2016 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 - Annual Percentage Change.

伯克希尔与标普 500 的表现对比 - 年度百分比变动。

Note: Data are for calendar years with exceptions for 1965, 1966 and 1967. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value equity securities at market. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas Berkshire's numbers are after-tax.

注：数据按日历年统计，但 1965、1966 和 1967 年存在例外。从 1979 年开始，会计规则要求保险公司按市价计量其持有的权益证券。标普 500 的数据为税前口径，而伯克希尔的数据为税后口径。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over 52 years, per-share book value grew from $19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司致股东：2016 年，伯克希尔净资产增加 275 亿美元，A 类和 B 类股票的每股账面价值均增长 10.7%。在过去 52 年中，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 172,108 美元，年复合增长率为 19%。

During the first half of those years, Berkshire's net worth was roughly equal to intrinsic value because most resources were deployed in marketable securities that were marked to market. By the early 1990s, our focus shifted toward outright ownership of businesses, reducing the relevance of balance sheet figures.

在这 52 年的前半段，伯克希尔的净资产大致等同于企业的内在价值，因为大多数资源投向了可交易证券，并按市场价格重新计量。到 1990 年代初，我们的重心转向直接拥有企业，这使资产负债表数字的重要性明显下降。

Accounting for controlled businesses requires losers to be written down when failure becomes apparent, while winners are never revalued upward. Berkshire has experienced both results: some acquisitions led to goodwill write-offs, while some very large winners were not written up by a penny.

对受控企业的会计处理要求，当失败显现时必须下调“输家”的账面价值；而“赢家”却永远不会被向上重估。伯克希尔两种情况都经历过：有些收购导致商誉减记，而一些非常成功的赢家却没有被上调一分钱。

We have no quarrel with this asymmetrical accounting. But over time it widens the gap between Berkshire's intrinsic value and book value. Large and growing unrecorded gains at our winners now mean that intrinsic value far exceeds book value, especially in property/casualty insurance.

我们并不反对这种不对称的会计处理。但随着时间推移，它必然扩大伯克希尔内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。如今，我们赢家业务中大量且持续增长的未入账收益，使伯克希尔股票的内在价值远高于账面价值，尤其是在财产/意外保险业务中。

Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That has happened at Berkshire and explains why the company's 52-year market-price gain materially exceeds its book-value gain.

长期来看，股价会向内在价值靠拢。伯克希尔正是如此，这也解释了为什么公司 52 年的市值增长显著超过账面价值增长。

What We Hope to Accomplish. Charlie Munger and I expect Berkshire's normalized earning power per share to increase every year, though actual earnings will sometimes decline because of economic weakness, insurance mega-catastrophes or industry-specific events.

我们希望实现什么。查理·芒格和我预计伯克希尔每股正常化盈利能力会逐年提高，尽管实际盈利有时会因美国经济疲弱、保险巨灾或行业特定事件而下降。

It is our job to deliver significant growth over time, bumpy or not. Berkshire's directors have opted to retain all earnings; in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained.

无论过程是否崎岖，我们的职责都是长期实现显著增长。伯克希尔董事会选择保留全部收益；2015 年和 2016 年，伯克希尔在美国企业中按留存收益金额均排名第一。

Charlie and I have no magic plan other than to dream big and be mentally and financially prepared to act fast when opportunities appear. Every decade or so, dark clouds fill the economic skies and briefly rain gold. When that happens, we must rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons.

查理和我没有什么神奇计划，除了敢于做大梦，并在机会出现时从心理和财务上都准备好迅速行动。大约每十年，经济天空就会乌云密布，并短暂地下起黄金雨。当这种倾盆而下的机会出现时，我们必须拿着大盆冲出去，而不是拿着茶匙。

Berkshire gradually shifted from gains mostly generated by investments to value growth by owning businesses. I made a particularly egregious error in 1993, acquiring Dexter Shoe for $434 million in Berkshire stock; Dexter soon became worthless, while the shares issued were worth more than $6 billion by yearend 2016.

伯克希尔逐渐从主要依靠投资活动获取收益，转向通过拥有企业来增长价值。1993 年，我犯了一个特别严重的错误，用价值 4.34 亿美元的伯克希尔股票收购 Dexter Shoe；Dexter 很快变得一文不值，而当年支付给卖方的股票到 2016 年底价值超过 60 亿美元。

Three events then set us on our present course: buying the rest of GEICO in early 1996, foolishly issuing Berkshire stock to buy General Re in 1998, and buying 76% of MidAmerican Energy in early 2000.

随后三件事把我们推上今天的道路：1996 年初买下 GEICO 剩余股份；1998 年愚蠢地发行伯克希尔股票收购 General Re；以及 2000 年初买下 MidAmerican Energy 76% 的股权。

The GEICO purchase made a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. General Re became a fine operation but the stock issuance was a terrible mistake. MidAmerican Energy launched Berkshire's path of building insurance, acquiring diversified non-insurance businesses and using internally-generated cash.

