巴菲特1979年致股东信中英对照整理稿，涵盖经营业绩、长期回报、保险承保与投资、银行剥离及财务报告理念等。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Again, we must lead off with a few words about accounting. Since our last annual report, the accounting profession has decided that equity securities owned by insurance companies must be carried on the balance sheet at market value. We previously have carried such equity securities at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value. Because we have large unrealized gains in our insurance equity holdings, the result of this new policy is to increase substantially both the 1978 and 1979 yearend net worth, even after the appropriate liability is established for taxes on capital gains that would be payable should equities be sold at such market valuations.
我们再次不得不以几句会计方面的说明开场。自上次年报以来，会计行业决定，保险公司持有的权益证券必须按市值在资产负债表上列示。我们之前一直按总成本与总市值的孰低法来列示这些权益证券。由于我们的保险权益持仓中有大量未实现收益，这一新政策的结果是大幅增加了1978年和1979年年末的净值，即便在为此类市值出售股票时需缴纳的资本利得税确立了适当的负债之后也是如此。
As you know, Blue Chip Stamps, our 60% owned subsidiary, is fully consolidated in Berkshire Hathaway's financial statements. However, Blue Chip still is required to carry its equity investments at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value, just as Berkshire Hathaway's insurance subsidiaries did prior to this year. Should the same equities be purchased at an identical price by an insurance subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway and by Blue Chip Stamps, present accounting principles often would require that they end up carried on our consolidated balance sheet at two different values. (That should keep you on your toes.) Market values of Blue Chip Stamps' equity holdings are given in footnote 3 on page 18.
如您所知，我们持股60%的子公司蓝筹印花完全合并进伯克希尔·哈撒韦的财务报表中。然而，蓝筹印花仍然被要求按总成本与总市值的孰低法来列示其权益投资，一如伯克希尔·哈撒韦的保险子公司今年之前所做的那样。如果伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下一家保险子公司和蓝筹印花以完全相同的价格买入相同的股票，现行的会计准则常常会要求它们在合并资产负债表上以两个不同的价值列示。（这应该会让您保持警觉。）蓝筹印花持股的市值列示在第18页的脚注3中。
1979 Operating Results
1979年经营业绩
We continue to feel that the ratio of operating earnings (before securities gains or losses) to shareholders' equity with all securities valued at cost is the most appropriate way to measure any single year's operating performance.
我们仍然认为，以所有证券按成本计价的股东权益来计算经营收益（扣除证券损益前）的比率，是衡量单一年度经营业绩最合适的方式。
Measuring such results against shareholders' equity with securities valued at market could significantly distort the operating performance percentage because of wide year-to-year market value changes in the net worth figure that serves as the denominator. For example, a large decline in securities values could result in a very low "market value" net worth that, in turn, could cause mediocre operating earnings to look unrealistically good. Alternatively, the more successful that equity investments have been, the larger the net worth base becomes and the poorer the operating performance figure appears. Therefore, we will continue to report operating performance measured against beginning net worth, with securities valued at cost.
如果以按市值计价证券的股东权益来衡量这一业绩，由于作为分母的净值数据每年市值波动很大，会严重扭曲经营业绩百分比。例如，证券价值大幅下跌可能导致一个非常低的“市值”净值，从而使平庸的经营收益看起来异常之好。反之，权益投资越成功，净值基数越大，经营业绩数字就显得越差。因此，我们将继续以证券按成本计价的期初净值为基础，报告经营业绩。
On this basis, we had a reasonably good operating performance in 1979 - but not quite as good as that of 1978 - with operating earnings amounting to 18.6% of beginning net worth. Earnings per share, of course, increased somewhat (about 20%) but we regard this as an improper figure upon which to focus. We had substantially more capital to work with in 1979 than in 1978, and our performance in utilizing that capital fell short of the earlier year, even though per-share earnings rose. "Earnings per share" will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because "earnings" (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a "stopped clock" can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low.
按此标准，1979年我们取得了相当不错的经营业绩——但不如1978年那么好——经营收益为期初净值的18.6%。每股收益当然有所增长（约20%），但我们认为这并非一个合适的聚焦指标。1979年可运用的资本比1978年多得多，而我们运用这些资本的表现落后于前一年，尽管每股收益上升了。在一个闲置的储蓄账户或固定利率的美国储蓄国债中，“每股收益”会持续上升，仅仅是因为“收益”（票面利率）不断被再投资并加入资本基数。因此，如果股息支付率很低，即使是一只“停摆的钟”也能看起来像成长股。
The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure.
衡量管理层经济绩效的首要标准是运用权益资本取得高收益率（不得过度举债、耍会计花招等），而非实现每股收益的持续增长。我们认为，如果管理层和金融分析师调整他们对每股收益及该指标年度变化的过分强调，许多企业的股东所有者和公众将更好地理解这些企业。
Long Term Results
长期业绩
In measuring long term economic performance - in contrast to yearly performance - we believe it is appropriate to recognize fully any realized capital gains or losses as well as extraordinary items, and also to utilize financial statements presenting equity securities at market value. Such capital gains or losses, either realized or unrealized, are fully as important to shareholders over a period of years as earnings realized in a more routine manner through operations; it is just that their impact is often extremely capricious in the short run, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate as an indicator of single year managerial performance.
在衡量长期经济绩效——与年度绩效相反——时，我们认为应充分确认任何已实现资本利得或损失以及非常项目，并采用按市值列示权益证券的财务报表。这些资本利得或损失，无论是已实现还是未实现的，对股东而言，在数年期间与通过经营更常规实现的收益同等重要；只是它们在短期内的冲击往往极其无常，这一特性使它们不适合作为衡量单一年度管理层绩效的指标。
The book value per share of Berkshire Hathaway on September 30, 1964 (the fiscal yearend prior to the time that your present management assumed responsibility) was $19.46 per share. At yearend 1979, book value with equity holdings carried at market value was $335.85 per share. The gain in book value comes to 20.5% compounded annually. This figure, of course, is far higher than any average of our yearly operating earnings calculations, and reflects the importance of capital appreciation of insurance equity investments in determining the overall results for our shareholders. It probably also is fair to say that the quoted book value in 1964 somewhat overstated the intrinsic value of the enterprise, since the assets owned at that time on either a going concern basis or a liquidating value basis were not worth 100 cents on the dollar. (The liabilities were solid, however.)
1964年9月30日（即现任管理层接手之前的上一个财年末），伯克希尔·哈撒韦的每股账面价值为19.46美元。到1979年末，按市值计价的每股账面价值为335.85美元。账面价值的年复合增长率为20.5%。这一数字当然远高于我们每年的经营收益计算平均水平，反映了保险权益投资资本增值在决定股东整体回报中的重要性。或许也可以公允地说，1964年的账面价值略微高估了企业的内在价值，因为当时拥有的资产无论是按持续经营价值还是清算价值都不值每1美元的100美分。（不过负债是坚实的。）
We have achieved this result while utilizing a low amount of leverage (both financial leverage measured by debt to equity, and operating leverage measured by premium volume to capital funds of our insurance business), and also without significant issuance or repurchase of shares. Basically, we have worked with the capital with which we started. From our textile base we, or our Blue Chip and Wesco subsidiaries, have acquired total ownership of thirteen businesses through negotiated purchases from private owners for cash, and have started six others. (It's worth a mention that those who have sold to us have, almost without exception, treated us with exceptional honor and fairness, both at the time of sale and subsequently.)
