2013 年致股东信

Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended
12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at
market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s
results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated
using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-
tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its
results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the
S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the
aggregate lag to be substantial.

伯克希尔与标普 500 年度百分比变化

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2013 was $34.2 billion. That gain was after our deducting $1.8 billion of charges - meaningless economically, as I will explain later - that arose from our purchase of the minority interests in Marmon and Iscar. After those charges, the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 18.2%. Over the last 49 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $134,973, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔 2013 年的净资产增加了 342 亿美元。这一增长是在我们扣除 18 亿美元费用之后实现的——这些费用在经济上毫无意义，我将在后面解释——这些费用源于我们购买 Marmon 和 Iscar 的少数股权。扣除这些费用后，我们的 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值增长了 18.2%。在过去 49 年里（即现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从 19 美元增长到 134,973 美元，年复合增长率为 19.7%。*

On the facing page, we show our long-standing performance measurement: The yearly change in Berkshire's per-share book value versus the market performance of the S&P 500. What counts, of course, is per-share intrinsic value. But that's a subjective figure, and book value is useful as a rough tracking indicator. (An extended discussion of intrinsic value is included in our Owner-Related Business Principles on pages 103-108. Those principles have been included in our reports for 30 years, and we urge new and prospective shareholders to read them.)

在对面页，我们展示了我们长期以来的业绩衡量标准：伯克希尔每股账面价值的年度变化与标普 500 指数的市场表现对比。当然，重要的是每股内在价值。但这是一个主观数字，而账面价值作为一个粗略的跟踪指标是有用的。（关于内在价值的详细讨论包含在我们的所有者相关经营原则中，见第 103-108 页。这些原则已纳入我们的报告 30 年，我们敦促新股东和潜在股东阅读它们。）

As I've long told you, Berkshire's intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That's why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount. We did not purchase shares during 2013, however, because the stock price did not descend to the 120% level. If it does, we will be aggressive.

正如我一直告诉你的那样，伯克希尔的内在价值远远超过其账面价值。此外，近年来这种差距显著扩大。这就是为什么我们在 2012 年决定授权以账面价值 120% 的价格回购股票是合理的。以该水平回购对持续股东有利，因为每股内在价值远超账面价值的该百分比。然而，我们在 2013 年没有回购股票，因为股价没有跌到 120% 的水平。如果跌到了，我们会积极回购。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman and my partner, and I believe both Berkshire's book value and intrinsic value will outperform the S&P in years when the market is down or moderately up. We expect to fall short, though, in years when the market is strong - as we did in 2013. We have underperformed in ten of our 49 years, with all but one of our shortfalls occurring when the S&P gain exceeded 15%.

伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人查理·芒格和我相信，在市场下跌或温和上涨的年份，伯克希尔的账面价值和内在价值都会跑赢标普 500。然而，在市场强劲的年份——就像我们在 2013 年那样——我们预计会落后。在我们 49 年中有十年表现落后，除了一个例外，所有落后都发生在标普 500 涨幅超过 15% 的时候。

Over the stock market cycle between years 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.

在 2007 年至 2013 年的股市周期中，我们跑赢了标普 500。在未来几年的完整周期中，我们期望再次做到这一点。如果我们做不到，我们就没资格拿报酬。毕竟，你随时可以持有指数基金，并获得标普 500 的收益。

The Year at Berkshire

伯克希尔的这一年

On the operating front, just about everything turned out well for us last year - in certain cases very well. Let me count the ways:

在运营方面，去年几乎所有事情对我们来说都进展顺利——在某些情况下非常顺利。让我一一列举：

We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.

我们完成了两笔大型收购，花费近 180 亿美元购买了 NV Energy 的全部股权和 H. J. 亨氏的主要权益。两家公司都非常适合我们，并且将在一个世纪后蓬勃发展。

With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates - Bernardo Hees, Heinz's new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman - are responsible for operations.

此外，通过收购亨氏，我们创建了一个合作模板，伯克希尔未来在进行大规模收购时可能会使用这个模板。在这里，我们与我的朋友豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼领导的 3G 资本集团的投资者合作。他才华横溢的伙伴——亨氏的新 CEO 贝尔纳多·赫斯和董事长亚历克斯·贝林——负责运营。

Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred's annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.

伯克希尔是融资合作伙伴。在此角色中，我们购买了 80 亿美元的亨氏优先股，票面利率为 9%，但还具有其他特征，应将优先股的年回报率提高到 12% 左右。伯克希尔和 3G 各自以 42.5 亿美元购买了亨氏普通股的一半。

Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a "private equity" transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).

尽管亨氏收购与“私募股权”交易有一些相似之处，但有一个关键区别：伯克希尔从不打算出售该公司的任何股份。相反，我们想要的是买更多，而这可能发生：某些 3G 投资者未来可能出售部分或全部股份，我们可能会在此时增加持股。伯克希尔和 3G 也可能在某个时候决定，如果我们用部分优先股交换普通股（以当时适当的股权估值），将是互利的。

Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.

我们的合伙企业在 6 月控制了亨氏，迄今的运营结果令人鼓舞。然而，亨氏的收益只有一小部分反映在伯克希尔今年的报告中：收购及随后的重组产生的一次性费用总计 13 亿美元。2014 年的收益将是可观的。

With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 8½ companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 491½ to go.

有了亨氏，伯克希尔现在拥有 8.5 家如果作为独立企业就能入选《财富》500 强的公司。只剩 491.5 家了。

NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada's population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican's last major acquisition.

NV Energy 由我们的公用事业子公司 MidAmerican Energy 以 56 亿美元收购，为内华达州约 88% 的人口供电。这次收购与我们现有的电力公用事业业务完美契合，并为可再生能源的大规模投资提供了许多可能性。NV Energy 不会是 MidAmerican 的最后一次重大收购。

MidAmerican is one of our "Powerhouse Five" – a collection of large non-insurance businesses that, in aggregate, had a record $10.8 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2013, up $758 million from 2012. The other companies in this sainted group are BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol and Marmon.

MidAmerican 是我们的“五大动力中心”之一——这是一个大型非保险业务的集合，合计在 2013 年实现了创纪录的 108 亿美元税前利润，比 2012 年增加 7.58 亿美元。这个卓越集团中的其他公司是 BNSF、Iscar、路博润和 Marmon。

Of the five, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire nine years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and, for the remainder, issued shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $10.4 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the nine-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.

在这五家公司中，九年前只有当时税前利润为 3.93 亿美元的 MidAmerican 为伯克希尔所拥有。随后，我们以全现金方式另外购买了三家。在收购第五家 BNSF 时，我们支付了约 70% 的现金成本，其余部分通过发行股票支付，使流通股增加了 6.1%。换句话说，在九年的时间里，这五家公司为伯克希尔带来的年收益增加了 104 亿美元，而稀释却很微小。这实现了我们的目标：不仅仅是增长，而是增加每股业绩。

If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2014, we can expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve also – perhaps by $1 billion or so pre-tax.

如果美国经济在 2014 年继续改善，我们预计五大动力中心的收益也会改善——可能税前增加 10 亿美元左右。

Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $4.7 billion pre-tax last year, up from $3.9 billion in 2012. Here, too, we expect further gains in 2014.

我们的数十家较小的非保险业务去年税前赚取了 47 亿美元，高于 2012 年的 39 亿美元。同样，我们预计 2014 年将进一步增长。

Berkshire's extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 – that makes 11 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float – money that doesn't belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire's benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.

