1962年7月6日致合伙人信

A Reminder:

提醒：

In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. "And a Prediction." While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:

在我1962年1月24日关于1961年业绩的信中，我加入了一段题为“一项预测”的内容。虽然我并不想对我的读者施加残酷和不寻常的惩罚，但将这一段完整地重印一遍也许是值得的：

> And a Prediction

> 一项预测

> Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

> 我估计老读者们（如果我有读者的话）在看到我谈论预测时，会认为我离题了。这是我一直回避的事情，在通常意义上我仍然如此。

> I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.

> 我当然不会去预测未来一两年整体经济或股市的走势，因为我对此一无所知。

> I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

> 我认为你们可以相当肯定地认为，在未来十年中，会有几年市场整体上涨20%或25%，有几年下跌相似幅度，而大多数年份介于两者之间。我完全不知道这些年份的先后顺序，也不认为这对长期投资者有什么大不了的意义。

> Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

> 在任何一个长时期内，我认为道琼斯工业平均指数很可能会通过股息和市场价值增长，实现每年约5%至7%的复利回报。尽管近年来的经验与此不同，但若有人指望整个市场的回报远高于此，恐怕会大失所望。

> Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

> 我们的工作是在每年积累相对于道指的优势，而不必过于担心某一年绝对收益是正还是负。我认为，如果我们下跌15%而道指下跌25%的年份，要远远好于我们和道指都上涨20%的年份。我在与合伙人交谈时强调了这一点，并且看到他们点头认可，尽管热情程度各异。

> It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

> 对我来说，你们完全理解我在这方面的理由，并且不仅在理智上认同我，而且在内心深处也认同我，这一点至关重要。

> For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

> 根据我阐述的操作方法，我们相对于道指表现最佳的年份很可能出现在下跌或横盘的市场。因此，我们寻求的优势很可能会呈现出幅度各异的波动。肯定会有某些年份我们被道指超越，但如果长期来看，我们每年能平均领先道指十个百分点，我将认为业绩是令人满意的。

> Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year over-all gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

> 具体而言，如果某年市场下跌35%或40%（我认为未来十年内某一年发生这种情况的概率很高——没人知道是哪一年），我们应该只下跌15%或20%。如果市场基本持平，我们希望上涨约十个百分点。如果市场上涨20%或更多，我们将力争跟上这样的涨幅。这样的表现在多年积累后意味着，如果道指每年复合增长5%到7%，我希望我们的结果可能是每年15%到17%。

> The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!

> 上述期望可能听起来有些轻率，毫无疑问，当从1965年或1970年的角度来看时，它们可能显得更加鲁莽。也许结果会证明我完全错了。然而，我觉得合伙人们当然有权知道我在这个问题上的想法，尽管这项业务的性质决定了这类预期有很高的出错概率。在任何一年中，波动都可能非常显著。1961年就发生了这种情况，但幸运的是波动是令人愉快的。不会总是这样的！

The First Half of 1962:

1962年上半年：

Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.

从1961年末到1962年6月30日，道指从731.14点下跌至561.28点。如果在此期间持有道指，将获得约11.00美元的股息，因此投资道指整体损失为21.7%。对于喜欢统计数据的人，附录A给出了自前身合伙企业成立以来道指每年的结果。

As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.

如上所述，下跌的道指给了我们表现的机会，积累百分比优势，再加上上涨市场中的平均表现，将带来相当令人满意的长期结果。我们的目标是道指每下跌1%，我们大约下跌0.5%。如果实现，意味着我们拥有一个比几乎所有其他股票投资方式都更为保守的投资工具。

As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months' or even one-year's results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.

如附录B所示，该汇总了前身合伙企业的合并结果，1962年上半年我们取得了历史上最好的时期之一，向合伙人支付前的收益为-7.5%，而道指整体结果为-21.7%。如果市场继续下跌，这14.2个百分点的优势有望在下半年扩大，但如果市场转而上涨，则可能收窄。请记住我持续提醒：六个月甚至一年的结果都不应被太当回事。短期的衡量会放大业绩中的偶然波动。尽管各种因素促成上半年的异常出色，但必然会有我们表现相对较差的时期。我们的业绩数据并未改变我们对丹普斯特磨坊制造公司控制权的估值，尽管近几个月的发展表明可能实现更高的价值。

Investment Companies during the First Half:

上半年投资公司的情况：

Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.

