2021 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔的表现 vs. 标普 500 指数

Annual Percentage Change

年度百分比变化

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注： 数据按日历年度统计，但有以下例外：1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度；1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月期间。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.

我的长期合伙人查理·芒格和我的工作是管理你们储蓄的一部分。我们为你们的信任感到荣幸。

Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.

我们的职位附带这样的责任：如果我们是你这位缺席所有者、而你是管理者，我们会想知道什么，我们就报告什么。我们乐于通过这封年度信以及年度股东大会直接与你们沟通。

Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.

我们的政策是平等对待所有股东。因此，我们不与分析师或大型机构进行讨论。只要可能，我们也会在周六早上发布重要信息，以便股东和媒体在周一开盘前有最多的时间消化新闻。

A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 - K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.

伯克希尔每年向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）定期提交的 10-K 报告中包含了大量事实和数据，我们在 K-1 至 K-119 页予以转载。有些股东会觉得这些细节引人入胜；另一些股东则更愿意了解查理和我认为伯克希尔有什么新事或趣事。

Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.

唉，2021 年这样的行动很少。不过，我们在增加你们股票的内在价值方面还是取得了合理的进展。这项任务在 57 年来一直是我的首要职责，而且将继续如此。

What You Own

你们所拥有的

Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.

伯克希尔拥有各种各样的企业，有些是全资持有，有些只是部分持有。第二类主要是美国大公司的可流通普通股。此外，我们还持有一些非美国股票，并参与了几家合资企业或其他合作活动。

Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

无论我们采用何种所有权形式，我们的目标都是对具有持久经济优势和一流 CEO 的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有股票是基于对其长期业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为适时市场波动的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是选股者，我们是选企业者。

I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that - on occasion - it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.

我会犯很多错误。因此，我们庞大的企业集合中，有些企业拥有真正非凡的经济特性，许多企业拥有良好的经济特征，还有少数处于边缘水平。我们普通股板块的一个优势是——有时——能够以美妙的价格轻松买入出色企业的一部分。这种“瓮中捉鳖”般的体验在协议交易中非常罕见，而且永远不会批量出现。当错误发生在可流通领域时，退出也要容易得多。

Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:

关于你们的公司，有几件事常常连经验丰富的投资者也感到惊讶：

Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets - classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment - than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.

许多人认为伯克希尔是一个庞大且有些奇怪的金融资产集合。事实上，伯克希尔拥有并运营的美国本土“基础设施”资产——在我们的资产负债表上归类为不动产、厂房和设备——比任何其他美国公司都多。这一优势从来不是我们的目标。然而，它已成为事实。

At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire's balance sheet at $158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.

截至年底，这些国内基础设施资产在伯克希尔资产负债表上的账面价值为 1580 亿美元。这个数字去年有所增加，并将继续增加。伯克希尔永远会在建设。

Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid $3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of $402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.

每年，你们的公司都会缴纳可观的联邦所得税。例如，2021 年我们缴纳了 33 亿美元，而美国财政部报告的企业所得税总收入为 4020 亿美元。此外，伯克希尔还缴纳了大量的州税和外国税。伯克希尔的股东说“我已在公司缴纳了税款”，这是一个无可辩驳的说法。

Berkshire's history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.

伯克希尔的历史生动地说明了政府与美国企业之间无形且常被忽视的金融伙伴关系。我们的故事始于 1955 年初，当时伯克希尔精纺公司和哈撒韦制造公司同意合并业务。在请求股东批准时，这些历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司对合并寄予厚望。

The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company's advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).

例如，哈撒韦的征集函向股东保证：“资源与管理的结合将造就纺织业中最强大、最高效的组织之一。”这一乐观观点得到了公司顾问雷曼兄弟（是的，就是那个雷曼兄弟）的认可。

I'm sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.

我相信在福尔里弗（伯克希尔所在地）和新贝德福德（哈撒韦所在地），合并完成的那一天是欢乐的。然而，当乐队停止演奏、银行家们回家后，股东们收获的却是一场灾难。

In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire's owners watched the company's net worth crater from $51.4 million to $22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire's struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.

