2010 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年统计，但以下年份例外：1965和1966年截至9月30日；1967年截至12月31日（15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的业绩已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，业绩均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前，而伯克希尔数据为税后。如果一家像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正收益年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负收益年份，其业绩会超过标普500。多年下来，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.*

2010 年，我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 13%。在过去 46 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 95,453 美元，年复合增长率为 20.2%。*

The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that's working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire's "normal" earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we've quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.

2010 年的亮点是我们收购了 Burlington Northern Santa Fe，这笔收购的效果比我预想的还要好。现在看来，拥有这条铁路将使伯克希尔的“正常”盈利能力在税前提高近 40%，税后提高超过 30%。此次收购使我们的股票数量增加了 6%，并使用了 220 亿美元现金。由于我们迅速补充了现金，这笔交易的经济效益非常好。

A "normal year," of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the "Investment" section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.

当然，“正常年份”是查理·芒格和我都无法精确定义的。但为了估算我们当前的盈利能力，我们设想的是一个没有保险特大灾难、总体商业环境略好于 2010 年但弱于 2005 或 2006 年的年份。基于这些假设以及我将在“投资”部分解释的其他一些假设，我可以估算出我们目前拥有的资产在正常情况下的盈利能力约为税前 170 亿美元、税后 120 亿美元，不包括任何资本利得或损失。查理和我每天都在思考如何在此基础上继续建设。

Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF's future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That's three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

我们两人都对 BNSF 的未来充满热情，因为铁路相对于其主要竞争对手卡车运输具有显著的成本和环境优势。去年，BNSF 每加仑柴油能将其运输的每吨货物运送创纪录的 500 英里。这比卡车运输的燃油效率高出三倍，这意味着我们的铁路在运营成本上拥有重要优势。同时，我们的国家也因温室气体排放减少和对进口石油的需求大幅降低而受益。当货物通过铁路运输时，整个社会都会受益。

Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.

随着时间的推移，美国的货物运输量将会增加，BNSF 应该会获得其应得的份额。铁路将需要大量投资来实现这一增长，但在提供所需资金方面，没有人比伯克希尔更有优势。无论经济多么缓慢，市场多么混乱，我们的支票都会兑现。

Last year - in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy - we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion - or 90% of the total - was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending - $8 billion - and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.

去年——面对对经济的普遍悲观情绪——我们花费了 60 亿美元用于物业和设备，以此展示了伯克希尔对资本投资的热情。其中，54 亿美元（占总数的 90%）用在了美国。当然，我们的业务未来会在国外扩张，但未来投资的绝大部分仍将在国内。2011 年，我们将创下资本支出的新纪录——80 亿美元——并将全部 20 亿美元的增量支出用于美国。

Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of "great uncertainty." But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.

资金总是流向机会，而美国机会丰富。今天的评论员经常谈论“巨大的不确定性”。但回想一下，例如，1941 年 12 月 6 日、1987 年 10 月 18 日和 2001 年 9 月 10 日。无论今天多么平静，明天总是不确定的。

Don't let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential - a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War - remains alive and effective.

不要让这个现实吓到你。在我的一生中，政客和权威人士一直不停地抱怨美国面临的可怕问题。然而，我们的公民现在的生活水平比我出生时惊人地高出六倍。末日预言者忽略了那个确定无疑的最重要因素：人类潜力远未耗尽，而释放这种潜力的美国制度——尽管时常被经济衰退甚至内战打断，但在两个多世纪里创造了奇迹——仍然充满活力且行之有效。

We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America's best days lie ahead.

我们并不比建国时更聪明，也不比那时更努力。但环顾四周，你会看到一个超出任何殖民地居民梦想的世界。现在，就像在 1776 年、1861 年、1932 年和 1941 年一样，美国最好的日子还在前方。

Performance

业绩表现

Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull's-eye around wherever it lands.

查理和我认为，受托管理他人资金的人应该在开始时设定业绩目标。缺乏这样的标准，管理层就容易先射出业绩之箭，然后在箭头落下的地方画上靶心。

In Berkshire's case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

在伯克希尔，我们很久以前就告诉过你，我们的工作是以高于标普 500 指数（包括股息）增长率的速度增加每股内在价值。有些年份我们成功了；有些年份我们失败了。但是，如果我们长期无法实现这一目标，我们就为投资者什么也没做——他们自己通过持有指数基金本可以获得同等或更好的结果。

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn't possible.

当然，挑战在于内在价值的计算。把这个任务分别交给查理和我，你会得到两个不同的答案。精确根本不可能。

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we'll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

为了消除主观性，我们在衡量业绩时使用一个被低估的内在价值代理指标——账面价值。诚然，我们的一些业务价值远高于其在账簿上的账面价值。（在本报告后面，我们将提供一个案例研究。）但由于这种溢价很少会逐年大幅波动，账面价值可以作为一个合理的工具来追踪我们的表现。

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

第 2 页的表格显示了我们对标普 500 的 46 年记录，早年表现相当不错，现在仅算令人满意。我们要强调的是，那些丰收的岁月永远不会回来了。我们目前管理的大量资本抹去了任何非凡表现的可能性。然而，我们将努力争取高于平均水平的结果，并且认为你们以这个标准来要求我们是公平的。

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth's movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

应该指出，年度数据既不能忽视，也不能视为绝对重要。地球绕太阳公转的速度与投资理念或运营决策所需的时间并不同步。例如，在 GEICO，我们去年热情地花费了 9 亿美元用于广告以获取保单持有人，他们不会立即为我们带来利润。如果我们能有成效地花费两倍于此的金额，我们会很乐意这样做，尽管短期业绩会进一步受到影响。我们在铁路和公用事业业务上的许多大额投资也是为了长远的回报。

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market's golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

为了给你提供更长期的业绩视角，我们将第 2 页的年度数据重新整理为一系列五年期，展示在对面页。总共有 42 个这样的时期，它们讲述了一个有趣的故事。从比较的角度看，我们最好的年份在 1980 年代初结束。然而，市场的黄金时期出现在随后的 17 年里，即使我们的相对优势缩小，伯克希尔仍取得了出色的绝对回报。

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

1999 年之后，市场停滞了（或者你已经注意到了？）。因此，伯克希尔自那时以来相对于标普 500 取得的令人满意的表现，只带来了适度的绝对结果。

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P - though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.

展望未来，我们希望平均能比标普 500 高出几个百分点——尽管这当然远非确定。如果我们成功实现了这一目标，那么在股市糟糕的年份，我们几乎肯定会取得更好的相对结果，而在市场强劲的年份则会表现更差。

Though Berkshire's intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire's value.

尽管伯克希尔的内在价值无法精确计算，但其三个关键支柱中的两个是可以衡量的。查理和我在对伯克希尔的价值做出自己的估计时，严重依赖这些衡量标准。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

价值的第一个组成部分是我们的投资：股票、债券和现金等价物。年底时，这些投资按市值总计为 1,580 亿美元。

Insurance float - money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us - funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is "free" as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we've been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments - those funded both by float and by retained earnings - can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金——我们保险业务中临时持有但不属于我们的资金——为我们的投资提供了 660 亿美元。只要保险承保达到盈亏平衡，即我们收到的保费等于我们发生的损失和费用，这种浮存金就是“免费”的。当然，承保业绩波动很大，在盈利和亏损之间摇摆不定。然而，在我们整个历史中，我们一直显著盈利，而且我也预计未来我们的平均业绩将至少达到盈亏平衡或更好。如果我们做到了，我们所有的投资——包括由浮存金和留存收益资助的投资——都可以被视为伯克希尔股东价值的一个元素。

Berkshire's second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire's early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we've increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

伯克希尔价值的第二个组成部分是来自投资和保险承保以外的收益。这些收益由我们的 68 家非保险公司贡献，详见第 106 页。在伯克希尔早年，我们专注于投资方面。然而，在过去二十年里，我们越来越重视非保险业务收益的发展，这种做法将会持续下去。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

以下表格说明了这一转变。在第一张表中，我们列出了自 1970 年开始（即我们进入保险业三年后）每隔十年的每股投资数据。我们排除了适用于少数股东权益的投资。

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

尽管在 40 年期间，我们每股投资的年复合增长率达到了健康的 19.9%，但随着我们专注于使用资金购买运营业务，增长率已急剧放缓。

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

这种转变的回报如下表所示，该表展示了我们的非保险业务收益如何增长，同样是每股基础并扣除适用的少数股东权益后。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire's stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire's investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths - sometimes for extended periods - but eventually they meet.