收购 GEICO 让我们把一项组合投资变成全资经营业务。General Re 后来成为优秀业务，但当时发行股票是一个严重错误。MidAmerican Energy 则使伯克希尔走上了如今的道路：继续建设保险业务，积极收购大型多元化非保险企业，并主要使用内部产生的现金交易。

Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, though de-emphasized, has continued to grow and generate capital gains, interest and dividends. Berkshire's two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.

虽然债券和股票组合的重要性已被淡化，但它仍在增长，并继续带来资本利得、利息和股息。伯克希尔这种双轨资本配置方式给了我们真正的优势。

After-Tax Earnings (in billions of dollars).

税后收益（单位：十亿美元）。

Investment gains will continue to be substantial but random in timing, supplying funds for business purchases. Operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings and bolt-on acquisitions. Avoiding Berkshire stock issuance means earnings improvements translate into equivalent per-share gains.

投资收益仍将是可观的，但出现时间完全随机，并将为收购企业提供资金。我们的经营 CEO 会专注于提升各自业务的收益，有时也会通过补强型收购来增长。只要避免发行伯克希尔股票，盈利提升就会等比例转化为每股收益的增长。

America's economic dynamism has aided Berkshire throughout our tenure. One word sums up the country's achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago, Americans created abundance beyond the dreams of the forefathers.

美国经济的活力一直在帮助伯克希尔。一个词可以概括这个国家的成就：奇迹。240 年前几乎从零起步，美国人创造了远超先辈想象的丰饶。

America has amassed wealth totaling $90 trillion, including homes, farmland, vehicles, factories, medical centers and universities. Borrowing may change ownership, but the assets remain useful and the nation's wealth remains intact.

美国已经积累了总计 90 万亿美元的财富，包括住房、农田、汽车、工厂、医疗中心和大学。借款可能导致资产所有权转移，但资产本身不会消失，也不会丧失用途，国家财富仍然存在。

The market system has directed capital, brains and labor and created abundance, while government redirection through taxes has affected the distribution of the bounty. Public education for about four million babies born each year costs more than $600 billion annually, about 3.5% of GDP.

市场体系像经济交通警察一样调配资本、智慧和劳动，创造了丰裕；政府通过各级税收再分配，也影响了这份成果的分配方式。每年约 400 万美国婴儿生来就享有公共教育权利，年度成本超过 6000 亿美元，约占 GDP 的 3.5%。

Early Americans were not smarter or harder working than those before them, but they crafted a system that unleashed human potential. Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

早期美国人并不比此前千百年来辛劳的人们更聪明或更勤奋，但他们建立了一个释放人类潜力的制度。今天出生在美国的婴儿，是历史上最幸运的一代。

American business and a basket of stocks are virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and abundant capital will see to that, though many companies will fall behind or fail.

美国企业，以及由这些企业构成的一篮子股票，几乎必定会在未来多年变得更有价值。创新、生产率提升、企业家精神和充足资本会推动这一点，尽管许多公司会落后甚至失败。

Major market declines and panics will occasionally occur, but no one can predict when. During such scary periods, widespread fear is your friend because it creates bargains; personal fear is your enemy.

重大市场下跌和恐慌偶尔会发生，但没有人知道它们何时到来。在可怕时期，广泛的恐惧是投资者的朋友，因为它会带来便宜货；而个人恐惧则是敌人。

Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and sit for an extended period with large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well. Berkshire's size precludes brilliant results, but its businesses, financial strength and owner-oriented culture should deliver decent results.

避开高昂且不必要成本，并长期持有一组大型、财务保守的美国企业的投资者，几乎肯定会取得不错结果。伯克希尔的规模使耀眼成绩变得不可能，但我们的优秀业务、坚固财务实力和股东导向文化，应能带来体面的结果。

Share Repurchases. For exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus because they add a buyer. For continuing shareholders, repurchases only make sense if shares are bought below intrinsic value.

股票回购。对卖出股票的股东而言，回购永远是好事，因为市场多了一个买方。对继续持有的股东而言，只有当公司以低于内在价值的价格回购股票时，回购才有意义。

If three equal partners own a business worth $3,000 and one is bought out for $900, each remaining partner gains $50. If the exiting partner is paid $1,100, each remaining partner loses $50. The same math applies to corporations.

如果三个平等合伙人拥有一家价值 3000 美元的企业，其中一人以 900 美元被合伙企业买出，则剩下两位合伙人各获得 50 美元的即时收益。如果离开的合伙人得到 1100 美元，则剩下两人各损失 50 美元。同样的数学也适用于公司。

Repurchases should not occur if a business needs all available money to protect or expand operations and is uncomfortable adding debt. Nor should they occur if another investment opportunity offers far greater value than buying undervalued shares.

