1989 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

1989 年我们的净值增加了 15.15 亿美元，增幅为 44.4%。在过去的 25 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到了 4,296.01 美元，年复合增长率为 23.8%。

What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals.

但真正重要的是内在价值——它表明我们所有组成部分的业务在理性上值多少钱。如果拥有完美的预见能力，这个数字可以通过对企业未来全部现金流入和流出按当期利率折现来计算。按此估值，从马车鞭制造商到手机运营商，所有企业在经济意义上都是平等的。

Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.

当年伯克希尔的账面价值是 19.46 美元时，内在价值要略低一些，因为账面价值完全被绑在了一家纺织业务上，其实际价值并不等于账面数字。现在，我们的大多数业务都远高于其账面价值。这种从折价到溢价的令人愉快的演变意味着伯克希尔的内在商业价值以略高于我们 23.8% 账面价值年增长率的幅度在复利增长。

The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.

后视镜是一回事，挡风玻璃又是另一回事。我们账面价值的很大一部分由权益证券构成，除了少数例外，这些证券在我们的资产负债表上按当前市值列示。年底时，相对于这些证券自身的内在商业价值，它们的定价比过去更高。一个原因是 1989 年股市活跃。更重要的是，这些企业的优点已被广泛认可。虽然它们的股价曾经过低，但现在不是了。

We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.

无论我们的主要持仓相对于内在商业价值如何定价，我们都会保留大部分。这种“至死不渝”的态度，加上这些持仓目前价格高企，意味着不能指望它们未来像过去那样大幅推高伯克希尔的价值。换句话说，我们至今的业绩受益于“双重红利”：（1）我们投资组合中的公司实现了非凡的内在价值增长；（2）市场对这些公司的价格进行了适当的“修正”，提高了它们相对于普通企业的估值，我们因此获得了额外的奖励。我们相信投资组合中的公司将继续创造良好的商业价值增长，并从中获益。但我们的“追赶”奖励已经实现，这意味着未来我们只能满足于“单重红利”。

We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.

我们面临另一个障碍：在一个有限的世界里，高增长率必然会自我毁灭。如果增长的基础很小，这个规律可能暂时不起作用。但当基础急剧膨胀时，派对就结束了：高增长率最终会打造自己的锚。

Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."

卡尔·萨根有趣地描述了这一现象，他思索着每 15 分钟分裂一次进行繁殖的细菌的命运。萨根说：“这意味着每小时翻四倍，每天翻 96 倍。虽然一个细菌的重量只有大约一万亿分之一克，但在一天疯狂的无性繁殖之后，它的后代总重量将相当于一座山……两天后，比太阳还重——不久之后，宇宙中的一切都将由细菌构成。”不用着急，萨根说：总有某种障碍会阻止这种指数级增长。“细菌会耗尽食物，或者互相毒害，或者羞于在公众场合繁殖。”

Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.

即使在糟糕的日子里，查理·芒格（伯克希尔的副董事长，也是我的合伙人）和我也不认为伯克希尔是细菌。同样令我们永远遗憾的是，我们也没有找到每 15 分钟将净值翻一番的方法。此外，我们对于在公众面前进行（财务上的）繁殖一点也不害羞。尽管如此，萨根的观察仍然适用。在伯克希尔目前 49 亿美元净值的基础上，我们发现要实现账面价值年均 15% 的增长，比我们当初从 2200 万美元起步实现 23.8% 的平均增长要困难得多。

Taxes

税收

Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.

我们 1989 年 15 亿美元的收益是在扣除了约 7.12 亿美元的所得税费用后实现的。此外，伯克希尔在五大被投资公司所支付的所得税中占有的份额总计约 1.75 亿美元。

Of this year's tax charge, about $172 million will be paid currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.

在今年的税费中，约 1.72 亿美元将当期支付；剩余的 5.4 亿美元为递延税款。几乎所有的递延部分都与 1989 年我们持有的普通股未实现利润的增加有关。针对这一增加，我们按 34% 的税率计提了准备金。

We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2 billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.

针对 1987 年和 1988 年产生的所有未实现利润，我们也按该税率计提了准备金。但正如我们去年解释的，我们在 1987 年之前积累的未实现收益——约 12 亿美元——按当时通行的 28% 税率计提了准备金。

A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth, by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.

一项新的会计准则可能被采纳，要求公司对所有收益按当前税率（无论是多少）计提准备金。如果税率为 34%，这样的规则将使我们的递延所得税负债增加约 7100 万美元，同时使我们的净值减少同样的数额——这是将我们 1987 年前的收益准备金提高六个百分点的结果。由于该提议的规则引发了广泛争议，且其最终形式尚不明确，我们尚未做出这一变更。

As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.

正如你从第 27 页的资产负债表中所见，如果我们在年底按市值出售所有证券，我们将欠税超过 11 亿美元。这 11 亿美元的负债，与年底后 15 天应付给贸易债权人的 11 亿美元负债相等，甚至类似吗？显然不是——尽管这两个项目对经审计的净值影响完全相同，都使其减少 11 亿美元。

On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.

另一方面，这笔递延税负债是否因为只有在出售股票时才会触发支付（而我们在很大程度上无意出售这些股票）而成为毫无意义的会计虚构？答案同样是否定的。

In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224 million of gains.

从经济角度看，这笔负债类似于美国财政部提供的一笔免息贷款，只有在我们选择时才会到期（当然，除非国会决定对未实现收益征税）。这笔“贷款”在其他方面也很奇特：它只能用于为持有特定的、已升值的股票提供融资，并且其规模会波动——每日随市场价格变化，若税率变动则定期变化。实际上，这笔递延税负债等同于一笔非常大的转移税，只有当我们选择从一项资产转移到另一项资产时才需支付。事实上，我们在 1989 年出售了一些相对较小的持仓，在 2.24 亿美元的收益上承担了约 7600 万美元的“转移税”。

Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme comparison.

由于税法的运作方式，我们偏爱的“瑞普·范·温克尔”式的投资方式——如果成功——在数学上比更疯狂的方法具有重要优势。让我们看一个极端的比较。

Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.

假设伯克希尔只有 1 美元，我们将其投入一只证券，到年底翻倍，然后卖出。再假设我们用税后收益在接下来的 19 年每年重复这一过程，每次翻倍。20 年结束时，我们为每次出售的利润支付的 34% 的资本利得税将为政府带来约 13,000 美元，我们剩下约 25,250 美元。还不错。然而，如果我们在 20 年里只做一项了不起的投资，该投资本身翻了 20 倍，那么我们的 1 美元将增长到 1,048,576 美元。如果我们那时套现，将支付约 356,500 美元的 34% 的税款，剩下约 692,000 美元。

The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.

造成这种惊人差异的唯一原因是纳税时机。有趣的是，政府从情景 2 中获得的收益与我们完全相同的 27:1 的比例——收取 356,500 美元的税 vs. 13,000 美元——尽管，不可否认，它必须等待这笔钱。

We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after-tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.

我们应该强调，我们并非因为这些数学计算而采取了偏向长期投资承诺的策略。事实上，通过相当频繁地从一个投资转向另一个投资，我们有可能获得更高的税后回报。很多年前，查理和我正是这么做的。

Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.

现在我们宁愿保持不动，即使这意味着稍低的回报。原因很简单：我们发现卓越的商业关系如此罕见且如此令人愉悦，以至于我们希望保留所有已经建立起来的关系。这个决定对我们来说尤其容易，因为我们觉得这些关系将产生良好（尽管可能不是最优）的财务结果。考虑到这一点，我们认为放弃与我们认为有趣且令人钦佩的人相处的时间，转而与我们不认识、且人性品质可能远接近平均水平的人相处，是没什么意义的。那类似于为了钱而结婚——在大多数情况下都是一个错误，如果一个人已经富有则是疯狂。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告盈余的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告盈余的主要来源。在此列报中，商誉摊销和其他主要的购买价格会计调整不针对其适用的特定业务进行扣除，而是汇总后单独列示。这种处理方式让您可以看到我们业务的盈余，就像我们没有购买它们时报告的那样。我在过去的报告中已经解释过，为什么我们认为这种列报形式对投资者和管理者来说比使用公认会计原则（GAAP）更有用，因为 GAAP 要求逐笔业务进行购买价格调整。当然，我们在表中显示的总净收益与经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包括斯科特·费策金融集团和互助储蓄与贷款公司的利息费用。

We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们还请您参阅第 45-51 页，我们将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个部分。这与查理和我的思维方式一致，应该有助于您计算伯克希尔的内在价值。这几页显示了以下部分的资产负债表和损益表：（1）我们的保险业务，并列明了其主要投资头寸；（2）我们的制造、出版和零售业务，排除了某些非经营性资产和购买价格会计调整；（3）我们从事金融类业务的子公司，即互助储蓄公司和斯科特·费策金融公司；（4）一个“其他”类别，包括第（2）部分中公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是有价证券）、所有购买价格会计调整，以及韦斯科和伯克希尔母公司的各种资产和债务。

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.

如果您将这四个部分的收益和净值相加，得出的总额将与我们 GAAP 报表中的总额一致。但是，我想强调，这种四类别的列报方式不属于我们审计师的职责范围，他们绝不会予以认可。

In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about $45 million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investees totaled about $212 million last year, not counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been close to $500 million rather than the $300 million shown in the table.

除了我们报告的收益之外，我们还从被投资公司获得了标准会计准则不允许我们报告的大量收益。在第 15 页，我们列出了五大被投资公司，1989 年我们从这些公司获得的税后股息约为 4500 万美元。然而，去年我们在这些被投资公司留存收益中的份额总计约为 2.12 亿美元，这不包括 GEICO 和可口可乐实现的大额资本利得。如果这 2.12 亿美元分配给我们，我们自己的营业收益在支付额外税款后将接近 5 亿美元，而不是表中显示的 3 亿美元。

The question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are - and even think they may be more valuable. The reason for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these cases.