四十年来，我们每股税前非保险收益的年复合增长率为 21.0%。同期，伯克希尔的股价以每年 22.1% 的速度增长。随着时间的推移，你可以预期我们的股价将与伯克希尔的投资和收益大致同步。市场价格和内在价值常常走截然不同的路径——有时会长达很长一段时间——但最终它们会汇合。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

内在价值计算还有第三个更主观的要素，它可能是正面的也可能是负面的：未来留存收益的配置效率。我们以及其他许多企业很可能在未来十年留存的收益将等于甚至超过我们目前使用的资本。有些公司会将留存的美元变成 50 美分，而另一些则会变成两美元。

This "what-will-they-do-with-the-money" factor must always be evaluated along with the "what-do-we-have-now" calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company's intrinsic value. That's because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company's earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company's current value; if the CEO's talents or motives are suspect, today's value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck's or Montgomery Ward's CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

这个“他们会用钱做什么”的因素必须与“我们现在有什么”的计算一起评估，以便我们或其他任何人能够对公司内在价值做出合理的估计。这是因为当管理层将属于他的那部分公司收益进行再投资时，外部投资者只能无助地旁观。如果一位 CEO 能够预期很好地完成这项工作，那么再投资的前景会增加公司的当前价值；如果 CEO 的才能或动机可疑，那么今天的价值就必须打折扣。结果的差异可能很大。1960 年代末，交给西尔斯·罗巴克或蒙哥马利·沃德 CEO 们手中的一美元，与交给山姆·沃尔顿的一美元，有着截然不同的命运。

Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We're prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

查理和我希望我们非保险业务的每股收益能继续以可观的速度增长。但随着数字变大，这项工作变得更加困难。我们既需要现有业务的良好表现，也需要更多重大收购。我们准备好了。我们的大象枪已重新上膛，我的扳机指也在发痒。

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can't be lured away.

部分抵消我们规模带来的负担的是我们拥有的几个重要优势。首先，我们拥有一批真正有才华的经理人，他们对自己经营的业务和伯克希尔有着非同寻常的承诺。我们的许多 CEO 本身就很富有，工作只是因为他们热爱自己所做的事情。他们是志愿者，而不是雇佣兵。因为没有人能提供给他们一份更享受的工作，所以他们不会被挖走。

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it's reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A "hire well, manage little" code suits both them and me.

在伯克希尔，经理人可以专注于经营自己的业务：他们不用参加总部会议，不用担心融资问题，也不用忍受华尔街的骚扰。他们只需每两年收到我的一封信（信的内容重印在第 104-105 页），并在他们愿意的时候给我打电话。他们的愿望也各不相同：有些经理人我去年一整年都没说过话，而有一位我几乎每天都通话。我们的信任是在人而非流程上。“雇对人、少管理”的信条对他们和我都适合。

Berkshire's CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

伯克希尔的 CEO 们形形色色。有些人拥有 MBA 学位；有些人从未完成大学学业。有些人使用预算，是循规蹈矩的类型；有些人凭直觉行事。我们的团队就像一个由击球风格迥异、但都是全明星球员组成的棒球队。我们很少需要更换阵容。

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a "universe" for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

我们的第二个优势与我们企业赚取资金的配置有关。在满足这些业务的需求之后，我们还有非常可观的剩余资金。大多数公司将自己限制在它们一直运营的行业内进行再投资。然而，这通常将它们的资本配置限制在一个“宇宙”中，这个宇宙既小又远不如更广阔世界中的机会。对少数可用机会的竞争往往会变得激烈。卖方占据上风，就像一个女孩如果是一个有许多男孩参加的派对中唯一的女性那样。这种不平衡的局面对这个女孩来说是好事，但对男孩们来说却是坏事。

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle - and frequently we can't - we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.

在伯克希尔，我们在配置资本时没有制度上的限制。查理和我只受限于我们理解潜在收购可能未来的能力。如果我们跨越了这一障碍（我们经常无法做到），我们就能够将任何一个机会与众多其他机会进行比较。

When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn't exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue "opportunities" to improve and expand the existing textile operation - so for years that's exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaarg! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

当我在 1965 年取得伯克希尔控制权时，我并没有利用这个优势。当时伯克希尔只经营纺织业，在此前的十年里已经损失了大量资金。我能做的最愚蠢的事情就是追求“机会”来改进和扩大现有的纺织业务——所以多年来我正是这样做的。然后，在一次最后的“聪明”爆发中，我出去买了另一家纺织公司。啊啊啊！最终我醒悟过来，先是进入保险业，然后进入其他行业。

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don't make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

这个世界是我们的牡蛎的优势还有一个补充：除了将一项业务与众多其他业务的吸引力进行比较之外，我们还将业务与有价证券中可用的机会进行比较，这是大多数管理层不会做的比较。通常，业务相对于从股票或债券投资中可能获得的收益而言，价格高得离谱。在这种时候，我们会购买证券并等待时机。

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See's Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

我们在资本配置方面的灵活性是我们至今取得大部分进展的原因。我们能够将从喜诗糖果或 Business Wire 等业务中赚到的钱——这两家是我们经营得最好的企业，但也提供了有限的再投资机会——作为我们购买 BNSF 所需资金的一部分。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一个优势是渗透在伯克希尔各个层面的难以复制的文化。在商业中，文化很重要。

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire's actions and results with keen interest and an owner's eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

首先，代表你们的董事像所有者一样思考和行动。他们只获得象征性的报酬：没有期权、没有限制性股票，而且几乎没有现金。我们不向他们提供董事和高管责任保险，这几乎是其他所有大型上市公司的标配。如果他们在处理你们的钱时搞砸了，他们自己的钱也会遭受损失。除去我的持股，董事及其家人持有的伯克希尔股票价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事以所有者的眼光和浓厚的兴趣监督伯克希尔的行动和结果。你和我很幸运有他们作为管家。

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner's mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

这种所有者导向在我们的经理人中也很普遍。在很多情况下，这些人之所以选择伯克希尔作为他们和家人长期拥有的企业的收购方，是因为他们带着所有者的心态来找我们，而我们提供了鼓励他们保持这种心态的环境。拥有热爱自己事业的经理人绝非小优势。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you." That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, "You know you're no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn't move.") At Berkshire's "World Headquarters" our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment - you name it - totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire's managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

文化会自我传播。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经说过：“你塑造你的房子，然后它们塑造你。”这种智慧也适用于企业。官僚程序会滋生更多的官僚主义，帝国式的公司总部会引发傲慢的行为。（正如一位讽刺作家所说：“当你坐进汽车后座而车子不动时，你就知道自己不再是 CEO 了。”）在伯克希尔的“世界总部”，我们的年租金是 270,212 美元。此外，总部办公室在家具、艺术品、可乐机、午餐室、高科技设备——你能想到的一切——上的投资总计为 301,363 美元。只要查理和我把你们的钱当成自己的钱来对待，伯克希尔的经理人也很可能会小心对待它。

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

我们的薪酬计划、年度股东大会甚至年度报告，都是为了强化伯克希尔文化而设计的，并将其打造成一种能够排斥和驱逐不同倾向经理人的文化。这种文化每年都在增强，并且将在查理和我离开后长期保持完整。

We will need all of the strengths I've just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.

我们需要我刚才描述的所有优势才能做得相当好。我们的经理人会交出成绩；你可以信赖这一点。但查理和我在资本配置方面能否尽到我们的责任，部分取决于收购的竞争环境。你将会得到我们最大的努力。

GEICO

GEICO

Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.

现在让我给你讲一个故事，它将帮助你理解一项业务的内在价值如何能远远超过其账面价值。讲述这个故事也给了我重温一些美好回忆的机会。

Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.

六十年前的上个月，GEICO 进入了我的生活，注定将极大地塑造它。我当时是哥伦比亚大学 20 岁的研究生，之所以选择去那里，是因为我的偶像本·格雷厄姆在学校每周授课一次。

One day at the library, I checked out Ben's entry in Who's Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.

有一天在图书馆，我查阅了《美国名人录》中本的词条，发现他是政府雇员保险公司（现称 GEICO）的董事长。我对保险一无所知，也从未听说过这家公司。然而，图书管理员引导我找到了一本保险公司的巨著，在阅读了关于 GEICO 的那一页后，我决定去拜访该公司。接下来的星期六，我登上了前往华盛顿的早班火车。

Alas, when I arrived at the company's headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.