即使股票被低估，也有两种情况不应回购：第一，公司需要全部可用资金保护或扩张自身业务，并且不愿增加债务；第二，某项收购或其他投资机会提供的价值远高于回购低估股票。

Before discussing repurchases, a CEO and board should stand, join hands and declare: “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”

在讨论回购前，CEO 和董事会应该站起来手牵手齐声宣布：“在一个价格上聪明的事，在另一个价格上就是愚蠢的事。”

Berkshire's repurchase policy authorizes buying large amounts of stock at 120% or less of book value because the Board concluded that purchases at that level clearly benefit continuing shareholders. The policy does not mean Berkshire will prop up the stock price.

伯克希尔的回购政策授权我在股价不高于账面价值 120% 时大量买入公司股票，因为董事会认定在这个水平买入会给继续持有的股东带来即时且实质性的利益。但这并不意味着伯克希尔会托住股价。

Some people characterize repurchases as un-American, claiming they divert funds from productive endeavors. That is not the case: American corporations and private investors are awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed.

有些人把回购描述为不美国的行为，认为它们把资金从生产性用途转移走。事实并非如此：今天美国企业和私人投资者手中都有大量资金，正在寻找理性的配置机会。

Insurance. The property/casualty branch has propelled Berkshire's growth since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and National Fire & Marine for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world measured by net worth.

保险。财产/意外保险业务自 1967 年以来一直推动伯克希尔增长，那一年我们以 860 万美元收购了 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine。今天，按净资产衡量，National Indemnity 是世界最大的财产/意外保险公司。

P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves insurers holding large sums called float, which they can invest for their own benefit. As business grows, so does float.

财产/意外保险公司先收保费，后付赔款。这种“先收后付”的模式让保险公司持有大量我们称为“浮存金”的资金，并可在此期间为自身利益进行投资。随着业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。

Berkshire recently wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than $100 billion. Float at GEICO and several specialized operations is almost certain to grow, while some run-off reinsurance contracts will drift downward. Any eventual decline should be gradual, at most about 3% in a year.

伯克希尔最近签下一份大型保单，使浮存金超过 1000 亿美元。GEICO 和若干专业业务的浮存金几乎肯定会增长，而 National Indemnity 再保险部门的一些大型清算合同浮存金则会逐步下降。即便未来出现下降，也会非常缓慢，最多一年约 3%。

If premiums exceed expenses and eventual losses, insurance produces an underwriting profit that adds to float investment income. Then we enjoy free money and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果保费超过费用和最终损失，保险业务就会产生承保利润，并叠加到浮存金投资收益之上。在这种情况下，我们不仅使用免费资金，更妙的是还因持有这笔资金而获得报酬。

The insurance industry as a whole faces intense competition and low interest rates. Most P/C companies invest heavily in bonds, and as high-yielding legacy investments mature, earnings from float will decline. Berkshire's unmatched financial strength gives it more investment flexibility.

整个保险行业面临激烈竞争和低利率环境。大多数财产/意外保险公司的投资组合高度集中于债券，随着高收益旧债到期，浮存金带来的收益会下降。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们拥有更大的投资灵活性。

Berkshire has operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, with pre-tax gain totaling $28 billion. Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

伯克希尔已连续 14 年实现承保利润，税前收益合计 280 亿美元。严格评估风险是我们保险经理每天的核心工作。在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰，而且是旧约式的信仰。

Under GAAP, float is deducted as a liability as if it had to be paid tomorrow and could not be replaced. But if float is costless and long-enduring, its true value as a liability is far less than its accounting liability.

在 GAAP 下，浮存金被作为负债全额扣除，好像我们明天就必须支付且无法补充。但如果浮存金既无成本又长期存在，那么它作为负债的真实价值远低于会计负债。

A partial offset is $15.5 billion of insurance goodwill on the books, largely representing the price paid for float-generating capabilities. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill is far above its carrying value.

部分抵消项是账上 155 亿美元的保险商誉，它很大程度上代表我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值远高于其账面价值。

Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain, is first by float size. Ajit insures risks that others lack the desire or capital to take on, combining capacity, speed, decisiveness and brains.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是 Ajit Jain 管理的 Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group。Ajit 承保其他人既无意愿也无资本承担的风险，将承保能力、速度、决断力和智慧结合在一起。

Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. Even if the industry suffered a $250 billion mega-catastrophe loss, Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year and remain eager to write business.

伯克希尔在规避风险方面比多数大型保险公司保守得多。即使保险业遭遇 2500 亿美元的超级灾难损失，伯克希尔整体很可能仍会录得可观年度利润，并继续乐于承保新业务。

General Re was managed until recently by Tad Montross, who retired in 2016 after 39 years. Kara Raiguel, who worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO.

