2009 年致股东信

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

说明：数据按日历年度统计，但以下年份除外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日，1967年截至12月31日（共15个月）。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司按市价而非成本与市价孰低法（此前的要求）计量其持有的权益证券。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年之前的业绩已按新规则重新列报。其他方面，业绩均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数据为税前数据，而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提相应税款，那么在指数正回报的年份，其业绩会落后于标普500；在指数负回报的年份，其业绩会超过标普500。长期来看，税收成本会导致累计落后幅度相当大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2009 was $21.8 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 19.8%. Over the last 45 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*

2009 年，我们的净资产增加了 218 亿美元，使得 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 19.8%。在过去 45 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 84,487 美元，年复合增长率为 20.3%。*

Berkshire's recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It's important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire's operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you - but particularly our new shareholders - to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I'm gone.

伯克希尔最近收购了伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路公司（BNSF），为我们原本约 50 万的股东名册至少增加了 65,000 名股东。让我们的所有所有者了解伯克希尔的运营、目标、局限和文化，对我和我的长期合伙人查理·芒格来说非常重要。因此，在每一份年度报告中，我们都会重申指导我们的经济原则。今年这些原则出现在第 89-94 页，我敦促你们所有人——尤其是我们的新股东——去阅读它们。伯克希尔几十年来一直遵循这些原则，并将在我去世后长期继续这样做。

In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.

在这封信中，我们还将回顾我们业务的一些基础，希望既为 BNSF 的新成员提供一次新生入学指导，也为伯克希尔的老兵提供一次进修课程。

How We Measure Ourselves

我们如何衡量自己

Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have - or have not - accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull's eye around it.

我们评估管理绩效的指标展示在对页。从一开始，查理和我就相信，衡量我们取得了或未取得什么成就，需要一个理性且不妥协的标准。这使我们避免了看到业绩之箭落在何处然后在其周围画上靶心的诱惑。

Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?

选择标普 500 作为我们的基准很容易，因为我们的股东几乎不需要成本，就可以通过持有指数基金来匹配其表现。他们为什么要为仅仅复制这一结果而付钱给我们？

A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.

对我们来说，一个更困难的决定是如何衡量伯克希尔相对于标普 500 的进展。仅仅使用我们股价的变化是有充分理由的。实际上，从长期来看，那是最好的测试。但年与年之间的市场价格可能非常反复无常。即使是长达十年的评估，也可能因测量期开始或结束时股价过高或过低而严重扭曲。微软的史蒂夫·鲍尔默和通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特可以告诉你这个问题，他们深受其股票在他们接手管理权时处于高位价格的影响。

The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value - understated though it is - supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.

衡量我们年度进展的理想标准是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变化。唉，这个价值无法精确计算，所以我们用一个粗略的代理指标：每股账面价值。依赖这个标尺有其缺点，我们在第 92 和 93 页讨论了这些缺点。此外，大多数公司的账面价值都低估了内在价值，伯克希尔当然也是如此。总的来说，我们的业务价值远远超过其账面价值。在我们至关重要的保险业务中，差距尤其巨大。即便如此，查理和我相信，我们的账面价值——尽管被低估——为内在价值的变化提供了最有用的跟踪工具。根据这一衡量标准，正如本信开头一段所述，自 1965 财年开始以来，我们的账面价值以每年 20.3% 的复合增长率增长。

We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire's results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.

我们应该指出，如果我们选择市场价格作为标尺，伯克希尔的结果会看起来更好，自 1965 财年开始以来的年复合增长率为 22%。令人惊讶的是，年复合增长率的这种微小差异导致整个 45 年期间的市场价值增长为 801,516%，而账面价值增长为 434,057%（如第 2 页所示）。我们的市场表现更好是因为 1965 年伯克希尔的股价相对于其盈利能力不足的纺织资产的账面价值有适当的折价，而今天伯克希尔的股价相对于其一流业务的会计价值通常有溢价。

Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 - and there have been 41 of these - during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P's gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that's likely to continue.

总之，第 2 页的表格传达了三个信息：两个积极的，一个非常消极的。第一，从 1965-69 年开始到 2005-09 年结束，我们从未有过任何一个五年期（共有 41 个这样的时期）我们的账面价值增长没有超过标普 500 的增长。第二，尽管我们在市场上涨的某些年份落后于标普 500，但在标普 500 取得负收益的十一个年份中，我们一直比标普 500 做得更好。换句话说，我们的防守比进攻更好，这种趋势很可能会持续下去。

The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.

最大的负面影响是，随着我们规模的扩大，我们的业绩优势已经急剧缩小，这是一个不愉快的趋势，而且肯定会持续下去。诚然，伯克希尔拥有许多出色的企业和一批真正伟大的经理人，他们在一个不寻常的企业文化中运营，这让他们能够最大限度地发挥自己的才能。查理和我相信，随着时间的推移，这些因素将继续产生高于平均水平的结果。但巨额资金会形成自己的锚，我们未来的优势（如果有的话）将只是我们历史优势的一小部分。

What We Don't Do

我们不做什么

Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: "All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled "Invert, always invert" as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)

很久以前，查理说出了他最强烈的抱负：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。”这句智慧源自伟大的普鲁士数学家雅各比，他建议“反过来想，总是反过来想”以帮助解决难题。（我也可以报告，这种逆向方法在一个不那么崇高的层面上也有效：倒着唱一首乡村歌曲，你将很快找回你的车、房子和妻子。）

Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie's thinking at Berkshire:

以下是我们在伯克希尔应用查理思维的几个例子：

Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can't evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding. Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.

查理和我避免涉足我们无法评估其未来的企业，无论其产品多么令人兴奋。在过去，人们无需才智就能预见到汽车（1910 年）、飞机（1930 年）和电视机（1950 年）等行业即将迎来的巨大增长。但当时的未来也包括竞争态势，这将摧毁几乎所有进入这些行业的公司。即使是幸存者也往往伤痕累累。仅仅因为查理和我能清楚地看到一个行业未来的巨大增长，并不意味着我们能在众多竞争者争夺霸主地位时判断出其利润率和资本回报率会是多少。在伯克希尔，我们将坚持那些未来几十年的盈利状况似乎可以合理预测的企业。即便如此，我们也会犯很多错误。

We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.

我们永远不会依赖陌生人的善意。大而不能倒不是伯克希尔的退路。相反，我们总是会安排好我们的事务，使得任何我们可能想到的现金需求都被我们自身的流动性所淹没。而且，这种流动性将不断被我们众多多元化业务的盈利洪流所补充。

When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed - without delay - our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.

当金融体系在 2008 年 9 月陷入心脏骤停时，伯克希尔是该体系的流动性和资本提供者，而非乞求者。在危机的最高峰，我们向商界注入了 155 亿美元，而在其他地方，他们只能指望联邦政府的帮助。其中，90 亿美元用于增强三家备受尊敬且以往安全的美国企业的资本，它们需要——毫不拖延地——我们切实的表态支持。剩下的 65 亿美元履行了我们帮助资助收购箭牌的承诺，这笔交易在别处恐慌肆虐时毫无停顿地完成了。

We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.

我们为维持我们首屈一指的财务实力付出了高昂的代价。我们通常持有的 200 多亿美元现金等价物资产目前只赚取微薄的收益。但我们睡得很安稳。

We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly - or not at all - because of a stifling bureaucracy.