唉，当我到达公司总部时，大楼已经关门了。然后我相当疯狂地开始敲门，直到终于出现了一个看门人。我问他办公室里有没有我可以交谈的人，他指引我找到了当时唯一在场的人——洛里默·戴维森。

That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, "Davy" gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

那是我幸运的时刻。在接下来的四个小时里，“戴维”给我上了一堂关于保险和 GEICO 的课。这是一段美好友谊的开始。此后不久，我从哥伦比亚大学毕业，成为奥马哈的一名股票推销员。当然，GEICO 是我的首选推荐，这让我在几十个客户那里有了一个良好的开端。GEICO 也启动了我的净资产，因为在我见到戴维后不久，我就把这支股票变成了我 9,800 美元投资组合的 75%。（即便如此，我还是觉得自己过度分散了。）

Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened - with the stock falling by more than 95% - Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO's repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire's cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)

随后，戴维成为 GEICO 的 CEO，将公司带到了难以想象的高度，直到 1970 年代中期，也就是他退休几年后，公司陷入困境。当这种情况发生时——股价下跌超过 95%——伯克希尔在市场上购买了公司约三分之一的股份，由于 GEICO 回购自己的股票，这一比例多年来增加到 50%。伯克希尔为这一半业务支付的成本是 4,600 万美元。（尽管我们的持股比例很大，但我们没有对运营施加任何控制。）

We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, "Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.")

随后，我们在 1996 年初购买了 GEICO 剩余的 50%，这促使时年 95 岁的戴维制作了一盘录像带，说他多么高兴他所钟爱的 GEICO 将永久归属于伯克希尔。（他还开玩笑地总结道：“下次，沃伦，请预约。”）

A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal - saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance - remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder's business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America's third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.

在过去的 60 年里，GEICO 发生了很多事情，但其核心目标——为美国人购买汽车保险节省大量资金——始终未变。（请拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com 试试。）换句话说，赢得投保人的业务。专注于这一目标，该公司已成长为美国第三大汽车保险公司，市场份额达到 8.8%。

When Tony Nicely, GEICO's CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.

当 GEICO 的 CEO 托尼·奈斯利在 1993 年接手时，这个份额是 2.0%，已经停滞了十多年。在托尼的领导下，GEICO 变成了一家不同的公司，找到了持续增长的道路，同时保持了承保纪律和低成本。

Let me quantify Tony's achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn't already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.

让我量化一下托尼的成就。1996 年，当我们购买尚未拥有的 GEICO 的 50% 时，我们花费了约 23 亿美元。这个价格意味着 100% 的价值为 46 亿美元。当时 GEICO 的有形净资产为 19 亿美元。

The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value - $2.7 billion - was what we estimated GEICO's "goodwill" to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO's customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company's low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.

隐含价值超出有形净资产的部分——27 亿美元——是我们当时估计 GEICO“商誉”的价值。这笔商誉代表了当时与 GEICO 做生意的保单持有人的经济价值。1995 年，这些客户向公司支付了 28 亿美元的保费。因此，我们当时对 GEICO 客户的估值大约是他们对公司年度支付额的 97%（27/28）。按照行业标准，这是一个非常高的价格。但 GEICO 不是普通的保险公司：由于公司的低成本，其保单持有人持续盈利并且异常忠诚。

Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97% of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO's economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO - off to a strong start in 2011 - is the gift that keeps giving.

如今，保费收入为 143 亿美元且在增长。然而，我们在账簿上记录的 GEICO 商誉仅为 14 亿美元，无论 GEICO 的价值增加多少，这个数字都将保持不变。（根据会计准则，如果商誉的经济价值下降，你就要减记其账面价值；但如果经济价值增加，则保持不变。）使用我们应用于 1996 年收购的保费收入的 97% 作为标尺，如今 GEICO 经济商誉的真实价值约为 140 亿美元。并且这个价值在十年或二十年后很可能要高得多。GEICO——在 2011 年开局强劲——是一份不断给予的礼物。

One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country's largest personal-lines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.

一个不算太小的脚注：在托尼的领导下，GEICO 发展了美国最大的个人险种保险代理机构之一，主要向我们 GEICO 汽车保险客户销售房主保险。在这项业务中，我们代表多家与我们无关的保险公司。他们承担风险；我们只负责签约客户。去年，我们通过该代理机构销售了 769,898 份新保单，比前一年增长 34%。这项活动对我们有所帮助的明显方式是它产生了佣金收入；同样重要的是，它进一步加强了我们与保单持有人的关系，帮助我们留住他们。

I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).

我欠托尼和戴维（而且，回想起来，也欠那位看门人）一份巨大的恩情。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们审视伯克希尔的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，将它们混在一起会妨碍分析。所以我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。

We will look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

我们首先看保险，这是伯克希尔的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。

Insurance

保险

Property-casualty ("P/C") insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire's benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，我们持有的浮存金金额与保费收入相比保持非常稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少？请看下表：

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country's largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润发生时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。唉，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。例如，State Farm——迄今为止全国最大的保险公司，也是一家管理良好的公司——在过去十年中有七年发生了承保亏损。在此期间，其承保亏损总额超过 200 亿美元。

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most - though certainly not all - future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

在伯克希尔，我们已经连续八年实现承保利润，期间的承保收益总额为 170 亿美元。我相信，在未来大多数（尽管肯定不是所有）年份，我们很可能会继续盈利承保。如果我们做到了，我们的浮存金将优于零成本。我们将从中受益，就像有人将 660 亿美元存入我们这里，为持有其资金支付我们费用，然后让我们为自己的利益投资其资金一样。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry's overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire's outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We've already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个财产意外险行业可以预期的结果：在大多数年份，行业保费不足以覆盖损失加费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形股本回报率远低于美国工业的平均回报率，这种糟糕的表现几乎肯定会持续下去。伯克希尔卓越的经济状况之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营一些不寻常的业务。我们已经告诉过你 GEICO，但我们还有另外两个非常大的业务，以及一批较小的业务，每个都以自己的方式闪耀。

First of all the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

首先是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。事实上，我们在这方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。在过去的一年里，阿吉特显著扩大了他的寿险再保险业务，发展了约 20 亿美元的年度保费收入，这将持续几十年。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

从 1985 年的零起步，阿吉特创建了一项拥有 300 亿美元浮存金和显著承保利润的保险业务，这是其他任何保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的壮举。通过这些成就，他为伯克希尔的价值增加了许多数十亿美元。即使是氪石也奈何不了阿吉特。

We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要四项纪律：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. "The other guy is doing it so we must as well" spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，在第四项上不及格。华尔街的鼓动、代理机构和经纪人的压力，或者仅仅是一个荷尔蒙驱动的 CEO 拒绝接受业务量萎缩，导致太多保险公司以不充分的价格承保业务。“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数专注于保险领域的偏僻角落。总的来说，它们一直盈利，并且如下表所示，它们为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们财产意外险和人寿保险业务四个板块的记录：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire's impresses me as the best in the world.

在大型保险业务中，伯克希尔给我的印象是世界上最好的。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/10 (in millions)

2010年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

| Assets | | Liabilities and Equity | |
|--------|--|------------------------|--|
| Cash and equivalents | $2,673 | Notes payable | $1,805 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | $5,396 | Other current liabilities | $8,169 |
| Inventory | $7,101 | Total current liabilities | $9,974 |
| Other current assets | $550 | | |
| Total current assets | $15,720 | | |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | $16,976 | Deferred taxes | $3,001 |
| Fixed assets | $15,421 | Term debt and other liabilities | $6,621 |
| Other assets | $3,029 | Equity | $31,550 |
| Total | $51,146 | Total | $51,146 |

| 资产 | | 负债与权益 | |
|------|--|------------|--|
| 现金及等价物 | 2,673 | 应付票据 | 1,805 |
| 应收账款及票据 | 5,396 | 其他流动负债 | 8,169 |
| 存货 | 7,101 | 流动负债合计 | 9,974 |
| 其他流动资产 | 550 | | |
| 流动资产合计 | 15,720 | | |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | 16,976 | 递延税款 | 3,001 |
| 固定资产 | 15,421 | 长期债务及其他负债 | 6,621 |
| 其他资产 | 3,029 | 权益 | 31,550 |
| 总计 | 51,146 | 总计 | 51,146 |

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

\* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

\* 不包括购买会计调整。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

这个公司群销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。其中一些企业拥有极好的经济状况，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，税后利润从 25% 到超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12-20% 的良好回报。不幸的是，有少数回报非常差，这是我在资本配置工作中犯下的一些严重错误的结果。这些错误的发生是因为我误判了被收购业务的竞争实力或其所在行业的未来经济状况。我在进行收购时会努力展望未来十年或二十年，但有时我的眼光不好。

Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let's look first at the record-breakers.

这个板块中的大多数公司去年都改善了盈利，有四家创下了纪录。让我们先看看这些破纪录者。

• TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI's exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.

