1963年7月10日致合伙人信

First Half Performance

上半年业绩

During the first half of 1963, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow") advanced from 652.10 to 706.88. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of $10.66 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%.

1963年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）从652.10点上涨至706.88点。如果在此期间持有道指，将获得10.66美元的股息，这使得道指上半年的整体回报率达到+10.0%。

Our incantation has been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that devotes a portion of resources to control situations, and; (2) That our results relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media, will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in bubbling markets.

我们一直强调：(1) 短期（少于三年）的业绩意义不大，尤其是对于我们这样将一部分资源投入控制型投资的投资操作而言；(2) 我们的业绩相对于道指和其他普通股形式的投资媒介，在下跌市场中会更好，而在泡沫市场中可能很难与之持平。

Nevertheless, our first-half performance, excluding any change in Dempster valuation (and its valuation did change --I'm saving this for dessert later in the letter) was plus 14%. This 14% is computed on total net assets (not non-Dempster assets) and is after expenses, but before monthly payments (to those who take them) to partners and allocation to the General Partner. Such allocations are academic on an interim basis, but if we were also plus 14% at yearend, the first 6% would be allocated to partners according to their capital, plus three-quarters of the balance of 8% (14% -6%), or an additional 6%, giving the limited partners a plus 12% performance.

尽管如此，我们上半年的业绩（不包括德普斯特估值的变化——其估值确实发生了变化，我将在信的后半部分详细说明）为+14%。这14%是基于总净资产（而非不包括德普斯特的资产）计算得出，且已扣除费用，但未扣除支付给合伙人的月度分红（针对那些领取分红者）以及普通合伙人的利润分配。在中期阶段，这些分配仅是理论上的，但如果我们在年底仍保持+14%的收益，则首先将6%按照资本比例分配给合伙人，然后将剩余8%（14% - 6%）的四分之三，即额外的6%，分配出去，因此有限合伙人将获得+12%的收益。

Despite the relatively pleasant results of the first half the admonitions stated two paragraphs earlier hold in full force. At plus 14% versus plus 10% for the Dow, this six months has been a less satisfactory period than the first half of 1962 when we were minus 7.5% versus minus 21.7% for the Dow. You should completely understand our thinking in this regard which has been emphasized in previous letters.

尽管上半年业绩相对令人满意，但前文所述的两点忠告依然完全有效。在这六个月里，我们的+14%相对道指的+10%，与1962年上半年我们下跌7.5%而道指下跌21.7%相比，这段时期的表现要逊色一些。我们在这个问题上的想法在以往的信中已经强调过，你应当完全理解。

During the first half we had an average net investment in "generals" (long positions in generals minus short positions in generals) of approximately $5,275,000. Our overall gain from this net investment in generals (for a description of our investment categories see the last annual letter) was about $1,100,000 for a percentage gain from this category of roughly 21%. This again illustrates the extent to which the allocation of our resources among various categories affects short-term results. In 1962 the generals were down for the year and only an outstanding performance by both of the other two categories, "work-outs" and "controls," gave us our unusually favorable results for that year.

上半年，我们在“普通股”上的平均净投资（普通股多头头寸减去空头头寸）约为5,275,000美元。从这一净投资中，我们获得的总体收益约为1,100,000美元，该类的收益率约为21%。这再次说明，我们的资源在不同类别间的分配会在多大程度上影响短期业绩。1962年，普通股全年下跌，仅凭“套利类”和“控制类”两个类别的出色表现，我们才在当年取得了异常优异的业绩。

Now this year, our work-outs have done poorer than the Dow and have been a drag on performance, as they are expected to be in rising markets. While it would be very nice to be 100% in generals in advancing markets and 100% in work-outs in declining markets, I make no attempt to guess the course of the stock market in such a manner. We consider all three of our categories to be good businesses on a long-term basis, although their short-term price behavior characteristics differ substantially in various types of markets. We consider attempting to gauge stock market fluctuations to be a very poor business on a long-term basis and are not going to be in it, either directly or indirectly through the process of trying to guess which of our categories is likely to do best in the near future.

