保罗·安德鲁斯和雅各布·哈帕兹领导的TTI和伊斯卡——在2007年表现卓越。伊斯卡是我见过的最令人印象深刻的制造企业，这一观点我在去年就报告过，并且去年秋天我参观了其在韩国的非凡工厂后得到了证实。

Finally, our insurance business - the cornerstone of Berkshire - had an excellent year. Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business - more about them later. But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.

最后，我们的保险业务——伯克希尔的基石——度过了出色的一年。部分原因是我们拥有业内最优秀的保险经理人团队——稍后会详细介绍他们。但我们在2007年也非常幸运，这是连续第二年没有发生重大保险灾难。

That party is over. It's a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008. Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise. Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so. If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse. So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.

好日子结束了。可以肯定，包括我们在内的保险业利润率将在2008年显著下降。保费价格在下降，而风险敞口却在无情地增加。即使美国连续第三年灾害较少，行业利润率也可能缩减约四个百分点。如果狂风怒吼或大地颤抖，结果可能会糟糕得多。所以，为未来几年保险业收益的下降做好准备吧。

Yardsticks

衡量标准

Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At year end these totaled $141 billion (not counting those in our finance or utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value).

伯克希尔有两大价值领域。第一是我们的投资：股票、债券和现金等价物。年底这些总计达到1410亿美元（不包括我们金融或公用事业业务中的投资，这些被归入我们的第二价值桶）。

Insurance float - money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us - funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is "free" as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we've been profitable, and I expect we will average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金——我们保险业务中暂时持有但不属于我们的资金——为我们的590亿美元投资提供了资金。只要保险承保能够实现盈亏平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们发生的损失和费用，这些浮存金就是“免费”的。当然，保险承保是波动的，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。然而，纵观我们的整个历史，我们一直是盈利的，我预计未来我们平均能达到盈亏平衡或更好的结果。如果能做到，我们的投资就可以被视为伯克希尔股东不受阻碍的价值来源。

Berkshire's second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 66 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 76. In our early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we have put ever more emphasis on the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses.

伯克希尔的第二个价值组成部分是来自投资和保险以外来源的收益。这些收益由我们的66家非保险公司提供，详见第76页。在我们早期，我们专注于投资方面。然而，在过去二十年里，我们越来越重视非保险业务收益的发展。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first we tabulate per-share investments at 14-year intervals. We exclude those applicable to minority interests.

下面的表格说明了这种转变。第一个表格列出了以14年为间隔的每股投资额。我们排除了适用于少数股东权益的部分。

For the entire 42 years, our compounded annual gain in per-share investments was 27.1%. But the trend has been downward as we increasingly used our available funds to buy operating businesses.

在整整42年间，我们每股投资的年复合增长率为27.1%。但随着我们越来越多地使用可用资金购买运营业务，这一趋势呈下降态势。

Here's the record on how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have grown, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

以下是关于我们非保险业务收益增长的记录，同样是每股数据，并扣除了适用的少数股东权益。

For the entire period, the compounded annual gain was 17.8%, with gains accelerating as our focus shifted.

在整个时期内，年复合增长率为17.8%，随着我们重心的转移，增长率在加快。

Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire's past record can't be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.

尽管这些表格可能有助于你了解历史背景并对估值有用，但在预测未来可能性时，它们完全具有误导性。伯克希尔过去的记录无法复制，甚至无法接近。我们现在的资产和收益基础过于庞大，无法在未来获得超额的收益。

Charlie Munger, my partner at Berkshire, and I will continue to measure our progress by the two yardsticks I have just described and will regularly update you on the results. Though we can't come close to duplicating the past, we will do our best to make sure the future is not disappointing.

我在伯克希尔的合伙人查理·芒格和我将继续用我刚才描述的两个标准来衡量我们的进展，并会定期向你更新结果。虽然我们无法接近复制过去，但我们会尽力确保未来不会令人失望。

In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.

在我们的努力中，我们将得到加入伯克希尔的经理人的巨大帮助。这是一个在几个方面都非同寻常的群体。首先，他们中的大多数人没有工作的经济需求。许多人将他们的企业以高价卖给我们，然后继续经营，是因为他们热爱这样做，而不是因为他们需要钱。他们自然希望得到公平的报酬，但金钱本身并不是他们努力且富有成效地工作的原因。

A second, somewhat related, point about these managers is that they have exactly the job they want for the rest of their working years. At almost any other company, key managers below the top aspire to keep climbing the pyramid. For them, the subsidiary or division they manage today is a way station – or so they hope. Indeed, if they are in their present positions five years from now, they may well feel like failures.

关于这些经理人的第二点，与前述有些相关，即他们拥有的是他们在余下的工作生涯中确切想要的工作。在几乎所有其他公司，高层以下的关键经理人都渴望不断攀登金字塔。对他们来说，他们今天管理的子公司或部门只是一个中转站——或者他们希望如此。确实，如果五年后他们还处在现在的职位上，他们很可能会感到失败。

Conversely, our CEOs' scorecards for success are not whether they obtain my job but instead are the long-term performances of their businesses. Their decisions flow from a here-today, here-forever mindset. I think our rare and hard-to-replicate managerial structure gives Berkshire a real advantage.

相反，我们CEO的成功记分卡不是看他们是否得到我的职位，而是看他们业务的长期表现。他们的决策源于一种“今日在此，永远在此”的心态。我认为我们这种罕见且难以复制的管理结构给了伯克希尔一个真正的优势。

Acquisitions

收购

Though our managers may be the best, we will need large and sensible acquisitions to get the growth in operating earnings we wish. Here, we made little progress in 2007 until very late in the year. Then, on Christmas day, Charlie and I finally earned our paychecks by contracting for the largest cash purchase in Berkshire's history.

尽管我们的经理人可能是最优秀的，但我们仍然需要进行大型且明智的收购，才能实现我们所期望的营业收益增长。在这方面，我们在2007年直到年底前都进展甚微。然后，在圣诞节那天，查理和我终于通过签约完成伯克希尔历史上最大的一笔现金收购，赚到了我们的薪水。

The seeds of this transaction were planted in 1954. That fall, only three months into a new job, I was sent by my employers, Ben Graham and Jerry Newman, to a shareholders' meeting of Rockwood Chocolate in Brooklyn. A young fellow had recently taken control of this company, a manufacturer of assorted cocoa-based items. He had then initiated a one-of-a-kind tender, offering 80 pounds of cocoa beans for each share of Rockwood stock. I described this transaction in a section of the 1988 annual report that explained arbitrage. I also told you that Jay Pritzker – the young fellow mentioned above – was the business genius behind this tax-efficient idea, the possibilities for which had escaped all the other experts who had thought about buying Rockwood, including my bosses, Ben and Jerry.

这笔交易的种子早在1954年就已埋下。那年秋天，我刚入职新工作三个月，就被我的雇主本·格雷厄姆和杰里·纽曼派去参加布鲁克林一家名为洛克伍德巧克力的公司的股东大会。一个年轻小伙最近控制了这家生产各种可可制品的公司。然后他发起了一次独一无二的要约收购，用80磅可可豆换取每股洛克伍德股票。我在1988年年报中解释套利操作的部分描述了这笔交易。我还告诉过你，杰伊·普利兹克——就是上面提到的那个年轻人——是这个节税构想背后的商业天才，而这个构想的可能性是所有其他考虑过收购洛克伍德的专家们，包括我的老板本和杰里，都未曾想到的。

At the meeting, Jay was friendly and gave me an education on the 1954 tax code. I came away very impressed. Thereafter, I avidly followed Jay's business dealings, which were many and brilliant. His valued partner was his brother, Bob, who for nearly 50 years ran Marmon Group, the home for most of the Pritzker businesses.

在会议上，杰伊很友好，并给我上了一堂关于1954年税法的课。我离开时印象非常深刻。此后，我热切地关注杰伊的商业交易，他的交易众多且出色。他宝贵的合伙人是他弟弟鲍勃，鲍勃管理了马蒙集团近50年，该集团是普利兹克家族大部分业务的所在地。

Jay died in 1999, and Bob retired early in 2002. Around then, the Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors. Marmon's largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers. The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 billion. All told, Marmon has $7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees.

杰伊于1999年去世，鲍勃于2002年初退休。大约在那个时候，普利兹克家族决定逐步出售或重组其部分持股，其中包括马蒙集团，这家公司运营着125项业务，通过九个部门进行管理。马蒙最大的业务是联合油罐车公司，该公司与一家加拿大同行共同拥有94,000辆铁路罐车，出租给各种发货方。这些车队的原始成本为51亿美元。总的来说，马蒙的销售额为70亿美元，拥有约20,000名员工。

We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years. Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings. Prior to our entry into the picture, the Pritzker family received substantial consideration from Marmon's distribution of cash, investments and certain businesses.