您必须判断的问题是，这些未分配的收益对我们来说是否与我们所报告的收益一样有价值。我们相信它们同样有价值——甚至认为可能更有价值。得出“双鸟在林不如一鸟在手可能变成一鸟在手不如双鸟在林”这一结论的原因是，这些被投资公司留存的收益将由才华横溢、以所有者为导向的管理者来配置，他们有时在自己的业务中对这些资金有比我们更好的用途。我不会对大多数管理层做出如此慷慨的评价，但在这些情况下是合适的。

In our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best measured by a "look-through" approach, in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our "look-through" earnings must grow at about the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in order to reach this 15% goal.

在我们看来，衡量伯克希尔基本盈利能力的最佳方法是“透视”法，即我们将被投资公司留存的营业收益中我们应占的份额附加到我们自己报告的营业收益上，在这两种情况下均排除资本利得。为了使我们内在商业价值以年均 15% 的速度增长，我们的“透视”收益必须以大致相同的速度增长。我们需要现有被投资公司的大量帮助，并且不时需要增加新的投资，才能达到这 15% 的目标。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险业务

In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing and retail operations "The Sainted Seven." With our acquisition of Borsheim's early in 1989, the challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed: Let's call the group "The Sainted Seven Plus One."

过去，我们将主要的制造、出版和零售业务称为“神圣七家”。随着我们 1989 年初收购博希姆公司，面临的挑战是找到一个既押头韵又合适的新名称。我们失败了：让我们称这个集团为“神圣七家加一”。

This divine assemblage - Borsheim's, The Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, World Book - is a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.

这个神圣的组合——博希姆珠宝、布法罗新闻报、费希海默兄弟公司、科比公司、内布拉斯加家具卖场、斯科特·费策制造集团、喜诗糖果、世界图书——是一批经济特征从良好到极佳的企业。其管理者从卓越到卓越。

Most of these managers have no need to work for a living; they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that's exactly what they do. Their combined financial statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers - the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - I feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his 1927 New York Yankees.

这些管理者中的大多数无需为谋生而工作；他们出现在球场是因为他们喜欢击出本垒打。而他们正是这么做的。他们合并的财务报表（包括一些较小业务的报表），见第 49 页，说明了他们的表现有多么出色。按历史会计基础计算，这些业务的税后收益是平均股本的 57%。而且，这一回报是在没有净杠杆的情况下实现的：现金等价物与有息债务相匹配。当我念出我们管理者的名字——布姆金家族、弗里德曼家族、赫尔德曼家族、查克·哈金斯、斯坦·利普西和拉尔夫·谢伊——我感觉到了米勒·哈金斯在宣布他 1927 年纽约洋基队阵容时一定体验过的那种兴奋。

Let's take a look, business by business:

让我们逐家企业来看：

o In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.

o 在加入伯克希尔的第一年，博希姆达到了所有预期。销售额显著增长，现在比四年前公司迁至现址时高出两倍多。在搬迁前的六年里，销售额也翻了一番。艾克·弗里德曼，博希姆的管理天才——我是认真的——只有一个速度：快进。

If you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.

如果你没去过那里，你就从未见过像博希姆这样的珠宝店。由于它在单一地点进行巨额销售，该店可以在所有价格范围内保持巨大的选择范围。出于同样的原因，它可以将其费用率控制在提供类似商品的珠宝店普遍费用率的三分之一左右。该店对费用的严格控制，加上其非凡的购买力，使其能够提供远低于其他珠宝商的价格。而这些价格反过来又产生了更大的销量，如此循环往复。最终结果是，在季节性繁忙的日子里，店内客流量高达 4,000 人。

Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.

艾克·弗里德曼不仅是一位杰出的商人和伟大的表演家，也是一位正直的人。我们没有经过审计就买下了这家公司，所有的惊喜都是积极的。“如果你不懂珠宝，就了解你的珠宝商”这句话很有道理，无论你是在购买整个企业还是一颗小钻石。

A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.

有一个故事可以说明我为什么如此喜欢艾克：每隔两年，我会参加一个非正式团体的聚会，大家聚在一起娱乐并探讨一些话题。去年九月，在圣达菲的主教旅馆聚会时，我们邀请艾克、他的妻子罗兹和他的儿子艾伦过来，给我们讲讲宝石和珠宝生意。

Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive - Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. "See that safe?" he said. "This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn't know what it is." I breathed easier. Ike went on: "See those two big fellows with guns on their hips? They'll be guarding the safe all night." I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: "And besides, Warren," he confided, "the jewels aren't in the safe."

艾克决定让这群人大开眼界，所以他从奥马哈带来了大约价值 2000 万美元的特别精美的商品。我有点担心——主教旅馆可不是诺克斯堡——在他演讲前一天的开幕派对上，我向艾克提到了我的担忧。艾克把我拉到一边。“看到那个保险柜了吗？”他说。“今天下午我们换了密码，现在连酒店管理层都不知道是什么了。”我松了口气。艾克接着说：“看到那两个腰挎枪的大个子了吗？他们会整夜看守保险柜。”我现在准备重新加入派对。但艾克靠得更近了：“此外，沃伦，”他悄悄告诉我，“珠宝不在保险柜里。”

How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.

有这样一个伙伴，我们怎么可能失败——尤其是当他还有一个才华横溢、精力充沛的家庭团队：艾伦、马文·科恩和唐·耶鲁。

At See's Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first in many years.

在喜诗糖果，我们的销售量（磅）增长了 8%，尽管 1988 年本身已是创纪录的一年。1989 年的业绩中包括出色的同店销售量增长，这是我们多年来的首次。

Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4 million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make See's special.

广告在这一出色表现中发挥了重要作用。我们将广告总支出从 400 万美元增加到 500 万美元，并从我们的代理机构 Hal Riney & Partners, Inc. 那里获得了文案，这些文案百分之百精准地传达了使喜诗与众不同的品质。

In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses, such as See's, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At See's, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for this result.

在我们的媒体业务中，比如布法罗新闻报，我们出售广告。在其他业务中，比如喜诗，我们是买家。当我们购买时，我们完全践行我们在销售时所宣扬的原则。在喜诗，去年我们在报纸广告上的支出增加了两倍多，达到了我所记得的最高销售占比。回报非常出色，我们感谢哈尔·赖尼以及精准投放的报纸广告的力量带来的这一成果。

See's splendid performances have become routine. But there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.

喜诗的出色表现已成为常态。但查克·哈金斯的管理绝非寻常：他每天参与生产和销售的各个方面，向我们每年需要生产和分销超过 2700 万磅糖果的数千名员工传递质量和服务的信息。在一家拥有 225 家门店以及庞大的邮购和电话业务的公司里，要做到让几乎每一位顾客都满意离开，绝非易事。查克让它看起来很容易。

The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500 - quit in May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family/management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.

内布拉斯加家具卖场在 1989 年实现了创纪录的销售额和出色的盈利，但有一个令人遗憾的消息。B 夫人——罗斯·布姆金，52 年前用 500 美元创办了这家公司——在 5 月份辞职，原因是她与布姆金家族/管理层的其他成员在地毯部的改造和运营上存在分歧。

Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American, but in this particular case I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past three years, while the store's other departments increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).

B 夫人可能比任何在世美国人都做出了更多明智的商业决策，但在这个特定案例中，我相信家族的其他成员是完全正确的：在过去三年里，当商店的其他部门销售额增长了 24% 时，地毯销售额却下降了 17%（但这并不是因为 B 夫人缺乏销售能力，她个人的销售额一直远远超过店里的任何其他销售人员）。

You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger's heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age 96 she has started a new business selling - what else? - carpet and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.

你会很高兴地知道，B 夫人继续让霍雷肖·阿尔杰笔下的英雄们看起来像是气血不足的受害者。在 96 岁高龄，她开始了一项新业务，卖什么？当然是地毯和家具。而且一如既往，她每周工作七天。

At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.

在家具卖场，路易、罗恩和厄夫·布姆金继续推动着这家迄今为止全国最大、最成功的家居用品商店。他们是杰出的商人，杰出的管理者，与他们交往是一种乐趣。他们商业敏锐度的一个指标：1989 年第四季度，地毯部在奥马哈市场的消费者份额达到了 75.3%，高于一年前的 67.7%，是其最接近竞争对手的六倍多。

NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.

NFM 和博希姆遵循完全相同的成功公式：（1）在一个地点提供无与伦比的商品广度和深度；（2）行业内最低的运营成本；（3）最精明的采购，部分原因是购买量巨大；（4）毛利率因此远低于竞争对手，价格也相应更低；（5）友好的个性化服务，家族成员随时在场。

Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989 - off a record 1988 - and remains the paper's largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut space purchases in 1989; our experience at See's and NFM would indicate they made a major mistake.

再次为报纸做宣传：NFM 在 1989 年将其在当地报纸上的广告行数增加了 20% 以上——在 1988 年创纪录的基础上——并且仍然是该报迄今为止最大的 ROP 广告客户。（ROP 广告是指印刷在报纸上的那种，与预印插页广告相对。）据我所知，奥马哈是唯一一个家居用品店成为广告领导者的城市。许多零售商在 1989 年削减了广告版面购买；我们在喜诗和 NFM 的经验表明他们犯了一个大错误。

The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration - the percentage of local households that purchase it each day. Second, in "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news-rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.

布法罗新闻报在 1989 年继续在三个方面表现出色：首先，在主要都市报纸中，无论是平日刊还是周日刊，新闻报的家庭渗透率（每天购买该报的当地家庭比例）排名第一。其次，在“新闻版面”（报纸专门用于新闻的部分）方面，该报在 1989 年为 50.1%，而 1988 年为 49.5%，这一水平再次使其比任何同类美国报纸都更注重新闻。第三，在许多主要报纸利润下滑的一年里，新闻报连续第七次创下利润纪录。

To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single "megaphone." A low-penetration paper is a far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.

