1986 年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or 26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually. Both the numerator and denominator are important in the per-share book value calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased less than 1%.

1986 年我们的净值增长了 4.925 亿美元，增幅为 26.1%。过去 22 年（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到 2,073.06 美元，年复合增长率 23.3%。在每股账面价值的计算中，分子和分母都很重要：在这 22 年间，我们的公司净值增长了 10,600%，而流通股数量增长不到 1%。

In past reports I have noted that book value at most companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however, book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.

在过去的年报中，我曾指出大多数公司的账面价值与内在商业价值（对股东真正重要的数字）相差甚远。然而，就我们自己而言，十多年来，账面价值一直是一个合理（尽管略显保守）的商业价值替代指标。也就是说，我们的商业价值适度超过了账面价值，且两者之间的比率保持相当稳定。

The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say "probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments more than 10% apart.

好消息是，1986 年我们商业价值的百分比增幅很可能超过了账面价值的增幅。我说“很可能”是因为商业价值是一个模糊的数字：就我们而言，两位同样消息灵通的观察者做出的判断可能相差超过 10%。

A large measure of our improvement in business value relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers - the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was substantial.

我们商业价值相对于账面价值的大部分提升，反映了核心运营业务中关键经理人的杰出表现。这些经理人——布鲁姆金家族、麦克·戈德伯格、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊——多年来大幅提高了各自业务的盈利，除保险业务外，几乎未使用额外资本。这一成就创造了经济价值或“商誉”，但它并未出现在我们资产负债表的净值数字中，也未体现在每股账面价值里。1986 年，这一未记录的增长是巨大的。

So much for the good news. The bad news is that my performance did not match that of our managers. While they were doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated.

好消息就说到这里。坏消息是，我的表现未能与我们的经理人匹敌。在他们出色地经营业务的同时，我却未能熟练地配置他们所产生的大部分资本。

Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult. Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing.

我们的副董事长查理·芒格和我实际上只有两项工作。第一项是吸引并留住优秀的经理人来管理我们的各项业务。这并不那么困难。通常，经理人是随我们收购的公司而来的，他们在跨越各种商业环境的职业生涯中已经证明了才华。早在认识我们之前，他们就已经是管理明星了，我们的主要贡献就是不挡他们的道。这种方法看似简单：如果我的工作是管理一支高尔夫球队——并且杰克·尼克劳斯或阿诺德·帕尔默愿意为我打球——我不会给他们太多关于如何挥杆的指令。

Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all aspects of their business absorbing.

我们的一些核心经理人已经财务独立（我们希望他们都能如此），但这并不威胁他们的持续投入：他们工作是因为热爱自己所做的事，并享受卓越表现带来的兴奋感。他们始终像所有者一样思考（这是我们对经理人的最高赞扬），并对业务的方方面面都充满兴趣。

(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?" Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")

（我们心目中职业热情的典范是那位天主教裁缝，他用多年积攒的一点积蓄资助了一次去梵蒂冈的朝圣。回来后，他的教区召开了一次特别会议，听取他对教皇的第一手描述。“告诉我们，”热心的信徒说，“他到底是怎样一个人？”我们的英雄言简意赅：“他是四十四码，中等身材。”）

Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."

查理和我明白，合适的球员几乎能让任何球队经理看起来很棒。我们信奉奥美创始天才大卫·奥格威的理念：“如果我们每个人都雇用比我们矮小的人，我们就会变成一家侏儒公司。但是，如果我们每个人都雇用比我们高大的人，我们就会变成一家巨人公司。”

A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read management treatises that specify exactly how many people should report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us. When you have able managers of high character running businesses about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap. Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare qualities of the present ones.

我们管理风格的副产品是它让我们能够轻松地扩展伯克希尔的业务。我们读过一些管理论文，确切地规定了一个高管应该有多少直接下属，但这些对我们没什么意义。当你拥有能力出众、品格高尚、对自己的业务充满热情的经理人时，你可以有十几个甚至更多人向你汇报，而仍有时间打个午觉。相反，如果向你汇报的哪怕只有一个人，但他不诚实、无能或缺乏兴趣，你就会发现自己忙不过来。查理和我可以与比现在多一倍的经理人共事，只要他们具备现任经理人那些罕见的品质。

We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, it also ensures us an extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich.

我们打算继续坚持只与我们喜欢和钦佩的人共事的做法。这一政策不仅最大化了我们取得好结果的机会，也保证了我们能享受非常愉快的时光。另一方面，与那些让你感到不安的人一起工作，就像为了钱而结婚——在任何情况下可能都不是个好主意，但如果你已经很有钱了，那绝对是疯狂。

The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow. Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-allocation decisions, though still important, will change the company’s economics far more slowly.

查理和我必须处理的第二项工作是资本配置，这在伯克希尔比在大多数公司要重要得多。三个因素造成了这一点：我们赚的钱比平均水平多；我们保留所有赚到的钱；而且我们很幸运，旗下业务大多只需很少的增量资本就能保持竞争力和增长。显然，一家年赚 23% 并保留所有利润的企业，其未来业绩受当前资本配置的影响，远比一家年赚 10% 并将一半利润分给股东的企业要大得多。如果我们保留的盈利——以及我们主要被投公司 GEICO 和大都会/ABC 的保留盈利——被用于非生产性的方式，伯克希尔的经济状况会迅速恶化。在一家每年净值仅增长 5% 的公司中，资本配置决策虽然仍然重要，但改变公司经济状况的速度要慢得多。

Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros. Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.

1986 年，伯克希尔的资本配置是一项艰难的工作。我们确实进行了一项业务收购——费希海默兄弟公司，我们将在后面讨论。费希海默是一家经济特性优异的公司，由其经营者正是我们乐于与之打交道的那种人。但它相对较小，仅使用了伯克希尔净值的 2% 左右。

Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986 were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth would slow significantly.

与此同时，我们在有价证券领域没有任何新想法。就在几年前，我们还能轻易地以非常合理的价格将大笔资金投入到优秀的企业中。因此，我们 1986 年主要的资本配置动作是偿还债务和囤积资金。这两者都不是比死亡更糟糕的命运，但也不会让我们兴奋得翻跟头。如果查理和我在资本配置努力中连续几年一无所获，伯克希尔的增长率将显著放缓。

We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it is to help our performance materially. Under current stock market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly - you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might happen.

我们将继续寻找符合我们标准的运营业务，运气好的话，每隔几年会收购一家这样的企业。但要想对我们的业绩产生实质性帮助，收购的规模必须很大。在当前股市条件下，我们几乎无望为保险公司找到可买的股票。市场会发生显著变化——你可以确信这一点，总有一天我们会再次迎来击球机会。然而，我们完全不知道那可能发生在什么时候。

It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes described in a later section of this report. If we are to achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2 billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big (and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.

无论怎样强调都不为过（尽管我相信你们觉得我已经试过了）：即使在有利条件下，由于我们的规模扩大，回报率也必然会大幅下降。我们曾告诉你们，我们希望平均实现 15% 的净资产收益率，并且尽管本报告后面部分提到了一些不利的税法变化，我们仍保持这一希望。如果我们要实现这一回报率，我们的净值在未来十年必须增长 72 亿美元。只有在我们不久之后想出几个非常大（且好的）主意时，才有可能实现如此幅度的增长。查理和我不能承诺结果，但我们向你们保证，我们会继续将努力集中在我们的目标上。

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. This table differs in several ways from the one presented last year. We have added four new lines of business because of the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions. In the case of Scott Fetzer, the two major units acquired were World Book and Kirby, and each is presented separately. Fourteen other businesses of Scott Fetzer are aggregated in Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing. SF Financial Group, a credit company holding both World Book and Kirby receivables, is included in "Other." This year, because Berkshire is so much larger, we also have eliminated separate reporting for several of our smaller businesses.

报告盈利来源

下一页的表格显示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。该表格与去年相比有几处不同。由于收购了斯科特·费策和费希海默，我们增加了四个新的业务条线。就斯科特·费策而言，收购的两个主要部门是世界图书和科比，每个都单独列出。斯科特·费策的其他十四个业务汇总在“斯科特·费策 - 多元化制造”中。SF 金融集团是一家持有世界图书和科比应收账款的信贷公司，被归入“其他”。今年，由于伯克希尔规模更大，我们还取消了几个较小业务的单独报告。

In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 Annual Report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A Compendium of earlier letters, including the Goodwill discussion, is available upon request.) Both the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions created accounting Goodwill, which is why the amortization charge for Goodwill increased in 1986.

在表格中，商誉摊销不直接抵扣具体业务，而是根据 1983 年年报中我信件的附录所述原因，作为一个单独项目汇总。（早期信件的汇编，包括商誉讨论，可应要求提供。）斯科特·费策和费希海默的收购都产生了会计商誉，这就是 1986 年商誉摊销费用增加的原因。

Additionally, the Scott Fetzer acquisition required other major purchase-price accounting adjustments, as prescribed by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP figures, of course, are the ones used in our consolidated financial statements. But, in our view, the GAAP figures are not necessarily the most useful ones for investors or managers. Therefore, the figures shown for specific operating units are earnings before purchase-price adjustments are taken into account. In effect, these are the earnings that would have been reported by the businesses if we had not purchased them.

此外，根据公认会计原则，斯科特·费策的收购还需要进行其他重大的购买价格会计调整。当然，GAAP 数字是我们合并财务报表中使用的数字。但我们认为，GAAP 数字对投资者或经理人来说不一定是最有用的。因此，所示的具体运营单位的数字是未考虑购买价格调整前的盈利。实际上，这些就是如果我们没有收购这些业务，它们本应报告的盈利。

A discussion of our reasons for preferring this form of presentation is in the Appendix to this letter. This Appendix will never substitute for a steamy novel and definitely is not required reading. However, I know that among our 6,000 shareholders there are those who are thrilled by my essays on accounting - and I hope that both of you enjoy the Appendix.

关于我们为何偏好这种呈现形式的讨论，请参见本信件的附录。这个附录永远无法替代一本香艳的小说，也绝对不是必读内容。然而，我知道在我们 6,000 名股东中，有些人对我关于会计的文章感到兴奋——我希望你们两位能喜欢这个附录。

In the Business Segment Data on pages 41-43 and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 45-49, you will find much additional information about our businesses. I urge you to read those sections, as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 50.

在第 41-43 页的业务分部数据以及第 45-49 页的管理层讨论部分，你会找到关于我们业务的更多信息。我敦促你阅读这些部分，以及从第 50 页开始的查理·芒格致西科股东的信，其中描述了该子公司的各项业务。

                                               (000s omitted)
                                 ------------------------------------------
                                                          Berkshire's Share
                                                           of Net Earnings
                                                          (after taxes and
                                   Pre-Tax Earnings      minority interests)
                                 -------------------     -------------------
                                   1986       1985         1986       1985
                                 --------   --------     --------   --------
Operating Earnings:
  Insurance Group:
    Underwriting ............... $(55,844)   $(44,230)   $(29,864)   $(23,569)
    Net Investment Income ...... 107,143       95,217      96,440      79,716
  Buffalo News .................   34,736      29,921      16,918      14,580
  Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86)      8,400       ---         3,792       ---
  Kirby ........................   20,218       ---        10,508       ---
  Nebraska Furniture Mart ......   17,685      12,686       7,192       5,181
  Scott Fetzer - Diversified Mfg. 25,358        ---        13,354       ---
  See’s Candies ................   30,347      28,989      15,176      14,558
  Wesco - other than insurance      5,542      16,018       5,550       9,684
  World Book ...................   21,978       ---        11,670       ---
  Amortization of Goodwill         (2,555)     (1,475)     (2,555)     (1,475)
  Other purchase-price
     accounting charges ........ (10,033)       ---       (11,031)      ---
  Interest on Debt and
     Pre-Payment penalty ....... (23,891)     (14,415)    (12,213)     (7,288)
  Shareholder-Designated
     Contributions .............   (3,997)     (4,006)     (2,158)     (2,164)
  Other ........................   20,770       6,744       8,685       3,725
                                 --------    --------    --------    --------
Operating Earnings ............. 195,857      125,449     131,464      92,948
Special General Foods
   Distribution ................    ---         4,127       ---         3,779
Special Washington Post
   Distribution ................    ---      14,877       ---        13,851
Sales of securities ............ 216,242      468,903     150,897     325,237
                                 --------    --------    --------    --------
Total Earnings - all entities .. $412,099    $613,356    $282,361    $435,815
                                 ========    ========    ========    ========

