1958年致合伙人信

THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958

1958年股票市场概况

A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: "The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least".

一位经营中型投资信托的朋友最近写道：“美国人反复无常的性情，在1958年引发了一场重大转变，至少可以说，‘狂热’是形容股票市场最恰当的词。”

I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.

我认为这句话概括了1958年主宰股票市场的心态变化，无论是在业余还是专业层面。在过去一年里，几乎任何理由都被拿来为“投资”市场辩护。毫无疑问，现在股票市场上性情反复无常的人比多年来都多，而他们停留的时间长短取决于他们认为能够多快、多轻松地获利。虽然无法确定他们还会继续涌入多久，从而推高价格，但我认为可以说，他们停留的时间越长，随之而来的反作用力就越大。

I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.

我不试图预测整体市场——我的精力专注于寻找低估的证券。然而，我确实相信，公众普遍认为投资股票必然获利，最终会带来麻烦。如果这种情况发生，即使是被低估证券的价格（但不是内在价值），预计也会受到重大影响。

RESULTS IN 1958

1958年业绩

In my letter of last year, I wrote:

在去年的信中，我写道：

> “Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively will. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.”

> “相对而言，我们的业绩在熊市中可能会比在牛市中更好，因此从上述结果中得出的推论应考虑到，那是我们应该表现相对较好的年份。在总体市场大幅上涨的年份，只要能跟上平均涨幅，我就会非常满意。”

The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.

后一句话描述了1958年我们所经历的那种年份，我的预测也实现了。道琼斯工业平均指数从435点上涨到583点，加上大约20点的股息，道琼斯单位总体涨幅为38.5%。全年运营的五家合伙基金的业绩略高于这个38.5%。以两年年末的市场价值计算，它们的收益率在36.7%到46.2%之间。考虑到很大一部分资产已经并仍然投资于证券，而这些证券在快速上涨的市场中受益甚微，我认为这些业绩还算不错。我仍然预测，在下跌或平稳的市场中，我们的业绩将高于平均水平，但在上涨的市场中，我们最多只能跟上步伐。

TYPICAL SITUATION

典型案例

So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.

为了让各位更好地理解我们的操作方法，我认为最好回顾一下1958年的一项具体操作。去年我提到了我们最大的持仓，它占各个合伙基金资产的10%到20%。我曾指出，让这只股票下跌或保持相对稳定对我们有利，这样我们可以建立更大的仓位，因此这样的证券在牛市中可能会拖累我们的相对表现。

This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantial earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.

这只股票是新泽西州联合城的联邦信托公司。我们开始买入时，按保守计算，其内在价值为每股125美元。然而，出于充分理由，尽管每股收益约为10美元，它却完全不分发现金股息，这很大程度上导致了其股价被压低至每股约50美元。因此，我们拥有了一家管理良好、盈利能力强劲的银行，其售价远低于内在价值。管理层对我们这些新股东很友好，最终造成损失的风险似乎很小。

Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for personal reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:
1. Very strong defensive characteristics;
2. Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and;
3. Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.

联邦信托公司25.5%的股份由一家更大的银行持有（联邦信托的资产约为5000万美元，大约是奥马哈第一国民银行的一半），该银行多年来一直希望合并。由于个人原因，合并遭到阻止，但有迹象表明这种情况不会无限期持续。因此，我们具备了以下组合：
1. 极强的防御特性；
2. 价值以令人满意的速度稳步增长；
3. 有迹象表明，最终这一价值将被释放，尽管可能是一年或十年。如果是后者，价值可能会积累到相当大的数字，比如每股250美元。

Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.

在一年多的时间里，我们成功地以平均约每股51美元的价格获得了该银行约12%的股份。显然，股价保持沉寂对我们非常有利。随着持股规模的扩大，我们的股票块价值增加，尤其是在我们成为第二大股东，拥有足够投票权，可以在任何合并提案中参与协商之后。

Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.

联邦信托只有大约300名股东，平均每月可能只有两笔左右的交易，所以你能理解为什么我说股票市场的整体活动对我们某些持仓的价格变动影响很小。

Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which raised the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any "Leakage" regarding our portfolio holdings.

遗憾的是，我们在买入时遇到了一些竞争，这使股价涨到了约65美元，此时我们既不买也不卖。在交易不活跃的股票中，非常小的买单就能造成这种幅度的价格变动，这说明了关于我们投资组合持仓的“信息泄露”必须要杜绝的重要性。

Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.

年底，我们成功找到了一个特殊情况，可以以有吸引力的价格成为最大股东，因此我们卖出了联邦信托的股份，获得每股80美元，尽管当时市场报价大约低20%。

It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.

显然，我们本可以仍然持有50美元的股票，耐心地零星买入，我会对这种策略非常满意，尽管相对于去年的市场，我们的表现会显得很差。像联邦信托这样的情况在某一年带来实际利润，在很大程度上是偶然的。因此，我们任何一年的业绩作为评估长期结果的基础都有很大的局限性。不过，我相信投资这类低估且保护良好的证券，是获取证券长期利润最可靠的方法。

I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.

我或许可以提一下，以80美元买入这只股票的人，长期来看有望获得不错的回报。然而，以80美元买入内在价值135美元的相对低估，与以50美元买入内在价值125美元的情况大不相同，我认为我们的资金可以更好地运用在取代它的那个机会上。这个新机会的规模比联邦信托稍大一些，占各个合伙基金资产的约25%。虽然低估程度并不比我们持有的许多其他证券更大（甚至不如某些），但我们是最大股东，这在很多时候对于缩短价值回归所需时间具有巨大优势。在这个特定的持仓中，我们几乎可以保证，在持有期间其表现会优于道琼斯指数。

THE CURRENT SITUATION

当前情况

The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.

市场水平越高，低估的证券就越少，我发现要找到足够多的有吸引力投资有些困难。我更希望增加套利类资产的比例，但很难找到条件合适的。

To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.

因此，在可能的范围内，我试图通过大量持有几只低估证券来自己创造套利机会。这样的策略应该会实现我早先的预测——在熊市中表现优于平均水平。我希望以此为基础来评判我。如果有什么问题，请随时提出。

WARREN E. BUFFETT 2-11-59

沃伦·E·巴菲特 1959年2月11日