General Re 此前由 Tad Montross 管理，他在公司服务 39 年后于 2016 年退休。与 Ajit 共事 16 年的 Kara Raiguel 现在担任 CEO。

A sound insurance operation must understand exposures, conservatively assess likelihood and cost, set a profitable premium and walk away if the appropriate premium cannot be obtained. Many insurers fail the fourth test.

健全的保险业务必须做到四点：理解可能导致损失的风险；保守评估风险发生概率和成本；设定在覆盖损失和费用后仍能盈利的保费；若无法获得合适保费，则愿意离开。许多保险公司都败在第四点。

GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016. Since he became CEO in 1993, GEICO has been flying. Like Ajit, Tony created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.

GEICO 由 Tony Nicely 管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2016 年已服务 55 年。自 1993 年成为 CEO 以来，GEICO 一路腾飞。像 Ajit 一样，Tony 为伯克希尔创造了数百亿美元价值。

GEICO's low costs create a durable moat. Its share of industry volume rose from 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control, to about 12% at yearend 2016. Employment grew from 8,575 to 36,085.

GEICO 的低成本形成了一条持久护城河。其行业份额从伯克希尔 1995 年取得控制权时的 2.5%，增长到 2016 年底约 12%。员工人数从 8,575 人增至 36,085 人。

GEICO's growth accelerated in the second half of 2016 as industry loss costs increased and competitors became less enthusiastic about new customers. GEICO accelerated its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets.

2016 年下半年，随着汽车保险行业损失成本上升，竞争者对新增客户的热情减弱，GEICO 的增长明显加速。GEICO 则加大了新业务力度。我们喜欢在太阳落山时晒草，因为我们知道太阳一定会再次升起。

Berkshire also owns smaller primary insurance companies, including Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance. Over the past 14 years this group earned $4.7 billion from underwriting, about 13% of premium volume, while float grew from $943 million to $11.6 billion.

伯克希尔还拥有一组较小的直接保险公司，包括 Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance。过去 14 年，这一组业务通过承保赚取了 47 亿美元，约为保费规模的 13%，浮存金从 9.43 亿美元增至 116 亿美元。

Recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division.

各部门税前承保收益和年末浮存金汇总。

Berkshire's managers, financial strength and business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world, an asset that time will only make more valuable.

伯克希尔优秀的经理人、顶级财务实力以及由宽阔护城河保护的商业模式，在保险世界中构成独一无二的组合。时间只会让这一资产更有价值。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses. BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy share characteristics that distinguish them from other Berkshire activities. Together they accounted for 33% of Berkshire's after-tax operating earnings in 2016.

受监管、资本密集型业务。BNSF 铁路和 Berkshire Hathaway Energy 具有与伯克希尔其他业务不同的重要特征。2016 年，两者合计贡献了伯克希尔税后经营收益的 33%。

Both companies have huge investments in long-lived regulated assets, partially funded by long-term debt not guaranteed by Berkshire. Their earning power comfortably exceeds interest requirements even in difficult conditions.

两家公司都在寿命很长、受监管的资产上投入巨资，并部分以不由伯克希尔担保的长期债务融资。即使在恶劣经济条件下，它们的盈利能力也足以轻松覆盖利息需求。

BHE and BNSF invested $8.9 billion in plant and equipment in 2016. Berkshire welcomes such infrastructure investments as long as they promise reasonable returns and depend on regulation that treats capital providers fairly.

2016 年，BHE 和 BNSF 在厂房和设备上投入 89 亿美元。只要这些基础设施投资有望带来合理回报，并依赖公平对待资本提供者的监管环境，伯克希尔就乐于进行此类投资。

BHE's Iowa average retail electric rate was 7.1 cents per KWH, below neighboring states and the national average of 10.3 cents. BHE promised Iowans that base rates would not increase until 2029 at the earliest.

BHE 在爱荷华州的平均零售电价为每千瓦时 7.1 美分，低于邻近州和全美 10.3 美分的平均水平。BHE 已向爱荷华州居民承诺，基本电价最早也要到 2029 年才会上调。

BHE and BNSF have led in planet-friendly technology. Iowa wind generation equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to Iowa retail customers in 2016, with projects underway expected to lift the figure to 89% by 2020.

BHE 和 BNSF 在环保技术方面处于领先地位。2016 年，BHE 在爱荷华州的风力发电量相当于向当地零售客户售电量的 55%，在建风电项目预计到 2020 年会把这一比例提升至 89%。

BNSF and BHE key financial figures.

BNSF 和 BHE 的关键财务数据。

HomeServices came with Berkshire's purchase of MidAmerican and has become an attractive real estate brokerage and franchise business. It owns 38 realty companies with more than 29,000 agents operating in 28 states.

