1977 年致股东信

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized directly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings. While too much attention should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance.

1977年的营业利润为21,904,000美元，即每股22.54美元，比一年前的预期略好。其中，每股1.43美元来自蓝筹印花公司实现的大额资本利得，我们按持股比例将其计入营业利润。伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司或其保险子公司直接实现的资本利得或亏损不计入我们的营业利润计算。虽然不应过分关注任何一个单一年份的数字，但长期而言，累计资本利得或亏损的纪录显然具有重要意义。

Textile operations came in well below forecast, while the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as the operating earnings attributable to our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations.

纺织业务远低于预期，而伊利诺伊国民银行的业绩以及我们按股权占比从蓝筹印花公司获得的营业利润大致符合预期。然而，在菲尔·利什管理团队再次出色领导的国家赔偿公司的带动下，保险业务的业绩甚至比我们乐观的预期还要好。

Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.

大多数公司将“创纪录”的盈利定义为每股盈利的新高。由于企业通常会逐年增加其股权基础，我们认为，管理层实现股权资本增长10%、每股盈利增长5%的业绩组合并不值得特别关注。毕竟，即使是一个完全静止的储蓄账户，由于复利效应，每年也会产生稳步增长的利息收益。

Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital. In 1977 our operating earnings on beginning equity capital amounted to 19%, slightly better than last year and above both our own long-term average and that of American industry in aggregate. But, while our operating earnings per share were up 37% from the year before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the gain in earnings per share considerably less impressive than it might appear at first glance.

除了特殊情况（例如，负债权益比异常或重要资产以不切实际的账面价值入账的公司），我们认为，衡量管理层经济表现的更恰当指标是股权资本回报率。1977年，我们期初股权资本的营业利润率为19%，略高于去年，且高于我们自身的长期平均水平以及美国行业的总体水平。但是，尽管我们的每股营业利润同比增长了37%，期初资本却增长了24%，这使得每股盈利的增长远不如初看时那么令人印象深刻。

We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return during the forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital is up 23% from a year ago, and we expect the trend of insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down well before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a reasonably good year and our present estimate, subject to the usual caveats regarding the frailties of forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve somewhat on a per share basis during 1978.

我们预计未来一年很难达到1977年的回报率。期初股权资本比去年同期增长23%，我们预计保险承保利润率在年底前将明显下降。尽管如此，我们仍然预期会有一个相当不错的年份，并且根据目前的估计（当然，预测总是存在不确定性），1978年的每股营业利润将有所改善。

Textile Operations

纺织业务

The textile business again had a very poor year in 1977. We have mistakenly predicted better results in each of the last two years. This may say something about our forecasting abilities, the nature of the textile industry, or both. Despite strenuous efforts, problems in marketing and manufacturing have persisted. Many difficulties experienced in the marketing area are due primarily to industry conditions, but some of the problems have been of our own making.

纺织业务在1977年又度过了一个非常糟糕的年份。我们在过去两年都错误地预测了更好的结果。这可能说明了我们的预测能力，或者纺织行业的性质，或者两者兼而有之。尽管付出了巨大努力，市场营销和制造方面的问题依然存在。营销领域的许多困难主要源于行业状况，但有些问题是我们自己造成的。

A few shareholders have questioned the wisdom of remaining in the textile business which, over the longer term, is unlikely to produce returns on capital comparable to those available in many other businesses. Our reasons are several: (1) Our mills in both New Bedford and Manchester are among the largest employers in each town, utilizing a labor force of high average age possessing relatively non-transferable skills. Our workers and unions have exhibited unusual understanding and effort in cooperating with management to achieve a cost structure and product mix which might allow us to maintain a viable operation. (2) Management also has been energetic and straightforward in its approach to our textile problems. In particular, Ken Chace’s efforts after the change in corporate control took place in 1965 generated capital from the textile division needed to finance the acquisition and expansion of our profitable insurance operation. (3) With hard work and some imagination regarding manufacturing and marketing configurations, it seems reasonable that at least modest profits in the textile division can be achieved in the future.