在某种程度上，这三个因素是相关的，尽管很明显，高比例的新闻版面本身会显著降低利润。然而，一个庞大且被明智利用的新闻版面会吸引广泛的读者，从而提高渗透率。高渗透率反过来又使报纸对零售商特别有价值，因为它允许他们通过一个“扩音器”与整个社区对话。对于许多广告商来说，低渗透率的报纸的购买吸引力要小得多，最终会在广告费率和利润两方面都受损。

It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the News, has been falling - from 1,113,000 in 1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988. Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County. Last year - with population at least 5% lower - the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase in penetration.

应该强调的是，我们出色的渗透率既非偶然也非自动得来。新闻报的本土市场伊利县的人口一直在下降——从 1970 年的 111.3 万降至 1980 年的 101.5 万，再降至 1988 年估计的 96.6 万。发行量数据则讲述了另一个故事。1975 年，就在我们开始发行周日版前不久，历史悠久的布法罗报纸 Courier-Express 在伊利县销售了 207,500 份周日版。去年——在人口至少减少 5% 的情况下——新闻报平均销售了 292,700 份。我相信，在其他任何主要的周日报纸市场，都没有出现过如此接近的渗透率增长。

When this kind of gain is made - and when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town - someone is doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that is frequently late, because of production problems or distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content.

当取得这样的增长时——当一份报纸在其家乡达到无与伦比的接受度时——一定是有人做对了事情。在这种情况下，主要功劳显然属于我们的长期编辑默里·莱特，他每天都在创造一个信息丰富、有用且有趣的产品。功劳也应归于发行和生产部门：由于生产问题或分发薄弱而经常迟到的报纸，无论其编辑内容多么强大，都会失去客户。

Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan's managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a talented manager who knows - and cares - about every nut and bolt of the business.

新闻报的发行人斯坦·利普西创造的利润完全达到了我们产品实力应有的水平。我相信，与普通管理者在相同情况下所能实现的收益相比，斯坦的管理技能带来的利润率至少高出五个百分点。这是一个了不起的表现，只有一位了解并关心业务每一个细节的有才华的管理者才能做到。

Stan's knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business were spent on the news side and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.

应该强调的是，斯坦的知识和才能也延伸到编辑产品。他早年从事新闻工作，在开发和编辑一系列报道方面发挥了关键作用，这些报道于 1972 年为奥马哈太阳报赢得了普利策奖。斯坦和我已经合作了 20 多年，经历了顺境和逆境，我找不到比他更好的合作伙伴了。

At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - continue their extraordinary performance. Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.

在费希海默，赫尔德曼家族——鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德——继续着他们非凡的表现。1989 年的利润有所下降，原因是该公司在整合 1988 年的一次重大收购时遇到了一些问题。这些问题会随着时间得到解决。与此同时，费希海默的投资资本回报率仍然出色。

Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year's annual meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That's only a slight exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.

和我们所有的管理者一样，赫尔德曼家族对他们业务的细节有着非凡的掌握。在去年的年度会议上，我提到当一个囚犯进入圣昆廷监狱时，鲍勃和乔治可能知道他的衬衫尺码。这仅仅是略微夸张：无论讨论的是国内的哪个地区，他们都清楚地知道主要客户和竞争对手的情况。

Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed.

尽管我们四年前收购了费希海默，但查理和我从未参观过它的任何工厂或位于辛辛那提的总部。我们很像孤独的梅泰格维修工：赫尔德曼的管理产品如此优秀，以至于永远不需要上门维修。

Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group - World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500. And he's running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.

拉尔夫·谢伊在管理我们最大的集团——世界图书、科比和斯科特·费策制造公司方面继续做着出色的工作。自我们收购以来，这些业务的总收益每年都在增长，投资资本回报率仍然非常出色。拉尔夫管理的企业规模足够大，如果独立存在，可以进入财富 500 强。他以一种按股本回报率衡量会使他名列前 10% 的方式管理着它。

For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago's Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us.

多年来，世界图书一直在芝加哥商品市场的单一地点运营。由于租约即将到期，该公司正在将业务分散到四个地点。这一转变的代价巨大；然而 1989 年的利润仍然保持良好。还需要一年时间，搬迁的成本才能完全成为过去。

Kirby's business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in 1990.

去年科比的业务特别强劲，出口销售大幅增长。国际业务在过去两年中增长了一倍多，在过去四年中增长了四倍；其销量占比从 5% 上升到 20%。我们 1989 年最大的资本支出是在科比，为 1990 年的重大型号变更做准备。

Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.

拉尔夫的业务贡献了第 49 页所示非保险集团总收益的约 40%。当我们在 1986 年初收购斯科特·费策时，我们收购拉尔夫作为管理者与收购这些业务本身同等重要。除了创造非凡的收益外，拉尔夫还非常擅长管理资本。这些能力为伯克希尔创造了资金，进而使我们能够做出许多其他有利可图的承诺。

And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.

至此，我们完成了对 1927 年洋基队的回答。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

下面是我们通常列出的财产意外险行业关键数据表的最新版本：

Source: A.M. Best Co.

来源：A.M. Best 公司

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表总保险成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入的比较：比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。当考虑到保险公司因持有保单持有人的资金（“浮存金”）而获得的投资收益时，综合比率在 107-111 之间通常会产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供的资金所赚取的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.

基于先前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计该行业的已发生损失将以每年约 10% 的速度增长，即使在总体通胀率低得多的年份也是如此。（实际上，在过去 25 年中，已发生损失以更快的速度增长，为 11%。）如果与此同时保费增长大幅落后于 10% 的比率，承保损失将会增加，尽管该行业在业务恶化时准备金不足的倾向可能会暂时掩盖损失的规模。

Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was "almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years." This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast. Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it down.

去年我们曾说，综合比率的攀升“几乎肯定会持续——并且很可能会加速——至少再持续两年”。今年我们不会预测加速，但在其他方面必须重复去年的预测。保费增长远远低于每年所需的 10%。还要记住，10% 的增长率只能稳定综合比率，而不能使其下降。

The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a "normal" year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree.

1989 年综合比率的增幅略高于我们的预期，因为巨灾（以雨果飓风为首）异常严重。这些异常情况可能约占增幅的两个百分点。如果 1990 年更接近“正常”年份，综合比率应该只会从 1989 年因巨灾而膨胀的基础上微幅上升。不过，到 1991 年，该比率可能会以更大的幅度攀升。

Commentators frequently discuss the "underwriting cycle" and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics.

评论员经常讨论“承保周期”并猜测其下一个转折点。如果这个词用来暗示节奏性特征，在我们看来是用词不当，会导致对该行业基本经济状况的错误思考。

The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new "corrected" rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.

几十年前，当该行业和监管机构合作以卡特尔方式开展业务时，这个术语是合适的。那时，综合比率有节奏地波动，原因有两个，都与滞后有关。首先，分析过去的数据，然后用它来设定新的“修正”费率，随后几乎所有保险公司都实施了这些费率。其次，当时几乎所有保单的期限都是一到三年——这意味着定价错误的保单需要相当长的时间才能到期——这延迟了新费率对收入的影响。这两个滞后的反应使综合比率表现得像交流电一样。同时，缺乏显著的价格竞争保证了行业在整个周期平均的利润将是令人满意的。

The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at independently-established prices. Such a configuration - whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies - is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.

卡特尔时期早已过去。现在该行业有数百家参与者以独立制定的价格销售类似商品的产品。这样的配置——无论销售的产品是钢材还是保险单——在所有情况下都必然导致低于正常的盈利能力，只有一种情况例外：可用产能短缺。这些时期发生的频率和持续时间决定了相关行业的平均盈利能力。

In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is, it's considered appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.

在大多数行业，产能是用物理术语描述的。然而，在保险界，产能通常用财务术语描述；也就是说，如果一家公司拥有 Y 美元的净资产，那么它承保不超过 X 美元的业务被认为是合适的。然而，在实践中，这种约束已被证明是无效的。监管机构、保险经纪人和客户都迟迟不对那些过度使用资源的公司进行约束。当公司严重夸大其真实资本时，他们也会默许。因此，如果一家公司有意愿，它可以用很少的资本承保大量业务。因此，从根本上说，任何特定时刻的行业产能数量主要取决于保险管理者的精神状态。

All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits. Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely - and most assuredly is not happening now.

理解了所有这些，预测该行业的利润并不十分困难。只有当产能短缺时，才会实现良好的利润。只有当保险公司感到害怕时，才会出现短缺。这种情况很少发生——而且现在肯定没有发生。

Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes - Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake - will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.

一些分析人士认为，最近对保险业征收的更繁重的税收以及 1989 年的巨灾——雨果飓风和加州地震——将导致价格显著走强。我们不同意。这些逆境并没有消除保险公司以当前价格承保业务的渴望。因此，1990 年的保费收入不会增长 10%，这意味着负面的承保趋势不会逆转。

The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices. And we're a long way from that point.

与此同时，该行业会表示需要更高的价格才能实现与美国普通企业相当的盈利能力。当然它需要。钢铁行业也需要。但需求和愿望与行业的长期盈利能力无关。相反，经济基本面决定结果。只有当几乎所有保险公司在价格更高的情况下仍在拒绝业务时，保险业的盈利能力才会改善。我们离那一点还有很长的路要走。

Berkshire's premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in 1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman's Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit.

伯克希尔 1990 年的保费收入可能会降至 1.5 亿美元左右（从 1986 年 10 亿美元的高点下降），部分原因是我们的传统业务持续萎缩，部分原因是我们获得 Fireman's Fund 7% 业务的合同已于去年 8 月到期。无论下降幅度多大，都不会让我们感到不安。我们对承保在数学期望上会亏损的保险没有兴趣；我们在做自己认为有盈利期望的交易时已经经历了足够多的失望。

However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns "CAT covers," which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies (and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money.)