伯克希尔的广泛保险业务 2013 年再次实现承保利润——这已是连续 11 年——并增加了浮存金。在这 11 年期间，我们的浮存金——不属于我们但我们可以为伯克希尔的利益进行投资的资金——从 410 亿美元增长到 770 亿美元。同时，我们的承保利润总额为 220 亿美元税前，其中包括 2013 年实现的 30 亿美元。这一切都始于我们 1967 年以 860 万美元收购国民赔偿公司。

We now own a wide variety of exceptional insurance operations. Best known is GEICO, the car insurer Berkshire acquired in full at yearend 1995 (having for many years prior owned a partial interest). GEICO in 1996 ranked number seven among U.S. auto insurers. Now, GEICO is number two, having recently passed Allstate. The reasons for this amazing growth are simple: low prices and reliable service. You can do yourself a favor by calling 1-800-847-7536 or checking Geico.com to see if you, too, can cut your insurance costs. Buy some of Berkshire's other products with the savings.

我们现在拥有多种卓越的保险业务。最著名的是 GEICO，伯克希尔在 1995 年底全资收购了这家汽车保险公司（此前多年持有部分权益）。1996 年 GEICO 在美国汽车保险公司中排名第七。现在，GEICO 排名第二，最近超过了 Allstate。这种惊人增长的原因很简单：低价和可靠的服务。你可以通过拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 Geico.com 给自己一个好处，看看你是否也能降低保险成本。用省下的钱购买一些伯克希尔的其他产品。

While Charlie and I search for elephants, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year, we contracted for 25 of these, scheduled to cost $3.1 billion in aggregate. These transactions ranged from $1.9 million to $1.1 billion in size.

在查理和我寻找大象的同时，我们的许多子公司定期进行补强收购。去年，我们签约了 25 笔这类交易，总成本 31 亿美元。这些交易的规模从 190 万美元到 11 亿美元不等。

Charlie and I encourage these deals. They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. The result is no more work for us and more earnings for you. Many more of these bolt-on deals will be made in future years. In aggregate, they will be meaningful.

查理和我鼓励这些交易。它们将资本配置到与我们现有业务契合、并由我们专业经理团队管理的活动中。结果是我们无需更多工作，而你获得更多收益。未来几年将进行更多这类补强交易。总的来说，它们将是重要的。

Last year we invested $3.5 billion in the surest sort of bolt-on: the purchase of additional shares in two wonderful businesses that we already controlled. In one case – Marmon – our purchases brought us to the 100% ownership we had signed up for in 2008. In the other instance – Iscar – the Wertheimer family elected to exercise a put option it held, selling us the 20% of the business it retained when we bought control in 2006.

去年我们投资了 35 亿美元进行最稳妥的补强：增持两家我们已经控制的出色企业的股份。在一个案例中——Marmon——我们的购买使我们达到了 2008 年签约时承诺的 100% 所有权。在另一个案例中——Iscar——韦特海默家族选择行使他们持有的看跌期权，将 2006 年我们获得控股权时他们保留的 20% 业务卖给了我们。

These purchases added about $300 million pre-tax to our current earning power and also delivered us $800 million of cash. Meanwhile, the same nonsensical accounting rule that I described in last year's letter required that we enter these purchases on our books at $1.8 billion less than we paid, a process that reduced Berkshire's book value. (The charge was made to "capital in excess of par value"; figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshire's excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion.

这些收购为我们的当前盈利能力增加了约 3 亿美元税前收入，并为我们带来了 8 亿美元的现金。与此同时，我在去年信中描述过的同一条荒谬的会计准则要求我们以比实际支付少 18 亿美元的金额将这些收购记入账簿，这一过程减少了伯克希尔的账面价值。（这笔费用被记入“资本公积”；你琢磨去吧。）你应该理解，这种奇怪的会计处理立即将伯克希尔内在价值超出账面价值的部分增加了同样的 18 亿美元。

Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America.

我们的子公司 2013 年在厂房和设备上花费了创纪录的 110 亿美元，大约是我们折旧费用的两倍。其中约 89% 的资金用在了美国。尽管我们也在国外投资，但机会的母脉在美国。

In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They've earned it.

在大多数股票基金经理都无法跑赢标普 500 的一年里，托德·库姆斯和特德·韦施勒都轻松做到了。他们各自管理的投资组合现已超过 70 亿美元。他们配得上这样的成绩。

I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add "by a lot.") If such humiliating comparisons continue, I'll have no choice but to cease talking about them.

我必须再次承认，他们的投资表现胜过了我。（查理说我应该加上“而且赢了很多”。）如果这种令人羞愧的比较继续下去，我将别无选择，只能停止谈论他们。

Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins.

托德和特德还在与投资组合活动无关的几件事情上为你们创造了显著的价值。他们的贡献才刚刚开始：这两人血管里流淌着伯克希尔的血液。

Berkshire's yearend employment – counting Heinz – totaled a record 330,745, up 42,283 from last year. The increase, I must admit, included one person at our Omaha home office. (Don't panic: The headquarters gang still fits comfortably on one floor.)

伯克希尔的年末员工——包括亨氏——总计创纪录的 330,745 人，比去年增加 42,283 人。我必须承认，这一增长包括奥马哈总部的一人。（别慌：总部团队仍然舒适地挤在一层楼里。）

Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its "Big Four" investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (increasing our ownership to 9.2% versus 8.7% at yearend 2012) and IBM (6.3% versus 6.0%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.9% to 9.1% and our interest in American Express from 13.7% to 14.2%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren't important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our share of their equity raises Berkshire's share of their annual earnings by $50 million.

伯克希尔去年增加了其在“四大”投资中的每一家——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM 和富国银行——的持股比例。我们购买了更多富国银行股票（持股比例从 2012 年底的 8.7% 提高到 9.2%）和 IBM 股票（从 6.0% 提高到 6.3%）。与此同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的权益从 8.9% 增长到 9.1%，在美国运通的权益从 13.7% 增长到 14.2%。如果你认为十分之一百分点不重要，请看这个计算：对于这四家公司合计，我们在其股权中的份额每增加十分之一百分点，伯克希尔在其年收益中的份额就增加 5000 万美元。

The four companies possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business; it's better to have a partial interest in the Hope diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

这四家公司拥有卓越的业务，并由既有才华又以股东为导向的管理者经营。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家出色公司的非控股但可观的股份，而不是拥有一家平庸企业的 100%；拥有希望之钻的部分权益，比拥有一颗水钻的全部要好。

Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the "Big Four's" 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive - about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don't report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

按我们的年底持股计算，我们在“四大”2013 年收益中的份额为 44 亿美元。然而，在我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包括收到的股息——去年约 14 亿美元。但不要搞错：我们没有报告的 30 亿美元的收益，与伯克希尔记录的部分对我们同等有价值。

The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock - a move that enhances our share of future earnings - as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, our unrealized capital gains will, too. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.)

这四家公司留存的收益通常用于回购自己的股票——这一举动会提高我们在未来收益中的份额——以及用于资助通常证明是有利的商业机会。所有这些都使我们预期，随着时间的推移，这四家被投资方的每股收益将大幅增长。如果确实如此，支付给伯克希尔的股息将会增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本收益也会增加。（对于这四家公司，未实现收益在年底已达到 390 亿美元。）

Our flexibility in capital allocation - our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses - gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: "The advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night." Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash.

