1969年1月22日致合伙人信
巴菲特回顾1968年合伙企业取得58.8%的超常回报，但警示未来投资机会枯竭，前景堪忧。
January 22nd, 1969
1969年1月22日
Our Performance in 1968
1968年业绩表现
Everyone makes mistakes.
人非圣贤，孰能无过。
At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas, like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.
1968年初，我感觉BPL的业绩前景比我们历史上任何时候都更加黯淡。然而，很大程度上得益于一个简单但时机恰好成熟的好主意（投资想法就像女人，常常是让人兴奋的，但准时到达的却不多），我们最终实现了40,032,691美元的总收益。
Naturally, you all possess sufficient intellectual purity to dismiss the dollar result and demand an accounting of performance relative to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. We established a new mark at plus 58.8% versus an overall plus 7.7% for the Dow, including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average throughout the year. This result should be treated as a freak like picking up thirteen spades in a bridge game. You bid the slam, make it look modest, pocket the money and then get back to work on the part scores. We will also have our share of hands when we go set.
当然，你们都有足够的理智，不会只盯着美元数字，而会要求我交代相对道琼斯工业平均指数的业绩。我们创下了新纪录：收益率为58.8%，而道指全年含股息的收益率仅为7.7%。这个结果应该被看作一个异数，就像打桥牌时手中有十三张黑桃。你叫了大满贯，表面上不动声色，把钱装进口袋，然后回去继续打那些部分定约。以后我们也肯定会碰到打宕的时候。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the General Partner and the results for limited partners:
下表总结了道指、合伙企业（在向普通合伙人分配超额收益的1/4之前）以及有限合伙人的逐年业绩对比：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
| 年份 | 道指整体表现 (1) | 合伙企业业绩 (2) | 有限合伙人收益 (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of Partnership activity.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the General Partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of Partnership results allowing for allocation to the General Partner based upon the present Partnership Agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(1) 基于道指价值的年度变化加上当年持有道指应获得的股息。表中包含了合伙企业完整的经营年度。
(2) 1957-1961年数据为整个年度内所有前身有限合伙企业在扣除所有费用后、但在向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分配之前的合并业绩。
(3) 1957-1961年数据根据前一栏合伙企业业绩，按现行合伙协议允许向普通合伙人分配之前的利润计算，且未考虑有限合伙人每月提取的资金。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
从累计或复合增长角度看，结果如下：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 – 68 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.1% | 31.6% | 25.3% |
| 年份 | 道指整体表现 | 合伙企业业绩 | 有限合伙人收益 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 – 68 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| 年化复合增长率 | 9.1% | 31.6% | 25.3% |
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they stood at the top in size from 1957 through 1966 - they are still number two and three) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下页照例列出了两家最大的共同基金（它们在1957年至1966年间规模一直排在前两位，现在仍排第二和第三）和两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩。这些基金通常将95%-100%的资产投资于普通股。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| Cumulative Results | 189.3% | 167.7% | 225.6% | 200.2% | 185.7% | 1403.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.3% | 8.6% | 10.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 25.3% |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托 (1) | 投资者股票基金 (1) | 雷曼公司 (2) | 三洲公司 (2) | 道指 | 有限合伙人收益 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| 累计收益 | 189.3% | 167.7% | 225.6% | 200.2% | 185.7% | 1403.5% |
| 年化复合增长率 | 9.3% | 8.6% | 10.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 25.3% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1967. Estimated for 1968.
(1) 根据资产价值变动加上当年向登记在册股东的任何分配计算。
(2) 1957-1967年数据来自1968年《穆迪银行与金融手册》，1968年为估计值。
It is interesting that after twelve years these four funds (which presently aggregate well over $5 billion and account for over 10% of the investment company industry) have averaged only a fraction of one percentage point annually better than the Dow.
有趣的是，经过十二年，这四家基金（目前合计管理资产远超50亿美元，占投资公司行业10%以上）的年均回报仅比道指高出微不足道的一个百分点零头。
Some of the so-called “go-go” funds have recently been re-christened “no-go” funds. For example, Gerald Tsai's Manhattan Fund, perhaps the world's best-known aggressive investment vehicle, came in at minus 6.9% for 1968. Many smaller investment entities continued to substantially outperform the general market in 1968, but in nothing like the quantities of 1966 and 1967.