一些股东质疑继续留在纺织业务的明智性，因为从长期来看，该业务不太可能产生与其他许多业务相当的资本回报。我们的理由有几条：（1）我们在新贝德福德和曼彻斯特的工厂是当地最大的雇主之一，雇用的劳动力平均年龄较高，且技能相对难以转移。我们的工人和工会表现出非凡的理解和努力，与管理层合作，以实现可能维持生存的成本结构和产品组合。（2）管理层在处理纺织问题上也表现出积极和坦率的态度。特别是，肯·查斯在1965年公司控制权变更后的努力，从纺织部门产生了资本，用于收购和扩张我们盈利的保险业务。（3）通过在制造和营销配置上的辛勤工作和一些想象力，未来至少实现纺织部门的适度利润似乎是合理的。

Insurance Underwriting

保险承保

Our insurance operation continued to grow significantly in 1977. It was early in 1967 that we made our entry into this industry through the purchase of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company (sister companies) for approximately $8.6 million. In that year their premium volume amounted to $22 million. In 1977 our aggregate insurance premium volume was $151 million. No additional shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock have been issued to achieve any of this growth.

我们的保险业务在1977年继续显著增长。我们在1967年初通过以约860万美元收购国家赔偿公司及其姐妹公司国家火灾和海洋保险公司进入这一行业。当时它们的保费总额为2200万美元。1977年，我们的保险保费总额达到1.51亿美元。这一增长没有通过增发伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票来实现。

Rather, this almost 600% increase has been achieved through large gains in National Indemnity’s traditional liability areas plus the starting of new companies (Cornhusker Casualty Company in 1970, Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company in 1971, Texas United Insurance Company in 1972, The Insurance Company of Iowa in 1973, and Kansas Fire and Casualty Company in late 1977), the purchase for cash of other insurance companies (Home and Automobile Insurance Company in 1971, Kerkling Reinsurance Corporation, now named Central Fire and Casualty Company, in 1976, and Cypress Insurance Company at yearend 1977), and finally through the marketing of additional products, most significantly reinsurance, within the National Indemnity Company corporate structure.

相反，这种近600%的增长是通过以下方式实现的：国家赔偿公司传统责任险领域的大幅增长，加上新公司的设立（1970年的康哈斯克意外险公司、1971年的莱克兰火灾和意外险公司、1972年的德克萨斯联合保险公司、1973年的爱荷华保险公司以及1977年底的堪萨斯火灾和意外险公司），以及用现金收购其他保险公司（1971年的家庭和汽车保险公司、1976年收购的克尔克林再保险公司——现更名为中央火灾和意外险公司，以及1977年底的赛普拉斯保险公司），最后还在国家赔偿公司内部增加了新产品，最重要的是再保险业务。

In aggregate, the insurance business has worked out very well. But it hasn’t been a one-way street. Some major mistakes have been made during the decade, both in products and personnel. We experienced significant problems from (1) a surety operation initiated in 1969, (2) the 1973 expansion of Home and Automobile’s urban auto marketing into the Miami, Florida area, (3) a still unresolved aviation “fronting” arrangement, and (4) our Worker’s Compensation operation in California, which we believe retains an interesting potential upon completion of a reorganization now in progress. It is comforting to be in a business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved. In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds.

总体而言，保险业务进展非常顺利。但并非一帆风顺。过去十年在产品和人上都犯过一些重大错误。我们遇到了重大问题，包括（1）1969年启动的担保业务，（2）1973年将家庭和汽车保险公司的城市汽车营销扩展到佛罗里达州迈阿密地区，（3）一个尚未解决的航空“前端”安排，以及（4）我们在加利福尼亚州的劳工赔偿业务，我们认为在完成当前重组后仍具有有趣潜力。令人欣慰的是，在一个允许犯一些错误但仍能取得相当满意总体表现的行业中。从某种意义上说，这与我们的纺织业务相反，在那里，即使管理得非常好，可能也只能取得平庸的成果。你们的管理层学到的一个教训——不幸的是，有时还需要反复学习——就是选择顺风行业而非逆风行业的重要性。

In 1977 the winds in insurance underwriting were squarely behind us. Very large rate increases were effected throughout the industry in 1976 to offset the disastrous underwriting results of 1974 and 1975. But, because insurance policies typically are written for one-year periods, with pricing mistakes capable of correction only upon renewal, it was 1977 before the full impact was felt upon earnings of those earlier rate increases.

1977年，保险承保的风向完全在我们身后。1976年整个行业大幅提高费率，以弥补1974年和1975年的灾难性承保业绩。但由于保单通常是一年期的，定价错误只能在续保时纠正，所以直到1977年，早期费率上涨的全部影响才在盈利中体现出来。

The pendulum now is beginning to swing the other way. We estimate that costs involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month. This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as “social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies. Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink. Recently the pace of rate increases has slowed dramatically, and it is our expectation that underwriting margins generally will be declining by the second half of the year.