• TTI，我们的电子元件分销商，销售额比之前的最高纪录（2008 年）高出 21%，税前利润比之前的纪录高出 58%。其销售额增长遍布三大洲：北美 16%，欧洲 26%，亚洲 50%。TTI 分销的数千种商品都很普通，许多售价不到一美元。TTI 卓越表现的魔力是由其 CEO 保罗·安德鲁斯和他的同事创造的。

• Forest River, our RV and boat manufacturer, had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There's no need; Pete Liegl, the company's CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.
• CTB, our farm-equipment company, again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company's CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid $140 million for CTB in 2002. It has since paid us dividends of $160 million and eliminated $40 million of debt. Last year it earned $106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were $189,365; now they are $405,878.
• Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.

• Forest River，我们的房车和船舶制造商，销售额接近 20 亿美元创纪录，盈利也创纪录。Forest River 有 82 家工厂，我还没去过一家（总部也没去过）。没有必要；公司 CEO 皮特·利格尔经营着一家出色的企业。来年会看看他的产品。更好的是，买一个。
• CTB，我们的农业设备公司，再次创下盈利纪录。我在 2008 年年报中告诉过你该公司的 CEO 维克·曼奇内利。他不断进步。伯克希尔在 2002 年为 CTB 支付了 1.4 亿美元。此后，它向我们支付了 1.6 亿美元的股息，并消除了 4000 万美元的债务。去年它税前赚了 1.06 亿美元。生产率提升是这一增长的主要原因。我们收购 CTB 时，人均销售额为 189,365 美元；现在为 405,878 美元。
• 你相信鞋子吗？H. H. Brown 由吉姆·伊斯勒经营，以其 Born 品牌最为知名，销售额和盈利均创下新纪录（得益于在我们年会上售出 1,110 双鞋）。吉姆出色地适应了重大的行业变化。我应该提到，他的工作由 89 岁的弗兰克·鲁尼监督，弗兰克是一位出色的商人，仍然是一个在高尔夫球场上与之打赌很危险的家伙。

A huge story in this sector's year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can't overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol's achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.

该板块逐年改善的一个巨大故事发生在 NetJets。我无法夸大戴夫·索科尔在这家公务机分时所有权领先供应商所取得成就的广度和重要性。NetJets 长期以来在运营上一直很成功，2010 年的市场份额是最近竞争对手的五倍。我们压倒性的领导地位源于由飞行员、机械师和服务人员组成的出色团队。2010 年，这批员工再次完成了他们的工作，客户满意度在定期调查中创下新高。

Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire's credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater.

尽管 NetJets 在客户方面一直是遥遥领先的赢家，但自 1998 年收购以来，我们的财务表现是失败的。在截至 2009 年的 11 年里，该公司报告的税前亏损总额为 1.57 亿美元，这一数字被大大低估，因为 NetJets 的借款成本因其免费使用伯克希尔的信用而得到大量补贴。如果 NetJets 独立运营，其多年来的亏损将多出数亿美元。

We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire's guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to $38 million in 2010), NetJets earned $207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave's quick restructuring of management and the company's rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire's only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.

我们现在正在向 NetJets 收取适当的伯克希尔担保费。尽管有这笔费用（2010 年为 3,800 万美元），NetJets 在 2010 年还是取得了 2.07 亿美元的税前利润，比 2009 年增加了 9.18 亿美元。戴夫对管理层的快速重组以及公司对其采购和支出政策的合理化，结束了现金流失，并将伯克希尔唯一的主要业务问题变成了一个稳定盈利的运营。

Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets' industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that's equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.

与此同时，戴夫保持了 NetJets 在安全和服务方面的行业领先声誉。在许多重要方面，我们的培训和运营标准远高于 FAA 的要求。保持最高标准是正确的做法，但我也有支持这一政策的自私理由。我和我的家人在 NetJets 上飞行了超过 5,000 小时（相当于每天 24 小时连续飞行七个月），未来还将飞行数千小时。我们没有受到特殊待遇，随机使用了至少 100 架飞机和 300 个机组。无论哪架飞机或机组，我们始终知道我们是在与私人航空领域训练有素的飞行员一起飞行。

The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon, a collection of 130 businesses. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.

我们制造、服务和零售板块中最大的盈利者是 Marmon，一个由 130 家企业组成的集合。我们很快将通过对 Pritzker 家族执行计划中的 17% 股份购买，将我们在该公司的持股比例提高到 80%。成本约为 15 亿美元。然后，我们将在 2013 年或 2014 年购买 Pritzker 家族剩余的股份，具体日期由该家族选择。弗兰克·普塔克出色地运营着 Marmon，我们期待 100% 的所有权。

Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier's McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company's dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.

仅次于 Marmon，该板块中最大的两家盈利者是 Iscar 和 McLane。两者都表现优异。2010 年，格雷迪·罗西尔领导的 McLane 进入了葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务，以补充其作为食品、香烟、糖果和杂货分销商的 320 亿美元业务。在收购佐治亚州和北卡罗来纳州的运营商 Empire Distributors 时，我们与该公司的活力 CEO 大卫·卡恩合作。大卫正领导我们进行地域扩张。到年底，他已经完成了他的第一次收购——田纳西州的 Horizon Wine and Spirits。

At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar's main competitors.

在 Iscar，2010 年利润增长了 159%，我们很可能在 2011 年超过衰退前的水平。全球销售额都在改善，尤其是在亚洲。这要归功于 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman 的卓越表现，远超 Iscar 的主要竞争对手。

All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned $362 million pre-tax in 2010 compared to $1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.

这些都是好消息。然而，我们与房屋建筑相关的业务仍在挣扎。Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw 和 Acme Brick 保持了它们的竞争地位，但利润远低于几年前的水平。这些业务合计 2010 年税前盈利 3.62 亿美元，而 2006 年为 13 亿美元，就业人数减少了约 9,400 人。

A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently: (1) At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months; (2) At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for $50 million; (3) Johns Manville is building a $55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year; and (4) Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America. These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.

住房复苏可能在一两年内开始。无论如何，它肯定会在某个时候发生。因此：（1）在 MiTek，我们在过去十一个月里已经完成或承诺了五次补强收购；（2）在 Acme，我们最近刚刚以 5000 万美元收购了阿拉巴马州领先的砖块制造商；（3）Johns Manville 正在俄亥俄州建设一座耗资 5500 万美元的屋面膜工厂，将于明年完工；（4）Shaw 将在 2011 年斥资 2 亿美元用于工厂和设备，所有这些都在美国。这些企业进入衰退时实力雄厚，退出时会更强大。在伯克希尔，我们的时间视野是永恒的。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们有两个非常大的业务，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy，它们具有重要的共同特征，与我们许多其他业务不同。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF's car loadings far off peak levels, the company's interest coverage was 6:1.

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们在非常长寿命的受监管资产上进行了巨额投资，这些投资由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。我们的信用并非必需：这两项业务都具有即使在非常不利的商业条件下也充分覆盖其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，在 2010 年经济衰退期间，BNSF 的铁路运输量远未达到峰值，但公司的利息覆盖倍数仍为 6:1。

Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.

这两家公司都受到严格监管，并且都将有永无止境的需要对工厂和设备进行重大投资。它们都需要提供高效、让客户满意的服务，以赢得社区和监管机构的尊重。作为回报，它们都需要得到保证，即它们将被允许从未来的资本投资中获得合理的收益。

Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country's future. Rail moves 42% of America's inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad - about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.

我之前解释过铁路对我们国家未来有多重要。按吨英里计算，铁路运输了美国 42% 的城际货物，而 BNSF 的运输量超过任何其他铁路——约占行业总量的 28%。简单计算可知，美国所有城际货物吨英里中超过 11% 是由 BNSF 运输的。考虑到人口向西部转移，我们的份额很可能会进一步上升。

All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy's circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society's needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I'm confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.

所有这些都意味着巨大的责任。我们是美国经济循环系统的主要和必要组成部分，有义务不断维护和改善我们的 23,000 英里轨道及其附属桥梁、隧道、机车和车辆。在执行这项任务时，我们必须预见社会的需求，而不仅仅是应对它们。为了履行我们的社会义务，我们将定期花费远超折旧费用的资金，2011 年超额部分将达到 20 亿美元。我相信我们将在巨大的增量投资上获得适当的回报。明智的监管和明智的投资是同一枚硬币的两面。

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar "social compact." We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.

在 MidAmerican，我们参与了一个类似的“社会契约”。人们期望我们投入不断增加的资金来满足客户未来的需求。如果我们同时可靠、高效地运营，我们知道我们将从这些投资中获得公平的回报。

MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country's natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.