我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意被动地将大笔资金投资于非控股企业——使我们在那些仅限于收购自己经营的企业方面具有显著优势。伍迪·艾伦曾概括了这个想法：“双性恋的优势在于它让你在周六晚上找到约会对象的机会加倍。”类似地，我们对经营业务或被动投资的渴望，使我们在为伯克希尔源源不断的现金找到明智用途方面的机会加倍。

Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire's history. At the time, I called the transaction an "all-in wager on the economic future of the United States."

2009 年底，在大萧条的阴霾中，我们同意收购 BNSF，这是伯克希尔历史上最大的一笔收购。当时，我把这笔交易称为“对美国经济未来的全押赌注”。

That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: We've been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a "bet" on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.

这种承诺对我们来说并不新鲜：自巴菲特合伙有限公司于 1965 年获得伯克希尔控股权以来，我们一直在进行类似的赌注。理由也很充分。查理和我一直认为，押注美国不断增长的繁荣几乎是一件确定无疑的事情。

Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country's present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America's best days lie ahead.

事实上，在过去 237 年里，有谁曾因做空美国而受益？如果你把我们国家的现状与 1776 年的情况相比，你会惊讶地揉眼睛。我们市场经济中蕴含的活力将继续发挥魔力。美国最好的日子还在前头。

With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

凭借这股顺风，查理和我希望通过以下方式构建伯克希尔的每股内在价值：（1）不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；（2）通过补强收购进一步增加其收益；（3）从被投资方的增长中受益；（4）当伯克希尔股票出现相对于内在价值的大幅折价时进行回购；（5）偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过很少（如果有的话）发行伯克希尔股票来为您实现最大的回报。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals - and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire.

这些基石建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一百年后，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy 仍将是我们经济中的主要角色。保险也仍将是企业和个人不可或缺的——没有哪家公司能像伯克希尔那样为这项业务带来更强大的人力和财力资源。

Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company's prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.

此外，我们将始终保持最高的财务实力，运营中持有至少 200 亿美元的现金等价物，并且从不承担重大的短期债务。审视这些以及其他优势，查理和我看好你们公司的前景。我们为被委托管理它而感到幸运。

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements - one of them qualitative - that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109-110.

尽管查理和我经常谈论内在业务价值，但我们无法准确告诉你伯克希尔股票的这个数字是多少（事实上，对任何其他股票也是如此）。然而，在我们的 2010 年年报中，我们列出了三个要素——其中一个是定性的——我们认为这些是合理估算伯克希尔内在价值的关键。该讨论全文转载于第 109-110 页。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9,116 per share.

以下是两个定量因素的更新：2013 年，我们的每股投资增长 13.6%，达到 129,253 美元；除保险和投资以外的业务每股税前收益增长 12.8%，达到 9,116 美元。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合增长率 19.3% 的速度增长，我们的收益数字以 20.6% 的速度增长。在 43 年期间，伯克希尔股价的增长率与我们这两个价值衡量指标的增长率非常相似，这并非巧合。查理和我喜欢看到这两个领域的增长，但我们将最强烈地专注于构建营业收益。

Now, let's examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don't get any ideas!)

现在，让我们审视我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块的资产负债表和收入特征都截然不同。因此，我们将它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法（尽管将它们整合在一个屋檐下具有重要且持久的经济优势）。我们的目标是提供在我们角色互换——你是报告的管理者，而我们是缺席的股东——时我们希望拥有的信息。（但别胡思乱想！）

Insurance

保险

"Let's look first at insurance, Berkshire's core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published."

“让我们先看看保险，伯克希尔的核心理业务，也是自 1967 年报告发布以来一直推动我们扩张的引擎。”

Property-casualty ("P/C") insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers' compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums - money we call "float" - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费，随后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故引起的索赔，支付可能持续数十年。这种先收后付的模式使财产意外险公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终将流向他人。与此同时，保险公司可以为了自己的利益投资这些浮存金。尽管个别保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费收入保持相当稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。我们增长了多少，如下表所示：

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO's float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity's reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.)

浮存金的进一步增长将难以实现。有利的一面是，GEICO 的浮存金几乎肯定会增长。然而，在国民赔偿公司的再保险部门，我们有一些已停止承保的合同，其浮存金在逐渐下降。如果我们确实在未来某个时候经历浮存金下降，那也将是非常缓慢的——任何一年最多不超过 3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了我们永远不会面临与现金资源相比数额巨大的即时资金需求。（在这方面，财产意外险与某些形式的人寿保险有重要区别。）

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，从而增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当这样的利润被赚取时，我们享受使用免费资金——而且更好的是，我们因持有它而获得报酬。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country's largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry - despite the float income all companies enjoy - will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人高兴的结果，这造成了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份如此激烈以至于导致财产意外险行业整体出现重大的承保亏损。这种亏损实际上是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。例如，State Farm——迄今为止全国最大的保险公司，也是一家管理良好的公司——在截至 2012 年的 12 年中有 9 年发生了承保亏损（这是在我写这封信时能获得的最新财务数据）。竞争动态几乎保证了保险业——尽管所有公司都享有浮存金收入——将继续其与其他行业相比回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.

正如本报告第一部分所述，我们现在已连续 11 年实现承保利润，期间的税前收益总额为 220 亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们将在大多数年份继续盈利承保。这是我们所有保险经理的日常重点，他们知道虽然浮存金很有价值，但它可能被糟糕的承保结果所淹没。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire's book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims - some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 - and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.

那么，我们的浮存金如何影响内在价值？当计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们必须明天支付而无法补充一样。但是，将浮存金严格视为负债是不正确的；它应该被视为一个循环基金。每天，我们支付旧的索赔——2013 年向超过 500 万索赔人支付了约 170 亿美元——这会减少浮存金。同样确定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，从而产生新的索赔，增加浮存金。如果我们的循环浮存金既无成本又持久（我相信会是如此），那么这项负债的真实价值就远远小于会计负债。

A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of "goodwill" that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这种高估负债的对应项是 155 亿美元的“商誉”，它归属于我们的保险公司，并作为资产计入账面价值。在很大程度上，这种商誉代表了我们为保险业务产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的成本与其真实价值无关。例如，如果一项保险业务遭受巨大且持续的承保亏损，那么账上记录的任何商誉资产都应被视为毫无价值，无论其原始成本如何。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill - what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have - to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason - a huge reason - why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，这并不描述伯克希尔。查理和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——我们愿意支付多少来购买一个拥有与我们类似质量浮存金的保险业务——远远超过其历史账面价值。我们的浮存金价值是我们相信伯克希尔的内在业务价值大大超过其账面价值的一个原因——一个重要的原因。

Berkshire's attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

伯克希尔诱人的保险经济之所以存在，是因为我们有一些出色的管理者在运营着纪律严明、拥有强大且难以复制的商业模式的业务。让我告诉你主要的业务单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe - a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced - Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.

按浮存金规模排名第一的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因管理。阿吉特承保其他公司没有意愿或资本承担的风险。他的业务以保险业独一无二的方式结合了容量、速度、果断，以及最重要的，智慧。然而，他从不使伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险。事实上，我们在规避风险方面比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某场特大灾难遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——这大约是历史最高损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上很可能因多元化的收益流而录得可观的年度利润。我们将继续拥有充足的现金，如果灾难导致市场陷入休克，我们将寻找大机会。与此同时，所有其他主要保险公司和再保险公司将处于严重亏损状态，有些将面临破产。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit's mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.