钟摆现在开始向另一个方向摆动。我们估计，我们所经营的保险领域的成本每月上升接近1%。这是由于持续的货币通胀影响人力和财产修复成本，以及“社会通胀”，即社会和陪审团对保单覆盖范围的扩大定义。除非费率以相应的每月1%的速度增长，否则承保利润必然萎缩。最近，费率上涨的速度急剧放缓，我们预计到下半年，承保利润率总体上将下降。

We must again give credit to Phil Liesche, greatly assisted by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, for an extraordinary underwriting achievement in National Indemnity’s traditional auto and general liability business during 1977. Large volume gains have been accompanied by excellent underwriting margins following contraction or withdrawal by many competitors in the wake of the 1974-75 crisis period. These conditions will reverse before long. In the meantime, National Indemnity’s underwriting profitability has increased dramatically and, in addition, large sums have been made available for investment. As markets loosen and rates become inadequate, we again will face the challenge of philosophically accepting reduced volume. Unusual managerial discipline will be required, as it runs counter to normal institutional behavior to let the other fellow take away business - even at foolish prices.

我们必须再次赞扬菲尔·利什，在承保部门的罗兰·米勒和理赔部门的比尔·莱昂斯的极大协助下，1977年在国家赔偿公司的传统汽车和一般责任险业务中取得了非凡的承保成就。在1974-75年危机期间许多竞争对手收缩或退出后，我们取得了大幅度的业务增长，并伴随着出色的承保利润率。这些情况不会持久。与此同时，国家赔偿公司的承保盈利能力急剧上升，此外，还有大量资金可用于投资。随着市场宽松和费率变得不足，我们将再次面临在哲学上接受业务量减少的挑战。需要非凡的管理纪律，因为让竞争对手抢走业务——即使以愚蠢的价格——与正常的机构行为相悖。

Our reinsurance department, managed by George Young, improved its underwriting performance during 1977. Although the combined ratio (see definition on page 12) of 107.1 was unsatisfactory, its trend was downward throughout the year. In addition, reinsurance generates unusually high funds for investment as a percentage of premium volume.

由乔治·杨管理的再保险部门在1977年改善了承保业绩。尽管综合成本率（见第12页定义）107.1%不令人满意，但全年呈下降趋势。此外，再保险业务相对于保费规模产生了异常高的投资资金。

At Home and Auto, John Seward continued to make progress on all fronts. John was a battlefield promotion several years ago when Home and Auto’s underwriting was awash in red ink and the company faced possible extinction. Under his management it currently is sound, profitable, and growing.

在家庭和汽车保险公司，约翰·苏厄德在所有方面继续取得进展。几年前，当家庭和汽车保险公司的承保陷入严重亏损、公司面临可能倒闭时，约翰是火线提拔的。在他的管理下，公司目前稳健、盈利并持续增长。

John Ringwalt’s homestate operation now consists of five companies, with Kansas Fire and Casualty Company becoming operational late in 1977 under the direction of Floyd Taylor. The homestate companies had net premium volume of $23 million, up from $5.5 million just three years ago. All four companies that operated throughout the year achieved combined ratios below 100, with Cornhusker Casualty Company, at 93.8, the leader. In addition to actively supervising the other four homestate operations, John Ringwalt manages the operations of Cornhusker which has recorded combined ratios below 100 in six of its seven full years of existence and, from a standing start in 1970, has grown to be one of the leading insurance companies operating in Nebraska utilizing the conventional independent agency system. Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company, managed by Jim Stodolka, was the winner of the Chairman’s Cup in 1977 for achieving the lowest loss ratio among the homestate companies. All in all, the homestate operation continues to make excellent progress.

约翰·林沃尔特的本地州业务现在包括五家公司，其中堪萨斯火灾和意外险公司在弗洛伊德·泰勒的领导下于1977年底开始运营。本地州公司的净保费总额达到2300万美元，而三年前仅为550万美元。全年运营的四家公司的综合成本率都低于100，其中康哈斯克意外险公司以93.8领先。除了积极监督其他四家本地州运营外，约翰·林沃尔特还管理康哈斯克的运营，该公司在其七个完整年度中的六个年度综合成本率低于100，并且从1970年白手起家，已发展成为内布拉斯加州利用传统独立代理体系运营的领先保险公司之一。由吉姆·斯托多尔卡管理的莱克兰火灾和意外险公司因实现最低损失率而获得1977年主席杯。总体而言，本地州业务继续取得卓越进展。

The newest addition to our insurance group is Cypress Insurance Company of South Pasadena, California. This Worker’s Compensation insurer was purchased for cash in the final days of 1977 and, therefore, its approximate $12.5 million of volume for that year was not included in our results. Cypress and National Indemnity’s present California Worker’s Compensation operation will not be combined, but will operate independently utilizing somewhat different marketing strategies. Milt Thornton, President of Cypress since 1968, runs a first-class operation for policyholders, agents, employees and owners alike. We look forward to working with him.