MidAmerican 为美国 240 万客户供电，是爱荷华州、怀俄明州和犹他州最大的供应商，也是其他州的重要供应商。我们的管道输送了全国 8% 的天然气。显然，每天有数百万美国人依赖我们。

MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire's interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company's performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

MidAmerican 为其所有者（伯克希尔持股 89.8%）和客户都带来了卓越的成果。MidAmerican 在 2002 年收购 Northern Natural Gas 管道后不久，该管道的性能在该领域权威机构的评级中排名垫底，43 家中排第 43。在最新发布的报告中，Northern Natural 排名第二。第一名由我们的另一条管道 Kern River 占据。

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.

在电力业务方面，MidAmerican 也有着类似的记录。自 1999 年我们在爱荷华州收购业务以来，那里的电价一直没有上涨。在同一时期，该州另一家主要电力公司的价格上涨了 70% 以上，现在的电价远高于我们。在这两家公用事业公司并排运营的某些大都市地区，我们客户的电费远低于他们的邻居。我听说，在这些城市，如果可比较的房子位于我们的服务区域内，售价会更高。

MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.

到 2011 年底，MidAmerican 将有 2,909 兆瓦的风电投入运营，超过国内任何其他受监管的电力公用事业。MidAmerican 已经投资或承诺投资风电的总金额高达 54 亿美元。我们能够进行这种投资，是因为 MidAmerican 保留了其所有收益，而与其他通常支付大部分收益的公用事业公司不同。

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:

正如你现在所知，我为马特·罗斯在 BNSF 以及戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔在 MidAmerican 为我们社会所取得的成就感到自豪。我为他们对伯克希尔股东所取得的成就同样感到自豪和感激。以下是相关数据：

\* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $19 in 2010 and $38 in 2009.

\* 包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后），2010 年为 1,900 万美元，2009 年为 3,800 万美元。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country's leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.

这是我们最小的板块，包括两家租赁公司 XTRA（拖车）和 CORT（家具），以及美国领先的活动房屋生产商和融资商 Clayton Homes。

Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to $35 million from $17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of $3 million in 2009 to $18 million of profit in 2010.

我们的两家租赁业务去年都改善了业绩，尽管是从一个很低的基数开始。XTRA 的设备利用率从 2009 年的 63% 提高到 2010 年的 75%，从而将税前利润从 2009 年的 1,700 万美元提高到 3,500 万美元。CORT 业务随着年份的推移而回升，并且大幅收紧了运营。两者结合，使其税前业绩从 2009 年的亏损 300 万美元变为 2010 年的盈利 1,800 万美元。

At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry's total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.

在 Clayton，我们生产了 23,343 套住宅，占行业总数 50,046 套的 47%。相比之下，1998 年的高峰年份生产了 372,843 套住宅。（当时我们的行业份额为 8%。）去年，在任何情况下销售都会很糟糕，但我在 2009 年报告中提到的融资问题继续加剧了困境。解释一下：我们政府的住房融资政策，通过 FHA、房地美和房利美认可的贷款来体现，偏爱现场建造的房屋，并起到抵消活动房屋价格优势的作用。

We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country's home-loan practices. Let's take a look.

我们资助的活动房屋购买者比任何其他公司都多。因此，我们的经验对于那些准备彻底改革国家住房贷款实践的各方应该具有指导意义。让我们来看一看。

Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.

Clayton 拥有 200,804 笔由其发起的抵押贷款。（它还有一些购买的抵押贷款组合。）在这些合同发起时，我们借款人的平均 FICO 评分为 648，47% 的人评分为 640 或更低。你的银行家会告诉你，具有此类评分的人通常被认为是信用可疑的。

Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here's our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:

尽管如此，我们的贷款组合在压力条件下表现良好。以下是我们过去五年中发起贷款的经验损失率：

Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.

我们的借款人遇到麻烦时，是因为他们失去工作、出现健康问题、离婚等。经济衰退对他们打击很大。但他们想留在自己的家中，而且通常他们借入的金额相对于收入是合理的。此外，我们将发起的抵押贷款保留在自己的账户中，这意味着我们没有将其证券化或以其他方式转售。如果我们在放贷时犯傻，我们就要付出代价。这让人集中注意力。

If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.

如果全国的购房者都像我们的购房者那样行事，美国就不会发生那样的危机。我们的方法很简单：获得一笔有意义的首付款，并将固定的月供与收入的合理百分比挂钩。这一政策保持了 Clayton 的偿付能力，也让购房者留在了自己的家中。

Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today's lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.

对于大多数美国人来说，拥有住房是合理的，特别是在今天较低的价格和优惠的利率下。综合考虑，我做过第三好的投资是购买我的房子，尽管如果我租房并用购房款买股票，我会赚得多得多。（前两个最好的投资是结婚戒指。）我花了 31,500 美元买了我们的房子，我和我的家人获得了 52 年的美好回忆，未来还会有更多。

But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer's eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender - often protected by a government guarantee - facilitates his fantasy. Our country's social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.

但是，如果买家的胃口超过了钱包，而贷款人——通常受到政府担保的保护——助长了他们的幻想，那么房子可能变成一场噩梦。我们国家的社会目标不应该是让家庭住进梦想之屋，而是让他们住进负担得起的房子。

Investments

投资

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

下面我们列出了年底市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资。

\* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP "cost" differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP“成本”因要求的增记或减记而有所不同。

In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience - and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century - undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: "This is worse than divorce. I've lost half my net worth - and I still have my wife.") In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.

在我们报告的收益中，我们只反映我们的投资组合公司支付给我们的股息。然而，我们应占的这些被投资方未分配收益去年超过 20 亿美元。这些留存收益很重要。根据我们的经验——就此而言，也是根据过去一个世纪投资者的经验——未分配收益要么被市场收益所匹配，要么被超过，尽管这种方式极不规则。（事实上，有时这种相关性会反过来。正如一位投资者在 2009 年所说：“这比离婚还糟糕。我失去了一半的净资产——而我的妻子还在。”）未来，我们期望我们的市场收益最终至少等于我们被投资方留存的收益。

In our earlier estimate of Berkshire's normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).

在我们对伯克希尔正常盈利能力的早期估计中，我们做了三个与未来投资收益相关的调整（但没有包括我刚才描述的未分配收益因素）。

The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these - our Swiss Re note - was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others - our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks - are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.

第一个调整显然是负面的。去年，我们讨论了五个大型固定收益投资，它们为我们报告的收益贡献了大量资金。其中之一——我们的瑞士再保险票据——已于 2011 年初被赎回，另外两个——我们的高盛和通用电气优先股——很可能在年底前消失。通用电气有权在 10 月赎回我们的优先股，并已表示有意这样做。高盛有权提前 30 天通知赎回我们的优先股，但一直被美联储（天佑它！）阻止，不幸的是，美联储很可能很快就会给高盛开绿灯。

All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so - in aggregate about $1.4 billion - but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That's the bad news.

所有三家赎回公司都必须向我们支付溢价——总计约 14 亿美元——但这些赎回仍然是不受欢迎的。它们发生后，我们的盈利能力将显著下降。这是坏消息。

There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held $38 billion of cash equivalents that have been earning a pittance throughout 2010. At some point, however, better rates will return. They will add at least $500 million - and perhaps much more - to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of "normal" earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can't come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.

有两个可能的抵消因素。年底我们持有 380 亿美元的现金等价物，整个 2010 年只赚了微薄收益。但某个时候，更好的利率会回来。它们将为我们的投资收益增加至少 5 亿美元——可能更多。货币市场收益率的这种增长不太可能很快到来。然而，在估计“正常”盈利能力时，我们纳入更高的利率是合适的。此外，即使在利率上升之前，我们也有幸找到一个机会，以不错的回报使用部分现金储备。对我来说，那一天越快越好：更新一下伊索寓言，一个穿着可转换债券的女孩抵得上电话簿里的五个。

In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don't fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)

此外，我们目前普通股持股的股息几乎肯定会增加。最大的增长可能来自富国银行。美联储——我们在高盛问题上的朋友——在过去两年冻结了各大银行的股息水平，无论强弱。富国银行尽管在整个衰退最严重的时期持续繁荣，目前拥有巨大的财务实力和盈利能力，但仍被迫维持人为的低派息率。（我们不责怪美联储：出于各种原因，在危机期间及其直接后果中，全面冻结是有道理的。）

At some point, probably soon, the Fed's restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

在某个时候，可能很快，美联储的限制就会停止。富国银行随后可以恢复其所有者应得的合理股息政策。届时，我们预计仅这一只证券的年度股息每年就会增加数亿美元。

Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us $88 million in 1995, the year after we finished purchasing the stock. Every year since, Coke has increased its dividend. In 2011, we will almost certainly receive $376 million from Coke, up $24 million from last year. Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn't be surprised to see our share of Coke's annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.

