2022 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔·哈撒韦与标普500指数业绩对比

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注：数据按日历年计算，例外如下：1965年和1966年，截至9月30日；1967年，15个月，截至12月31日。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

我的长期搭档查理·芒格和我，负责管理众多个人的积蓄。我们感激他们长久以来的信任，这种关系往往贯穿他们成年后的大部分时光。在我撰写这封信时，脑海中浮现的正是这些忠诚的储蓄者。

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

人们普遍认为，人们选择在年轻时储蓄，期望以此维持退休后的生活水平。这种理论认为，去世时剩余的资产通常会留给家人，或者可能留给朋友和慈善机构。

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

我们的经验则不同。我们相信伯克希尔的个人股东大体上属于“一日储蓄，终生储蓄”的类型。尽管这些人生活优裕，他们最终会将大部分资金捐赠给慈善组织。这些组织再通过支出将这些资金重新分配，旨在改善众多与原始捐赠者并无关联的人们的生活。有时，成果相当显著。

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.

金钱的处置方式揭示了人性。查理和我欣慰地看到，伯克希尔产生的资金大量流向公共需求，同时，我们的股东很少选择炫耀性资产或建立王朝。

Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?

谁不乐意为像我们这样的股东工作呢？

What We Do

我们的工作

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

查理和我在伯克希尔将你们的储蓄分配在两种相关的所有权形式上。第一，我们投资于我们控股的企业，通常收购每家企业的100%。伯克希尔在这些子公司中指导资本配置，并挑选负责日常运营决策的首席执行官。在管理大型企业时，信任和规则都不可或缺。伯克希尔对前者的重视程度非同寻常——有人会说是极端。失望在所难免。我们对业务失误持理解态度；但对个人不端行为零容忍。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

在第二类所有权中，我们购买公开交易的股票，通过这些股票我们被动地持有企业的一部分。持有这些投资，我们在管理上没有发言权。

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

在两种所有权形式中，我们的目标都是对有持久良好的经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有公开交易的股票是基于对其长期业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为巧妙买卖的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是选股者；我们是选企业者。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

多年来，我犯过许多错误。因此，我们目前庞大的企业组合包括少数具有真正非凡经济特征的企业，许多享有非常好的经济特征，以及一大批处于边缘的企业。一路走来，我投资的其他一些企业已经消亡，其产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性：这个体系在创造越来越多的失败者的同时，也源源不断地提供改进的商品和服务。熊彼特将这种现象称为“创造性破坏”。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

我们公开交易部分的一个优势是，偶尔会很容易以极好的价格买入优秀企业的一部分。至关重要的是要明白，股票经常以真正愚蠢的价格交易，无论高低。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，可交易的股票和债券令人困惑，通常只有在事后才能理解其行为。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

控股企业则是另一回事。它们有时会要求远高于合理水平的荒谬价格，但几乎从不以折价估值出售。除非面临压力，控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌型估值出售。

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

此时，我理应给自己打一张成绩单：在管理伯克希尔的58年中，我的大部分资本配置决策都不过尔尔。在某些情况下，我的糟糕举措也被极大的运气所挽救。（还记得我们从全美航空和所罗门的几乎灾难中脱身吗？我当然记得。）

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

我们令人满意的业绩是大约十几个真正好的决策的产物——大约每五年一个——以及一个有时被遗忘的对伯克希尔这样的长期投资者有利的优势。让我们掀开帘幕一角看一看。

The Secret Sauce

秘密配方

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

1994年8月——是的，1994年——伯克希尔完成了对现在持有的4亿股可口可乐股票长达七年的购买。总成本为13亿美元——当时对伯克希尔来说是一笔很大的金额。

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

1994年我们从可口可乐获得的现金股息为7500万美元。到2022年，股息已增至7.04亿美元。增长逐年发生，就像生日一样确定。查理和我需要做的只是兑现可口可乐的季度股息支票。我们预计这些支票极大概率还会增长。

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

美国运通的故事也大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的购买基本上在1995年完成，巧合的是，成本也是13亿美元。从这项投资获得的年度股息已从4100万美元增至3.02亿美元。这些支票似乎也极有可能增加。

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

这些股息收益虽然令人愉悦，但远谈不上惊人。但它们带来了重要的股价上涨。到年底，我们的可口可乐投资价值250亿美元，而美国运通则为220亿美元。每项持股现在约占伯克希尔净值的5%，与很久以前的权重相近。

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.