我们在取得这一结果的同时，运用了较低的杠杆（金融杠杆以负债权益比衡量，经营杠杆以保险业务的保费收入与资本金之比衡量），而且没有大量发行或回购股票。基本上，我们一直运用起始时的资本。在纺织业务基础上，我们（或通过蓝筹印花和韦斯科子公司）通过现金协商购买从私人业主手中收购了13家企业的全部所有权，并新创办了6家。（值得一提的是，那些出售业务给我们的人，几乎无一例外地，在出售当时及之后都以极其诚信和公平的方式对待我们。）
But before we drown in a sea of self-congratulation, a further - and crucial - observation must be made. A few years ago, a business whose per-share net worth compounded at 20% annually would have guaranteed its owners a highly successful real investment return. Now such an outcome seems less certain. For the inflation rate, coupled with individual tax rates, will be the ultimate determinant as to whether our internal operating performance produces successful investment results - i.e., a reasonable gain in purchasing power from funds committed - for you as shareholders.
但在陷入自我庆幸之前，还有一点——至关重要的——观察必须提出。几年前，一家每股净值年复合增长20%的企业，几乎可以保证其所有者获得极为成功的实际投资回报。如今，这样的结果似乎不那么确定了。因为通货膨胀率，加上个人税率，将成为最终的判断因素，决定我们的内部经营绩效是否为你们作为股东带来成功的投资结果——即从投入资金中获得合理的购买力增长。
Just as the original 3% savings bond, a 5% passbook savings account or an 8% U.S. Treasury Note have, in turn, been transformed by inflation into financial instruments that chew up, rather than enhance, purchasing power over their investment lives, a business earning 20% on capital can produce a negative real return for its owners under inflationary conditions not much more severe than presently prevail.
正如原本3%的储蓄债券、5%的存折储蓄账户或8%的美国国债，已相继被通货膨胀转化为在投资期内侵蚀而非增强购买力的金融工具，一家资本收益率为20%的企业，在当前并不比现在严重多少的通胀环境下，也可能为其所有者带来负的实际回报。
If we should continue to achieve a 20% compounded gain - not an easy or certain result by any means - and this gain is translated into a corresponding increase in the market value of Berkshire Hathaway stock as it has been over the last fifteen years, your after-tax purchasing power gain is likely to be very close to zero at a 14% inflation rate. Most of the remaining six percentage points will go for income tax any time you wish to convert your twenty percentage points of nominal annual gain into cash.
如果我们能继续实现20%的复合增长——这绝非易事或确定之事——并且这种增长转化为伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票市值的相应增长，如同过去十五年的情形，那么在14%的通胀率下，你们税后购买力的增长很可能接近于零。其余六个百分点中的大部分将用于缴纳所得税，无论何时你们想将20%的名义年收益兑现。
That combination - the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) - can be thought of as an "investor's misery index". When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor's purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all. We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity.
这一组合——通胀率加上所有者必须支付的、将企业年度收益转入自己口袋所需的资本比例（即股息普通所得税和留存收益的资本利得税）——可以视作一个“投资者痛苦指数”。当这一指数超过企业权益收益率时，投资者的购买力（实际资本）就会缩水，即使他根本没有消费。我们对这个问题没有企业层面的解决方案；高通胀率不会帮助我们获得更高的权益回报率。
One friendly but sharp-eyed commentator on Berkshire has pointed out that our book value at the end of 1964 would have bought about one-half ounce of gold and, fifteen years later, after we have plowed back all earnings along with much blood, sweat and tears, the book value produced will buy about the same half ounce. A similar comparison could be drawn with Middle Eastern oil. The rub has been that government has been exceptionally able in printing money and creating promises, but is unable to print gold or create oil.
一位友好但目光敏锐的伯克希尔观察者指出，1964年末我们的账面价值可以买到约半盎司黄金，而十五年后，在我们将所有收益以及大量的血汗与泪水再投资之后，产生的账面价值仍只能买到差不多半盎司黄金。类似的比较也可用于中东石油。症结在于，政府特别善于印钞和创造承诺，却无法印刷黄金或创造石油。
We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business. But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most important factor in determining whether there are any real rewards from your investment in Berkshire Hathaway.
我们打算继续尽力管理好企业的内部事务。但你们应该理解，影响货币稳定的外部条件很可能成为决定你们对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资能否获得任何实际回报的最重要因素。
Sources of Earnings
盈利来源
We again present a table showing the sources of Berkshire's earnings. As explained last year, Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows both aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire's share. All of the significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gain figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.
我们再次列出一张展示伯克希尔盈利来源的表格。如去年所解释，伯克希尔拥有蓝筹印花约60%的股份，而蓝筹印花又拥有韦斯科金融公司80%的股份。表格既显示了各业务实体的总收益，也显示了归属伯克希尔的份额。所有应归属于任何一个业务实体的重大资本利得或损失，都汇总在表格底部的已实现证券收益数字中，而不包含在经营收益内。
Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
(in thousands of dollars) 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total - all entities ......... $68,632 $66,180 $56,427 $54,350 $42,817 $39,242
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
Earnings from Operations:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $ 3,742 $ 3,001 $ 3,741 $ 3,000 $ 2,214 $ 1,560
Net Investment Income ... 24,224 19,705 24,216 19,691 20,106 16,400
Berkshire-Waumbec textiles 1,723 2,916 1,723 2,916 848 1,342
Associated Retail
Stores, Inc. ........... 2,775 2,757 2,775 2,757 1,280 1,176
See’s Candies ............. 12,785 12,482 7,598 7,013 3,448 3,049
Buffalo Evening News ...... (4,617) (2,913) (2,744) (1,637) (1,333) (738)
Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 2,397 2,133 1,425 1,198 1,624 1,382
Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company .......... 5,747 4,822 5,614 4,710 5,027 4,262
Wesco Financial
Corporation - Parent ... 2,413 1,771 1,098 777 937 665
Mutual Savings and Loan
Association ............ 10,447 10,556 4,751 4,638 3,261 3,042
Precision Steel ........... 3,254 -- 1,480 -- 723 --
Interest on Debt .......... (8,248) (5,566) (5,860) (4,546) (2,900) (2,349)
Other ..................... 1,342 720 996 438 753 261
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings from
Operations .......... $57,984 $52,384 $46,813 $40,955 $35,988 $30,052
Realized Securities Gain 10,648 13,796 9,614 13,395 6,829 9,190
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings ......... $68,632 $66,180 $56,427 $54,350 $42,817 $39,242
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ======== 净利润
税前收益 税后
-------------------------------------- ------------------
总计 伯克希尔份额 伯克希尔份额
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
（千美元） 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1978
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
全部实体合计 ................. $68,632 $66,180 $56,427 $54,350 $42,817 $39,242
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
经营收益：
保险集团：
承保 ................... $ 3,742 $ 3,001 $ 3,741 $ 3,000 $ 2,214 $ 1,560
净投资收益 ............. 24,224 19,705 24,216 19,691 20,106 16,400
伯克希尔-沃姆贝克纺织 ..... 1,723 2,916 1,723 2,916 848 1,342
联合零售商店公司 .......... 2,775 2,757 2,775 2,757 1,280 1,176
喜诗糖果 .................. 12,785 12,482 7,598 7,013 3,448 3,049
布法罗晚报 ................ (4,617) (2,913) (2,744) (1,637) (1,333) (738)
蓝筹印花（母公司） ......... 2,397 2,133 1,425 1,198 1,624 1,382
伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司 .. 5,747 4,822 5,614 4,710 5,027 4,262
韦斯科金融公司（母公司） .... 2,413 1,771 1,098 777 937 665
互助储蓄贷款协会 .......... 10,447 10,556 4,751 4,638 3,261 3,042
精密钢铁 .................. 3,254 -- 1,480 -- 723 --
债务利息 .................. (8,248) (5,566) (5,860) (4,546) (2,900) (2,349)
其他 ...................... 1,342 720 996 438 753 261
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
经营收益合计 ............ $57,984 $52,384 $46,813 $40,955 $35,988 $30,052
已实现证券收益 .......... 10,648 13,796 9,614 13,395 6,829 9,190
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
总收益 ................. $68,632 $66,180 $56,427 $54,350 $42,817 $39,242
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========
Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 37-43 of this report, we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1979 operations. Some of the numbers they mention in their reports are not precisely identical to those in the above table because of accounting and tax complexities. (The Yanomamo Indians employ only three numbers: one, two, and more than two. Maybe their time will come.) However, the commentary in those reports should be helpful to you in understanding the underlying economic characteristics and future prospects of the important businesses that they manage.