从 1985 年的零起步，阿吉特创建了一项拥有 370 亿美元浮存金和巨额累计承保利润的保险业务，这是其他保险 CEO 无法企及的壮举。阿吉特的头脑是一个创意工厂，总是在寻找可以添加到当前业务组合中的更多业务线。

One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance ("BHSI"). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully.

去年 6 月，他成立伯克希尔·哈撒韦专业保险公司，一项企业由此实现。这一举措使我们进入了商业保险领域，我们立即受到了全美主要保险经纪人和公司风险经理的欢迎。这些专业人士认识到，没有其他保险公司能比得上伯克希尔的财务实力，这保证了多年后产生的合法索赔将得到及时和充分的支付。

BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.

BHSI 由彼得·伊斯特伍德领导，他是一位经验丰富、在保险界广受尊敬的核保人。彼得组建了一支出色的团队，已经与许多财富 500 强公司以及较小的企业开展了大量业务。BHSI 将成为伯克希尔的一项主要资产，几年内将达到数十亿的业务量。在年会上见到彼时时，向他致以伯克希尔的问候。

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有另一个再保险巨头——通用再保险，由塔德·蒙特罗斯管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.

归根结底，一个健全的保险业务需要遵守四项纪律。它必须：（1）了解可能导致保单产生损失的所有风险敞口；（2）保守评估任何风险敞口实际导致损失的可能性以及发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一个平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本和运营费用后能产生利润的保费；（4）如果无法获得合适的保费，愿意放弃。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can't turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, "The other guy is doing it, so we must as well," spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司通过了前三项测试，但在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法拒绝那些被竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人在这么做，所以我们也必须做”在任何行业都意味着麻烦，但在保险业尤其如此。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re's huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re's international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

塔德遵守了所有四项保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金已经优于零成本，我们预计平均而言这将继续下去。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其充满热情，自 1998 年我们收购该公司以来，该业务一直持续且盈利地增长。

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators - and me as well, briefly - to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

值得一提的是，在我们收购通用再保险后不久，该公司就被一些问题困扰，导致评论员——也包括我，短暂地——认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。那个时代早已过去。通用再保险现在是一颗宝石。

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.

最后，还有 GEICO，这是我 63 年前初出茅庐时接触的保险公司。GEICO 由托尼·奈斯利管理，他 18 岁加入公司，到 2013 年已服务 52 年。托尼于 1993 年成为 CEO，从那以后公司一直在飞速发展。

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them - and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.

当我在 1951 年 1 月第一次接触 GEICO 时，该公司与行业巨头相比所享有的巨大成本优势令我震惊。这种运营效率一直延续到今天，是一项至关重要的资产。没有人喜欢购买汽车保险。但几乎每个人都喜欢开车。所需的保险对大多数家庭来说是一项主要支出。省钱对他们很重要——而只有低成本运营才能做到这一点。

GEICO's cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat - an enduring one - that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling.

GEICO 的成本优势是使得公司能够年复一年吞噬市场份额的因素。其低成本创造了一条护城河——一条持久的护城河——竞争对手无法跨越。与此同时，我们的小壁虎继续告诉美国人 GEICO 可以如何为他们节省大量资金。随着我们最近进一步降低运营成本，它的故事变得更加引人入胜。

In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn't already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That's "goodwill," and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO's business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.

1995 年，我们购买了尚未拥有的另一半 GEICO，支付的金额比我们获得的净有形资产高出 14 亿美元。这就是“商誉”，它在我们的账簿上将永远保持不变。然而，随着 GEICO 业务的增长，其真实的经济商誉也在增长。我相信这个数字已接近 200 亿美元。

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一批较小的公司，其中大多数在保险世界的小众领域开展业务。总的来说，这些公司是一项不断增长的业务，持续产生承保利润。此外，如下表所示，它们还为我们提供了可观的浮存金。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The "customer" pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.

简而言之，保险是承诺的销售。“顾客”现在付钱；保险公司承诺，如果将来发生某些事件，则在未来支付钱款。

Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay - even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives - is all-important.

有时，这个承诺几十年都不会被检验。（想想 20 多岁的人购买的人寿保险。）因此，即使在支付时经济混乱盛行，保险公司支付的能力和意愿也是至关重要的。

Berkshire's promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world's largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to "cede" their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however - one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor - would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.

伯克希尔的承诺无与伦比，近年来世界上最大、最成熟的保险公司的行动证实了这一事实，其中一些公司希望摆脱巨大且异常长尾的负债，特别是涉及石棉索赔的负债。也就是说，这些保险公司希望将它们的负债“分出”给一家再保险公司。然而，如果选错了再保险公司——后来被证明财务困难或行为不当——就会使原保险公司面临将这些负债又拿回来的危险。

Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd's in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.)

寻求帮助的最大保险公司几乎无一例外地都来到了伯克希尔。事实上，在有记录以来最大的此类交易中，劳合社于 2007 年将 1993 年之前承保的保单所产生的数千起已知索赔，以及同一时期未知但数量庞大的未来肯定会出现的大量索赔一并移交给了我们。（是的，几十年后我们还会收到与 1993 年之前发生的事件相关的索赔。）

Berkshire's ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd's transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer's promise would have given Lloyd's the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd's claims said it best: "Names [the original insurers at Lloyd's] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we've just bought them the world's best mattress."

伯克希尔因劳合社交易产生的最终支付额目前尚不可知。然而，可以肯定的是，伯克希尔将支付我们保单 150 亿美元限额内的所有有效索赔。没有其他保险公司的承诺能给劳合社带来与伯克希尔协议所提供的安心感。当时处理劳合社索赔的实体的 CEO 说得最好：“Names（劳合社的原始保险人）想晚上睡个安稳觉，我们认为我们刚刚为他们买了世界上最好的床垫。”

Berkshire's great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.

伯克希尔的杰出管理者、一流的财务实力以及拥有宽阔护城河的各种商业模式，在保险界是独一无二的。这种组合对伯克希尔的股东来说是一项巨大的资产，并且只会随着时间的推移变得更加宝贵。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管的资本密集型业务

"We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement."

“我们有两项主要业务，BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy，它们具有区别于其他业务的重要特征。因此，我们在本信中为它们单独设立一节，并在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中拆分出它们的合并财务数据。”

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF's interest coverage was 9:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

这两家公司的一个关键特征是它们对非常长寿命的受监管资产进行了巨额投资，这些投资部分由大量未由伯克希尔担保的长期债务提供资金。事实上，我们的信用并非必需，因为每家公司都具有即使在糟糕的经济条件下也远远超过其利息需求的盈利能力。例如，去年 BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数为 9:1。（我们对覆盖倍数的定义是税前利润与利息的比率，而非 EBITDA/利息——我们认为后者是一个有严重缺陷的常用指标。）

At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company's ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies exclusively offering an essential service. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Now, with the acquisition of NV Energy, MidAmerican's earnings base has further broadened. This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire's ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.

