1987年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

1987年我们的净值增长了4.64亿美元，即19.5%。在过去的23年里（也就是现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到2,477.47美元，年复合增长率为23.1%。

What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United published yearend audits showing their book values to be $652 million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book value was only $177 million.

当然，真正重要的是每股商业价值的增长率，而非账面价值。在许多情况下，一家公司的账面价值和商业价值几乎毫无关联。例如，LTV和Baldwin-United在破产前夕公布的年末审计显示，它们的账面价值分别为6.52亿美元和3.97亿美元。相反，Belridge Oil在1979年以36亿美元出售给壳牌，尽管其账面价值仅有1.77亿美元。

At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.

然而在伯克希尔，这两个估值一直相当接近，过去十年商业价值的增长率适度超过了账面价值的增长率。这一好消息在1987年得以延续。

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers.

我们的商业价值相对于账面价值的溢价扩大，原因很简单：我们拥有一些卓越的企业，而这些企业由更加卓越的经理人经营。

You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.

你们有权质疑这第二条说法。毕竟，CEO们很少会告诉股东他们找了一群庸才来经营。他们不愿这样做，这导致了一些奇怪的年报。往往在致股东信中，CEO会花上好几页细述糟糕透顶的公司业绩，最后却用一段温暖的话语把经理同事们描绘成“我们最宝贵的资产”。这种评论有时会让你好奇，其他资产到底是什么。

At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non-financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.

但在伯克希尔，我对我们的经营经理的评价甚至可能过于保守。要理解为什么，先看看第7页，那里列示了我们最大的七个非金融业务部门（按历史成本会计计算）的收益：布法罗新闻报、费奇海默、柯比、内布拉斯加家具商城、斯科特-费策制造集团、喜诗糖果和世界图书。1987年，这七个业务部门合计实现息税前营业利润1.8亿美元。

By itself, this figure says nothing about economic performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings. Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.

这个数字本身并不能说明经济表现。要评估这一点，我们必须知道产生这些收益需要多少总资本——债务和股权。债务在我们这七个部门中的作用微不足道：1987年它们的净利息支出仅为200万美元。因此，这些企业所使用的股权资本的税前收益达到1.78亿美元。而这些股权资本——同样基于历史成本——仅为1.75亿美元。

If these seven business units had operated as a single company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.

如果这七个业务部门作为一家单一公司运营，其1987年的税后利润将约为1亿美元——股权资本的回报率约为57%。这样的百分比在任何地方都很少见，更不用说在利用极少杠杆的大型多元化公司了。这里有一个参照基准：在《财富》1988年《投资者指南》中，它报告说在500家最大工业公司和500家最大服务公司中，过去十年里只有六家平均净资产收益率超过30%。1000家公司中表现最佳的是Commerce Clearing House，为40.2%。

Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about $222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with. (If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change CCH's return on equity.)

当然，伯克希尔从这七个部门获得的回报并不等于它们的内部回报率，因为总体而言，我们购买这些企业时付出了高于基础股权资本的溢价。总体看，这些业务的账面价值比基础资产的历史会计价值高出约2.22亿美元。然而，这些部门的经理应该根据他们在基础资产上取得的回报来评判；我们为一家企业支付的价格并不会影响经理可运用的资本量。（如果你为了成为Commerce Clearing House的股东和部分所有者而支付了，比如说，六倍的账面价值，这并不会改变CCH的净资产收益率。）

Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I have cited. First, the current business value of these seven units is far above their historical book value and also far above the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet. Second, because so little capital is required to run these businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities. Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers. The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey all meld unusual talent, energy and character to achieve exceptional financial results.

从我引用的这些数字中可以得出三个重要推论。第一，这七个部门的当前商业价值远高于其历史账面价值，也远高于它们在伯克希尔资产负债表上的账面价值。第二，由于经营这些企业所需资本极少，它们能够实现增长，同时几乎将所有利润都用于新机会的配置。第三，这些企业由真正卓越的经理人经营。布卢姆金家族、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊，都将非凡的才华、精力和品格融合在一起，取得了杰出的财务成果。

For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we joined with these managers. In every case, however, our experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then, I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")

我们有充分的理由在与这些经理人合作时抱有极高的期望。然而，每一个案例中，我们的实际经历都远远超出了那些期望。我们得到的远多于我们应得的，但我们愿意接受这种不公平。（我们赞同杰克·本尼在领取表演奖项时表达的观点：“我不配得到这个，不过话说回来，我有关节炎，我也不该得那个。”）

Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit, insurance, which I believe also has a business value well above the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management, the insurance business should treat us well over time.

除了这“神圣七杰”，我们还有另一重要业务部门——保险，我相信它的商业价值也远高于其所用的净资产。不过，评估一家财产-意外险保险公司的商业价值是一个极不精确的过程。这个行业波动性大，报告盈利常常严重失实，而税法的近期变化将严重损害未来的盈利能力。尽管存在这些问题，我们喜欢这门生意，它几乎肯定会一直是我们最大的业务。在迈克·戈德堡的管理下，保险业务长期来看应该会善待我们。

With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I have little to do with operations. In fact, it is probably fair to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans about uniforms?

有了我们这样的经理人，我和我的合伙人查理·芒格对运营事务很少插手。事实上，可以公平地说，如果我们做得更多，成果反而会更少。我们没有公司会议，没有公司预算，也没有绩效评估（当然，我们的经理们往往觉得这些程序在自己的业务部门很有用）。毕竟，我们能告诉布卢姆金家族关于家居用品的事，或是告诉赫尔德曼家族关于制服的事吗？

Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two long careers we have spent intensively observing business performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening applause.

我们对子公司运营的主要贡献是鼓掌。但这并非盲目乐观者的不加分辨的掌声，而是基于我们用漫长职业生涯深入观察企业表现和管理者行为后形成的有见地的掌声。我和查理见过太多平庸的企业表现，因此能够真正欣赏大师级的表演。对我们运营经理们1987年的表现，只有一种回应是合适的：经久不息、震耳欲聋的掌声。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益来源

The table on the following page shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In the table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but, instead, are aggregated and shown separately. In effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP figures in our audited financial statements.

下页表格展示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在表格中，商誉摊销和其他主要收购价格会计调整并未分摊到其所对应的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。实际上，这一程序呈现的是如果我们没有收购这些业务，它们本应报告的经营成果。在我1983年和1986年年报信件的附录中，我解释了为什么我们认为这种列报方式比按业务分别进行收购价格调整的标准GAAP列报对投资者和管理者更有用。我们表格中列示的净利润总额，当然与审计财务报表中的GAAP数字完全一致。

In the Business Segment Data on pages 36-38 and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44 you will find much additional information about our businesses. In these sections you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie Munger's letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 45.

在第36至38页的业务分部数据以及第40至44页的管理层讨论部分，你可以找到关于我们业务的许多额外信息。在这些部分中，你还会看到基于GAAP报告的分部收益。我强烈建议你阅读这些材料，以及查理·芒格致韦斯科股东的信，该信从第45页开始描述了该子公司各项业务。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays: "I have everything I had last year; it's just that it's all two inches lower." As the table shows, during 1987 almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way.

吉普赛·罗斯·李在她后来的一次生日时说：“我拥有和去年一样的一切，只不过全都低了2英寸。”正如表格所示，1987年我们几乎所有业务都以更积极的方式变老了。

There's not a lot new to report about these businesses - and that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.

关于这些企业，没有太多新东西可报告——而这是好事，不是坏事。剧烈的变化和出色的回报通常不会并存。当然，大多数投资者的行为好像恰恰相反。他们通常把最高的市盈率赋予那些听起来新奇、承诺高速变化的企业。这种前景让投资者幻想未来的盈利能力，而不是面对当前的商业现实。对这类投资者幻想家来说，任何相亲都比邻家女孩强，不论她多么有魅力。

Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency. Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously these opportunities should be seized. But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns.

然而，经验表明，最好的商业回报通常是由那些今天所做的事情与五年或十年前非常相似的公司取得的。这并非主张管理层自满。企业总是有机会改进服务、产品线、制造技术等等，显然这些机会应当抓住。但一家不断遭遇重大变革的企业，也面临着许多犯下重大错误的机会。此外，永远剧烈变动的经济地形，是难以建立起堡垒式商业特许权的地方。这种特许权通常是持续高回报的关键。

The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view. Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.

我之前提到的《财富》研究支持了我们的观点。1000家公司中只有25家满足经济卓越的两个测试条件——1977年至1986年十年间平均净资产收益率超过20%，并且没有任何一年低于15%。这些商业超级明星也是股市超级明星：在那十年里，25家中的24家跑赢了标普500指数。

The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First, most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying capacity. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow. Second, except for one company that is "high-tech" and several others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non-sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices, or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics.

《财富》冠军榜可能在两个方面让你惊讶。第一，大多数公司与其偿息能力相比使用的杠杆极低。真正的好企业通常不需要借款。第二，除了一家“高科技”公司和几家制造处方药的公司外，这些公司所处的行业总体上看起来相当平淡。大多数销售非性感产品或服务的方式与十年前大致相同（尽管现在数量更多，或价格更高，或两者兼而有之）。这25家公司的记录证明了，充分利用已有的强大商业特许权，或者专注于单一制胜的商业主题，通常是产生卓越经济成果的原因。

Berkshire's experience has been similar. Our managers have produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things - but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and markets that build on their existing strengths and they don't get diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their businesses, and it shows.

伯克希尔的经历也是如此。我们的经理们通过做相当普通的事情——但做得异常出色——创造了非凡的业绩。我们的经理们保护自己的特许权，控制成本，在现有优势的基础上寻找新产品和新市场，而且不会偏离方向。他们异常勤奋地处理业务细节，而这一点显而易见。

Here's an update:

以下是更新：

Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you become, the more interested they are in you." It is students of business management, not archaeologists, who should be interested in Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), the 94-year-old chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart.