我们倾向于让我们的许多子公司自主运营，而不是对它们进行任何程度的监督和监控。这意味着我们有时会延迟发现管理问题，并且偶尔会做出一些运营和资本决策，如果咨询查理和我，我们本会不同意。然而，我们的大多数经理人出色地利用了我们给予他们的独立性，通过保持一种所有者导向的态度来回报我们的信任，这种态度在大型组织中非常宝贵且极为罕见。我们宁愿承受少数糟糕决策的可见成本，也不愿承担因令人窒息的官僚主义而导致决策过于缓慢——或根本不决策——所产生的许多隐形代价。

With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.

随着我们收购 BNSF，我们现在拥有约 257,000 名员工和数百个不同的运营单位。我们希望两者都拥有更多。但我们绝不允许伯克希尔变成一个被委员会、预算报告和多层管理所充斥的庞然大物。相反，我们计划作为一个由独立管理的中大型企业组成的集合体来运营，其中大部分决策发生在运营层面。查理和我会把自己限制在配置资本、控制企业风险、选择经理人和设定他们的薪酬。

We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it's one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business "marriage" between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn't change that truth.

我们不试图取悦华尔街。那些基于媒体或分析师评论进行买卖的投资者不适合我们。相反，我们希望合作伙伴加入伯克希尔是因为他们希望在他们自己了解的企业中进行长期投资，并且因为它遵循他们认同的政策。如果查理和我与几个合作伙伴一起进入一个小型风险投资，我们会寻找与我们步调一致的个人，因为我们知道共同的目标和共同的命运造就了所有者和管理者之间愉快的商业“婚姻”。扩大到巨大的规模并不会改变这个事实。

To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can't be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.

为了建立相容的股东群体，我们努力以直接且信息丰富的方式与我们的所有者沟通。我们的目标是告诉你们，如果我们的角色互换，我们会想知道什么。此外，我们尝试在周末早些时候将季度和年度财务信息发布在互联网上，从而给贵方和其他投资者在非交易时段足够的时间来消化我们多元化企业所发生的事情。（偶尔，SEC 的截止日期会迫使我们在非周五披露。）这些事情根本无法用几段话充分总结，它们也不适合记者有时寻求的那种吸引眼球的标题。

Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: "We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 - and probably well beyond - but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall." Many news organizations reported - indeed, blared - the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren't predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.

去年，我们看到了一个例子，说明断章取义式的报道是如何出错的。在年度信中 12,830 个单词中有这样一句话：“例如，我们确信，2009 年全年——甚至可能更长时间——经济将一片混乱，但这个结论并不能告诉我们市场会涨还是会跌。”许多新闻机构报道了——实际上是大声宣扬——这句话的前半部分，而对后半部分只字不提。我认为这是糟糕的新闻业：被误导的读者或观众很可能认为查理和我在预测股市的坏事情，尽管我们不仅在那句话中，而且在其他地方都明确表示我们根本没有预测市场。任何被那些哗众取宠者误导的投资者都付出了高昂的代价：道琼斯指数在信函发布当天收盘于 7,063 点，年底收于 10,428 点。

Given a few experiences we've had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.

考虑到我们有过的几次这样的经历，你就能理解为什么我宁愿我们与你们的沟通保持尽可能直接和完整。

Let's move to the specifics of Berkshire's operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

让我们来看看伯克希尔运营的具体情况。我们有四个主要运营板块，每个板块的资产负债表和收入账户特征都彼此不同。因此，像财务报表中通常做的那样将它们混在一起会妨碍分析。所以我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。

Insurance

保险

Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire's growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our "Goodwill" account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value - and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.

我们的财产意外险业务一直是伯克希尔增长背后的引擎，并将继续如此。它为我们创造了奇迹。我们在账簿上记录的财产意外险公司比其有形净资产高出 155 亿美元，这笔金额记在“商誉”账户中。然而，这些公司的价值远高于其账面价值——下面看一下财产意外险行业的经济模式，你就会明白为什么。

Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire's benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式让我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，我们可以为伯克希尔的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，我们持有的浮存金金额与保费收入相比保持非常稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。

If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.

如果保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。这种结合让我们能够享受免费资金的使用——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。唉，这种快乐结果的希望吸引了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。通常这种成本相当低，但在一些灾难频发的年份，承保亏损的成本超过了使用浮存金带来的收入。

In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most - though certainly not all - future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.

在我可能有偏见的观点中，伯克希尔拥有世界上最好的大型保险业务。而且我绝对要说，我们拥有最好的经理人。我们的浮存金从 1967 年我们进入该行业时的 1,600 万美元增长到 2009 年底的 620 亿美元。此外，我们已经连续七年实现承保利润。我相信，在未来大多数（尽管肯定不是全部）年份，我们很可能会继续盈利承保。如果我们做到了，我们的浮存金将是无成本的，就好像有人将 620 亿美元存入我们这里，我们可以为自己的利益投资而不支付利息。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry's overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire's value. It's a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个财产意外险行业可以预期的结果：在大多数年份，保费不足以覆盖损失加费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形股本回报率远低于标普 500 的回报率。伯克希尔卓越的经济状况之所以存在，是因为我们有一些杰出的管理者在运营一些不寻常的业务。我们的保险 CEO 们值得你们的感谢，他们为伯克希尔的价值增加了数十亿美元。我很高兴向你们介绍这些全明星。

Let's start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.

我们从 GEICO 开始，它因每年 8 亿美元的广告预算而为你们所熟知（几乎是汽车保险领域排名第二的广告商的两倍）。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司。现年 66 岁的托尼仍然每天跳着踢踏舞去办公室，就像 79 岁的我一样。我们俩都觉得自己很幸运，能在自己热爱的事业中工作。

GEICO's customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here's proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they've stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.

GEICO 的客户也对公司有热情。证据如下：自伯克希尔 1996 年获得 GEICO 控股权以来，其市场份额从 2.5% 增长到 8.1%，这一增长反映了净增加了 700 万保单持有人。也许他们联系我们是因为觉得我们的壁虎很可爱，但他们从我们这里购买是为了节省重要的钱。（也许你也可以；请致电 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com。）他们留下来了，因为他们喜欢我们的服务和价格。

Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company's stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.

伯克希尔分两个阶段收购了 GEICO。在 1976-80 年，我们以 4,700 万美元购买了该公司约三分之一的股票。多年来，该公司大量回购自己的股票，使我们的持股比例在没有再购买任何股票的情况下增长到了约 50%。然后，在 1996 年 1 月 2 日，我们以 23 亿美元现金收购了 GEICO 剩余的 50%，约是我们最初购买成本的 50 倍。

An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it's up to 18.
Broker: Yes, and that's just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it's an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.

一个古老的华尔街笑话接近我们的经历：
客户：谢谢你让我在 5 元买了 XYZ 股票。我听说它涨到 18 了。
经纪人：是的，这还只是开始。事实上，公司现在做得非常好，在 18 元买入甚至比你当初买入时更好。
客户：该死，我就知道我应该等一下的。

GEICO's growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That's illegal almost everywhere, but if you've lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our "low-cost producer" status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country's sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company's float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.