蓝筹印花和韦斯科均为上市公司，有各自的报告要求。在本报告第37-43页，我们转载了这两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，其中描述了1979年的经营情况。由于会计和税务的复杂性，他们在报告中提到的一些数字与上表不完全相同。（雅诺马马印第安人只使用三个数字：一、二和大于二。也许属于他们的时代终将到来。）不过，那些报告中的评述应有助于你们理解他们管理的重要业务的基本经济特征和未来前景。
A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.
伯克希尔的任何股东如需索取其中任一家公司的完整年报，可致函蓝筹印花公司的Robert H. Bird先生（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040）或韦斯科金融公司的Bette Deckard女士（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109），我们将邮寄给您。
Textiles and Retailing
纺织与零售
The relative significance of these two areas has diminished somewhat over the years as our insurance business has grown dramatically in size and earnings. Ben Rosner, at Associated Retail Stores, continues to pull rabbits out of the hat - big rabbits from a small hat. Year after year, he produces very large earnings relative to capital employed - realized in cash and not in increased receivables and inventories as in many other retail businesses - in a segment of the market with little growth and unexciting demographics. Ben is now 76 and, like our other "up-and-comers", Gene Abegg, 82, at Illinois National and Louis Vincenti, 74, at Wesco, regularly achieves more each year.
随着我们保险业务在规模和盈利上的急剧增长，这两个领域的相对重要性近年来有所下降。联合零售商店的Ben Rosner继续从帽子里变出兔子——从小帽子里变出大兔子。年复一年，相对于所用资本，他创造了极为丰厚的收益——这些收益是以现金形式实现，而非像许多其他零售企业那样体现在增加的应收账款和存货上——而且是在一个增长缓慢、人口结构无甚吸引力的细分市场中。Ben现年76岁，正如我们其他几位“后起之秀”——伊利诺伊国民银行的Gene Abegg（82岁）和韦斯科的Louis Vincenti（74岁）——每年都稳定地取得更多成就。
Our textile business also continues to produce some cash, but at a low rate compared to capital employed. This is not a reflection on the managers, but rather on the industry in which they operate. In some businesses - a network TV station, for example - it is virtually impossible to avoid earning extraordinary returns on tangible capital employed in the business. And assets in such businesses sell at equally extraordinary prices, one thousand cents or more on the dollar, a valuation reflecting the splendid, almost unavoidable, economic results obtainable. Despite a fancy price tag, the "easy" business may be the better route to go.
我们的纺织业务也继续产生一些现金，但与所用资本相比回报率较低。这并非对管理者的评判，而是对他们所处行业的反映。在某些行业——例如一家电视网络台——几乎不可能避免在所用有形资本上赚取非凡的回报。这类生意的资产也以同样非凡的价格出售，每1美元要价10美元甚至更高，这一估值反映了可获得的、几乎不可避免的辉煌经济成果。尽管价格标签高昂，但“轻松”的生意可能是更好的道路。
We can speak from experience, having tried the other route. Your Chairman made the decision a few years ago to purchase Waumbec Mills in Manchester, New Hampshire, thereby expanding our textile commitment. By any statistical test, the purchase price was an extraordinary bargain; we bought well below the working capital of the business and, in effect, got very substantial amounts of machinery and real estate for less than nothing. But the purchase was a mistake. While we labored mightily, new problems arose as fast as old problems were tamed.
我们可以凭经验发言，因为我们尝试过另一条路。几年前，你们的董事长决定收购位于新罕布什尔州曼彻斯特的沃姆贝克纺织厂，从而扩大我们在纺织业的投入。从任何统计标准来看，收购价格都是一笔极划算的交易；我们以远低于企业营运资本的价格买入，实际上等于白白获得了大量机器设备和房地产。但这笔收购是个错误。尽管我们付出了巨大努力，新问题解决的速度与旧问题被驯服的速度一样快。
Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that "turnarounds" seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. Although a mistake, the Waumbec acquisition has not been a disaster. Certain portions of the operation are proving to be valuable additions to our decorator line (our strongest franchise) at New Bedford, and it's possible that we may be able to run profitably on a considerably reduced scale at Manchester. However, our original rationale did not prove out.
无论是我们的经营经验还是投资经验，都使我们得出这样的结论：“困境反转”很少有真正反转的；同样的精力和才能，用在以合理价格买入好的生意上，远胜于用在以低廉价格买入糟糕的生意上。尽管沃姆贝克的收购是个错误，但并非灾难。该项业务的部分环节正证明对新贝德福德的装饰布系列（我们最强大的特许经营权）是有价值的补充，而且我们有可能在曼彻斯特以大幅缩减的规模实现盈利运营。不过，我们最初的逻辑并未得到验证。
Insurance Underwriting
保险承保
We predicted last year that the combined underwriting ratio (see definition on page 36) for the insurance industry would "move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position". That is just about the way it worked out. The industry underwriting ratio rose in 1979 over three points, from roughly 97.4% to 100.7%. We also said that we thought our underwriting performance relative to the industry would improve somewhat in 1979 and, again, things worked out as expected. Our own underwriting ratio actually decreased from 98.2% to 97.1%. Our forecast for 1980 is similar in one respect; again we feel that the industry's performance will worsen by at least another few points. However, this year we have no reason to think that our performance relative to the industry will further improve. (Don't worry - we won't hold back to try to validate that forecast.)
去年我们曾预测，保险行业的综合承保比率（定义见第36页）将“至少上升几个百分点，或许足以使整个行业陷入承保亏损状态”。实际情况正是如此。1979年行业承保比率上升超过3个百分点，从约97.4%升至100.7%。我们还说过，我们认为我们相对于行业的承保表现在1979年将有所改善，结果同样一如所期。我们自己的承保比率实际上从98.2%下降至97.1%。我们对1980年的预测在有一点上类似；我们再次认为行业表现将至少再恶化几个百分点。但今年，我们没有理由认为我们相对于行业的表现将进一步改善。（请放心——我们不会为了验证这一预测而刻意保留实力。）
Really extraordinary results were turned in by the portion of National Indemnity Company's insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. Aided by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this section of the business produced an underwriting profit of $8.4 million on about $82 million of earned premiums. Only a very few companies in the entire industry produced a result comparable to this.
