1968年7月11日致合伙人信
1968年上半年，巴菲特合伙公司取得16%的整体收益，远超道指0.9%的涨幅，但巴菲特警告当前市场中的投机行为可能带来长期风险。
First Half Performance
上半年业绩表现
During the first half of 1968, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined fractionally from 905 to 898. Ownership of the Dow would also have produced dividends of about $15 during the half, resulting in an overall gain of 0.9% for that Average. The Dow, once again, was an anemic competitor for most investment managers, although it was not surpassed by anything like the margins of 1967.
1968年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数从905点微幅下滑至898点。持有道指在此期间还将获得约15美元的股息，使得该指数整体上涨0.9%。道指再次成为大多数投资经理的微弱对手，尽管它并未像1967年那样以巨大差距被超越。
Our own performance was unusually good during the first half, with an overall gain of 16% excluding any change in valuation for controlled companies (which represented slightly over one-third of net assets at the beginning of the year). However, any release of adrenalin is unwarranted. Our marketable security investments are heavily concentrated in a few situations, making relative performance potentially more volatile than in widely diversified investment vehicles. Our long term performance goals are as stated in the revised "Ground Rules" and I will be quite happy if we achieve those limited objectives over a period of years. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual basis:
我们自己的表现在上半年异常出色，在不计入控股公司估值变化的情况下整体收益为16%（控股公司在年初占净资产的略超过三分之一）。然而，任何肾上腺素飙升都是不必要的。我们的有价证券投资高度集中在少数几个标的上，这使得相对表现可能比广泛分散的投资组合更不稳定。我们的长期业绩目标如修订后的“基本规则”所述，如果能在数年内实现这些有限的目标，我将非常满意。下表按常规方式总结了迄今为止的业绩：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners' Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| First Half 1968 | 0.9% | 16.0% | 13.5% |
| Cumulative Results | 167.7% | 1880.0% | 1072.0% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 8.9% | 29.6% | 23.8% |
| 年份 | 道指整体结果(1) | 合伙公司结果(2) | 有限合伙人结果(3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968年上半年 | 0.9% | 16.0% | 13.5% |
| 累计结果 | 167.7% | 1880.0% | 1072.0% |
| 年复合收益率 | 8.9% | 29.6% | 23.8% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(1) 基于道指每年价值变化加上该年持有道指可获得的股息。该表包括合伙公司所有完整运营年份。
(2) 1957-61年数据为所有前身有限合伙公司在整个年度中扣除所有费用后、向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分成前的合并结果。
(3) 1957-61年数据基于前一栏合伙公司结果，根据当前合伙协议考虑向普通合伙人分成，但未扣除有限合伙人每月提款。
Although we revise valuations of our controlled companies only at yearend, it presently appears that our share of their 1968 earnings will be something over $3 million. Those with primary responsibility for their operations, Ken Chace at Berkshire Hathaway, Louis Kohn at Hochschild Kohn, Jack Ringwalt at National Indemnity and Ben Rosner at Associated Cotton Shops, continue to meld effort and ability into results.
虽然我们仅在年底修订控股公司的估值，但目前看来，我们所占有的它们1968年收益份额将超过300万美元。这些公司的主要运营负责人——伯克希尔·哈撒韦的肯·蔡斯、霍克希尔德·科恩的路易斯·科恩、国民保险公司的杰克·林沃尔特以及联合棉花商店的本·罗斯纳——继续将努力与才能转化为成果。
This year, Diversified Retailing Company (owner of Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) issued its first published annual report. This was occasioned by the public sale of debentures to approximately 1,000 investors last December. Thus, DRC is in the rather unusual position of being a public company from a creditors' viewpoint, but a private one (there are three stockholders - BPL owns 80%) for ownership purposes. I am enclosing the DRC report with this letter (except where duplicates go to one household) and plan to continue to send them along with future mid-year letters.