一些所谓的“冲冲冲”基金最近被重新命名为“冲不动”基金。比如蔡至勇的曼哈顿基金，或许是全球最知名的进取型投资工具，1968年收益率为-6.9%。许多较小的投资实体在1968年仍继续大幅跑赢大盘，但数量上远不及1966年和1967年。
The investment management business, which I used to severely chastise in this section for excessive lethargy, has now swung in many quarters to acute hypertension. One investment manager, representing an organization (with an old established name you would recognize) handling mutual funds aggregating well over $1 billion, said upon launching a new advisory service in 1968:
投资管理行业，我过去在本节中严厉批评其过度懒散，现在许多领域又转向了极度亢奋。一位投资经理（代表一家你认得的名声在外的老牌机构，管理着合计远超10亿美元的共同基金）在1968年推出一项新顾问服务时说：
“The complexities of national and international economics make money management a full-time job. A good money manager cannot maintain a study of securities on a week-by-week or even a day-by-day basis. Securities must be studied in a minute-by-minute program.”
“国内和国际经济的复杂性使资金管理成为一项全职工作。一个好的资金经理无法以每周甚至每天为基础维持对证券的研究。证券必须以分钟为单位的计划来进行分析。”
Wow!
哇哦！
This sort of stuff makes me feel guilty when I go out for a Pepsi. When practiced by large and increasing numbers of highly motivated people with huge amounts of money on a limited quantity of suitable securities, the result becomes highly unpredictable. In some ways it is fascinating to watch and in other ways it is appalling.
这类事情让我出去喝杯百事可乐时都感到内疚。当大量日益壮大的积极进取者，带着巨额资金，在数量有限的合格证券上实践这种方法时，结果变得极难预料。从某些角度看，这令人着迷；从另一些角度看，却让人骇然。
Analysis of 1968 Results
1968年业绩分析
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1968. Our total overall gain of $40,032,691 was divided as follows:
我们投资运营的四大类别在1968年都表现良好。总收益40,032,691美元分配如下：
| Category | Average Investment | Overall Gain |
|---|---|---|
| Controls | $24,996,998 | $5,886,109 |
| Generals – Private Owner | $16,363,100 | $21,994,736 |
| Generals – Relatively Undervalued | $8,766,878 | $4,271,825 |
| Workouts | $18,980,602 | $7,317,128 |
| Miscellaneous, primarily US Treasury Bills | $12,744,973 | $839,496 |
| Total Income | $40,309,294 | |
| Less – General Expense, including Interest | $276,603 | |
| Overall Gain | $40,032,691 |
| 类别 | 平均投资额 | 总收益 |
|---|---|---|
| 控制类 | $24,996,998 | $5,886,109 |
| 普通股-私人所有者类 | $16,363,100 | $21,994,736 |
| 普通股-相对低估类 | $8,766,878 | $4,271,825 |
| 套利类 | $18,980,602 | $7,317,128 |
| 杂项，主要是美国国库券 | $12,744,973 | $839,496 |
| 总收入 | $40,309,294 | |
| 减：一般费用，包括利息 | $276,603 | |
| 总收益 | $40,032,691 |
A few caveats, as mentioned in my letter two years ago, are again in order (non-doctoral candidates may proceed to next section):
如同两年前的信中所提，几点提醒再次重申（非博士候选者可直接跳到下一节）：
- An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. We'll be glad to give you a copy.
- 上述各类别的说明已在1965年1月18日的信中给出。如果你需要温故，而报亭又买不到口袋版，我们很乐意提供一份。
- The classifications are not iron clad. Nothing is changed retroactively, but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary. Sometimes later classification proves difficult; e.g. a workout that falls through but that I continue to hold for reasons unrelated or only partially related to the original decision (like stubbornness).
- 分类并非一成不变。不会事后更改，但最初归类有时主观。有时后续归类变得困难，例如一项套利失败，但我继续持有是因为与原决定无关或仅部分相关的原因（比如固执）。
- Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be significantly understated relative to Partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the foregoing figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 200 on December 31 would have an average investment of 150 producing a 66-2/3% result contrasted to a 100% result by the customary approach. In other words, the foregoing figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.