与此同时，在 MidAmerican，有两个因素确保了公司在任何情况下偿还债务的能力。第一个是所有公用事业公司共有的：抗衰退的收益，这是由于这些公司独家提供基本服务。第二个是很少有其他公用事业公司享有的：收益流的巨大多样性，这保护我们免受任何单一监管机构的严重伤害。现在，随着 NV Energy 的收购，MidAmerican 的收益基础进一步拓宽。这种特殊的优势，再加上伯克希尔的持股，使 MidAmerican 及其公用事业子公司能够显著降低其债务成本。这一优势使我们和我们的客户都受益。

Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways: BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy's circulatory system. Its hold on the number-one position strengthened in 2013. BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel. MidAmerican's utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: From a standing start nine years ago, MidAmerican now accounts for 7% of the country's wind generation capacity, with more on the way. Our share in solar - most of which is still in construction - is even larger. MidAmerican can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. Here's a little known fact: Last year MidAmerican retained more dollars of earnings - by far - than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this as an important advantage - one almost certain to exist five, ten and twenty years from now.

每天，我们的两家子公司以重要的方式为美国经济提供动力：BNSF 运输了约 15%（按吨英里计算）的所有城际货物，无论这些货物是通过卡车、铁路、水路、航空还是管道运输。事实上，我们运输的吨英里货物比任何人都多，这一事实使 BNSF 成为我们经济循环系统中最重要的动脉。它在 2013 年巩固了其第一的位置。BNSF 与所有铁路一样，也以极其燃油高效和环境友好的方式运输货物，仅用一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运输约 500 英里。承担相同工作的卡车消耗约四倍的燃料。MidAmerican 的公用事业公司服务于 11 个州的受监管零售客户。没有哪家公用事业公司覆盖得更广。此外，我们是可再生能源的领导者：从九年前的零起步，MidAmerican 现在占全国风力发电能力的 7%，而且还在增加。我们在太阳能方面的份额——大部分仍在建设中——甚至更大。MidAmerican 能够进行这些投资，因为它保留了所有收益。这里有一个鲜为人知的事实：去年 MidAmerican 留存的收益金额——远远超过——任何其他美国电力公用事业公司。我们和我们的监管机构都将此视为一项重要优势——几乎肯定会在五年、十年和二十年后仍然存在。

When our current projects are completed, MidAmerican's renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns. And, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

当我们当前的项目完成后，MidAmerican 的可再生能源组合将耗资 150 亿美元。只要这些投资能带来合理的回报，我们就乐于进行。在这方面，我们对未来的监管寄予厚望。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is meanwhile in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既源于过去的经验，也源于认识到社会将永远需要在交通和能源领域进行巨额投资。政府以确保持续资金流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同时，我们的经营方式赢得监管者及其所代表人民的认可，也符合我们的自身利益。

Tangible proof of our dedication to that duty was delivered last year in a poll of customer satisfaction covering 52 holding companies and their 101 operating electric utilities. Our MidAmerican group ranked number one, with 95.3% of respondents giving us a "very satisfied" vote and not a single customer rating us "dissatisfied." The bottom score in the survey, incidentally, was a dismal 34.5%.

去年一项涵盖 52 家控股公司及其 101 家运营电力公用事业的客户满意度调查，提供了我们致力于履行这一职责的具体证明。我们的 MidAmerican 集团排名第一，95.3% 的受访者给了我们“非常满意”的评价，没有一个客户给我们“不满意”的评级。顺便说一句，调查中的最低分是令人沮丧的 34.5%。

All three of our companies were ranked far lower by this measure before they were acquired by MidAmerican. The extraordinary customer satisfaction we have achieved is of great importance as we expand: Regulators in states we hope to enter are glad to see us, knowing we will be responsible operators.

在被 MidAmerican 收购之前，我们这三家公司在此指标上的排名都低得多。我们所取得的非凡客户满意度对我们扩张至关重要：我们希望进入的州的监管机构很高兴看到我们，因为他们知道我们会是负责任的运营商。

Our railroad has been diligent as well in anticipating the needs of its customers. Whatever you may have heard about our country's crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America's rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting: BNSF spent $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, double its depreciation charge and a single-year record for any railroad. And, we will spend considerably more in 2014. Like Noah, who foresaw early on the need for dependable transportation, we know it's our job to plan ahead.

我们的铁路在预测客户需求方面也很勤奋。无论你听到多少关于我们国家基础设施破败的说法，这绝不适用于 BNSF 或一般的铁路。美国的铁路系统从未像现在这样好，这是行业巨额投资的结果。然而，我们不会止步：BNSF 在 2013 年花费了 40 亿美元用于铁路，是折旧费用的两倍，也是任何铁路公司的单年记录。此外，我们将在 2014 年花费更多。像诺亚一样，他早就预见到需要可靠的交通工具，我们知道提前规划是我们的工作。

Leading our two capital-intensive companies are Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, and the team of Matt Rose and Carl Ice at BNSF. The three are extraordinary managers who have my gratitude and deserve yours as well. Here are the key figures for their businesses:

领导我们这两家资本密集型公司的是 MidAmerican 的格雷格·阿贝尔，以及 BNSF 的马特·罗斯和卡尔·艾斯团队。这三位是非凡的管理者，我感谢他们，你们也应感谢他们。以下是他们业务的关键数据：

Ron Peltier continues to build HomeServices, MidAmerican's real estate brokerage subsidiary. Last year his operation made four acquisitions, the most significant being Fox & Roach, a Philadelphia-based company that is the largest single-market realtor in the country.

罗恩·佩尔蒂埃继续建设 MidAmerican 的房地产经纪子公司 HomeServices。去年他的业务进行了四次收购，最重要的是 Fox & Roach，这是一家总部位于费城的公司，是全美最大的单一市场房地产经纪人。

HomeServices now has 22,114 agents (listed by geography on page 112), up 38% from 2012. HomeServices also owns 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which are in the process of rebranding their franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices. If you haven't yet, many of you will soon be seeing our name on "for sale" signs.

HomeServices 现在拥有 22,114 名经纪人（按地理区域列在第 112 页），比 2012 年增长 38%。HomeServices 还拥有 Prudential 和 Real Living 特许经营业务 67% 的股份，这些业务正在将其加盟商重新命名为伯克希尔·哈撒韦 HomeServices。如果你们还没有看到，你们中的许多人很快就会在“待售”标志上看到我们的名字。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let's look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔这一部分的活动包罗万象。不过，让我们看一下整个集团的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/13 (in millions)

2013年12月31日资产负债表（百万美元）

| Assets | | Liabilities and Equity | |
|--------|--|------------------------|--|
| Cash and equivalents | $6,625 | Notes payable | $1,615 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | $7,749 | Other current liabilities | $8,965 |
| Inventory | $9,945 | Total current liabilities | $10,580 |
| Other current assets | $716 | | |
| Total current assets | $25,035 | | |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | $25,617 | Deferred taxes | $5,184 |
| Fixed assets | $19,389 | Term debt and other liabilities | $4,405 |
| Other assets | $4,274 | Non-controlling interests | $456 |
| | | Berkshire equity | $53,690 |
| Total | $74,315 | Total | $74,315 |

| 资产 | | 负债与权益 | |
|------|--|------------|--|
| 现金及等价物 | 6,625 | 应付票据 | 1,615 |
| 应收账款及票据 | 7,749 | 其他流动负债 | 8,965 |
| 存货 | 9,945 | 流动负债合计 | 10,580 |
| 其他流动资产 | 716 | | |
| 流动资产合计 | 25,035 | | |
| 商誉及其他无形资产 | 25,617 | 递延税款 | 5,184 |
| 固定资产 | 19,389 | 长期债务及其他负债 | 4,405 |
| 其他资产 | 4,274 | 非控制性权益 | 456 |
| | | 伯克希尔权益 | 53,690 |
| 总计 | 74,315 | 总计 | 74,315 |

Earnings Statement (in millions)

利润表（百万美元）

Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.