今年，我们的套利类表现不及道指，对业绩形成了拖累，而这在上升市场中是可以预期的。虽然在上涨市场中百分百持有普通股、在下跌市场中百分百从事套利类操作会非常理想，但我从不试图以这种方式预测股市的走向。我们认为，就长期而言，我们所有三个类别都是好的业务，尽管它们在不同市况下的短期价格表现特征会有很大差异。我们认为，试图揣测股市波动，从长期来看是一项非常糟糕的业务，我们不会直接或间接地通过猜测哪些类别在近期最有可能表现出色来参与其中。

Investment Companies

投资公司

Shown below are the usual statistics on a cumulative basis for the Dow and Buffett Partnership. Ltd. (including predecessor partnerships) as well as for the two largest open-end (mutual funds) and two largest closed-end investment companies following a diversified common-stock investment policy:

以下是道琼斯指数和巴菲特合伙有限公司（包括前身合伙基金）的常规累计统计数据，以及两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的数据，这些公司均遵循分散化的普通股投资策略：

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62. Estimated for first half 1963.
(3) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(4) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

(1) 根据年内资产价值变动加上向登记在册持有人进行的任何分配计算。
(2) 1957-62年数据来自1963年《穆迪银行与金融手册》；1963年上半年为估算值。
(3) 1957-61年的数据包括全年经营的所有前身有限合伙基金的合并业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人进行利润分配。
(4) 1957-61年的数据基于前一列合伙基金业绩，并根据现行合伙协议分配给普通合伙人的部分计算得出。

The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality, etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.

结果继续表明，报酬最高、最受尊敬的投资建议也难以匹敌一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数。这绝不是对这些机构、投资顾问和信托部门的否定，他们的方法、逻辑和业绩在很大程度上与这些投资公司相似。这些载体为数百万投资者提供了重要的服务，帮助他们实现充分的分散投资，提供便利和安心，避免劣质证券等。但是，他们的服务并不包括（而且在绝大多数情况下，他们也未声称包括）以高于市场平均水平的速度实现资金复利。

Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly cannot represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation.

我们合伙基金存在的根本目的就是以高于平均水平的速率实现资金复利，同时承受的长期资本损失风险低于上述投资媒介。我们当然不能保证一定能实现这一目标。但我们确实可以说，如果在任何一个合理的时期内——排除广泛的投机泡沫期——我们未能实现这一目标，我们将停止运营。

Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company

德普斯特磨坊制造公司

In our most recent annual letter, I described Harry Bottle as the “man of the year”. If this was an understatement.

在最近的年度信中，我将哈里·博特尔称为“年度人物”。如果说这是轻描淡写，那么确实如此。

Last year Harry did an extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash which we then, of course, began to invest in undervalued securities. Harry has continued this year to turn under-utilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has made the remaining needed assets productive. Thus we have had the following transformation in balance sheets during the last nineteen months:

去年，哈里出色地将非生产性资产转化为现金，我们当然随后开始将现金投资于低估的证券。今年，哈里继续将未充分利用的资产转化为现金，不仅如此，他还让留下的必要资产产生了效益。因此，在过去十九个月中，我们经历了以下资产负债表的转变：

November 30, 1961 (000’s omitted)

1961年11月30日（单位：千美元）

November 30, 1962 (000’s omitted)

1962年11月30日（单位：千美元）

November 30, 1963 (000’s omitted)

1963年11月30日（单位：千美元）

I have included above the conversion factors we have previously used in valuing Dempster for B.P.L. purposes to reflect estimated immediate sale values of non-earning assets.

我在上表中列出了我们之前为B.P.L.对德普斯特进行估值时所使用的转换系数，以反映非盈利资产的估计即时变现价值。

As can be seen, Harry has converted the assets at a much more favorable basis than was implied by my valuations. This largely reflects Harry's expertise and, perhaps, to a minor degree my own conservatism in valuation.