HomeServices 随伯克希尔收购 MidAmerican 而来，如今已成为颇具吸引力的房地产经纪和特许经营业务。它拥有 38 家房地产公司，超过 29,000 名经纪人在 28 个州开展业务。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations. These operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. The group includes 44 businesses reporting directly to headquarters, many with numerous units beneath them.

制造、服务和零售业务。这些业务销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气飞机不等。该组包括 44 家直接向总部汇报的企业，其中许多企业旗下又有大量独立业务单元。

This group is a motley crew. Some operations earn terrific returns on unleveraged net tangible assets, in a few cases above 100%; most are solid businesses earning 12% to 20%; a few are serious capital allocation mistakes.

这一组业务非常多样。有些业务在无杠杆净有形资产上获得极高回报，个别超过 100%；多数是稳健业务，回报率在 12% 到 20% 左右；也有少数是我在资本配置上犯下的严重错误。

As a single entity, the manufacturing, service and retailing group is an excellent business. It employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets in 2016 and earned 24% after tax on that capital despite excess cash and little debt.

把制造、服务和零售组视为一个整体，它是一项优秀业务。2016 年，该组平均使用 240 亿美元净有形资产，尽管持有大量多余现金且债务很少，却在这些资本上获得了 24% 的税后回报。

A business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if bought too expensively. Berkshire paid premiums above net tangible assets for many businesses, reflected in goodwill and intangibles, but overall is earning a decent return in this sector.

经济特性很好的企业，如果买价太高，也可能成为糟糕投资。伯克希尔为许多企业支付了高于净有形资产的溢价，反映在商誉和无形资产中；但整体看，我们在这一板块仍获得了不错回报。

Most purchase-accounting amortization expenses are not true economic costs, though railroad depreciation can understate true economic costs. BNSF's GAAP depreciation was $2.1 billion in 2016, but simply spending that amount annually would let the railroad deteriorate.

大多数购买会计下的摊销费用并不是真正的经济成本，但铁路折旧却可能低估真实经济成本。BNSF 2016 年 GAAP 折旧为 21 亿美元，但如果每年只投入这笔钱，铁路很快就会退化并失去竞争力。

Too many managements feature adjusted earnings above GAAP earnings, often excluding restructuring costs and stock-based compensation. Charlie and I want unusual items explained, but regular exclusion of real costs makes us nervous.

太多管理层想方设法报告并强调高于 GAAP 收益的“调整后收益”，常见做法是剔除重组费用和股权薪酬。查理和我希望管理层解释异常项目，但若管理层经常把真实成本排除在外，我们会感到不安。

To say stock-based compensation is not an expense is cavalier. CEOs who do so should explain why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost, or why payroll costs should be excluded when calculating earnings.

说股权薪酬不是费用，是一种轻率做法。这样做的 CEO 应该向股东说明：为什么用有价值的东西支付员工不是成本，或者为什么工资成本在计算收益时应被排除。

Finance and Financial Products. Berkshire's leasing and rental operations are CORT, XTRA and Marmon, each a leader in its field. Clayton Homes is included here because it earns much of its profit from its mortgage portfolio.

金融和金融产品。伯克希尔的租赁和出租业务包括 CORT、XTRA 和 Marmon，它们各自在领域中处于领先。Clayton Homes 也列入本节，因为其大部分收益来自庞大的抵押贷款组合。

Clayton became America's largest home builder in 2016, delivering 42,075 units, or 5% of all new American homes. Its focus remains manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of new American homes costing less than $150,000.

2016 年，Clayton 成为美国最大的住宅建造商，交付 42,075 套住房，占美国新房总量的 5%。不过，它的重点仍是装配式住宅，这类住宅约占价格低于 15 万美元的新建美国住房的 70%。

Clayton's customers are often lower-income families with mediocre credit scores, but they strongly desire home ownership and have reasonable monthly payments averaging $587 including insurance and property taxes. Assistance programs help both borrowers and Clayton.

Clayton 的客户通常是收入较低、信用评分一般的家庭，但他们强烈希望拥有住房，且每月付款较合理，平均 587 美元，已含保险和房产税。贷款展期和付款豁免等援助计划既帮助借款人，也帮助 Clayton。

Marmon's railcar business slowed sharply in 2016, which will reduce earnings in 2017. Fleet utilization fell to 91% in December from 97% a year earlier. Berkshire nevertheless likes the business and expects decent long-term returns.

Marmon 的铁路车辆业务在 2016 年明显放缓，这会使 2017 年收益下降。车队利用率从一年前的 97% 降至 12 月的 91%。不过，伯克希尔仍喜欢这项业务，并期待长期获得不错的股本回报。

Investments. Berkshire lists its fifteen common stock investments with the largest market value at yearend, excluding Kraft Heinz because Berkshire is part of a control group and accounts for it under the equity method.

投资。伯克希尔列出了年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资，不包括 Kraft Heinz，因为伯克希尔属于其控制集团的一部分，必须按权益法核算。

Some investments are managed by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, each independently managing more than $10 billion, including about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets not shown in the table.