GEICO 的增长可能在 2010 年放缓。由于汽车销售低迷，美国的车辆登记量实际上在下降。此外，高失业率导致越来越多的司机不投保。（这几乎在任何地方都是非法的，但如果你丢了工作还想开车……）然而，我们的“低成本生产商”地位必将确保我们在未来获得显著收益。1995 年，GEICO 是美国第六大汽车保险公司；现在我们排名第三。该公司的浮存金从 27 亿美元增长到 96 亿美元。同样重要的是，在伯克希尔拥有 GEICO 的 14 年中，有 13 年它实现了承保利润。

I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I'm even more excited today.

1951 年 1 月，当我作为一名 20 岁的学生第一次访问 GEICO 时，我就对它感到兴奋。多亏了托尼，我今天更加兴奋。

A hugely important event in Berkshire's history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha - and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)

伯克希尔历史上一个极其重要的事件发生在 1985 年的一个星期六。阿吉特·贾因走进了我们在奥马哈的办公室——我立刻就知道我们找到了一位超级巨星。（他是被迈克·戈德堡发现的，现在迈克已被提升为圣·迈克。）

We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity's small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.

我们立即让阿吉特负责国民赔偿公司规模小且举步维艰的再保险业务。多年来，他将这项业务打造成了保险界独一无二的巨头。

Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit's operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits - and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants ("names") who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.

阿吉特的业务如今只有 30 名员工，却在保险业的多个领域创下了交易规模的记录。阿吉特承保数十亿美元的保额——然后将每一分钱的风险都保留下来，而不是将其分摊给其他保险公司。三年前，他接过了劳合社的巨额负债，使其能够清理与 27,972 名参与者（“成员”）的关系，这些成员承保了问题重重的保单，曾一度威胁到这家拥有 322 年历史的机构的生存。单单那份合同的保费就高达 71 亿美元。2009 年，他谈判了一份寿险再保险合同，可能在未来 50 年左右为我们带来 500 亿美元的保费。

Ajit's business is just the opposite of GEICO's. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.

阿吉特的业务与 GEICO 正好相反。在 GEICO，我们有数百万份小保单，基本上每年续保。阿吉特承保的保单相对较少，而且组合每年变化很大。在全世界，当需要为某些既非常大又不寻常的事情提供保险时，他是大家会打电话找的人。

If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat - and you can only save one of us - swim to Ajit.

如果查理、我和阿吉特在同一艘沉船上——而你只能救我们中的一个——请游向阿吉特。

Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.

我们的第三大保险巨头是通用再保险。几年前这个业务陷入困境；现在它已成为我们保险皇冠上一颗闪亮的宝石。

Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re's P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.

在塔德·蒙特罗斯的领导下，通用再保险在 2009 年取得了出色的承保业绩，同时每美元保费产生的浮存金也异常庞大。除了通用再保险的财产意外险业务，塔德和他的同事还发展了一项日益宝贵的大型人寿再保险业务。

Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key - though only partially-owned - part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.

去年，通用再保险终于实现了对科隆再保险的 100% 所有权。自 1995 年以来，科隆再保险一直是我们全球业务中的关键部分——尽管只是部分拥有。塔德和我将于 9 月访问科隆，感谢其经理们对伯克希尔的重要贡献。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数专注于保险领域的小众角落。总的来说，它们一直盈利，并且如下表所示，它们为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

以下是我们财产意外险和人寿保险业务四个板块的记录：

And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.

现在是一个痛苦的坦白：去年，你们的主席为一个完全由他自己造成的、代价非常昂贵的商业惨败画上了句号。

For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right - but of the wrong type.

多年来，我一直努力想找出我们可以为数百万忠诚的 GEICO 客户提供的附加产品。不幸的是，我终于成功了，有了一个绝妙的见解：我们应该推销自己的信用卡。我推断，GEICO 的保单持有人很可能是良好的信用风险，而且如果我们提供一张有吸引力的卡，他们很可能会把生意给我们。我们确实得到了生意——但是错误的类型。

Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.

在我们最终醒悟之前，信用卡业务的税前亏损约为 630 万美元。然后，我们以每美元 55 美分的价格出售了 9,800 万美元的不良应收账款组合，又损失了 4,400 万美元。

GEICO's managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO's customers we would get the - - - - - well, let's call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

应该强调的是，GEICO 的经理们从未对我的想法表现出热情。他们警告我，我们得到的不会是 GEICO 客户的精华，而是——好吧，我们称之为非精华。我含蓄地表示，我年纪更大、更明智。

I was just older.

我只是更老而已。

Regulated Utility Business

受监管的公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.'s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

伯克希尔持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 89.5% 的权益，后者拥有各种各样的公用事业业务。其中最大的是：（1）Yorkshire Electricity 和 Northern Electric，其 380 万终端用户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；（2）MidAmerican Energy，主要为爱荷华州的 725,000 名电力客户提供服务；（3）Pacific Power 和 Rocky Mountain Power，为西部六个州的约 170 万电力客户提供服务；（4）Kern River 和 Northern Natural 管道，运输美国约 8% 的天然气消耗量。

MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn't have better partners. They are truly a dream team.

MidAmerican 有两位出色的经理，戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔。此外，我的老朋友沃尔特·斯科特及其家族在公司拥有重要所有权。沃尔特为任何业务都带来了非凡的商业头脑。与戴夫、格雷格和沃尔特共事十年，强化了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能有更好的合作伙伴。他们真是一个梦之队。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.

有些不太协调的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过 21 家本地品牌公司运营，拥有 16,000 名经纪人。尽管去年又是房屋销售糟糕的一年，但 HomeServices 还是赚了一点钱。它还收购了芝加哥的一家公司，并将在价格合理时增加其他优质的经纪业务。十年后，HomeServices 很可能会大得多。

\ Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million. \* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $38 in 2009 and $72 in 2008.

\ 包括 1.75 亿美元的终止费和 9.17 亿美元的投资利润。\* 包括伯克希尔赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税后），2009 年为 3,800 万美元，2008 年为 7,200 万美元。

Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities' regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn't expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.

我们受监管的电力公用事业在大多数情况下提供垄断服务，与其服务区的客户以共生方式运作，这些用户依赖我们提供一流的服务并为他们的未来需求进行投资。发电和主要输电设施的许可和建设周期很长，因此我们有责任高瞻远瞩。反过来，我们期望我们的公用事业监管者（代表我们的客户行事）允许我们从为满足未来需求而必须投入的巨额资本中获得适当的回报。除非我们自己履行协议中我们的部分，否则我们不应期望监管者履行他们的部分。

Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.

戴夫和格雷格确保我们做到了这一点。国家研究公司一直将我们的爱荷华和西部公用事业行业排名第一或接近第一。同样，在 Mastio 公司排名的 43 家美国管道中，我们的 Kern River 和 Northern Natural 资产并列第二。

Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned $2.5 billion, while in this same period spending $3 billion on wind generation facilities.

此外，我们继续向我们的业务投入巨额资金，不仅为未来做准备，而且使这些业务更加环保。自从十年前我们收购 MidAmerican 以来，它从未支付过股息。相反，我们利用收益来改善和扩大我们服务的每个地区的资产。一个引人注目的例子是，在过去三年中，我们的爱荷华和西部公用事业赚了 25 亿美元，而同期在风力发电设施上花费了 30 亿美元。

MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society's credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the ever-increasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.

MidAmerican 一直履行其与社会达成的协议，而为了社会的信誉，它也做出了回报：除了少数例外，我们的监管者及时允许我们从必须投资的不断增加的资金中获得公平回报。展望未来，我们将竭尽全力以客户期望的方式服务我们的地区。我们相信，反过来，我们将被允许从我们投资的资金中获得应有的回报。

In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met - and we believe that they will be - Berkshire's ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.