我们持有的其他公司也很可能增加股息。可口可乐在 1995 年支付给我们 8,800 万美元，那是我们完成购买股票后的第二年。从那以后，可口可乐每年都增加股息。2011 年，我们几乎肯定会从可口可乐获得 3.76 亿美元，比去年增加 2,400 万美元。十年内，我预计这 3.76 亿美元会翻倍。到那个时期结束时，如果我们应占的可口可乐年收益超过我们为该投资支付金额的 100%，我不会感到惊讶。时间是出色企业的朋友。

Overall, I believe our "normal" investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.

总的来说，我相信我们的“正常”投资收益至少会等于我们在 2010 年实现的水平，尽管我描述的赎回将降低我们在 2011 年以及可能 2012 年的收益。

Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 - an age Charlie and I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire - his call was a surprise.

去年夏天，卢·辛普森告诉我他想退休。由于卢年仅 74 岁——这个年龄查理和我认为只适合伯克希尔的实习生——他的电话令人惊讶。

Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?

卢于 1979 年加入 GEICO 担任投资经理，他对该公司的贡献是无价的。在 2004 年的年报中，我详细介绍了他在股票方面的记录，我没有更新只是因为他的表现让我的看起来很差。谁需要那个？

Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.

卢从不炫耀自己的才华。但我会：简而言之，卢是投资界的伟人之一。我们会想念他。

Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren't around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.

四年前，我告诉过你，我们需要增加一名或多名年轻的投资经理，以便在查理、卢和我不在场时继续工作。当时，我们有多个出色的候选人可以立即担任我的 CEO 工作（我们现在也有），但我们在投资领域没有后备人选。

It's easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager's understanding of - and sensitivity to - risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.

识别许多近期记录良好的投资经理很容易。但是，在判断未来表现时，过去的业绩虽然重要，但还不够。记录是如何实现的至关重要，同样重要的是经理对风险的理解和敏感度（风险绝不应该用贝塔来衡量，这是太多学者的选择）。关于风险标准，我们在寻找一种难以评估的技能：能够预见以前未观察到的经济情景的影响。最后，我们希望找到一个将为伯克希尔工作视为远不止一份工作的人。

When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled pasties, not partners.

当查理和我遇到托德·库姆斯时，我们知道他符合我们的要求。托德，和卢一样，将获得薪水加上基于他与标普 500 相比的表现的或有付款。我们有延期和结转的安排，以防止不应得的付款伴随着摇摆不定的表现。对冲基金界已经见证了一些普通合伙人的可怕行为，他们在上涨时获得了巨额回报，然后在不需弥补过去损失的情况下获得未来利润。将资金投入此类管理者的投资者应该被贴上“冤大头”而不是“合伙人”的标签。

As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire's holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as "long-short," "macro," "intentional equities.") At Berkshire our only style box is "smart.")

只要我还是 CEO，我将继续管理伯克希尔绝大部分的持股，包括债券和股票。托德最初将管理 10 到 30 亿美元的资金，他每年可以重置这个金额。他的重点将是股票，但不限于这种投资形式。（基金顾问喜欢要求风格框，如“多空”、“宏观”、“特定股票”。）在伯克希尔，我们唯一的风格框是“聪明”。

Over time, we may add any two or three investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager's performance compensation system that pays off big for portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We will want a compensation system that pays off big for portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s).

随着时间的推移，如果找到合适的人选，我们可能会再增加两三名投资经理。如果这样做，我们可能会让每位经理的业绩报酬系统中有 80% 取决于其自身的投资组合表现，20% 取决于其他经理的表现。我们希望有一个对优秀投资组合给予丰厚回报的薪酬体系。

When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted - but not to have a vote - on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.

当查理和我都不在时，我们的投资经理将以当时由 CEO 和董事会确定的方式负责整个投资组合。因为优秀的投资者能为企业收购带来有用的视角，我们期望他们在可能的收购明智性方面被咨询——但没有投票权。当然，最终，董事会将决定任何重大收购。

One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd's joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was "little-known" and expressed the view that he was "big-name." I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Aajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops - that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)

一个脚注：当我们发布关于托德加入的新闻稿时，一些评论员指出他“鲜为人知”，并表达了认为他“不够大牌”的观点。我想知道他们中有多少人会知道 1979 年的卢、1985 年的阿吉特，或者就此而言，1959 年的查理。我们的目标是找到一匹两岁的“秘书处”，而不是一匹十岁的“海洋饼干”。（哎哟——对于一个 80 岁的 CEO 来说，这可能不是最明智的比喻。）

Derivatives

衍生品

Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging us in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks that others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought process we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no country risk. That's important.

我们持续的头寸——全部由我亲自负责——主要分为两类。我们将这两类都视为从事类保险活动，我们收取保费以承担他人希望转移的风险。事实上，我们在这些衍生品交易中采用的思维过程与我们在保险业务中使用的完全相同。你还应该理解，我们在签订合同时会预先收到付款，因此不承担主权风险。这很重要。

Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.

我们的第一类衍生品包括 2004-2008 年间签订的一些合同，如果特定高收益指数中包含的公司发生债券违约，我们就要支付。除了少数例外，我们在五年内承担这些风险，每份合同涵盖 100 家公司。

In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an "underwriting profit," meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the profits of the float.

总计，我们为这些合同收到了 34 亿美元的保费。当我在 2007 年年报中第一次告诉你这些合同的情况时，我说我预计这些合同将为我们带来“承保利润”，这意味着我们的损失将低于我们收到的保费。此外，我说我们将从浮存金的盈利中受益。

Subsequently, as you know too well, we encountered both a financial panic and a severe recession. A number of the companies in the high-yield indices failed, which required us to pay losses of $2.5 billion. Today, however, our exposure is largely behind us because most of our higher-risk contracts have expired. Consequently, it appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago.

随后，如你所知，我们遭遇了金融恐慌和严重衰退。高收益指数中的一些公司违约，我们需要支付 25 亿美元的损失。然而，今天，我们的风险敞口基本上已经过去，因为我们大多数高风险合同已经到期。因此，几乎可以肯定，我们将像最初预期的那样获得承保利润。此外，在合同有效期内，我们平均使用了约 20 亿美元的免息浮存金。简而言之，我们收取了正确的保费，这在三年前商业环境变得糟糕时保护了我们。

Our other large derivatives position - whose contracts go by the name of "equity puts" - involves insurance we wrote for parties wishing to protect themselves against a possible decline in equity prices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts are tied to various equity indices, such as the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the FTSE 100 in the U.K. In the 2004-2008 period, we received $4.8 billion of premiums for 47 of these contracts, most of which ran for 15 years. On these contracts, only the price of the indices on the termination date counts: No payments can be required before then.

我们的另一大类衍生品头寸——名为“股票看跌期权”的合同——涉及我们为希望保护自己免受美国、英国、欧洲和日本股票价格可能下跌影响的各方提供保险。这些合同与各种股票指数挂钩，例如美国的标普 500 指数和英国的富时 100 指数。在 2004-2008 年期间，我们为其中 47 份合同收取了 48 亿美元的保费，大多数期限为 15 年。在这些合同中，只有在终止日期的指数价格才算数：在此之前无需支付任何款项。

As a first step in updating you about these contracts, I can report that late in 2010, at the instigation of our counterparty, we unwound eight contracts, all of them due between 2021 and 2028. We had originally received $647 million in premiums for these contracts, and the unwinding required us to pay $425 million. Consequently, we realized a gain of $222 million and also had the interest-free and unrestricted use of that $647 million for about three years.

作为更新这些合同情况的第一步，我可以报告说，2010 年底，应我们交易对手的要求，我们平仓了八份合同，这些合同都将于 2021 年至 2028 年间到期。我们最初为这些合同收到了 6.47 亿美元的保费，平仓要求我们支付 4.25 亿美元。因此，我们实现了 2.22 亿美元的收益，并且在大约三年内可以免息、不受限制地使用这 6.47 亿美元。

Those 2010 transactions left us with 39 equity put contracts remaining on our books at yearend. On these, at their initiation, we received premiums of $4.2 billion.

这些 2010 年的交易使我们在年底账面留下了 39 份股票看跌期权合同。在签订这些合同时，我们收到了 42 亿美元的保费。

The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 - and foreign exchange rates are unchanged - we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount "settlement value."