表中部分股票由 Todd Combs 或 Ted Weschler 负责管理。二人各自独立管理超过 100 亿美元，其中包括约 76 亿美元的若干伯克希尔子公司养老金信托资产，这些未列入上表。

Excluded from the table but important is Berkshire's $5 billion of preferred stock issued by Bank of America, paying $300 million per year and carrying a warrant to buy 700 million common shares for $5 billion before September 2, 2021.

表中未列出但很重要的是，伯克希尔持有美国银行发行的 50 亿美元优先股，每年支付 3 亿美元股息，并附有一份认股权证，允许伯克希尔在 2021 年 9 月 2 日前以 50 亿美元购买 7 亿股普通股。

Berkshire likes investees repurchasing shares when shares are underpriced. When a company grows and outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders.

当被投资公司以低估价格回购股份时，伯克希尔非常喜欢这种行为。当公司成长而流通股数减少时，股东会受益良多。

About 95% of Berkshire's $86 billion of cash and equivalents was held in U.S. entities and not subject to repatriation tax. Cash held offshore by many U.S. companies is not worth as much as cash held at home.

伯克希尔 860 亿美元现金及等价物中约 95% 由美国实体持有，因此无需缴纳资金汇回税。许多美国公司在海外持有大量现金，这些现金的价值并不等同于在美国本土持有的现金。

Some cash is held in Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries. It is very valuable but slightly less valuable than cash held at the parent, because there are limits on distribution and investment choices.

伯克希尔也有部分现金由保险子公司持有。这仍是非常有价值的资产，但由于分配和投资选择存在限制，其价值略低于母公司层面的现金。

Berkshire has made no commitment to hold marketable securities forever. Owner-Related Business Principle 11 applies to controlled businesses, not marketable securities; any marketable security is available for sale, however unlikely that sale may now seem.

伯克希尔并未承诺永远持有任何可交易证券。股东相关商业原则第 11 条适用于受控企业，而非可交易证券；任何可交易证券都可以出售，尽管目前看来出售的可能性可能很低。

Berkshire, like most corporations, nets more from a dollar of dividends than from a dollar of capital gains. Capital gains face a 35-cent federal tax, while dividends from domestic corporations are taxed at lower effective rates.

像多数公司一样，伯克希尔从 1 美元股息中获得的税后收益，通常高于从 1 美元资本利得中获得的收益。资本利得要缴纳 35 美分联邦所得税，而来自美国公司的股息实际税率较低。

“The Bet” explains how money finds its way to Wall Street. Long Bets, seeded by Jeff Bezos, administers long-term wagers in which each side names a charity and posts its reasoning.

“赌局”这一节说明你的钱如何流向华尔街。Long Bets 由 Jeff Bezos 资助创立，负责管理长期赌约，赌约双方各自指定慈善受益方，并公开发布理由。

In Berkshire's 2005 annual report, Buffett argued that active investment managers in aggregate would underperform rank amateurs who simply sat still in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. He later wagered $500,000 that no professional could pick five hedge funds that would beat a low-cost Vanguard S&P 500 index fund over ten years.

在伯克希尔 2005 年年报中，巴菲特提出，专业主动投资管理者整体而言会跑输那些只是安静持有低成本非管理型指数基金的普通投资者。随后，他愿意以 50 万美元打赌，认为没有专业人士能选出五只对冲基金，在十年内跑赢一只低成本 Vanguard 标普 500 指数基金。

Ted Seides of Protégé Partners accepted the challenge and selected five funds-of-funds investing in more than 100 hedge funds. Each fund-of-funds layer added fees on top of the fees charged by the underlying hedge funds.

Protégé Partners 的 Ted Seides 接受了挑战，并选择了五只“基金中的基金”，它们投资于 100 多只对冲基金。每只基金中的基金都在底层对冲基金收费之上再加一层费用。

Results for the first nine years of the bet.

赌局前九年的结果。

The index fund compounded at 7.1% annually through nine years, while the five funds-of-funds averaged only 2.2%. One million dollars invested in the funds-of-funds would have gained $220,000; the index fund would have gained $854,000.

九年下来，指数基金的年复合增长率为 7.1%，而五只基金中的基金平均仅为 2.2%。投资 100 万美元于这些基金中的基金，只会赚 22 万美元；投资指数基金则会赚 85.4 万美元。

The managers involved were largely honest and intelligent, but results for investors were dismal. Huge fixed fees and performance fees meant managers were showered with compensation. As Gordon Gekko might say: “Fees never sleep.”

参与其中的经理人大多诚实且聪明，但投资者的结果糟糕透顶。巨额固定费用和业绩提成使管理人赚得盆满钵满。用 Gordon Gekko 的话说：“费用永不睡觉。”

Buffett's original Long Bets statement argued that over ten years starting January 1, 2008, the S&P 500 would outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds net of fees, costs and expenses.