早些时候，查理和我回避了公用事业等资本密集型业务。事实上，迄今为止对所有者来说最好的业务仍然是那些资本回报率高且增长所需增量投资很少的业务。我们很幸运拥有许多这样的业务，并且我们很乐意购买更多。然而，预期到伯克希尔将产生越来越多的现金，我们今天很愿意进入那些经常需要大量资本支出的业务。我们只期望这些业务能够合理预期从他们投资的增量资金中获得不错的回报。如果我们的期望得到满足——我们相信将会如此——那么伯克希尔不断增长的从好到极好的业务组合应该会在未来几十年产生高于平均水平（尽管肯定不是惊人）的回报。

Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.

应该指出，我们的 BNSF 业务具有某些类似于我们电力公用事业的重要经济特征。在这两种情况下，我们都提供基本的服务，这些服务对于我们的客户、我们服务的社区乃至整个国家的经济福祉至关重要，并将继续保持如此。两者都将在未来几十年需要远超折旧备抵的巨额投资。两者都必须远见卓识地规划，以满足预计将超过过去需求的需求。最后，两者都需要明智的监管者，他们能提供关于可允许回报的确定性，以便我们能信心十足地进行维护、更换和扩建工厂所需的巨额投资。

We see a "social compact" existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should - and we believe will - understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.

我们看到公众与我们的铁路业务之间存在一种“社会契约”，就像我们与公用事业业务一样。如果任何一方逃避其义务，双方都将不可避免地受苦。因此，契约双方应该——而且我们相信将会——理解以一种鼓励对方良好行为的方式行事的好处。难以想象，如果我们的国家没有一流的电力和铁路系统，能够实现接近其全部经济潜力。我们将尽我们的一份力量确保它们的存在。

In the future, BNSF results will be included in this "regulated utility" section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens - yes, tens - of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.

将来，BNSF 的结果将包含在这个“受监管的公用事业”部分。除了这两个业务具有相似的基本经济特征外，两者都是大量未由伯克希尔担保的债务的合理使用者。两者都将保留其大部分收益。无论经济好坏，两者都将赚取和投资大量资金，尽管铁路将表现出更大的周期性。总的来说，我们预计这个受监管的板块将随着时间的推移带来显著增长的收益，尽管代价是我们需要投资数百亿——是的，数百亿——美元的增量股权资本。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/09 (in millions)

2009年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

\* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

\* 不包括购买会计调整。

Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009's severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.

该板块中众多且广泛多元的运营业务几乎都不同程度地受到了 2009 年严重衰退的影响。主要的例外是 McLane，我们向数千家零售店（其中最大的是沃尔玛）分销食品、糖果和非食品商品的业务。

Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of $344 million, which even so amounted to only slightly more than one cent per dollar on its huge sales of $31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets - practically all of which it owns - including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane's prime asset, however, is Grady.

格雷迪·罗西尔带领 McLane 取得了 3.44 亿美元的创纪录税前利润，即便如此，这相对于其 312 亿美元的巨额销售额来说也仅相当于每美元略高于一美分。McLane 拥有大量实体资产——几乎全部为其所有——包括 3,242 辆拖车、2,309 辆牵引车和 55 个配送中心，总面积达 1,520 万平方英尺。然而，McLane 的主要资产是格雷迪。

We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:

我们有许多公司在销售额收缩的同时利润却有所改善，这始终是一项非凡的管理成就。以下是实现这一目标的 CEO 们：

Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak's Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company's sales were down 27%, Frank's cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.

在我们拥有的受低迷工业部门影响较大的企业中，Marmon 和 Iscar 都表现出了相对强劲的业绩。弗兰克·普塔克的 Marmon 实现了 13.5% 的税前利润率，创历史新高。尽管公司销售额下降了 27%，但弗兰克注重成本的管理缓解了利润的下滑。

Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar - not wars, recessions or competitors. The world's two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar's results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.

没有什么能阻止总部位于以色列的 Iscar——无论是战争、经济衰退还是竞争对手。世界上其他两家领先的小型切削工具供应商都度过了非常艰难的一年，大部分时间都在亏损经营。尽管 Iscar 的业绩比 2008 年大幅下降，但该公司仍定期报告盈利，即使是在整合和合理化去年我们告诉你们的日本大规模收购 Tungaloy 期间。当制造业反弹时，Iscar 将创下新纪录。其由 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman 组成的不可思议的管理团队将确保这一点。

Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.

我们拥有的与住宅和商业建筑相关的每一家企业都在 2009 年遭受了严重打击。Shaw、Johns Manville、Acme Brick 和 MiTek 的税前利润合计为 2.27 亿美元，比 2006 年建筑活动繁荣时的 12.95 亿美元下降了 82.5%。这些企业继续在底部挣扎，尽管它们的竞争地位仍然完好无损。

The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.

伯克希尔去年的主要问题是 NetJets，一家提供公务机分时所有权的航空业务。多年来，它非常成功地将自己打造成行业内的首要公司，其机队价值远远超过其三大竞争对手的总和。总的来说，我们在该领域的主导地位仍然无人能挑战。

NetJets' business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million. Moreover, the company's debt has soared from $102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire's guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It's clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.

然而，NetJets 的业务运营则是另一回事。在我们拥有该公司的十一年里，它累计税前亏损 1.57 亿美元。此外，公司的债务从购买时的 1.02 亿美元飙升至去年 4 月的 19 亿美元。没有伯克希尔对这笔债务的担保，NetJets 早就倒闭了。很明显，我让你们失望了，让 NetJets 陷入这种境地。但是，幸运的是，我被解救了。

Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to $1.4 billion, and, after suffering a staggering loss of $711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable.

戴夫·索科尔，这位 MidAmerican Energy 极具才华的建设者和运营者，于 8 月成为 NetJets 的 CEO。他的领导力正在带来转变：债务已降至 14 亿美元，在 2009 年遭受了 7.11 亿美元的惊人亏损之后，该公司现在已经稳固盈利。

Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets' previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more.

最重要的是，戴夫所做的任何改变都没有削弱 Rich Santulli（NetJets 前 CEO、分时所有权行业之父）所坚持的最高标准的安全和服务。戴夫和我在维护这些标准方面有着最强烈的个人利益，因为我和我们的家人几乎所有的飞行都使用 NetJets，我们的许多董事和经理也是如此。我们都没有被分配专机或机组人员。我们受到与任何其他所有者完全相同的待遇，这意味着当我们使用个人合同时，我们支付与其他人相同的价格。简而言之，我们用自己的产品。在航空业，没有比这更有力的证明了。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country's leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.

该板块中我们最大的业务是 Clayton Homes，美国领先的模块化和活动房屋生产商。Clayton 并不总是第一：十年前，三大制造商是 Fleetwood、Champion 和 Oakwood，它们合计占行业产量的 44%。它们之后都破产了。与此同时，行业总产量从 1999 年的 382,000 套下降到 2009 年的 60,000 套。

The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.

该行业陷入混乱有两个原因，第一个原因是如果美国经济要复苏，就必须接受的。这个原因与美国住房开工量（包括公寓单元）有关。2009 年，开工量为 554,000 套，是我们有数据以来 50 年中的最低数字。矛盾的是，这是个好消息。

People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts – the supply side of the picture – were running about two million annually. But household formations – the demand side – only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.