合并后的九年里，伯克希尔的所有者目睹公司的净资产从 5140 万美元骤降至 2210 万美元。这部分下滑是由股票回购、不明智的股息和工厂关闭造成的。但数千名员工九年的努力也带来了经营亏损。伯克希尔的困境并不罕见：新英格兰纺织业已悄然进入了一场漫长且不可逆转的死亡行军。

During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire's troubles. All told, the company paid the government only $337,359 in income tax during that period - a pathetic $100 per day.

在合并后的九年里，美国财政部也因伯克希尔的困境而受损。总计，公司在那段时期仅向政府缴纳了 337,359 美元的所得税——每天可怜的 100 美元。

Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.

1965 年初，情况发生了变化。伯克希尔引入了新的管理层，重新配置了可用现金，并将几乎所有盈利投入了各种优秀的企业，其中大部分多年来一直保持优秀。盈利再投资与复利的力量相结合，发挥了魔力，股东们也因此致富。

Berkshire's owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the $100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly $9 million daily to the Treasury.

应该指出，伯克希尔的所有者并不是这次路线调整的唯一受益者。他们的“沉默合伙人”——美国财政部——随后从公司征收了数百亿美元的所得税。还记得每天 100 美元吗？现在，伯克希尔每天向财政部缴纳大约 900 万美元。

In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge - indeed trumpet - the fact that Berkshire's prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.

为了公平对待我们的政府伙伴，我们的股东应该承认——甚至大声宣扬——伯克希尔的繁荣之所以被极大地促进，是因为公司在美国运营。自 1965 年以来，没有伯克希尔，我们的国家照样会做得非常出色。然而，如果没有美国这个家园，伯克希尔绝不可能接近成为今天的模样。当你看到国旗时，说声谢谢。

From an $8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” - money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire's total float has grown from $19 million when we entered the insurance business to $147 billion.

从 1967 年以 860 万美元收购国民赔偿公司开始，伯克希尔已成为保险“浮存金”的世界领导者——我们持有并可投资但不属于我们的资金。包括来自寿险的相对较小的金额，伯克希尔的浮存金总额从我们进入保险业务时的 1900 万美元增长到了 1470 亿美元。

So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float.

到目前为止，这些浮存金的成本低于零。虽然我们经历过一些年份，保险损失加上运营费用超过了保费，但总体而言，我们从产生浮存金的承保活动中获得了 55 年适度的利润。

Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.

同样重要的是，浮存金非常粘性。归因于我们保险业务的资金每天都会流入流出，但其总额不会急剧下降。因此，在投资浮存金时，我们可以长期思考。

If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased $9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP ("generally-accepted accounting principles") presentation of earnings and net worth.

如果你还不熟悉浮存金的概念，请参阅 A-5 页的长篇解释。令我惊讶的是，去年我们的浮存金增加了 90 亿美元，这一价值积累对伯克希尔的所有者很重要，尽管并未反映在我们的 GAAP（公认会计原则）盈利和净资产列报中。

Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire's good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, "None."

我们在保险领域创造的巨大价值，很大程度上归功于伯克希尔在 1986 年聘用了阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）的好运气。我们第一次见面是在一个周六的早上，我立刻问阿吉特他有什么保险经验。他回答说：“没有。”

I said, "Nobody's perfect," and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be - 35 years later.

我说：“人无完人”，然后雇用了他。那是我的幸运日：阿吉特实际上是一个再完美不过的选择。更好的是，35 年后的今天，他依然如此。

One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely - but far from assured - that Berkshire's float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.

关于保险的最后一点想法：我相信，伯克希尔的浮存金很可能——但远非确定——可以在不产生长期承保亏损的情况下得以维持。然而，我确信，会有一些年份我们会经历此类亏损，也许涉及非常大的金额。

Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer - and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.

伯克希尔的结构使其处理灾难性事件的能力无与伦比——而且这一首要原则将在查理和我离开后长期保持。

Our Four Giants

我们的四大巨头

Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices.

通过伯克希尔，我们的股东拥有数十家企业。其中一些企业本身又拥有自己的子公司集合。例如，Marmon 有 100 多个独立的业务运营，从铁路车厢租赁到医疗设备制造。

Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire's value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.