我们将很快购买马蒙60%的股份，并将在六年内收购几乎所有的剩余股份。我们的初始支出为45亿美元，后续购买的价格将基于与收益挂钩的公式。在我们介入之前，普利兹克家族已经从马蒙分配的现金、投资和某些业务中获得了可观的收益。

This deal was done in the way Jay would have liked. We arrived at a price using only Marmon's financial statements, employing no advisors and engaging in no nit-picking. I knew that the business would be exactly as the Pritzkers represented, and they knew that we would close on the dot, however chaotic financial markets might be. During the past year, many large deals have been renegotiated or killed entirely. With the Pritzkers, as with Berkshire, a deal is a deal.

这笔交易是以杰伊会喜欢的方式完成的。我们仅使用马蒙的财务报表就达成了价格，没有聘请任何顾问，也没有进行任何吹毛求疵的审查。我知道这项业务会完全如普利兹克家族所描述的那样，而他们也知道，无论金融市场可能多么混乱，我们都会准时完成交易。在过去的一年里，许多大型交易被重新谈判或完全取消。对普利兹克家族来说，就像对伯克希尔一样，一诺千金。

Marmon's CEO, Frank Ptak, works closely with a long-time associate, John Nichols. John was formerly the highly successful CEO of Illinois Tool Works (ITW), where he teamed with Frank to run a mix of industrial businesses. Take a look at their ITW record; you'll be impressed.

马蒙的CEO弗兰克·普塔克与他的长期同事约翰·尼科尔斯密切合作。约翰曾是非常成功的伊利诺伊工具工厂公司的CEO，在那里他与弗兰克合作管理着一系列工业企业。看看他们在伊利诺伊工具工厂的记录，你会印象深刻的。

Byron Trott of Goldman Sachs - whose praises I sang in the 2003 report - facilitated the Marmon transaction. Byron is the rare investment banker who puts himself in his client's shoes. Charlie and I trust him completely.

高盛的拜伦·特洛特——我在2003年的报告中曾赞扬过他——促成了马蒙的交易。拜伦是罕见的能设身处地为客户着想的投资银行家。查理和我完全信任他。

You'll like the code name that Goldman Sachs assigned the deal. Marmon entered the auto business in 1902 and exited it in 1933. Along the way it manufactured the Wasp, a car that won the first Indianapolis 500 race, held in 1911. So this deal was labeled "Indy 500."

你会喜欢高盛为这笔交易分配的代号。马蒙于1902年进入汽车行业，1933年退出。在此期间，它制造了“黄蜂”牌汽车，这款车赢得了1911年举办的首届印第安纳波利斯500赛车比赛。因此，这笔交易被命名为“Indy 500”。

In May 2006, I spoke at a lunch at Ben Bridge, our Seattle-based jewelry chain. The audience was a number of its vendors, among them Dennis Ulrich, owner of a company that manufactured gold jewelry.

2006年5月，我在我们西雅图的珠宝连锁店本·布里奇的一次午餐会上发表了讲话。听众是它的一些供应商，其中包括丹尼斯·乌尔里希，他是一家制造黄金珠宝公司的老板。

In January 2007, Dennis called me, suggesting that with Berkshire's support he could build a large jewelry supplier. We soon made a deal for his business, simultaneously purchasing a supplier of about equal size. The new company, Richline Group, has since made two smaller acquisitions. Even with those, Richline is far below the earnings threshold we normally require for purchases. I'm willing to bet, however, that Dennis - with the help of his partner, Dave Meleski - will build a large operation, earning good returns on capital employed.

2007年1月，丹尼斯打电话给我，建议在伯克希尔的支持下，他可以建立一个大型珠宝供应公司。我们很快就他的业务达成了协议，同时收购了一家规模大致相当的供应商。新公司名为瑞奇莱恩集团，此后又进行了两次较小的收购。即使有了这些收购，瑞奇莱恩也远低于我们通常要求的收购盈利门槛。但我愿意打赌，丹尼斯——在他的合作伙伴戴夫·梅莱斯基的帮助下——将会建立起一个大型企业，并获得良好的资本回报率。

Businesses - The Great, the Good and the Gruesome

生意：伟大的、优秀的与糟糕的

Let's take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we're at it, let's also discuss what we wish to avoid.

让我们来看看什么样的生意能让我们兴奋。与此同时，也让我们讨论一下我们希望避免什么。

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren't available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stock-market purchases. It's better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

查理和我寻找那些具备以下特征的公司：a) 我们能理解的业务；b) 有利的长期经济特征；c) 能干且值得信赖的管理层；d) 合理的价格。我们喜欢购买整个企业，或者，如果管理层是我们的合作伙伴，则至少购买80%的股份。然而，当无法通过控股方式购买优质企业时，我们也很乐意通过股市购买伟大企业的一小部分股份。拥有一颗希望之钻的部分权益，也好过拥有整颗莱茵石。

A truly great business must have an enduring "moat" that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business "castle" that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company's being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with "Roman Candles," companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

一个真正伟大的企业必须拥有一个持久的“护城河”，以保护其投入资本所获得的优异回报。资本主义的动态机制保证了竞争对手会反复攻击任何赚取高额回报的商业“城堡”。因此，一个强大的屏障——例如公司是低成本生产商（如盖可保险、好市多）或拥有强大的全球性品牌（如可口可乐、吉列、美国运通）——对于持续成功至关重要。商业史上充满了“罗马焰火筒”式的公司，它们的护城河被证明是虚幻的，并很快被跨越。

Our criterion of "enduring" causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism's "creative destruction" is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.

我们“持久性”的标准使我们排除了那些处于易于发生快速且持续变化行业中的公司。尽管资本主义的“创造性毁灭”对社会非常有益，但它排除了投资的确定性。一个必须不断重建的护城河最终根本算不上护城河。

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.

此外，这一标准还排除了那些成功依赖于拥有伟大经理人的企业。当然，一位出色的CEO对任何企业来说都是一笔巨大的财富，在伯克希尔我们有很多这样的经理人。他们的能力创造了数十亿美元的价值，如果换成一般的CEO来经营，这些价值永远不会实现。

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area's premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership's moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can't name its CEO.

但是，如果一个企业需要一位超级明星才能产生伟大的结果，那么这个企业本身就不能被认为是伟大的。由你所在地区顶尖的脑外科医生领导的一家医疗合伙企业可能会享有超常且不断增长的收益，但这对其未来几乎说明不了什么。当外科医生离开时，这家合伙企业的护城河也就消失了。然而，你可以指望梅奥诊所的护城河能够持久，即使你说不出它的CEO是谁。

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There's no rule that you have to invest money where you've earned it. Indeed, it's often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can't for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

我们在企业中寻求的是在稳定行业中的长期竞争优势。如果这伴随着快速的内生性增长，那很好。但即使没有内生性增长，这样的业务也是有回报的。我们只需将业务丰厚的收益拿出来，用它们去别处购买类似的企业。没有规则说你必须把钱投资在赚到钱的地方。事实上，这样做常常是个错误：真正伟大的企业，在有形资产上赚取巨额回报，却无法在任何较长时间内将其大部分收益在内部进行高回报率的再投资。

Let's look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See's Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn't grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See's, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry's earnings.

让我们来看看梦幻企业的原型，我们自己的喜诗糖果。它经营所在的盒装巧克力行业并不令人兴奋：美国的人均消费量极低且没有增长。许多曾经重要的品牌已经消失，在过去四十年里，只有三家公司的盈利超过了象征性的水平。事实上，我相信喜诗糖果，尽管其大部分收入仅来自少数几个州，却占了整个行业近一半的利润。

At See's, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See's sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See's family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.

1972年蓝筹印花公司收购喜诗糖果时，其年销售量为1600万磅糖果。（查理和我当时控制着蓝筹印花，后来将其并入了伯克希尔。）去年喜诗糖果销售了3100万磅，年增长率仅为2%。然而，由喜诗家族历经50年建立，随后由查克·哈金斯和布拉德·金斯特勒加强的持久竞争优势，为伯克希尔带来了非凡的成果。

We bought See's for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.