几年前，当住房开工量（供应端）每年运行在约 200 万套时，人们认为这是好消息。但家庭形成数量（需求端）只有约 120 万。经过几年的这种不平衡，国家不出所料地拥有了太多的房屋。

There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the "cash-for-clunkers" program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.

解决这种过剩有三种方法：（1）炸掉很多房子，类似于“旧车换现金”计划中销毁汽车的策略；（2）通过鼓励青少年同居等方式加快家庭形成速度，这个计划不太可能缺少志愿者；（3）将新房开工量降低到远低于家庭形成率的数字。

Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below "bubble" levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn't afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.

我们的国家明智地选择了第三种选择，这意味着在一两年内，住宅问题应该基本成为过去，只有高价值房屋和某些过度建设特别严重的地区的房屋除外。当然，价格将远低于“泡沫”水平，但对于每一个因此受到伤害的卖家（或贷款人）来说，都会有一个受益的买家。事实上，许多几年前买不起合适房子的家庭，由于泡沫破裂，现在发现完全在他们的能力范围之内。

The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.

活动房屋陷入困境的第二个原因是该行业特有的：工厂建造房屋和现场建造房屋之间的抵押贷款利率惩罚性差异。在你继续阅读之前，让我强调一个显而易见的事实：伯克希尔在这场争论中有切身利益，因此你应该特别谨慎地评估后面的评论。然而，在发出警告之后，让我解释一下为什么利率差异会给大量低收入美国人和 Clayton 带来问题。

The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 5¼%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.

住宅抵押贷款市场是由政府规则塑造的，这些规则由 FHA、房地美和房利美体现。它们的贷款标准具有决定性，因为它们担保的抵押贷款通常可以被证券化，并实际上变成美国政府的义务。目前，符合这些担保条件的传统现场建造房屋的购买者可以获得约 5.25% 的 30 年期贷款。此外，这些是美联储最近大量购买的抵押贷款，这一行动也有助于将利率维持在超低水平。

In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton's homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however – and, of course, most buyers do – the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.

相比之下，很少有工厂建造的房屋有资格获得机构担保的抵押贷款。因此，一个值得称赞的工厂建造房屋的购买者必须支付约 9% 的贷款利率。对于全现金买家来说，Clayton 的房屋提供了极好的价值。然而，如果买家需要抵押贷款融资——当然，大多数买家都需要——融资成本的差异常常抵消了工厂建造房屋的吸引力价格。

Last year I told you why our buyers - generally people with low incomes - performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren't making "liar's loans") and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton's delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.

去年我告诉过你，为什么我们的借款人——通常是低收入人群——作为信用风险表现如此出色。他们的态度至关重要：他们签约是为了住在家里，而不是转售或再融资。因此，我们的借款人通常以与其核定收入相匹配的还款额获得贷款（我们不做“说谎者贷款”），并期待着能够烧掉抵押贷款的那一天。如果他们失业、有健康问题或离婚，我们当然可以预期违约。但他们很少仅仅因为房屋价值下跌就一走了之。即使在今天，尽管失业问题更加严重，Clayton 的逾期和违约率仍然合理，不会给我们带来重大问题。

We have tried to qualify more of our customers' loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren't broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.

我们试图让更多客户获得类似于现场建造产品所能获得的贷款待遇。到目前为止，我们只取得了象征性的成功。许多收入不高但习惯负责任的家庭因此不得不放弃拥有住房，仅仅因为工厂建造产品附带的融资差异使月供变得过于昂贵。如果资格不扩大，以便向所有符合首付和收入标准的人开放低成本融资，那么活动房屋行业似乎注定要挣扎并萎缩。

Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn't have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire's interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire's credit to support Clayton's mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can't borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.

即使在这些条件下，我相信 Clayton 在未来几年仍将盈利运营，尽管远低于其潜力。我们不可能有比 CEO 凯文·克莱顿更好的经理了，他把伯克希尔的利益当作自己的利益。我们的产品是一流的、廉价的，并且不断改进。此外，我们将继续使用伯克希尔的信用来支持 Clayton 的抵押贷款计划，因为我们深信其稳健性。即便如此，伯克希尔也无法以接近政府机构可获得的利率借款。这一缺陷将限制销售，损害 Clayton 和众多渴望拥有低成本住房的可敬家庭。

In the following table, Clayton's earnings are net of the company's payment to Berkshire for the use of its credit. Offsetting this cost to Clayton is an identical amount of income credited to Berkshire's finance operation and included in "Other Income." The cost and income amount was $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008.

在下表中，Clayton 的收益是扣除公司因使用伯克希尔信用而向伯克希尔支付的费用后的净额。抵消 Clayton 这一成本的，是记入伯克希尔财务业务并计入“其他收入”的相同金额。这个费用和收入金额在 2009 年为 1.16 亿美元，2008 年为 9,200 万美元。

The table also illustrates how severely our furniture (CORT) and trailer (XTRA) leasing operations have been hit by the recession. Though their competitive positions remain as strong as ever, we have yet to see any bounce in these businesses.

该表还说明了我们的家具（CORT）和拖车（XTRA）租赁业务受到经济衰退的严重打击。尽管它们的竞争地位仍然和以往一样强大，但我们尚未看到这些业务有任何反弹。

\* Includes $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire's credit.

\* 包括伯克希尔为使用其信用向 Clayton 收取的费用，2009 年为 1.16 亿美元，2008 年为 9,200 万美元。

At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country's third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.

2009 年底，我们成为 Berkadia Commercial Mortgage（原名 Capmark）的 50% 所有者，这是美国第三大商业抵押贷款服务商。除了管理 2,350 亿美元的贷款组合外，该公司还是一个重要的抵押贷款发起人，在全国设有 25 个办事处。尽管商业房地产在未来几年将面临重大问题，但 Berkadia 的长期机遇是巨大的。

Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.

我们在这个业务中的合作伙伴是 Leucadia，由乔·斯坦伯格和伊恩·卡明经营。几年前，伯克希尔与他们合作购买了陷入困境的金融业务 Finova，那是一次极好的经历。在解决那种情况时，乔和伊恩做了远超他们份内的工作，这种安排是我一直鼓励的。自然，当他们打电话给我再次合作收购 Capmark 时，我很高兴。

Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let's call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I'll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia.

我们的第一次合作也命名为 Berkadia。所以让我们称这个为 Berkadia 之子。总有一天我会写信告诉你们关于 Berkadia 之孙的事。

Investments

投资

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

下面我们列出了年底市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资。

\* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

\* 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP 成本因要求的增记或减记而有所不同。

In addition, we own positions in non-traded securities of Dow Chemical, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re and Wrigley with an aggregate cost of $21.1 billion and a carrying value of $26.0 billion. We purchased these five positions in the last 18 months. Setting aside the significant equity potential they provide us, these holdings deliver us an aggregate of $2.1 billion annually in dividends and interest. Finally, we owned 76,777,029 shares (22.5%) of BNSF at yearend, which we then carried at $85.78 per share, but which have subsequently been melded into our purchase of the entire company.