阿加莎·克里斯蒂的丈夫是位考古学家，她说那是配偶最完美的职业：“你变得越老，他们对你越感兴趣。”应该对B夫人（罗斯·布卢姆金）感兴趣的，是企业管理的学生，而不是考古学家。她是内布拉斯加家具商城的94岁董事长。

Fifty years ago Mrs. B started the business with $500, and today NFM is far and away the largest home furnishings store in the country. Mrs. B continues to work seven days a week at the job from the opening of each business day until the close. She buys, she sells, she manages - and she runs rings around the competition. It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may well reach her full potential in another five or ten years. Therefore, I've persuaded the Board to scrap our mandatory retirement-at-100 policy. (And it's about time: With every passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.)

五十年前，B夫人用500美元创办了这家企业，如今内布拉斯加家具商城无疑是全国最大的家居用品商店。B夫人仍然每周工作七天，从每天开门营业一直工作到关门。她采购、销售、管理——而且轻松胜过竞争对手。在我看来，她正在加速，很可能再过五到十年就达到她的全部潜能。因此，我已说服董事会废除我们100岁强制退休的政策。（也差不多是时候了：每过一年，这项政策在我看来越发愚蠢。）

Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from 1986. There's nothing like this store in the country, and there's nothing like the family Mrs. B has produced to carry on: Her son Louie, and his three boys, Ron, Irv and Steve, possess the business instincts, integrity and drive of Mrs. B. They work as a team and, strong as each is individually, the whole is far greater than the sum of the parts.

1987年内布拉斯加家具商城的净销售额为1.426亿美元，比1986年增长了8%。全国没有任何一家商店能与它相比，也没有任何家庭能像B夫人培养出的继承人那样：她的儿子路易，以及他的三个儿子罗恩、伊尔夫和史蒂夫，都拥有B夫人的商业直觉、正直和干劲。他们团队合作，尽管每个人都很强，但整体远大于部分之和。

The superb job done by the Blumkins benefits us as owners, but even more dramatically benefits NFM's customers. They saved about $30 million in 1987 by buying from NFM. In other words, the goods they bought would have cost that much more if purchased elsewhere.

布卢姆金家族所做的出色工作令我们作为所有者受益，但更显著地惠及了内布拉斯加家具商城的顾客。1987年，他们通过从该店购买节省了大约3000万美元。换句话说，如果在别处购买，他们买的商品要多花这么多钱。

You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August: "Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter. One way you may gain back part of your lost. (sic) Check the pricing at The Furniture Mart. You will find that they are leaving 10% to 20% on the table. This additional profit on $140 million of sells (sic) is $28 million. Not small change in anyone's pocket! Check out other furniture, carpet, appliance and T.V. dealers. Your raising prices to a reasonable profit will help. Thank you. /signed/ A Competitor."

你会喜欢我去年八月收到的一封匿名信：“很遗憾看到伯克希尔第二季度利润下降。有一种方法你可以挽回部分损失。检查一下家具商城的定价。你会发现他们把10%到20%的利润留在了桌面上。1.4亿美元销售额上的这额外利润就是2800万美元。这可不是任何人口袋里的小零钱！看看其他家具、地毯、家电和电视经销商吧。你把价格提高到合理利润水平会有帮助的。谢谢。签名/一个竞争者。”

NFM will continue to grow and prosper by following Mrs. B's maxim: "Sell cheap and tell the truth."

内布拉斯加家具商城将继续遵循B夫人的座右铭而成长和繁荣：“低价销售，实话实说。”

Among dominant papers of its size or larger, the Buffalo News continues to be the national leader in two important ways: (1) its weekday and Sunday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper's primary market area that purchase it); and (2) its "news-hole" percentage (the portion of the paper devoted to news).

在同等规模及更大的主流报纸中，《布法罗新闻报》在两个重要方面继续保持全国领先地位：（1）其平日和周日渗透率（报纸主要市场区域购买该报的家庭百分比）；（2）其“新闻空间”百分比（报纸用来刊登新闻的版面比例）。

It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn until much later, if ever.

一家报纸在这两个类别都领先可能并非巧合：一份格外“新闻丰富”的产品能带来广泛的读者吸引力，进而导致高渗透率。当然，数量必须与质量相匹配。这不仅意味着好的报道和好的写作，还意味着新鲜感和相关性。要想不可或缺，一份报纸必须及时告诉读者许多他们想知道但否则要到很久之后——甚至永远不会——知道的事情。

At the News, we put out seven fresh editions every 24 hours, each one extensively changed in content. Here's a small example that may surprise you: We redo the obituary page in every edition of the News, or seven times a day. Any obituary added runs through the next six editions until the publishing cycle has been completed.

在《布法罗新闻报》，我们每24小时出版七个新版本，每个版本的内容都大幅变化。这里有一个可能会让你惊讶的小例子：我们在每版《布法罗新闻报》中都重排讣告版，也就是每天七次。新增的任何讣告都会贯穿接下来的六个版本，直到出版周期完成。

It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and international news well and in depth. But it is also vital for it to do what only a local newspaper can: promptly and extensively chronicle the personally-important, otherwise-unreported details of community life. Doing this job well requires a very broad range of news - and that means lots of space, intelligently used.

当然，一份报纸深入全面地报道国内和国际新闻至关重要。但同样至关重要是做到只有地方报纸才能做的事：及时广泛地记录社区生活中那些对个人重要但否则不会报道的细节。把这项工作做好需要非常广泛的新闻内容——那意味着大量的版面，并且要明智地使用。

Our news hole was about 50% in 1987, just as it has been year after year. If we were to cut it to a more typical 40%, we would save approximately $4 million annually in newsprint costs. That interests us not at all - and it won't interest us even if, for one reason or another, our profit margins should significantly shrink.

1987年我们的新闻空间占比约为50%，就像年复一年那样。如果我们将其削减到更典型的40%，我们每年大约可以节省400万美元的新闻纸成本。我们对此毫无兴趣——即使我们的利润率因这样或那样的原因大幅收缩，我们也不会感兴趣。

Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets, as in "Non-direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must be reduced if revenues are Y - 5%." Should we really cut our news hole at the Buffalo News, or the quality of product and service at See's, simply because profits are down during a given year or quarter? Or, conversely, should we add a staff economist, a corporate strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or something else that does Berkshire no good simply because the money currently is rolling in?

查理和我都不相信弹性运营预算，比如“非直接费用可以在收入为Y时为X，但如果收入为Y-5%就必须减少”。难道我们应该仅仅因为某一年的某季度利润下降，就削减《布法罗新闻报》的新闻空间，或降低喜诗的产品和服务质量？或者反过来，仅仅因为目前财源滚滚，就增加一名员工经济学家、一位公司战略师、一场机构广告活动或其他对伯克希尔无益的东西？

That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor the cutting of essential people or activities because profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is neither business-like nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times, and never to add the unneeded. ("But what about the corporate jet?" you rudely ask. Well, occasionally a man must rise above principle.)

这对我们来说毫无意义。我们既不理解因为利润飙升就增加不必要的人员或活动，也不理解因为盈利能力下降就削减必要的人员或活动。这种溜溜球式的方法既不符合商业原则，也不人道。我们的目标一直是做对伯克希尔的客户和员工有意义的事，而且从不增加不必要的东西。（“那公司专机呢？”你粗鲁地问。好吧，偶尔人必须超越原则。）

Although the News' revenues have grown only moderately since 1984, superb management by Stan Lipsey, its publisher, has produced excellent profit growth. For several years, I have incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News would fall. This year I will not let you down: Margins will, without question, shrink in 1988 and profit may fall as well. Skyrocketing newsprint costs will be the major cause.

虽然自1984年以来《布法罗新闻报》的收入仅温和增长，但其发行人斯坦·利普西的卓越管理带来了出色的利润增长。几年来，我一直错误地预测该报的利润率会下降。今年我不会让你失望了：毫无疑问，1988年利润率将收缩，利润也可能下降。新闻纸成本的飙升将是主要原因。

Fechheimer Bros. Company is another of our family businesses - and, like the Blumkins, what a family. Three generations of Heldmans have for decades consistently built the sales and profits of this manufacturer and distributor of uniforms. In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling interest in Fechheimer - 1986 - profits were a record. The Heldmans didn't slow down after that. Last year earnings increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.

费奇海默兄弟公司是我们的另一个家族企业——就像布卢姆金家族一样，多么出色的家族。赫尔德曼家族三代人几十年来持续推动这家制服制造商和分销商的销售额和利润增长。在伯克希尔获得费奇海默控股权的1986年，利润创下纪录。此后赫尔德曼家族并未放缓脚步。去年盈利大幅增长，1988年前景良好。

There's nothing magic about the Uniform business; the only magic is in the Heldmans. Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred know the business inside and out, and they have fun running it. We are fortunate to be in partnership with them.

制服生意本身并没有魔力；唯一的魔力在于赫尔德曼家族。鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德对这个行业了如指掌，而且他们经营得很开心。我们很幸运能与他们合伙。

Chuck Huggins continues to set new records at See's, just as he has ever since we put him in charge on the day of our purchase some 16 years ago. In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly under 25 million pounds. For the second year in a row, moreover, same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In case you are wondering, that represents improvement: In each of the previous six years, same-store sales had fallen.

查克·哈金斯在喜诗继续创造新纪录，正如自大约16年前我们收购之日让他负责以来一直所做的那样。1987年，销售量创下新高，略低于2500万磅。而且，连续第二年，按磅计算的同店销售额几乎没有变化。如果你感到疑惑，那是一种改善：在此前的六年里，同店销售额每年都下降。

Although we had a particularly strong 1986 Christmas season, we racked up better store-for-store comparisons in the 1987 Christmas season than at any other time of the year. Thus, the seasonal factor at See's becomes even more extreme. In 1987, about 85% of our profit was earned during December.