今年，多元化零售公司（拥有霍克希尔德·科恩和联合棉花商店）发布了其首份公开年度报告。这是由于去年12月向大约1,000名投资者公开发售债券所致。因此，DRC处于一种相当不寻常的地位：从债权人角度看是一家公众公司，但从所有权角度看是一家私有公司（有三名股东——BPL持有80%）。我随信附上DRC的报告（同一家庭重复的除外），并计划在今后的年中信中继续附上。
As I have mentioned before, we cannot make the same sort of money out of permanent ownership of controlled businesses that can be made from buying and reselling such businesses, or from skilled investment in marketable securities. Nevertheless, they offer a pleasant long term form of activity (when conducted in conjunction with high grade, able people) at satisfactory rates of return.
正如我之前提到的，我们无法通过永久持有控股企业获得像买卖这类企业或巧妙投资于有价证券那样的收益。然而，它们提供了一种令人愉快的长期活动形式（在与高素质、有能力的人共同经营时），并带来令人满意的回报率。
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the form sheet on the usual investment companies:
下页是通常投资公司的业绩表格：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| First Half 1968 | 5.1% | 2.8% | 4.4% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 13.5% |
| Cumulative Results | 175.7% | 154.5% | 218.6% | 186.7% | 167.7% | 1072.0% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.2% | 8.5% | 10.6% | 9.6% | 8.9% | 23.8% |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托(1) | 投资者股票(1) | 雷曼(2) | 三洲公司(2) | 道指 | 有限合伙人 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968年上半年 | 5.1% | 2.8% | 4.4% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 13.5% |
| 累计结果 | 175.7% | 154.5% | 218.6% | 186.7% | 167.7% | 1072.0% |
| 年复合收益率 | 9.2% | 8.5% | 10.6% | 9.6% | 8.9% | 23.8% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 -1967. Estimated for first half of 1968.
(1) 根据资产价值变化加上年内向登记持有人发放的任何分配计算。
(2) 1957-1967年数据来自1968年穆迪银行与金融手册，1968年上半年为估计值。
Due to a sluggish performance by the Dow in the last few years, the four big funds now have, on average, about a one-half point per annum advantage over the Dow for the full period.
由于道指过去几年表现低迷，四大基金现在在整个期间内平均每年比道指高出约半个百分点。
The Present Environment
当前环境
I make no effort to predict the course of general business or the stock market. Period. However, currently there are practices snowballing in the security markets and business world which, while devoid of short term predictive value, bother me as to possible long term consequences.
我并不试图预测整体经济或股票市场的走势。句号。然而，目前在证券市场和商业世界中，一些做法正在滚雪球般发展，虽然缺乏短期预测价值，但其可能的长期后果令我忧虑。
I know that some of you are not particularly interested (and shouldn't be) in what is taking place on the financial stage. For those who are, I am enclosing a reprint of an unusually clear and simple article which lays bare just what is occurring on a mushrooming scale. Spectacular amounts of money are being made by those participating (whether as originators, top employees, professional advisors, investment bankers, stock speculators, etc…) in the chain-letter type stock-promotion vogue. The game is being played by the gullible, the self-hypnotized, and the cynical. To create the proper illusions, it frequently requires accounting distortions (one particularly progressive entrepreneur told me he believed in "bold, imaginative accounting"), tricks of capitalization and camouflage of the true nature of the operating businesses involved. The end product is popular, respectable and immensely profitable (I'll let the philosophers figure in which order those adjectives should be placed).