此外，我们持有陶氏化学、通用电气、高盛、瑞士再保险和箭牌的非上市证券头寸，总成本为 211 亿美元，账面价值为 260 亿美元。我们在过去 18 个月中购买了这五个头寸。撇开它们为我们提供的显著股权潜力不谈，这些持股每年为我们带来总计 21 亿美元的股息和利息。最后，年底我们持有 76,777,029 股（22.5%）BNSF 股票，当时账面价值为每股 85.78 美元，但随后这些股票被合并到我们对整个公司的收购中。

In 2009, our largest sales were in ConocoPhillips, Moody's, Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson (sales of the latter occurring after we had built our position earlier in the year). Charlie and I believe that all of these stocks will likely trade higher in the future. We made some sales early in 2009 to raise cash for our Dow and Swiss Re purchases and late in the year made other sales in anticipation of our BNSF purchase.

2009 年，我们最大的卖出操作是在康菲石油、穆迪、宝洁和强生（后者的卖出是在我们年初建立头寸之后发生的）。查理和我相信所有这些股票未来都可能交易在更高的价位。我们在 2009 年初进行了一些卖出，为购买陶氏和瑞士再保险筹集现金，并在年底为购买 BNSF 进行了其他卖出。

We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it's raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.

去年我们告诉过你，当时公司和市政债券市场存在非常不寻常的条件，这些证券相对于美国国债来说便宜得离谱。我们通过一些购买支持了这一观点，但我本应该做得多得多。大机会不常来。当下金子雨时，要拿起桶，而不是顶针。

We entered 2008 with $44.3 billion of cash-equivalents, and we have since retained operating earnings of $17 billion. Nevertheless, at yearend 2009, our cash was down to $30.6 billion (with $8 billion earmarked for the BNSF acquisition). We've put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It's been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business - through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market - and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two.

我们以 443 亿美元的现金等价物进入 2008 年，此后我们保留了 170 亿美元的营业利润。然而，到 2009 年底，我们的现金下降到 306 亿美元（其中 80 亿美元指定用于 BNSF 收购）。在过去两年的混乱中，我们把很多钱投入了工作。对投资者来说，这是一个理想的时期：恐惧的气氛是他们最好的朋友。那些只在评论员乐观时才投资的投资者，最终为无意义的安慰付出了高昂的代价。最终，在投资中重要的是——通过在股票市场购买一小部分——你为企业支付了多少钱，以及该企业在随后的十年或二十年中赚了多少钱。

Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts, which were then the subject of both controversy and misunderstanding. For that discussion, please go to www.berkshirehathaway.com.

去年我大量写到了我们的衍生品合同，它们当时是争议和误解的主题。有关该讨论，请访问 www.berkshirehathaway.com。

We have since changed only a few of our positions. Some credit contracts have run off. The terms of about 10% of our equity put contracts have also changed: Maturities have been shortened and strike prices materially reduced. In these modifications, no money changed hands.

此后我们只改变了少数头寸。一些信用合同已经到期。我们大约 10% 的股票看跌期权合同的条款也已经改变：到期日缩短，行权价大幅降低。在这些修改中，没有金钱易手。

A few points from last year's discussion are worth repeating:
(1) Though it's no sure thing, I expect our contracts in aggregate to deliver us a profit over their lifetime, even when investment income on the huge amount of float they provide us is excluded in the calculation. Our derivatives float - which is not included in the $62 billion of insurance float I described earlier - was about $6.3 billion at yearend.
(2) Only a handful of our contracts require us to post collateral under any circumstances. At last year's low point in the stock and credit markets, our posting requirement was $1.7 billion, a small fraction of the derivatives-related float we held. When we do post collateral, let me add, the securities we put up continue to earn money for our account.
(3) Finally, you should expect large swings in the carrying value of these contracts, items that can affect our reported quarterly earnings in a huge way but that do not affect our cash or investment holdings. That thought certainly fit 2009's circumstances. Here are the pre-tax quarterly gains and losses from derivatives valuations that were part of our reported earnings last year:

去年讨论中的几点值得重复：
（1）尽管不是确定的事情，但我预计我们的合同在其整个生命周期内总体将为我们带来利润，即使排除它们为我们提供的巨额浮存金所产生的投资收益。我们的衍生品浮存金——不包括在我之前描述的 620 亿美元保险浮存金中——年底约为 63 亿美元。
（2）只有少数合同要求我们在任何情况下提供抵押品。在去年股票和信贷市场的低点，我们的抵押品要求为 17 亿美元，仅为我们持有的衍生品相关浮存金的很小一部分。我补充一点，当我们确实提供抵押品时，我们质押的证券会继续为我们的账户赚钱。
（3）最后，你应该预期这些合同账面价值的大幅波动，这些项目可能极大地影响我们报告的季度收益，但不会影响我们的现金或投资持有。这种想法确实符合 2009 年的情况。以下是去年我们报告收益中包含的衍生品估值的季度税前损益：

As we've explained, these wild swings neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. When we report to you, we will continue to separate out these figures (as we do realized investment gains and losses) so that you can more clearly view the earnings of our operating businesses. We are delighted that we hold the derivatives contracts that we do. To date we have significantly profited from the float they provide. We expect also to earn further investment income over the life of our contracts.

正如我们解释过的，这些剧烈的波动既不会让查理和我高兴，也不会困扰我们。当我们向你们报告时，我们将继续把这些数字分开（就像我们对已实现投资收益和损失所做的那样），以便你们能更清楚地看到我们经营业务的利润。我们很高兴持有我们现有的衍生品合同。迄今为止，我们已经从它们提供的浮存金中显著获利。我们还期望在合同有效期内获得进一步的投资收益。

We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced, just as we try to invest in mispriced stocks and bonds. Indeed, we first reported to you that we held such contracts in early 1998. The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society - dangers of which we've long warned, and that can be dynamite - arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred - nor will it.

我们长期投资于查理和我认为定价错误的衍生品合同，就像我们试图投资于定价错误的股票和债券一样。事实上，我们在 1998 年初首次向你们报告我们持有此类合同。衍生品对参与者和整个社会构成的危险——我们长期以来一直警告的危险，这些危险可能是炸药——在于当这些合同导致极端的杠杆和/或交易对手风险时。在伯克希尔，这种情况从未发生过——也不会发生。

It's my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It's simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.

让伯克希尔远离此类问题是我们的工作。查理和我认为，CEO 绝不能将风险控制授权出去。这简直是太重要了。在伯克希尔，我既发起又监控账簿上的每一份衍生品合同，除了我们少数子公司（如 MidAmerican）的运营相关合同以及通用再保险的小额存量合同。如果伯克希尔陷入困境，那将是我的错。它不会是因为风险委员会或首席风险官的误判。

In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he's incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it - with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees - the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.

在我看来，如果一个大型金融机构的董事会不坚持让其 CEO 对风险控制承担全部责任，那就是失职。如果他没有能力处理这份工作，他应该另谋高就。如果他在这方面失败了——政府因此需要用资金或担保介入——那么他和他的董事会应该承担严重的财务后果。

It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country's largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been "bailed-out" is to make a mockery of the term.

搞砸我们国家一些最大金融机构运营的并不是股东。然而，他们却承担了重负，在大多数失败案例中，其持有价值的 90% 或更多化为乌有。仅在最近两年最大的四起金融惨败中，他们总共损失了超过 5000 亿美元。说这些所有者被“救助”了，简直是对这个词的嘲弄。

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price - one not reimbursable by the companies they've damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.