尽管我们1986年的圣诞季格外强劲，但1987年圣诞季的同店对比较一年中其他任何时候都好。因此，喜诗的季节性因素变得更加极端。1987年，我们大约85%的利润是在12月赚得的。

Candy stores are fun to visit, but most have not been fun for their owners. From what we can learn, practically no one besides See's has made significant profits in recent years from the operation of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at See's is not due to a rising industry tide. Rather, it is a one-of-a-kind performance.

糖果店逛起来很有趣，但对大多数店主来说并没什么乐趣。据我们了解，近年来除了喜诗，几乎没有其他糖果店经营者赚到可观的利润。显然，查克在喜诗的成绩不是由于行业水涨船高，而是一种独一无二的表现。

His achievement requires an excellent product - which we have - but it also requires genuine affection for the customer. Chuck is 100% customer-oriented, and his attitude sets the tone for the rest of the See's organization.

他的成就需要出色的产品——这我们有——但也需要对顾客真挚的感情。查克是100%以顾客为导向的，他的态度为喜诗组织的其他成员定下了基调。

Here's an example of Chuck in action: At See's we regularly add new pieces of candy to our mix and also cull a few to keep our product line at about 100 varieties. Last spring we selected 14 items for elimination. Two, it turned out, were badly missed by our customers, who wasted no time in letting us know what they thought of our judgment: "A pox on all in See's who participated in the abominable decision...;" "May your new truffles melt in transit, may they sour in people's mouths, may your costs go up and your profits go down...;" "We are investigating the possibility of obtaining a mandatory injunction requiring you to supply...;" You get the picture. In all, we received many hundreds of letters.

这里有一个查克实际行动的例子：在喜诗，我们定期向产品组合中添加新糖果，同时也淘汰一些，以保持大约100个品种。去年春天，我们挑选了14个品种进行淘汰。结果，其中两种被顾客深深怀念，他们立即告诉我们他们对我们判断的看法：“愿所有参与这一可恶决定的喜诗人遭殃……”“愿你们的新松露在运输中融化，在人们口中变酸，愿你们的成本上升，利润下降……”“我们正在研究获得强制性禁令的可能性，要求你们供应……”你明白了吧。我们总共收到了好几百封信。

Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this miscue into an opportunity. Each person who had written got a complete and honest explanation in return. Said Chuck's letter: "Fortunately, when I make poor decisions, good things often happen as a result...;" And with the letter went a special gift certificate.

查克不但重新推出了这些品种，还把这次失误变成了一个机会。每个写信的人都收到了一封完整而诚实的解释回信。查克的信中写道：“幸运的是，当我做出糟糕决定时，往往由此带来好事……”随信还附上一张特别礼品券。

See's increased prices only slightly in the last two years. In 1988 we have raised prices somewhat more, though still moderately. To date, sales have been weak and it may be difficult for See's to improve its earnings this year.

过去两年喜诗仅小幅提价。1988年我们提价幅度稍大，但仍然温和。到目前为止，销售疲软，喜诗今年可能难以提高盈利。

World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group are all under the management of Ralph Schey. And what a lucky thing for us that they are. I told you last year that Scott Fetzer performance in 1986 had far exceeded the expectations that Charlie and I had at the time of our purchase. Results in 1987 were even better. Pre-tax earnings rose 10% while average capital employed declined significantly.

世界图书、柯比和斯科特-费策制造集团均在拉尔夫·谢伊的管理之下。对我们来说，这是多么幸运的事。我去年告诉过你，斯科特-费策1986年的表现远远超出了我和查理在收购时的预期。1987年的业绩甚至更好。税前利润增长了10%，而平均占用资本显著下降。

Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some outstanding managers to run them. We would love to find a few additional units that could be put under Ralph's wing.

拉尔夫对他负责的19项业务的精通真正令人惊叹，他还吸引了一些出色的经理人来经营它们。我们很乐意再找几个部门放到拉尔夫的羽翼之下。

The businesses of Scott Fetzer are too numerous to describe in detail. Let's just update you on one of our favorites: At the end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically-revised edition since 1962. The number of color photos was increased from 14,000 to 24,000; over 6,000 articles were revised; 840 new contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this product to you and your family, as we do World Book's products for younger children, Childcraft and Early World of Learning.

斯科特-费策的业务太多，无法一一详述。就让我们向你更新一下我们最钟爱的一个：1987年底，世界图书推出了自1962年以来最彻底修订的版本。彩色照片数量从14,000张增至24,000张；超过6,000篇文章被修订；新增840位撰稿人。查理和我向你和你的家人推荐这个产品，也推荐世界图书为幼儿设计的产品：Childcraft和Early World of Learning。

In 1987, World Book unit sales in the United States increased for the fifth consecutive year. International sales and profits also grew substantially. The outlook is good for Scott Fetzer operations in aggregate, and for World Book in particular.

1987年，世界图书在美国的销售量连续第五年增长。国际销售和利润也大幅增长。斯科特-费策整体业务前景良好，世界图书尤其如此。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

以下是我们常用的保险行业关键数据表的更新版本：

Source: Best's Insurance Management Reports

来源：贝氏保险管理报告

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合成本率代表总保险成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入之比：低于100的比率表明承保盈利，高于100表明承保亏损。当保险公司持有投保人资金（“浮存金”）所赚取的投资收益被考虑在内时，107至111范围内的综合成本率通常产生整体盈亏平衡的结果，不含股东提供资金所赚取的收益。

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry's annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry's revenues must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower rate.

这张表所概括的保险业的数学并不复杂。在行业年收入（保费）增长缓慢只有4%或5%的年份，承保亏损肯定会增加。这不是因为汽车事故、火灾、风暴等更频繁发生，最近也不是一般通货膨胀造成的。如今，社会和司法通胀是主要元凶；进入法庭的成本简直膨胀了。成本跃升部分源于天文数字的判决，部分源于法官和陪审团倾向于将保单覆盖范围扩大到超出保险公司签单时的设想。鉴于这两种趋势毫无缓和迹象，我们仍然认为，行业的收入必须每年增长约10%才能仅在盈利方面保持现状，即使一般通胀率可能会低得多。

The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and, indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the quarters rolled by: Best's estimates that year-over-year volume increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% "equilibrium" figure. Clearly, the party is over.

1985-1987年强劲的收入增长几乎保证了行业1987年出色的承保表现，而且那的确是个丰收年。但随着各个季度过去，消息变糟了：贝氏估计，逐季的同比增长率分别为12.9%、11.1%、5.7%和5.6%。1988年，收入增长肯定会远低于我们10%的“均衡”数字。显然，派对结束了。

However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a small climb for the industry's combined ratio in 1988, followed by several years of larger increases.

然而，盈利不会立即下降。这个行业存在滞后因素：因为大多数保单是一年期的，保险价格的高低要等到生效好多个月后才会对盈利产生全面影响。因此，继续用我们的比喻来说，当派对结束酒吧关门时，你被允许喝完你的那杯酒。如果结果不受重大自然灾害的影响，我们预计1988年行业综合成本率会小幅攀升，随后几年会有更大的增长。

The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels.

保险业受到一系列糟糕经济特征的诅咒，这导致了不佳的长期前景：数百个竞争者、容易进入，以及产品无法在任何有意义的方式上差异化。在这样的类商品业务中，只有非常低成本的运营商或在受保护且通常是小众市场中的经营者才能维持高盈利水平。

When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage conditions - even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history."

然而，当短缺存在时，即便是商品业务也会繁荣。保险业享受过一阵子这种气候，但现在已不复存在。资本主义的一个讽刺是，商品行业的大多数管理者憎恶短缺状况——尽管那些是唯一允许他们获得良好回报的条件。每当短缺出现，典型的管理者就迫不及待地扩张产能，从而堵住金钱洒向他的洞口。这正是保险业管理者在1985-1987年所做的，再次印证了迪斯雷利的观察：“我们从历史中学到的是我们从不吸取历史教训。”

At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness. It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind - and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)

在伯克希尔，我们通过两种方式努力摆脱保险业的商品经济学。第一，我们通过财务实力使我们的产品差异化，我们的实力超过业内所有其他公司。然而，这种实力的用处是有限的。在个人保险领域它毫无意义：车险或房主保单的购买者即使其保险公司破产（许多已破产）也会得到赔付。在商业保险领域，它也常常毫无意义：在景气时，许多主要的公司保险购买者及其经纪人对保险公司在可能更不利条件下履约的能力很少关注，比如五年后当一项复杂的索赔最终解决时。（眼不见，心不烦——随后可能就自掏腰包了。）

Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust. Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.

然而，购买者会周期性地记起本·富兰克林的观察——空袋子很难站直——并认识到他们需要只从拥有持久财务实力的保险公司购买承诺。那时我们就有重大的竞争优势。当购买者真正关注他的保险公司在五年或十年后是否能轻松支付1000万美元的索赔时，并考虑到届时糟糕的承保条件可能与低迷的金融市场和再保险公司违约同时发生的可能性，他会发现只有少数几家公司可以信赖。在其中，伯克希尔将位居前列。

Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course, that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with equal restraint.

我们实现差异化的第二种方式是我们对业务量的完全漠不关心。在1989年，我们完全愿意承接五倍于1988年的业务量——或者只有五分之一。当然，我们希望条件允许我们获得大业务量。但我们无法控制市场价格。如果价格不令人满意，我们只会做很少的业务。没有其他主要保险公司能表现出同样的克制。

Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of insurance, including most of those in which we operate, distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term prosperity.

保险业存在但大多数行业没有的三个条件，使我们得以灵活行事。第一，市场份额不是盈利能力的重要决定因素：在这个行业，与报纸或杂货行业相反，经济规则不是肥者生存。第二，在保险的许多领域，包括我们经营的大部分领域，分销渠道并非专有，可以轻松进入：今年的小业务量并不妨碍明年的巨大业务量。第三，闲置产能——在这个行业主要意味着人员——不会导致无法承受的成本。以印刷或钢铁等行业无法做到的方式，我们可以在大部分时间以四分之一的速度运营，却仍能享受长期繁荣。

We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means that we are always available, given prices that we believe are adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of property-casualty insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses, capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course, when others are panting to do business we are also available - but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large reservoir of standby capacity.