假设，在1990年代我犯了一个类似规模的投资错误，一项表现平平、到2022年价值仍仅为13亿美元的投资（例如高评级30年期债券）。那项令人失望的投资现在将仅占伯克希尔净值的微不足道的0.3%，并为我们带来约8000万美元不变的年收入。

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

给投资者的教训：野草随着繁花盛开而枯萎，重要性逐渐消失。随着时间的推移，只需少数赢家就能创造奇迹。而且，没错，早点开始并活到90多岁也有帮助。

The Past Year in Brief

过去一年简述

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

伯克希尔在2022年表现良好。公司运营利润——我们用来指根据通用会计准则（GAAP）计算的，不包括股权持有资本利得或损失的利润——创下308亿美元的纪录。查理和我关注这一运营数字，并敦促你们也这样做。若不加我们的调整，GAAP数字在每个报告日都会剧烈而无规律地波动。请注意它在2022年的杂技般表现，这绝无异常：

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

无论是按季度还是年度来看，GAAP利润都具有100%的误导性。诚然，过去几十年来，资本利得对伯克希尔极为重要，我们预计未来几十年它们仍将有意义地正面。但它们逐季的剧烈波动，被媒体规律性地、不加思考地大肆渲染，完全误导了投资者。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

去年伯克希尔的第二个积极进展是收购了Alleghany Corporation，一家由乔·布兰登领导的财产意外险保险公司。我过去曾与乔共事，他既了解伯克希尔，也懂得保险。Alleghany为我们带来了特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够采取几乎其他所有竞争对手都无法获得的宝贵而持久的投资策略。

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

在Alleghany的助力下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增至1640亿美元。通过纪律严明的承保，这些资金长期内有相当机会实现零成本。自1967年收购第一家财产意外险保险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮存金通过收购、运营和创新增长了8000倍。尽管未在我们的财务报表中确认，这笔浮存金一直是伯克希尔的一项非凡资产。新股东可以通过阅读我们每年更新的关于浮存金的解释（见A-2页）来了解其价值。

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

2022年，通过伯克希尔的股份回购以及我们重要的被投资方苹果和美国运通的类似操作，每股内在价值实现了非常微小的增长。在伯克希尔，我们通过回购1.2%的流通股，直接增加了你们在我们独特企业组合中的权益。在苹果和美国运通，回购也在不增加我们成本的情况下略微提高了伯克希尔的持股比例。

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

数学并不复杂：当股份数量减少时，你们在我们众多业务中的权益就会上升。如果回购是在增值价格上进行，每一点微小的帮助都有用。同样确定的是，当一家公司为回购支付过高价格时，继续持有的股东就会受损。在这种情况下，收益只流向卖出的股东和那位友好但昂贵的、推荐了愚蠢购买行为的投资银行家。

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

应该强调的是，增值回购带来的收益在所有方面都惠及所有所有者。请想象一下，一家本地汽车经销商有三名充分知情的股东，其中一人管理业务。再想象一下，其中一位被动股东希望以对两位继续持有的股东有吸引力的价格，将其权益卖回给公司。当交易完成后，是否有人受到损害？管理者是否以某种方式相对于继续持有的被动股东获得了优待？公众是否受到了伤害？

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

当你听到有人说所有回购都对股东、对国家有害，或对首席执行官特别有利时，你听到的要么是一个经济文盲，要么是一个口若悬河的煽动家（这两种角色并非互斥）。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

伯克希尔2022年运营的几乎无穷无尽的细节列于K-33至K-66页。查理和我，以及许多伯克希尔股东，都喜欢仔细研究该部分列出的大量事实和数据。但这些页面并非必读内容。有许多伯克希尔的亿万富豪，是的，甚至亿万富翁，从未研究过我们的财务数字。他们只是知道查理和我——连同我们的家人和密友——仍然在伯克希尔拥有非常重大的投资，并相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。

And that is a promise we can make.