然而，我们对定价合适的业务胃口很大，1989 年的一个故事可以说明这一点。它涉及“CAT 保障”，这是 primary 保险公司（以及再保险公司自身）购买的再保险合同，用以保护自己免受单一巨灾（如龙卷风或飓风）导致大量保单产生损失。在这些合同中，primary 保险公司可能会自留单次事件的损失，比如最高 1000 万美元，在此之上购买不同层次的再保险。当损失超过自留金额时，再保险公司通常支付超限部分的 95%，直至其合同限额，primary 保险公司支付剩余部分。（通过要求 primary 保险公司保留每层损失的 5%，再保险公司让其在每次损失理赔中都拥有财务利益，并防止其浪费再保险公司的资金。）

CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium. This provision protects the primary company from being "bare" for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event. The duration of "an event" is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under this definition, a wide-spread storm, causing damage for three days, will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause. If the storm lasts four days, however, the primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event.

CAT 保障通常是期限为一年的保单，并且规定一次自动恢复，即如果 primary 保险公司的保障因巨灾而耗尽，则需要支付另一笔保费，为该年度剩余时间购买第二份保障。这一条款可防止 primary 公司在第一次巨灾事件后即使是很短的时间内处于“裸奔”状态。“一个事件”的持续时间通常由合同限制为 primary 公司指定的任何 72 小时时段。根据这个定义，如果一场造成三天损失的广泛风暴由单一气候原因引起，则将被归类为单一事件。然而，如果风暴持续四天，primary 公司将提出索赔，划出遭受损失最大的连续 72 小时。该时段之外发生的损失将被视为由单独事件引起。

In 1989, two unusual things happened. First, Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured loss, at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit within weeks, causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate, even well after the event. Slammed by these two - or possibly three - major catastrophes, some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection, either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so.

1989 年发生了两件不寻常的事情。首先，雨果飓风造成了 40 亿美元或更多的保险损失，但其发生的节奏使得加勒比地区同等严重的损失发生之后，卡罗莱纳地区的大规模损失发生在略多于 72 小时之后。其次，几周后加州地震发生，造成的保险损失即使在事件发生很久之后也难以估计。受到这两次（或可能三次）重大巨灾的打击，一些 primary 保险公司，以及许多自己购买了 CAT 保障的再保险公司，要么用完了它们的自动第二次保障，要么不确定是否已经用完。

At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money - perhaps twice because of the reinstatements - and not taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a CAT premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of protection purchased. For some years, we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business.

在那个时候，CAT 保单的卖家已经损失了大量资金——由于恢复条款可能损失了两倍——并且没有收取多少保费。根据许多变量，CAT 保费通常在所购买保障金额的 3% 到 15% 之间。多年来，我们一直认为此类保费不足，并一直远离这块业务。

But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare, and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds, there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much-needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage, advertising that proposition in trade publications. Though we did not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount.

但由于 1989 年的灾难使许多保险公司实际上或可能处于“裸奔”状态，并且也让大多数 CAT 承保商舔舐伤口，地震后急需的巨灾保障立即出现了短缺。价格瞬间变得有吸引力，特别是对于 CAT 承保商自己购买的再保险。伯克希尔·哈撒韦也立即表示愿意承保高达 2.5 亿美元的巨灾保障，并在行业刊物上刊登了这一提议。虽然我们并没有承保所有我们寻求的业务，但在繁忙的十天内，我们确实签订了不少保单。

Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes write $250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage. But they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large percentage of the business with other companies. When they can't "lay off" in size, they disappear from the market.

我们愿意为明天可能发生的损失承担如此巨额的资金，这使我们与世界上任何一家再保险公司都不同。当然，有些公司有时会承保 2.5 亿美元甚至更多的巨灾保障。但他们这样做的前提是他们能够反过来将大部分业务分保给其他公司。当他们无法大规模“转分保”时，他们就会从市场上消失。

Berkshire's policy, conversely, is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent. And in our case, that's a lot.

相反，伯克希尔的政策是自留我们承保的业务，而不是分保出去。当费率有盈利预期时，我们希望在审慎的前提下承担尽可能多的风险。对我们来说，这个量很大。

We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other company because of two factors: (1) by the standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our insurance companies of about $6 billion - the second highest amount in the United States; and (2) we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached intelligently.

我们将为自己的账户承担比任何其他公司都多的再保险风险，原因有两个：（1）按照监管会计标准，我们保险公司的净资产约为 60 亿美元——在美国排名第二；（2）我们根本不关心我们按季度甚至按年度报告的收益是多少，只要导致这些收益（或损失）的决策是明智地做出的。

Obviously, if we write $250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves, there is some probability that we will lose the full $250 million in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it is not zero. If we had a loss of that magnitude, our after-tax cost would be about $165 million. Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our well-being.

显然，如果我们承保 2.5 亿美元的巨灾保障并全部自留，那么在单个季度内损失全部 2.5 亿美元的可能性是存在的。这种可能性很低，但并非为零。如果我们遭受如此规模的损失，我们的税后成本将约为 1.65 亿美元。尽管这远远超过伯克希尔正常情况下一个季度的盈利，但这种损害只会打击我们的自尊，而不会影响我们的福祉。

This posture is one few insurance managements will assume. Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity. But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single-quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises, over time, to produce superior results. I can understand their thinking: What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders. We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly.

这种姿态很少有保险管理层会采取。通常，他们愿意以几乎保证股本回报率平庸的条件承保大量业务。但他们不想让自己暴露在令人尴尬的单一季度亏损中，即使导致亏损的管理策略从长期看有望产生优异的结果。我能理解他们的想法：对所有者最有利的不一定对管理者最有利。幸运的是，查理和我都拥有完全的工作保障，并且我们的经济利益与股东完全一致。只要我们不觉得自己做了蠢事，我们就愿意看起来很傻。

Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we become less competitive only when capacity is abundant. Of course, we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization - we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action. Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case, Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised.

顺便提一下，我们的运作方式使我们成为行业中的稳定力量。我们在产能短缺时增加大量产能，只有在产能充裕时才变得不那么有竞争力。当然，我们遵循这一政策并非为了稳定——我们遵循它是因为我们相信这是最明智、最有利可图的行动方案。尽管如此，我们的行为稳定了市场。在这种情况下，亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”确实如其宣传的那样在发挥作用。

Currently, we hold an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume. This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment income from policyholder funds large. This pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off.

目前，与保费收入相比，我们持有异常大量的浮存金。这种情况应该会在未来几年为我们带来相当有利的保险业绩，就像 1989 年一样。我们的承保亏损应该是可以容忍的，而来自保单持有人资金的投资收益将很可观。然而，随着我们的浮存金流失，这种令人愉快的情况将逐渐恶化。

At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, Phil Urban, and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality.

然而，在某个时刻，我们将有机会承保大量有利可图的业务。迈克·戈德伯格和他的管理团队罗德·埃尔德里德、迪诺斯·约尔达努、阿吉特·贾恩、菲尔·厄本和唐·沃斯特正继续为这一可能性做好充分准备。

Marketable Securities

有价证券

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险公司选择有价证券时，我们通常从五个主要类别中进行选择：（1）长期普通股投资，（2）中期固定收益证券，（3）长期固定收益证券，（4）短期现金等价物，以及（5）短期套利承诺。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories; we just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

在选择这些类别时，我们没有特别的偏好；我们只是持续在其中寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，并且始终将自己限制在我们认为自己理解的投资选择上。我们的标准与最大化即时可报告的收益无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终的净值。

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面我们列出价值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持股。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股比例不足 100% 的子公司。

This list of companies is the same as last year's and in only one case has the number of shares changed: Our holdings of Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23,350,000.

这份公司名单与去年相同，只有一家公司的股份数量发生了变化：我们对可口可乐的持股从 1988 年底的 14,172,500 股增加到 23,350,000 股。

This Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to investment opportunities, no matter how obscure or well-disguised they may be. I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or 1936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son, the family grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each. In this excursion into high-margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the product.

这项对可口可乐的投资再次证明了你们的主席对投资机会的反应速度之快令人难以置信，无论这些机会多么不起眼或伪装得多好。我相信我喝第一杯可口可乐是在 1935 年或 1936 年。可以肯定的是，在 1936 年，我开始从家族杂货店巴菲特父子公司以 6 瓶 25 美分的价格购买可乐，然后在附近以每瓶 5 美分的价格出售。在这次涉足高利润零售业的尝试中，我恰当地观察到了该产品非凡的消费者吸引力和商业潜力。

I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers, anthracite producers, textile businesses, trading-stamp issuers, and the like. (If you think I'm making this up, I can supply the names.) Only in the summer of 1988 did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.

在接下来的 52 年里，随着可口可乐覆盖全球，我继续注意到这些品质。然而，在此期间，我小心翼翼地避免购买哪怕一股，而是将我的大部分净资产分配给了街道铁路公司、风车制造商、无烟煤生产商、纺织企业、 trading-stamp 发行商等等。（如果你认为我是在编造，我可以提供名字。）直到 1988 年夏天，我的大脑终于与我的眼睛建立了联系。

What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After drifting somewhat in the 1970's, Coca-Cola had in 1981 become a new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO. Roberto, along with Don Keough, once my across-the-street neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the company's policies and then energetically carried them out. What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained new momentum, with sales overseas virtually exploding.

我当时所感知到的既清晰又迷人。在 1970 年代有些迷失之后，可口可乐在 1981 年随着罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔出任 CEO 而变成了一家新公司。罗伯托，以及唐·基奥（曾是我在奥马哈街对面的邻居），首先重新思考并聚焦了公司的政策，然后充满活力地执行了它们。这本已是世界上最无处不在的产品获得了新的动力，海外销售几乎呈爆炸式增长。

Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills, Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally, the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream.