我们遵循基于风险暴露而非基于竞争的定价政策，因为这对我们的股东有意义。但我们高兴地报告，这也对社会有益。这项政策意味着，只要我们认为价格合适，我们随时准备承保几乎任何类型的财产-意外险的大额业务。许多其他保险公司采取时进时出的方式。当他们“退出”时——由于亏损上升、资本不足或其他原因——我们都在。当然，当其他人渴望做生意时，我们也在——但在这种时候我们常常发现自己的定价高于市场。实际上，我们为保险购买者和经纪人提供了一个巨大的备用承保能力储备池。

One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office. Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in 1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.

1987年中的一则故事说明了我们定价政策的一些后果：全国最大的家族保险经纪公司之一由一位长期是伯克希尔股东的人领导。此人手头有许多适合由我们纽约办事处承接的大风险业务。自然地，他为客户竭尽全力。同样自然地，当1987年保险市场大幅走软时，他发现其他保险公司的价格低于我们愿意提供的水平。他的反应是，首先，把所有业务都给了别处，其次，买入更多伯克希尔股票。他说，如果我们真正有竞争力，我们会得到他的保险业务，但他就不会买入我们的股票了。

Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987, in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103, our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and 1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.

伯克希尔1987年的承保经验极佳，部分原因是前面讨论的滞后因素。我们的综合成本率（按法定基础，不含结构性结算和财务再保险）为105。尽管该比率略逊于1986年的103，但我们的盈利能力在1987年有实质改善，因为我们使用了远远更多的浮存金。这一趋势将继续对我们有利：未来几年，我们的浮存金对保费收入比率将非常显著地上升。因此，伯克希尔的保险利润在1988年和1989年很可能改善，即使我们预计综合成本率会上升。

Our insurance business has also made some important non-financial gains during the last few years. Mike Goldberg, its manager, has assembled a group of talented professionals to write larger risks and unusual coverages. His operation is now well equipped to handle the lines of business that will occasionally offer us major opportunities.

我们的保险业务在过去几年还取得了一些重要的非财务收益。经理迈克·戈德堡已经组建了一支才华横溢的专业团队，承保更大的风险和特殊险种。他的部门现在已做好充分准备，来抓住那些偶尔会出现重大机会的业务线。

Our loss reserve development, detailed on pages 41-42, looks better this year than it has previously. But we write lots of "long-tail" business - that is, policies generating claims that often take many years to resolve. Examples would be product liability, or directors and officers liability coverages. With a business mix like this, one year of reserve development tells you very little.

我们亏损准备金的发展情况在第41-42页有详细介绍，今年看起来比往年要好。但我们承保了大量“长尾”业务——也就是那些产生的索赔往往需要很多年才能解决的保单。例如产品责任险、董事及高管责任险等。在这样的业务组合下，一年的准备金发展情况说明不了什么。

You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures reported by insurers (including our own, as we have unfortunately proved to you in the past). The record of the last decade shows that a great many of our best-known insurers have reported earnings to shareholders that later proved to be wildly erroneous. In most cases, these errors were totally innocent: The unpredictability of our legal system makes it impossible for even the most conscientious insurer to come close to judging the eventual cost of long-tail claims.

你应该对保险公司报告的任何盈利数字都保持高度怀疑（包括我们自己的，正如我们过去不幸向你们证明的那样）。过去十年的记录显示，许多最知名的保险公司向股东报告的盈利后来被证明是极其错误的。多数情况下，这些错误完全是出于无意：我们法律体系的不可预测性使得即使是最尽责的保险公司也无法接近判断长尾索赔的最终成本。

Nevertheless, auditors annually certify the numbers given them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.

尽管如此，审计师每年都对他们从管理层得到的数字进行认证，并在其意见中无保留地声明这些数字“公允列示”了其客户的财务状况。审计师使用这种令人安心的措辞，尽管他们从长期而痛苦的经验中知道，如此认证的数字很可能与当期的真实盈利相差甚远。尽管有这样的错误历史，投资者仍可以理解地依赖审计师的意见。毕竟，对非会计人员来说，“报表公允列示”的声明听起来一点儿也不含糊。

The wording in the auditor's standard opinion letter is scheduled to change next year. The new language represents improvement, but falls far short of describing the limitations of a casualty-insurer audit. If it is to depict the true state of affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to shareholders of a property-casualty company should read something like: "We have relied upon representations of management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein reported. We can express no opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that important reservation, in our opinion, etc."

审计师标准意见书的措辞定于明年改变。新语言有所改进，但远未描述出财产-意外险公司审计的局限性。如果要描绘真实的事态，我们认为致财产-意外险公司股东的标准意见书大致应该这样写：“我们依赖管理层关于所列示的损失和损失调整费用负债的陈述，而对这些负债的估计又非常重大地影响了此处报告的盈利和财务状况。我们无法就这些数字的准确性发表意见。基于这一重要保留，我们认为……”

If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not be forthright about their role and its limitations from the outset?

如果就严重失真的财务报表产生诉讼（确实会产生），审计师无论如何都会在法庭上说出类似的话。他们为什么不从一开始就坦率说明其角色及其局限性呢？

We want to emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for their inability to accurately assess loss reserves (and therefore earnings). We fault them only for failing to publicly acknowledge that they can't do this job.

我们要强调，我们不是在指责审计师无法准确评估损失准备金（以及因此盈利）。我们只是指责他们没有公开承认自己无法胜任这项工作。

From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched themselves at the expense of the investing public by exploiting, first, the inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and, second, the auditors' willingness to confidently certify those figures as if they had the expertise to do so. We will continue to see such chicanery in the future. Where "earnings" can be created by the stroke of a pen, the dishonest will gather. For them, long-tail insurance is heaven. The audit wording we suggest would at least serve to put investors on guard against these predators.

从表面上看，准备金评估中不断发生的无心之失伴随着其他故意的错误。形形色色的骗子们通过利用：第一，审计师无法评估准备金数字；第二，审计师愿意自信地认证这些数字，仿佛他们有这种专长似的——以投资大众为代价养肥了自己。未来我们将继续看到这种欺诈行为。在“盈利”可以通过挥笔造出的地方，不诚实者就会聚集。对他们来说，长尾保险就是天堂。我们建议的审计措辞至少能让投资者警惕这些掠夺者。

The taxes that insurance companies pay - which increased materially, though on a delayed basis, upon enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 - took a further turn for the worse at the end of 1987. We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report. We also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it materially reduced both their long-term earnings potential and their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily-helpful "fresh start" adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2 million.

保险公司支付的税金——在《1986年税制改革法案》颁布后虽延迟但显著增加——在1987年底进一步恶化。我们在去年的报告中详述了1986年的变化。我们还评论了这样一部法规的讽刺：它大幅增加了1987年保险公司报告盈利，却实质性地减少了它们的长期盈利潜力和商业价值。在伯克希尔，暂时的“重新开始”调整虚增了1987年盈利820万美元。

In our opinion, the 1986 Act was the most important economic event affecting the insurance industry over the past decade. The 1987 Bill further reduced the intercorporate dividends-received credit from 80% to 70%, effective January 1, 1988, except for cases in which the taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee.

在我们看来，1986年法案是过去十年影响保险业最重要的经济事件。1987年法案进一步将公司间收到的股息抵扣从80%降至70%，自1988年1月1日起生效，除非纳税人对被投资对象持有至少20%的股份。

Investors who have owned stocks or bonds through corporate intermediaries other than qualified investment companies have always been disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same securities directly. The penalty applying to indirect ownership was greatly increased by the 1986 Tax Bill and, to a lesser extent, by the 1987 Bill, particularly in instances where the intermediary is an insurance company. We have no way of offsetting this increased level of taxation. It simply means that a given set of pre-tax investment returns will now translate into much poorer after-tax results for our shareholders.

通过非合格投资公司的公司中介机构持有股票或债券的投资者，相比直接持有相同证券的投资者一直处于不利地位。间接所有权的惩罚因1986年税收法案而大大增加，1987年法案也略微加重了这种惩罚，尤其是在中介机构是保险公司的情况下。我们无法抵消这种增加的税收水平。这仅仅意味着一组给定的税前投资回报现在将转化成为我们股东糟糕得多的税后结果。

All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business, though our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is for substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings improvement. The decline in premium volume will accelerate after our quota-share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989. At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may see some major opportunities, for which we are now much better prepared than we were in 1985.

总而言之，我们预计在保险业务上会做得不错，尽管我们的记录肯定不平稳。近期前景是业务量大幅下降但盈利适度改善。1989年我们与Fireman's Fund的配额协议到期后，保费收入的下降将加速。在某个时候，很可能至少在几年之后，我们可能会看到一些重大机会，为此我们现在比1985年做好更充分的准备。

Marketable Securities - Permanent Holdings

有价证券——永久持有

Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed later) we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.

每当查理和我为伯克希尔的保险公司购买普通股时（抛开后面讨论的套利购买），我们处理这笔交易就好像是在买入一家私人企业。我们考察企业的经济前景、负责经营的人，以及我们必须支付的价格。我们心中没有任何出售的时间或价格。实际上，只要预期企业的内在价值能以令人满意的速率增长，我们愿意无限期持有一只股票。在投资时，我们视自己为企业分析师——而不是市场分析师、宏观经济分析师，甚至不是证券分析师。

Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer. Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.

我们的方法使活跃的交易市场有用，因为它周期性地为我们呈现诱人的机会。但绝不是必需的：我们所持证券的交易长期停摆，不会比缺少世界图书或费奇海默的每日报价更让我们烦恼。最终，我们的经济命运将由我们所拥有企业的经济命运决定，无论我们的所有权是部分的还是全部的。

Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.

我的朋友兼老师本·格雷厄姆很久以前就描述了对待市场波动的心理态度，我相信那最有利于投资成功。他说，你应该想象市场报价来自一位极其随和的家伙，名叫市场先生，他是你在私人企业中的合伙人。每天，市场先生都一定会出现，并报出一个价格，他要么买你的股份，要么卖给你他的股份。

Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.