- 按类别平均投资额计算的百分比收益率，与按期初投资额计算的合伙企业百分比收益率相比，会显著偏低。在前述数据中，假设我们1月1日以100买入的证券，年内匀速升值至12月31日的200，那么平均投资额为150，得出66-2/3%的回报，而传统方法则是100%。换言之，上述数据在计算平均投资额时采用了每月市场价值的平均值。
- All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable category's average investment.
- 所有结果均基于100%自有资金、无杠杆计算。利息及其他一般费用从总业绩中扣除，不再按类别分摊。与特定投资操作直接相关的费用，如卖空股票支付的股息，则按类别扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资额（多头减空头）显示在相应类别的平均投资额中。
- The foregoing table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
- 上述表格用途有限。每个类别的结果主要由一、两项投资主导。这些数据并非大量稳定数据的集合（比如全美男性死亡率之类），无法从中得出明确结论或做出预测。相反，它们代表的是稀少、非均质的现象，只能对各种行动方针给出非常初步的提示，我们也是如此运用的。
- Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.
- 最后，这些计算不像我们数钱时那样细心，可能存在笔误或数学错误，因为它们并非完全自检。
Controls
控制类
Overall, the controlled companies turned in a decent performance during 1968. Diversified Retailing Company Inc. (80% owned) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (70% owned) had combined after-tax earnings of over $5 million.
总体而言，控制类公司在1968年表现良好。多元零售公司（持股80%）和伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（持股70%）的合计税后利润超过500万美元。
Particularly outstanding performances were turned in by Associated Cotton Shops, a subsidiary of DRC run by Ben Rosner, and National Indemnity Company, a subsidiary of B-H run by Jack Ringwalt. Both of these companies earned about 20% on capital employed in their businesses.
特别突出的是由本·罗斯纳经营的DRC子公司联合棉布商店，以及由杰克·林沃特经营的B-H子公司国民赔偿公司。这两家公司的资本回报率均达到约20%。
Among Fortune's “500” (the largest manufacturing entities in the country, starting with General Motors), only 37 companies achieved this figure in 1967, and our boys outshone such mildly better-known (but not better appreciated) companies as IBM, General Electric, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard, etc...
在《财富》500强（以通用汽车为首的美国最大制造业企业）中，1967年只有37家公司达到这一指标，而我们的小伙子们超过了诸如IBM、通用电气、通用汽车、宝洁、杜邦、控制数据、惠普等稍微更有名（但未必更受赏识）的公司……
I still sometimes get comments from partners like: "Say, Berkshire is up four points - that's great!" or "What's happening to us, Berkshire was down three last week?" Market price is irrelevant to us in the valuation of our controlling interests.
我偶尔还会收到合伙人这样的评论：“嘿，伯克希尔涨了4个点——太棒了！”或者“怎么回事，伯克希尔上周跌了3个点？”在评估我们的控制类权益时，市场价格与我们无关。
We valued B-H at 25 at yearend 1967 when the market was about 20 and 31 at yearend 1968 when the market was about 37. We would have done the same thing if the markets had been 15 and 50 respectively. ("Price is what you pay. value is what you get").
1967年底市场价约20时，我们对B-H的估值为25；1968年底市场价约37时，我们估值为31。即使市场价分别是15和50，我们也会同样做。（“价格是你支付的，价值是你得到的。”）
We will prosper or suffer in controlled investments in relation to the operating performances of our businesses - we will not attempt to profit by playing various games in the securities markets.
在控制类投资上，我们的成败取决于企业的经营表现——我们不会试图通过在证券市场玩弄各种技巧来获利。
Generals - Private Owner
普通股-私人所有者类
Over the years this has been our best category, measured by average return, and has also maintained by far the best percentage of profitable transactions.
多年来，按平均回报衡量，这一直是我们表现最好的类别，并且保持着遥遥领先的最高盈利交易比例。
This approach was the way I was taught the business, and it formerly accounted for a large proportion of all our investment ideas. Our total individual profits in this category during the twelve year BPL history are probably fifty times or more our total losses. The cash register really rang on one simple industry idea (implemented in several ways) in this area in 1968. We even received a substantial fee (included in Other Income in the audit) for some work in this field.