巴菲特最初在 Long Bets 网站上的声明认为，从 2008 年 1 月 1 日开始的十年中，在扣除费用、成本和开支后，标普 500 将跑赢一组基金中的对冲基金组合。

Active investors and passive investors together make up the investing universe. If passive investors are destined to achieve average results before costs, active investors must also average out before costs. The group with lower costs wins.

主动投资者和被动投资者合起来构成整个投资世界。如果被动投资者在成本前注定获得平均结果，那么主动投资者在成本前也必然平均如此。成本更低的一组会胜出。

Some skilled individuals can outperform for long periods, but most managers who try will fail. Investing success also breeds failure because good records attract money, huge sums become an anchor and managers seek more assets because fees rise with assets.

确实有少数有能力的人能长期跑赢指数，但多数试图跑赢市场的经理人会失败。投资成功还会孕育失败，因为好业绩会迅速吸引资金，巨额资金会拖累表现，而经理人又会因费用随资产增长而追求更多资金。

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, the managers usually reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

结论是：当数万亿美元由收取高额费用的华尔街人士管理时，通常获得超额利润的是管理者，而不是客户。无论大投资者还是小投资者，都应坚持低成本指数基金。

If a statue is ever erected for the person who has done the most for American investors, Jack Bogle should be the hands-down choice. For decades, he urged investors to use ultra-low-cost index funds and helped millions earn better returns.

如果有一天要为对美国投资者贡献最大的人立像，Jack Bogle 应该毫无争议地当选。几十年来，他一直敦促投资者使用超低成本指数基金，帮助数百万人获得了本来无法取得的更好回报。

Buffett has regularly recommended a low-cost S&P 500 index fund. Friends of modest means often follow the advice, but mega-rich individuals, institutions and pension funds usually seek high-fee managers or consultants instead.

巴菲特经常推荐低成本标普 500 指数基金。财力普通的朋友通常采纳这一建议，但超级富豪、机构和养老金基金往往会转而寻找高收费的管理人或顾问。

The financial elite often has trouble accepting a product available to people investing only a few thousand dollars, even when it is clearly the best expected choice. Buffett estimates this search for superior advice wasted more than $100 billion over the past decade.

金融精英往往难以接受一种只投几千美元的人也能买到的产品，即使从期望值看它明显是最佳选择。巴菲特粗略估计，过去十年，精英阶层寻找“更高级”投资建议造成的浪费超过 1000 亿美元。

Much of the damage fell on pension funds for public employees. Poor performance combined with huge fees left assets underfunded, and taxpayers will have to make up the shortfalls for decades.

相当多的损失落在公共雇员养老金基金身上。糟糕表现叠加高额费用，使这些基金资产严重不足，而纳税人未来几十年都将不得不填补缺口。

Human behavior will not change. Advisors who sell “extra” advice to the wealthy will get rich. The likely outcome is captured by the adage: When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.

人性不会改变。那些向富人出售“额外”投资建议的顾问会变得富有。结果很可能正如那句老话：当有钱人遇到有经验的人，有经验的人最终拿走钱，有钱的人最终获得经验。

The Annual Meeting. In 2016, Berkshire partnered with Yahoo to webcast the annual meeting for the first time. The production drew 1.1 million unique real-time visits and 11.5 million more in replays.

年度股东大会。2016 年，伯克希尔首次与 Yahoo 合作直播年度股东大会。直播实时独立访问量达到 110 万，回放观看量又增加 1150 万。

The 2017 annual meeting will be held on May 6 and webcast again by Yahoo. The webcast will go live at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time, and the interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.

2017 年年度股东大会将于 5 月 6 日举行，并再次由 Yahoo 直播。直播将在美国中部夏令时间上午 9 点开始，采访和会议将同步译成普通话。

For in-person attendees, doors at CenturyLink open at 7:00 a.m.; the shareholder movie begins at 8:30; Q&A runs from 9:30 to 3:30 with a noon lunch break; the formal shareholder meeting begins at 3:45.

对现场参会者，CenturyLink 会场上午 7 点开门；股东电影 8:30 开始；问答环节 9:30 至 3:30，中午休息一小时；正式股东会议 3:45 开始。

Shareholders can shop in the 194,300-square-foot hall adjoining the meeting, buy products from many Berkshire subsidiaries, see the BNSF railroad layout, purchase Brooks commemorative shoes, and participate in the Berkshire 5K.

股东可以在毗邻会场、面积 194,300 平方英尺的展厅购物，购买许多伯克希尔子公司的产品，观看 BNSF 铁路模型，购买 Brooks 纪念跑鞋，并参加 Berkshire 5K 跑步活动。

GEICO will offer quotes and, in most cases, a shareholder discount of about 8%, permitted in 44 of 51 jurisdictions. The Bookworm will carry books and DVDs, including Shoe Dog and Jack Bogle investment classics.