尽管两人拥有的企业可能具有稳定的经济特征，但市场先生的报价绝不会稳定。因为可悲的是，这可怜的家伙有无法治愈的情绪问题。有时他感到狂喜，只能看到影响企业的有利因素。当处于那种情绪时，他会报出极高的交易价格，因为他担心你会抢走他的股份，夺走他即将到手的收益。在另一些时候他情绪低落，只能看到企业和世界前方的麻烦。在这些场合，他会报出非常低的价格，因为他害怕你会把股份甩给他。

Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you.

市场先生还有另一个可爱的特点：他不介意被忽视。如果他今天的报价你不感兴趣，他明天会带着新报价回来。交易完全取决于你的选择。在这些条件下，他越狂躁抑郁，对你越有好处。

But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."

但是，就像舞会上的灰姑娘，你必须注意一个警告，否则一切都会变成南瓜和老鼠：市场先生在那里是服务你，而不是指导你。你会发现有用的是他的钱包，而不是他的智慧。如果某天他带着特别愚蠢的情绪出现，你完全可以要么不理他，要么利用他，但如果你受到他的影响，那将是灾难性的。确实，如果你不能确定你理解并能比市场先生更好地评估你的企业，你就不属于这个游戏。正如玩扑克时说的：“如果你在游戏中待了30分钟还不知道谁是笨蛋，那你就是那个笨蛋。”

Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?

本的市场先生寓言在当今投资界可能显得过时了，如今大多数专业人士和学者谈论有效市场、动态对冲和贝塔系数。他们对这些事情的兴趣可以理解，因为蒙着神秘面纱的技术显然对投资建议的提供者有价值。毕竟，有哪个巫医仅仅靠建议“吃两片阿司匹林”就获得过名利呢？

The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.

市场秘术对投资建议消费者的价值则是另一回事。在我看来，投资成功不会由神秘的公式、计算机程序或股票和市场价格行为发出的信号产生。相反，投资者要成功，需要将良好的商业判断与一种能力结合起来，这种能力就是使自己的思想和行为隔绝于市场周围弥漫的极具传染性的情绪。在我自己努力保持隔绝的过程中，我发现牢牢记住本的市场先生概念极其有用。

Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.

遵循本的教导，查理和我让我们的有价证券用它们的经营成果——而不是用每天、甚至每年的报价——来告诉我们投资是否成功。市场可能暂时忽视商业成功，但最终会确认它。正如本所说：“短期来看，市场是一台投票机，但长期来看，它是一台称重机。”此外，企业成功被认可的速度并不那么重要，只要公司的内在价值正以令人满意的速率增长。事实上，延迟认可能是一种优势：它可能给我们机会以廉价的价格买入更多好东西。

Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.

当然，有时市场可能断定一家企业的价值高于基本事实所表明的。在这种情况下，我们会卖出所持股份。有时，我们也会卖出一只估值合理甚至低估的证券，因为我们需要资金投资于更被低估的或我们更理解的投资。

We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings just because they have appreciated or because we have held them for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be "You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.

然而，我们需要强调，我们不会仅仅因为股票升值了，或者我们持有了很长时间就将它卖出。（华尔街格言中最愚蠢的可能就是“落袋为安，永不会破产”。）只要基础业务的股权资本未来回报率令人满意，管理层有能力且诚实，并且市场没有高估该业务，我们相当乐意无限期持有任何证券。

However, our insurance companies own three marketable common stocks that we would not sell even though they became far overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these investments exactly like our successful controlled businesses - a permanent part of Berkshire rather than merchandise to be disposed of once Mr. Market offers us a sufficiently high price. To that, I will add one qualifier: These stocks are held by our insurance companies and we would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of our holdings to pay extraordinary insurance losses. We intend, however, to manage our affairs so that sales are never required.

然而，我们的保险公司持有三只可流通普通股，即使它们的市价被严重高估我们也不会卖出。实际上，我们看待这些投资与我们成功的受控企业完全一样——是伯克希尔永恒的一部分，而不是一旦市场先生给我们出足够高价就处理掉的商品。对此，我要附加一个限定条件：这些股票由我们的保险公司持有，万一有必要，我们会出售部分持股以支付不寻常的保险损失。然而，我们打算管理好事务以使出售永远不必发生。

A determination to have and to hold, which Charlie and I share, obviously involves a mixture of personal and financial considerations. To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric. (Charlie and I have long followed David Oglivy's advice: "Develop your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get old, people won't think you're going ga-ga.") Certainly, in the transaction-fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must seem odd: To many in that arena, both companies and stocks are seen only as raw material for trades.

查理和我共有的这种长期持有的决心，显然包含了个人因素与财务因素的混合。对一些人来说，我们的立场可能显得非常古怪。（查理和我长期遵循大卫·奥格威的建议：“趁你年轻培养你的古怪之处。这样等你老了，人们就不会以为你老糊涂了。”）当然，在近年痴迷于交易的华尔街，我们的姿态肯定显得奇怪：对那个圈子的许多人来说，公司和股票都只是交易的原材料。

Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones. And we will never find people we like and admire more than some of the main participants at the three companies - our permanent holdings - shown below:

然而，我们的态度与我们的个性以及我们想要的生活方式相契合。丘吉尔曾说：“你塑造你的房子，然后它们塑造你。”我们知道自己希望被塑造成什么样。为此，我们宁愿与非常喜欢且敬佩的人共事而获得X的回报，也不愿通过将这些关系换成无趣或讨厌的关系而实现110%的X回报。而且，我们永远找不到比下面这三大公司的关键人物更让我们喜欢和敬佩的人了——我们的永久持股：

We really don't see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings such as these. In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow's ears, we fail.

我们真的不觉得购买受控企业和购买这样有价证券之间有多大的根本区别。在每个案例中我们都努力买进具有良好长期经济特性的企业。我们的目标是以合理的价格找到杰出的企业，而不是以廉价的价格买入平庸的企业。查理和我发现，用丝绸做丝绸钱包是我们能做的最好的事；用母猪耳朵我们则失败。

(It must be noted that your Chairman, always a quick study, required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy good businesses. In the interim, I searched for "bargains" - and had the misfortune to find some. My punishment was an education in the economics of short-line farm implement manufacturers, third-place department stores, and New England textile manufacturers.)

（必须指出，你们的主席，一向学得很快，花仅仅20年就认识到购买好企业是多么重要。在那期间，我寻找“便宜货”——并不幸找到了一些。我的惩罚是接受了一堂关于短线农具制造商、三流百货公司和新英格兰纺织制造商经济学的教育。）

Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental economics of a business. When that happens, we will encounter problems whether that business is a wholly-owned subsidiary or a marketable security, although it is usually far easier to exit from the latter. (Indeed, businesses can be misread: Witness the European reporter who, after being sent to this country to profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled his editor, "My God, you'll never believe the sort of money there is in running libraries.")

当然，查理和我可能误读一家企业的基本经济特征。当这种情况发生时，无论是全资子公司还是有价证券，我们都会遇到问题，尽管从后者脱身通常容易得多。（确实，企业可能被误读：看看那位被派到这个国家来报道安德鲁·卡内基的欧洲记者吧，他给编辑发电报说：“天哪，你永远想不到经营图书馆能赚多少钱。”）

In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade, talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory: Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but-permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply couldn't be in better hands.

在进行控股收购和股票购买时，我们不仅努力买入好企业，还要买由一流、有才华且讨人喜欢的经理人经营的企业。如果我们对与之结盟的经理人判断有误，受控公司提供某种优势，因为我们有能力实施变革。然而实际上，这种优势有些虚幻：管理层变动，就像婚姻变化一样，痛苦、耗时且充满风险。无论如何，对我们的三大可流通但永久持有的持股而言，这一点无实际意义：在Cap Cities有汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克，在GEICO有比尔·斯奈德和娄·辛普森，在《华盛顿邮报》有凯·格雷厄姆和迪克·西蒙斯，我们简直不能更放心了。

I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.

我要说，受控公司提供两大主要优势。第一，当我们控制一家公司时，我们能够分配资本，而对于有价证券，我们很可能对此过程几乎没有或根本没有发言权。这一点可能很重要，因为许多公司的负责人并不擅长资本配置。他们的不足并不令人惊讶。大多数老板之所以升到高层，是因为他们在某个领域表现出色，比如营销、生产、工程、行政，或者有时是制度政治。

Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it's as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

一旦他们成为CEO，就面临新的职责。他们现在必须做出资本配置决策，这是一项关键工作，可能他们从未处理过，也不容易掌握。夸大点说，这就像一个极有才华的音乐家的最后一步不是在卡内基音乐厅演奏，而是被任命为美联储主席。

The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.

许多CEO在资本配置方面缺乏技能绝非小事：工作十年后，一个公司每年留存收益相当于净资产10%的CEO，将负责部署公司运用资本中超过60%的部分。

CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such "help." On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.

认识到自己缺乏资本配置技能的CEO（并非所有人都认识到）常常会试图通过求助于员工、管理顾问或投资银行家来弥补。查理和我经常观察到这种“帮助”的后果。总的来说，我们觉得这更可能加剧资本配置问题，而不是解决它。

In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That's why you hear so much about "restructuring.") Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.

最终，美国公司中存在着大量不明智的资本配置。（这就是为什么你听到那么多关于“重组”的消息。）然而，伯克希尔很幸运。在我们主要非控股持有的公司里，资本通常都得到良好运用，某些情况甚至极其出色。

The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.