我们符合公认会计原则的收入和费用数据在第 29 页。相比之下，上面的运营费用数字是非 GAAP 的，并且排除了某些购买会计项目（主要是某些无形资产的摊销）。我们以这种方式呈现数据，因为查理和我相信，调整后的数字比 GAAP 数字更能准确反映表中汇总业务的真实经济费用和利润。

I won't explain all of the adjustments - some are tiny and arcane - but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated - even though from an investor's viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不会解释所有的调整——有些是微小且晦涩的——但认真的投资者应该理解无形资产的不同性质：有些无形资产会随着时间的推移真正耗尽，而另一些则根本不会失去价值。以软件为例，摊销费用是非常真实的费用。然而，对其他无形资产如客户关系的摊销，源于购买会计规则，显然不是真实的成本。GAAP 会计对这两种费用不作区分。也就是说，在计算收益时，两者都被记为费用——尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们有天壤之别。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these "real," the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.

在第 29 页显示的符合 GAAP 的数字中，本节所包含公司的 6.48 亿美元摊销费用已被扣除作为开支。我们认为其中约 20% 是“真实的”，其余不是。这种差异由于我们进行了许多收购而变得显著。随着我们收购更多公司，它几乎肯定会进一步上升。

Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they're related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and - alas - it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.

当然，最终，当相关资产完全摊销后，非真实费用就会消失。但这通常需要 15 年，而且——唉——我的继任者的报告收益将受益于它们的到期。

Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that's true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.

然而，我们报告的每一分折旧费用都是真实的成本。在几乎所有其他公司也是如此。当华尔街人士兜售 EBITDA 作为估值指引时，捂紧你的钱包。

Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.

我们公开报告的收益当然会继续符合 GAAP。然而，要拥抱现实，请记得加回我们报告的大部分摊销费用。

The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.

本节中的公司群销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。其中一些企业，以无杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量，拥有极好的经济状况，产生的税后利润从 25% 到远超过 100% 不等。其他企业产生 12% 到 20% 的良好回报。然而，有少数回报非常差，这是我在资本配置工作中犯下的一些严重错误的结果。我没有被误导：我只是错误地评估了公司或其所处行业的经济动态。

Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.

幸运的是，我的失误通常涉及相对较小的收购。我们的大规模收购通常效果很好，在少数情况下，甚至非常好。然而，我还没有犯下购买企业或股票的最后一次错误。并非所有事情都能按计划进行。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.

作为一个整体来看，该板块的公司是一项出色的业务。它们在 2013 年平均使用了 250 亿美元的净有形资产，并持有大量过剩现金、使用很少的杠杆，在这些资本上获得了 16.7% 的税后收益。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.

当然，如果收购价格过高，一家经济状况极好的企业也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务支付了远高于净有形资产的价格，这一成本反映在我们显示的商誉的巨额数字中。然而，总体而言，我们在该板块部署的资本上获得了不错的回报。此外，这些业务的内在价值总和远远超过其账面价值。即便如此，保险和受监管行业板块的内在价值与账面价值之间的差距要大得多。真正的赢家就在那里。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, both current and potential competitors read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if they knew our numbers. So, in some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 80-84.

这个板块有太多的公司，无法逐一评论。此外，现有的和潜在的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们的一些业务中，如果他们知道了我们的数字，我们可能会处于不利地位。因此，在一些规模对伯克希尔的评估不重要的业务中，我们只披露所需的信息。不过，你可以在第 80-84 页找到关于我们许多业务的大量细节。

I can't resist, however, giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart's expansion into Texas. I'm not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire - it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire's $225 billion equity base. But I've now worked 30 years with the marvelous Blumkin family, and I'm excited about the remarkable store - truly Texas-sized - it is building at The Colony, in the northern part of the Dallas metropolitan area.

然而，我忍不住要向你介绍一下内布拉斯加家具城向德克萨斯州扩张的最新情况。我报道这件事并非因为它对伯克希尔的经济重要性——在伯克希尔 2250 亿美元的股权基础上，开一家新店还不足以撼动指针。但我现在已经与卓越的布鲁姆金家族共事了 30 年，我对他们在达拉斯都市区北部的 The Colony 建造的那家非凡的、真正德克萨斯规模的门店感到兴奋。

When the store is completed next year, NFM will have - under one roof, and on a 433-acre site - 1.8 million square feet of retail and supporting warehouse space. View the project's progress at www.nfm.com/texas. NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (in Omaha and Kansas City, Kansas), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away. If you live anywhere near Dallas, come check us out.

当门店明年完工时，NFM 将拥有——在同一屋檐下，占地 433 英亩——180 万平方英尺的零售和配套仓储空间。您可以在 www.nfm.com/texas 查看项目进展。NFM 已经拥有全国两家销售额最高的家居用品商店（在奥马哈和堪萨斯州堪萨斯城），每家年销售额约 4.5 亿美元。我预测德克萨斯州的门店将打破这些记录。如果你住在达拉斯附近，来看看我们。

I think back to August 30, 1983 - my birthday - when I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 1¼-page purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. (It's reproduced on pages 114-115.) Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company's financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was what, and her word was good enough for me.

回想 1983 年 8 月 30 日——我的生日——我去见 B 夫人（罗斯·布鲁姆金），带着我起草的一份 1.25 页的 NFM 收购方案。（见第 114-115 页。）B 夫人一个字没改地接受了我的提议，我们在没有投资银行家或律师参与的情况下完成了交易（这种体验只能用天堂般来形容）。尽管公司的财务报表未经审计，但我毫不担心。B 夫人只是告诉我情况，她的话对我来说就足够了。

Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 - definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM's financial statements from 1946 on pages 116-117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 - no zeros omitted - of cash the company then possessed, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son, Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.

B 夫人当时 89 岁，一直工作到 103 岁——绝对是我欣赏的那种女人。看看第 116-117 页 NFM 1946 年的财务报表。NFM 现在拥有的一切都来自：（a）公司当时拥有的 72,264 美元的净资产和 50 美元现金——没有省略零，以及（b）B 夫人、她的儿子路易、以及路易的儿子罗恩和欧文的非凡才能。

The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At Mrs. B's request, the family always sang God Bless America at its gatherings.

这个故事的点睛之笔是，B 夫人一天学都没上过。此外，她从俄罗斯移民到美国时一个英语单词都不懂。但她热爱她的第二故乡：应 B 夫人的要求，家人总是在聚会上唱《天佑美国》。

Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B's incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B's lessons, they need none from me.

有抱负的企业管理者应该仔细研究造就 B 夫人不可思议成功的那些朴实但罕见的品质。每年有 40 所大学的学生来拜访我，我让他们以参观 NFM 开始一天。如果他们吸收了 B 夫人的教训，就不需要从我这里学什么了。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country's leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100% owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这个板块是我们最小的，包括两家租赁公司 XTRA（拖车）和 CORT（家具），以及美国领先的活动房屋生产商和融资商 Clayton Homes。除了这些 100% 拥有的子公司外，我们还将一系列金融资产和我们 50% 的 Berkadia 商业抵押贷款权益归入此类。

Clayton is placed in this section because it owns and services 326,569 mortgages, totaling $13.6 billion. In recent years, as manufactured home sales plummeted, a high percentage of Clayton's earnings came from this mortgage business.