通过一种真正罕见的营销和财务技能的融合，罗伯托最大限度地实现了他产品的增长以及这种增长为股东带来的回报。通常，一家消费品公司的 CEO，基于其天生的倾向或经验，会导致营销或财务主导业务，而牺牲另一个领域。在罗伯托身上，营销和财务的融合是完美的，结果是股东的梦想。

Of course, we should have started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson: My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years.

当然，我们应该更早开始买入可口可乐，在罗伯托和唐开始管理之后不久。事实上，如果我当时思路清晰，我会在 1936 年说服我的祖父卖掉杂货店，并将所有收益投入可口可乐的股票。我已经吸取了教训：我对下一个极具吸引力的想法的反应时间将缩短到远低于 50 年。

As I mentioned earlier, the yearend prices of our major investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline. A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all - it might in fact work to our eventual benefit - but it would cause at least a one-year reduction in Berkshire's net worth. We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next three years. Indeed, it would take only about a 10% year-to-year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire's net worth down.

正如我之前提到的，我们主要被投资公司的年底价格相对于其内在价值比以往高得多。虽然这些价格可能还不至于让人头晕，但它们显然容易受到整体市场下跌的影响。它们的价格下跌丝毫不会让我们不安——实际上可能最终对我们有利——但这会导致伯克希尔的净值至少减少一年。我们认为在接下来的三年中至少有一年出现这种减少几乎是肯定的。事实上，我们的投资组合总价值只需要同比下降约 10%，就会导致伯克希尔的净值下降。

We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio companies. They are high-grade, talented, and shareholder-oriented. The exceptional results we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities.

我们继续有幸拥有我们投资组合公司中非凡的管理者。他们是高素质、有才华、以股东为导向的。我们在与他们一起投资时取得的非凡成果准确反映了他们非凡的个人品质。

We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989, and that's the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly good-sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: "Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.") We will engage in arbitrage from time to time - sometimes on a large scale - but only when we like the odds.

去年我们告诉过大家，预计 1989 年在套利方面会做得很少，结果也确实如此。套利头寸是短期现金等价物的替代品，在一年中的部分时间里，我们持有的现金水平相对较低。在剩下的时间里，我们有相当规模的现金头寸，即便如此，我们仍选择不进行套利。主要原因是那些对我们来说没有经济意义的企业交易；对这类交易进行套利太接近于玩“博傻”游戏了。（正如华尔街人士雷·德沃所说：“天使不敢交易的地方，傻瓜蜂拥而入。”）我们会不时地进行套利——有时规模很大——但只有在我们喜欢胜算的时候才会做。

Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium- and long-term fixed-income securities. In the long-terms, just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS) bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to high. During the year we sold a number of the low-coupon issues, which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15%-17% annually, tax-free. Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical high-grade tax-exempts then commanded. We have kept all of our high-coupon WPPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992, and we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid-1990s.

除了下一节讨论的三只可转换优先股外，我们大幅减少了中期和长期固定收益证券的持有量。在长期债券方面，我们几乎唯一持有的就是华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）的债券，其票面利率从低到高不等。在这一年里，我们出售了一些低票息债券，这些债券是我们最初以非常大的折扣购买的。自我们购买以来，其中许多债券的价格大约翻了一番，此外还每年向我们支付 15%-17% 的免税利息。我们的卖出价格只略低于当时典型的高级免税债券的价格。我们保留了所有高票息的 WPPSS 债券。其中一些已在 1991 年和 1992 年被要求赎回，我们预计其余部分将在 1990 年代早期至中期被赎回。

We also sold many of our medium-term tax-exempt bonds during the year. When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them - regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase - if something we liked better came along. Something did - and concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of tax-exempt bonds was about $51 million pre-tax.

我们还在年内出售了许多中期免税债券。当我们购买这些债券时，我们说过，如果有我们更喜欢的东西出现，我们会乐于出售它们——无论它们的价格是高于还是低于我们购买时的价格。现在确实出现了——与此同时，我们以适度的收益抛售了大部分这些债券。总体而言，我们 1989 年出售免税债券的税前利润约为 5100 万美元。

The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.

出售债券所得款项，加上我们年初的过剩现金以及后来通过收益产生的现金，被用于购买三只可转换优先股。在第一笔交易中（7 月份进行），我们购买了 6 亿美元的吉列公司优先股，股息为 8.75%，十年强制赎回，并有权以每股 50 美元的价格转换为普通股。接下来，我们购买了 3.58 亿美元的美国航空集团公司优先股，十年强制赎回，股息为 9.25%，有权以每股 60 美元的价格转换为普通股。最后，在年底，我们购买了 3 亿美元的冠军国际公司优先股，十年强制赎回，股息为 9.25%，有权以每股 38 美元的价格转换为普通股。

Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we own are either non-salable or non-convertible for considerable periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from short-term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the board of Gillette, but I am not on the board of USAir or Champion. (I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can't handle any more.)

与标准的可转换优先股不同，我们拥有的这些股票在相当长的时间内要么不可出售，要么不可转换，因此我们无法从普通股的短期价格波动中获利。我进入了吉列公司的董事会，但没有进入美国航空或冠军公司的董事会。（我非常喜欢我所在的董事会，但无法再承担更多。）

Gillette's business is very much the kind we like. Charlie and I think we understand the company's economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future. (If you haven't tried Gillette's new Sensor razor, go right out and get one.) However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business (in which we have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible preferred), the airline industry, or the paper industry. This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries: we're agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics.

吉列的业务正是我们喜欢的那种。查理和我认为我们理解该公司的经济状况，因此相信我们可以对其未来做出相当明智的猜测。（如果你还没有试过吉列的新 Sensor 剃须刀，马上去买一把试试。）然而，我们无法预测投资银行业（我们通过 1987 年购买所罗门可转换优先股在该行业拥有头寸）、航空业或造纸业的经济前景。这并不意味着我们预测这些行业的前景黯淡：我们是不可知论者，不是无神论者。然而，我们对这些业务缺乏强烈的信念，意味着我们必须以不同于投资于看似拥有卓越经济特征的企业的方式来构建我们对它们的投资。

In one major respect, however, these purchases are not different: We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades.

然而，在一个主要方面，这些购买并无不同：我们只想与我们喜欢、钦佩和信任的人合作。所罗门的约翰·古特弗伦德、吉列的小科尔曼·莫克勒、美国航空的埃德·科洛尼以及冠军公司的安迪·西格勒都完全符合这一标准。

They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted voting rights on a fully-converted basis, an arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.

反过来，他们也对我们表现出了一定的信心，在每种情况下都坚持我们的优先股在完全转换的基础上拥有不受限制的投票权，这种安排在公司财务中远非标准。实际上，他们相信我们是聪明的所有者，考虑的是明天而不是今天，就像我们相信他们是聪明的管理者，同样考虑今天和明天一样。

The preferred-stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the performance of our investees, but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette, under Colman's management, will far exceed that return and believe that John, Ed, and Andy will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh.

我们协商达成的优先股结构，如果行业经济状况阻碍了我们被投资公司的业绩，将为我们提供平庸的回报；但如果它们能赚取与美国总体工业相当的回报，将为我们产生相当有吸引力的结果。我们相信，在科尔曼的管理下，吉列将远远超过这一回报，并且相信除非行业条件恶劣，否则约翰、埃德和安迪也能达到这一回报。

Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get, though, the result will be disappointing, because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained only a preferred-stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well.

在几乎任何条件下，我们都期望这些优先股能返还我们的本金加上股息。然而，如果我们只得到这些，结果将是令人失望的，因为我们将放弃灵活性，从而错过这十年期间必然会出现的某些重要机会。在这种情况下，我们只会在一个典型的优先股对我们毫无吸引力的时期获得优先股的收益。伯克希尔从其四只优先股发行中获得满意结果的唯一方法是让被投资公司的普通股表现良好。

Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred-stock purchase. The help will come from the fact that each company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose Chairman and Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire's investments, indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical, and objective. We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their own businesses but who nevertheless, at certain moments, appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.

要实现这一点，需要良好的管理和至少可以容忍的行业条件。但我们相信伯克希尔的投资也会有所帮助，并且每家被投资公司的其他股东将在未来几年从我们的优先股购买中受益。这种帮助来自于这样一个事实：每家公司现在都有一个主要、稳定且感兴趣的股东，其董事长和副董事长通过伯克希尔的投资，间接地将自己非常大量的资金投入了这些事业。在与我们的被投资公司打交道时，查理和我将给予支持、分析并保持客观。我们认识到我们正在与经验丰富的 CEO 合作，他们非常了解自己的业务，但在某些时刻，他们仍会感激有机会与一个与他们的行业或过去决策无关的人一起检验他们的想法。

As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market. Nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of 80% or more of a fine business with a fine management. But both opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated resources.

作为一个整体，这些可转换优先股不会产生我们在发现一个具有极佳经济前景且未被市场赏识的业务时所能获得的回报。其回报也不会像我们进行最喜欢的资本配置形式——收购一家优秀企业 80% 或更多的股份并拥有优秀的管理层——时那样有吸引力。但这两种机会都很少见，尤其是规模适合我们当前和预期资源的情况下。

In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock investments should produce returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios and that we can play a minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the investee companies.

总之，查理和我认为，我们的优先股投资应该会产生适度高于大多数固定收益投资组合所实现的回报，并且我们可以在被投资公司中扮演一个微小但愉快且富有建设性的角色。

Zero-Coupon Securities

零息债券

In September, Berkshire issued $902.6 million principal amount of Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures, which are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice and a flawless execution.