受控公司相对于有价证券的第二个优势与税收有关。作为公司持有人，伯克希尔在持有部分股权时承担一些显著的税务成本，而我们持股80%或更多时则没有。这种税收劣势长期存在，但税法的变化导致它在过去一年显著增加了。结果是，一项既定的业务成果现在如果来自持股80%或以上的企业，能够给伯克希尔带来的财务成果比来自持股较少的企业最多要好50%。

The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are sometimes offset by a huge advantage: Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non-controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices - dramatically below those commanded in negotiated transactions that transfer control. For example, we purchased our Washington Post stock in 1973 at $5.63 per share, and per-share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were $10.30. Similarly, Our GEICO stock was purchased in 1976, 1979 and 1980 at an average of $6.67 per share, and after-tax operating earnings per share last year were $9.01. In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a mighty good friend.

持有有价证券的劣势有时会被一个巨大优势所抵消：偶尔股票市场给我们机会，以真正荒唐的价格——远低于转让控制权的协商交易中可要求的价格——购买杰出企业的非控制权股份。例如，我们在1973年以每股5.63美元购入华盛顿邮报股票，而1987年每股税后营业利润为10.30美元。同样，我们的GEICO股票是在1976年、1979年和1980年以平均每股6.67美元买入的，去年每股税后营业利润为9.01美元。在这样的例子中，市场先生被证明是一个非常棒的朋友。

An interesting accounting irony overlays a comparison of the reported financial results of our controlled companies with those of the permanent minority holdings listed above. As you can see, those three stocks have a market value of over $2 billion. Yet they produced only $11 million in reported after-tax earnings for Berkshire in 1987.

一个有趣的会计讽刺叠加在将我们受控公司与上述永久少数持股的报告财务结果进行比较时。如你所见，那三只股票有超过20亿美元的市值。然而，1987年它们仅为伯克希尔产生了1100万美元的报告税后盈利。

Accounting rules dictate that we take into income only the dividends these companies pay us - which are little more than nominal - rather than our share of their earnings, which in 1987 amounted to well over $100 million. On the other hand, accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings - owned, as they are, by insurance companies - must be recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices. The result: GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the up-to-date underlying values of the businesses we partially own, but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our income account.

会计准则规定，我们只能将这些公司支付给我们的股息（仅略高于名义数额）计入收益，而不能将我们应占的收益份额计入，而1987年该份额远超1亿美元。另一方面，会计准则规定，这三项持股（因由保险公司持有）的账面价值必须按当前市价记录在我们的资产负债表上。结果是：GAAP会计让我们能在净值中反映我们部分所有权的企业的最新基础价值，却不让我们在利润表中反映它们的基础收益。

In the case of our controlled companies, just the opposite is true. Here, we show full earnings in our income account but never change asset values on our balance sheet, no matter how much the value of a business might have increased since we purchased it.

对于我们受控的公司，情况正好相反。在这里，我们在利润表中显示全部收益，但从不改变资产负债表上的资产价值，无论一家企业的价值自我们购买以来增加了多少。

Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and non-controlled businesses. Using this approach, we establish our own ideas of business value, keeping these independent from both the accounting values shown on our books for controlled companies and the values placed by a sometimes foolish market on our partially-owned companies. It is this business value that we hope to increase at a reasonable (or, preferably, unreasonable) rate in the years ahead.

我们对这种会计精神分裂的心理态度是忽略GAAP数字，只专注于我们受控和非受控企业的未来盈利能力。使用这种方法，我们建立自己对商业价值的看法，使其独立于我们账面上显示的受控公司会计价值，也独立于有时愚蠢的市场赋予我们部分所有权公司的价值。我们希望在未来以合理（或者，更好是不合理）的速率增长的，正是这种商业价值。

Marketable Securities - Other

有价证券——其他

In addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance companies. In selecting these, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

除了我们的三大永久普通股持股外，我们的保险公司还持有大量有价证券。在选择这些时，我们可以在五大类别中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资，（2）中期固定收益证券，（3）长期固定收益证券，（4）短期现金等价物，以及（5）短期套利承诺。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

在选择这些类别时，我们没有特殊的偏好。我们只是不断在其中寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，始终把自己限制在我们认为自己理解的投资替代选择上。我们的标准与最大化即时可报告盈利无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终的净值。

Let's look first at common stocks. During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement: The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year. You are aware, of course, of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change. Mr. Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden, massive seizure.

让我们先看看普通股。1987年，股票市场是一个充满激情但净变动很小的领域：道指全年上涨2.3%。当然，你知道产生这微小变化的过山车之旅。市场先生狂躁飙升直到10月，然后经历了一次突然的大规模发作。

We have "professional" investors, those who manage many billions, to thank for most of this turmoil. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely tokens in a game, like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly.

我们要感谢“专业”投资者，那些管理数十亿美元的人，造成了这场动荡的大部分。许多著名基金经理现在关注的不是企业未来几年会做什么，而是他们预计其他基金经理在未来几天会做什么。对他们来说，股票只是游戏中的筹码，就像“大富翁”游戏中的顶针和熨斗。

An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is "portfolio insurance," a money-management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986-1987. This strategy - which is simply an exotically-labeled version of the small speculator's stop-loss order - dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio, or their index-future equivalents, be sold as prices decline. The strategy says nothing else matters: A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order. According to the Brady Report, $60 billion to $90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-October of 1987.

这种态度导致的一个极端例子是“投资组合保险”，这是许多主要投资顾问在1986-1987年采纳的一种资金管理策略。该策略——不过是小投机者止损单换了个花哨标签的版本——规定随着价格下跌，必须卖出股票投资组合或其指数期货等价物中越来越大的部分。该策略声称其他一切都不重要：给定幅度的下跌会自动产生巨额卖单。根据布雷迪报告，1987年10月中旬有600亿至900亿美元的股票处于这种一触即发的状态。

If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest, you may be bewildered by this technique. After buying a farm, would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely because at 9:30 a similar house sold for less than it would have brought on the previous day?

如果你认为投资顾问是被雇来投资的，你可能会对这种技术感到困惑。买下一个农场后，合理的所有者会不会命令他的房地产经纪人每当邻近地产以较低价格出售时就开始卖掉自己农场的一部分？或者你会仅仅因为早上9:30有一栋类似的房子卖得比前一天能获得的更少，就在早上9:31把你自己的房子卖给任何一个出价者吗？

Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of enterprises such as Ford or General Electric. The less these companies are being valued at, says this approach, the more vigorously they should be sold. As a "logical" corollary, the approach commands the institutions to repurchase these companies - I'm not making this up - once their prices have rebounded significantly. Considering that huge sums are controlled by managers following such Alice-in-Wonderland practices, is it any surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion?

然而，投资组合保险告诉养老基金或大学，在持有福特或通用电气这样的企业部分股权时所进行的正是这样的操作。这种方法说，对这些公司的估值越低，就越应该大力出售。作为一个“合乎逻辑”的推论，该方法命令机构一旦这些公司的价格大幅反弹就重新买回它们——我没有编造。考虑到有巨额资金由遵循这种爱丽丝梦游仙境般做法的经理控制，市场有时行为反常还有什么奇怪的吗？

Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large - so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.

然而，许多评论员在观察近期事件后得出了错误的结论：他们喜欢说小投资者在一个现在由大玩家反复无常行为主导的市场中没有机会。这个结论大错特错：这样的市场对任何投资者——无论大小——都是理想的，只要他坚持自己的投资本行。由用巨额资金非理性投机的资金经理造成的波动，将为真正的投资者提供更多做出明智投资行动的机会。他只有受到财务或心理压力的逼迫，不得不在不合适的时候出售，才会被这种波动所伤。

At Berkshire, we have found little to do in stocks during the past few years. During the break in October, a few stocks fell to prices that interested us, but we were unable to make meaningful purchases before they rebounded. At yearend 1987 we had no major common stock investments (that is, over $50 million) other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings. However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities - you can be sure of that - and, when he does, we will be willing and able to participate.

在伯克希尔，过去几年我们在股票方面无事可做。在10月的暴跌中，有几只股票跌到令我们感兴趣的价格，但我们未能在它们反弹之前进行有意义的购买。1987年末，除了我们视为永久持有或套利持有的股票，我们没有重大普通股投资（即超过5000万美元）。然而，市场先生会给我们机会的——你可以确信这一点——而当他这么做的时候，我们将愿意并且能够参与。

In the meantime, our major parking place for money is medium-term tax-exempt bonds, whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual report. Though we both bought and sold some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed little overall, holding around $900 million. A large portion of our bonds are "grandfathered" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are fully tax-exempt. Bonds currently purchased by insurance companies are not.

与此同时，我们资金的主要停放处是中期免税债券，我在去年的年报中解释了其有限的优点。尽管1987年我们买入并卖出了一些这类债券，但头寸总体变化不大，持有约9亿美元。我们很大一部分债券在1986年税制改革法案下被“豁免”，这意味着它们是完全免税的。而保险公司目前购买的债券则不是。

As an alternative to short-term cash equivalents, our medium-term tax-exempts have - so far - served us well. They have produced substantial extra income for us and are currently worth a bit above our cost. Regardless of their market price, we are ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better comes along.

作为短期现金等价物的替代，我们的中期免税债券——到目前为止——对我们有用。它们为我们带来了可观的额外收入，目前市值略高于我们的成本。无论它们的市场价格如何，只要出现更好的机会，我们就准备处置这些债券。

We continue to have an aversion to long-term bonds (and may be making a serious mistake by not disliking medium-term bonds as well). Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.

我们仍然厌恶长期债券（而且不同样厌恶中期债券可能是个严重错误）。债券的好坏不超过其计价货币的好坏，而我们在过去一年——或过去十年——所见到的任何情况都没有让我们对美元货币的长期未来充满热情。

Our enormous trade deficit is causing various forms of "claim checks" - U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank deposits, etc. - to pile up in the hands of foreigners at a distressing rate. By default, our government has adopted an approach to its finances patterned on that of Blanche DuBois, of A Streetcar Named Desire, who said, "I have always depended on the kindness of strangers." In this case, of course, the "strangers" are relying on the integrity of our claim checks although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition expensive for them.