尽管如此，我们的“四大”公司的运营占了伯克希尔价值的很大一部分。排在首位的是我们的保险公司集群。伯克希尔实际拥有该集团 100% 的股权，其庞大的浮存金价值我们前面已经描述过。这些保险公司的投资资产，因我们为支持其承诺而投入的大量资本而进一步扩大。

The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.

保险业务是为伯克希尔量身定做的。其产品永远不会过时，销售额通常会随着经济增长和通货膨胀而增加。此外，诚信和资本将永远重要。我们的公司能够而且将会表现得很好。

There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire's operation, however, would be almost impossible.

当然，还有其他拥有出色商业模式和前景的保险公司。然而，复制伯克希尔的运营几乎是不可能的。

Apple - our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value - is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55% up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple's 2021 earnings amounted to $100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple's repurchases did the job.

苹果——按年底市值计算，是我们排名第二的巨头——是一种不同类型的持股。在这里，我们的持股比例仅为 5.55%，高于一年前的 5.39%。这个增长听起来微不足道。但请考虑一下，苹果 2021 年盈利的每 0.1% 就相当于 1 亿美元。我们没有花费伯克希尔的资金来实现这种增值。是苹果的回购完成了这项工作。

It's important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports - and last year, Apple paid us $785 million of those. Yet our "share" of Apple's earnings amounted to a staggering $5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple's brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim's managerial touch as well.

需要理解的是，只有苹果的股息才计入伯克希尔报告的 GAAP 盈利中——去年，苹果向我们支付了 7.85 亿美元的股息。然而，我们“应占”的苹果盈利却高达惊人的 56 亿美元。公司留存的大部分资金被用于回购苹果股票，我们对此表示赞赏。苹果杰出的 CEO 蒂姆·库克非常恰当地将苹果产品的用户视为他的初恋，但他所有其他利益相关者也都受益于蒂姆的管理才能。

BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America's carbon emissions would soar.

BNSF，我们的第三大巨头，继续是美国商业的第一大动脉，这使其成为美国以及伯克希尔不可或缺的资产。如果 BNSF 运输的许多必需产品改用卡车运输，美国的碳排放量将飙升。

Your railroad had record earnings of $6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive "adjustments" to earnings - to use a polite description - have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull ...)

你们的铁路在 2021 年实现了创纪录的 60 亿美元盈利。这里应该指出，我们谈论的是我们偏爱的老式盈利：扣除利息、税金、折旧、摊销和所有形式薪酬后的数字。（我们的定义提出了一个警告：随着股票上涨，对盈利的欺骗性“调整”——用礼貌的说法——变得更加频繁和离奇。说得不那么礼貌，我会说牛市滋生夸夸其谈的废话……）

BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.

BNSF 的火车去年行驶了 1.43 亿英里，运载了 5.35 亿吨货物。这两项成就都远远超过任何其他美国承运商。你可以为你的铁路感到骄傲。

BHE, our final Giant, earned a record $4 billion in 2021. That's up more than 30-fold from the $122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.

BHE，我们最后一大巨头，在 2021 年实现了创纪录的 40 亿美元盈利。这比 2000 年（伯克希尔首次购买 BHE 股份的年份）的 1.22 亿美元增长了 30 多倍。如今，伯克希尔拥有该公司 91.1% 的股份。

BHE's record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol's and Greg Abel's leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.

BHE 的社会成就记录与其财务表现一样出色。该公司在 2000 年没有风能或太阳能发电。当时它仅仅被视为庞大的电力公用事业行业中一个相对较新且次要的参与者。随后，在戴维·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔的领导下，BHE 已成为一家公用事业巨头（请不要抱怨）以及美国大部分地区风能、太阳能和输电领域的领先力量。

Greg's report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable "green-washing" stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.

格雷格关于这些成就的报告见 A-3 和 A-4 页。你会在那里发现的简介绝不是那些当前流行的“漂绿”故事。自 2007 年以来，BHE 每年都忠实地详述其在可再生能源和输电领域的计划和表现。

To further review this information, visit BHE's website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.

要进一步了解这些信息，请访问 BHE 的网站 brkenergy.com。在那里，你会看到该公司长期以来一直在进行气候意识行动，这些行动消耗了其全部盈利。未来还有更多机会。BHE 拥有管理、经验、资本以及对我们国家所需大型电力项目的热情。

Now let's talk about companies we don't control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire's two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to $34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.