这种方法是我入行时学到的，过去曾占我们所有投资思路的很大比重。在BPL十二年的历史中，我们在这个类别上的累计盈利大约是累计亏损的五十倍甚至更多。1968年，这个领域的一个简单行业创意（以多种方式实施）真正让收银机响个不停。我们甚至因相关工作收到了一笔可观的费用（计入审计中的其他收入）。
Our total investment in this category (which is where I feel by far the greatest certainty regarding consistently decent results) is presently under $2 million and I have nothing at all in the hopper to bolster this.
目前我们在这个类别（也是我最确信能持续获得不错结果的领域）的总投资不到200万美元，而且我手头完全没有能补充的新点子。
What came through like the Johnstown flood in 1968 looks more like a leaky faucet in Altoona for 1969.
1968年这里犹如约翰斯顿大洪水般汹涌，1969年看起来却像阿尔图纳的一个漏水龙头。
Generals - Relatively Undervalued
普通股-相对低估类
This category produced about two-thirds of the overall gain in 1966 and 1967 combined. I mentioned last year that the great two-year performance here had largely come from one idea.
这个类别在1966年和1967年合计贡献了总收益的大约三分之二。我去年提到，那两年的优异表现主要来自一个投资想法。
I also said, "We have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment." It gives me great pleasure to announce that this statement was absolutely correct. It gives me somewhat less pleasure to announce that it must be repeated this year.
我还说过：“我们在这个类别中没有任何投资的规模或潜力能接近从前那个投资。” 我很高兴地宣布，这句话完全正确。不太高兴的是，今年我必须重复这句话。
Workouts
套利类
This category, which was a disaster in 1967, did well during 1968.
这个类别在1967年是灾难，但在1968年表现良好。
Our relatively heavy concentration in just a few situations per year (some of the large arbitrage houses may become involved in fifty or more workouts per annum) gives more variation in yearly results than an across-the-board approach. I feel the average profitability will be as good with our policy and 1968 makes me feel better about that conclusion than 1967 did.
我们每年相对集中于少数几个机会（一些大型套利机构每年可能参与五十个或更多套利项目），这使得年度业绩波动比全面铺开的方式更大。我认为我们的策略同样能带来不错的平均盈利能力，1968年比1967年更让我确信这一点。
It should again be stated that our results in the Workout area (as well as in other categories) are somewhat understated compared to the more common method of determining results computed on an initial base figure and utilizing borrowed money (which is often a sensible part of the Workout business).
需要再次说明的是，与基于初始投入并利用借入资金（这往往是套利业务中的合理部分）计算结果的常见方法相比，我们在套利领域（以及其他类别）的业绩略显低估。
I can't emphasize too strongly that the quality and quantity of ideas is presently at an all time low - the product of the factors mentioned in my October 9th, 1967 letter, which have largely been intensified since then.
我必须再三强调，目前投资想法的质量和数量都处于历史最低点——这是我在1967年10月9日信中提到的因素共同造成的，此后这些因素大多进一步加剧。
Sometimes I feel we should have a plaque in our office like the one at the headquarters of Texas Instruments in Dallas which reads: “We don't believe in miracles, we rely on them.” It is possible for an old, overweight ball player, whose legs and batting eye are gone, to tag a fast ball on the nose for a pinch-hit home run, but you don't change your line-up because of it.
有时我觉得我们办公室应该挂一块匾额，像达拉斯德州仪器总部的那样，上面写着：“我们不信奇迹，我们靠奇迹。” 一位年迈、超重、腿脚和眼力都已退化的棒球手，偶尔也可能在代打时正中速球一棒击出本垒打，但你不会因此改变你的阵容。
We have a number of important negatives operating on our future and, while they shouldn't add up to futility, they certainly don't add up to more than an average of quite moderate profitability.
我们的未来面临多项重大不利因素，虽然这些因素不应导致毫无作为，但它们也肯定不会带来超出相当温和水平的平均盈利。
Memorabilia
往事追忆
As one of my older friends says, “Nostalgia just isn't what it used to be.” Let's take a stab at it, anyway.