国民赔偿公司由Phil Liesche负责的那部分保险业务取得了真正非同寻常的业绩。在承保部Roland Miller和理赔部Bill Lyons的协助下，该部门在约8200万美元的已赚保费基础上实现了840万美元的承保利润。整个行业内唯有极少数公司能取得与此比肩的业绩。
You will notice that earned premiums in this segment were down somewhat from those of 1978. We hear a great many insurance managers talk about being willing to reduce volume in order to underwrite profitably, but we find that very few actually do so. Phil Liesche is an exception: if business makes sense, he writes it; if it doesn't, he rejects it. It is our policy not to lay off people because of the large fluctuations in work load produced by such voluntary volume changes. We would rather have some slack in the organization from time to time than keep everyone terribly busy writing business on which we are going to lose money. Jack Ringwalt, the founder of National Indemnity Company, instilled this underwriting discipline at the inception of the company, and Phil Liesche never has wavered in maintaining it. We believe such strong-mindedness is as rare as it is sound - and absolutely essential to the running of a first-class casualty insurance operation.
您会注意到，该部门的已赚保费较1978年有所下降。我们听到很多保险经理人谈论愿意为承保盈利而减少业务量，但我们发现很少有人真正如此行动。Phil Liesche是个例外：如果业务合理，他就承保；如果不合理，他就拒绝。我们的政策是不因为这种自愿性的业务量变化所导致的工作量大幅波动而裁员。我们宁愿组织内时而有些松弛，也不愿让每个人都忙于承保那些会让我们亏损的业务。国民赔偿公司的创始人Jack Ringwalt在公司创立之初就植入了这种承保纪律，而Phil Liesche从未动摇地坚守着它。我们相信，这种顽强既罕见又明智——而且是运营一流财产意外险业务绝对不可或缺的。
John Seward continues to make solid progress at Home and Automobile Insurance Company, in large part by significantly expanding the marketing scope of that company in general liability lines. These lines can be dynamite, but the record to date is excellent and, in John McGowan and Paul Springman, we have two cautious liability managers extending our capabilities.
John Seward在家庭与汽车保险公司继续取得扎实进展，主要得益于显著扩大了该公司在一般责任险领域的营销范围。这类业务可能极具风险，但迄今的记录非常出色，而且我们有John McGowan和Paul Springman这两位谨慎的责任险经理人，正拓展我们的能力。
Our reinsurance division, led by George Young, continues to give us reasonably satisfactory overall results after allowing for investment income, but underwriting performance remains unsatisfactory. We think the reinsurance business is a very tough business that is likely to get much tougher. In fact, the influx of capital into the business and the resulting softer price levels for continually increasing exposures may well produce disastrous results for many entrants (of which they may be blissfully unaware until they are in over their heads; much reinsurance business involves an exceptionally "long tail", a characteristic that allows catastrophic current loss experience to fester undetected for many years). It will be hard for us to be a whole lot smarter than the crowd and thus our reinsurance activity may decline substantially during the projected prolonged period of extraordinary competition.
由George Young领导的再保险部门，在考虑投资收益后，继续给我们带来尚算满意的整体结果，但承保表现仍不理想。我们认为再保险业务是一个非常艰难的生意，而且可能会变得更加艰难。事实上，资本涌入该行业，以及随之而来的在风险不断增长情况下的更低价位，很可能给许多新进入者带来灾难性的结果（他们可能浑然不觉，直至深陷其中；大量再保险业务具有异常“长尾”特性，这使得灾难性的当期损失经历可以潜伏多年而不被发现）。我们很难比众人聪明太多，因此在预计将持续较长时间的超常竞争期内，我们的再保险业务量可能会大幅下降。
The Homestate operation was disappointing in 1979. Excellent results again were turned in by George Billings at Texas United Insurance Company, winner of the annual award for the low loss ratio among Homestate companies, and Floyd Taylor at Kansas Fire and Casualty Company. But several of the other operations, particularly Cornhusker Casualty Company, our first and largest Homestate operation and historically a winner, had poor underwriting results which were accentuated by data processing, administrative and personnel problems. We have made some major mistakes in reorganizing our data processing activities, and those mistakes will not be cured immediately or without cost. However, John Ringwalt has thrown himself into the task of getting things straightened out and we have confidence that he, aided by several strong people who recently have been brought aboard, will succeed.
Homestate业务在1979年令人失望。德克萨斯联合保险公司的George Billings再次取得优异成绩，荣获Homestate公司中低损失率年度奖，以及堪萨斯火灾与意外险公司的Floyd Taylor也表现优异。但其他几家业务，尤其是我们最早也是规模最大的Homestate公司——Cornhusker意外险公司，历史上一直是赢家，却出现了较差的承保结果，而数据处理、行政和人事问题加剧了这一问题。我们在重组数据处理活动方面犯了一些重大错误，这些错误不会立即或毫无代价地得到纠正。不过，John Ringwalt已全身心投入理清乱局的任务中，我们有信心，在最近引进的几位强人的协助下，他将会成功。
Our performance in Worker's Compensation was far, far better than we had any right to expect at the beginning of 1979. We had a very favorable climate in California for the achievement of good results but, beyond this, Milt Thornton at Cypress Insurance Company and Frank DeNardo at National Indemnity's California Worker's Compensation operation both performed in a simply outstanding manner. We have admitted - and with good reason - some mistakes on the acquisition front, but the Cypress purchase has turned out to be an absolute gem. Milt Thornton, like Phil Liesche, follows the policy of sticking with business that he understands and wants, without giving consideration to the impact on volume. As a result, he has an outstanding book of business and an exceptionally well functioning group of employees. Frank DeNardo has straightened out the mess he inherited in Los Angeles in a manner far beyond our expectations, producing savings measured in seven figures. He now can begin to build on a sound base.
我们在工伤保险方面的表现，比1979年初我们有权期望的要好得多得多。在加州，我们拥有一个非常有利于取得良好业绩的环境，但除此之外，赛普拉斯保险公司的Milt Thornton和国民赔偿公司加州工伤保险业务的Frank DeNardo都表现得简直出类拔萃。我们承认——而且有充分理由——在收购方面犯过一些错误，但赛普拉斯的收购结果证明是一颗绝对的宝石。Milt Thornton和Phil Liesche一样，遵循坚持承保他理解并想要的业务之政策，而不考虑对业务量的影响。结果，他拥有了一本出色的业务组合和一支运转异常高效的员工队伍。Frank DeNardo以远超我们预期的方式整理好了他在洛杉矶接手的烂摊子，节省金额以百万美元计。他现在可以开始在坚实的基础上建设。
At yearend we entered the specialized area of surety reinsurance under the management of Chet Noble. At least initially, this operation will be relatively small since our policy will be to seek client companies who appreciate the need for a long term "partnership" relationship with their reinsurers. We are pleased by the quality of the insurers we have attracted, and hope to add several more of the best primary writers as our financial strength and stability become better known in the surety field.