9 月份，伯克希尔发行了本金总额为 9.026 亿美元的零息可转换次级债券，这些债券现已在纽约证券交易所上市。所罗门兄弟公司以出色的方式处理了承销事宜，为我们提供了有益的建议和完美的执行。

Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest, usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time between issuance and maturity.

当然，大多数债券需要定期支付利息，通常是每半年一次。相反，零息债券不需要当期支付利息；相反，投资者通过以远低于到期价值的价格购买证券来获得收益。实际利率由发行价、到期价值以及发行与到期之间的时间长度决定。

In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only 44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were $400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).

在我们的案例中，这些债券以到期价值的 44.314% 发行，期限为 15 年。对于购买债券的投资者来说，这在数学上等同于支付 5.5% 的当期利息并每半年复利一次。由于我们每 1 美元面值只收到 44.31 美分，我们此次发行的收益为 4 亿美元（减去约 950 万美元的发行费用）。

The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway. Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value.

这些债券以每张 10,000 美元的面值发行，每张债券可转换为 0.4515 股伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票。由于一张 10,000 美元的债券成本为 4,431 美元，这意味着转换价格为每股伯克希尔股票 9,815 美元，比当时的市场价格溢价 15%。伯克希尔可以在 1992 年 9 月 28 日之后的任何时间按增值价值（发行价加上 5.5% 的半年复利）赎回这些债券，并且在两个特定日期，即 1994 年 9 月 28 日和 1999 年 9 月 28 日，债券持有人可以要求伯克希尔按增值价值购买这些证券。

For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5% interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.

出于税收目的，伯克希尔有权每年扣除 5.5% 的应计利息，即使我们没有向债券持有人支付任何款项。因此，对我们来说，减税带来的净效果是正向现金流。这是一个非常重要的好处。一些不可知的变量使我们无法计算出我们确切的实际利率，但在任何情况下，它都将远低于 5.5%。同时，税法具有对称性：任何应税的债券持有人每年都必须为这 5.5% 的利息纳税，即使他没有收到现金。

Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola) resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten.

我们的债券，以及去年发行了类似债券的其他一些公司（特别是洛斯和摩托罗拉）的债券，都不同于近年来发行的大部分零息债券。对这些债券，查理和我一直是，并且将继续是直言不讳的批评者。正如我稍后将解释的，此类债券常常以最具欺骗性的方式使用，并给投资者带来致命的后果。但在我们讨论这个问题之前，让我们回到伊甸园，回到苹果尚未被咬的那个时代。

If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S. Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S. households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's precisely what the Series E was.

如果你和我年龄相仿，你在二战期间购买了著名的 E 系列美国储蓄债券，从而拥有了你的第一批零息债券，这是历史上销售最广泛的债券发行。（战后，每两个美国家庭中就有一个持有这些债券。）当然，没有人称 E 系列为零息债券，事实上我怀疑这个词当时还没有被发明出来。但 E 系列恰恰就是零息债券。

These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.

这些债券的面值小至 18.75 美元。这个金额购买了美国政府 10 年后到期的 25 美元债务，这使购买者获得 2.9% 的年复合回报率。在当时，这是一个有吸引力的提议：2.9% 的利率高于政府债券的普遍利率，并且持有者没有市场波动风险，因为他可以随时兑现他的债券，只是利息略有减少。

A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate - say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semi-annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other investors with long-term liabilities, "reinvestment risk" of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed was huge quantities of "Savings Bond Equivalents."

第二种形式的零息美国国债发行，同样也是有益且有用的，在过去十年中出现了。普通债券的一个问题是，即使它支付给定的利率（比如 10%），持有者也无法保证能实现 10% 的复利回报。要实现该利率，每半年收到的票息必须按 10% 的利率进行再投资。如果当这些票息到期时，当前利率只有比如说 6% 或 7%，那么持有者将无法在债券的存续期内以广告宣传的利率使他的资金复利增长。对于养老基金或其他有长期负债的投资者来说，这种“再投资风险”可能是一个严重的问题。储蓄债券本可以解决这个问题，但它们只向个人发行，并且没有大面额。大买家需要的是大量的“储蓄债券等价物”。

Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful investment bankers (led, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers). They created the instrument desired by "stripping" the semi-annual coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S. Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zero-coupon bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10% for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts, recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited to their needs.

于是一些聪明的、在这种情况下非常有用的投资银行家（我很高兴地说，由所罗门兄弟公司领导）登场了。他们通过将标准政府债券的半年期票息“剥离”出来，创造了所需的工具。每张票息一旦被剥离，就具有了储蓄债券的基本特征，因为它代表未来某个时间到期的一笔单笔款项。例如，如果你从 2010 年到期的一张美国政府债券中剥离出 40 张半年期票息，你将得到 40 张零息债券，期限从 6 个月到 20 年不等，每张都可以与其他相同期限的票息捆绑在一起销售。如果所有期限的当前利率都是 10%，那么 6 个月期债券将以到期价值的 95.24% 出售，20 年期债券将以 14.20% 出售。因此，任何特定期限的购买者都保证在其整个持有期内获得 10% 的复利回报率。近年来，政府债券的剥离已大规模发生，因为从养老基金到个人 IRA 账户的长期投资者都认识到这些高质量的零息债券非常适合他们的需求。

But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long-term zero-coupon obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.

但正如华尔街经常发生的那样，智者开头做的事，愚者结尾也会做。在过去几年里，零息债券（以及功能等同的实物支付债券，它以每半年分配额外的 PIK 债券作为利息，而不是支付现金）已被越来越垃圾的信用大量发行。对于这些发行者来说，零息（或 PIK）债券提供了一个压倒性的优势：不可能在支付零的承诺上违约。事实上，如果欠发达国家政府在 1970 年代除长期零息债券外没有发行任何债务，那么它们现在作为债务人将拥有无懈可击的记录。

This principle at work - that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time - has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back, purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is, operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.

这个起作用的原理——即如果你郑重承诺长期不支付任何款项，你就可以长期不违约——并没有被那些寻求为越来越不稳定的交易融资的发起人和投资银行家所忽视。但是贷款人接受它需要一段时间：几年前杠杆收购热潮开始时，收购者只能在相当稳健的基础上借款，即保守估计的自由现金流——即营业利润加上折旧和摊销减去正常化的资本支出——足以支付利息和适度减少债务。

Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett O'Hara "I'll think about it tomorrow" position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes: "I don't know how I'll ever repay you."

后来，随着交易撮合者的肾上腺素激增，企业开始以如此高的价格被收购，以至于所有自由现金流都必然用于支付利息。这导致没有资金用于偿还债务。实际上，借款人在本金支付方面采取了斯嘉丽·奥哈拉式的“我明天再想”的态度，并被新一代贷款人——原始发行垃圾债券的买家——所接受。债务现在变成了需要再融资的东西，而不是偿还的东西。这种变化让人想起《纽约客》的一幅漫画，其中感激的借款人起身与银行贷款官握手，并滔滔不绝地说：“我不知道该怎么还你。”

Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions, they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company's ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay.

很快，借款人发现即使是新的、宽松的标准也令人难以忍受地具有约束力。为了诱使贷款人为更愚蠢的交易融资，他们引入了一个可恶的指标：EBDIT——折旧、利息和税前利润——作为衡量公司支付利息能力的标准。使用这个截断的标尺，借款人忽略了折旧作为一项费用，理由是不需要当期现金支出。

Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.

这种态度显然是妄想。在 95% 的美国企业中，随着时间的推移大致等于折旧的资本支出是必需的，并且与劳动力或公用事业成本一样是真实的费用。即使一个高中辍学生也知道，为汽车融资，他的收入必须不仅覆盖利息和运营费用，还要覆盖按实际计算的折旧。如果他开始谈论 EBDIT，他会被银行笑出来。

Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up, the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-and-stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital expenditures.

当然，企业的资本支出在任何一个月都可以被跳过，就像人可以有一天甚至一周不吃饭一样。但如果这种跳过成为常规且没有弥补，身体就会虚弱并最终死亡。此外，与持续稳定的供给相比，断断续续的供给政策随着时间的推移会产生一个不太健康的有机体，无论是人还是公司。作为商人，查理和我很高兴看到那些无力为资本支出提供资金的竞争对手。

You might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you haven't been paying attention during the past few years. Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing deals to other promoters with more "imagination."

你可能会认为，忽略折旧等重大支出以使糟糕的交易看起来像是好交易，这触及了华尔街创造力的极限。如果是这样，那你在过去几年里就没有注意。发起人需要找到一种方法来证明更昂贵的收购是合理的。否则，他们就有可能——天哪！——将交易输给更具“想象力”的其他发起人。

So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's-ignore-it corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful to do so only with clients' money, not their own. (Calling these managers "professionals" is actually too kind; they should be designated "promotees.")

于是，如同穿越了镜中世界，发起人和他们的投资银行家宣称，EBDIT 现在应该仅与现金利息相比较，这意味着在评估交易的财务可行性时，可以忽略零息或 PIK 债券的应计利息。这种方法不仅将折旧费用扔进了“忽略它”的角落，而且对通常占利息费用很大一部分的部分也给予了类似的对待。可耻的是，许多专业的投资经理也赞同这种胡言乱语，尽管他们通常小心翼翼地只用客户的钱，而不用自己的钱。（称这些经理为“专业人士”实际上太客气了；他们应该被指定为“被提拔者”。）

Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100 million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these issues would typically be very high, which means that the situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69 million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds. Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.

在这个新标准下，一个例如税前盈利 1 亿美元、且当前必须支付 9000 万美元利息的公司，可能会使用零息或 PIK 发行来产生另外 6000 万美元的年利息，这些利息将应计并复利，但几年内不会到期。这些债券的利率通常非常高，这意味着第 2 年的情况可能是 9000 万美元现金利息加上 6900 万美元应计利息，随着复利进行，情况依此类推。这种高利率的再借款计划，几年前还只合适地局限于海滨地区，很快就成了几乎所有主要投资银行公司的现代金融模式。

When they make these offerings, investment bankers display their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the future for companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun: Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these with what actually happened.