                                               （省略 000）
                                 ------------------------------------------
                                                         伯克希尔应占
                                                           净收益
                                                        （税后及扣除
                                    税前收益            少数股东权益后）
                                 -------------------     -------------------
                                   1986       1985         1986       1985
                                 --------   --------     --------   --------
经营收益：
  保险集团：
    承保 ....................... $(55,844)   $(44,230)   $(29,864)   $(23,569)
    净投资收入 ................. 107,143       95,217      96,440      79,716
  Buffalo News .................   34,736      29,921      16,918      14,580
  Fechheimer（1986/6/3 收购）...    8,400       ---         3,792       ---
  Kirby ........................   20,218       ---        10,508       ---
  Nebraska Furniture Mart ......   17,685      12,686       7,192       5,181
  Scott Fetzer - 多元制造 ...... 25,358        ---        13,354       ---
  See’s Candies ................   30,347      28,989      15,176      14,558
  Wesco - 保险以外业务 .........    5,542      16,018       5,550       9,684
  World Book ...................   21,978       ---        11,670       ---
  商誉摊销 .....................   (2,555)     (1,475)     (2,555)     (1,475)
  其他购买价格
     会计费用 .................. (10,033)       ---       (11,031)      ---
  债务利息及
     提前还款罚金 .............. (23,891)     (14,415)    (12,213)     (7,288)
  股东指定
     捐款 ......................   (3,997)     (4,006)     (2,158)     (2,164)
  其他 .........................   20,770       6,744       8,685       3,725
                                 --------    --------    --------    --------
经营收益 ....................... 195,857      125,449     131,464      92,948
General Foods
   特别分配 ....................    ---         4,127       ---         3,779
Washington Post
   特别分配 ....................    ---      14,877       ---        13,851
证券销售 ....................... 216,242      468,903     150,897     325,237
                                 --------    --------    --------    --------
所有实体总收益 ................. $412,099    $613,356    $282,361    $435,815
                                 ========    ========    ========    ========

As you can see, operating earnings substantially improved during 1986. Some of the improvement came from the insurance operation, whose results I will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer also will be discussed separately. Our other major businesses performed as follows:

如你所见，营业收益在 1986 年有了显著改善。部分改善来自保险业务，我将在后面部分讨论其结果。费希海默也将单独讨论。我们的其他主要业务表现如下：

o Operating results at The Buffalo News continue to reflect a truly superb managerial job by Stan Lipsey. For the third year in a row, man-hours worked fell significantly and other costs were closely controlled. Consequently, our operating margins improved materially in 1986, even though our advertising rate increases were well below those of most major newspapers.

o 布法罗新闻报的运营结果继续反映了斯坦·利普西真正出色的管理工作。连续第三年，工时显著下降，其他成本也得到了严格控制。因此，尽管我们的广告费率涨幅远低于大多数主要报纸，但 1986 年的营业利润率仍有了实质性提高。

Our cost-control efforts have in no way reduced our commitment to news. We continue to deliver a 50% "news hole" (the portion of the total space in the paper devoted to news), a higher percentage, we believe, than exists at any dominant newspaper in this country of our size or larger.

我们的成本控制努力丝毫没有减少我们对新闻的投入。我们继续保持 50% 的“新闻版面率”（报纸总版面中用于新闻的比例），我们相信这一比例高于美国任何同等规模或更大规模的主导性报纸。

The average news hole at papers comparable to the News is about 40%. The difference between 40% and 50% is more important than it might first seem: a paper with 30 pages of ads and a 40% news hole delivers 20 pages of news a day, whereas our paper matches 30 pages of ads with 30 pages of news. Therefore, given ad pages equal in number, we end up delivering our readers no less than 50% more news.

与《新闻报》规模相当的报纸，平均新闻版面率约为 40%。40% 和 50% 的差异比乍看起来更重要：一份有 30 页广告、新闻版面率 40% 的报纸，每天提供 20 页新闻；而我们的报纸用 30 页广告配 30 页新闻。因此，在广告页数相同的情况下，我们最终为读者提供的新闻量至少多出 50%。

We believe this heavy commitment to news is one of the reasons The Buffalo News has the highest weekday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper’s primary marketing area purchasing it each day) among any of the top 50 papers in the country. Our Sunday penetration, where we are also number one, is even more impressive. Ten years ago, the only Sunday paper serving Buffalo (the Courier-Express) had circulation of 271,000 and a penetration ratio of about 63%. The Courier-Express had served the area for many decades and its penetration ratio - which was similar to those existing in many metropolitan markets - was thought to be a "natural" one, accurately reflecting the local citizenry’s appetite for a Sunday product.

我们相信，这种对新闻的高度投入是《布法罗新闻报》在美国前 50 名报纸中拥有最高工作日渗透率（报纸主要市场区域中每天购买的家庭百分比）的原因之一。我们的周日版渗透率同样排名第一，甚至更令人印象深刻。十年前，布法罗唯一的周日版报纸《信使快报》发行量为 27.1 万份，渗透率约 63%。《信使快报》为该地区服务了几十年，其渗透率——与许多大都市市场相似——被认为是“自然的”，准确反映了当地市民对周日产品的需求。

Our Sunday paper was started in late 1977. It now has a penetration ratio of 83% and sells about 100,000 copies more each Sunday than did the Courier-Express ten years ago - even though population in our market area has declined during the decade. In recent history, no other city that has long had a local Sunday paper has experienced a penetration gain anywhere close to Buffalo’s.

我们的周日版报纸始于 1977 年底。现在它的渗透率达到了 83%，每个周日售出的份数比十年前的《信使快报》多出约 10 万份——尽管我们市场区域的人口在这十年间有所下降。在近代史上，没有哪个长期拥有本地周日版报纸的城市，其渗透率的增长能接近布法罗的水平。

Despite our exceptional market acceptance, our operating margins almost certainly have peaked. A major newsprint price increase took effect at the end of 1986, and our advertising rate increases in 1987 will again be moderate compared to those of the industry. However, even if margins should materially shrink, we would not reduce our news-hole ratio.

尽管我们的市场接受度异常高，但我们的营业利润率几乎肯定已经见顶。1986 年底，新闻纸价格大幅上涨生效，而 1987 年我们的广告费率涨幅与行业相比仍将保持温和。然而，即使利润率大幅下降，我们也不会降低新闻版面率。

As I write this, it has been exactly ten years since we purchased The News. The financial rewards it has brought us have far exceeded our expectations and so, too, have the non-financial rewards. Our respect for the News - high when we bought it - has grown consistently ever since the purchase, as has our respect and admiration for Murray Light, the editor who turns out the product that receives such extraordinary community acceptance. The efforts of Murray and Stan, which were crucial to the News during its dark days of financial reversals and litigation, have not in the least been lessened by prosperity. Charlie and I are grateful to them.

在我写这段话的时候，距离我们收购《新闻报》正好十年。它带给我们的财务回报远远超出了我们的预期，非财务回报也是如此。我们对《新闻报》的尊重——在收购时就已经很高——自收购以来一直在增长，同样增长的还有我们对默里·莱特的尊重和钦佩，他是这份获得社区如此非凡接受的产品的编辑。默里和斯坦的努力，在《新闻报》经历财务挫折和诉讼的黑暗日子里至关重要，并没有因为繁荣而有丝毫减少。查理和我都感激他们。

o The amazing Blumkins continue to perform business miracles at Nebraska Furniture Mart. Competitors come and go (mostly go), but Mrs. B. and her progeny roll on. In 1986 net sales increased 10.2% to $132 million. Ten years ago sales were $44 million and, even then, NFM appeared to be doing just about all of the business available in the Greater Omaha Area. Given NFM’s remarkable dominance, Omaha’s slow growth in population and the modest inflation rates that have applied to the goods NFM sells, how can this operation continue to rack up such large sales gains? The only logical explanation is that the marketing territory of NFM’s one-and-only store continues to widen because of its ever-growing reputation for rock-bottom everyday prices and the broadest of selections. In preparation for further gains, NFM is expanding the capacity of its warehouse, located a few hundred yards from the store, by about one-third.

o 神奇的布鲁姆金家族继续在内布拉斯加家具卖场创造商业奇迹。竞争对手来了又走（多数是走了），但 B 夫人和她的后代们依然前行。1986 年净销售额增长 10.2%，达到 1.32 亿美元。十年前销售额为 4,400 万美元，即使在当时，NFM 似乎已经包揽了大奥马哈地区几乎所有的生意。鉴于 NFM 显著的主导地位、奥马哈缓慢的人口增长以及 NFM 所售商品的温和通胀率，这家企业如何能继续取得如此大的销售增长？唯一合乎逻辑的解释是，NFM 这唯一一家店铺的市场区域因其在每日最低价和最广泛选择方面日益增长的声誉而不断扩大。为了迎接进一步的增长，NFM 正在将其距离店铺几百码的仓库容量扩大约三分之一。

Mrs. B, Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, continues at age 93 to outsell and out-hustle any manager I’ve ever seen. She’s at the store seven days a week, from opening to close. Competing with her represents a triumph of courage over judgment.

B 夫人，内布拉斯加家具卖场的董事长，在 93 岁高龄时，依然比我见过的任何经理人都更能销售、更拼。她每周七天，从开门到关门都在店里。与她竞争，是勇气战胜判断的胜利。

It’s easy to overlook what I consider to be the critical lesson of the Mrs. B saga: at 93, Omaha based Board Chairmen have yet to reach their peak. Please file this fact away to consult before you mark your ballot at the 2024 annual meeting of Berkshire.

人们很容易忽视我认为 B 夫人传奇中的关键一课：在 93 岁时，奥马哈的董事会主席尚未达到巅峰。请牢记这个事实，在 2024 年伯克希尔年会上投票之前查阅一下。

o At See’s, sales trends improved somewhat from those of recent years. Total pounds sold rose about 2%. (For you chocaholics who like to fantasize, one statistic: we sell over 12,000 tons annually.) Same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In the previous six years, same store poundage fell, and we gained or maintained poundage volume only by adding stores. But a particularly strong Christmas season in 1986 stemmed the decline. By stabilizing same-store volume and making a major effort to control costs, See’s was able to maintain its excellent profit margin in 1986 though it put through only minimal price increases. We have Chuck Huggins, our long-time manager at See’s, to thank for this significant achievement.

o 在喜诗糖果，销售趋势比最近几年有所改善。总销量磅数增长了约 2%。（对于喜欢幻想的巧克力爱好者来说，有一个数据：我们每年销售超过 12,000 吨。）以磅数计算的可比门店销售额几乎未变。在过去六年中，可比门店的销量磅数一直在下降，我们只能通过增加门店来获得或维持销量。但 1986 年特别强劲的圣诞季阻止了这一下降趋势。通过稳定可比门店销量并大力控制成本，喜诗在 1986 年仅进行了极小幅度的提价，却保持了出色的利润率。我们要感谢喜诗的长期经理查克·哈金斯，这一重大成就归功于他。

See’s has a one-of-a-kind product "personality" produced by a combination of its candy’s delicious taste and moderate price, the company’s total control of the distribution process, and the exceptional service provided by store employees. Chuck rightfully measures his success by the satisfaction of our customers, and his attitude permeates the organization. Few major retailing companies have been able to sustain such a customer-oriented spirit, and we owe Chuck a great deal for keeping it alive and well at See’s.

喜诗糖果拥有独一无二的产品“个性”，这源于其糖果美味的口感和适中的价格、公司对分销流程的完全控制，以及店铺员工提供的卓越服务。查克理所当然地以我们客户的满意度来衡量自己的成功，他的态度渗透到整个组织。很少有大型零售公司能够保持这种以客户为导向的精神，我们欠查克很多，因为他让这种精神在喜诗充满活力。

See’s profits should stay at about their present level. We will continue to increase prices very modestly, merely matching prospective cost increases.

喜诗的利润应保持在目前的水平左右。我们将继续非常温和地提价，仅仅是为了匹配预期的成本增长。

o World Book is the largest of 17 Scott Fetzer operations that joined Berkshire at the beginning of 1986. Last year I reported to you enthusiastically about the businesses of Scott Fetzer and about Ralph Schey, its manager. A year’s experience has added to my enthusiasm for both. Ralph is a superb businessman and a straight shooter. He also brings exceptional versatility and energy to his job: despite the wide array of businesses that he manages, he is on top of the operations, opportunities and problems of each. And, like our other managers, Ralph is a real pleasure to work with. Our good fortune continues.

o 世界图书是斯科特·费策旗下 17 项业务中最大的一个，于 1986 年初加入伯克希尔。去年我曾热情地向你们介绍斯科特·费策的业务及其经理拉尔夫·谢伊。一年的经历让我对两者更加热情。拉尔夫是一位出色的商人和直率坦诚的人。他还为他的工作带来了非凡的多才多艺和精力：尽管他管理的业务种类繁多，但他对每一项业务的运营、机会和问题都了如指掌。而且，像我们的其他经理人一样，与拉尔夫共事非常愉快。我们的好运还在继续。

World Book’s unit volume increased for the fourth consecutive year, with encyclopedia sales up 7% over 1985 and 45% over 1982. Childcraft’s unit sales also grew significantly.