年末，我们在Chet Noble的管理下进入了保证再保险这一专业领域。至少在初期，这项业务规模将相对较小，因为我们的政策是寻求那些认识到与再保险人建立长期“伙伴”关系必要性的客户公司。我们对已吸引来的保险公司质量感到满意，并希望随着我们的财务实力与稳健性在保证领域日益为人所知，能再增添几家最优秀的一级承保人。
The conventional wisdom is that insurance underwriting overall will be poor in 1980, but that rates will start to firm in a year or so, leading to a turn in the cycle some time in 1981. We disagree with this view. Present interest rates encourage the obtaining of business at underwriting loss levels formerly regarded as totally unacceptable. Managers decry the folly of underwriting at a loss to obtain investment income, but we believe that many will. Thus we expect that competition will create a new threshold of tolerance for underwriting losses, and that combined ratios will average higher in the future than in the past.
传统观点认为，1980年保险承保总体上将表现不佳，但费率将在一年左右开始坚挺，从而导致周期在1981年某个时候转向。我们不同意这种看法。当前的利率鼓励着以过去被认为完全不可接受的承保亏损水平来获取业务。管理者们谴责为获得投资收益而承保亏损的愚蠢行为，但我们相信许多人会这样做。因此，我们预计竞争将催生对承保亏损的新容忍门槛，未来综合比率将平均高于过去。
To some extent, the day of reckoning has been postponed because of marked reduction in the frequency of auto accidents - probably brought on in major part by changes in driving habits induced by higher gas prices. In our opinion, if the habits hadn't changed, auto insurance rates would have been very little higher and underwriting results would have been much worse. This dosage of serendipity won't last indefinitely.
在一定程度上，最终清算日被推迟了，因为汽车事故频率显著下降——这可能在很大程度上是由高油价导致的驾驶习惯改变所引起的。在我们看来，如果驾驶习惯没有改变，汽车保险费率将会更高，而承保结果将会糟糕得多。这份意外好运不会无限期持续下去。
Our forecast is for an average combined ratio for the industry in the 105 area over the next five years. While we have a high degree of confidence that certain of our operations will do considerably better than average, it will be a challenge to us to operate below the industry figure. You can get a lot of surprises in insurance.
我们预测未来五年行业平均综合比率将在105%左右。尽管我们高度相信我们的某些业务会明显优于平均水平，但要运营在行业水平线以下对我们仍是一个挑战。保险业总能带给你许多意外。
Nevertheless, we believe that insurance can be a very good business. It tends to magnify, to an unusual degree, human managerial talent - or the lack of it. We have a number of managers whose talent is both proven and growing. (And, in addition, we have a very large indirect interest in two truly outstanding management groups through our investments in SAFECO and GEICO.) Thus we expect to do well in insurance over a period of years. However, the business has the potential for really terrible results in a single specific year. If accident frequency should turn around quickly in the auto field, we, along with others, are likely to experience such a year.
尽管如此，我们相信保险可以是一门非常好的生意。它倾向于以一种不同寻常的程度放大人的管理才能——或缺乏才能。我们拥有一批才能已得到证明且仍在不断增长的管理者。（此外，通过我们对SAFECO和GEICO的投资，我们还拥有对两家真正杰出的管理团队的巨大间接权益。）因此，我们预期在数年内保险业务将表现良好。然而，该业务在某个单一年份有产生真正可怕结果的潜力。如果汽车事故频率迅速逆转，我们可能和业内其他人一起，经历那样的一年。
Insurance Investments
保险投资
In recent years we have written at length in this section about our insurance equity investments. In 1979 they continued to perform well, largely because the underlying companies in which we have invested, in practically all cases, turned in outstanding performances. Retained earnings applicable to our insurance equity investments, not reported in our financial statements, continue to mount annually and, in aggregate, now come to a very substantial number. We have faith that the managements of these companies will utilize those retained earnings effectively and will translate a dollar retained by them into a dollar or more of subsequent market value for us. In part, our unrealized gains reflect this process.
近年来，我们在这一部分详细讨论了我们的保险权益投资。1979年，它们继续表现良好，主要因为我们所投资的标的公司几乎无一例外地交出了出色的业绩。归属我们保险权益投资的留存收益（未在我们的财务报表中报告）继续逐年增长，累计已达相当巨大的数额。我们相信这些公司的管理层将有效运用这些留存收益，将保留的每一美元转化为随后一美元或更多的市值给我们。我们的未实现收益部分反映了这一过程。
No. of Sh. Company Cost Market
---------- ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
289,700 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ........... $ 2,821 $ 8,800
112,545 Amerada Hess ............................ 2,861 5,487
246,450 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ... 6,082 9,673
5,730,114 GEICO Corp. (Common Stock) .............. 28,288 68,045
328,700 General Foods, Inc. ..................... 11,437 11,053
1,007,500 Handy & Harman .......................... 21,825 38,537
711,180 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .... 4,531 23,736
1,211,834 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ........ 20,629 23,328
282,500 Media General, Inc. ..................... 4,545 7,345
391,400 Ogilvy & Mather International ........... 3,709 7,828
953,750 SAFECO Corporation ...................... 23,867 35,527
1,868,000 The Washington Post Company ............. 10,628 39,241
771,900 F. W. Woolworth Company ................. 15,515 19,394
---------- ----------
Total ................................... $156,738 $297,994
All Other Holdings ...................... 28,675 38,686
---------- ----------
Total Equities .......................... $185,413 $336,680
========== ==========持股数量 公司 成本 市值
---------- ------- ---------- ----------
（千美元，省略）
289,700 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ........... $ 2,821 $ 8,800
112,545 Amerada Hess ............................ 2,861 5,487
246,450 美国广播公司 ............................ 6,082 9,673
5,730,114 GEICO Corp.（普通股） ................... 28,288 68,045
328,700 General Foods, Inc. ..................... 11,437 11,053
1,007,500 Handy & Harman .......................... 21,825 38,537
711,180 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .... 4,531 23,736
1,211,834 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. ........ 20,629 23,328
282,500 Media General, Inc. ..................... 4,545 7,345
391,400 Ogilvy & Mather International ........... 3,709 7,828
953,750 SAFECO Corporation ...................... 23,867 35,527
1,868,000 华盛顿邮报公司 .......................... 10,628 39,241
771,900 F. W. Woolworth Company ................. 15,515 19,394
---------- ----------
合计 ................................... $156,738 $297,994
其他所有持股 .......................... 28,675 38,686
---------- ----------
权益总计 .............................. $185,413 $336,680
========== ==========We currently believe that equity markets in 1980 are likely to evolve in a manner that will result in an underperformance by our portfolio for the first time in recent years. We very much like the companies in which we have major investments, and plan no changes to try to attune ourselves to the markets of a specific year.
我们目前认为，1980年的股票市场很可能演变成导致我们的投资组合近年来首次跑输大市的局面。我们非常喜欢我们重仓投资的公司，并且不计划为试图适应某个特定年份的市场而做任何变动。
Since we have covered our philosophy regarding equities extensively in recent annual reports, a more extended discussion of bond investments may be appropriate for this one, particularly in light of what has happened since yearend. An extraordinary amount of money has been lost by the insurance industry in the bond area - notwithstanding the accounting convention that allows insurance companies to carry their bond investments at amortized cost, regardless of impaired market value. Actually, that very accounting convention may have contributed in a major way to the losses; had management been forced to recognize market values, its attention might have been focused much earlier on the dangers of a very long-term bond contract.