这些合同的未来当然是不确定的。但这里有一个视角。如果相关指数在合同到期日的价格与 2010 年 12 月 31 日的价格相同——且汇率不变——那么对于 2018 年至 2026 年到期的合同，我们将欠 38 亿美元。你可以称这个金额为“结算价值”。

On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at $6.7 billion. In other words, if the prices of the relevant indices remain unchanged from that date, we will record a $2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of $6.7 billion and the settlement value of $3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that, of course, is far from a sure thing.

然而，在我们年底的资产负债表上，我们为这些剩余的股票看跌期权负债记为 67 亿美元。换句话说，如果相关指数的价格从那天起保持不变，我们将在未来几年记录 29 亿美元的收益，这就是 67 亿美元的负债数字与 38 亿美元的结算价值之间的差额。我相信股票价格很可能会上涨，从现在到结算日之间我们的负债将显著下降。如果是这样，我们从这一点开始的收益将更大。但这当然远非确定。

What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining "float" of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.

确定的是，我们将平均再使用大约 10 年剩余的 42 亿美元“浮存金”。（这笔浮存金以及高收益合同产生的浮存金都不包括在 660 亿美元的保险浮存金数字中。）由于资金是可替代的，可以将这些资金的一部分视为为购买 BNSF 做出了贡献。

As I have told you before, almost all of our derivatives contracts are free of any obligation to post collateral - a fact that cut the premiums we could otherwise have charged. But that fact also left us feeling comfortable during the financial crisis, allowing us in those days to commit to some advantageous purchases. Foregoing some additional derivatives premiums proved to be well worth it.

正如我过去告诉你的，我们几乎所有的衍生品合同都没有任何提供抵押品的义务——这一事实降低了我们本可以收取的保费。但这一事实也让我们在金融危机期间感到安心，使我们那时能够承诺进行一些有利的购买。事实证明，放弃一些额外的衍生品保费是非常值得的。

On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don't

关于报告与误报：重要数字与无关数字

Earlier in this letter, I pointed out some numbers that Charlie and I find useful in valuing Berkshire and measuring its progress.

在本信前面，我指出了一些查理和我认为对评估伯克希尔价值和衡量其进展有用的数字。

Let's focus here on a number we omitted, but which many in the media feature above all others: net income. Important though that number may be at most companies, it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire. Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could - quite legally - cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.

让我们在这里关注一个我们省略了，但许多媒体最关注的数字：净利润。尽管这个数字在大多数公司可能很重要，但在伯克希尔，它几乎总是毫无意义。无论我们的业务表现如何，查理和我都可以——完全合法地——让任何特定时期的净利润几乎变成我们想要的任何数字。

We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a $10 billion increase in unrealized gains in a given year and concurrently had $1 billion of realized losses. Our net income - which would count only the loss - would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved.

我们有这种灵活性，因为已实现的投资损益计入净利润数字，而未实现收益（以及大多数情况下的损失）被排除在外。例如，想象一下，伯克希尔在某一年未实现收益增加了 100 亿美元，同时有 10 亿美元的已实现损失。我们的净利润——只计算了损失——将被报告为低于我们的营业收入。如果我们同时在前一年实现了收益，头条新闻可能会宣称我们的收益下降了 X%，而实际上我们的业务可能大有改善。

If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for "game playing" with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.

如果我们真的认为净利润很重要，我们可以定期将已实现收益注入其中，仅仅是因为我们有大量未实现收益可以提取。不过请放心，查理和我从未因为出售会影响我们即将报告的净利润而出售证券。我们都对用数字“玩游戏”深感厌恶，这种做法在 1990 年代盛行于美国企业界，并且仍然存在，尽管不像以前那么频繁和明目张胆。

Operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing. Ignore our net income figure, however. Regulations require that we report it to you. But if you find reporters focusing on it, that will speak more to their performance than ours.

营业利润尽管有一些缺点，但通常是衡量我们业务表现的一个合理指南。然而，忽略我们的净利润数字吧。法规要求我们向你报告它。但如果你发现记者们关注它，那更多反映的是他们的表现，而不是我们的。

Both realized and unrealized gains and losses are fully reflected in the calculation of our book value. Pay attention to the changes in that metric and to the course of our operating earnings, and you will be on the right track.

已实现和未实现的损益都完全反映在我们账面价值的计算中。关注该指标的变化以及我们营业利润的走势，你就会走在正确的轨道上。

As a p.s., I can't resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had a termination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay $6.4 billion to our counterparties at that date. Security prices then generally rose in the next quarter, a move that brought the corresponding figure down to $5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from $8.9 billion to $9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.

作为附言，我忍不住指出报告的净利润是多么反复无常。如果我们的股票看跌期权的到期日是 2010 年 6 月 30 日，我们将在那天需要向交易对手支付 64 亿美元。随后，下个季度证券价格普遍上涨，这一变化使 9 月 30 日的相应数字降至 58 亿美元。然而，我们在估值这些合同时使用的布莱克-斯科尔斯公式要求我们在此期间将资产负债表负债从 89 亿美元增加到 96 亿美元，这一变化在计入税款应计项目的影响后，使该季度的净利润减少了 4.55 亿美元。

Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.

查理和我都认为，当应用于长期期权时，布莱克-斯科尔斯公式会产生非常不合适的价值。两年前，我们在这些页面中举了一个荒谬的例子。更具体地说，我们通过签订股票看跌期权合同将钱放在了嘴上。通过这样做，我们含蓄地断言我们的交易对手或其客户使用的布莱克-斯科尔斯计算是有缺陷的。

We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation - almost all leading business schools teach it - and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use Black-Scholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.

然而，我们在呈报财务报表时继续使用该公式。布莱克-斯科尔斯是期权估值公认的标准——几乎所有顶尖商学院都教授它——如果我们偏离它，就会被指责会计质量低劣。此外，如果我们这样做，我们会给审计师带来一个无法克服的问题：他们有客户是我们的交易对手，而这些客户对我们持有的相同合同使用布莱克-斯科尔斯估值。如果两者的价值相差甚远，我们的审计师就不可能证明他们的价值和我们的价值都是准确的。

Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can't supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can't come up with an exact figure - anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn't bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.

布莱克-斯科尔斯对审计师和监管者的吸引力部分在于它产生一个精确的数字。查理和我无法提供这样的数字。我们相信我们合同的真实负债远低于布莱克-斯科尔斯计算的值，但我们无法得出一个确切的数字——就像我们无法得出 GEICO、BNSF 或伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身的确切价值一样。我们无法精确确定一个数字并不会困扰我们：我们宁愿大致正确也不愿精确错误。

John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it "anomalies." (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship's circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)

约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思曾狡黠地指出，经济学家在思想方面最为节约：他们把在研究生院学到的东西用了一辈子。大学金融系往往也有类似的行为。见证一下在 1970 年代和 1980 年代，几乎所有人都顽固地坚持有效市场理论，轻蔑地将反驳它的有力事实称为“异常”。（我总喜欢这种解释：地平说学会可能将环球航行的船只视为一个恼人但无关紧要的异常。）

Academics' current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic's inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That's what investing is all about.

学术界目前将布莱克-斯科尔斯作为揭示的真理来教授的做法需要重新审视。就此而言，学术界沉迷于期权估值的倾向也需要重新审视。你可以成为非常成功的投资者，却丝毫没有评估期权的能力。学生应该学习的是如何评估一家企业。这才是投资的全部意义。

Life and Debt

生活与债务

The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.

赛车的基本原则是：要首先完赛，必须先完成比赛。这句格言同样适用于商业，并指导着我们在伯克希尔的每一个行动。

Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that's also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you're clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade - and some relearned in 2008 - any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.

毫无疑问，有些人通过借钱变得非常富有。然而，这也是一种变得非常贫穷的方式。当杠杆起作用时，它会放大你的收益。你的配偶认为你很聪明，你的邻居会嫉妒。但杠杆是会上瘾的。一旦从其奇迹中获利，很少有人会退回到更保守的做法。正如我们在三年级都学到的——有些人在 2008 年重新学到——任何一系列正数，无论数字多么令人印象深刻，乘以一个零就会化为乌有。历史告诉我们，杠杆往往会产生零，即使是聪明人使用也是如此。

Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.

当然，杠杆对企业也可能是致命的。负债累累的公司通常假设这些债务到期时可以再融资。这个假设通常有效。但偶尔，由于公司特有的问题或全球信贷短缺，债务到期时实际上必须用现金支付。只有现金才能做到这一点。

Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that's all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.