我们以2500万美元买下喜诗糖果时，它的销售额为3000万美元，税前利润不到500万美元。当时经营业务所需的资本为800万美元。（每年也有几个月需要少量的季节性债务。）因此，该公司的投入资本税前回报率为60%。有两个因素有助于最小化运营所需的资金。第一，产品以现金销售，这消除了应收账款。第二，生产和分销周期短，这最小化了库存。

Last year See's sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth - and somewhat immodest financial growth - of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See's has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)

去年喜诗糖果的销售额为3.83亿美元，税前利润为8200万美元。现在经营业务所需的资本是4000万美元。这意味着自1972年以来，我们只需要再投资3200万美元，就能应对业务适度的物理增长——以及有点不节制的财务增长。与此同时，税前利润总额达到了13.5亿美元。除了那3200万美元，所有这些利润都已被送往伯克希尔（或者早年间送往蓝筹印花）。在支付了这些利润的公司税后，我们用剩余的钱购买了其他有吸引力的企业。正如亚当和夏娃启动了一项导致60亿人口的活动一样，喜诗糖果也为我们催生了多个新的现金流。（圣经中“生养众多”的命令，我们在伯克希尔是认真对待的。）

There aren't many See's in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That's because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.

在美利坚的公司里，像喜诗糖果这样的企业并不多见。通常，一家公司若要将收益从500万美元增加到8200万美元，可能需要大约4亿美元左右的资本投资来为其增长提供资金。这是因为成长中的企业既有与销售增长成比例增加的营运资金需求，也有对固定资产投资的重大需求。

A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See's situation. It's far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.

一家需要大量增加资本来推动其增长的公司，很可能会被证明是一项令人满意的投资。继续我们上面的例子，用4亿美元的有形资产净额赚取8200万美元的税前利润，这并不寒酸。但对所有者来说，这种等式与喜诗糖果的情况截然不同。拥有一个几乎不需要重大资本投入就能持续增长的收益流要好得多。去问问微软或谷歌吧。

One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

我们自己的飞安国际公司就是一个优秀但远非惊人的商业经济学的例子。这家公司为其客户提供的好处不亚于我所知的任何企业。它同样拥有持久的竞争优势：选择除最佳之外的任何其他飞行培训供应商，就像在手术项目上接受最低出价一样。

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See's-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.

然而，这项业务如果要增长，就需要进行大量的收益再投资。1996年我们收购飞安国际时，其税前营业利润为1.11亿美元，固定资产净投资为5.7亿美元。自我们收购以来，折旧费用总计9.23亿美元。但资本支出总计16.35亿美元，其中大部分用于购买模拟器，以匹配不断推出的新型飞机型号。（一台模拟器可能花费我们超过1200万美元，我们有273台。）我们的固定资产在折旧后现在达到10.79亿美元。2007年的税前营业利润为2.7亿美元，自1996年以来增长了1.59亿美元。这一增长为我们的5.09亿美元增量投资提供了良好但远非喜诗糖果般的回报。

Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.

因此，如果仅以经济回报来衡量，飞安国际是一项优秀而非非凡的业务。它这种“投入更多才能赚得更多”的经历是大多数公司所面临的。例如，我们在受监管公用事业上的大量投资就完全属于这一类。十年后，我们将从这项业务中赚到多得多的钱，但我们需要投入数十亿美元才能实现这一点。

Now let's move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.

现在让我们转向糟糕的。最糟糕的业务是那种增长迅速、需要大量资本来推动增长，然后却赚不到什么钱或根本不赚钱的业务。想想航空公司吧。自莱特兄弟时代以来，持久的竞争优势在那里就被证明是难以捉摸的。事实上，如果当时一个富有远见的资本家在场，他会一枪把奥维尔打下来，那将是对其后继者们的巨大帮助。

The airline industry's demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.

自从那次首次飞行以来，航空业对资本的需求就是贪得无厌的。投资者被增长所吸引，将资金投入一个无底洞，而他们本应被增长所排斥。而我，惭愧地说，在1989年让伯克希尔购买全美航空优先股时，也参与了这种愚蠢行为。我们支票上的墨迹还未干，公司就陷入了螺旋式下降，不久我们的优先股股息就不再支付了。但随后我们非常幸运。在航空业又一次周期性但总是被误导的乐观情绪爆发中，我们竟然能够在1998年以可观的收益卖出我们的股票。在我们出售后的十年里，该公司破产了。两次。

To sum up, think of three types of "savings accounts." The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.

总结一下，想想三种类型的“储蓄账户”。伟大的那种支付异常高的利率，而且随着时间推移利率还会上升。优秀的那种支付有吸引力的利率，并且你后续存入的资金也能赚取同样的利率。最后，糟糕的那种不仅支付不足的利率，还要求你不断以那些令人失望的回报率继续往里存钱。

And now it's confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.

现在是坦白时间。需要注意的是，没有哪个顾问、董事会或投资银行家迫使我犯下我将要描述的错误。用网球术语来说，它们都是非受迫性失误。

To begin with, I almost blew the See's purchase. The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.

首先，我差点搞砸了喜诗糖果的收购。卖家要价3000万美元，而我坚决不高于2500万美元。幸运的是，他让步了。否则我会退缩，而那13.5亿美元就会落到别人手里。

About the time of the See's purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the "cross-ownership" rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See's-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.

大约在收购喜诗糖果的同时，当时掌管首都城市广播公司的汤姆·墨菲打电话给我，提出以3500万美元的价格将达拉斯-沃斯堡的NBC电视台卖给我。这家电视台是首都城市广播公司正在收购的沃斯堡报社的一部分，根据“交叉所有权”规则，墨菲必须将其剥离。我知道电视台就像喜诗糖果一样的生意，几乎不需要资本投入，并且有极好的增长前景。它们经营简单，并能为主人带来滚滚现金。

Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered "buy" into my ear. But I didn't listen.

此外，墨菲当时和现在一样，是我的密友，是一位我敬佩的卓越经理人和杰出人士。他对电视业务了如指掌，除非他觉得一笔收购肯定会成功，否则他不会打电话给我。实际上，墨菲在我耳边低语“买吧”。但我没听。

In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion - almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say "no"? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: "If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.")

2006年，该电视台税前赚了7300万美元，这使其在我拒绝这笔交易后的总盈利至少达到了10亿美元——几乎全部可供所有者用于其他目的。此外，该资产现在的资本价值约为8亿美元。我为什么说“不”？唯一的解释是我的大脑去度假了，忘记通知我。（我的行为类似于莫莉·艾文斯曾经描述过的一位政客：“如果他的智商再低一点，你就得每天给他浇两次水了。”）

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said "yes" to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that's just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business - one now valued at $220 billion - to buy a worthless business.

最后，当我同意收购 Dexter 鞋业公司时，犯了一个更糟糕的错误。我在1993年用价值4.33亿美元的伯克希尔股票（25,203股A类股）收购了这家公司。我评估为持久竞争优势的东西在几年内就消失了。但这仅仅是开始：通过使用伯克希尔的股票，我极大地放大了这个错误。这一举动使伯克希尔股东付出的代价不是4亿美元，而是35亿美元。本质上，我放弃了一家优秀企业1.6%的股份——该企业现在的价值为2200亿美元——去买了一家毫无价值的企业。

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I've made. But I'll make more mistakes in the future - you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare's country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: "I've never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I've sure woke up with a few."

迄今为止，Dexter 是我做过的最糟糕的交易。但我将来还会犯更多错误——你可以打赌。博比·贝尔的乡村歌曲中的一句歌词解释了收购中经常发生的事情：“我从未和丑女人上过床，但我肯定醒来时身边有过几个。”

Now, let's examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们审视伯克希尔的四个主要运营部门。每个部门的资产负债表和损益表特征都截然不同。因此，将它们混为一谈会妨碍分析。所以我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，查理和我也正是这么看待它们的。

Insurance

保险

The best anecdote I've heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney, who asked his wife, Ann, "When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be president?" To which she replied, "Honey, you weren't in my wildest dreams."

我在本次总统竞选中听到的最好的轶事来自米特·罗姆尼，他问妻子安：“我们年轻的时候，你做过最疯狂的梦，有没有想过我可能会成为总统？”她回答说：“亲爱的，你根本不在我最疯狂的梦里。”

When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation. Here's how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:

当我们在1967年首次进入财产/意外险业务时，我最疯狂的梦想也没有预见到我们现在的运营状况。以下是我们在收购国民赔偿公司后头五年的业绩：

To put it charitably, we were a slow starter. But things changed. Here's the record of the last five years:

说得客气点，我们起步缓慢。但情况发生了变化。以下是过去五年的记录：

This metamorphosis has been accomplished by some extraordinary managers. Let's look at what each has achieved.

这一蜕变是由一些非凡的经理人完成的。让我们看看他们各自取得了什么成就。

GEICO possesses the widest moat of any of our insurers, one carefully protected and expanded by Tony Nicely, its CEO. Last year – again – GEICO had the best growth record among major auto insurers, increasing its market share to 7.2%. When Berkshire acquired control in 1995, that share was 2.5%. Not coincidentally, annual ad expenditures by GEICO have increased from $31 million to $751 million during the same period.