当他们进行这些发行时，投资银行家展示了他们幽默的一面：他们为几个月前几乎没听说过的公司提供长达五年或更久的收入和资产负债表预测。如果你看到这样的时间表，我建议你也加入这个游戏：向投资银行家索要他自己公司过去几年年初所准备的年度预算，然后将这些与实际情况进行比较。

Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle," defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel poorer.

不久前，肯·加尔布雷思在他机智而深刻的《大崩盘》一书中创造了一个新的经济术语：“bezzle”，定义是目前未被发现的贪污金额。这个金融生物具有一种神奇的特性：贪污者因 bezzle 而变得更富有，而被贪污者还没有感到更穷。

Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth" would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.

加尔布雷思教授敏锐地指出，这笔金额应被添加到国民财富中，以便我们了解精神国民财富。从逻辑上讲，一个希望自己感觉极其繁荣的社会会同时鼓励其公民贪污并努力不去发现罪行。通过这种方式，“财富”将膨胀，尽管没有做出一尔格的 productive 工作。

The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the real-world nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience "income" without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually - and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest - magically creates "earnings" for bondholders of $150 million. As long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much "income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.

bezzle 的讽刺性荒谬在零息债券的现实世界荒谬面前相形见绌。使用零息债券，合同的一方可以体验“收入”，而另一方则不会体验支出的痛苦。在我们的例子中，一家每年只能赚取 1 亿美元——因此也只能支付那么多利息——的公司为债券持有人神奇地创造了 1.5 亿美元的“收益”。只要主要投资者自愿戴上他们的彼得潘翅膀并反复说“我相信”，零息债券可以创造的“收入”就没有上限。

Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow. Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it, transactions are the mother's milk of finance.

华尔街以不太开明的人可能为轮子或犁保留的热情欢迎了这一发明。这里终于有了一种工具，可以让华尔街以不再受实际盈利能力限制的价格进行交易。结果显而易见，将是更多的交易：愚蠢的价格总会吸引卖家。正如杰西·安鲁可能说的那样，交易是金融的母乳。

The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out. This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals - and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures.

零息或 PIK 债券对发起人和投资银行家还有一个额外的吸引力，那就是从愚蠢到失败之间的时间可以被拉长。这不是一个小好处。如果在所有成本必须面对之前的时期很长，发起人可以在他们早期冒险的恶果显现之前，创造一连串愚蠢的交易——并收取大量费用。

But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually be the source of his wealth.

但最终，无论是冶金术还是金融术，炼金术都会失败。一个基础业务不可能通过会计或资本结构的把戏转变为黄金业务。自称金融炼金术士的人可能会变得富有。但通常，轻信的投资者才是他财富的来源，而不是商业成就。

Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed. (We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it's just that some variations have far more potential for mischief than others.

我们还应该补充一点，无论其弱点如何，许多零息和 PIK 债券不会违约。事实上，我们曾经拥有一些，并且如果它们的市场变得足够低迷，我们可能会购买更多。（然而，我们甚至没有考虑过从信用薄弱的发行者那里购买新发行的债券。）没有哪种金融工具本身是邪恶的；只是有些变体比其他变体具有更大的作恶潜力。

The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zero-coupon issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zero-coupon fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.

恶作剧的头奖应该颁给那些无法当期支付利息的零息债券发行者。我们的建议是：每当投资银行家开始谈论 EBDIT——或者每当有人创建了一种资本结构，不允许所有利息（包括应付和应计）都能从扣除充足资本支出后的当期现金流中得到轻松满足时——就拉上你钱包的拉链。反过来建议发起人和他身边的高薪人员接受零费用，将他们的收入递延到零息债券全部付清之后。然后看看他们对这笔交易的热情还能剩下多少。

Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess. Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years, unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not encountered heavy traffic.

我们对投资银行家的评论可能听起来刺耳。但查理和我——以我们无可救药的守旧方式——认为他们应该扮演守门人的角色，保护投资者免受发起人过度放纵倾向的伤害。毕竟，发起人在接受金钱时表现出的判断力和克制力，历来与酒鬼在接受烈酒时如出一辙。因此，银行家的行为至少应该达到负责任的酒保的标准：必要时拒绝下一杯酒的利润，以免酒后驾车者上路。不幸的是，近年来，许多领先的投资公司发现酒保的道德标准是令人无法容忍的限制性标准。最近，在华尔街走“正道”的人，路上并没有遇到太多同行。

One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds, using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks.

一个令人痛心的注脚：零息债券愚蠢行为的代价不会仅由直接参与者承担。某些储蓄和贷款协会是这些债券的大买家，使用的是来自 FSLIC 保险存款的现金。为了努力显示出色的收益，这些买家记录了——但没有收到——这些债券的超高利息收入。其中许多协会现在陷入大麻烦。如果他们向摇摇欲坠的信用发放的贷款成功了，协会的所有者会赚取利润。在贷款将失败的许多案例中，纳税人将承担账单。套用杰基·梅森的话，在这些协会里，应该是经理们戴着滑雪面罩。

Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)

头二十五年的错误（精简版）

To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.

引用罗伯特·本奇利的话：“养狗教会一个男孩忠诚、毅力，以及在躺下之前转三圈。”这就是经验的缺点。尽管如此，在犯下新错误之前回顾过去的错误是个好主意。所以让我们快速回顾一下过去的 25 年。

My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.

我的第一个错误自然是买下伯克希尔的控制权。虽然我知道它的业务——纺织制造——前景不佳，但因其价格看似便宜，我被诱惑着买了下来。这类股票购买在我早些年已被证明能带来相当不错的回报，尽管到了 1965 年伯克希尔出现时，我开始意识到这个策略并不理想。

If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.

如果你以足够低的价格买入一只股票，那么即使该企业的长期表现可能很糟糕，其命运中通常也会出现一些波动，给你一个以可观利润卖出的机会。我称之为“烟蒂”投资法。在大街上找到的一个只剩一口烟的烟蒂可能提供不了多少烟雾，但“便宜的价格”会使那一口全是利润。

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.

除非你是清算人，否则这种购买企业的方式是愚蠢的。首先，最初的“便宜”价格很可能根本不是什么大便宜。在一个困难的企业中，一个问题刚解决，另一个问题就会浮现——厨房里从来不会只有一只蟑螂。其次，你获得的任何初始优势都将很快被企业赚取的低回报所侵蚀。例如，如果你以 800 万美元买入一家可以以 1000 万美元出售或清算的企业，并立即采取任一种方式，你可以实现高回报。但如果该企业在十年后以 1000 万美元出售，而在此期间每年只赚取并分配了成本的几个百分点的收益，那么这项投资就会令人失望。时间是优秀业务的朋友，平庸业务的敌人。

You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."

你可能认为这个原则很明显，但我不得不通过艰难的方式学到它——事实上，我学了不止一次。在购买伯克希尔后不久，我通过一家名为 Diversified Retailing（后来与伯克希尔合并）的公司收购了巴尔的摩的一家百货公司 Hochschild Kohn。我以大大低于账面价值的价格买入，人员是一流的，交易还包括一些额外的东西——未记录的房地产价值和大量的 LIFO 库存缓冲。我怎么能失手呢？所以——三年后，我很幸运地以大约我买入的价格卖掉了这家公司。结束我们与 Hochschild Kohn 的公司联姻后，我的记忆就像乡村歌曲中的丈夫：“我的妻子和我最好的朋友跑了，我仍然很想他。”

I could give you other personal examples of "bargain-purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.

我可以给你举出其他关于“便宜购买”愚蠢行为的个人例子，但我相信你已经明白了：以合理的价格购买一家出色的公司远比以出色的价格购买一家普通的公司好得多。查理很早就明白了这一点；我学得慢。但现在，在购买公司或普通股时，我们寻找的是一流的企业，并配有一流的管理层。

That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.

这就引出了一个相关的教训：好的骑师在好马上会表现出色，但在破旧的劣马上则不行。伯克希尔的纺织业务和 Hochschild Kohn 都有能干且诚实的人经营。同样的经理，如果受雇于一个经济特征良好的企业，本可以取得优异的业绩。但他们在流沙中奔跑，永远无法取得进展。

I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

我已经说过很多次：当一个以才华著称的管理层接手一个以糟糕经济状况著称的企业时，保持不变的往往是企业的声誉。我只希望当初自己没有如此精力充沛地去创造例子。我的行为与梅·韦斯特所承认的相符：“我是白雪公主，但我漂走了。”

A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.

一个更进一步的教训：别太拼。在购买和监管了各种各样企业 25 年后，查理和我还没有学会如何解决困难的商业问题。我们学到的是如何避开它们。我们之所以能在一定程度上取得成功，是因为我们专注于识别那些我们可以跨过的一英尺高的跨栏，而不是因为我们获得了跨越七英尺高栏的能力。

The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.

这个发现可能看起来不公平，但在商业和投资中，通常坚持简单而显而易见的事情远比解决困难的事情更有利可图。有时，棘手的问题必须解决，就像我们在布法罗创办周日版报纸时那样。在其他情况下，一个伟大的投资机会出现在一家出色的企业遇到一次性的、巨大但可以解决的问题时，就像多年前美国运通和 GEICO 的情况一样。然而，总的来说，我们通过避开恶龙而不是杀死它们做得更好。

My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

我最令人惊讶的发现：商业中一种我们可称之为“机构惯性”的看不见的力量具有压倒性的重要性。在商学院，没有人暗示过这种惯性的存在，我进入商界时也没有直观地理解它。我当时认为，正派、聪明且有经验的管理者会自动做出理性的商业决策。但我随着时间的推移了解到并非如此。相反，当机构惯性发挥作用时，理性常常会枯萎。

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

例如：（1）仿佛受牛顿第一运动定律支配，一个机构会抵制其当前方向的任何改变；（2）正如工作会膨胀以填满可用时间一样，公司项目或收购会具体化以吸收可用资金；（3）领导者任何业务上的渴望，无论多么愚蠢，都会迅速得到其部下准备的详细回报率和战略研究的支持；（4）同行的行为，无论是扩张、收购、制定高管薪酬还是其他什么，都会被盲目模仿。

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.