我们保险集团的最新成员是加利福尼亚州南帕萨迪纳的赛普拉斯保险公司。这家劳工赔偿保险公司在1977年最后几天以现金收购，因此其当年约1250万美元的保费量未计入我们的业绩。赛普拉斯和国家赔偿公司现有的加利福尼亚劳工赔偿业务将不会合并，而是独立运营，采用稍有不同的营销策略。自1968年起担任赛普拉斯总裁的米尔特·桑顿，为保单持有人、代理人、员工和股东经营着一流的业务。我们期待与他合作。

Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce insulation from competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn’t. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance. We are very fortunate to have the group of managers that are associated with us.

保险公司提供标准化的保单，任何人都可以复制。它们唯一的产品是承诺。获得执照并不困难，费率也是公开的。商标、专利、地理位置、公司历史、原材料来源等方面没有重要优势，消费者也难以区分，无法形成竞争壁垒。在公司年报中，强调人的作用很常见。有时候这是真的，有时候不是。但毫无疑问，保险业务的性质放大了个别管理者对公司业绩的影响。我们很幸运能拥有这样一群管理者。

Insurance Investments

保险投资

During the past two years insurance investments at cost (excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252.8 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings, have accounted for this increase in marketable securities. In turn, net investment income of the Insurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax in 1975 to $12.3 million pre-tax in 1977.

过去两年，保险投资成本（不包括对我们关联公司蓝筹印花的投资）从1.346亿美元增长到2.528亿美元。保费的大幅增长带来的保险准备金增加以及留存收益推动了可交易证券的增长。相应地，保险集团净投资收入从1975年税前840万美元提高到1977年税前1230万美元。

In addition to this income from dividends and interest, we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax, about one-quarter from bonds and the balance from stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 was approximately $74 million but this figure, like any other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss of $17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stocks.

除了这些股息和利息收入外，我们还实现了税前690万美元的资本利得，约四分之一来自债券，其余来自股票。1977年末我们股票的未实现收益约为7400万美元，但这个数字，像任何单一日期的数字一样（1974年末我们有1700万美元的未实现亏损），不应被过分当真。我们大多数大额持股将持有多年，投资决策的评分卡将由那段时间的业务成果提供，而不是任何特定日期的价格。正如在收购整个企业时过度关注短期前景是愚蠢的，我们认为在购买企业的小部分——即可交易普通股时，被近期盈利预期或盈利趋势所迷惑同样是不明智的。

A little digression illustrating this point may be interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined basis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18 million and employed 10,000 people at a dozen large mills throughout New England. In the business world of that period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, in that same year earnings of IBM were $28 million (now $2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, $10 million, Minnesota Mining, $13 million, and Time, Inc., $9 million. But, in the decade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales of $595 million produced an aggregate loss for Berkshire Hathaway of $10 million. By 1964 the operation had been reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to $22 million, from $53 million at the time of the merger. So much for single year snapshots as adequate portrayals of a business.

举个稍微偏离主题的例子来说明这一点可能很有趣。伯克希尔精细纺织公司和哈撒韦制造公司于1955年合并成立伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。1948年，在模拟合并基础上，他们税后盈利近1800万美元，在新英格兰的十几个大型工厂雇用了1万名员工。在当时的企业界，它们是一个经济强国。例如，同一年，IBM的盈利为2800万美元（现在是27亿美元），西夫韦超市1000万美元，明尼苏达矿业1300万美元，时代公司900万美元。但是，在1955年合并后的十年里，伯克希尔·哈撒韦累计销售额5.95亿美元，却累计亏损1000万美元。到1964年，业务缩减到两家工厂，净值从合并时的5300万美元缩水至2200万美元。单一年份的快照不足以充分描绘一个企业，就说这么多。

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $5 million on December 31, 1977 were as follows (in thousands, omitted):

1977年12月31日，我们保险公司持有的市值超过500万美元的股票如下（单位：千美元，已省略）：

We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.

我们选择可交易股票的方式，与评估整体收购企业的方式大致相同。我们希望企业是（1）我们能够理解的，（2）具有有利的长期前景，（3）由诚实且有能力的人经营，以及（4）以非常有吸引力的价格出售。我们通常不会试图基于预期的短期股价上涨来买入股票。事实上，如果它们的业务经验继续令我们满意，我们欢迎所持股票的市场价格下跌，作为以更好价格购买更多好东西的机会。

Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.