借款人随后会明白，信贷就像氧气。当它丰富时，它的存在不会被注意到。当它缺失时，人们注意到的只有它。即使短暂的信贷缺失也能让一家公司陷入困境。事实上，在 2008 年 9 月，信贷在许多经济领域的隔夜消失险些让整个国家陷入困境。

Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire's wellbeing. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.

查理和我对任何可能对伯克希尔的福祉构成丝毫威胁的活动都不感兴趣。（由于我们两人年龄加起来 167 岁，重新开始不在我们的愿望清单上。）我们永远意识到这样一个事实：你们，我们的合伙人，将你们在许多情况下的大部分积蓄托付给了我们。此外，重要的慈善事业依赖于我们的审慎。最后，许多由我们投保人造成的事故的残疾受害者指望我们在几十年后支付应付款项。为了追求几个额外的回报点而拿所有这些相关方需要的东西去冒险，对我们来说是不负责任的。

A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn't meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather's grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather's name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.

一点个人历史可能部分解释了我们为何极端厌恶金融冒险。我直到查理 35 岁才认识他，尽管他在我住了 52 年的地方 100 码范围内长大，并且也毕业于奥马哈同一所市中心公立高中——我的父亲、妻子、孩子和两个孙子都从那里毕业。然而，查理和我小时候都在我祖父的杂货店工作过，尽管我们的工作期间相隔约五年。我祖父的名字是欧内斯特（Ernest），也许没有人比他名字的寓意更贴切了。没有人替欧内斯特工作——即使是作为理货员——而不受这段经历的影响。

On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found - along with $1,000 of cash - when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.

在对页（第 22 页），你可以读到 1939 年欧内斯特写给他最小的儿子——我的弗雷德叔叔的一封信。类似的信也写给了他的其他四个孩子。我仍然保留着写给我爱丽丝姑妈的信——1970 年，作为她遗产的执行人，我打开她的保险箱时发现了这封信以及 1,000 美元现金。

Ernest never went to business school - he never in fact finished high school - but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry's most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.

欧内斯特从未上过商学院——事实上他连高中都没毕业——但他理解流动性作为确保生存的条件的重要性。在伯克希尔，我们把他 1,000 美元的解决方案向前推进了一步，并承诺我们将持有至少 100 亿美元的现金，不包括我们受监管的公用事业和铁路业务持有的现金。由于这一承诺，我们通常手头保留至少 200 亿美元，这样我们既能承受史无前例的保险损失（迄今为止我们最大的损失是卡特里娜飓风造成的约 30 亿美元，这是保险业损失最大的灾难），也能迅速抓住收购或投资机会，即使在金融动荡时期也是如此。

We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe's observation, "More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun." At Berkshire, we don't rely on bank lines, and we don't enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.

我们将现金主要放在美国国库券中，避免购买其他收益率稍高几个基点的短期证券，这一政策我们在 2008 年 9 月商业票据和货币市场基金的脆弱性变得明显之前就长期坚持了。我们同意投资作家雷·德沃的观察：“追求收益而失去的钱比枪口下失去的还要多。”在伯克希尔，我们不依赖银行授信额度，我们也不签订可能需要提供抵押品的合同，除非金额与我们的流动资产相比非常小。

Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.

此外，在过去的 40 年里，没有一分钱现金离开伯克希尔用于股息或股票回购。相反，我们保留了所有收益来加强我们的业务，现在每月大约增加 10 亿美元。因此，在这四十年里，我们的净资产从 4,800 万美元增加到 1,570 亿美元，而我们的内在价值增长得更多。没有其他美国公司能以这种持续不断的方式建立起这样的财务实力。

By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That's what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.

通过对杠杆如此谨慎，我们将收益小幅损失。然而，拥有大量流动性让我们睡得安稳。此外，在我们经济中偶尔爆发的金融混乱期间，我们将在财务上和情绪上都做好准备，在他人争相求生时发起进攻。这就是让我们在 2008 年雷曼兄弟破产后的 25 天恐慌期内投资 156 亿美元的原因。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.

年度股东大会将于 4 月 30 日星期六举行。我们总部的 Carrie Kizer 将担任主持人，她今年的主题是飞机、火车和汽车。这给了 NetJets、BNSF 和比亚迪展示的机会。

As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest's stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

一如既往，Qwest Center 的门将在早上 7 点开放，8:30 将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节，中间在 Qwest 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:45 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。（动作要快；他可以很简洁。）

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,053 pairs of Justin boots, 12,416 pounds of See's candy, 8,000 Dairy Queen Blizzards and 8,800 Quikut knives (that's 16 knives per minute). But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can't buy happiness simply hasn't learned where to shop.

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将通过在与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满来自数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你购物。去年，你们尽了自己的一份力，大多数展位都创下了销售记录。在九个小时内，我们售出了 1,053 双 Justin 靴子、12,416 磅喜诗糖果、8,000 杯冰雪皇后暴风雪和 8,800 把 Quikut 刀具（每分钟 16 把）。但你可以做得更好。记住：任何说金钱买不到幸福的人，只是不知道去哪里购物。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务，所有人都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有一半的人，我们可以做到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie's Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can't read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。它将携带超过 60 本书和 DVD，包括中文版的《穷查理宝典》，这本关于我合作伙伴的畅销书。看不懂中文又怎样？买一本带着走；它会让你显得温文尔雅、博学多识。如果你需要邮寄购买的书籍，附近会有邮寄服务。

If you are a big spender - or merely a gawker - visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.

如果你是大手笔的消费者——或者只是个看客——周六中午到下午 5:00 之间前往奥马哈机场东侧的 Elliott Aviation。在那里，我们将有一支 NetJets 机队，肯定会让你心跳加速。乘巴士来；乘私人飞机离开。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。关于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与美国运通签约（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。负责这些事务的 Carol Pedersen 每年都为我们做得很出色，我感谢她。酒店房间可能很难找，但与 Carol 合作，你会找到一间。

Airlines have often jacked up prices - sometimes dramatically so - for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 2½ hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.

航空公司经常对伯克希尔周末的航班涨价——有时涨得很多。如果你从远方来，比较飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。开车大约需要 2.5 小时，你可能会节省大量资金，特别是如果你原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that - as far as I know - exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anyplace. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年该店在年会促销期间实现了 3,330 万美元的营业额，据我所知，这一数字超过了任何地方任何零售店的一周总额。要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 26 日（周二）至 5 月 2 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开放，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办野餐会，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men's shirts at J.C. Penney's 63 years ago. I've told Susan Jacques, Borsheims' CEO, that I'm still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 4 月 29 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 1 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。周日下午 1 点左右，我将在 Borsheims 带着微笑和擦亮的皮鞋卖珠宝，就像 63 年前我在 J.C. Penney 卖男士衬衫一样。我已经告诉 Borsheims 的 CEO Susan Jacques，我仍然是一个出色的推销员。但我看到她眼中的怀疑。所以放手吧，从我这里为你的妻子或爱人（应该是同一个人）买点东西。让我好看点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire shareholder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 25 日（周一）持续到 5 月 7 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔股东的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。

Gorat's and Piccolo's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat's opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo's opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and - still being a growing boy - I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo's call 402-342-9038.

Gorat's 和 Piccolo's 将在 5 月 1 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。两家餐厅都将营业到晚上 10 点，Gorat's 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo's 下午 4 点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅——而且我仍然是一个成长中的男孩——我将在周日晚上两家都吃。记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-342-9038。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将再次有同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和重要的十几个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones, and that's the way we like it.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者们会选一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.

我们将再次在周六早上 8:15 在 13 个麦克风处为希望亲自提问的股东举行抽签。在会议上，我将交替采纳记者提问和获胜股东的提问。我们希望至少回答 60 个问题。从我们的角度来看，越多越好。我们通过年度信函和会议讨论追求的目标，是让你更好地了解你所拥有的业务。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们的成就。然而，同样重要的是在我公司办公室与我一起工作的 20 位男男女女（所有人都在同一层楼，这也是我们打算一直保持的方式！）。

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097-page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country's largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board's activities - and the list goes on and on.

这个团队高效地处理着大量的 SEC 和其他监管要求，提交一份 14,097 页的联邦所得税申报表以及州和外国税表，回应无数的股东和媒体询问，发布年度报告，准备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的活动——这样的例子不胜枚举。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率高得令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超越了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动：他们处理 48 所大学（从 200 名申请者中选出）在本学年派学生到奥马哈与我共度一天的事宜，处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买来汉堡包做午餐。没有 CEO 比我更好了。

This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30th and tell them so.

这些总部员工，我深表感谢，你们也应感谢他们。4 月 30 日来参加我们的资本主义伍德斯托克，并告诉他们吧。

February 26, 2011

2011 年 2 月 26 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席