世界图书的销售量连续第四年增长，百科全书销售额比 1985 年增长 7%，比 1982 年增长 45%。Childcraft 的销售量也显著增长。

World Book continues to dominate the U.S. direct-sales encyclopedia market - and for good reasons. Extraordinarily well-edited and priced at under 5 cents per page, these books are a bargain for youngster and adult alike. You may find one editing technique interesting: World Book ranks over 44,000 words by difficulty. Longer entries in the encyclopedia include only the most easily comprehended words in the opening sections, with the difficulty of the material gradually escalating as the exposition proceeds. As a result, youngsters can easily and profitably read to the point at which subject matter gets too difficult, instead of immediately having to deal with a discussion that mixes up words requiring college-level comprehension with others of fourth-grade level.

世界图书继续主导美国直销百科全书市场——这有充分的理由。这些书编辑得异常出色，每页价格不到 5 美分，对年轻人和成年人来说都很划算。你可能会发现一个有趣的编辑技巧：世界图书按难度对超过 44,000 个单词进行排序。较长的词条在开篇部分只使用最容易理解的单词，随着论述的推进，材料的难度逐渐增加。这样一来，年轻人可以轻松且有益地读到内容变得太难的节点，而不必立即面对一个混合了需要大学理解水平的词汇和四年级水平词汇的讨论。

Selling World Book is a calling. Over one-half of our active salespeople are teachers or former teachers, and another 5% have had experience as librarians. They correctly think of themselves as educators, and they do a terrific job. If you don’t have a World Book set in your house, I recommend one.

销售世界图书是一种使命。我们活跃的销售人员中，超过一半是教师或前教师，另外 5% 有图书馆员经验。他们正确地视自己为教育者，并且工作非常出色。如果你家里没有一套世界图书，我推荐你买一套。

o Kirby likewise recorded its fourth straight year of unit volume gains. Worldwide, unit sales grew 4% from 1985 and 33% from 1982. While the Kirby product is more expensive than most cleaners, it performs in a manner that leaves cheaper units far behind ("in the dust," so to speak). Many 30- and 40-year-old Kirby cleaners are still in active duty. If you want the best, you buy a Kirby.

o 科比同样连续第四年实现了销量增长。全球范围内，单位销售额比 1985 年增长 4%，比 1982 年增长 33%。虽然科比产品比大多数吸尘器都贵，但其性能将更便宜的机型远远甩在身后（可以说是“望尘莫及”）。许多使用了三四十年的科比吸尘器仍在服役。如果你想要最好的，你就买科比。

Some companies that historically have had great success in direct sales have stumbled in recent years. Certainly the era of the working woman has created new challenges for direct sales organizations. So far, the record shows that both Kirby and World Book have responded most successfully.

一些历史上在直销领域取得巨大成功的公司近年来遭遇了挫折。当然，职业女性的时代给直销组织带来了新的挑战。到目前为止，记录显示科比和世界图书都做出了非常成功的应对。

The businesses described above, along with the insurance operation and Fechheimer, constitute our major business units. The brevity of our descriptions is in no way meant to diminish the importance of these businesses to us. All have been discussed in past annual reports and, because of the tendency of Berkshire owners to stay in the fold (about 98% of the stock at the end of each year is owned by people who were owners at the start of the year), we want to avoid undue repetition of basic facts. You can be sure that we will immediately report to you in detail if the underlying economics or competitive position of any of these businesses should materially change. In general, the businesses described in this section can be characterized as having very strong market positions, very high returns on capital employed, and the best of operating managements.

上述业务，连同保险业务和费希海默，构成了我们的主要业务单元。我们描述的简洁性绝不意味着削弱这些业务对我们的重要性。所有这些都在过去的年报中讨论过，并且由于伯克希尔的股东倾向于留下来（每年年底约 98% 的股份由年初就是股东的人持有），我们希望避免对基本事实的不当重复。你可以放心，如果其中任何业务的基本经济状况或竞争地位发生重大变化，我们会立即向你详细报告。总的来说，本节描述的业务可以概括为拥有非常强大的市场地位、非常高的资本回报率以及最优秀的运营管理层。

The Fechheimer Bros. Co.

Every year in Berkshire’s annual report I include a description of the kind of business that we would like to buy. This "ad" paid off in 1986.

费希海默兄弟公司

每年在伯克希尔的年报中，我都会描述我们希望收购的业务类型。这个“广告”在 1986 年奏效了。

On January 15th of last year I received a letter from Bob Heldman of Cincinnati, a shareholder for many years and also Chairman of Fechheimer Bros. Until I read the letter, however, I did not know of either Bob or Fechheimer. Bob wrote that he ran a company that met our tests and suggested that we get together, which we did in Omaha after their results for 1985 were compiled.

去年 1 月 15 日，我收到了辛辛那提的鲍勃·赫尔德曼的一封信，他是多年的股东，也是费希海默兄弟公司的董事长。但在读到这封信之前，我既不知道鲍勃，也不知道费希海默。鲍勃写道，他经营着一家符合我们标准的公司，并建议我们见一面。在他们 1985 年的业绩汇总后，我们在奥马哈见了面。

He filled me in on a little history: Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business, began operations in 1842. Warren Heldman, Bob’s father, became involved in the business in 1941 and his sons, Bob and George (now President), along with their sons, subsequently joined the company. Under the Heldmans’ management, the business was highly successful.

他向我简要介绍了一些历史：费希海默是一家制服制造和分销企业，始于 1842 年。鲍勃的父亲沃伦·赫尔德曼于 1941 年进入该行业，他的儿子鲍勃和乔治（现任总裁）以及他们的儿子随后也加入了公司。在赫尔德曼家族的管理下，这家企业非常成功。

In 1981 Fechheimer was sold to a group of venture capitalists in a leveraged buy out (an LBO), with management retaining an equity interest. The new company, as is the case with all LBOs, started with an exceptionally high debt/equity ratio. After the buy out, however, operations continued to be very successful. So by the start of last year debt had been paid down substantially and the value of the equity had increased dramatically. For a variety of reasons, the venture capitalists wished to sell and Bob, having dutifully read Berkshire’s annual reports, thought of us.

1981 年，费希海默通过杠杆收购被卖给了一群风险资本家，管理层保留了股权。与所有杠杆收购一样，新公司的初始债务股本比异常高。然而，收购之后，运营依然非常成功。因此，到去年年初，债务已大幅减少，股权价值急剧增加。出于各种原因，风险资本家希望出售，而鲍勃尽职尽责地阅读了伯克希尔的年报，便想到了我们。

Fechheimer is exactly the sort of business we like to buy. Its economic record is superb; its managers are talented, high-grade, and love what they do; and the Heldman family wanted to continue its financial interest in partnership with us. Therefore, we quickly purchased about 84% of the stock for a price that was based upon a $55 million valuation for the entire business.

费希海默正是我们喜欢收购的那种企业。它的经济记录出色；其经理人才华横溢、品格高尚，并且热爱自己的工作；赫尔德曼家族希望继续与我们合作保持财务利益。因此，我们迅速购买了约 84% 的股份，价格基于整个公司 5,500 万美元的估值。

The circumstances of this acquisition were similar to those prevailing in our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart: most of the shares were held by people who wished to employ funds elsewhere; family members who enjoyed running their business wanted to continue both as owners and managers; several generations of the family were active in the business, providing management for as far as the eye can see; and the managing family wanted a purchaser who would not re-sell, regardless of price, and who would let the business be run in the future as it had been in the past. Both Fechheimer and NFM were right for us, and we were right for them.

这次收购的情况与我们购买内布拉斯加家具卖场时的情况相似：大部分股份由希望将资金用于其他地方的人持有；喜欢经营自己生意的家族成员希望继续作为所有者和管理者；家族中有几代人都活跃在业务中，提供了长远的经营管理；管理家族希望找到一个无论出价多少都不会转卖、并且允许未来业务像过去一样运营的买家。费希海默和 NFM 都适合我们，我们也适合他们。

You may be amused to know that neither Charlie nor I have been to Cincinnati, headquarters for Fechheimer, to see their operation. (And, incidentally, it works both ways: Chuck Huggins, who has been running See’s for 15 years, has never been to Omaha.) If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble. Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining. Fechheimer was a standout in both respects. In addition to Bob and George Heldman, who are in their mid-60s - spring chickens by our standards - there are three members of the next generation, Gary, Roger and Fred, to insure continuity.

你可能会觉得好笑，查理和我都没有去过费希海默的总部辛辛那提参观他们的运营。（顺便说一句，反过来也一样：经营喜诗糖果 15 年的查克·哈金斯从未去过奥马哈。）如果我们的成功依赖于通过工厂考察获得的洞察力，那么伯克希尔就麻烦大了。相反，在考虑收购时，我们尝试评估业务的经济特性——它的竞争优势和劣势——以及我们将与之共事的人的品质。费希海默在这两方面都很出色。除了鲍勃和乔治·赫尔德曼（他们 65 岁左右，按我们的标准还是“春鸡”），还有下一代的三名成员——加里、罗杰和弗雷德——以确保连续性。

As a prototype for acquisitions, Fechheimer has only one drawback: size. We hope our next acquisition is at least several times as large but a carbon copy in all other respects. Our threshold for minimum annual after-tax earnings of potential acquisitions has been moved up to $10 million from the $5 million level that prevailed when Bob wrote to me.

作为收购的样板，费希海默只有一个缺点：规模。我们希望下一次收购的规模至少是它的几倍，但在其他所有方面都是翻版。我们对潜在收购标的最低年税后收益的门槛已经从鲍勃给我写信时的 500 万美元提高到了 1,000 万美元。

Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a business that fits, call me or, preferably, write.

Here’s what we’re looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turn-around" situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt.
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

因成功而兴奋，我们重复我们的广告。如果你有符合条件的企业，给我打电话，或者最好是写信。

以下是我们寻找的目标：
(1) 大规模收购（至少 1,000 万美元的税后收益）；
(2) 被证明具有持续的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，对“ turnaround ”也不感兴趣）；
(3) 在很少或没有债务的情况下获得良好净资产收益率的企业；
(4) 已有管理层到位（我们无法提供）；
(5) 简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们无法理解）；
(6) 提供报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步地讨论交易，浪费我们或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并非常快速地给出答复——通常五分钟内——告知我们是否感兴趣。我们更倾向于用现金购买，但当我们获得的内在商业价值与付出的对价相等时，也会考虑发行股票。事实上，随着伯克希尔股票近期价格的上涨，涉及发行股票的交易可能会相当可行。我们邀请潜在的卖家通过联系我们过去有过业务往来的人来了解我们。对于合适的企业和合适的人，我们可以提供一个好的归宿。

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.

另一方面，我们经常接到一些远不符合我们标准的收购提议：新创企业、扭亏为盈、拍卖式销售，以及（在经纪人中）永远流行的“我相信如果你们彼此了解，事情总会解决的”。这些对我们毫无吸引力。

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.

除了对收购上述整个企业感兴趣外，我们也对通过谈判购买大量但不控股的股份感兴趣，就像我们购买大都会/ABC 那样。只有当我们对企业的经济状况以及经营者的能力和诚信感到非常满意时，这类购买才会吸引我们。我们偏爱大额交易：在特殊情况下，我们可能会做小至 5,000 万美元（甚至更小）的交易，但我们的偏好是进行数倍于此规模的投入。

Insurance Operations

We present our usual table of industry figures, expanded this year to include data about incurred losses and the GNP inflation index. The contrast in 1986 between the growth in premiums and growth in incurred losses will show you why underwriting results for the year improved materially:

保险业务

我们照例提供行业数据表格，今年扩大了范围，增加了已发生损失和 GNP 通胀指数的数据。1986 年保费增长与已发生损失增长之间的对比将向你展示为什么当年的承保业绩有了显著改善：

Source: Best’s Insurance Management Reports

来源：贝斯特保险管理报告

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-112 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入的比较：比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。当考虑到保险公司因持有投保人资金（“浮存金”）而获得的投资收益时，综合比率在 107-112 之间通常会产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供资金所获得的收益。

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. This is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues must grow at close to 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running only 2% - 4%.