我们的经验是，真正优秀企业的按比例份额有时在证券市场上以远低于整体公司协商交易中价格的大幅折扣出售。因此，通过企业收购直接无法获得的商业所有权便宜货，可以通过拥有股票间接获得。当价格合适时，我们愿意在选定公司中持有非常大的头寸，并非意图控股，也不预见出售或合并，而是期望优秀的企业业绩长期转化为相应的优秀市场价值和股息回报，无论对于少数还是多数股东。

Such investments initially may have negligible impact on our operating earnings. For example, we invested $10.9 million in Capital Cities Communications during 1977. Earnings attributable to the shares we purchased totaled about $1.3 million last year. But only the cash dividend, which currently provides $40,000 annually, is reflected in our operating earnings figure.

这类投资最初对我们营业利润的影响可能微乎其微。例如，我们在1977年向首都通信公司投资了1090万美元。我们购买的股票对应的盈利去年约为130万美元。但只有现金股息，目前每年提供4万美元，才反映在我们的营业利润数字中。

Capital Cities possesses both extraordinary properties and extraordinary management. And these management skills extend equally to operations and employment of corporate capital. To purchase, directly, properties such as Capital Cities owns would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages to us. While control would give us the opportunity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.

首都通信拥有非凡的资产和非凡的管理。这些管理技能同样延伸到运营和企业资本运用。直接购买首都通信所拥有的资产，成本大约是我们通过股票市场购买成本的两倍，而且直接拥有对我们没有重要优势。虽然控制权将给我们机会——和责任——来管理运营和企业资源，但我们无法在上述任一方面提供与现管理层同等的能力。实际上，我们可以通过非控制权获得比控制权更好的管理结果。这是一个非正统的观点，但我们认为是合理的。

Banking

银行业

In 1977 the Illinois National Bank continued to achieve a rate of earnings on assets about three times that of most large banks. As usual, this record was achieved while the bank paid maximum rates to savers and maintained an asset position combining low risk and exceptional liquidity. Gene Abegg formed the bank in 1931 with $250,000. In its first full year of operation, earnings amounted to $8,782. Since that time, no new capital has been contributed to the bank; on the contrary, since our purchase in 1969, dividends of $20 million have been paid. Earnings in 1977 amounted to $3.6 million, more than achieved by many banks two or three times its size.

1977年，伊利诺伊国民银行继续实现约大多数大银行三倍的资产收益率。与往常一样，这一业绩是在银行向储户支付最高利率并保持低风险、高流动性的资产状况的同时取得的。吉恩·阿贝格于1931年以25万美元创立了这家银行。在首个完整运营年度，盈利为8,782美元。自那时起，银行未注入新资本；相反，自我们1969年收购以来，已支付了2000万美元股息。1977年盈利达到360万美元，超过许多规模是其两到三倍的银行。

Late last year Gene, now 80 and still running a banking operation without peer, asked that a successor be brought in. Accordingly, Peter Jeffrey, formerly President and Chief Executive Officer of American National Bank of Omaha, has joined the Illinois National Bank effective March 1st as President and Chief Executive Officer.

去年年底，吉恩已80岁高龄，仍然经营着一家无与伦比的银行，他请求引入继任者。因此，曾任奥马哈美国国民银行总裁兼首席执行官的彼得·杰弗里已于3月1日加入伊利诺伊国民银行，担任总裁兼首席执行官。

Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford’s leading bank.

吉恩作为董事长健康状况良好。我们期待罗克福德这家领先银行继续成功运营。

Blue Chip Stamps

蓝筹印花公司

We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.

我们再次增持了蓝筹印花公司的股权，到1977年底持有约36.5%。蓝筹印花公司表现良好，运营盈利约1290万美元，此外还实现了410万美元的证券收益。

Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary of Blue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See’s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuck Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth. Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

蓝筹印花公司80%控股的韦斯科金融公司，由路易斯·文森蒂管理，以及99%控股的喜诗糖果公司，由查克·哈金斯管理，均在1977年取得了良好进展。自1972年初蓝筹印花收购喜诗以来，税前营业利润从420万美元增长到1260万美元，且几乎没有追加资本投入。喜诗在行业几乎没有销量增长的环境下取得了这一业绩。伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东可向罗伯特·H·伯德先生索取蓝筹印花公司的年报，地址：蓝筹印花公司，5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
March 14, 1978

华伦·E·巴菲特，主席
1978年3月14日