盖可保险拥有我们所有保险公司中最宽的护城河，其CEO托尼·奈斯利精心守护并拓展了这条护城河。去年，盖可再次成为主要汽车保险公司中增长记录最好的，将其市场份额提高到7.2%。1995年伯克希尔取得控股权时，这一份额为2.5%。并非巧合的是，在同一时期，盖可的年度广告支出从3100万美元增加到了7.51亿美元。

Tony, now 64, joined GEICO at 18. Every day since, he has been passionate about the company – proud of how it could both save money for its customers and provide growth opportunities for its associates. Even now, with sales at $12 billion, Tony feels GEICO is just getting started. So do I.

现年64岁的托尼18岁就加入了盖可。此后的每一天，他都对公司充满热情——为它既能帮客户省钱，又能为同事提供成长机会而感到自豪。即使现在销售额已达120亿美元，托尼仍觉得盖可才刚刚起步。我也这么认为。

Here's some evidence. In the last three years, GEICO has increased its share of the motorcycle market from 2.1% to 6%. We've also recently begun writing policies on ATVs and RVs. And in November we wrote our first commercial auto policy. GEICO and National Indemnity are working together in the commercial field, and early results are very encouraging.

这里有一些证据。在过去三年中，盖可将其在摩托车市场的份额从2.1%提高到了6%。我们最近也开始承保全地形车和房车的保单。去年11月，我们签下了第一份商业汽车保单。盖可和国民赔偿正在商业领域合作，早期的结果非常令人鼓舞。

Even in aggregate, these lines will remain a small fraction of our personal auto volume. Nevertheless, they should deliver a growing stream of underwriting profits and float.

即使合计起来，这些业务线也仍将是我们个人汽车业务量的一小部分。尽管如此，它们应该会产生不断增长的承保利润和浮存金。

General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of "home-grown" float – $23 billion at year end. This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire. Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.

通用再保险，我们的国际再保险公司，是迄今为止我们最大的“本土”浮存金来源——年底为230亿美元。这项业务现在对伯克希尔来说是一笔巨大的资产。然而，我们对它的拥有开局并不稳固。

For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline. This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re. The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.

几十年来，通用再保险都是再保险业界的蒂芙尼，其承保技巧和纪律受到所有人的钦佩。不幸的是，这种声誉存续的时间超过了其事实基础，而我在1998年决定与通用再保险合并时完全忽略了这一缺陷。1998年的通用再保险并非像1968年或1978年的通用再保险那样运作。

Now, thanks to Joe Brandon, General Re's CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, the luster of the company has been restored. Joe and Tad have been running the business for six years and have been doing first-class business in a first-class way, to use the words of J. P. Morgan. They have restored discipline to underwriting, reserving and the selection of clients.

现在，多亏了通用再保险的CEO乔·布兰登和他的搭档塔德·蒙特罗斯，公司的光彩得以恢复。用J.P.摩根的话来说，乔和塔德经营这项业务已有六年，并且一直以一流的方式做一流的生意。他们恢复了承保、准备金计提和客户筛选方面的纪律。

Their job was made more difficult by costly and time-consuming legacy problems, both in the U.S. and abroad. Despite that diversion, Joe and Tad have delivered excellent underwriting results while skillfully repositioning the company for the future.

由于在美国和国外存在代价高昂且耗费时间的遗留问题，他们的工作变得更加困难。尽管有这些干扰，乔和塔德还是交出了出色的承保业绩，同时巧妙地重新定位了公司未来的发展方向。

Since joining Berkshire in 1986, Ajit Jain has built a truly great specialty reinsurance operation from scratch. For one-of-a-kind mammoth transactions, the world now turns to him.

自1986年加入伯克希尔以来，阿吉特·贾因从零开始建立了一个真正伟大的专业再保险业务。对于独一无二的巨额交易，全世界现在都求助于他。

Last year I told you in detail about the Equitas transfer of huge, but capped, liabilities to Berkshire for a single premium of $7.1 billion. At this very early date, our experience has been good. But this doesn't tell us much because it's just one straw in a fifty-year-or-more wind. What we know for sure, however, is that the London team who joined us, headed by Scott Moser, is first-rate and has become a valuable asset for our insurance business.

去年我详细告诉过你，Equitas 将巨额但有上限的负债转移给伯克希尔，我们一次性收取了71亿美元的保费。在这么早的阶段，我们的经验是好的。但这并不能说明太多问题，因为这在长达五十年甚至更久的风中只是一根稻草。然而，我们确信的是，加入我们的伦敦团队，由斯科特·莫泽领导，是一流的，并且已经成为我们保险业务的宝贵资产。

Finally, we have our smaller operations, which serve specialized segments of the insurance market. In aggregate, these companies have performed extraordinarily well, earning above-average underwriting profits and delivering valuable float for investment.

最后，我们还有一些规模较小的业务，它们服务于保险市场的特定细分领域。总的来说，这些公司表现非常出色，赚取了高于平均水平的承保利润，并为投资提供了宝贵的浮存金。

Last year BoatU.S., headed by Bill Oakerson, was added to the group. This company manages an association of about 650,000 boat owners, providing them services similar to those offered by AAA auto clubs to drivers. Among the association's offerings is boat insurance. Learn more about this operation by visiting its display at the annual meeting.

去年，由比尔·奥克森领导的BoatU.S.加入了该集团。这家公司管理着一个约有65万船主组成的协会，为他们提供服务，类似于AAA汽车俱乐部为司机提供的服务。该协会提供的服务之一就是船只保险。你可以通过参观年会上的展位来了解更多关于这项业务的信息。

Below we show the record of our four categories of property/casualty insurance.

下表显示了我们四类财产/意外险业务的记录。

*Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.

*包括2006年5月19日起的Applied Underwriters。

Regulated Utility Business

受监管的公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

伯克希尔持有中美能源控股公司87.4%（稀释后）的权益，该公司拥有多种公用事业业务。其中最大的包括：（1）约克郡电力和北方电力，其380万电力客户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；（2）中美能源公司，主要为爱荷华州72万电力客户提供服务；（3）太平洋电力和洛基山电力，为西部六个州约170万电力客户提供服务；以及（4）克恩河和北方天然气管道，输送约8%的美国天然气消费量。

Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It's unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn't have better partners.

我们在中美能源的所有权伙伴是沃尔特·斯科特，以及其两位出色的经理人戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔。每一方拥有多少投票权并不重要；只有当我们一致认为某项重大举措明智时，我们才会采取行动。与戴夫、格雷格和沃尔特八年的合作，印证了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能有更好的合作伙伴了。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.

有点不太协调的是，中美能源还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过20家地方品牌公司运营，拥有18,800名经纪人。去年是住宅销售疲软的一年，2008年可能会更疲软。然而，我们将继续以合理的价格收购优质的经纪业务。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican's operation:

以下是中美能源运营的一些关键数据：

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $70 in 2007 and $87 in 2006.

*包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后），2007年为7000万美元，2006年为8700万美元。

We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 per share in 1999, a year in which its per-share earnings were $2.59. Why the odd figure of $35.05? I originally decided the business was worth $35.00 per share to Berkshire. Now, I'm a "one-price" guy (remember See's?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire's offer. But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05. With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me. At the time, it hurt.

1999年，我们同意以每股35.05美元的价格购买中美能源35,464,337股，那一年该公司的每股收益为2.59美元。为什么是35.05美元这个奇怪的数字？我最初认为这项业务对伯克希尔来说每股值35.00美元。我是个“一口价”的人（还记得喜诗糖果吗？），代表中美能源的投资银行家们几天都没能说动我提高伯克希尔的出价。但是，最后他们抓住了我软弱的时刻，我让步了，告诉他们我会出到35.05美元。我解释说，这样他们就可以告诉客户，他们从我这里榨出了最后一分钱。当时，这让我很心痛。

Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 to help finance the acquisition of one of our pipelines. Lastly, in 2006, when MidAmerican bought PacificCorp, we purchased 23,268,793 shares at $145 per share.

后来，在2002年，伯克希尔以60美元的价格购买了6,700,000股，以帮助为我们的一条管道收购提供资金。最后，在2006年，当中美能源收购太平洋公司时，我们以每股145美元的价格购买了23,268,793股。

In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 per share. However, $.77 of that was non-recurring - a reduction in deferred tax at our British utility, resulting from a lowering of the U.K. corporate tax rate. So call normalized earnings $15.01 per share. And yes, I'm glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.