Clayton 被归入本节，因为它拥有并服务着 326,569 笔抵押贷款，总额达 136 亿美元。近年来，随着活动房屋销售暴跌，Clayton 的大部分收益来自这项抵押贷款业务。

In 2013, however, the sale of new homes began to pick up and earnings from both manufacturing and retailing are again becoming significant. Clayton remains America's number one homebuilder: Its 2013 output of 29,547 homes accounted for about 4.7% of all single-family residences built in the country. Kevin Clayton, Clayton's CEO, has done a magnificent job of guiding the company through the severe housing depression. Now, his job - definitely more fun these days - includes the prospect of another earnings gain in 2014.

然而，在 2013 年，新房销售开始回升，来自制造和零售的收益再次变得显著。Clayton 仍然是美国第一大住宅建筑商：其 2013 年生产的 29,547 套房屋约占全国建造的所有单户住宅的 4.7%。Clayton 的 CEO 凯文·克莱顿在引导公司度过严重的住房萧条方面做得非常出色。现在，他的工作——这些天肯定更有趣——包括 2014 年再获收益增长的前景。

\* Excludes capital gains or losses

\* 不包括资本收益或损失

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.

下面我们列出了年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。

\ This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP "cost" differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules. \* Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.

\ 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP“成本”因 GAAP 规则要求的增记或减记而有所不同。\* 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金基金持有的股份。

Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.

伯克希尔有一个未包含在表中的主要股票头寸：我们可以在 2021 年 9 月之前的任何时间以 50 亿美元购买 7 亿股美国银行股票。到年底，这些股票价值 109 亿美元。我们可能会在期权到期前购买这些股票。与此同时，重要的是你要认识到，美国银行实际上是我们的第五大股权投资——而且我们高度评价它。

In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we've done well in these. But not always.

除了股票持仓外，我们还大量投资于债券。通常我们在这方面做得不错，但并非总是如此。

Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn't. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.

你们大多数人从未听说过 Energy Future Holdings。算你们幸运；我当然希望自己也没听说过。该公司成立于 2007 年，旨在对德克萨斯州的电力公用事业资产进行大规模杠杆收购。股权所有者投入了 80 亿美元，并额外借入了巨额资金。伯克希尔购买了约 20 亿美元的债务，这是我未与查理商量就做出的决定。那是一个大错误。

Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I'll call Charlie.

除非天然气价格飙升，否则 EFH 几乎肯定会在 2014 年申请破产。去年，我们以 2.59 亿美元卖掉了持仓。在持有债券期间，我们收到了 8.37 亿美元的现金利息。因此，总体而言，我们遭受了 8.73 亿美元的税前损失。下次我会打电话给查理。

A few of our subsidiaries - primarily electric and gas utilities - use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of medium-term float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.

我们的一些子公司——主要是电力和天然气公用事业——在其运营中使用衍生品。除此之外，我们已经多年没有签订任何衍生品合同，现有的头寸也在继续平仓。已到期的合同带来了巨额利润以及数十亿美元的中期浮存金。尽管没有保证，但我们预计账上剩余的头寸也会产生类似的结果。

Some Thoughts About Investing

关于投资的一些思考

"Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike." — The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

“投资最聪明的时候，正是它最像做生意的时候。”——本杰明·格雷厄姆《聪明的投资者》

It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.

用本·格雷厄姆的话来开启这段讨论是恰当的，因为我在投资方面的知识很大程度上归功于他。我稍后会更多地谈到本，并且会更早地谈到普通股。但让我先告诉你很久以前我做过的两笔非股票的小投资。尽管它们都没有对我的净资产产生太大影响，但它们具有启发性。

This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble's aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.

这个故事开始于内布拉斯加州。从 1973 年到 1981 年，中西部地区经历了农场价格的暴涨，原因是一种普遍认为恶性通货膨胀即将到来的信念，并受到小型农村银行贷款政策的推动。然后泡沫破裂，导致价格下跌 50% 或更多，重创了杠杆化的农民及其贷款人。在该泡沫的后果中，爱荷华州和内布拉斯加州的银行倒闭数量是我们最近一次大衰退的五倍。

In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.

1986 年，我从 FDIC 购买了一个占地 400 英亩的农场，位于奥马哈以北 50 英里处。花费 28 万美元，远低于几年前一家破产银行以该农场为抵押发放的贷款金额。我对经营农场一无所知。但我有一个热爱农活的孩子，我从他那里了解到该农场能生产多少蒲式耳玉米和大豆，以及运营费用是多少。根据这些估计，我计算出该农场的正常化回报率当时约为 10%。我还认为生产力会随着时间的推移而提高，农作物价格也会上涨。这些期望都得到了验证。

I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.

我无需特殊知识或智力就能得出结论：这项投资没有下行风险，且潜在上行空间巨大。当然，偶尔会有歉收的年份，价格有时也会令人失望。但那又怎样？也会有几年异常好的年份，而且我永远不会有出售该物业的压力。如今，28 年后，该农场的收益增长了两倍，价值是我支付价格的五倍或更多。我仍然对农业一无所知，最近只是第二次去农场。

In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon's landlord when I was the company's CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped - this one involving commercial real estate - and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.

1993 年，我做了另一笔小投资。拉里·西尔弗斯坦——在我担任所罗门公司 CEO 时是该公司的房东——告诉我，纽约大学附近有一处纽约零售物业正在由重组信托公司出售。又一次，泡沫破裂了——这一次涉及商业地产——RTC 的成立是为了处置那些倒闭的储蓄机构的资产，这些机构的乐观贷款行为助长了这场愚蠢行为。

Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant - who occupied around 20% of the project's space - was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property's location was also superb: NYU wasn't going anywhere.

同样，分析也很简单。与农场的情况一样，该物业的无杠杆当前收益率约为 10%。但该物业被 RTC 管理不善，当几个空置店铺被租出时，其收入会增加。更重要的是，最大的租户——占据了项目约 20% 的空间——每平方英尺支付约 5 美元的租金，而其他租户平均支付 70 美元。这份廉价租约在九年后到期，必将为收益提供重大推动。该物业的地理位置也非常优越：纽约大学不会搬走。

I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I've yet to view the property.

我加入了一个包括拉里和我的朋友弗雷德·罗斯在内的小型团队，一起购买了这块地。弗雷德是一位经验丰富、高素质的房地产投资者，他和他的家人将管理该物业。他们也确实管理了。随着旧租约到期，收益增长了两倍。现在的年度分配已超过我们原始股权投资额的 35%。此外，我们在 1996 年和 1999 年对原始抵押贷款进行了两次再融资，这些举措使得几次特别分配总额超过了我们投资额的 150%。我还没去现场看过这处物业。

Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won't be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.

来自农场和纽约大学房地产的收入在未来的几十年里可能还会增加。尽管收益不会很大，但这两种投资对我来说将是牢固且令人满意的持有，并随后惠及我的子女和孙辈。

I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:

我讲述这些故事是为了说明投资的某些基本原理：

You don't need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren't, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don't swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick "no."

你不需要成为专家就能获得令人满意的投资回报。但如果你不是专家，你必须认识到自己的局限性，并遵循一个确定能合理运作的路径。保持简单，不要追求本垒打。当有人承诺快速获利时，迅速回答“不”。

Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don't feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset's future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn't necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.