表格所概括的保险业的数学原理并不复杂。在行业年收入（保费）增长率仅为 4% 或 5% 的年份，承保亏损必然会增加。这并非因为车祸、火灾、风暴等发生得更频繁，近期也不是普遍通胀的错。如今，社会和司法通胀是主要罪魁祸首；进入法庭的成本简直飙升了。成本上升部分源于裁决金额的暴涨，部分源于法官和陪审团倾向于将保险单的承保范围扩大到保险公司在承保时所设想的范围之外。由于看不到这两种趋势有任何缓解，我们仍然认为，即使普遍通胀率可能只有 2%-4%，行业的收入必须以接近 10% 的年增长率增长，才能勉强维持盈利能力。

In 1986, as noted, the industry’s premium volume soared even faster than loss costs. Consequently, the underwriting loss of the industry fell dramatically. In last year’s report we predicted this sharp improvement but also predicted that prosperity would be fleeting. Alas, this second prediction is already proving accurate. The rate of gain in the industry’s premium volume has slowed significantly (from an estimated 27.1% in 1986’s first quarter, to 23.5% in the second, to 21.8% in the third, to 18.7% in the fourth), and we expect further slowing in 1987. Indeed, the rate of gain may well fall below my 10% "equilibrium" figure by the third quarter.

如前所述，1986 年行业的保费量飙升得比损失成本更快。因此，行业的承保亏损急剧下降。在去年的年报中，我们预测了这种急剧改善，但也预测繁荣将是短暂的。唉，这第二个预测已经被证明是准确的。行业保费量的增长率已显著放缓（从 1986 年第一季度估计的 27.1%，到第二季度的 23.5%，第三季度的 21.8%，第四季度的 18.7%），我们预计 1987 年将进一步放缓。实际上，到第三季度，增长率很可能降至我 10% 的“均衡”数字以下。

Nevertheless, underwriting results in 1987, assuming they are not dragged down by a major natural catastrophe, will again improve materially because price increases are recognized in revenues on a lagged basis. In effect, the good news in earnings follows the good news in prices by six to twelve months. But the improving trend in earnings will probably end by late 1988 or early 1989. Thereafter the industry is likely to head south in a hurry.

尽管如此，假设不被重大自然灾害拖累，1987 年的承保业绩将再次显著改善，因为价格上涨会滞后地体现在收入中。实际上，盈利的好消息会滞后于价格的好消息六到十二个月。但盈利的改善趋势可能会在 1988 年底或 1989 年初结束。此后，该行业很可能会迅速走下坡路。

Pricing behavior in the insurance industry continues to be exactly what can be expected in a commodity-type business. Only under shortage conditions are high profits achieved, and such conditions don’t last long. When the profit sun begins to shine, long-established insurers shower investors with new shares in order to build capital. In addition, newly-formed insurers rush to sell shares at the advantageous prices available in the new-issue market (prices advantageous, that is, to the insiders promoting the company but rarely to the new shareholders). These moves guarantee future trouble: capacity soars, competitive juices flow, and prices fade.

保险业的定价行为仍然是商品型企业中完全可以预料到的。只有在短缺条件下才能获得高利润，而这种条件不会持续太久。当利润的阳光开始照耀时，老牌保险公司就会向投资者大量增发新股以增加资本。此外，新成立的保险公司争先恐后地以新股发行市场上的有利价格出售股票（有利价格指的是对推销公司的内部人士有利，但很少对新股东有利）。这些举动保证了未来的麻烦：产能飙升，竞争激烈，价格下跌。

It’s interesting to observe insurance leaders beseech their colleagues to behave in a more "statesmanlike" manner when pricing policies. "Why," they ask, "can’t we learn from history, even out the peaks and valleys, and consistently price to make reasonable profits?" What they wish, of course, is pricing that resembles, say, that of The Wall Street journal, whose prices are ample to start with and rise consistently each year.

观察到保险业领袖们恳求他们的同行在保单定价时采取更“有政治家风范”的方式，这很有趣。“为什么，”他们问道，“我们不能从历史中吸取教训，熨平峰谷，持续定价以获得合理利润？”当然，他们所希望的是类似于《华尔街日报》的定价方式，其起始价格就很充足，并且每年持续上涨。

Such calls for improved behavior have all of the efficacy of those made by a Nebraska corn grower asking his fellow growers, worldwide, to market their corn with more statesmanship. What’s needed is not more statesmen, but less corn. By raising large amounts of capital in the last two years, the insurance industry has, to continue our metaphor, vastly expanded its plantings of corn. The resulting increase in "crop" - i.e., the proliferation of insurance capacity - will have the same effect on prices and profits that surplus crops have had since time immemorial.

这种呼吁改善行为的号召，其效果与内布拉斯加一位玉米种植者请求全球的同行以更有政治家风范的方式销售他们的玉米如出一辙。需要的不是更多的政治家，而是更少的玉米。继续用我们的比喻，通过过去两年筹集的大量资本，保险业大大扩大了其玉米种植面积。由此导致的“作物”增加——即保险产能的激增——将对价格和利润产生与古往今来农作物过剩相同的影响。

Our own insurance operation did well in 1986 and is also likely to do well in 1987. We have benefited significantly from industry conditions. But much of our prosperity arises from the efforts and ability of Mike Goldberg, manager of all insurance operations.

我们自己的保险业务在 1986 年表现良好，并且在 1987 年也可能表现良好。我们显著受益于行业状况。但我们的繁荣很大程度上归功于所有保险业务的经理麦克·戈德伯格的努力和能力。

Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) fell from 111 in 1985 to 103 in 1986. In addition, our premium growth has been exceptional: although final figures aren’t available, I believe that over the past two years we were the fastest growing company among the country’s top 100 insurers. Some of our growth, it is true, came from our large quota-share contract with Fireman’s Fund, described in last year’s report and updated in Charlie’s letter on page 54. But even if the premiums from that contract are excluded from the calculation, we probably still ranked first in growth.

我们的综合比率（按法定基础计算，不包括结构性结算和财务再保险）从 1985 年的 111 下降到 1986 年的 103。此外，我们的保费增长非常出色：虽然最终数据尚未公布，但我相信在过去两年中，我们是美国前 100 家保险公司中增长最快的公司。诚然，我们的一部分增长来自与消防员基金签订的大额比例再保险合同，这在去年的报告中有所描述，并在第 54 页查理的来信中进行了更新。但即使将该合同的保费排除在计算之外，我们可能仍然在增长中排名第一。

Interestingly, we were the slowest-growing large insurer in the years immediately preceding 1985. In fact, we shrank - and we will do so again from time to time in the future. Our large swings in volume do not mean that we come and go from the insurance marketplace. Indeed, we are its most steadfast participant, always standing ready, at prices we believe adequate, to write a wide variety of high-limit coverages. The swings in our volume arise instead from the here-today, gone-tomorrow behavior of other insurers. When most insurers are "gone," because their capital is inadequate or they have been frightened by losses, insureds rush to us and find us ready to do business. But when hordes of insurers are "here," and are slashing prices far below expectable costs, many customers naturally leave us in order to take advantage of the bargains temporarily being offered by our competition.

有趣的是，在 1985 年之前的几年里，我们是增长最慢的大型保险公司。事实上，我们萎缩了——而且未来还会时不时地再次萎缩。我们业务量的大幅波动并不意味着我们在保险市场上进进出出。实际上，我们是最坚定的参与者，始终准备以我们认为充足的价格承保各种高限额保险。我们业务量的波动反而源于其他保险公司“今天在，明天走”的行为。当大多数保险公司因为资本不足或被亏损吓跑而“不在”时，投保人涌向我们，发现我们随时准备做生意。但当大批保险公司“在场”，并将价格削减到远低于预期成本时，许多客户自然会离开我们，去利用竞争对手暂时提供的便宜货。

Our firmness on prices works no hardship on the consumer: he is being bombarded by attractively priced insurance offers at those times when we are doing little business. And it works no hardship on our employees: we don’t engage in layoffs when we experience a cyclical slowdown at one of our generally-profitable insurance operations. This no-layoff practice is in our self-interest. Employees who fear that large layoffs will accompany sizable reductions in premium volume will understandably produce scads of business through thick and thin (mostly thin).

我们在价格上的坚定对消费者并无损害：在我们业务量很少的时候，消费者正被价格诱人的保险报价所轰炸。这对我们的员工也没有损害：当我们通常盈利的保险业务之一经历周期性放缓时，我们不会裁员。这种不裁员的作法符合我们的自身利益。那些担心保费量大幅减少会伴随大量裁员的员工，可以理解地会在好日子和坏日子（主要是坏日子）里拼命产生大量业务。

The trends in National Indemnity’s traditional business - the writing of commercial auto and general liability policies through general agents - suggest how gun-shy other insurers became for a while and how brave they are now getting. In the last quarter of 1984, NICO’s monthly volume averaged $5 million, about what it had been running for several years. By the first quarter of 1986, monthly volume had climbed to about $35 million. In recent months, a sharp decline has set in. Monthly volume is currently about $20 million and will continue to fall as new competitors surface and prices are cut. Ironically, the managers of certain major new competitors are the very same managers that just a few years ago bankrupted insurers that were our old competitors. Through state-mandated guaranty funds, we must pay some of the losses these managers left unpaid, and now we find them writing the same sort of business under a new name. C’est la guerre.

国民赔偿公司传统业务的趋势——通过总代理承保商业汽车和一般责任险——表明其他保险公司曾一度变得多么胆小，以及现在又变得多么大胆。在 1984 年第四季度，NICO 的月平均业务量为 500 万美元，与过去几年的水平相当。到 1986 年第一季度，月业务量已攀升至约 3,500 万美元。最近几个月，出现了急剧下降。目前月业务量约为 2,000 万美元，并将随着新竞争对手的出现和价格削减而继续下降。具有讽刺意味的是，某些主要新竞争对手的经理人，正是几年前将我们的老竞争对手弄得破产的同一批经理人。通过州政府授权的担保基金，我们必须支付这些经理人未付的一些损失，而现在我们发现他们正以新名称承保同类型的业务。这就是战争。

The business we call "large risks" expanded significantly during 1986, and will be important to us in the future. In this operation, we regularly write policies with annual premiums of $1 - $3 million, or even higher. This business will necessarily be highly volatile - both in volume and profitability - but our premier capital position and willingness to write large net lines make us a very strong force in the market when prices are right. On the other hand, our structured settlement business has become near-dormant because present prices make no sense to us.

我们称之为“大额风险”的业务在 1986 年显著扩张，并将在未来对我们很重要。在这项业务中，我们经常承保年保费在 100 万至 300 万美元甚至更高的保单。这项业务必然具有高度波动性——无论是业务量还是盈利能力——但我们卓越的资本状况和承保大额自留净额的意愿，使我们在价格合适时成为市场上非常强大的力量。另一方面，我们的结构性结算业务已近乎停滞，因为目前的价格对我们来说毫无意义。

The 1986 loss reserve development of our insurance group is chronicled on page 46. The figures show the amount of error in our yearend 1985 liabilities that a year of settlements and further evaluation has revealed. As you can see, what I told you last year about our loss liabilities was far from true - and that makes three years in a row of error. If the physiological rules that applied to Pinocchio were to apply to me, my nose would now draw crowds.

我们保险集团 1986 年的损失准备金发展情况在第 46 页有详细记载。这些数字显示了一年的结算和进一步评估所揭示的我们 1985 年底负债中的错误金额。如你所见，我去年关于我们损失负债的说法远非真实——这已经是连续第三年出错了。如果适用于匹诺曹的生理规律也适用于我，我的鼻子现在会引来一群人围观。

When insurance executives belatedly establish proper reserves, they often speak of "reserve strengthening," a term that has a rather noble ring to it. They almost make it sound as if they are adding extra layers of strength to an already-solid balance sheet. That’s not the case: instead the term is a euphemism for what should more properly be called "correction of previous untruths" (albeit non-intentional ones).

当保险业高管迟来地建立适当准备金时，他们常常谈到“准备金加强”，这个术语听起来相当高尚。他们几乎让人觉得是在已经稳固的资产负债表上增加额外的实力层。但事实并非如此：这个词更像是一个委婉语，更恰当的称呼应该是“修正先前的不实之处”（尽管是无意的）。

We made a special effort at the end of 1986 to reserve accurately. However, we tried just as hard at the end of 1985. Only time will tell whether we have finally succeeded in correctly estimating our insurance liabilities.