GEICO 将现场报价，并在多数情况下提供约 8% 的股东折扣，该优惠在 51 个司法辖区中的 44 个获准实施。Bookworm 书店将销售书籍和 DVD，包括《鞋狗》和 Jack Bogle 的投资经典。

Nebraska Furniture Mart will offer Berkshire Weekend discount pricing from May 2 through May 8, including in Kansas City and Dallas stores for shareholders who present credentials or evidence of ownership.

Nebraska Furniture Mart 将在 5 月 2 日至 5 月 8 日提供“伯克希尔周末”折扣，堪萨斯城和达拉斯门店也将向出示参会凭证或持股证明的股东提供同样优惠。

Borsheims will host shareholder-only events, including a Friday cocktail reception and Sunday gala. Shareholder prices will be available from May 1 through May 13.

Borsheims 将举办仅限股东参加的活动，包括周五鸡尾酒会和周日主活动。股东价将在 5 月 1 日至 5 月 13 日期间提供。

Shareholders can also see Norman Beck, play bridge with Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, challenge Ariel Hsing at table tennis, and eat at Gorat's on Sunday, May 7.

股东还可以观看 Norman Beck 的魔术表演，与 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg 打桥牌，挑战 Ariel Hsing 的乒乓球，并在 5 月 7 日周日去 Gorat's 用餐。

Three journalists - Carol Loomis, Becky Quick and Andrew Ross Sorkin - will ask shareholder-submitted questions. Three analysts will also ask questions: Jay Gelb, Jonathan Brandt and Gregg Warren.

三位记者 Carol Loomis、Becky Quick 和 Andrew Ross Sorkin 将提问股东提交的问题。三位分析师 Jay Gelb、Jonathan Brandt 和 Gregg Warren 也将提问。

Neither Charlie nor Buffett will get any clue about the questions in advance. Multi-part questions are not allowed, because the goal is to give as many questioners as possible a shot and for shareholders to leave knowing more about Berkshire.

查理和巴菲特事先不会得到任何问题提示。多部分问题不被允许，因为目标是让尽可能多的提问者有机会发问，并让股东离开时比来时更了解伯克希尔。

Berkshire tries to release financial data late on Fridays or early Saturdays so all shareholders have simultaneous access to new information and enough time to digest it before trading. Berkshire does not hold one-on-one briefings with large institutions or analysts.

伯克希尔尽量在周五晚间或周六早晨发布财务数据，使所有股东同时获得新信息，并在交易前有足够时间消化。伯克希尔不与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一沟通。

There is no one more important to Berkshire than the shareholder of limited means who trusts the company with a substantial portion of his or her savings. Buffett keeps that shareholder in mind when running Berkshire and writing the letter.

对伯克希尔而言，没有谁比这样一位股东更重要：他或她财力有限，却把相当一部分积蓄托付给伯克希尔。巴菲特在日常经营公司和写这封信时，脑海里浮现的正是这类股东。

Buffett regularly praises Berkshire's operating managers, who run their businesses as if those were the only assets owned by their families. Their mindset is as shareholder-oriented as can be found among large public companies.

巴菲特经常赞扬伯克希尔的经营经理人，他们经营各自业务时，就像那是自己家庭唯一拥有的资产一样。他们的思维方式在大型上市公司中几乎是最以股东为导向的。

Equally important are the men and women at headquarters, who handle SEC and regulatory requirements, a 30,450-page federal tax return, 3,580 state tax returns, shareholder and media inquiries, the annual report, the annual meeting, board coordination and fact-checking.

同样重要的是总部的同事们。他们处理 SEC 和其他监管要求，提交 30,450 页联邦所得税申报表，监督 3,580 份州税申报，回应股东和媒体询问，完成年报，筹备年度会议，协调董事会活动，并核查这封信的事实。

They also help with university visits, travel, requests and even Buffett's hamburgers and French fries smothered in Heinz ketchup. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and Buffett is proud of them.

他们还协助安排大学生访问、出行、各种请求，甚至为巴菲特准备涂满 Heinz 番茄酱的汉堡和薯条。他们为在伯克希尔工作感到自豪，巴菲特也为他们感到自豪。

Buffett concludes that he is lucky to be surrounded by an excellent staff, talented operating managers and wise, experienced directors. He invites shareholders to Omaha - the cradle of capitalism - on May 6 to meet the Berkshire Bunch.

巴菲特在结尾说，他很幸运，身边有出色的总部团队、才华横溢的经营经理人，以及睿智而经验丰富的董事会。他邀请股东 5 月 6 日来到“资本主义摇篮”奥马哈，与伯克希尔大家庭见面。

February 25, 2017. Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board.

2017 年 2 月 25 日。沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事会主席。