现在让我们谈谈我们不控制的公司，这份名单再次提及苹果。下面我们列出了十五大股票持仓，其中几只是伯克希尔两位长期投资经理托德·库姆斯和特德·韦施勒的选择。截至年底，这对受重视的搭档总共掌管着 340 亿美元的投资，其中许多未达到我们在表中使用的门槛价值。此外，托德和特德管理的资金中有很大一部分存放在伯克希尔旗下企业的各种养老金计划中，这些计划的资产未包含在此表中。

\ This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis. \ Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position. \ Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.

\ 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基。\ 由 BHE 持有；因此，伯克希尔股东仅拥有该头寸 91.1% 的权益。\ 包括对西方石油公司的 100 亿美元投资，由优先股和购买普通股的认股权证组成，目前该组合价值为 107 亿美元。

In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the "equity" method, not market value, and carried at $13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of $45 billion.

除了脚注中提到的西方石油持股和我们的各种普通股头寸外，伯克希尔还持有卡夫亨氏 26.6% 的权益（按“权益法”核算，而非市值，账面价值 131 亿美元），以及 Pilot Corp.（旅行中心领导者，去年收入为 450 亿美元）38.6% 的股权。

Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted "equity" accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot's earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.

自 2017 年我们购买 Pilot 股份以来，该持股一直采用“权益法”会计处理。2023 年初，伯克希尔将额外购买 Pilot 的权益，将我们的持股比例提高至 80%，并导致我们在财务报表中完全合并 Pilot 的盈利、资产和负债。

Berkshire's balance sheet includes $144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, $120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about 1/2 of 1% of the publicly-held national debt.

伯克希尔的资产负债表包括 1440 亿美元的现金及现金等价物（不包括 BNSF 和 BHE 的持有）。其中，1200 亿美元投资于美国国库券，全部在一年内到期。这一持股意味着伯克希尔为公众持有的国家债务提供了约 0.5% 的融资。

Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than $30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.

查理和我已承诺，伯克希尔（以及除 BNSF 和 BHE 以外的子公司）将始终持有超过 300 亿美元的现金及等价物。我们希望你们的公司在财务上坚不可摧，从不依赖陌生人（甚至朋友）的善意。我们俩都喜欢睡个好觉，我们也希望我们的债权人、保险索赔人和你们也能如此。

But $144 billion?

但是 1440 亿美元？

That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was $114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)

我向你保证，这笔巨款并非某种疯狂的爱国表现。查理和我也没有失去对企业所有权压倒性的偏好。事实上，我 80 年前就已首次表现出了这种热情，那是在 1942 年 3 月 11 日，我购买了三股 Cities Services 优先股。成本是 114.75 美元，花光了我所有的积蓄。（当天道琼斯工业平均指数收于 99 点，这一事实应该向你高声呼喊：永远不要做空美国。）

After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My favored status throughout that period was 100% and still is. Berkshire's current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for longterm holding.

在我初次投资之后，我一直将净资产的至少 80% 投资于股票。在整个期间，我最偏爱的状态是 100%，现在仍然如此。伯克希尔目前 80% 左右的企业持股，是因为我未能找到符合我们长期持有标准的整个公司或部分股权（即可流通股票）。

Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.

查理和我在过去也时不时经历过类似的现金重仓时期。这些时期从不令人愉快；但也从不持久。幸运的是，在 2020 年和 2021 年，我们有一个还算有吸引力的资本配置替代方案。请继续往下读。

Share Repurchases

股票回购

There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire's controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire's resources.

我们可以通过三种方式增加你投资的价值。第一种始终是我们心中的重中之重：通过内生增长或收购来增加伯克希尔控股企业的长期盈利能力。如今，内生机会带来的回报远高于收购。然而，与伯克希尔的资源相比，这些机会的规模很小。

Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.

我们的第二种选择是购买许多已上市的优秀或卓越企业的非控股部分权益。不时地，这种可能性既众多又极具吸引力。不过，今天我们几乎找不到令我们兴奋的目标。

That's largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.