我们在 1986 年底做了特别努力以准确计提准备金。然而，我们在 1985 年底也同样努力过。只有时间能证明我们最终是否成功正确估计了我们的保险负债。

Despite the difficulties we have had in reserving and the commodity economics of the industry, we expect our insurance business to both grow and make significant amounts of money - but progress will be distinctly irregular and there will be major unpleasant surprises from time to time. It’s a treacherous business and a wary attitude is essential. We must heed Woody Allen: "While the lamb may lie down with the lion, the lamb shouldn’t count on getting a whole lot of sleep."

尽管我们在准备金计提方面遇到了困难，而且该行业具有商品型经济特征，我们仍预计我们的保险业务会增长并赚取可观的利润——但进展将明显不规则，并且时不时会出现重大的不愉快意外。这是一个危险的行业，保持警惕的态度至关重要。我们必须听从伍迪·艾伦的话：“虽然羔羊可以和狮子躺在一起，但羔羊不应该指望能睡很多觉。”

In our insurance operations we have an advantage in attitude, we have an advantage in capital, and we are developing an advantage in personnel. Additionally, I like to think we have some long-term edge in investing the float developed from policyholder funds. The nature of the business suggests that we will need all of these advantages in order to prosper.

在我们的保险业务中，我们在态度上有优势，在资本上有优势，并且我们正在人才上发展优势。此外，我愿意相信我们在投资由投保人资金产生的浮存金方面有一些长期优势。该业务的性质表明，我们需要所有这些优势才能繁荣发展。

GEICO Corporation, 41% owned by Berkshire, had an outstanding year in 1986. Industrywide, underwriting experience in personal lines did not improve nearly as much as it did in commercial lines. But GEICO, writing personal lines almost exclusively, improved its combined ratio to 96.9 and recorded a 16% gain in premium volume. GEICO also continued to repurchase its own shares and ended the year with 5.5% fewer shares outstanding than it had at the start of the year. Our share of GEICO’s premium volume is over $500 million, close to double that of only three years ago. GEICO’s book of business is one of the best in the world of insurance, far better indeed than Berkshire’s own book.

伯克希尔持有 41% 股份的 GEICO 公司在 1986 年表现出色。在全行业范围内，个人险种的承保业绩改善幅度远不及商业险种。但几乎只做个人险种的 GEICO，将其综合比率提高到 96.9，并实现了 16% 的保费量增长。GEICO 还继续回购自己的股票，到年底流通股数量比年初减少了 5.5%。我们在 GEICO 保费量中的份额超过 5 亿美元，几乎是三年前的两倍。GEICO 的业务组合是保险界最好的之一，实际上远好于伯克希尔自己的业务组合。

The most important ingredient in GEICO’s success is rock-bottom operating costs, which set the company apart from literally hundreds of competitors that offer auto insurance. The total of GEICO’s underwriting expense and loss adjustment expense in 1986 was only 23.5% of premiums. Many major companies show percentages 15 points higher than that. Even such huge direct writers as Allstate and State Farm incur appreciably higher costs than does GEICO.

GEICO 成功的最重要因素是极低的运营成本，这使得该公司与提供汽车保险的数百家竞争对手截然不同。GEICO 在 1986 年的承保费用和损失调整费用总额仅为保费的 23.5%。许多大公司的这一比例要高出 15 个百分点。即使是像 Allstate 和 State Farm 这样的直销巨头，其成本也明显高于 GEICO。

The difference between GEICO’s costs and those of its competitors is a kind of moat that protects a valuable and much-sought-after business castle. No one understands this moat-around-the-castle concept better than Bill Snyder, Chairman of GEICO. He continually widens the moat by driving down costs still more, thereby defending and strengthening the economic franchise. Between 1985 and 1986, GEICO’s total expense ratio dropped from 24.1% to the 23.5% mentioned earlier and, under Bill’s leadership, the ratio is almost certain to drop further. If it does - and if GEICO maintains its service and underwriting standards - the company’s future will be brilliant indeed.

GEICO 的成本与其竞争对手的成本之间的差异，是一种保护着有价值且备受追捧的商业城堡的护城河。没有人比 GEICO 董事长比尔·斯奈德更理解这种“城堡周围的护城河”概念。他通过进一步降低成本来不断拓宽护城河，从而捍卫和加强经济特许经营权。1985 年至 1986 年间，GEICO 的总费用率从 24.1% 下降到之前提到的 23.5%，在比尔的领导下，该比率几乎肯定会进一步下降。如果真能如此——并且 GEICO 保持其服务和承保标准——那么该公司的未来将确实非常光明。

The second stage of the GEICO rocket is fueled by Lou Simpson, Vice Chairman, who has run the company’s investments since late 1979. Indeed, it’s a little embarrassing for me, the fellow responsible for investments at Berkshire, to chronicle Lou’s performance at GEICO. Only my ownership of a controlling block of Berkshire stock makes me secure enough to give you the following figures, comparing the overall return of the equity portfolio at GEICO to that of the Standard & Poor’s 500:

GEICO 火箭的第二级由副董事长卢·辛普森提供燃料，他从 1979 年底开始管理公司的投资。事实上，对于我这个负责伯克希尔投资的人来说，记录卢在 GEICO 的业绩有点尴尬。只有因为我拥有伯克希尔的控股权，我才足够安全地向你们提供以下数据，比较 GEICO 股票投资组合的整体回报与标准普尔 500 指数的回报：

These are not only terrific figures but, fully as important, they have been achieved in the right way. Lou has consistently invested in undervalued common stocks that, individually, were unlikely to present him with a permanent loss and that, collectively, were close to risk-free.

这些不仅是极好的数字，而且同样重要的是，它们是以正确的方式实现的。卢一直投资于被低估的普通股，这些股票单个来看不太可能给他带来永久性损失，而作为一个整体则接近无风险。

In sum, GEICO is an exceptional business run by exceptional managers. We are fortunate to be associated with them.

总之，GEICO 是由卓越的经理人经营的卓越企业。我们很幸运能与他们合作。

Marketable Securities

During 1986, our insurance companies purchased about $700 million of tax-exempt bonds, most having a maturity of 8 to 12 years. You might think that this commitment indicates a considerable enthusiasm for such bonds. Unfortunately, that’s not so: at best, the bonds are mediocre investments. They simply seemed the least objectionable alternative at the time we bought them, and still seem so. (Currently liking neither stocks nor bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she declared: "I like only two kinds of men - foreign and domestic.")

有价证券

1986 年，我们的保险公司购买了约 7 亿美元的免税债券，其中大部分期限为 8 到 12 年。你可能会认为这样的投入表明对这些债券有相当的热情。不幸的是，事实并非如此：这些债券充其量只是平庸的投资。它们只是在购买时似乎是最不令人反感的选择，现在仍然如此。（目前既不喜欢股票也不喜欢债券，我发现自己是梅·韦斯特的对立面，她曾宣称：“我只喜欢两种男人——外国人和本国人。”）

We must, of necessity, hold marketable securities in our insurance companies and, as money comes in, we have only five directions to go: (1) long-term common stock investments; (2) long-term fixed-income securities; (3) medium-term fixed-income securities; (4) short-term cash equivalents; and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

我们必然要在保险公司中持有有价证券，随着资金流入，我们只有五个去向：(1) 长期普通股投资；(2) 长期固定收益证券；(3) 中期固定收益证券；(4) 短期现金等价物；(5) 短期套利承诺。

Common stocks, of course, are the most fun. When conditions are right that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea - and never have had - whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.

普通股当然是最有趣的。当条件合适时——即经济状况良好、管理良好的公司股价远低于内在商业价值时——股票有时能带来本垒打。但当前我们找不到任何接近我们标准的股票。这一表述绝不意味着对股市的预测：我们不知道——也从来不知道——市场在短期或中期未来会上涨、下跌还是横盘。

What we do know, however, is that occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.

然而，我们所知道的是，恐惧和贪婪这两种极具传染性的疾病会时不时地在投资界爆发。这些流行病爆发的时间无法预测。它们产生的市场异常，无论是持续时间还是程度，同样无法预测。因此，我们从不试图预测任何一种疾病的到来或离去。我们的目标更为谦逊：我们只是试图在他人贪婪时保持恐惧，只有在他人恐惧时才变得贪婪。

As this is written, little fear is visible in Wall Street. Instead, euphoria prevails - and why not? What could be more exhilarating than to participate in a bull market in which the rewards to owners of businesses become gloriously uncoupled from the plodding performances of the businesses themselves. Unfortunately, however, stocks can’t outperform businesses indefinitely.

在写这段话的时候，华尔街几乎看不到恐惧。相反，欣快感盛行——为什么不呢？还有什么比参与一个牛市更令人振奋的呢？在这个牛市中，企业所有者的回报与企业本身缓慢的业绩表现被美妙地脱钩了。然而不幸的是，股票不可能永远跑赢企业。

Indeed, because of the heavy transaction and investment management costs they bear, stockholders as a whole and over the long term must inevitably underperform the companies they own. If American business, in aggregate, earns about 12% on equity annually, investors must end up earning significantly less. Bull markets can obscure mathematical laws, but they cannot repeal them.

事实上，由于股东承担了沉重的交易和投资管理成本，总体而言，长期来看，股东的表现必然逊于他们所拥有的公司。如果美国企业总体上每年能获得约 12% 的净资产收益率，那么投资者的最终收益必然远低于此。牛市可以掩盖数学定律，但不能废除它们。

The second category of investments open to our insurance companies is long-term bonds. These are unlikely to be of interest to us except in very special situations, such as the Washington Public Power Supply System #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. (At yearend, we owned WPPSS issues having an amortized cost of $218 million and a market value of $310 million, paying us $31.7 million in annual tax-exempt income.) Our aversion to long-term bonds relates to our fear that we will see much higher rates of inflation within the next decade. Over time, the behavior of our currency will be determined by the behavior of our legislators. This relationship poses a continuing threat to currency stability - and a corresponding threat to the owners of long-term bonds.

我们保险公司可投资的第二类资产是长期债券。除非在非常特殊的情况下，比如我们在 1984 年报中讨论的华盛顿公共电力供应系统 #1、#2 和 #3 债券，否则我们不太可能对它们感兴趣。（年底时，我们持有的 WPPSS 债券摊余成本为 2.18 亿美元，市值为 3.1 亿美元，每年为我们提供 3,170 万美元的免税收入。）我们对长期债券的厌恶源于我们担心在未来十年内会出现更高的通胀率。随着时间的推移，我们货币的行为将由立法者的行为决定。这种关系对货币稳定构成了持续的威胁——也对长期债券的所有者构成了相应的威胁。

We continue to periodically employ money in the arbitrage field. However, unlike most arbitrageurs, who purchase dozens of securities each year, we purchase only a few. We restrict ourselves to large deals that have been announced publicly and do not bet on the come. Therefore, our potential profits are apt to be small; but, with luck, our disappointments will also be few.

我们继续定期将资金用于套利领域。然而，与每年购买数十种证券的大多数套利者不同，我们只购买少数几种。我们只限于已公开宣布的大型交易，并且不赌未来的可能性。因此，我们的潜在利润往往很小；但运气好的话，我们的失望也会很少。

Our yearend portfolio shown below includes one arbitrage commitment, Lear-Siegler. Our balance sheet also includes a receivable for $145 million, representing the money owed us (and paid a few days later) by Unilever, then in the process of purchasing Chesebrough-Ponds, another of our arbitrage holdings. Arbitrage is an alternative to Treasury Bills as a short-term parking place for money - a choice that combines potentially higher returns with higher risks. To date, our returns from the funds committed to arbitrage have been many times higher than they would have been had we left those funds in Treasury Bills. Nonetheless, one bad experience could change the scorecard markedly.

我们年末的投资组合如下所示，包括一项套利承诺：李尔-西格勒。我们的资产负债表还包括一笔 1.45 亿美元的应收款，这是联合利华欠我们的钱（几天后支付），联合利华当时正在收购我们另一项套利持有的切斯布罗-庞兹公司。套利是短期资金存放的替代选择，可以替代国库券——这是一种结合了潜在更高回报和更高风险的选择。迄今为止，我们从套利资金中获得的回报，比将这些资金留在国库券中高出许多倍。尽管如此，一次糟糕的经历可能会显著改变业绩记录。

We also, though it takes some straining, currently view medium-term tax-exempt bonds as an alternative to short-term Treasury holdings. Buying these bonds, we run a risk of significant loss if, as seems probable, we sell many of them well before maturity. However, we believe this risk is more than counter-balanced first, by the much higher after-tax returns currently realizable from these securities as compared to Treasury Bills and second, by the possibility that sales will produce an overall profit rather than a loss. Our expectation of a higher total return, after allowing for the possibility of loss and after taking into account all tax effects, is a relatively close call and could well be wrong. Even if we sell our bonds at a fairly large loss, however, we may end up reaping a higher after-tax return than we would have realized by repeatedly rolling over Treasury Bills.