2007年，中美能源每股收益为15.78美元。然而，其中0.77美元是非经常性的——是由于英国降低公司税率导致我们在英国的公用事业业务递延税项减少所致。因此，正常化后的每股收益约为15.01美元。是的，我很高兴我当时让步了，多给了那五分钱。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

我们在伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的简要资产负债表和损益表。

Balance Sheet 12/31/07 (in millions)

资产负债表 2007年12月31日（单位：百万美元）

Earnings Statement (in millions)

损益表（单位：百万美元）

*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

*不包括购买会计调整。

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 23% on average tangible net worth last year. It's noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth - a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet - and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.

这个形形色色的集团，销售从棒棒糖到房车的各种产品，去年在有形资产净值上获得了令人满意的23%回报率。同样值得注意的是，这些业务在实现这一回报时只使用了很少的财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有一些出色的企业。然而，我们收购其中许多企业时，支付了相对于净资产的高额溢价——这一点反映在资产负债表上的商誉项目中——这一事实使我们按平均账面价值计算的收益率降至9.8%。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:

以下是该板块公司的一些值得关注的动态：

Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville and MiTek were all hurt in 2007 by the sharp housing downturn, with their pre-tax earnings declining 27%, 41%, 38% and 9% respectively. Overall, these companies earned $941 million pre-tax compared to $1.296 billion in 2006.

肖氏工业、阿克米砖块、约翰斯·曼维尔和 MiTek 在2007年都因住房市场的急剧下滑而受损，其税前收益分别下降了27%、41%、38%和9%。总的来说，这些公司税前赚了9.41亿美元，而2006年为12.96亿美元。

Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.

去年，肖氏工业、MiTek 和阿克米签订了补强收购协议，这将有助于未来的收益。你可以肯定他们会寻找更多这样的机会。

In a tough year for retailing, our standout were See's, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.

在零售业艰难的一年里，我们表现突出的是喜诗糖果、博希姆珠宝和内布拉斯加家具卖场。

Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See's. We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire. But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance. The move could not have worked out better. In his two years, profits at See's have increased more than 50%.

两年前，布拉德·金斯特勒被任命为喜诗糖果的CEO。在伯克希尔，我们很少将经理人从一个行业调到另一个行业。但我们对布拉德做了例外处理，他之前经营过我们的制服公司费希海默和赛普拉斯保险。这一变动结果再好不过了。在他任职的两年里，喜诗糖果的利润增长了50%以上。

At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1% helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.

在博希姆珠宝，销售额增长了15.1%，这得益于股东周末期间27%的增长。两年前，苏珊·雅克建议我们翻新和扩建店面。我表示怀疑，但苏珊是对的。

Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She's smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.

苏珊25年前来到博希姆，是一名时薪4美元的售货员。尽管她缺乏管理背景，但我在1994年毫不犹豫地任命她为CEO。她聪明、热爱这项事业、也热爱她的同事。这任何时候都比拥有MBA学位强。

(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity. Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire's earnings since we purchased it early in 2006. She is an owner's dream. It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect. Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)

（顺便说一句：查理和我不太看重简历。相反，我们关注头脑、激情和正直。我们的另一位杰出经理人是凯茜·巴伦·塔姆拉兹，自从我们2006年初收购美国商业资讯以来，她显著提高了其收益。她是所有者的梦想。站在凯茜和一个商业机会之间绝对是危险的。需要指出的是，凯茜的职业生涯始于一名出租车司机。）

Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million. These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country. In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.

最后，在内布拉斯加家具卖场，随着我们在奥马哈和堪萨斯城的店面销售额均达到约4亿美元，利润创下了纪录。这两家店毫无疑问是全国排名前两位的家居用品店。在许多家具零售商遭遇灾难性的一年里，堪萨斯城店的销售额增长了8%，而奥马哈店的销售额增长了6%。

Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance. Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.

这一业绩要归功于杰出的布鲁姆金兄弟，罗恩和厄夫。他们都是我的密友，也是伟大的商人。

Iscar continues its wondrous ways. Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive. The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China. For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable. Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China. In effect, we've now moved the brains to the tungsten. Major opportunities for growth await Iscar. Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.

伊斯卡继续其神奇的发展道路。其产品是小型硬质合金切削工具，能使大型且昂贵的机床更高效。硬质合金的原材料是钨，开采于中国。几十年来，伊斯卡将钨运到以色列，在那里用智慧将其转化为更有价值的东西。2007年底，伊斯卡在中国大连开设了一家大型工厂。实际上，我们现在是把智慧带到了钨矿所在地。伊斯卡面前有重大的增长机遇。其由埃坦·韦特海默、雅各布·哈帕兹和丹尼·戈德曼领导的管理团队，一定会充分利用这些机遇。

Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million. Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies - as runaway leaders in their fields - fully participated.

飞行服务业务在2007年创下了记录，税前利润增长了49%，达到5.47亿美元。全球公务航空经历了非凡的一年，我们的两家公司——作为各自领域遥遥领先的领导者——完全参与了其中。

FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings. We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots. Bruce Whitman, the company's CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.

飞安国际，我们的飞行员培训业务，收入增长了14%，税前利润增长了20%。我们估计我们培训了约58%的美国公司飞行员。公司CEO布鲁斯·惠特曼于2003年从先进飞行培训之父阿尔·乌尔奇手中继承了这一领导地位，并且已被证明是一位当之无愧的继任者。

At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader. We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined. Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.

在喷气机分时所有权发明者 NetJets，我们仍然是无懈可击的领导者。我们现在在美国运营着487架飞机，在欧洲运营着135架，这个机队规模是我们三个主要竞争对手总和的两倍多。由于我们在大型客舱市场的份额接近90%，我们在价值方面的领先优势要大得多。

The NetJets brand - with its promise of safety, service and security - grows stronger every year. Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli. If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn't do better than Rich. No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn't stop.

NetJets 品牌以其对安全、服务和保障的承诺，每年都在变得更加强大。这背后是理查德·桑图利一个人的激情。如果你要选一个人和你一起蹲战壕，再没有比里奇更好的人选了。无论遇到什么障碍，他就是不停止。

Europe is the best example of how Rich's tenacity leads to success. For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million. After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction. Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.

欧洲是里奇的坚韧如何带来成功的最好例子。头十年我们在那里财务进展甚微，实际上累积亏损了2.12亿美元。然而，在里奇让马克·布斯加入负责欧洲业务后，我们开始取得进展。现在我们有了真正的势头，去年利润增长了两倍。

In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there. It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service. Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities - but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.

去年11月，我们的董事在哥伦布市的 NetJets 总部开会，亲眼目睹了那里的复杂运营。它负责在各种天气下每天大约1000次航班，客户期望的是顶级的服务。我们的董事离开时对那里的设施和其能力印象深刻——但对里奇和他的伙伴们印象更为深刻。

Finance and Finance Products

金融及金融产品

Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes. Clayton's market share hit a record 31% last year. But industry volume continues to shrink: Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton. (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)

我们在这一类别的主要业务是克莱顿房屋公司，美国最大的活动房屋制造商和营销商。克莱顿的市场份额去年达到了创纪录的31%。但行业销量持续萎缩：去年，活动房屋销量为96,000套，低于2003年我们收购克莱顿时的131,000套。（需要记住的是，当时一些评论家批评其董事会在周期性底部出售了公司。）

Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers. That's why we include Clayton's operation in this finance section. Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well. Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.

尽管克莱顿通过制造和零售房屋赚钱，但其大部分收益来自于一个覆盖30万借款人的110亿美元贷款组合。这就是为什么我们将克莱顿的业务归入此金融板块。尽管2007年房地产金融领域暴露出许多问题，克莱顿的贷款组合表现良好。当年的违约率、止赎率和损失率与我们之前所有年份经历的比率相似。

Clayton's loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire. For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire's borrowing cost - a fee that amounted to $85 million last year. Clayton's 2007 pre-tax earnings of $526 million are after its paying this fee. The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in "other" in the following table.

克莱顿的贷款组合由伯克希尔提供资金。对于这笔资金，我们向克莱顿收取比伯克希尔借款成本高一个百分点的费用——去年这笔费用总计8500万美元。克莱顿2007年5.26亿美元的税前利润是在支付这笔费用之后的。这笔交易的另一面是，伯克希尔将8500万美元记为收入，包含在下表的“其他”中。

The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture. Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA. That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire. The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA's earnings.

表中列出的租赁业务是出租拖车的XTRA和出租家具的CORT。2007年拖车利用率大幅下降，导致XTRA的收益下降。该公司去年还借入了4亿美元，并将所得款项分配给了伯克希尔。由此产生的它现在支付的更高利息进一步减少了XTRA的收益。

Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire's ownership. More will come.

克莱顿、XTRA 和 CORT 都是好生意，分别由凯文·克莱顿、比尔·弗兰兹和保罗·阿诺德非常能干地经营着。每家公司在伯克希尔拥有期间都进行过补强收购。未来还会有更多。

Investments

投资

We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.