鉴于我们在近年来的年报中已广泛阐述我们对股票的投资理念，本文或许更适合对债券投资进行更深入的讨论，特别是考虑到年末以来发生的情况。保险行业在债券领域损失了巨额资金——尽管会计准则允许保险公司按摊余成本列示债券投资，而不考虑受损的市值。实际上，正是这一会计准则可能在很大程度上促成了损失；假如管理层被迫确认市场价值，其注意力可能更早地集中到超长期债券合约的危险上。
Ironically, many insurance companies have decided that a one-year auto policy is inappropriate during a time of inflation, and six-month policies have been brought in as replacements. "How," say many of the insurance managers, "can we be expected to look forward twelve months and estimate such imponderables as hospital costs, auto parts prices, etc.?" But, having decided that one year is too long a period for which to set a fixed price for insurance in an inflationary world, they then have turned around, taken the proceeds from the sale of that six-month policy, and sold the money at a fixed price for thirty or forty years.
具有讽刺意味的是，许多保险公司断定一年期的汽车保单在通胀时期是不合适的，于是采用六个月期保单作为替代。许多保险经理说：“怎么能指望我们展望十二个月，估算诸如住院费用、汽车零件价格等无法估测的因素呢？”但是，在认定在通胀世界里为保险设定一年期固定价格过于漫长之后，他们转身却将六个月期保单销售所得的资金，以三十或四十年的固定价格出售掉。
The very long-term bond contract has been the last major fixed price contract of extended duration still regularly initiated in an inflation-ridden world. The buyer of money to be used between 1980 and 2020 has been able to obtain a firm price now for each year of its use while the buyer of auto insurance, medical services, newsprint, office space - or just about any other product or service - would be greeted with laughter if he were to request a firm price now to apply through 1985. For in virtually all other areas of commerce, parties to long-term contracts now either index prices in some manner, or insist on the right to review the situation every year or so.
超长期债券合约是通胀肆虐的世界里最后一种仍在定期启动的主要长期固定价格契约。资金的使用者（在1980年至2020年间使用资金）现在能为每年使用资金锁定一个确定的价格，而汽车保险、医疗服务、新闻纸、办公场所——或其他几乎任何产品或服务的购买者——如果他现在要求确定一个直至2025年都适用的固定价格，将会迎来一片哄笑。因为在几乎所有其他商业领域，长期合同的各方现在要么以某种方式对价格进行指数化，要么坚持每年或每若干年重新审视的权利。
A cultural lag has prevailed in the bond area. The buyers (borrowers) and middlemen (underwriters) of money hardly could be expected to raise the question of whether it all made sense, and the sellers (lenders) slept through an economic and contractual revolution.
债券领域盛行着一种文化滞后。资金的购买者（借款人）和中介（承销商）几乎不可能指望他们提出这一切是否合理的问题，而出售者（贷款人）则在经济和契约革命中酣睡不醒。
For the last few years our insurance companies have not been a net purchaser of any straight long-term bonds (those without conversion rights or other attributes offering profit possibilities). There have been some purchases in the straight bond area, of course, but they have been offset by sales or maturities. Even prior to this period, we never would buy thirty or forty-year bonds; instead we tried to concentrate in the straight bond area on shorter issues with sinking funds and on issues that seemed relatively undervalued because of bond market inefficiencies.
过去几年里，我们的保险公司没有成为任何普通长期债券（即不含转换权或其他提供盈利可能特征的债券）的净买家。当然，在普通债券领域也有过一些买入，但都被卖出或到期所抵消。甚至在此之前，我们也从不买三十或四十年的债券；相反，我们试图在普通债券领域集中投资于较短期限、附有偿付基金的债券，以及因债券市场缺乏效率而显得相对低估的债券。
However, the mild degree of caution that we exercised was an improper response to the world unfolding about us. You do not adequately protect yourself by being half awake while others are sleeping. It was a mistake to buy fifteen-year bonds, and yet we did; we made an even more serious mistake in not selling them (at losses, if necessary) when our present views began to crystallize. (Naturally, those views are much clearer and definite in retrospect; it would be fair for you to ask why we weren't writing about this subject last year.)
然而，我们所采取的温和谨慎对我们周围展开的世界而言是一种不当的回应。当别人沉睡时仅保持半醒，你无法充分保护自己。买入十五年期的债券是一个错误，而我们却犯了；一个更严重的错误是，当我们的现有观点开始形成时，我们没有将它们卖出（如果需要，不惜亏损）。（自然，这些观点在事后回顾起来要清晰明确得多；你们完全有理由问我们为什么去年没有就此主题撰写文章。）
Of course, we must hold significant amounts of bonds or other fixed dollar obligations in conjunction with our insurance operations. In the last several years our net fixed dollar commitments have been limited to the purchase of convertible bonds. We believe that the conversion options obtained, in effect, give that portion of the bond portfolio a far shorter average life than implied by the maturity terms of the issues (i.e., at an appropriate time of our choosing, we can terminate the bond contract by conversion into stock).
当然，为配合我们的保险业务，我们必须持有大量的债券或其他固定美元债务。过去几年来，我们的净固定美元承诺一直局限于购买可转换债券。我们认为，所获得的转换期权实际上使得这部分债券组合的平均寿命远短于债券期限条款所暗示的（即，在我们选择的适当时机，我们可以通过转换为股票来终止债券契约）。
This bond policy has given us significantly lower unrealized losses than those experienced by the great majority of property and casualty insurance companies. We also have been helped by our strong preference for equities in recent years that has kept our overall bond segment relatively low. Nevertheless, we are taking our lumps in bonds and feel that, in a sense, our mistakes should be viewed less charitably than the mistakes of those who went about their business unmindful of the developing problems.
这一债券政策使我们的未实现损失远低于绝大多数财产意外险公司所经历的。我们也得益于近年来对股票的强烈偏好，这使我们整体的债券部分保持相对较低的水平。尽管如此，我们在债券上也吃了苦头，并且觉得，在某种意义上，我们的错误应该比那些不顾问题发展而照常做生意的人所犯的错误受到更少的宽恕。
Harking back to our textile experience, we should have realized the futility of trying to be very clever (via sinking funds and other special type issues) in an area where the tide was running heavily against us.
回顾我们在纺织业的经历，我们早该意识到，在一个潮流严重不利于我们的领域里试图过于聪明（通过偿付基金和其他特殊类型债券）是徒劳的。
We have severe doubts as to whether a very long-term fixed-interest bond, denominated in dollars, remains an appropriate business contract in a world where the value of dollars seems almost certain to shrink by the day. Those dollars, as well as paper creations of other governments, simply may have too many structural weaknesses to appropriately serve as a unit of long term commercial reference. If so, really long bonds may turn out to be obsolete instruments and insurers who have bought those maturities of 2010 or 2020 could have major and continuing problems on their hands. We, likewise, will be unhappy with our fifteen-year bonds and will annually pay a price in terms of earning power that reflects that mistake.