然而，倒闭公司的 CEO 和董事们基本上毫发无损。他们监督下的灾难可能减少了一些财富，但他们仍然过着奢华的生活。需要改变的是这些 CEO 和董事的行为：如果他们的鲁莽伤害了他们的机构和国家，他们应该付出沉重的代价——这笔代价不应由他们破坏的公司或保险来补偿。CEO 以及许多情况下的董事，长期受益于过大的财务“胡萝卜”；现在，一些有意义的“大棒”也需要成为他们工作的一部分。

An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)

一个不便的真相（董事会过热）

Our subsidiaries made a few small "bolt-on" acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.

去年我们的子公司进行了一些小的现金“补强”收购，但我们与 BNSF 的重磅交易要求我们发行约 95,000 股伯克希尔股票，这相当于此前流通股的 6.1%。查理和我发行伯克希尔股票的喜欢程度，与我们准备进行结肠镜检查的喜欢程度差不多。

The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn't dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we "sell" a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?

我们厌恶的原因很简单。如果我们做梦都不会以当前市场价格出售整个伯克希尔，那么我们究竟为什么应该通过在一项合并中发行我们的股票，以同样不够高的价格“出售”公司的重要部分呢？

In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer's shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares - the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it's impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can't exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.

在评估换股收购要约时，目标公司股东理所当然地关注将给予他们的收购方股票的市场价格。但他们也期望交易能给他们带来自己股票（他们正在放弃的股票）的内在价值。如果潜在收购方的股票以低于其内在价值的价格交易，那么该收购方就不可能进行一项明智的全股票交易。你根本无法在不损害自己股东利益的情况下，用低估的股票换取完全定价的股票。

Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 1¼ shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B's combined assets and A's shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.

请想象 A 公司和 B 公司，规模相同，且两家业务的内在价值都是每股 100 美元。然而，两只股票的交易价格均为每股 80 美元。A 公司的 CEO 信心满满但智商不足，他提出以 1.25 股 A 公司股票换取 1 股 B 公司股票，他正确地告诉他的董事 B 公司价值每股 100 美元。但他将忽略解释，他所给予的东西将花费他的股东 125 美元的内在价值。如果董事们数学也不好，交易因此完成，那么 B 公司的股东最终将拥有 A&B 合并资产的 55.6%，而 A 公司的股东将拥有 44.4%。应该指出，并非 A 公司的每个人都是这笔荒唐交易的输家。它的 CEO 现在管理的公司是他原来管辖范围的两倍大，在这个世界上，规模往往与声望和薪酬相关。

If an acquirer's stock is overvalued, it's a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer's advantage. That's why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)

如果收购方的股票被高估，那就是另一回事了：将其用作货币有利于收购方。这就是为什么股市不同领域的泡沫总是导致狡猾的发起人连续发行股票。根据他们股票的市值，他们能够支付过高价格，因为他们实际上在使用假币。周期性地发生了许多以虚换实的收购，1960 年代末是这种欺骗行为特别猖獗的时期。事实上，某些大公司就是这样建立起来的。（当然，参与其中的人从未公开承认正在发生的现实，尽管私下里有很多窃笑。）

In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.

在我们收购 BNSF 的过程中，出售股份的股东很恰当地将我们的出价评估为每股 100 美元。然而，我们的成本稍高一些，因为 100 美元的 40% 是以我们的股票支付的，而查理和我相信这些股票的价值高于其市场价格。幸运的是，我们长期以来一直持有大量 BNSF 股票，这些股票是我们用现金在市场上购买的。因此，总的来说，我们总成本中只有约 30% 是用伯克希尔股票支付的。

In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.

最终，查理和我决定，用股票支付 30% 价格的劣势被收购带给我们的机会所抵消——即在我们理解并长期喜欢的业务中部署 220 亿美元现金。它还有一个额外的优点，即由我们信任和钦佩的马特·罗斯管理。我们还喜欢以合理的回报率在未来多年投资额外数十亿美元的前景。但最终的决定很接近。如果我们需要发行更多股票来完成收购，那实际上就没有意义了。那样我们会放弃比得到的更多的东西。

I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer's stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer's stock price was woefully inadequate - absolutely no indicator of its real value - had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.

我参加过几十次审议收购的董事会会议，通常由高价的投资银行家（还有其他类型的吗？）给董事们做指导。银行家们总是给董事会一份关于被收购公司价值的详细评估，并强调为什么它远远高于其市场价格。然而，在超过五十年的董事会成员生涯中，我从未听到投资银行家（或管理层！）讨论所给予的东西的真实价值。当交易涉及发行收购方股票时，他们只是用市场价值来衡量成本。他们这样做，尽管如果有针对收购方的收购要约成为讨论的主题时，他们会辩称收购方的股价严重不足——完全不能指示其真实价值。

When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: "Don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut."

当股票是收购中正在考虑的货币，并且董事们正在听取顾问意见时，在我看来，只有一种方法可以获得理性、平衡的讨论。董事们应该聘请第二位顾问来提出反对拟议收购的理由，其费用取决于交易未达成。如果没有这种彻底的补救措施，我们在使用顾问方面的建议仍然是：“不要问理发师你是否需要理发。”

I can't resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers - fine people and able bankers - not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.

我忍不住要给你们讲一个很久以前的真实故事。我们持有一家经营良好、规模庞大的银行的股票，该银行几十年来在法律上被禁止进行收购。最终，法律改变了，我们的银行立即开始寻找可能的收购对象。它的经理们——好人，有能力的银行家——毫不意外地开始表现得像刚发现女孩的十几岁男孩。

They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that's why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.

他们很快聚焦于一家小得多的银行，同样经营良好，且在净资产收益率、利差、贷款质量等方面具有相似的财务特征。我们银行的股价适中（这就是我们买入的原因），接近账面价值，市盈率很低。然而，与此同时，这家小银行的所有者正受到该州其他大银行的追捧，他坚持要求接近三倍账面价值的价格。此外，他想要股票，而不是现金。

Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. "We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it's only a small deal," they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie's reaction at the time: "Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?"

自然地，我们的同伙屈服了，同意了这个破坏价值的交易。“我们需要表明我们在行动。此外，这只是一个小交易，”他们说，好像只有对股东造成重大损害才是克制自己的正当理由。查理当时的反应是：“我们是否应该因为弄脏我们草坪的狗是吉娃娃而不是圣伯纳犬而鼓掌？”

The seller of the smaller bank – no fool – then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. "After the merger," he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, "I'm going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you'll never again do a deal this dumb."

小银行的卖家——可不是傻瓜——然后在谈判中提出了最后一项要求。“合并后，”他实际上是这么说的，也许用了比这更委婉的词句，“我将成为你们银行的大股东，这将成为我净资产的很大一部分。因此，你必须向我保证，你再也不会做这么愚蠢的交易了。”

Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank – newly bigger – lived happily ever after.

是的，合并完成了。小银行的所有者变得更富有了，我们变得更穷了，而大银行的管理者——变得更大——从此过上了幸福的生活。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year (up from 12 – no zeros omitted – in 1981). With our shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year. Therefore, we will have to make a few changes in the usual routine. There will be no change, however, in our enthusiasm for having you attend. Charlie and I like to meet you, answer your questions and – best of all – have you buy lots of goods from our businesses.