下表列出了我们年底的普通股投资，其中详列了市值至少为6亿美元的项目。

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

*这是我们实际的购买价格，也是我们的计税基础；由于之前要求的减值或增值，GAAP下的成本在少数情况下有所不同。

Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.

总的来说，我们对被投资方的业务表现感到满意。2007年，我们四大重仓股中的三个——美国运通、可口可乐和宝洁——每股收益分别增长了12%、14%和14%。第四大重仓股富国银行，由于房地产泡沫破裂，收益略有下降。尽管如此，我相信它的内在价值有所增加，即使幅度很小。

In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.

在“奇怪的世界”栏目中，请注意美国运通和富国银行都是由亨利·威尔斯和威廉·法戈创立的，美国运通成立于1850年，富国银行成立于1852年。宝洁和可口可乐分别于1837年和1886年开始营业。初创企业不是我们的菜。

I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their "moats" - a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors - have widened during the year. All of the "big four" scored positively on that test.

我应该强调，我们衡量投资进展的标准不是它们在任意给定年份的市场价格表现。相反，我们通过适用于我们拥有的企业的两种方法来评估它们的表现。第一个考验是收益的改善，同时我们会对行业状况给予适当的考虑。第二个考验更为主观，即它们的“护城河”——一个比喻，指它们所拥有的让竞争对手日子不好过的优势——是否在年内加宽了。所有“四大”公司在那次测试中都得到了肯定的评价。

We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion. By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina's management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.

去年我们进行了一次大规模的卖出。2002年和2003年，伯克希尔以4.88亿美元买入了中国石油1.3%的股份，这个价格使整个公司的估值约为370亿美元。当时查理和我认为该公司价值约1000亿美元。到2007年，有两个因素显著提高了其价值：石油价格大幅攀升，并且中国石油的管理层在建立油气储备方面做得非常出色。去年下半年，公司的市值升至2750亿美元，这与我们根据其他大型石油公司进行比较后认为的价值大致相当。因此，我们以40亿美元的价格卖出了我们的持股。

A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government - defense, social security, you name it - for about four hours.

补充一点：我们就中国石油的收益向美国国税局缴纳了12亿美元的税款。这笔钱支付了美国政府——包括国防、社会保障等等——大约四个小时的所有费用。

Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.

去年我告诉过你，伯克希尔有62份由我管理的衍生品合约。（我们在通用再保险的 legacy 账簿中还有一些。）今天，我们有94份这样的合约，它们分为两类。

First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

第一类，我们签订了54份合约，要求我们在某些包含在各种高收益指数中的特定债券违约时进行支付。这些合约的到期日从2009年到2013年不等。年底，我们已收到这些合约32亿美元的保费；已支付4.72亿美元的损失；在最坏的情况下（尽管可能性极低），可能需要额外支付47亿美元。

We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in "Derivative Contract Liabilities" on our balance sheet.

我们肯定还会进行更多的支付。但我相信，仅就保费收入而言，这些合约将被证明是有利可图的，更不用说我们还能利用持有的大量资金赚取收益了。年底我们为这一风险敞口记录的负债为18亿美元，包含在资产负债表上的“衍生品合约负债”中。

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

第二类合约涉及我们卖出的、基于四个股票指数（标普500加上三个外国指数）的各种看跌期权。这些看跌期权的原始期限为15年或20年，行权价为当时的市场水平。我们已收到45亿美元的保费，年底记录的负债为46亿美元。这些合约中的看跌期权只能在到期日（介于2019年至2027年之间）行权，并且只有当相关指数的报价低于卖出看跌期权当日的水平时，伯克希尔才需要进行支付。我再次相信，总的来说，这些合约将是有利可图的，此外，在15年或20年的时期内，我们还将从持有保费的现金投资中获得可观的收入。

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.

我们衍生品合约有两个特别重要的方面。首先，在所有情况下，我们都是持有资金的一方，这意味着我们没有交易对手风险。

Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire's balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

其次，我们衍生品合约的会计规则与适用于我们投资组合的规则不同。在投资组合中，价值的变化会影响伯克希尔资产负债表上显示的净值，但除非我们出售（或减记）一项持有物，否则不会影响收益。然而，衍生品合约价值的变化必须每个季度计入收益。

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings - even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter - and we hope you won't be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

因此，我们的衍生品头寸有时会导致报告的收益出现大幅波动，即使查理和我可能认为这些头寸的内在价值变化很小。他和我不会为这些波动感到困扰——即使它们在一个季度内很容易达到10亿美元或更多——我们也希望你不会。你会记得，在我们的巨灾保险业务中，我们总是准备用短期报告收益增加的波动性，来换取长期净值的更大增长。这也是我们在衍生品方面的理念。

The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it's no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.

2007年，美元兑主要货币进一步走弱，原因并不神秘：美国人喜欢购买别处生产的产品，超过了世界其他地方喜欢购买美国产品的程度。这不可避免地导致美国每天向世界其他地方输送约20亿美元的借据和资产。随着时间的推移，这给美元带来了压力。

When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That's why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion. Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007. Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.

当美元下跌时，它既使我们的产品对外国人来说更便宜，也使他们的产品对美国公民来说更昂贵。这就是为什么货币贬值被认为可以治愈贸易逆差。事实上，美国的逆差无疑因美元大幅贬值而有所缓和。但请思考一下：2002年，当欧元平均汇率为94.6美分时，我们对德国（我们的第五大贸易伙伴）的贸易逆差为360亿美元；而在2007年，当欧元平均汇率为1.37美元时，我们对德国的逆差增加到了450亿美元。同样，加元在2002年平均为64美分，2007年为93美分。然而，我们对加拿大的贸易逆差也从2002年的500亿美元增加到了2007年的640亿美元。至少到目前为止，美元暴跌对平衡我们的贸易活动作用不大。

There's been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

最近有很多关于主权财富基金以及它们如何购买美国企业大量股份的讨论。这是我们自己造成的，不是外国政府的什么邪恶阴谋。我们的贸易等式保证了外国对美国的大量投资。当我们每天强行向世界其他地方输送20亿美元时，他们必须在这里投资点什么。当他们选择股票而不是债券时，我们为什么要抱怨呢？

Our country's weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America's exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.

我们国家货币的疲软不是欧佩克、中国等国家的错。其他发达国家也依赖进口石油，并像我们一样与中国进口产品竞争。在制定明智的贸易政策时，美国不应单独挑出某些国家进行惩罚，也不应保护某些行业。我们也不应采取可能引发报复行为的行动，这会减少美国的出口，而出口是真正的贸易，惠及我们国家和世界其他地方。

Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan's comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee's minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke's statement on September 11, 2007.)

然而，我们的立法者应该认识到，当前的不平衡是不可持续的，因此应该采取政策，尽早而非延后地大幅减少这种不平衡。否则，我们每天强行输送给世界其他地方的20亿美元可能会产生某种令人不快的全球性消化不良。（关于我们贸易逆差不可持续性的其他评论，请参阅艾伦·格林斯潘2004年11月19日的评论、联邦公开市场委员会2004年6月29日的会议纪要以及本·伯南克2007年9月11日的声明。）

At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

在伯克希尔，我们在2007年只持有一个直接的货币头寸。那就是——屏住呼吸——巴西雷亚尔。不久前，将美元兑换成雷亚尔还是不可想象的。毕竟，在过去的一个世纪里，巴西有五个版本的货币实际上都变成了废纸。正如许多货币周期性枯萎消亡的国家一样，富有的巴西人有时会把大量资金存放在美国以保全财富。

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here's the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.

但是，任何遵循这种看似谨慎做法的巴西人，在过去五年里都会损失一半的净资产。以下是2002年底至2007年底雷亚尔兑美元的年复一年（指数化）记录：100；122；133；152；166；199。每年雷亚尔都在上涨，美元都在下跌。此外，在此期间的大部分时间里，巴西政府实际上通过在市场上购买美元来压低雷亚尔的价值，支撑我们的货币。

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as "junk" credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

过去五年，我们的直接货币头寸产生了23亿美元的税前利润，此外，我们还通过持有以其他货币计价的美国公司债券获利。例如，在2001年和2002年，我们以面值57%的价格购买了3.1亿欧元的亚马逊公司2010年到期、票息6 7/8%的债券。当时，亚马逊的债券被定价为“垃圾”级别，但事实绝非如此。（是的，弗吉尼亚，你偶尔可以找到效率低得离谱的市场——或者至少除了在一些顶尖商学院的金融系之外，你在任何地方都能找到。）

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

亚马逊债券以欧元计价对我们来说是一个额外的、重要的吸引力。我们在2002年购买时，欧元兑美元为0.95。因此，我们的美元成本仅为1.69亿美元。现在这些债券的交易价格为面值的102%，欧元价值1.47美元。在2005年和2006年，我们的一些债券被赎回，我们收到了2.53亿美元。我们剩余的债券在年底的价值为1.62亿美元。在我们2.46亿美元的已实现和未实现收益中，约有1.18亿美元归因于美元下跌。货币确实重要。

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country's many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America's rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.