可以看出，哈里转化资产的方式比我的估值所暗示的更为有利。这主要反映了哈里的专业能力，或许在较小程度上也反映了我本人在估值上的保守。

As can also be seen, Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating profit in the first half (as well as a substantial unrealized gain in securities) and there is little question that the operating business, as now conducted, has at least moderate earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct it. Because of a very important-seasonal factor and also the presence of a tax carry forward, however, the earning power is not nearly what might be inferred simply by a comparison of the 11/30/62 and 6/30/63 balance sheets. Partly because of this seasonality, but more importantly, because of possible developments in Dempster before 1963 yearend, we have left our Dempster holdings at the same $51.26 valuation used at yearend 1962 in our figures for B.P.L’s first half. However, I would be very surprised if it does not work out higher than this figure at yearend.

同样可以看出，德普斯特上半年取得了非常令人满意的营业利润（以及大量的未实现证券收益），而且毫无疑问，如今以所需的大幅缩减的资产进行运营的业务，至少具备一定的盈利能力。然而，由于一个非常重要的季节性因素以及存在可抵扣税务亏损，其盈利能力远非简单比较1962年11月30日与1963年6月30日的资产负债表所能推断。部分由于这种季节性，但更重要的是由于德普斯特在1963年底前可能发生的变化，我们在B.P.L.上半年的数据中仍将德普斯特的估值维持在1962年底所用的每股51.26美元。然而，如果年底这一数字没有更高，我会感到非常惊讶。

One sidelight for the fundamentalists in our group: B.P.L. owns 71.7% of Dempster acquired at a cost of $1,262,577.27. On June 30, 1963 Dempster had a small safe deposit box at the Omaha National Bank containing securities worth $2,028,415.25. Our 71.7% share of $2,028,415.25 amounts to $1,454,373.70. Thus, everything above ground (and part of it underground) is profit. My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more substance in this fingers and toes method than in any prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year's earnings.

对于我们团队中的基本面主义者，一个小插曲：B.P.L.拥有德普斯特71.7%的股份，收购成本为1,262,577.27美元。1963年6月30日，德普斯特在奥马哈国民银行有一个小型保管箱，里面存放着价值2,028,415.25美元的证券。我们所占71.7%的份额为1,454,373.70美元。因此，地面以上的一切（以及地下的部分）都是利润。我的证券分析师朋友可能会认为这是一种相当原始的会计方法，但我必须承认，我发现在这种“掰手指和脚趾”的方法中比虔诚地指望有人会支付我明年收益的35倍更有实质内容。

Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals

预付款和预提款

We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert the payment to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time of payment.

我们接受合伙人和潜在合伙人的预付款，自收到之日起至年底按6%计息。虽然在年底没有义务将预付款转换为合伙权益，但在支付时应有此意图。

Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use US like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for unanticipated need for funds.

类似地，我们允许合伙人在年底前提取其合伙账户中最多20%的资金，并从提取之日起至年底按6%收取利息，届时该利息从他们的资本账户中扣除。同样，我们不希望合伙人把我们当作银行，而是让他们在未预料的资金需求时使用这一提取权。

The willingness to both borrow and lend at 6% may seem "un-Buffett-like.” We look at the withdrawal right as a means of giving some liquidity for unexpected needs and, as a practical matter, are reasonably sure it will be far more than covered by advance payments.

愿意以6%的利率既借入又借出，可能看起来“不像巴菲特的风格”。我们将提取权视为提供一些流动性以满足意外需求的手段，而且从实际来看，我们有相当的把握预付款将远超提款。

Why then the willingness to pay 6% for advance payment money when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? For example, in the first half we obtained a substantial six-month bank loan at 4%. The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner's allocation is zero unless we do although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude in the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable. On June 30, 1963 we had advance withdrawals of $21,832.00 and advance payments of $562,437.11.