我们最好的猜测是，去年有 35,000 人参加了年会（高于 1981 年的 12 人——没有省略零）。随着我们的股东人数大幅增加，我们预计今年会更多。因此，我们必须在通常的程序上做一些改变。然而，我们对于你们参加的热情不会改变。查理和我想见你们，回答你们的问题，并且——最重要的是——让你们从我们的企业购买大量商品。

The meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 1st. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest's stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

今年的年会将于 5 月 1 日星期六举行。与往常一样，Qwest Center 的门将在早上 7 点开放，8:30 将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节，中间在 Qwest 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:45 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。（动作要快；他可以很简洁。）

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I get testy and lock the exits.)

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将通过在与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满来自数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你购物。去年，你们尽了自己的一份力，大多数展位都创下了销售记录。但你可以做得更好。（一个友好的警告：如果我发现销售滞后，我会变得暴躁并锁上出口。）

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务，所有人都准备好为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有 50% 的人，我们可以做到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. Among the more than 30 books and DVDs it will offer are two new books by my sons: Howard's Fragile, a volume filled with photos and commentary about lives of struggle around the globe and Peter's Life Is What You Make It. Completing the family trilogy will be the debut of my sister Doris's biography, a story focusing on her remarkable philanthropic activities. Also available will be Poor Charlie's Almanack, the story of my partner. This book is something of a publishing miracle – never advertised, yet year after year selling many thousands of copies from its Internet site. (Should you need to ship your book purchases, a nearby shipping service will be available.)

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。在它将提供的 30 多本书和 DVD 中，有我两个儿子的两本新书：霍华德的《脆弱》，一本充满全球挣扎生活照片和评论的书，以及彼得的《生活即你所为》。完成家庭三部曲的是我姐姐多丽丝的传记处女作，一个聚焦于她非凡慈善活动的故事。还会提供《穷查理宝典》，关于我合作伙伴的故事。这本书可以说是出版界的奇迹——从未做过广告，却年复一年在其网站上售出成千上万册。（如果你需要邮寄购买的书籍，附近会有邮寄服务。）

If you are a big spender – or, for that matter, merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing.

如果你是大手笔的消费者——或者就此而言，只是个看客——周六中午到下午 5:00 之间前往奥马哈机场东侧的 Elliott Aviation。在那里，我们将有一支 NetJets 机队，肯定会让你心跳加速。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。关于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与美国运通签约（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。负责这些事务的 Carol Pedersen 每年都为我们做得很出色，我感谢她。酒店房间可能很难找，但与 Carol 合作，你会找到一间。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday, May 3rd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Berkyville BBQ to which you are all invited.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 29 日（周四）至 5 月 3 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开放，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办 Berkyville 烧烤，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 2nd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 4 月 30 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 10 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 2 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 26th through Saturday, May 8th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder. Enter with rhinestones; leave with diamonds. My daughter tells me that the more you buy, the more you save (kids say the darnedest things).

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 26 日（周一）持续到 5 月 8 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。带着水钻进来；带着钻石离开。我女儿告诉我，你买得越多，省得越多（孩子们总是说些最奇怪的话）。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。

Our special treat for shareholders this year will be the return of my friend, Ariel Hsing, the country's top-ranked junior table tennis player (and a good bet to win at the Olympics some day). Now 14, Ariel came to the annual meeting four years ago and demolished all comers, including me. (You can witness my humiliating defeat on YouTube; just type in Ariel Hsing Berkshire.)

今年我们对股东的特殊款待将是我朋友邢延华的回归，她是美国排名第一的少年乒乓球运动员（很有希望在某天赢得奥运会）。现年 14 岁的邢延华四年前来到年会，击败了所有挑战者，包括我。（你可以在 YouTube 上见证我那耻辱性的失败；只需输入 Ariel Hsing Berkshire。）

Naturally, I've been plotting a comeback and will take her on outside of Borsheims at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. It will be a three-point match, and after I soften her up, all shareholders are invited to try their luck at similar three-point contests. Winners will be given a box of See's candy. We will have equipment available, but bring your own paddle if you think it will help. (It won't.)

自然，我一直在策划复出，并将在周日下午 1:00 在 Borsheims 外面与她比赛。这将是一场三分制比赛，在我削弱她的体力后，所有股东都被邀请在类似的三分制比赛中试试运气。获胜者将获得一盒喜诗糖果。我们将提供设备，但如果你认为有帮助，可以自带球拍。（不会有帮助。）

Gorat's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year, though, it was overwhelmed by demand. With many more diners expected this year, I've asked my friend, Donna Sheehan, at Piccolo's - another favorite restaurant of mine - to serve shareholders on Sunday as well. (Piccolo's giant root beer float is mandatory for any fan of fine dining.) I plan to eat at both restaurants: All of the weekend action makes me really hungry, and I have favorite dishes at each spot. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo's call 402-342-9038.

Gorat's 将在 5 月 2 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，从下午 1 点营业到晚上 10 点。然而，去年它被需求淹没了。由于预计今年会有更多食客，我已经请我在 Piccolo's 的朋友唐娜·希恩（这也是我最喜欢的餐厅之一）在周日照顾客人。（Piccolo's 巨大的根汁汽水浮冰是任何美食爱好者的必点品。）我计划两家餐厅都去吃：整个周末的活动让我真的很饿，而且我在每个地方都有最喜欢的菜。记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-342-9038。

Regrettably, we will not be able to have a reception for international visitors this year. Our count grew to about 800 last year, and my simply signing one item per person took about 2½ hours. Since we expect even more international visitors this year, Charlie and I decided we must drop this function. But be assured, we welcome every international visitor who comes.

遗憾的是，今年我们将无法为国际访客举办招待会。去年人数增加到约 800 人，仅仅是我为每个人签一个物品就花了大约 2.5 小时。由于我们预计今年会有更多的国际访客，查理和我决定必须取消这个活动。但请放心，我们欢迎每一位前来的国际访客。

Last year we changed our method of determining what questions would be asked at the meeting and received many dozens of letters applauding the new arrangement. We will therefore again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.

去年我们改变了确定会议上提问问题的方法，并收到了几十封赞扬新安排的来信。因此，我们将再次由同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。

The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和重要的十几个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁，并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that's the way we like it.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者们会选一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We've added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group.

我们将再次在周六早上 8:15 在 13 个麦克风处为希望亲自提问的股东举行抽签。在会议上，我将交替采纳记者提问和获胜股东的提问。我们已经将提问时间增加了 30 分钟，可能每组将有大约 30 个问题的时间。

At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a "business" gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society's well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don't tell the Comp Committee).

86 岁和 79 岁的查理和我仍然幸运得超乎梦想。我们出生在美国；有伟大的父母确保我们接受了良好的教育；拥有美好的家庭和健康的身体；并且天生具备“商业”基因，使我们能够以远远超出许多为社会福祉做出同样或更多贡献的人所经历的方式取得成功。此外，我们长期以来从事着自己热爱的工作，在无数方面得到才华横溢、乐观开朗的同事的帮助。事实上，多年来，我们的工作变得越来越迷人；难怪我们跳着踢踏舞去上班。如果被逼无奈，我们会很乐意支付大笔金钱来拥有我们的工作（但别告诉薪酬委员会）。

Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire's annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We'll see you there.

然而，对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔年会上与我们的股东合伙人相聚更有趣的了。所以 5 月 1 日来 Qwest 参加我们一年一度的资本家伍德斯托克吧。我们到时候见。

February 26, 2010

2010 年 2 月 26 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

P.S. Come by rail.

附言：乘火车来。