过去的信件都强调，我们认为道指作为投资业绩的衡量标准绝非易事。只要资金投资于普通股，无论投资方式是通过投资公司、投资顾问、银行信托部门还是自己操作，我们相信绝大多数投资者的结果大致与道指相当。我们的观点是，偏离道指的情况更可能偏向更差的表现，而非更好的表现。

To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners' results against the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five -years' results, and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.

为了说明这一点，我们不断将道指和有限合伙人的业绩与从事普通股投资的两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式投资公司进行对比。附录C的表格显示了五年的结果，你们会注意到这些数据与道指极其接近。这些公司总资产约为35亿美元。

In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed "Funds vs. Market." Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.

为了让这封信尽快发出，我们是在封闭式公司结果尚未公布的情况下寄出的。然而，两家共同基金的表现都逊于道指，马萨诸塞投资者信托整体表现下跌23%，投资者股票基金下跌25.4%。这并不罕见，正如1962年6月13日《华尔街日报》头版文章《基金与市场》所见证的那样。在所研究的17只大型普通股基金中，从道指734点的高点到文章发表之日，每只基金的记录都逊于道指，尽管在某些情况下差距不大。

Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were down considerably more than the Dow. The three large "growth" (the quotation marks are more applicable now) funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date is still better than average, as it may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.

上半年受到特别重创的是所谓的“成长型”基金，它们几乎无一例外地跌幅远超道指。前几年业绩最好的三只大型“成长型”（现在引号更适用了）基金，即富达资本基金、普特南成长基金和惠灵顿股票基金，上半年整体平均下跌32.3%。公允地说，由于它们在1959-1961年间的出色表现，其迄今为止的整体业绩仍高于平均水平，未来也可能如此。然而，具有讽刺意味的是，早期的优异表现导致大量新投资者涌入，因此今年糟糕的业绩影响到的持有人数量远多于享受早年优异表现的人数。这一经验倾向于证实我的假设，即投资业绩必须在一段时期内加以评判，这段时期既要包括上涨市场也要包括下跌市场。两者未来将继续存在；这一点现在或许比六个月前更易理解。

In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments managed similarly.

我列出投资公司的业绩，并不是因为我们的运作方式与它们类似，或我们的投资与它们相似。这样做是因为这些基金代表了专业、高薪投资管理行业的公开平均水平，它们管理着非常庞大的200亿美元证券。我相信，这种管理水平是管理更大资金规模的典型表现。作为合伙权益的替代方案，我认为可以合理假设，许多合伙人可能会将资金交给类似的方式管理。

Asset Values:

资产价值：

The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners. Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of $100,000 on January 1, 1962 would have an equity at December 31, 1962 of $87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or $7,000 plus monthly payments of $500 for an additional $6,000. Thus, with $87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963, monthly payments next year would be $435.00.

上述业绩计算均未扣除对普通合伙人的分配以及每月向合伙人支付的款项。当然，只要全年整体业绩未达到市场价值的6%（不足部分可递延），就不会向普通合伙人分配。因此，未提取资金的合伙人在前六个月市场价值权益减少了7.5%，而按年率6%提取的合伙人上半年市场价值权益减少了10.5%。如果我们的全年业绩低于6%（除非道指大幅上涨，这很可能），则接受月度付款的合伙人在1962年12月31日的市场价值权益将减少。这意味着明年基于此新市场价值的6%月度付款将按比例降低。例如，如果全年整体业绩为-7%，一位在1962年1月1日拥有100,000美元市场价值权益并接受月度付款的合伙人，到1962年12月31日权益将降至87,000美元。这一减少源于-7%的业绩即7,000美元，加上每月500美元的付款共6,000美元。因此，到1963年1月1日市场价值权益为87,000美元，明年的月度付款将是435.00美元。

None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.

当然，上述内容均不适用于1962年收到的预付款，这些款项不参与盈亏分配，仅按固定6%计息。

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APPENDIX A

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附录 A

DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE

道琼斯工业平均指数

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APPENDIX B

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附录 B

PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

合伙企业业绩

(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partners.

(1) 1957-61年数据为所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的合并结果，已扣除所有费用但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分配。

(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

(2) 1957-61年数据根据上列合伙企业结果计算，并按照现行合伙协议考虑了对普通合伙人的分配。

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APPENDIX C

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附录 C

YEARLY RESULTS

年度结果

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 根据资产价值变动加上年内对登记持有人的任何分配计算。

(2) From Moody's Bank & Finance Manual - 1962.

(2) 来源：穆迪银行与金融手册 - 1962年。

CUMULATIVE RESULTS

累计结果