这主要是因为一个不言而喻的道理：长期低利率会推高所有生产性投资的价格，无论是股票、公寓、农场、油井还是其他资产。其他因素也会影响估值，但利率始终很重要。

Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)

我们创造价值的最后一条路径是回购伯克希尔的股票。通过这一简单的行为，我们增加了你们在伯克希尔拥有的众多控股和非控股企业中的份额。当价格与价值等式合适时，这条路径是增加你们财富最简单、最确定的方式。（除了为持续股东带来价值增值外，其他几方也会受益：回购对回购股份的卖方以及社会也有适度好处。）

Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire's owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of $51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody's).

偶尔，当其他路径变得缺乏吸引力时，回购对伯克希尔的所有者来说就很有意义。因此，在过去两年中，我们回购了 2019 年底流通股的 9%，总成本为 517 亿美元。这一支出使得我们的持续股东拥有所有伯克希尔企业的权益增加了约 10%，无论是全资持有的（如 BNSF 和 GEICO）还是部分持有的（如可口可乐和穆迪）。

I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don't want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of $1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.

我想强调，伯克希尔的回购要有意义，我们的股票必须提供合适的价值。我们不想为其他公司的股票支付过高价格，如果我们回购伯克希尔时支付过高，那将是价值破坏。截至 2022 年 2 月 23 日，自年底以来，我们又斥资 12 亿美元回购了额外的股票。我们的胃口仍然很大，但将始终取决于价格。

It should be noted that Berkshire's buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.

应该指出，由于其优质的投资者基础，伯克希尔的回购机会有限。如果我们的股票主要由短期投机者持有，价格波动性和交易量都将大幅增加。那种重塑将为我们通过回购创造价值提供更大的机会。尽管如此，查理和我还是更喜欢我们现在拥有的股东，即使他们令人钦佩的买入并持有的态度限制了长期股东从机会主义回购中获利的程度。

Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we've discussed, insurance "float" of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of "float" per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% going from $79,387 per "A" share to $99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.

最后，一个伯克希尔特有的容易被忽视的价值计算：正如我们所讨论的，合适的保险“浮存金”对我们具有巨大价值。恰巧的是，回购会自动增加每股的“浮存金”数额。在过去两年中，该数字增加了 25%，从每股 A 类股 79,387 美元增至 99,497 美元，这是一个显著的增益，如前所述，这在某种程度上要归功于回购。

A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business

一个了不起的人与一个了不起的企业

Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life - in both his business and his personal pursuits - Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told.

去年，保罗·安德鲁斯去世了。保罗是伯克希尔旗下总部位于沃斯堡的子公司 TTI 的创始人兼 CEO。在他的一生中——无论是在商业还是个人追求中——保罗都 quietly 展示了查理和我欣赏的所有品质。他的故事值得讲述。

In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul.

1971 年，保罗在通用动力公司担任采购代理时，天塌了下来。在失去一份巨额国防合同后，该公司解雇了数千名员工，包括保罗。

With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using $500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled $112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of $7.7 billion.

由于第一个孩子即将出生，保罗决定靠自己，用 500 美元的积蓄创办了 Tex-Tronics（后更名为 TTI）。该公司专门分销小型电子元件，第一年销售额总计 11.2 万美元。如今，TTI 销售超过一百万个不同的产品，年销售额为 77 亿美元。

But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend's early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man's family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?

但回到 2006 年：63 岁的保罗对家庭、工作和同事感到满意。但他有一个挥之不去的担忧，因为最近他目睹了一位朋友的早逝以及随后对那个人的家庭和企业造成的灾难性后果。保罗在 2006 年问自己，如果他意外去世，那些依赖他的许多人会怎样？

For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative "synergies" - savings that would be achieved as the acquirer slashed duplicated functions at TTI.

整整一年，保罗在各种选择中挣扎。卖给竞争对手？从纯经济角度来看，这条路最有意义。毕竟，竞争对手可以预见到利润丰厚的“协同效应”——随着收购方削减 TTI 重复的职能而实现的节省。

But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer's home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.

但是……这样的买家很可能还会保留自己的 CFO、法律顾问和人力资源部门。因此，TTI 相应部门的员工将被扫地出门。而且，呃！如果需要新建配送中心，收购方的总部城市肯定会比沃斯堡更受青睐。

Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled - aptly so - a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.