我知道你们中的一些人对金融舞台上的事并不特别感兴趣（也不应该感兴趣）。对于感兴趣的人，我随信附上一份异常清晰简洁的文章重印本，揭示了正在急剧蔓延的现状。那些参与这种连锁信式股票推销风潮的人（无论是发起者、高级雇员、专业顾问、投资银行家、股票投机者……）正在赚取巨额金钱。这场游戏由轻信者、自我催眠者和愤世嫉俗者参与。为了制造合适的幻觉，常常需要会计扭曲（一位特别有进取心的企业家告诉我，他信奉“大胆、富有想象力的会计处理”）、资本化技巧以及掩盖所涉企业真实性质的手法。最终产品广受欢迎、受人尊敬且利润极高（让哲学家们去判断这些形容词的顺序应该是怎样的）。
Quite candidly, our own performance has been substantially improved on an indirect basis because of the fall-out from such activities. To create an ever widening circle of chain letters requires increasing amounts of corporate raw material and this has caused many intrinsically cheap (and not so cheap) stocks to come to life. When we have been the owners of such stocks, we have reaped market rewards much more promptly than might otherwise have been the case. The appetite for such companies, however, tends to substantially diminish the number of fundamentally attractive investments which remain.
坦率地说，由于这类活动的附带影响，我们自身的业绩也得到了间接的大幅提升。为了创造不断扩大的连锁信圈子，需要越来越多的公司原材料，这导致许多本质上便宜（以及不那么便宜）的股票活跃起来。当我们成为这类股票的所有者时，我们比原本可能的情况更快地收获了市场回报。然而，对这类公司的胃口往往会大幅减少剩余的基本面吸引力投资的数量。
I believe the odds are good that, when the stock market and business history of this period is being written, the phenomenon described in Mr. May's article will be regarded as of major importance, and perhaps characterized as a mania. You should realize, however, that his "The Emperor Has No Clothes" approach is at odds (or dismissed with a "So What?" or an "Enjoy, Enjoy") with the views of most investment banking houses and currently successful investment managers. We live in an investment world, populated not by those who must be logically persuaded to believe, but by the hopeful, credulous and greedy, grasping for an excuse to believe.
我认为，当撰写这一时期的股票市场和商业历史时，梅先生文章中所描述的现象极有可能被视为一件大事，或许会被定性为一场狂热。然而，你应该意识到，他的“皇帝没穿衣服”式的论点与大多数投资银行和当前成功的投资经理的观点格格不入（或被他们以“那又怎样？”或“尽情享乐”的态度所摒弃）。我们生活在一个投资世界里，这里充斥的不是那些必须被逻辑说服才会相信的人，而是充满希望、轻信和贪婪，抓住任何理由去相信的人。
Finally, for a magnificent account of the current financial scene, you should hurry out and get a copy of "The Money Game" by Adam Smith. It is loaded with insights and supreme wit. (Note: Despite my current "Support Your Local Postmaster" drive, I am not enclosing the book with this letter - it retails for $6.95.)
最后，如果想对当前金融景象有一个精彩的了解，你应该赶快去买一本亚当·斯密的《金钱游戏》。它充满了洞见和高级智慧。（注：尽管我目前正在推动“支持当地邮政局长”活动，但我不随信附上这本书——零售价6.95美元。）
Taxes
税务
Several unusual factors make the tax figure even more difficult than usual to estimate this year. We will undoubtedly have an above average amount of ordinary income. The picture on short term and long term capital gain is subject to unusually substantial variance. At the beginning of the year, I suggested that you use an 8% ordinary income factor (it won't come in this manner but this figure embodies an adjustment for long term capital gain) applied to your BPL capital account on an interim basis to compute quarterly tax estimates. If a figure different from 8% seems more appropriate for your September 15th quarterly estimate, I will let you know by September 5th. If no change is necessary, you will next hear from me on November 1st with the Commitment Letter for 1969.
今年，一些特殊因素使得税务数字比往常更难估算。我们无疑将获得高于平均水平的普通收入。短期和长期资本利得的情况将面临异常大的波动。在年初，我建议你在计算季度预计税款时，暂时对你的BPL资本账户采用8%的普通收入因子（它不会以这种方式出现，但这个数字包含了长期资本利得的调整）。如果对于你9月15日的季度预计税额，有不同于8%的数字更为合适，我将在9月5日前通知你。如果无需变动，你将在11月1日收到我随附1969年承诺书的下一封来信。
Cordially,
此致
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特