正如我一位老友所说：“怀旧已不复往昔模样。”无论如何，我们试着一忆。
Buffett Associates, Ltd., the initial predecessor partnership, was formed May 5, 1956 with seven limited partners (four family, three close friends), contributing $105,000, and the General Partner putting his money where his mouth was by investing $100. Two additional single-family limited partnerships were formed during 1956, so that on January 1, 1957 combined net assets were $303,726. During 1957, we had a gain of $31,615.97, leading to the 10.4% figure shown on page one. During 1968 I would guess that the New York Stock Exchange was open around 1,200 hours, giving us a gain of about $33,000 per hour (sort of makes you wish they had stayed with the 5-1/2 hour, 5 day week, doesn't it), or roughly the same as the full year gain in 1957.
巴菲特联合有限公司，最初的前身合伙企业，成立于1956年5月5日，有七位有限合伙人（四位家人、三位密友），出资105,000美元，普通合伙人则以100美元的投资表明了诚意。1956年又成立了两个单一家庭有限合伙企业，因此到1957年1月1日，合并净资产为303,726美元。1957年，我们获利31,615.97美元，即第一页所示的10.4%回报率。1968年，我猜测纽约证券交易所大约开了1,200小时，我们每小时大约赚33,000美元（这让人不禁希望他们当初坚持每天5个半小时、每周5天的交易时间，不是吗），这差不多相当于1957年全年的收益。
On January 1, 1962 we consolidated the predecessor limited partnerships moved out of the bedroom and hired our first full-time employees. Net assets at that time were $7,178,500. From that point to our present net assets of $104,429,431 we have added one person to the payroll.
1962年1月1日，我们合并了前身有限合伙企业，搬出了卧室，并雇用了第一批全职员工。当时净资产为7,178,500美元。从那以后到我们目前的净资产104,429,431美元，我们只增加了一名在册员工。
Since 1963 (Assets $9,405,400) rent has gone from $3,947 to $5,823 (Ben Rosner would never have forgiven me if I had signed a percentage lease) travel from $3,206 to $3,603, and dues and subscriptions from $900 to $994. If one of Parkinson's Laws is operating, at least the situation hasn't gotten completely out of control.
自1963年（资产9,405,400美元）以来，房租从3,947美元涨到5,823美元（如果我签了分成租约，本·罗斯纳永远不会原谅我），差旅费从3,206美元增到3,603美元，会费和订阅费从900美元升到994美元。即使帕金森定律在起作用，至少局面还没完全失控。
In making our retrospective survey of our financial assets, our conclusion need not parallel that of Gypsy Rose Lee who opined, when reviewing her physical assets on her fifty-fifth birthday: “I have everything I had twenty years ago - it's just that it's all lower.”
在回顾我们的财务资产时，我们的结论不必与吉普赛·罗斯·李的观点一致——她在五十五岁生日检视自身身体资产时曾说：“二十年前拥有的，我现在一样都不缺——只是全都下垂了。”
Miscellaneous
其他事项
Although the investment environment is difficult, the office environment is superb. With Donna, Gladys, Bill and John, we have an organization that functions speedily, efficiently and pleasantly. They are the best.
尽管投资环境艰难，办公室环境却无与伦比。有了Donna、Gladys、Bill和John，我们拥有一个运转迅速、高效而愉快的组织。他们是最棒的。
The office group, along with spouses (one apiece - I still haven't figured out how I should handle that plural) and children have over $27 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1969. Assorted sizes and shapes of aunts, uncles, parents, in-laws, brothers, sisters and cousins make the BPL membership list read like “Our Crowd” - which, so far as I am concerned, is exactly what it is.
办公室团队及其配偶（每人一位——我还没想好这个复数怎么处理）和子女在1969年1月1日共投资于BPL超过2,700万美元。形形色色的姑姨叔舅、父母、姻亲、兄弟姐妹和堂表亲们，让BPL的成员名单读起来就像《我们这一伙》——就我而言，这恰如其分。
Within a few days, you will receive:
几天后，你将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1968 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- An audit from Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1968, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1969. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封税务信函，提供你申报1968年联邦所得税所需的全部BPL信息。这封信是报税的唯一依据。
- Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 出具的1968年审计报告（他们再次出色完成了工作），列明BPL的运营和财务状况，以及你的个人资本账户情况。
- 由我签署的一封信，列明你在1969年1月1日的BPL权益状况。这与审计得出的数字完全一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 10th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果这封信或年内发生的事有任何需要澄清之处，请告诉我。我的下一封信大约在7月10日，总结今年上半年情况。
Cordially,
诚挚地，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特