在伯克希尔，我们将试图进一步增加我们的直接和间接外国收益流。然而，即使我们成功了，我们的资产和收益仍将始终集中在美国。尽管我们的国家存在诸多不完美和层出不穷的各种问题，但美国的法治、响应市场的经济体制以及对精英管理的信念，几乎必然会给其公民带来不断增长的繁荣。

As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.

正如我以前告诉过你的，我们一段时间以来一直为CEO的继任做好了充分准备，因为我们有三位出色的内部候选人。董事会非常清楚，如果我因去世或能力下降而无法履职，他们会选谁。而且那仍会给董事会留下两位后备人选。

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.

去年我告诉你，我们也会迅速完成伯克希尔投资工作的继任计划，我们现在确实已经确定了四位可以接替我管理投资的候选人。他们目前都管理着巨额资金，并且都表示如果被召唤，非常有兴趣来伯克希尔。董事会了解这四位的优势，并期望在需要时聘请其中一位或多位。候选人们从年轻到中年不等，从富裕到富有，并且他们为伯克希尔工作的愿望都超出了薪酬的范畴。

(I've reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death - abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term "thinking outside the box.")

（我已经不情愿地抛弃了在我死后继续管理投资组合的想法——放弃了我希望给“跳出框框思考”这个词赋予新含义的愿望。）

Fanciful Figures - How Public Companies Juice Earnings

虚幻的数字——上市公司如何粉饰收益

Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: "Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic." If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America's accounting.

前参议员艾伦·辛普森有句名言：“在华盛顿走高尚道路的人不必担心交通拥堵。”然而，如果他想要寻找真正人迹罕至的街道，这位参议员应该看看美国公司的会计。

An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America's CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity - by unanimous agreement, no less - to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.

关于企业偏好哪条道路的一次重要公投发生在1994年。当时，美国的CEO们刚刚以88票对9票的投票结果，迫使美国参议院命令财务会计准则委员会闭嘴。在那次斥责之前，FASB表现出了胆量——而且是全体一致同意——告诉企业首领们，他们被授予的股票期权代表一种补偿形式，其价值应记为费用。

After the senators voted, the FASB - now educated on accounting principles by the Senate's 88 closet CPAs - decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.

在参议员们投票之后，FASB——现在被参议院88位隐藏的注册会计师们进行了会计原则教育——规定公司可以选择两种报告期权的方法中的一种。优先的处理方法是将它们的价值费用化，但公司也可以选择忽略这笔费用，只要他们的期权是以市场价值发行的。

A moment of truth had now arrived for America's CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher "earnings." I'm sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.

美国CEO们的关键时刻到来了，而他们的反应并不好看。在接下来的六年里，标准普尔500家公司中只有两家选择了优先路径。其余的CEO们都选择了低端路线，从而忽略了一大笔显而易见的费用，以便报告更高的“收益”。我敢肯定，他们中的一些人还觉得，如果他们选择费用化，他们的董事会在未来几年批准经理人们渴望的巨额期权授予时可能会三思而后行。

It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn't good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.

事实证明，对许多CEO来说，即使是低端路线也不够好。在这一被削弱的规则下，如果期权的行权价低于市场价值发行，仍然会对收益产生影响。没问题。为了避免这个麻烦的规则，许多公司秘密地对期权进行回溯，虚假地表明它们是以当前市场价格授予的，而实际上它们是以远低于市场的价格发放的。

Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain - important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid "earnings." For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let's look at the chances of that being achieved.

几十年来期权会计的荒谬现已告一段落，但其他的会计选择依然存在——其中重要的是公司在计算养老金费用时使用的投资回报假设。毫不意外，许多公司继续选择允许他们报告不那么扎实的“收益”的假设。在标准普尔拥有养老金计划的363家公司中，2006年这一假设平均为8%。让我们看看实现这一目标的可能性有多大。

The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.

所有养老基金持有的债券和现金平均约为28%，这些资产的回报率预计不超过5%。当然，可以获得更高的收益率，但它们伴随着相应（或更大）损失的风险。

This means that the remaining 72% of assets - which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments - must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.

这意味着，剩下的72%资产——主要是股票，要么直接持有，要么通过对冲基金或私募股权投资等工具持有——必须赚取9.2%的回报，整个基金才能达到假定的8%。而且这个回报必须是在扣除所有费用之后实现的，现在的费用比以往任何时候都高得多。

How realistic is this expectation? Let's revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.

这个期望有多现实？让我们回顾一下我两年前提到的一些数据：在20世纪，道琼斯指数从66点涨到了11,497点。这个涨幅虽然看起来巨大，但年复合增长率仅为5.3%。一个在整个世纪都持有道指成分股的投资者，在大部分时间里也会获得可观的股息，但在最后几年只有大约2%左右。那是一个精彩的世纪。

Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow - recently below 13,000 - would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.

现在想想本世纪。为了让投资者仅仅达到5.3%的市值增长，道指——最近低于13,000点——需要在2099年12月31日收于约2,000,000点。我们现在已进入本世纪八年，而市场在本世纪需要上涨1,988,000点才能达到上世纪的5.3%，我们才涨了不到2,000点。

It's amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?

有趣的是，评论员们经常因为道指突破某个千点整数关口（例如14,000或15,000点）的前景而过度激动。如果他们继续这样反应，本世纪5.3%的年增长率将意味着他们在接下来的92年里至少经历1,986次发作。虽然一切皆有可能，但真有人认为这是最可能的结果吗？

Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets - allowing for expenses of .5% - would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and high-priced managers ("helpers").

股息率仍在2%左右。即使股票的平均年增值率能达到20世纪的5.3%，养老金计划的股票部分——考虑到0.5%的费用——产生的回报也不会超过7%左右。考虑到存在多层顾问和高价经理人（“帮手”），0.5%很可能低估了成本。

Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers - bless their hearts - will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group - the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group - the "know-nothings" - must win.

当然，每个人都期望自己高于平均水平。而那些“帮手”——愿上帝保佑他们——肯定会鼓励他们的客户相信这一点。但是，作为一个整体，有“帮手”辅助的群体必然低于平均水平。原因很简单：1）总体而言，投资者必然赚取平均回报率减去他们承担的成本；2）被动型和指数型投资者，由于其非常不活跃的性质，将赚取平均回报率减去非常低的成本；3）既然这个群体赚取了平均回报，那么剩下的群体——主动型投资者——也必须赚取平均回报。但这个群体将承担高昂的交易、管理和咨询成本。因此，主动型投资者的回报率被削减的比例将远高于他们不活跃的同胞。这意味着被动型群体——“什么都不知道的人”——必胜。

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century - envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation - are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about double-digit returns from equities, explain this math to him - not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: "Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

我应该提到，那些期望本世纪股票每年赚取10%收益的人——设想其中2%来自股息，8%来自价格上涨——实际上是在预测道指到2100年将达到约24,000,000点。如果你的顾问跟你谈论股票两位数的回报率，请向他解释这个算术——虽然这不会让他感到不安。许多“帮手”显然是从《爱丽丝梦游仙境》中的王后那里直系下来的，她曾说：“嘿，有时我在早餐前就相信了多达六件不可能的事情。”要警惕那些用幻想填满你头脑，同时用费用填满他自己口袋的能言善辩的“帮手”。

Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I've never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.

一些公司在欧洲和美国都有养老金计划，并且在它们的会计处理中，几乎所有公司都假设美国计划的收益将高于非美国计划。这种差异令人费解：为什么这些公司不让他们的美国经理人负责非美国的养老金资产，让他们也对这些资产施展魔法呢？我从未见过对这个谜题的解释。但是，负责审查回报假设的审计师和精算师们似乎对此并无异议。

What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won't come home to roost until long after they retire.

然而，并不令人费解的是CEO们为什么选择高投资假设：这让他们能报告更高的收益。如果他们错了，正如我相信他们错了那样，那么因果报应要到他们退休很久之后才会显现。

After decades of pushing the envelope - or worse - in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: "If you've hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing."