我们巨大的贸易逆差正导致各种形式的“提款凭据”——美国政府和企业债券、银行存款等——以令人不安的速度在外国人手中堆积。在默认情况下，我们的政府采用了模仿《欲望号街车》中布兰奇·杜波依斯的财务方法，她说：“我总是依赖陌生人的仁慈。”当然，在这种情况下，“陌生人”依赖的是我们提款凭据的完整性，尽管暴跌的美元已经让这种提议对他们来说代价高昂。

The faith that foreigners are placing in us may be misfounded. When the claim checks outstanding grow sufficiently numerous and when the issuing party can unilaterally determine their purchasing power, the pressure on the issuer to dilute their value by inflating the currency becomes almost irresistible. For the debtor government, the weapon of inflation is the economic equivalent of the "H" bomb, and that is why very few countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt denominated in their own currency. Our past, relatively good record for fiscal integrity has let us break this rule, but the generosity accorded us is likely to intensify, rather than relieve, the eventual pressure on us to inflate. If we do succumb to that pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of our claim checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.

外国人对我们的信任可能是错误的。当未偿付的提款凭据变得足够多，并且发行方可以单方面决定其购买力时，发行方通过膨胀货币来稀释其价值的压力几乎变得无法抗拒。对债务国政府来说，通货膨胀武器在经济上相当于“氢弹”，这就是为什么很少有国家被允许用本国货币计价的债务淹没世界。我们过去相对良好的财政诚信记录让我们打破了这条规则，但给予我们的慷慨很可能加剧而不是缓解最终迫使我们通货膨胀的压力。如果我们屈服于这种压力，受害的将不仅仅是持有我们提款凭据的外国人，我们所有人也都将受害。

Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences.

当然，美国很可能会在我们的净债务国地位失控之前采取措施遏制贸易逆差。（在这方面，美元贬值将有所帮助，尽管不幸的是它会在其他方面造成损害。）尽管如此，我们的政府在这场对其勇气的考验中的表现，很可能与其普遍的斯嘉丽·奥哈拉方式一致：“我明天再想。”而且，几乎不可避免的是，拖延面对财政问题将产生通胀后果。

Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.

这些后果的时间和范围是不可预测的。但我们无法量化或定时风险并不意味着我们应该忽视它。虽然承认我们可能错了，而且目前的利率可能会充分补偿通胀风险，但我们总体上仍然惧怕长期债券。

We are, however, willing to invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in a specific security. That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position during 1987. At yearend, we had holdings with an amortized cost of $240 million and a market value of $316 million, paying us tax-exempt income of $34 million annually.

然而，如果我们认为在某个特定证券上我们有显著优势，我们愿意将适度比例的资金投入这一类别。这种意愿解释了我们在1984年的报告中讨论过的华盛顿公共电力供应系统1号、2号和3号债券的持有。我们在1987年增加了WPPSS头寸。年末，我们持有摊销成本为2.4亿美元、市值为3.16亿美元的这些债券，每年为我们带来3400万美元的免税收入。

We continued to do well in arbitrage last year, though - or perhaps because - we operated on a very limited scale. We enter into only a few arbitrage commitments each year and restrict ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not participate in situations in which green-mailers are attempting to put a target company "in play."

我们去年在套利方面继续做得不错，尽管——或许正是因为——我们的操作规模非常小。我们每年只参与少数几笔套利承诺，并且仅限于已公开宣布的大型交易。我们不参与绿票讹诈者试图将目标公司置于“待售”状态的局面。

We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for decades and, to date, our results have been quite good. Though we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that overall we have averaged annual pre-tax returns of at least 25% from arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987. But it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two - such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 - could change the figures dramatically.

我们以机会主义的方式实践套利已有几十年，迄今结果相当不错。虽然我们从未精确计算，但我相信我们套利平均每年的税前回报至少达到25%。我很确定1987年我们做得比这更好。但应该强调的是，一两次真正糟糕的经历——就像1987年末许多套利操作遭受的那样——可能会戏剧性地改变数据。

Our only $50 million-plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987 was 1,096,200 shares of Allegis, with a cost of $76 million and a market value of $78 million.

1987年末我们唯一超过5000万美元的套利头寸是1,096,200股Allegis股票，成本7600万美元，市值7800万美元。

We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit precisely into any of our five categories. One was various Texaco, Inc. bonds with short maturities, all purchased after Texaco went into bankruptcy. Were it not for the extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance companies, it would be inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds. At prices prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing, however, we regarded these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment available to us.

年末我们还有另外两大持股，不完全属于我们五大类别中的任何一类。一个是各种短期到期的德士古公司债券，全部在德士古破产后买入。要不是我们保险公司异常强大的资本状况，我们购买违约债券是不合适的。然而，在德士古申请破产后的价格下，我们将这些债券视为远远最具吸引力的债券投资对象。

On a worst-case basis with respect to the Pennzoil litigation, we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what we paid for them. Given a sensible settlement, which seemed likely, we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more. At yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at $104 million and had a market value of $119 million.

从最坏的Pennzoil诉讼角度看，我们觉得这些债券可能值我们购买时的价钱。如果达成合理和解，这看起来很有可能，我们预计这些债券会值多得多。年末，我们的德士古债券在账面上为1.04亿美元，市值为1.19亿美元。

By far our largest - and most publicized - investment in 1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995. From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium-term fixed-income securities category. In addition, we have an interesting conversion possibility.

到目前为止，我们在1987年最大——也是最受关注的——投资是购买7亿美元的所罗门公司9%优先股。该优先股三年后可转换为所罗门普通股，转换价为每股38美元，如果未转换，将从1995年10月31日开始分五年等额赎回。从多数角度看，这项承诺属于中期固定收益证券类别。此外，我们有一个有趣的转换可能性。

We, of course, have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking. By their nature, the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major commitments. This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.

当然，我们对投资银行的方向或未来盈利能力没有特殊的洞见。按其性质，这个行业的经济特性比我们有重大承诺的大多数其他行业不可预测得多。这种不可预测性是我们以可转换优先股形式参与的原因之一。

What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc. Charlie and I like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near-bankruptcy. Several times since, we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise, but that the client clearly wanted to make - even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee. Such service-above-self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street.

我们真正有强烈感觉的是所罗门公司CEO约翰·古特弗罗因德的能力和正直。查理和我喜欢、敬佩并信任约翰。我们第一次认识他是在1976年，当时他在GEICO从近乎破产中脱身发挥了关键作用。此后好几次，我们看到约翰引导客户远离那些虽然不明智但客户明确想做的交易——哪怕他的建议不给所罗门带来任何费用，而默许则会带来一大笔费用。这种服务高于自我的行为在华尔街远非自然而然的。

For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50, at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par, $14 million less than our cost. However, we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading, high-quality capital-raising and market-making operation can average good returns on equity. If so, our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable.

出于查理在第50页概述的原因，年末我们将所罗门投资按面值的98%估值，比我们的成本少1400万美元。不过，我们相信一家领先的高质量融资与做市业务有合理可能取得良好的平均股权回报。如果这样，我们的转换权最终将被证明有价值。

Two further comments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate. First, we give you our usual warning: Our holdings have changed since yearend and will continue to do so without notice.

关于我们有价证券投资，还有两点适宜的补充评论。第一，我们一如既往提醒：自年末以来我们的持股已有变化，并将继续无预告地变化。

The second comment is related: During 1987, as in some earlier years, there was speculation in the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of various securities. These stories were sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and other times completely untrue. Interestingly, there has been no correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and the accuracy of the report. One dead-wrong rumor was given considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and another leading publication misled its readers by writing about an arbitrage position as if it were a long-term investment commitment. (In not naming names, I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the barrel.)

第二点评论与此相关：1987年，如同某些更早的年份一样，媒体不时有关于我们买卖各种证券的猜测。这些报道有时真实，有时部分真实，其余时候完全不实。有趣的是，出版物的规模和声望与报道的准确性之间没有关联。一个完全错误的谣言被一家主要全国性杂志放在突出位置，另一家主导性刊物则将套利头寸写成长期投资承诺来误导读者。（不提名字，我是在遵守那句老警告：与按桶买墨水的人打架不明智。）

You should understand that we simply don't comment in any way on rumors, whether they are true or false. If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on the correct ones, we would in effect be commenting on all.

你应该理解，我们对谣言根本不以任何方式评论，无论真假。如果我们否认不实报道而拒绝对真实报道置评，实际上就相当于对所有报道都进行了评论。

In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by law. We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their investment ideas. Nor would we expect a media company to disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a journalist to tell his competitors about stories on which he is working or sources he is using.

在一个重大投资创意既有限又宝贵的世界里，除了法律要求外，我们没有兴趣告诉潜在竞争对手我们在做什么。我们当然也不指望别人告诉我们他们的投资创意。我们更不指望一家媒体公司透露其私下进行的收购消息，或一个记者告诉竞争对手他正在进行的报道或他使用的消息来源。

I find it uncomfortable when friends or acquaintances mention that they are buying X because it has been reported - incorrectly - that Berkshire is a buyer. However, I do not set them straight. If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire actually is buying, they can always purchase Berkshire stock. But perhaps that is too simple. Usually, I suspect, they find it more exciting to buy what is being talked about. Whether that strategy is more profitable is another question.

当朋友或熟人提到他们因为报道——错误地——称伯克希尔是买家而买X时，我感到不舒服。但我不纠正他们。如果他们想参与伯克希尔真正正在买入的任何东西，他们总可以购买伯克希尔股票。但也许那太简单了。我猜，通常他们觉得买大家都在谈论的东西更刺激。这种策略是否更有利可图是另一个问题。

Financing

融资

Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.

年末不久，伯克希尔发行了两批债券，总计2.5亿美元。两批均将于2018年到期，并将通过始于1999年的偿债基金操作匀速偿还。扣除发行费用后，我们的总体利息成本略高于10%。所罗门是我们的投资银行家，其服务十分出色。

Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher, though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It's even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s.