我们目前（虽然有点勉强）也将中期免税债券视为短期国债的替代品。购买这些债券，如果我们（这似乎很有可能）在到期前很久就卖出其中许多，我们将面临重大损失的风险。然而，我们相信这种风险被以下因素所抵消：首先，与国库券相比，这些债券目前可实现更高的税后回报；其次，卖出可能产生整体利润而非损失。在考虑到损失的可能性并考虑到所有税收影响后，我们对更高总回报的预期是一个相对接近的判断，很可能是错误的。然而，即使我们以相当大的损失卖出债券，我们最终获得的税后回报也可能高于通过反复滚动投资国库券所能实现的回报。

In any event, you should know that our expectations for both the stocks and bonds we now hold are exceptionally modest, given current market levels. Probably the best thing that could happen to us is a market in which we would choose to sell many of our bond holdings at a significant loss in order to re-allocate funds to the far-better equity values then very likely to exist. The bond losses I am talking about would occur if high interest rates came along; the same rates would probably depress common stocks considerably more than medium-term bonds.

无论如何，你应该知道，鉴于当前的市场水平，我们对目前持有的股票和债券的期望都异常温和。对我们来说可能发生的最好的事情是，在一个市场中，我们会选择以重大亏损卖出大量债券，以便将资金重新配置到届时很可能会出现的、价值远优于债券的股票上。我所说的债券损失会在高利率出现时发生；同样的利率对普通股的压制可能会比对中期债券的压制严重得多。

We show below our 1986 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value of over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholdings of Wesco Financial Corp. and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.

下面列出我们 1986 年末有价证券的净持有量。所有市值超过 2,500 万美元的头寸均列出，西科金融公司和内布拉斯加家具卖场的少数股权权益被排除在外。

We should note that we expect to keep permanently our three primary holdings, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post. Even if these securities were to appear significantly overpriced, we would not anticipate selling them, just as we would not sell See’s or Buffalo Evening News if someone were to offer us a price far above what we believe those businesses are worth.

我们应该指出，我们期望永久保留我们的三个主要持仓：大都会/ABC公司、GEICO公司和华盛顿邮报公司。即使这些证券看起来价格显著过高，我们也不会预期出售它们，就像如果有人出价远高于我们认为喜诗糖果或布法罗晚报的价值，我们也不会出售它们一样。

This attitude may seem old-fashioned in a corporate world in which activity has become the order of the day. The modern manager refers to his "portfolio" of businesses - meaning that all of them are candidates for "restructuring" whenever such a move is dictated by Wall Street preferences, operating conditions or a new corporate "concept." (Restructuring is defined narrowly, however: it extends only to dumping offending businesses, not to dumping the officers and directors who bought the businesses in the first place. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is a theology as popular with the Fortune 500 as it is with the Salvation Army.)

在一个活动已成为日常秩序的企业世界里，这种态度可能显得过时。现代经理人谈论他的业务“组合”——意思是，只要华尔街的偏好、运营状况或新的公司“概念”要求，所有这些业务都成为“重组”的候选对象。（然而，重组的定义很狭隘：它仅限于抛弃有问题的业务，而不是抛弃当初购买这些业务的高管和董事。“恨罪但爱罪人”是一种神学，在《财富》500强中与在救世军中一样流行。）

Investment managers are even more hyperkinetic: their behavior during trading hours makes whirling dervishes appear sedated by comparison. Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mudwrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."

投资经理更是过度活跃：他们在交易时段的行为让旋转的苦行僧相比之下都显得镇静。事实上，“机构投资者”这个词正在变成一种自我矛盾的所谓矛盾修辞法，堪比“巨型虾”、“女子泥浆摔跤手”和“廉价律师”。

Despite the enthusiasm for activity that has swept business and financial America, we will stick with our ‘til-death-do-us-part policy. It’s the only one with which Charlie and I are comfortable, it produces decent results, and it lets our managers and those of our investees run their businesses free of distractions.

尽管追求活动的热情席卷了美国的商业和金融界，我们将坚持我们“至死不渝”的政策。这是查理和我唯一感到舒服的政策，它产生了不错的结果，并且让我们的经理人以及被投公司的经理人能够不受干扰地经营他们的业务。

NHP, Inc.

Last year we paid $23.7 million for about 50% of NHP, Inc., a developer, syndicator, owner and manager of multi-family rental housing. Should all executive stock options that have been authorized be granted and exercised, our equity interest will decline to slightly over 45%.

NHP 公司

去年，我们支付了 2,370 万美元购买了 NHP 公司约 50% 的股份，该公司是一家多户型租赁住宅的开发商、承销商、所有者和管理者。如果所有已授权的管理层股票期权都被授予并行使，我们的股权将下降到略高于 45%。

NHP, Inc. has a most unusual genealogy. In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission of business and civic leaders, led by Edgar Kaiser, to study ways to increase the supply of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income tenants. Certain members of the commission subsequently formed and promoted two business entities to foster this goal. Both are now owned by NHP, Inc. and one operates under unusual ground rules: three of its directors must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it is also required by law to submit an annual report to the President.

NHP 公司有着非常不寻常的渊源。1967 年，约翰逊总统任命了一个由商界和公民领袖组成的委员会，由埃德加·凯撒领导，研究如何增加面向中低收入租户的多户型住房供应。委员会的一些成员随后成立并推动了两个商业实体以促进这一目标。这两个实体现在都由 NHP 公司拥有，其中一个在非同寻常的基本规则下运营：其三名董事必须由总统在参议院的建议和同意下任命，并且法律还要求其向总统提交年度报告。

Over 260 major corporations, motivated more by the idea of public service than profit, invested $42 million in the two original entities, which promptly began, through partnerships, to develop government-subsidized rental property. The typical partnership owned a single property and was largely financed by a non-recourse mortgage. Most of the equity money for each partnership was supplied by a group of limited partners who were primarily attracted by the large tax deductions that went with the investment. NHP acted as general partner and also purchased a small portion of each partnership’s equity.

超过 260 家大公司，更多是出于公共服务而非利润的动机，向这两个原始实体投资了 4,200 万美元。这些实体随即通过合伙制开始开发政府补贴的租赁房产。典型的合伙企业拥有单一房产，主要由无追索权抵押贷款提供资金。每个合伙企业的大部分股权资金由一组有限合伙人提供，他们主要被投资附带的大额税收减免所吸引。NHP 担任普通合伙人，并购买了每个合伙企业的一小部分股权。

The Government’s housing policy has, of course, shifted and NHP has necessarily broadened its activities to include non-subsidized apartments commanding market-rate rents. In addition, a subsidiary of NHP builds single-family homes in the Washington, D.C. area, realizing revenues of about $50 million annually.

当然，政府的住房政策已经转变，NHP 也相应地将其活动范围扩大到包括按市场租金出租的无补贴公寓。此外，NHP 的一家子公司在华盛顿特区地区建造独户住宅，年收入约为 5,000 万美元。

NHP now oversees about 500 partnership properties that are located in 40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and that include about 80,000 housing units. The cost of these properties was more than $2.5 billion and they have been well maintained. NHP directly manages about 55,000 of the housing units and supervises the management of the rest. The company’s revenues from management are about $16 million annually, and growing.

NHP 现在监管着大约 500 个合伙制房产，分布在 40 个州、哥伦比亚特区和波多黎各，包括约 8 万个住房单元。这些房产的成本超过 25 亿美元，并且维护良好。NHP 直接管理约 55,000 个住房单元，并监督其余单元的管理。公司来自管理的年收入约为 1,600 万美元，并且还在增长。

In addition to the equity interests it purchased upon the formation of each partnership, NHP owns varying residual interests that come into play when properties are disposed of and distributions are made to the limited partners. The residuals on many of NHP’s "deep subsidy" properties are unlikely to be of much value. But residuals on certain other properties could prove quite valuable, particularly if inflation should heat up.

除了在每个合伙企业成立时购买的股权外，NHP 还拥有各种剩余权益，这些权益在房产被处置并向有限合伙人分配时发挥作用。NHP 许多“深度补贴”房产的剩余权益不太可能有太大价值。但某些其他房产的剩余权益可能会被证明相当有价值，特别是如果通货膨胀加剧的话。

The tax-oriented syndication of properties to individuals has been halted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the main, NHP is currently trying to develop equity positions or significant residual interests in non-subsidized rental properties of quality and size (typically 200 to 500 units). In projects of this kind, NHP usually works with one or more large institutional investors or lenders. NHP will continue to seek ways to develop low- and moderate-income apartment housing, but will not likely meet success unless government policy changes.

1986 年的税收改革法案已经停止了向个人进行以税收为导向的房产承销。目前，NHP 主要试图在优质且规模（通常 200 至 500 套）的无补贴租赁房产中发展股权头寸或显著的剩余权益。在这类项目中，NHP 通常与一个或多个大型机构投资者或贷款方合作。NHP 将继续寻找开发中低收入公寓住房的方法，但除非政府政策改变，否则不太可能成功。

Besides ourselves, the large shareholders in NHP are Weyerhauser (whose interest is about 25%) and a management group led by Rod Heller, chief executive of NHP. About 60 major corporations also continue to hold small interests, none larger than 2%.

除了我们之外，NHP 的大股东是惠好公司（其持股约 25%）和由 NHP 首席执行官罗德·海勒领导的管理团队。大约 60 家大公司也继续持有少量股份，没有一家超过 2%。

Taxation

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.

税收

1986 年的税收改革法案以重要且不同的方式影响了我们的各项业务。尽管我们发现该法案有很多值得称赞之处，但对伯克希尔的净财务影响是负面的：在新法案下，我们业务价值的增长率很可能至少会比旧法案下适度放缓。对我们股东的净影响则更为负面：每股业务价值每增加一美元，假设这一增长伴随着伯克希尔股票市值等额的增长，我们的股东将获得 72 美分的税后收益，而不是旧法案下的 80 美分。当然，这一结果反映了个人资本利得最高税率从 20% 上升到 28%。

Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:

o The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC and The Washington Post Company.

以下是影响伯克希尔的主要税收变化：

o 公司普通所得税率计划从 1986 年的 46% 降至 1988 年的 34%。这一变化显然对我们有积极影响——并且对我们三大主要被投公司中的两个，大都会/ABC 和华盛顿邮报公司，也有显著的积极影响。

I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument, of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase. Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not help profits but will instead flow through, leading to correspondingly lower prices for consumers.

我这么说，是因为我知道多年来关于谁真正支付了公司税——企业还是他们的客户——有很多模糊且常常带有党派偏见的评论。当然，争论通常围绕税收增加而非减少展开。那些抵制提高公司税率的人经常辩称，公司实际上没有支付任何征收给它们的税款，而是扮演了一种经济管道的角色，将所有税收转嫁给消费者。根据这些倡导者的说法，任何公司税的增加只会导致价格上涨，而对企业来说，价格上涨抵消了增加的部分。基于这一立场，“管道”理论的支持者也必须得出结论：公司税减税不会帮助利润，而是会传导下去，导致消费者价格相应降低。

Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.

相反，另一些人认为，公司不仅要支付征收给它们的税款，还要吸收这些税款。这一学派认为，消费者将不受公司税率变化的影响。

What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an important question for investors and managers, as well as for policymakers.

实际情况如何？当公司税率被削减时，伯克希尔、华盛顿邮报、大都会等公司是自身吸收了收益，还是以更低价格的形式将收益传递给了客户？这对投资者、经理人以及政策制定者来说都是一个重要问题。

Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of that franchise is regulated.

我们的结论是，在某些情况下，降低公司税的好处完全或几乎完全归于公司及其股东，而在其他情况下，好处完全或几乎完全传递给客户。决定结果的是公司业务特许经营权的强弱，以及该特许经营权的盈利能力是否受到监管。

For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut, prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.

例如，当特许经营权强大且税后利润以相对精确的方式受到监管时，就像电力公司那样，公司税率的变化主要反映在价格上，而不是利润上。当税收削减时，价格通常会在短期内下调。当税收增加时，价格会上涨，尽管往往不那么及时。

A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market "regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect, performs much the same function in dealing with the price-competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore, tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.

第二种情况也会出现类似的结果——在价格竞争激烈的行业中，企业通常拥有非常弱的业务特许经营权。在这样的行业中，自由市场以延迟且不规则但总体有效的方式“调节”税后利润。实际上，市场在处理价格竞争型行业时所发挥的功能，与公共事业委员会在处理电力公司时发挥的功能大致相同。因此，在这些行业中，税收变化最终对价格的影响大于对利润的影响。

In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down prices.