那么，为什么我们愿意为预付款支付6%的利息，而我们却可以以远低于此的利率从商业银行借款呢？例如，上半年我们获得了一笔大额的六个月期银行贷款，利率为4%。答案是，从长期来看，我们期望能赚取超过6%的收益（除非我们实现这一收益，否则普通合伙人的分配为零），尽管在任何短期内能否达到6%在很大程度上是偶然的。此外，对于预计很快将成为我们权益资本一部分的资金，我可以采取与短期借款不同的投资态度。预付款对我们还有一个额外的好处，就是可以将新资金的投资分散到全年，而不是在1月份一次性涌入。另一方面，6%的利率高于我们的合伙人在短期美元安全投资中所能获得的收益，因此我认为这对双方都有利。1963年6月30日，我们有预提款21,832.00美元，预付款562,437.11美元。

Taxes

税务

There is some possibility that we may have fairly substantial realized gains this year. Of course, this may not materialize at all and actually does not have anything to do with our investment performance this year. I am an outspoken advocate of paying large amounts of income taxes -- at low rates. A tremendous number of fuzzy, confused investment decisions are rationalized through so-called "tax considerations.”

今年，我们可能有相当可观的已实现收益。当然，这完全可能不实现，而且实际上与我们今年的投资业绩并无关系。我是公开提倡以低税率缴纳大量所得税的人。大量模糊、混乱的投资决策被所谓的“税务因素”合理化。

My net worth is the market value of holdings less the tax payable upon sale. The liability is just as real as the asset unless the value of the asset declines (ouch), the asset is given away (no comment), or I die with it. The latter course of action would appear to at least border on a Pyrrhic victory.

我的净资产是所持证券的市场价值减去出售时应缴的税款。这项负债与资产一样真实，除非资产价值下降（哎哟），资产被捐赠（不评论），或者我带着它去世。后一种做法至少近乎一场代价惨重的胜利。

Investment decisions should be made on the basis of the most probable compounding of after-tax net worth with minimum risk. Any isolation of low-basis securities merely freezes a portion of net worth at a compounding factor identical with the assets isolated. While this may work out either well or badly in individual cases, it is a nullification of investment management. The group experience holding various low basis securities will undoubtedly approximate group experience on securities as a whole, namely compounding at the compounding rate of the Dow. We do not consider this the optimum in after-tax compounding rates.

投资决策应基于最有可能实现的税后净资产复利，同时承担最小风险。将低成本的证券孤立起来，仅仅是将一部分净资产冻结在与其所孤立的资产相同的复利因素上。虽然这在个别情况下可能有利或不利，但它却使投资管理失去了意义。持有各种低成本证券的总体经验，无疑将近似于整体证券的经验，即以道琼斯指数的复利速度增长。我们认为这在税后复利速度上并非最优。

I have said before that if earnings from the partnership can potentially amount to a sizable portion of your total taxable income, the safe thing to do is to estimate this year the same tax you incurred last year. If you do this, you cannot run into penalties. In any event, tax liabilities for those who entered the partnership on 1/1/63 will be minimal because of the terms of our partnership agreement first allocating capital gains to those having an interest in unrealized appreciation.

我以前说过，如果合伙基金的收益有可能占到你总应税收入的相当大一部分，那么最稳妥的做法是估计今年你要缴纳与去年相同的税款。如果你这样做，就不会受到处罚。无论如何，根据我们的合伙协议条款，资本利得将首先分配给那些对未实现增值拥有权益的合伙人，因此对于在1963年1月1日加入合伙基金的合伙人而言，其税负将微乎其微。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the partnership agreement, commitment letter for 1964, estimate of the 1963 tax situation, etc.

与往年一样，我们将在11月1日左右发出一封信函（寄给合伙人以及届时已向我表示有兴趣成为合伙人的人），其中包含合伙协议的修订条款、1964年的承诺书、对1963年税务状况的估计等。

My closing plea for questions regarding anything not clear always draws a blank. Maybe no one reads this far. Anyway, the offer is still open.

我每次在信尾恳请就任何不明之处提问，总是毫无回应。也许没人读到这里。不管怎样，邀请依然有效。

Cordially,

谨上

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特