尽管我们对通胀持悲观看法，我们对债务的兴趣却相当有限。诚然，伯克希尔很可能通过转向一个更高——尽管仍属常规——的债务对商业价值比率来提高股本回报率。甚至更有可能的是，我们能够毫无问题地应对这样的比率，即使经济状况远比自1930年代初以来任何时期都糟糕。

But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to policies - both in regard to debt and all other matters - that will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions.

但我们不希望只是可能能够履行义务；我们希望这是确定的。因此，我们坚持的政策——在债务及所有其他事务方面——是让我们能够在极其不利的条件下取得可接受的长期成果，而不是在正常条件范围内取得最优成果。

Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees) for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant. This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have remained constant.

好的企业或投资决策最终会产生相当令人满意的经济成果，无需杠杆的帮助。因此，在我们看来，为了相对不重要的额外回报，去拿重要的东西（必然包括无辜旁观者如投保人和员工的福祉）冒险，既愚蠢又不当。这种观点并非源于我们渐长的年纪或财富：我们关于债务的看法始终未变。

However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis - will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and well-entrenched businesses; these businesses seldom require much capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we now have.

然而，我们并不恐惧借款。（我们远非认为没有比负债更糟的命运。）我们愿意借入我们认为——在最坏情况下——不会对伯克希尔的健康构成威胁的金额。分析可能的金额时，我们可以审视一些重要优势，如果重大问题吞噬我们的经济，这些优势会很好地为我们服务：伯克希尔的利润来自许多多样化且根基牢固的企业；这些企业很少需要大量资本投资；我们现有的债务结构良好；我们保有大量的流动资产。显然，我们可以接受比现在更高的债务对商业价值比率。

One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment: Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.

我们债务政策还有一个方面值得评论：与商界许多人不同，我们倾向于在预期需要时融资，而不是在需要发生时再作反应。一家企业通过良好管理资产负债表的两边来取得可能的最佳财务成果。这意味着在资产上获取尽可能高的回报，在负债上实现尽可能低的成本。如果双方面明智行动的机会恰好重合，那会很方便。然而，道理告诉我们恰恰相反的情况很可能发生：银根紧缩状况，即负债成本高昂，将创造最好的收购机会；而廉价资金将导致资产被哄抬上天。我们的结论是：负债方面的行动有时应独立于资产方面的任何行动。

Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.

唉，在任何特定时间，什么是“紧缩”和“廉价”的资金远非明晰。我们没有能力预测利率，而且——保持我们一贯的开放心态——相信也没有别人能。因此，我们只是在条件看起来不压抑时借款，并希望以后能找到明智的扩张或收购机会，而正如我们所说，这些机会最可能在债务市场条件明显压抑时出现。我们的基本原则是：如果你想射猎稀有、快速移动的大象，你就应该一直带着装好子弹的枪。

Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week. This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.

我们先筹资、后买入或扩张的政策几乎总会惩罚近期盈利。例如，我们现在将最近以10%利率筹得的2.5亿美元，以约6.5%的收益率进行投资，这一差异目前每周耗费我们约16万美元。这种负利差对我们来说不重要，不会导致我们去勉强收购或追求高收益短期工具。如果我们在未来五年左右找到合适类型的商业大象，等待就是值得的。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望购买更多与现有企业类似的企业，我们需要一些帮助。如果你有一个符合以下标准的企业，请打电话或最好是写信给我。

Here's what we're looking for:

以下是我们寻找的：

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

（1）大型收购（税后盈利至少1000万美元），

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),

（2）显示出一贯的盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对“扭亏”状况也一样），

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

（3）在运用极少或没有债务的情况下，取得良好的股本回报率的业务，

(4) management in place (we can't supply it),

（4）有现成的管理层（我们无法提供），

(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),

（5）简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们理解不了），

(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

（6）提供报价（我们不想在没有价格的情况下，哪怕是初步地，讨论交易而浪费我们的时间或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

我们不会参与敌意收购。我们承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常五分钟之内——关于我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于用现金购买，但如果我们得到的内在商业价值与我们给出的相当，也会考虑发行股票。我们诚邀潜在卖家通过与过去和我们做过生意的人联系来了解我们。对于合适的企业——以及合适的人——我们能够提供一个好归宿。

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) "I'm-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.

另一方面，我们经常被接洽一些远未达到我们标准的收购：新创企业、扭亏项目，拍卖式出售，以及在经纪人中永远流行的“我肯定如果你们双方互相了解，事情会成的”。这些一点也不吸引我们。

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了对上述购买整个企业感兴趣外，我们也对通过协商购买大宗但不控股的股票块感兴趣，类似于我们在大都会和所罗门持有的。我们对购买可转换优先股作为长期投资特别感兴趣，就像我们在所罗门所做的那样。

And now a bit of deja vu. Most of Berkshire's major stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Some of these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., a pump and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL controlled.

现在来一点似曾相识。伯克希尔的大多数主要股东是在1969年末从巴菲特合伙有限公司的清算分配中获得股份的。其中一些前合伙人会记得，1962年我在登普斯特磨坊制造公司（一家由BPL控制的水泵和农具制造公司）遇到了严重的管理问题。

At that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems that were too tough for me to solve. Charlie suggested the solution might lie in a California friend of his, Harry Bottle, whose special knack was never forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry in Los Angeles on April 17, 1962, and on April 23 he was in Beatrice, Nebraska, running Dempster. Our problems disappeared almost immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to partners, I named Harry "Man of the Year."

那时，就像现在一样，我带着对我来说太难解决的问题去找查理。查理建议解决方案可能在于他的一位加州朋友哈里·博特尔，他的特殊本领是从不忘记根本。我于1962年4月17日在洛杉矶见到了哈里，4月23日他就在内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯经营登普斯特了。我们的问题几乎立刻消失了。在我1962年致合伙人的年度信件中，我将哈里评为“年度人物”。

Fade to 24 years later: The scene is K & W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. For years K & W did well, but in 1985-86 it stumbled badly, as it pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable. Charlie, who oversees K & W, knew there was no need to consult me. Instead, he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO, and sat back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long. In 1987 K & W's profits set a record, up more than 300% from 1986. And, as profits went up, capital employed went down: K & W's investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased 20%.

切换到24年后：场景是K & W Products，一家生产汽车化合物的伯克希尔小子公司。多年来K & W做得不错，但在1985-86年，由于追求不可得而忽视了力所能及之事，它严重跌跤。监管K & W的查理知道无需咨询我。相反，他给当时68岁的哈里打了电话，任命他为CEO，然后坐等必然的结果。他没等多久。1987年K & W的利润创下纪录，比1986年增长300%以上。而且随着利润上升，占用资本反而下降：K & W的应收账款和存货投资下降了20%。

If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.

如果十年或二十年后我们再遇到另一个管理问题，你知道电话会打给谁。

About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1987 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4.9 million, and 2,050 charities were recipients.

大约97.2%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1987年股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划进行的捐赠为490万美元，有2,050家慈善机构受益。

A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American companies match charitable contributions made by directors (sometimes by a factor of three to one). In effect, these representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite charities, and never consult the owners as to their charitable preferences. (I wonder how they would feel if the process were reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for charities favored by the shareholders.) When A takes money from B to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy. We continue to believe that contributions, aside from those with quite clear direct benefits to the company, should reflect the charitable preferences of owners rather than those of officers and directors.

最近一项调查显示，约50%的美国大公司会匹配董事进行的慈善捐赠（有时是三对一）。实际上，这些所有者的代表将资金引向他们偏爱的慈善机构，而从不咨询所有者的慈善偏好。（我想知道如果过程反过来，股东可以侵用董事的口袋捐给股东青睐的慈善机构，他们会作何感想。）当A拿B的钱给C，且A是立法者时，这个过程叫税收。但当A是公司的高管或董事时，就叫做慈善。我们仍然认为，除了那些对公司有相当明确直接利益的捐赠外，捐赠应该反映所有者的慈善偏好，而不是高管和董事的偏好。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54 and 55. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1988 will be ineligible for the 1988 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第54和55页对我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如果你希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈敦促你立即确保你的股份登记在实际所有者的名下，而不是“街名”或代名人名下。到1988年9月30日未如此登记的股份，将没有资格参与1988年的计划。

Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual meeting. The 60 or so questions they asked were, as always, excellent. At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of time because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow. Ours, however, is different. It is informative for shareholders and fun for us. (At Berkshire's meetings, the exhibitionists are on the dais.)

去年我们年度大会再次有大约450名股东参加。他们提出的约60个问题一如既往地出色。在许多公司，年会纯属浪费时间，因为爱出风头的人把它变成了一场杂耍。然而，我们的年会不同。它对股东们有信息量，对我们来说很有趣。（在伯克希尔的会议上，爱出风头的人在主席台上。）

This year our meeting will be on May 23, 1988 in Omaha, and we hope that you come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.

今年我们的会议将于1988年5月23日在奥马哈举行，我们希望你能来。会议为你提供了一个论坛，你可以提出任何与所有者有关的问题，我们会一直回答，直到所有问题（除了涉及投资组合活动或其他专有信息的）都处理完毕。

Last year we rented two buses - for $100 - to take shareholders interested in the trip to the Furniture Mart. Your actions demonstrated your good judgment: You snapped up about $40,000 of bargains. Mrs. B regards this expense/sales ratio as on the high side and attributes it to my chronic inattention to costs and generally sloppy managerial practices. But, gracious as always, she has offered me another chance and we will again have buses available following the meeting. Mrs. B says you must beat last year's sales figures, and I have told her she won't be disappointed.

去年我们租了两辆大巴——花了100美元——带感兴趣的股东前往家具商城。你们的行动显示出了良好判断力：你们抢购了约4万美元的特价商品。B夫人认为这个费用/销售比率偏高，并将其归因于我一贯忽视成本以及总体散漫的管理作风。但和平时一样宽厚，她给了我另一个机会，会后我们将再次准备大巴。B夫人说你们必须超过去年的销售额，我告诉她她不会失望的。

Warren E. Buffett
February 29, 1988 Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
1988年2月29日 董事会主席