机构动态，而非贪婪或愚蠢，将企业引上这些往往被误导的路线。在因为忽略了惯性的力量而犯了一些代价高昂的错误之后，我试图以最小化其影响的方式来组织和管理伯克希尔。此外，查理和我努力将我们的投资集中在那些似乎对这个问题保持警惕的公司上。

After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.

在其他一些错误之后，我学会了只与我喜欢、信任和钦佩的人一起做生意。正如我之前指出的，这项政策本身并不能保证成功：一个二流的纺织或百货公司不会仅仅因为其管理者是你乐意看到女儿嫁给的人而繁荣。然而，如果一个所有者——或投资者——能够与这样的人在具有体面经济特征的企业中结盟，他就能创造奇迹。相反，我们不想与缺乏令人钦佩品质的管理者合作，无论他们企业的前景多么诱人。我们从未成功与一个坏人做成过好交易。

Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

我一些最严重的错误并不为公众所见。这些是我明白其优点却没有进行的股票和企业购买。错过自己能力圈之外的大好机会并不是罪过。但我放弃过几个放在银盘上端给我、且我完全有能力理解的大好购买机会。对于伯克希尔的股东，包括我自己，这种举棋不定的代价是巨大的。

Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.

我们一贯保守的财务政策可能看起来是个错误，但在我看来并非如此。回顾过去，很明显，如果伯克希尔采用显著更高但仍然常规的杠杆比率，其股本回报率会比我们实际平均的 23.8% 高得多。即使在 1965 年，或许我们也可以判断，更高的杠杆率有 99% 的可能性只会带来好处。相应地，我们可能只看到 1% 的可能性，即某些外部或内部的冲击因素会导致常规的债务比率产生介于暂时痛苦和违约之间的结果。

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.

我们不喜欢这种 99:1 的赔率——永远也不会。在我们看来，一个小的困境或耻辱的可能性不能由大的超额回报的可能性来抵消。如果你的行动是明智的，你一定会得到好的结果；在大多数此类情况下，杠杆只是让事情进展得更快。查理和我从不着急：我们远远更享受过程而不是收益——尽管我们也学会了接受后者。

We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

我们希望再过 25 年，能报告前 50 年的错误。如果我们能在 2015 年做到这一点，你可以相信这一节所占的篇幅将比现在多得多。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望购买更多与我们现有业务类似的企业，并且我们可以得到一些帮助。如果你有符合以下标准的企业，请给我打电话，或者最好是写信。

Here's what we're looking for:

以下是我们正在寻找的：

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

(1) 大规模收购（税后收益至少 1000 万美元），
(2) 已被证明有持续的盈利能力（我们对未来预测不感兴趣，对“困境反转”情况也不感兴趣），
(3) 在很少或没有负债的情况下获得良好股本回报率的企业，
(4) 管理层到位（我们不能提供管理层），
(5) 简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们将无法理解），
(6) 提供报价（我们不想在不知道价格的情况下，即使是初步讨论，浪费我们或卖家的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行不友好的收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并且非常快速地（通常在五分钟内）答复我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于用现金购买，但当我们获得的内在商业价值与我们付出的相等时，也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的购买形式是符合布姆金-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的那种。在这种案例中，公司的所有者-管理者希望产生大量现金，有时是为了他们自己，但通常是为了他们的家人或不活跃的股东。同时，这些管理者希望保留作为重要所有者的身份，继续像过去一样经营他们的公司。我们认为我们特别适合有这样目标的所有者。我们邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去与之做过生意的人来了解我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by a Goldwynism: "Please include me out."

查理和我经常被问及那些远不符合我们标准的收购：我们发现，如果你宣传有意购买牧羊犬，很多人会打电话来希望能卖给你他们的可卡犬。我们对新企业、困境反转或拍卖式销售的兴趣，最好用一句戈德温的话来表达：“请别把我算进去。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of investment.

除了对上述类型的企业收购感兴趣之外，我们也对通过协商购买大量但不控股的股票感兴趣，类似于我们在资本城市、所罗门、吉列、美国航空和冠军公司持有的股份。去年我们说过，我们对大量购买可转换优先股有特殊兴趣。我们仍然有这种胃口，但它是有限的，因为我们现在已经接近我们认为对这一投资类别合适的最大头寸。

Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962 quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my "bargain" purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W, rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance, acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company's profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs.

两年前，我告诉过你们关于哈利·博特尔的故事，他在 1962 年迅速解决了我控制的第一家工业公司 Dempster Mill Manufacturing（我的一次“便宜货”购买）的重大业务混乱，并且 24 年后再次出现来拯救我，这次是解决伯克希尔一家生产汽车化合物的小子公司 K&W Products 的问题。正如我所报告的，哈利在短时间内减少了 K&W 的资本占用，理顺了生产，削减了成本，并使利润翻了四倍。你可能认为他会停下来喘口气。但去年，现年 70 岁的哈利参加了一次破产拍卖，并以极低的价格获得了一个与 K&W 天然契合的产品线。这次妙手可能会使该公司的盈利能力提高 50%。请关注这个位置，以获取未来关于哈利胜利的消息。

With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire of Henderson Brothers, Inc. ("HBI"), continues his outstanding performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in transaction costs.

在伯克希尔股票于纽约证券交易所交易一年多之后，我们的专家、Henderson Brothers, Inc.（“HBI”）的 Jim Maguire 继续着他出色的表现。在我们上市之前，交易商的点差通常是市价的 3% 或更高。Jim 将点差维持在 50 美分或更低，以当前价格计算远低于 1%。买卖股票的股东从交易成本的降低中受益匪浅。

Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.

由于我们对 Jim、HBI 和纽交所的经历感到非常满意，我在纽交所投放的一系列广告中表达了这一点。通常我回避推荐，但这次我很乐意公开赞扬交易所。

Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7 million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.

去年夏天，我们卖掉了三年前以 85 万美元购买的公司专机，并以 670 万美元购买了另一架二手飞机。你们中那些还记得第 5 页繁殖细菌的数学的人会理解地恐慌：如果我们的净值继续以当前速度增长，而更换飞机的成本也以现在确定的 100% 年复利速度继续上升，那么伯克希尔的全部净值很快就会被它的专机吞噬。

Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria; he feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I'm sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict between intellect and glands, he pled: "Help me, Oh Lord, to become chaste - but not yet."

查理不喜欢我把飞机和细菌相提并论；他觉得这对细菌是一种侮辱。他对潇洒旅行的想法是坐带空调的巴士，他只有在票价特价时才会升级到这种奢侈。我自己对专机的态度可以用一段据信（我敢肯定是附会的）是圣奥古斯丁在考虑离开世俗享乐生活成为牧师时的祈祷来概括。在与理智和本能的冲突中，他恳求：“主啊，帮助我变得贞洁——但不是现在。”

Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested "The Charles T. Munger." Charlie countered with "The Aberration." We finally settled on "The Indefensible."

给飞机命名并不容易。我最初建议用“查尔斯·T·芒格号”。查理反驳说“异类号”。我们最终决定用“无可辩驳号”。

About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and 2,550 charities were recipients.

约 96.9% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1989 年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划进行的捐赠为 590 万美元，有 2,550 家慈善机构收到了捐赠。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第 52-53 页上关于我们的股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如果你想参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议你立即确保你的股份以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管处的名义注册。在 1990 年 8 月 31 日未如此注册的股份将没有资格参加 1990 年的计划。

The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000, very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at Joslyn Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim's. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

今年的年度会议将于 1990 年 4 月 30 日星期一上午 9:30 举行。去年的出席人数增长到约 1,000 人，非常接近乔斯林博物馆威瑟斯彭厅的座位容量。因此，今年的会议将移至奥芬剧院举行，该剧院位于奥马哈市中心，距离红狮酒店约四分之一英里。Radisson-Redick Tower 是一家小得多但不错的酒店，位于奥芬剧院对面。或者你可能想住在万豪酒店，它位于奥马哈西部，距离博希姆约 100 码。我们将在万豪酒店安排巴士，分别在 8:30 和 8:45 出发前往会场，并在会议结束后返回。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理和我总是很享受会议，希望你能参加。我们股东的质量体现在我们收到的问题的质量上：我们在任何地方参加的年度会议上，从未见过如此持续高水平的、与所有者相关的聪明问题。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.

我们代理材料的附件说明了如何获取参加会议所需的入场卡。由于平日奥芬剧院周围停车可能很紧张，我们已经为我们的股东安排了许多附近的停车场。附件中也包含了相关信息。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.

和往常一样，会议结束后我们将有巴士送你去内布拉斯加家具卖场和博希姆，之后送你到市中心酒店或机场。我希望你能留出充足的时间来充分探索两家商店的魅力。提前到达的客人可以在任何一天参观家具卖场；周六营业时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日为中午至下午 5:30。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders.

博希姆通常在周日关门，但我们将在 4 月 29 日（星期日）中午至下午 6 点为股东及其 guests 开放。艾克喜欢上演好戏，你可以相信他会为我们的股东带来一些非常特别的东西。

In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the 29th.

在这封信中，我们说了很多关于复利增长率的内容。如果你能忍受让自己的回报率有一天变成负数——我承认这不是一个美好的想法——那就 29 日去找艾克吧。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 2, 1990

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1990 年 3 月 2 日