我们严重怀疑，在一个美元价值几乎确定日复一日缩水的世界里，以美元计价的超长期固定利息债券是否仍是一个合适的商业契约。这些美元以及其他政府创造的纸币，可能有着太多的结构性弱点，难以适当充当长期商业参照单位。如果是这样，真正长期的债券可能会变成过时的工具，那些购买了2010年或2020年到期债券的保险公司可能会面临重大且持续的问题。同样，我们也会对我们的十五年债券感到不满，并每年在盈利能力上为此错误付出代价。
Some of our convertible bonds appear exceptionally attractive to us, and have the same sort of earnings retention factor (applicable to the stock into which they may be converted) that prevails in our conventional equity portfolio. We expect to make money in these bonds (we already have, in a few cases) and have hopes that our profits in this area may offset losses in straight bonds.
我们的一些可转换债券对我们显得格外有吸引力，它们具有与我们传统股票组合中盛行的留存收益因素（适用于它们可能转换成的股票）相同的特征。我们预期在这些债券上获利（在某些案例上已经获利），并希望这方面的利润或许能抵消普通债券的损失。
And, of course, there is the possibility that our present analysis is much too negative. The chances for very low rates of inflation are not nil. Inflation is man-made; perhaps it can be man-mastered. The threat which alarms us may also alarm legislators and other powerful groups, prompting some appropriate response.
当然，也存在我们现在的分析过于悲观的可能性。极低通货膨胀率的机会并非为零。通货膨胀是人为造成的；也许它可以被人驯服。使我们警觉的威胁也可能使立法者和其他强有力团体警觉，从而促使一些适当的回应。
Furthermore, present interest rates incorporate much higher inflation projections than those of a year or two ago. Such rates may prove adequate or more than adequate to protect bond buyers. We even may miss large profits from a major rebound in bond prices. However, our unwillingness to fix a price now for a pound of See's candy or a yard of Berkshire cloth to be delivered in 2010 or 2020 makes us equally unwilling to buy bonds which set a price on money now for use in those years. Overall, we opt for Polonius (slightly restated): "Neither a short-term borrower nor a long-term lender be."
此外，当前的利率包含了比一两年前高得多的通胀预期。这样的利率或许足以或绰绰有余地保护债券买家。我们甚至可能错失债券价格大幅反弹带来的巨额利润。然而，我们不愿现在就为2010年或2020年交付的一磅喜诗糖果或一码伯克希尔布料锁定价格，这同样使我们不愿购买那些现在为那些年份使用的资金锁定价格的债券。总体而言，我们选择波洛尼厄斯（稍作修改）：“既不做短期借款人，也不做长期贷款人。”
Banking
银行业务
This will be the last year that we can report on the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company as a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. Therefore, it is particularly pleasant to report that, under Gene Abegg's and Pete Jeffrey's management, the bank broke all previous records and earned approximately 2.3% on average assets last year, a level again over three times that achieved by the average major bank, and more than double that of banks regarded as outstanding. The record is simply extraordinary, and the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway owe a standing ovation to Gene Abegg for the performance this year and every year since our purchase in 1969.
这将是我们能够将伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司作为伯克希尔·哈撒韦子公司来报告的最后一年。因此，特别令人高兴的是，在Gene Abegg和Pete Jeffrey的管理下，该银行打破了所有以往的记录，去年平均资产收益率约为2.3%，这一水平再次超过主要银行的平均水平三倍以上，且是那些被视为杰出银行的两倍以上。这一记录简直非凡卓越，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东们应为Gene Abegg自1969年我们收购以来每年以及今年的表现起立鼓掌。
As you know, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 requires that we divest the bank by December 31, 1980. For some years we have expected to comply by effecting a spin-off during 1980. However, the Federal Reserve Board has taken the firm position that if the bank is spun off, no officer or director of Berkshire Hathaway can be an officer or director of the spun-off bank or bank holding company, even in a case such as ours in which one individual would own over 40% of both companies.
如您所知，1969年《银行控股公司法》要求我们在1980年12月31日之前剥离该银行。多年来，我们一直预期通过在1980年内实施分拆来合规。然而，联邦储备委员会已采取坚定立场：如果银行被分拆，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的任何高管或董事都不能成为分拆后的银行或银行控股公司的高管或董事，即使像我们这样，有一个人会同时持有两家公司超过40%的股份。
Under these conditions, we are investigating the possible sale of between 80% and 100% of the stock of the bank. We will be most choosy about any purchaser, and our selection will not be based solely on price. The bank and its management have treated us exceptionally well and, if we have to sell, we want to be sure that they are treated equally as well. A spin-off still is a possibility if a fair price along with a proper purchaser cannot be obtained by early fall.
在这种情况下，我们正在研究可能出售银行80%至100%的股份。我们将对任何买家极为挑剔，我们的选择不仅基于价格。该银行及其管理层一直对我们极为优待，如果我们不得不卖掉，我们希望能确保他们也得到同样优厚的待遇。如果在初秋之前无法获得公允价格及合适的买家，分拆仍是一种可能。
However, you should be aware that we do not expect to be able to fully, or even in very large part, replace the earning power represented by the bank from the proceeds of the sale of the bank. You simply can't buy high quality businesses at the sort of price/earnings multiple likely to prevail on our bank sale.
然而，你们应该意识到，我们预期无法用出售银行的所得完全、甚至大部分地替代该银行所代表的盈利能力。你根本无法以我们出售银行时可能出现的市盈率倍数买到高质量的企业。
Financial Reporting
财务报告
During 1979, NASDAQ trading was initiated in the stock of Berkshire Hathaway This means that the stock now is quoted on the Over-the-Counter page of the Wall Street journal under "Additional OTC Quotes". Prior to such listing, the Wall Street journal and the Dow-Jones news ticker would not report our earnings, even though such earnings were one hundred or more times the level of some companies whose reports they regularly picked up.
1979年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股票开始在纳斯达克交易。这意味着该股票现在在《华尔街日报》的“场外附加报价”栏目中报价。在此上市之前，《华尔街日报》和道琼斯新闻播报不会报道我们的盈利，即便这些盈利是他们定期报道的一些公司水平的百倍甚至更多。
Now, however, the Dow-Jones news ticker reports our quarterly earnings promptly after we release them and, in addition, both the ticker and the Wall Street journal report our annual earnings. This solves a dissemination problem that had bothered us.
但现在，道琼斯新闻播报在我们发布后迅速报道我们的季度盈利，此外，播报和《华尔街日报》都会报道我们的年度盈利。这解决了一个曾困扰我们的传播问题。
In some ways, our shareholder group is a rather unusual one, and this affects our manner of reporting to you. For example, at the end of each year about 98% of the shares outstanding are held by people who also were shareholders at the beginning of the year. Therefore, in our annual report we build upon what we have told you in previous years instead of restating a lot of material. You get more useful information this way, and we don't get bored.
在某些方面，我们的股东群体相当与众不同，这影响了我们向您报告的方式。例如，每年年末，约98%的流通股份由年初也是股东的人持有。因此，在我们的年度报告中，我们是在往年告知您信息的基础上做补充，而不是复述大量材料。这样你们能得到更有用的信息，我们也不会感到乏味。
Furthermore, perhaps 90% of our shares are owned by investors for whom Berkshire is their largest security holding, very often far and away the largest. Many of these owners are willing to spend a significant amount of time with the annual report, and we attempt to provide them with the same information we would find useful if the roles were reversed.