无论财务收益如何，保罗迅速得出结论，卖给竞争对手不适合他。他接着考虑寻找财务买家，一个曾被称为——恰如其分——杠杆收购公司的物种。然而，保罗知道，这样的买家会专注于“退出策略”。谁知道那会是什么呢？反复思考这一切后，保罗发现自己对将自己 35 年的心血交给一个转售商毫无兴趣。

When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying - in far more tactful phrasing than this - “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.

当保罗见到我时，他解释了为什么排除了这两种买家。然后他总结了自己的困境，他说——用远比这委婉的措辞——“在思考了各种替代方案一年后，我想把公司卖给伯克希尔，因为你是唯一剩下的人。”于是，我报了个价，保罗说“行”。一次会面；一顿午餐；一笔交易。

To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.

说我们俩从此过上了幸福生活是一种轻描淡写。伯克希尔收购 TTI 时，该公司有 2,387 名员工。现在这个数字是 8,043。其中很大一部分增长发生在沃斯堡及其周边地区。盈利增长了 673%。

Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I'm too busy now.”

每年，我都会打电话给保罗，告诉他他的工资应该大幅提高。每年，他都会告诉我：“我们明年再谈吧，沃伦；我现在太忙了。”

When Greg Abel and I attended Paul's memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI's first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.

当格雷格·阿贝尔和我参加保罗的追悼会时，我们见到了他的孩子、孙子、长期同事（包括 TTI 的第一位员工）以及约翰·罗奇——伯克希尔在 2000 年收购的一家沃斯堡公司的前 CEO。约翰曾引导他的朋友保罗来到奥马哈，凭直觉知道我们会很合拍。

At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary - geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.

在追悼会上，格雷格和我听说了保罗默默支持的无数人和组织。他慷慨之广非同寻常——总是致力于改善他人的生活，尤其是沃斯堡的人们。

In all ways, Paul was a class act.

无论在各方面，保罗都是一个高尚的人。

Good luck - occasionally extraordinary luck - has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend - John Roach - TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.

好运——偶尔是非凡的好运——在伯克希尔发挥了作用。如果保罗和我没有共同的朋友约翰·罗奇，TTI 就不会在我们这里找到归宿。但那份丰盛的好运只是开始。TTI 很快将引导伯克希尔完成其最重要的收购。

Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary's CEO and learn more about the acquiree's activities.

每年秋天，伯克希尔的董事们都会聚在一起听取几位高管的汇报。我们有时会根据近期收购的地点来选择地点，以此让董事们与新子公司的 CEO 会面，并更多地了解被收购方的活动。

In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad's headquarters.

因此，在 2009 年秋天，我们选择了沃斯堡，以便参观 TTI。当时，同样家乡在沃斯堡的 BNSF 是我们可流通股票中的第三大持仓。尽管持有如此大的股份，我却从未造访过这家铁路公司的总部。

Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board's opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF's third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.

我的助手黛布·博萨内克将董事会的开幕晚宴安排在 10 月 22 日。同时，我安排在当天早些时候到达，与 BNSF 的 CEO 马特·罗斯会面，我长期钦佩他的成就。我定下日期时，并不知道我们的聚会将与 BNSF 的第三季度盈利报告同时发生，该报告于 22 日晚些时候发布。

The market reacted badly to the railroad's results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF's earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn't feeling friendly to railroads - or much else.

市场对铁路公司的业绩反应不佳。大萧条在第三季度全面肆虐，BNSF 的盈利反映了那场衰退。经济前景也黯淡，华尔街对铁路——或其他任何东西——都不友好。

The following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.

第二天，我再次与马特会面，并建议伯克希尔将为这条铁路提供一个比作为上市公司所能期望的更好的长期归宿。我还告诉了他伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。

Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I'll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.

马特将报价转达给了他的董事和顾问。十一个忙碌的日子后，伯克希尔和 BNSF 宣布了一项确定交易。在此，我将大胆做一个罕见的预测：一个世纪后，BNSF 将成为伯克希尔和我们国家的关键资产。

The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn't sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.

如果保罗·安德鲁斯没有认定伯克希尔是 TTI 合适的归宿，BNSF 的收购就永远不会发生。

Thanks

感谢

I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018.