这是一个我们可以做出的承诺。

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

最后，一个重要警告：即使是我们偏爱的运营利润数字，也很容易被有意为之的管理者操纵。首席执行官、董事及其顾问常认为这种篡改是精明的。记者和分析师也欣然接受其存在。击败“预期”被吹捧为管理上的胜利。

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

这种行为令人作呕。操纵数字无需才能：只需要欺骗的强烈欲望。正如一位首席执行官曾向我描述他的欺骗行为那样，“大胆富有想象力的会计”已成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58 Years – and a Few Figures

58年以及一些数字

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

1965年，伯克希尔是一匹只会一招的小马，是一家古老但注定失败的新英格兰纺织企业的所有者。随着这项业务走向消亡，伯克希尔需要立即重新开始。回想起来，我当时迟迟未能认识到问题的严重性。

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

然后好运降临：1967年，国家赔偿公司成为可收购标的，我们将资源转向保险和其他非纺织业务。

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

于是，我们开启了通往2023年的旅程，这是一条崎岖之路，包含了我们所有者持续的储蓄（即留存收益）、复利的力量、我们对重大错误的避免，以及最重要的——美国的顺风。没有伯克希尔，美国仍会发展得很好。反之则不然。

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

伯克希尔现在在一系列无与伦比的庞大而多元化的企业中拥有主要所有权。我们先看看那些在纳斯达克、纽约证券交易所及相关场所每日交易的约5000家上市公司。标普500指数成分股就包含在其中，这是一个由美国大型知名公司组成的精英集合。

In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

这500家公司在2021年合计赚取了1.8万亿美元。我还没有2022年的最终数据。因此，使用2021年的数字，500家中只有128家（包括伯克希尔自身）盈利30亿美元或以上。事实上，有23家出现亏损。

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

截至2022年底，伯克希尔是这八家巨头中最大的股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普、穆迪、西方石油和派拉蒙环球。

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

除了这八家被投资方，伯克希尔还全资拥有BNSF，并持有BH能源92%的股份，每家的盈利都超过了上述30亿美元大关（BNSF为59亿美元，BHE为43亿美元）。如果这些公司是公开上市的，它们将取代标普500指数中的两家现有成分股。总而言之，我们这十家控股和非控股的巨头使伯克希尔比任何其他美国公司都更广泛地与美国经济的未来保持一致。（此计算未考虑养老金基金和投资公司等“受托”业务。）此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过众多独立管理的子公司进行，其价值可与BNSF或BHE相媲美。

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

至于未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，同时拥有广泛的企业。我们还将避免任何可能导致在不便之时出现令人不安的现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。我们的首席执行官将始终兼任首席风险官——这是一项不可委托的任务。此外，我们未来的首席执行官们将在伯克希尔股票中拥有其净资产的很大一部分，这些股票是用他们自己的钱购买的。是的，我们的股东将继续通过留存收益进行储蓄并实现繁荣。

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.

在伯克希尔，没有终点线。

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes

关于联邦税收的一些令人惊讶的事实

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.

在截至2021年的十年中，美国财政部收到约32.3万亿美元的税收，同时支出43.9万亿美元。

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

尽管经济学家、政治家以及许多公众对这种巨大的失衡后果各有看法，查理和我承认我们无知，并坚信短期经济和市场预测比无用更糟。我们的工作是管理伯克希尔的运营和财务，以期长期取得可接受的结果，并在金融恐慌或严重的全球性衰退发生时保持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔还能提供一些对恶性通胀的适度保护，但这种特性远非完美。庞大而根深蒂固的财政赤字终有后果。

The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (34½%), corporate income tax payments (8½%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

这32万亿美元的收入，财政部通过个人所得税（48%）、社会保障及相关收入（34.5%）、企业所得税缴纳（8.5%）以及各种较小税项获得。伯克希尔在十年间通过企业所得税贡献了320亿美元，几乎恰好是财政部全部税收的千分之一。

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

这意味着——做好准备——如果美国大约有1000个纳税人的纳税额与伯克希尔相当，那么没有任何其他企业，也没有全国1.31亿家庭，需要向联邦政府缴纳任何税款。一分钱都不用。

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:

百万、十亿、万亿——我们都知道这些词，但涉及的金额几乎无法理解。让我们给这些数字加上物理尺寸：

• If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
• Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about ¾ of a mile into the sky.
• Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

• 如果你把100万美元换成新印制的100美元钞票，将得到一摞齐胸高的钞票。
• 对10亿美元同样操作——这开始令人兴奋了！——这摞钞票将高达约0.75英里。
• 最后，想象堆积320亿美元，即伯克希尔2012-21年联邦所得税总额。现在这摞钞票将超过21英里高，大约是商业客机通常巡航高度的三倍。

When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”

谈到联邦税收，拥有伯克希尔的个人可以明确地说：“我在办公室捐了”。

At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

在伯克希尔，我们希望并期待在未来十年缴纳更多的税。我们欠这个国家的绝不更少：美国的活力为伯克希尔取得的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献——这一贡献伯克希尔永远需要。我们依赖美国的顺风，尽管它时有风平浪静，但其推动力总会回归。

I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.