此外，大约90%的股份由那些将伯克希尔作为其最大证券持仓的投资者持有，通常还是遥遥领先的最大持仓。这些所有者中许多人愿意花大量时间阅读年度报告，我们试图为他们提供若角色互换我们也会觉得有用的同样信息。
In contrast, we include no narrative with our quarterly reports. Our owners and managers both have very long time-horizons in regard to this business, and it is difficult to say anything new or meaningful each quarter about events of long-term significance.
相比之下，我们的季度报告不包含叙述性内容。我们的所有者和经理人对该业务都有着非常长远的时间视野，很难每个季度就具有长期意义的事件说出什么新颖或有意义的话。
But when you do receive a communication from us, it will come from the fellow you are paying to run the business. Your Chairman has a firm belief that owners are entitled to hear directly from the CEO as to what is going on and how he evaluates the business, currently and prospectively. You would demand that in a private company; you should expect no less in a public company. A once-a-year report of stewardship should not be turned over to a staff specialist or public relations consultant who is unlikely to be in a position to talk frankly on a manager-to-owner basis.
但当你们确实收到我们的信函时，它将来自你们付钱经营企业的那个人。你们的董事长坚信，所有者有权直接听取CEO讲述正在发生的事情以及他对企业当前和未来的评估。在私人公司里你们会这样要求；在公众公司里你们也应同样期望。一年一度的受托职责报告不应转交给职员专家或公关顾问，因为他们不太可能以管理者对所有者坦诚对话的立场发言。
We feel that you, as owners, are entitled to the same sort of reporting by your manager as we feel is owed to us at Berkshire Hathaway by managers of our business units. Obviously, the degree of detail must be different, particularly where information would be useful to a business competitor or the like. But the general scope, balance, and level of candor should be similar. We don't expect a public relations document when our operating managers tell us what is going on, and we don't feel you should receive such a document.
我们认为，作为所有者，你们有权从你们的管理者那里获得我们期望伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下业务单位经理人给予我们的那种报告。显然，详细程度必然不同，尤其是在信息可能对商业竞争对手有用之类的情况下。但是，总体范围、平衡度和坦诚程度应相似。当我们的运营经理告诉我们情况时，我们不期望看到一份公关文件，我们也不觉得你们应该收到这样一份文件。
In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.
在很大程度上，公司得到的是它们所寻求和应得的股东群体。如果它们将思考和沟通聚焦于短期结果或短期股市影响，那么在很大程度上，它们会吸引聚焦同样因素的股东。如果它们对待投资者时玩世不恭，最终这种玩世不恭极可能被投资界回敬。
Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele - patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc. - and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.
备受尊敬的投资人与作家菲利普·费雪曾将公司在吸引股东方面的政策比作餐厅吸引潜在顾客。一家餐厅可以追求特定的客户群——快餐食客、精致餐饮、东方美食等——并最终获得一群合适的忠实顾客。如果工作做得专业，那群顾客对服务、菜单和价格水平感到满意，就会持续光顾。但餐厅不能不断改变自身特色而最终拥有一个满意且稳定的客户群。如果生意在法式大餐和外带炸鸡之间摇摆不定，结果将是一扇旋转门，充满了困惑和不满的顾客。
So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can't be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.
公司和它们所寻求的股东群体也是如此。你不可能面面俱到，同时追求主要兴趣从高当期收益到长期资本增长再到股市烟花表演等不同类型的所有者。
The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones - because you can't add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners.
管理层寻求其股票大规模交易活动的推理令我们不解。实际上，这样的管理层是在说，他们希望相当多的现有客户群体不断弃他们而去，投奔新群体——因为你无法在增添大量新所有者（带着新期望）的同时不丢失大量的原有所有者。
We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder "seats" than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations. And we hope to deliver on those expectations.
我们更偏爱那些喜欢我们的服务和菜单并年复一年光顾的所有者。很难找到比现有占据伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东“席位”者更好的群体了。因此，我们希望继续保持极低的所有者周转率，反映出一个理解我们的运作、认同我们的政策并共享我们期望的支持群体。我们希望能实现那些期望。
Prospects
前景展望
Last year we said that we expected operating earnings in dollars to improve but return on equity to decrease. This turned out to be correct. Our forecast for 1980 is the same. If we are wrong, it will be on the downside. In other words, we are virtually certain that our operating earnings expressed as a percentage of the new equity base of approximately $236 million, valuing securities at cost, will decline from the 18.6% attained in 1979. There is also a fair chance that operating earnings in aggregate dollars will fall short of 1979; the outcome depends partly upon the date of disposition of the bank, partly upon the degree of slippage in insurance underwriting profitability, and partly upon the severity of earnings problems in the savings and loan industry.
去年我们曾说，我们预期以美元计的经营收益将提高，但权益回报率将下降。事实证明这是正确的。我们对1980年的预测相同。如果我们错了，那将是向下错。换句话说，我们几乎可以肯定，按证券成本计价、基于约2.36亿美元的新权益基础计算的经营收益百分比，将从1979年实现的18.6%下降。同时，以总美元计的经营收益也有相当可能低于1979年；结果部分取决于处置银行的日期，部分取决于保险承保盈利能力的下滑程度，部分取决于储蓄贷款行业盈利问题的严重程度。
We continue to feel very good about our insurance equity investments. Over a period of years, we expect to develop very large and growing amounts of underlying earning power attributable to our fractional ownership of these companies. In most cases they are splendid businesses, splendidly managed, purchased at highly attractive prices.
我们对我们的保险权益投资仍然感觉很好。经年累月，我们期望发展出非常庞大且不断增长的、归属于我们对这些公司的部分所有权的潜在盈利能力。在大多数情况下，它们是出色的企业，管理出色，并以极具吸引力的价格购得。
Your company is run on the principle of centralization of financial decisions at the top (the very top, it might be added), and rather extreme delegation of operating authority to a number of key managers at the individual company or business unit level. We could just field a basketball team with our corporate headquarters group (which utilizes only about 1500 square feet of space).
你们公司的运营原则是顶层（可以说最高层）集中财务决策，以及对各家公司或业务单元的若干关键经理人进行相当极端的运营授权。我们公司总部团队（仅占用约1500平方英尺空间）刚好能凑齐一支篮球队。
This approach produces an occasional major mistake that might have been eliminated or minimized through closer operating controls. But it also eliminates large layers of costs and dramatically speeds decision-making. Because everyone has a great deal to do, a very great deal gets done. Most important of all, it enables us to attract and retain some extraordinarily talented individuals - people who simply can't be hired in the normal course of events - who find working for Berkshire to be almost identical to running their own show.
这种方法偶尔会产生一些原本通过更紧密的运营控制可能避免或减少的重大错误。但它也消除了大量的成本层级，并极大地加快了决策速度。因为每个人都有非常多的事情要做，所以完成了非常多的事情。最重要的是，它使我们能够吸引并留住一些才华横溢的人——那些按部就班根本不可能雇佣到的人——他们发现在伯克希尔工作和经营自己的事业几乎一模一样。
We have placed much trust in them - and their achievements have far exceeded that trust.
我们对他们寄予了极大的信任——而他们的成就远远超出了这种信任。
Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 3, 1980
沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事长
1980年3月3日