然而，对于不受监管且拥有强大特许经营权的企业来说，情况就不同了：公司及其股东是减税的主要受益者。这些公司从减税中受益，就像电力公司在没有监管机构强制降价的情况下所会受益的那样。

Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise, think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?

我们的许多业务，无论是全资还是部分持有，都拥有这样的特许经营权。因此，它们税收的减少最终主要落入我们的口袋，而不是顾客的口袋。虽说这种说法可能不够得体，但却无法否认。如果你倾向于相信别的说法，请想一想你所在地区最有能力的脑外科医生或律师。在个人最高税率从 50% 降至 28% 的情况下，你真的期望这位专家（其专业领域内的本地“特许经营权持有者”）的费用会降低吗？

Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number of our operating businesses and investees should be severely tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988 tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say, five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us to see both.

然而，对于我们关于较低税率有利于我们许多运营业务和被投公司的结论，你们的喜悦应该被我们的另一个信念严重冲淡：计划中的 1988 年税率，无论是个人还是公司税率，在我们看来完全不现实。这些税率很可能会给华盛顿带来一个被证明与价格稳定不相容的财政问题。因此，我们相信，最终——比如说，五年内——几乎肯定会出现要么更高的税率，要么更高的通胀率。看到两者同时出现，我们也不会感到惊讶。

o Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from 28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to arise from capital gains. For example, our three major investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to eventually deliver us capital gains.

o 公司资本利得税率已从 28% 提高到 34%，于 1987 年生效。这一变化将对伯克希尔产生重要的不利影响，因为我们预计未来业务价值的大部分增长，如同过去一样，将来自资本利得。例如，我们的三个主要投资持仓——大都会、GEICO 和华盛顿邮报——在年底的市值超过 17 亿美元，接近伯克希尔总净值的 75%，但它们每年只为我们带来约 900 万美元的收入。相反，这三家公司都保留了很高比例的盈利，我们预计这些盈利最终会给我们带来资本利得。

The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.

新法律提高了未来实现的所有资本利得的税率，包括法律颁布前就已存在的未实现利得。年底时，我们的股权投资中有 12 亿美元的此类未实现利得。新法律对我们资产负债表的影响将被延迟，因为 GAAP 规则规定，适用于未实现利得的递延所得税负债应按去年的 28% 税率而非当前的 34% 税率列报。预计该规则将很快改变。一旦改变，约有 7,300 万美元将从我们的 GAAP 净值中消失，并计入递延税项账户。

o Dividend and interest income received by our insurance companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law. First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual 80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds: interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will only be 85% tax-exempt.

o 新法律下，我们保险公司收到的股息和利息收入将被征收更重的税。首先，所有公司从其他国内公司收到的股息中，有 20% 将被征税，而旧法下为 15%。其次，关于剩余 80% 有一个仅适用于财产/意外险公司的变化：如果支付股息的股票是在 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后购买的，则该剩余部分的 15% 将被征税。第三个变化，同样仅适用于财产/意外险公司，涉及免税债券：保险公司在 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后购买的债券，其利息只有 85% 是免税的。

The last two changes are very important. They mean that our income from the investments we make in future years will be significantly lower than would have been the case under the old law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least 10% from what we could previously have expected.

后两个变化非常重要。这意味着我们未来几年投资的收入将显著低于旧法下的水平。我最好的猜测是，仅这些变化最终就会使我们的保险业务盈利能力比我们原先预期的至少降低 10%。

o The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income. Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.

o 新税法还实质性地改变了财产/意外险公司的纳税时间。一项新规则要求我们在纳税申报时对损失准备金进行折现，这一变化将减少扣除额并增加应纳税所得额。另一项规则将在六年内逐步实施，要求我们将未赚保费准备金的 20% 计入应纳税所得额。

Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning 21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you died.

这两条规则都不会改变我们向你报告的年度应计税额，但每一条都实质上加速了支付时间。也就是说，以前递延的税款现在将前置，这一变化将显著降低我们业务的盈利能力。一个类比可以说明损失：如果你在年满 21 岁时被要求立即为你一生中所有应得收入纳税，那么你的终身财富和遗产将只是在你去世时才支付所有所得税情况下的一个小零头。

Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say. Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.

细心的读者可能会发现我们所说的不一致之处。之前，在讨论价格竞争型行业的公司时，我们提出税收的增加或减少对这些公司影响相对较小，而是大部分转嫁给了客户。但现在我们却说，税收增加会影响伯克希尔财产/意外险公司的利润，尽管它们经营在一个竞争极其激烈的行业中。

The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major players will generally contend with similar tax equations.

该行业可能成为我们一般规则的例外，原因在于并非所有主要保险公司都将面临相同的税务等式。由于以下几个原因，会存在重要差异：新的替代性最低税将对一些公司产生实质性影响，而对另一些公司则没有影响；某些主要保险公司拥有巨额亏损结转，这将至少在几年内使其收入免受重大税收的影响；一些大型保险公司的业绩将被并入拥有非保险业务的公司的合并报表中。这些不同的状况将在财产/意外险行业产生差异巨大的边际税率。然而，在大多数其他价格竞争型行业，如铝、汽车和百货商店，主要参与者通常将面临相似的税务等式，情况则不会如此。

The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.

财产/意外险公司缺乏共同的税务计算方式，意味着该行业面临的税收增加可能不会像在典型的价格竞争型行业中那样转嫁给客户。换句话说，保险公司自身将承担大部分新的税收负担。

o A partial offset to these burdens is a "fresh start" adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31, 1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however, reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past - undiscounted except in special cases such as structured settlements.) The net effect of the "fresh start" is to give us a double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and earlier years.

o 对这些负担的部分抵消是 1987 年 1 月 1 日发生的“新起点”调整，当时我们 1986 年 12 月 31 日的损失准备金数字为了税务目的被转换为新要求的折现基础。（然而，在我们向你报告的报表中，准备金将完全保持与过去相同的基础——除了结构性结算等特殊情况外，不予折现。）“新起点”的净效果是给我们带来双重扣除：我们将在 1987 年及未来几年，对已在 1986 年及以前年份作为成本完全扣除的已发生未支付保险损失的一部分，获得税收扣除。

The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the $30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in important respects, will become more severe as time passes.

这一变化所产生的净值增加尚未反映在我们的财务报表中。相反，根据当前的 GAAP 规则（可能会改变），该收益将在未来几年通过减少的税费流入利润表，并因此流入净值。我们预计“新起点”调整的总收益在 3,000 万至 4,000 万美元之间。但应注意，这是一次性收益，而其他与保险相关的税收变化的负面影响不仅是持续的，而且在重要方面会随着时间的推移变得更加严重。

o The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be - shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all. My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

o “通用公用事业原则”被新税法废除了。这意味着在 1987 年及以后，公司清算将面临双重征税，一次在公司层面，一次在股东层面。过去，公司层面的税是可以避免的。例如，如果伯克希尔被清算——这绝对不可能——根据新法律，股东从我们财产出售中获得的收益将远少于过去出售这些财产所能获得的收益，假设每次出售的价格相同。尽管这一结果对我们来说是理论上的，但法律的这一变化将对许多公司产生实质性影响。因此，它也影响我们对潜在投资的评估。以那些可能希望出售的石油和天然气生产商、某些媒体公司、房地产公司等为例。仅仅因为“通用公用事业原则”被废除，其股东能够实现的价值就可能会显著降低——尽管这些公司的运营经济状况根本没有发生不利变化。我的印象是，投资者和经理人都尚未完全理解这一重要的法律变化。

This section of our report has been longer and more complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law are many and important, particularly for property/casualty insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with any precision.

我们报告的这部分比我想要的更长、更复杂。但法律的变化很多且重要，特别是对财产/意外险保险公司而言。正如我所指出的，新法律将损害伯克希尔的业绩，但负面影响无法精确量化。

Miscellaneous

We bought a corporate jet last year. What you have heard about such planes is true: they are very expensive and a luxury in situations like ours where little travel to out-of-the-way places is required. And planes not only cost a lot to operate, they cost a lot just to look at. Pre-tax, cost of capital plus depreciation on a new $15 million plane probably runs $3 million annually. On our own plane, bought for $850,000 used, such costs run close to $200,000 annually.

杂项

我们去年买了一架公务机。你听说的关于这类飞机的事情是真的：它们非常昂贵，在我们这种很少需要去偏远地方旅行的情况下是一种奢侈品。飞机不仅运营成本高，光是看着就花费不菲。税前，一架新的 1,500 万美元飞机的资金成本加上折旧，每年大概要 300 万美元。对于我们这架以 85 万美元购买的二手飞机，这类成本每年接近 20 万美元。

Cognizant of such figures, your Chairman, unfortunately, has in the past made a number of rather intemperate remarks about corporate jets. Accordingly, prior to our purchase, I was forced into my Galileo mode. I promptly experienced the necessary "counter-revelation" and travel is now considerably easier - and considerably costlier - than in the past. Whether Berkshire will get its money’s worth from the plane is an open question, but I will work at achieving some business triumph that I can (no matter how dubiously) attribute to it. I’m afraid Ben Franklin had my number. Said he: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."

意识到这些数字后，你们的董事长不幸地过去曾对公务机发表过一些相当不客气的言论。因此，在我们购买之前，我被迫进入了我的伽利略模式。我立即经历了必要的“反启示”，现在旅行比过去容易多了——也贵多了。伯克希尔是否能从这架飞机中物有所值，这是一个悬而未决的问题，但我会努力取得一些可以（无论多么可疑地）归功于它的商业胜利。恐怕本·富兰克林看透了我。他说：“做一个理性的生物是如此方便，因为它能使一个人为自己想做的每一件事找到或制造一个理由。”

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1986 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,934 charities were recipients.

大约 97% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1986 年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划进行的捐赠为 400 万美元，有 1,934 家慈善机构受益。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 58 and 59. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1987 will be ineligible for the 1987 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第 58 和 59 页上关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股票以实际所有者的名义登记，而不是以“街头”名义或代名人名义。未在 1987 年 9 月 30 日如此登记的股票将没有资格参加 1987 年的计划。

Last year almost 450 people attended our shareholders’ meeting, up from about 250 the year before (and from about a dozen ten years ago). I hope you can join us on May 19th in Omaha. Charlie and I like to answer owner-related questions and I can promise you that our shareholders will pose many good ones. Finishing up the questions may take quite a while - we had about 65 last year so you should feel free to leave once your own have been answered.

去年有近 450 人参加了我们的股东大会，高于前年的约 250 人（而十年前只有大约十几人）。我希望你能在 5 月 19 日来奥马哈参加我们的会议。查理和我喜欢回答与所有者相关的问题，我可以向你保证，我们的股东会提出很多好问题。回答完所有问题可能需要相当长的时间——去年我们大约有 65 个问题，所以一旦你自己的问题得到回答，你可以随时离开。

Last year, after the meeting, one shareholder from New Jersey and another from New York went to the Furniture Mart, where each purchased a $5,000 Oriental rug from Mrs. B. (To be precise, they purchased rugs that might cost $10,000 elsewhere for which they were charged about $5,000.) Mrs. B was pleased - but not satisfied - and she will be looking for you at the store after this year’s meeting. Unless our shareholders top last year’s record, I’ll be in trouble. So do me (and yourself) a favor, and go see her.

去年，会后，一位来自新泽西的股东和一位来自纽约的股东去了家具卖场，每人从 B 夫人那里买了一条 5,000 美元的东方地毯。（准确地说，他们购买的地毯在其他地方可能要花 10,000 美元，而他们只付了大约 5,000 美元。）B 夫人很高兴——但并不满足——她会在今年会后在店里等你。除非我们的股东打破去年的纪录，否则我就有麻烦了。所以帮我（也帮你自己）一个忙，去见她吧。

Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 1987
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1987 年 2 月 27 日

Appendix

Purchase-Price Accounting Adjustments and the "Cash Flow" Fallacy

First a short quiz: below are abbreviated 1986 statements of earnings for two companies. Which business is the more valuable?

附录

购买价格会计调整与“现金流”谬误

先来一个小测验：下面是两家公司 1986 年的简要利润表。哪家企业更有价值？

(Numbers (1) through (4) designate items discussed later in this section.)

（数字 (1) 至 (4) 指本节后面讨论的项目。）

As you’ve probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the "O" (for "old") column we have shown what the company’s 1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the "N" (for "new") column we have shown Scott Fetzer’s GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire.