在经历了数十年试图报告尽可能高的当期收益而挑战极限——甚至更糟——之后，美国公司应该放松一下了。它应该听听我的合伙人查理的话：“如果你已经连续三次把球打出左边界，那么下一次挥杆时就应该稍微瞄准右边一点。”

Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement - sometimes to those in their low 40s - and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

无论未来股东们会遭遇怎样的养老金成本意外，这些冲击都将被纳税人所经历的冲击超过许多倍。公共养老金的承诺是巨大的，而且在许多情况下，资金准备严重不足。由于这颗定时炸弹的引信很长，政客们不愿施加税收的痛苦，因为问题只会在这些官员离开很久之后才会变得明显。涉及过早退休——有时是40岁出头——以及慷慨的生活成本调整的承诺，对这些官员来说很容易做出。在一个人们寿命更长、通货膨胀确凿无疑的世界里，履行这些承诺绝非易事。

Having laid out the failures of an "honor system" in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.

在阐述了美国会计中“荣誉制度”的失败之后，我需要指出，这恰恰是伯克希尔在一个真正巨大的资产负债表项目上存在的制度。在每次向你们报告的报告中，我们都必须对我们的保险部门的损失准备金进行估算。如果我们的估算错误，那意味着我们的资产负债表和损益表都将出错。所以，我们自然会尽力使这些猜测准确。然而，在每一份报告中，我们的估算肯定都是错误的。

At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney's fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker's compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.

在2007年底，我们列示了560亿美元的保险负债，这是我们对于年底前发生的所有损失事件最终将支付的金额的猜测（除了约30亿美元已折现到现值的准备金）。我们知道成千上万的事件，并为每个事件设定了一个美元价值，反映了我们认为我们将支付的金额，包括我们在支付过程中将发生的相关费用（如律师费）。在某些情况下，例如工人赔偿保险所涵盖的某些严重伤害的索赔，支付将持续50年或更长时间。

We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.

我们还包括一笔很大的准备金，用于支付年底前发生但我们尚未获悉的损失。有时，被保险人自己也不知道发生了损失。（想象一下一起多年未被发现的贪污案。）我们有时会在保单承保几十年后才知道相关的损失。

A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn't get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000. He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10. He paid that, too - and still another $10 charge he received a month later. When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. "Oh," she replied, "I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit."

几年前我讲过的一个故事说明了我们在准确估计损失负债方面的问题：一个家伙在欧洲进行一次重要的商务旅行，他姐姐打电话告诉他父亲去世了。他解释说无法回去，但说葬礼不要省钱，费用由他承担。他回来后，姐姐告诉他葬礼办得很美，并给了他总计8,000美元的账单。他付了钱，但一个月后，他收到了殡仪馆10美元的账单。他也付了——一个月后又收到了另一笔10美元的费用。又过了一个月，第三张10美元的发票寄给了他，这个困惑的人打电话给他姐姐问是怎么回事。“哦，”她回答说，“我忘了告诉你。我们把爸爸租了一套西装下葬的。”

At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of "rented suits" buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I've been wrong several times in the past.

在我们的保险公司，我们在世界各地埋藏着数量未知，但肯定非常庞大的“租来的西装”。我们试图准确估算它们的费用。在十年或二十年后，我们甚至能很好地猜出我们目前的猜测有多不准确。但即使那个猜测也会有意想不到的地方。我个人认为我们列示的准备金是充足的，但我过去也错过好几次。

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest's stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

我们今年的年会将于5月3日星期六举行。和往常一样，Qwest Center 将在早上7点开门，8:30放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。9:30，我们将直接进入问答环节（在 Qwest 的摊位吃午饭休息），将持续到下午3点。然后，短暂休息后，查理和我在3:15召开年度股东大会。如果你决定在白天问答环节离开，请在查理讲话时离开。

The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (If necessary, I'll lock the doors.)

当然，离开的最佳理由是去购物。我们会帮助你们做到这一点，用伯克希尔子公司的产品填满毗邻会议区的194,300平方英尺的大厅。去年，前来参加会议的27,000人尽了自己的一份力，几乎每个地方都创造了创纪录的销售额。但你们可以做得更好。（如果有必要，我会锁上门。）

This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that this 1,550-square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value. And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.

今年，我们将再次展示一个克莱顿房屋（采用阿克米砖块、肖氏地毯、约翰斯·曼维尔隔热材料、MiTek 紧固件、Carefree 遮阳篷和 NFM 家具）。你会发现这座1,550平方英尺、标价69,500美元的房屋物超所值。买了房子后，也可以考虑购买附近展示的森林河房车和浮桥船。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

盖可将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的许多顶级顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，盖可能给你一个特别的股东折扣（通常为8%）。在我们经营的50个司法管辖区中，有45个允许这种特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你符合其他折扣条件，例如某些团体的折扣，此折扣不可累加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮你省钱。我相信，对你们中至少50%的人来说，我们能做到。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you.

星期六，在奥马哈机场，我们将提供往常一样的一系列 NetJets 飞机供你参观。请到 Qwest 的 NetJets 展位了解如何观看这些飞机。坐巴士来奥马哈，开着自己的新飞机离开。带上你想要的任何发胶和剪刀登机。

Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs - all discounted - led again by Poor Charlie's Almanack. Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie's book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies. For those of you who can't make the meeting, go to poorcharliessalmanack.com to order a copy.

接下来，如果你还有钱，可以逛逛 Bookworm，你会在那里找到大约25种图书和DVD——全部打折——其中又以《穷查理宝典》为首。在没有广告或书店宣传的情况下，查理的书现在已经惊人地售出了近5万册。对于那些无法参加会议的人，可以访问 poorcharliessalmanack.com 购买一本。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

本报告随附的委托书材料附件解释了如何获得参加年会和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次签约美国运通（800-799-6634）为你提供特别帮助。负责这些事务的卡罗尔·佩德森每年都为我们做得很出色，我为此感谢她。酒店房间可能难找，但与卡罗尔合作，你就会找到一间。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM eleven years ago, and sales during the "Weekend" grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30.9 million in 2007. This is more volume than most furniture stores register in a year.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间第72街占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具卖场，我们将再次提供“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。我们11年前在 NFM 启动了这项特别活动，“周末”期间的销售额从1997年的530万美元增长到2007年的3090万美元。这比大多数家具店一年登记的销售额还要多。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.

要获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在5月1日星期四至5月5日星期一期间（含首尾两天）购物，并出示你的会议凭证。该期间的特价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有反对打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点开放，周日上午10点至下午6点开放。今年的星期六下午5:30到晚上8点，NFM 将举办巴哈海滩派对，提供牛肉和鸡肉玉米卷。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在博希姆珠宝，我们将再次举办两场股东专属活动。第一场是5月2日星期五晚上6点到10点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于5月4日星期日上午9点至下午4点举行。星期六，我们将营业至下午6点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，博希姆珠宝将人潮涌动。因此，为方便起见，从4月28日星期一到5月10日星期六，股东价格将有效。在此期间，请出示你的会议凭证或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的券商对账单，以证明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

星期天，在博希姆珠宝外面的帐篷里，两次美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙上眼睛，接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛——每组六人。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者感到迷惑。此外，我们将有鲍勃·哈曼和莎朗·奥斯伯格这两位世界顶尖桥牌专家在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。

Gorat's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat's, which seats 240, served 915 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,487 including 656 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please remember that to come to Gorat's on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).

戈拉特牛排馆将于5月4日星期日再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至晚上10点。去年，拥有240个座位的戈拉特在股东星期日供应了915份晚餐。三天总计2,487份，其中包括656份T骨牛排，这是行家们首选的主菜。请记住，要在那天去戈拉特，你必须预订。预订请于4月1日（但不能提前）致电402-551-3733。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.

星期六下午4点，我们将再次为来自北美以外的股东举行招待会。每年我们的年会都会吸引来自全球各地的许多人，查理和我想要确保我们亲自问候那些远道而来的人。去年我们很高兴见到了来自几十个国家的400多位股东。任何来自美国或加拿大以外的股东都将获得特殊的凭证和参加本次活动的说明。

At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a "business" gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society's well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire's annual meeting. So join us on May 3rd at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We'll see you there.

84岁和77岁的查理和我，依然拥有着超乎梦想的幸运。我们出生在美国；有很棒的父母，他们确保我们接受了良好的教育；拥有美满的家庭和健康的身体；并且天生具备“商业”基因，让我们能够获得巨大成功，其程度与许多为社会福祉做出同样或更多贡献的人所经历的相比极不相称。此外，我们长期从事着自己热爱的工作，无数才华横溢、乐观向上的同事在方方面面给予我们帮助。每一天都让我们兴奋不已；难怪我们跳着舞步去上班。但对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔年会上与我们的股东伙伴们相聚更有趣的了。所以，请在5月3日加入我们，参加在 Qwest 中心举行的我们一年一度的“资本家伍德斯托克”。我们到时见。

February 2008

2008年2月

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席