我已经投资了80年——超过我们国家历史的三分之一。尽管我们的公民倾向于——几乎热衷——自我批评和自我怀疑，但我还没有看到何时做空美国是个长期有意义的事情。我非常怀疑这封信的任何读者在未来会有不同的经历。

Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner

没有什么比拥有伟大的伙伴更好

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

查理和我几乎想法一致。但需要我用一页纸解释的事情，他往往用一句话就能概括。而且，他的版本总是理由更清晰，表述更巧妙——有人可能加上直率。

Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

以下是他的一些想法，许多摘自最近的一个播客：

• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”

• 世界充满了愚蠢的赌徒，他们不会像耐心的投资者那样做得好。
• 如果你不按世界的本来面目看待它，就像通过扭曲的透镜来判断事物。
• 我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。还有一个相关想法：尽早写下你想要的讣告——然后据此行事。
• 如果你不在乎自己是否理性，你就不会在这方面努力。那么你就会保持非理性并得到糟糕的结果。
• 耐心是可以学会的。拥有长时间注意力集中和专注于一件事的能力是一个巨大的优势。
• 你可以从逝者那里学到很多。阅读你钦佩和厌恶的逝者的生平。
• 如果一艘船在下沉，而你能游向一艘适合航海的船，就不要留在沉船上。
• 一家伟大的公司在你不在了以后仍能继续运作；平庸的公司则做不到。
• 沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找良好的长期投资，并长期固执地持有它们。
• 本·格雷厄姆说：“日复一日，股市是一台投票机；长期来看，它是一台称重机。”如果你不断提高某物的价值，那么某个聪明人会注意到并开始购买。
• 投资中没有百分之百确定的事。因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一连串美妙的数字乘以零总是等于零。不要指望两次发财。
• 不过，你不需要拥有很多东西才能致富。
• 如果你想成为一名伟大的投资者，就必须不断学习。当世界改变时，你必须改变。
• 沃伦和我憎恨铁路股几十年，但世界变了，最终美国有了四条对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路。我们认识到变化的速度很慢，但迟到总比不到好。
• 最后，我要加上查理几十年来作为决策定论的两句简短的话：“沃伦，再多想想。你很聪明，而我是对的。”

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

就是如此。我每次和查理通电话都能学到东西。而且，他让我思考的同时，也让我开怀大笑。

I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.

我要在查理的清单上添加一条我自己的规则：找一个非常聪明、一流的伙伴——最好比你年长一些——然后非常仔细地听他说的话。

A Family Gathering in Omaha

奥马哈的家庭聚会

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

查理和我毫不掩饰。去年，在三年来首次股东聚会中，我们以一贯的商业热情迎接了你们。

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

开场铃声一响，我们就直奔你们的钱包。很快，我们的喜诗糖果售货亭向你们售出了11吨营养丰富的花生脆和巧克力。在我们P.T.巴纳姆式的推销中，我们向你们承诺长寿。毕竟，除了喜诗糖果，还有什么能解释查理和我活到99岁和92岁呢？

I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.

我知道你们迫不及待想听去年推销的具体情况。

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 6½ of the 9½ operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

周五，门从中午开到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台完成了2690笔个人销售。周六，喜诗在早上7点至下午4点30分之间又增加了3931笔交易，尽管在9.5小时的营业时间中，有6.5小时我们的电影和问答环节限制了商业人流。

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.

算一算：喜诗在黄金营业时间约每分钟达成10笔销售（两天内销售额达400,309美元），所有商品购自同一地点，销售的产品在101年里没有实质性改变。亨利·福特T型车时代对喜诗有效的方法，现在依然有效。

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

查理、我以及整个伯克希尔团队期待在5月5日至6日于奥马哈见到你们。我们将度过愉快的时光，你们也会。

February 25, 2023

2023年2月25日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席