70 年前，我上了第一堂投资课。从那以后，我几乎每年都喜欢与不同年龄的学生一起工作，最终在 2018 年从那项追求中“退休”。

Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson's fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.

一路上，我遇到的最难对付的听众是我孙子的五年级班级。那些 11 岁的孩子在座位上扭来扭去，茫然地看着我，直到我提到可口可乐及其著名的秘密配方。瞬间，所有的手都举了起来，我明白了“秘密”对孩子们来说是猫薄荷。

Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.

教学如同写作，帮助我发展和澄清自己的想法。查理称这种现象为猩猩效应：如果你和一只猩猩坐在一起，仔细向它解释你珍视的一个想法，你可能会留下一个困惑的灵长类动物，但你自己离开时思路会更清晰。

Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”

与大学生交谈则要好得多。我敦促他们寻找（1）在其感兴趣的领域、（2）与他们在不需要钱时会选择的那种人一起工作的就业机会。我承认，经济现实可能会干扰这种寻找。即便如此，我仍敦促学生们永远不要放弃这种追求，因为当他们找到那种工作时，他们将不再是在“工作”。

Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as part-timers at my grandfather’s grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.

查理和我本人在经历了几次早期的挫折后，也遵循了那条解放之路。我们都从我祖父的杂货店做兼职开始，查理在 1940 年，我在 1942 年。我们都被分配了无聊的任务，报酬微薄，绝对不是我们心中所想。查理后来从事法律工作，我则尝试销售证券。工作满意度仍然与我们无缘。

Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It's a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.

最终，在伯克希尔，我们找到了热爱的事业。除了极少数例外，我们现在已经与喜欢和信任的人一起“工作”了几十年。能与保罗·安德鲁斯这样的经理人，或我去年告诉你们的伯克希尔家族成员共事，是人生的一大乐事。在我们的总部办公室，我们雇佣的是正派且有才华的人——没有混蛋。人员流动率平均每年大约一人。

I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction - working for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.

然而，我想强调另一件事，它使我们的工作变得有趣和满足——为你们工作。对查理和我来说，没有什么比享受个人长期股东的信任更令人有成就感了，这些股东几十年来加入我们，期望我们将成为他们资金的可靠保管人。

Obviously, we can't select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.

显然，我们无法选择我们的所有者，如果我们的运营形式是合伙制，我们本可以做到这一点。今天任何人都可以购买伯克希尔的股票，并打算很快转售。当然，我们会有少数这类股东，就像我们有一些指数基金只是因为要求持有而持有大量伯克希尔股票一样。

To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large – some might say excessive – portion of their savings.

然而，在真正不同寻常的程度上，伯克希尔的所有者是一个庞大的个人和家庭群体，他们选择加入我们，其意图接近“至死不渝”。他们常常将很大一部分——有些人可能会说过大——的储蓄托付给我们。

Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.

这些股东有时会承认，伯克希尔可能远非他们所能做出的最佳选择。但他们也会补充说，在他们最感舒适的投资中，伯克希尔会名列前茅。而对自己的投资感到舒适的人，平均而言，会比那些被不断变化的头条新闻、流言和承诺所驱动的人取得更好的结果。

Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”

长期个人股东既是查理和我一直寻求的“合伙人”，也是我们在伯克希尔做决策时时刻铭记的人。我们对他们说：“为你‘工作’感觉真好，感谢你们的信任。”

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29th through Sunday, May 1st. The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.

清空你的日程！伯克希尔将于 4 月 29 日（周五）至 5 月 1 日（周日）在奥马哈举行年度资本家聚会。有关这个周末的详细信息见 A-1 和 A-2 页。奥马哈热切地等待着你们，我也是。

I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy's masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family's use. Join me.

我将用一个推销词来结束这封信。“表弟”吉米·巴菲特设计了一艘浮筒“派对”船，现由伯克希尔旗下的 Forest River 制造。该船将于 4 月 29 日在我们伯克希尔促销集市上亮相。而且，仅限两天，股东将能够以 10% 的折扣购买吉米的杰作。你们这位爱淘便宜货的董事长将为自己家人买一艘船。和我一起吧。

February 26, 2022

2022 年 2 月 26 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席