你可能已经猜到，公司 O 和公司 N 是同一家企业——斯科特·费策。在“O”（代表“旧”）列中，我们展示的是如果我们没有收购它，该公司 1986 年的 GAAP 盈利会是多少；在“N”（代表“新”）列中，我们展示的是伯克希尔实际报告的斯科特·费策的 GAAP 盈利。

It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both "companies" generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.

需要强调的是，这两列描绘的是完全相同的经济状况——即相同的销售额、工资、税收等。而且两家“公司”为所有者产生的现金数量相同。只有会计处理不同。

So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?

那么，各位哲学家同仁，哪一列呈现了真相？管理者和投资者应该关注哪一组数字？

Before we tackle those questions, let’s look at what produces the disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.

在我们解决这些问题之前，先来看看是什么造成了 O 和 N 之间的差异。我们将在某些方面简化讨论，但简化不应导致分析或结论出现任何不准确。

The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Scott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by "purchase-price adjustments." In Scott Fetzer’s case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So we paid a premium of $142.6 million.

O 和 N 之间的对比出现，是因为我们为斯科特·费策支付的金额与其账面净值不同。根据 GAAP，这种差异——即溢价或折价——必须通过“购买价格调整”来核算。就斯科特·费策而言，我们支付了 3.15 亿美元收购其账面价值为 1.724 亿美元的净资产。因此我们支付了 1.426 亿美元的溢价。

The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current values. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer’s inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount from current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.

对所支付溢价的会计处理的第一步，是将流动资产账面价值调整为当前价值。在实践中，这一要求通常不影响应收账款（通常按当前价值列账），但常常影响存货。由于存在 2,290 万美元的后进先出准备金及其他会计复杂性，斯科特·费策的存货账户账面价值比当前价值低了 3,730 万美元。因此，作为我们的第一个会计动作，我们用 1.426 亿美元溢价中的 3,730 万美元来增加存货的账面价值。

Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate.

假设流动资产调整后还有剩余溢价，下一步是将固定资产调整为当前价值。在我们的案例中，这一调整还需要一些与递延税有关的会计技巧。由于这被标榜为简化讨论，我将跳过细节，直接给出结果：固定资产增加了 6,800 万美元，递延所得税负债减少了 1,300 万美元。完成这 8,100 万美元的调整后，我们剩下 2,430 万美元的溢价需要分配。

Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded pension liabilities. In Scott Fetzer’s case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.

如果我们的情况需要，接下来还需要两步：将除商誉以外的无形资产调整为当前公允价值，以及将负债重述为当前公允价值，这一要求通常只影响长期债务和未拨备的养老金负债。然而，就斯科特·费策而言，这两步都不需要。

The final accounting adjustment we needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as "excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired"). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet of Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.

在记录了所有资产和负债的公允市场价值后，我们需要做的最后一项会计调整是将剩余溢价分配给商誉（技术上称为“成本超过所购净资产公允价值的部分”）。这一剩余金额为 2,430 万美元。因此，收购前一刻斯科特·费策的资产负债表（下面 O 列所总结的）通过购买被转换为 N 列所示的资产负债表。实际上，两张资产负债表描绘的是相同的资产和负债——但如你所见，某些数字差异很大。

The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of the earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed to the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:

1. $4,979,000 for non-cash inventory costs resulting, primarily, from reductions that Scott Fetzer made in its inventories during 1986; charges of this kind are apt to be small or non-existent in future years.

1. $5,054,000 for extra depreciation attributable to the write-up of fixed assets; a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

1. $595,000 for amortization of Goodwill; this charge will be made annually for 39 more years in a slightly larger amount because our purchase was made on January 6 and, therefore, the 1986 figure applies to only 98% of the year.

1. $998,000 for deferred-tax acrobatics that are beyond my ability to explain briefly (or perhaps even non-briefly); a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

N 列中较高的资产负债表数字，产生了前面利润表中 N 列较低的盈利数字。这是资产增值以及某些增值资产必须折旧或摊销的结果。资产数字越高，每年对盈利的折旧或摊销费用就越高。由于资产负债表增值而计入利润表的费用，在前面的利润表中用数字标出：

1. 4,979,000 美元的非现金存货成本，主要源于斯科特·费策在 1986 年期间减少的存货；此类费用在未来几年可能很小或不存在。

1. 5,054,000 美元的可归因于固定资产增值的额外折旧；这笔费用大概在未来 12 年内每年都会以接近此金额的水平发生。

1. 595,000 美元的商誉摊销；这笔费用将每年发生，持续 39 年，金额会略大，因为我们的收购是在 1 月 6 日进行的，因此 1986 年的数字仅适用于全年的 98%。

1. 998,000 美元用于我无法简要解释（甚至详细解释也可能做不到）的递延税会计技巧；这笔费用大概在未来 12 年内每年都会以接近此金额的水平发生。

It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The "new" Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the "old" Scott Fetzer would have, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the "old" and "new" company might differ widely.

重要的是要理解，这些新产生的会计成本总计 1,160 万美元，均不可用于所得税抵扣。尽管两个实体的 GAAP 盈利差异很大，但“新”斯科特·费策支付的税款与“旧”斯科特·费策本应支付的税款完全相同。而且，就营业收益而言，未来也是如此。然而，在不太可能发生的情况下，如果斯科特·费策出售其一项业务，对“旧”公司和“新”公司的税务后果可能会有很大不同。

By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the "old" and "new" Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the higher inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.

到 1986 年底，“旧”斯科特·费策和“新”斯科特·费策之间的净值差额，已通过新实体额外计入盈利的 1,160 万美元从 1.426 亿美元减少到 1.310 亿美元。随着岁月的流逝，相似的盈利费用将导致大部分溢价消失，两张资产负债表将趋同。然而，新资产负债表上所确立的较高的土地价值和大部分较高的存货价值将保持不变，除非土地被处置或存货水平进一步降低。

What does all this mean for owners? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth some given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day?

这一切对所有者意味着什么？伯克希尔的股东是购买了一家在 1986 年赚了 4,020 万美元的企业，还是购买了一家赚了 2,860 万美元的企业？这 1,160 万美元的新费用对我们来说是真正的经济成本吗？投资者应该为公司 O 的股票支付比公司 N 更高的价格吗？而且，如果一家企业的价值是其盈利的某个倍数，那么斯科特·费策在我们收购前一天的价值是否比收购后一天的价值高得多？

If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called "owner earnings." These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N's items (1) and (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)

如果我们仔细思考这些问题，我们可以对所谓的“所有者收益”获得一些见解。“所有者收益”代表 (a) 报告盈利加上 (b) 折旧、折耗、摊销以及某些其他非现金费用，如公司 N 的项目 (1) 和 (4)，减去 (c) 企业为完全维持其长期竞争地位和销量所需的厂房设备等资本化支出的年平均金额。（如果企业需要额外的营运资本来维持其竞争地位和销量，增量也应包含在 (c) 中。然而，采用后进先出存货法的企业，如果销量不变，通常不需要额外的营运资本。）

Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since (c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figure, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes's observation: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong."

我们的所有者收益公式不会产生 GAAP 提供的那些看似精确的数字，因为 (c) 必须是一个猜测——而且有时很难做出。尽管存在这一问题，我们认为所有者收益数字，而不是 GAAP 数字，才是估值的目的相关项目——对投资者购买股票和管理者购买整个企业都是如此。我们同意凯恩斯的观察：“我宁愿模糊地正确，也不愿精确地错误。”

The approach we have outlined produces "owner earnings" for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you should be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because (c) is necessarily the same in both cases.

我们概述的方法为公司 O 和公司 N 产生的“所有者收益”是相同的，这意味着估值也相同，正如常识告诉你的那样。之所以得出这一结果，是因为 O 列和 N 列中 (a) 和 (b) 的总和相同，并且因为两种情况下 (c) 必然相同。

And what do Charlie and I, as owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe (c) is very close to the "old" company's (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the "new" company's (b) number of $19.9 million. Therefore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.

那么，作为所有者和经营者的查理和我，认为斯科特·费策的所有者收益的正确数字是多少？在当前情况下，我们相信 (c) 非常接近“旧”公司的 (b) 数字 830 万美元，并且远低于“新”公司的 (b) 数字 1,990 万美元。因此，我们认为，O 列中报告盈利比 N 列中的报告盈利更能描绘出所有者收益。换句话说，我们觉得斯科特·费策的所有者收益远远大于我们报告的 GAAP 数字。

That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when (c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.

这显然是一种令人欣喜的状况。但这类计算通常不会提供如此令人愉快的消息。大多数经理人可能都会承认，长期来看，他们需要花费比 (b) 更多的资金在业务上，仅仅为了维持销量和竞争地位。当这种必要性存在时——即当 (c) 超过 (b) 时——GAAP 盈利就会高估所有者收益。这种高估往往很严重。石油行业近年来就是这一现象的显著例子。如果大多数主要石油公司每年只花费 (b)，它们将保证自己实际规模的萎缩。

All of this points up the absurdity of the "cash flow" numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract (c). Most sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations were to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.

所有这些都指出了华尔街报告中经常出现的“现金流”数字的荒谬性。这些数字通常包括 (a) 加上 (b) ——但不减去 (c)。大多数投资银行家的销售说明书也包含这种欺骗性的表述。它们暗示所出售的业务是商业界的金字塔——永远是最先进的，永远不需要更换、改进或翻新。事实上，如果所有美国公司同时通过我们的主要投资银行家出售——并且如果描述它们的销售说明书可信的话——政府对全国厂房和设备支出的预测将不得不削减 90%。

"Cash Flow", true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But "cash flow" is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, (c) is always significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.

诚然，“现金流”在描述某些房地产企业或其他需要巨大初始支出而后续支出很少的企业时，可能作为一种有用的简略表达。一家只持有一座桥梁或一个极长寿命气田的公司就是一个例子。但在制造业、零售业、采掘业和公用事业等企业中，“现金流”是毫无意义的，因为对它们而言，(c) 总是很重要的。诚然，这类企业可能在某一特定年份能够推迟资本支出。但在五年或十年期间，它们必须进行投资——否则业务就会衰败。

Why, then, are "cash flow" numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to justify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn't add (b) without subtracting (c): though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they'll go away, the same is not true for (c). The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring (c) is headed for certain trouble.

那么，为什么“现金流”数字在当今如此流行？作为回答，我们承认我们的愤世嫉俗：我们相信这些数字经常被企业和证券的营销者用来试图证明不合理的事情是合理的（从而出售本应无法出售的东西）。当 (a) ——即 GAAP 盈利——本身看起来不足以支付垃圾债券的利息或证明愚蠢的股票价格是合理的时候，销售人员将焦点转向 (a)+(b) 就变得多么方便。但你不应该在不减掉 (c) 的情况下加上 (b)：尽管牙医正确地声称，如果你忽视牙齿，它们会消失，但这对 (c) 却不适用。那些认为可以通过将 (a) 和 (b) 相加而忽略 (c) 来衡量企业偿债能力或股权价值的公司或投资者，注定要陷入麻烦。

To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to (c). (The two items are not identical, of course. For example, at See's we annually make capitalized expenditures that exceed depreciation by $500,000 to $1 million, simply to hold our ground competitively.) Our conviction about this point is the reason we show our amortization and other purchase-price adjustment items separately in the table on page 8 and is also our reason for viewing the earnings of the individual businesses as reported there as much more closely approximating owner earnings than the GAAP figures.

总而言之：对于斯科特·费策和我们的其他业务，我们认为基于历史成本的 (b)——即排除无形资产摊销和其他购买价格调整——在金额上非常接近 (c)。（当然，这两个项目并不相同。例如，在喜诗糖果，我们每年进行的资本化支出比折旧多 50 万到 100 万美元，仅仅是为了维持我们的竞争地位。）我们对此观点的确信，是我们为什么在第 8 页的表格中单独列出我们的摊销和其他购买价格调整项目的原因，也是为什么我们认为那里报告的各个业务的盈利比 GAAP 数字更接近所有者收益的原因。

Questioning GAAP figures may seem impious to some. After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the "truth" about our business. But the accountants' job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.

质疑 GAAP 数字对某些人来说可能显得不敬。毕竟，如果不是为了向我们提供关于我们业务的“真相”，我们付钱给会计师是干什么的呢？但会计师的工作是记录，而不是评估。评估的工作落在投资者和管理者身上。

Accounting numbers, of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.

当然，会计数字是商业的语言，因此对任何评估企业价值并追踪其进展的人都有巨大的帮助。没有这些数字，查理和我会迷失方向：它们始终是我们评估自己业务和他人业务的起点。然而，管理者和所有者需要记住，会计只是商业思维的辅助工具，永远不能替代它。