关注你正在考虑的资产的未来生产力。如果你对粗略估计该资产的未来收益感到不自在，那就忘记它，继续前进。没有人能够评估每一种投资可能性。但全知全能没有必要；你只需要理解你所采取的行动。

If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.

如果你转而关注预期购买的未来价格变化，那么你就是在投机。这没有什么不妥。然而，我知道我无法成功投机，并且我对那些声称能持续成功投机的人持怀疑态度。抛硬币的人中有一半会在第一次抛掷中获胜；这些获胜者中没有人有期望在继续玩下去时获利。而且，某项资产在近期内已经升值的事实，绝不是购买它的理由。

With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field - not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.

对于我的两笔小投资，我只考虑这些物业会产出什么，完全不关心它们的每日估值。游戏是由专注于赛场的选手赢得的，而不是那些眼睛紧盯着记分牌的人。如果你能在不看股票价格的情况下享受周六和周日，那么在工作日也试试看。

Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle's scathing comment: "You don't know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.")

形成宏观观点或听取他人的宏观或市场预测是浪费时间。事实上，这是危险的，因为它可能会模糊你对真正重要事实的视野。（当我听到电视评论员滔滔不绝地预测市场下一步走势时，我想起了米奇·曼特尔尖刻的评论：“直到你走进那个转播室，你才知道这场比赛有多容易。”）

My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following - 1987 and 1994 - was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can't remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.

我的两次购买分别是在 1986 年和 1993 年。随后的几年里——1987 年和 1994 年——经济、利率或股市会发生什么，对我来说在做这些投资时并不重要。我不记得当时头条新闻或权威人士在说什么。无论有什么闲言碎语，内布拉斯加州的玉米会继续生长，学生们会涌向纽约大学。

There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.

我的两笔小投资与股票投资之间有一个主要区别。股票为您提供持仓的每分钟估值，而我还没有看到农场或纽约房地产的报价。

It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings - and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his - and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state - how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.

对于股票投资者来说，能够看到这些大幅波动的估值应该是一个巨大的优势——对某些投资者来说，确实如此。毕竟，如果一个与我土地接壤的农场主是个情绪化的人，他每天向我喊出一个他愿意买我的农场或卖他农场的价格——而且这些价格在短期内根据他的精神状态大幅波动——我怎么可能不受益于他不稳定的行为呢？如果他每天喊出的价格低得离谱，而我有一些闲钱，我就会买下他的农场。如果他喊出的数字高得离谱，我可以卖给他，或者继续种地。

Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits - and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.

然而，股票所有者常常让他们同伴的反复无常且往往非理性的行为导致自己也做出非理性的行为。因有太多关于市场、经济、利率、股票价格行为等的议论，一些投资者认为听从权威人士很重要——更糟的是，认为根据他们的评论采取行动很重要。

Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of "Don't just sit there, do something." For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.

那些拥有农场或公寓楼时能安静地坐几十年的人，在接触到源源不断的股票行情和伴随的评论员传达的暗示信息“别只是坐着，做点什么”时，常常变得狂躁。对这些投资者来说，流动性从它本应是的无条件的好处变成了诅咒。

A "flash crash" or some other extreme market fluctuation can't hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.

“闪电崩盘”或其他极端市场波动伤害投资者的程度，不会超过一个喜怒无常、话多的邻居伤害我的农场投资的程度。事实上，暴跌的市场对真正的投资者是有帮助的，如果他手头有现金，当价格与价值严重偏离时。在投资中，恐惧的情绪是你的朋友；狂喜的世界是你的敌人。

During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?

在 2008 年底发生的特殊金融恐慌期间，我从未想过要卖掉我的农场或纽约房地产，尽管当时一场严重的衰退显然正在酝酿。而且，如果我拥有 100% 一家具有良好长期前景的稳健企业，我甚至考虑抛弃它都是愚蠢的。那么，我为什么要卖掉那些代表了出色企业一小部分权益的股票呢？诚然，其中任何一家都可能最终令人失望，但作为一个整体，它们肯定会表现良好。有人真的相信地球会把美国存在的惊人生产性资产和无限的人类智慧吞掉吗？

When Charlie and I buy stocks - which we think of as small portions of businesses - our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings - which is usually the case - we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.

当查理和我购买股票时——我们将其视为企业的一小部分——我们的分析与我们用于购买整个企业的分析非常相似。我们首先要判断是否能够合理估计出五年或更长时间的收益范围。如果答案是肯定的，那么如果该股票（或企业）的售价与我们估计区间的下限相比处于合理水平，我们就会购买。然而，如果我们缺乏估计未来收益的能力——这通常是事实——我们就转向其他机会。在我们共同合作的 54 年里，我们从未因为宏观或政治环境，或他人的观点而放弃一个有吸引力的购买机会。事实上，这些主题在我们做决策时从未出现过。

It's vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our "circle of competence" and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.

然而，至关重要的是，我们要识别出自己的“能力圈”边界并牢牢待在圈内。即便如此，我们也会在股票和生意上犯一些错误。但是它们不会成为灾难，比如当长期上涨的市场诱使人们基于预期的价格行为和想要参与其中的欲望而购买时发生的灾难。

I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn't need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners - neither he nor his "helpers" can do that - but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.

我要给这些非专业人士带来一个好消息：普通投资者不需要这种技能。总的来说，美国企业一直以来表现优异，并将继续如此（尽管肯定会有不可预测的起伏）。在 20 世纪，道琼斯工业指数从 66 点上涨到 11,497 点，同时还支付着不断增长的股息。21 世纪将见证进一步的收益，几乎肯定会相当可观。非专业人士的目标不应是挑选赢家——他们自己及其“帮手”都做不到这一点——而应该是拥有一系列总体上注定会表现良好的企业的横截面。一只低成本的标普 500 指数基金就能实现这一目标。

That's the "what" of investing for the non-professional. The "when" is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs' observation: "A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.") The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the "know-nothing" investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

这就是非专业人士投资的“什么”。“何时”也很重要。主要的风险是，胆怯或初入市的投资者会在市场极度亢奋时入市，然后在出现账面亏损时感到幻灭。（记住已故的巴顿·比格斯的观察：“牛市就像性爱。在它结束前感觉最好。”）这种时机错误的对策是投资者长期积累股票，并且永远不要在坏消息和股票远低于高点时卖出。遵循这些规则，“什么都不知道”的投资者，只要进行多样化投资并保持最低成本，几乎肯定会获得令人满意的结果。事实上，对自己的缺点有现实认识的朴素投资者，比即使对单一弱点也视而不见的知识渊博的专业人士，更有可能获得更好的长期结果。

If "investors" frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.

如果“投资者”疯狂地相互买卖农田，他们的作物产量或价格都不会提高。这种行为的唯一后果是，拥有农田的群体的总收益将会下降，因为他们会因寻求建议和转换资产而产生大量成本。

Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.

尽管如此，个人和机构都会不断被那些从提供建议或执行交易中获利的人敦促采取行动。由此产生的摩擦成本可能是巨大的，并且对投资者整体而言没有好处。因此，忽略那些杂音，保持最低成本，像投资农场那样投资股票。

My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I've laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife's benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard's.) I believe the trust's long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors - whether pension funds, institutions or individuals - who employ high-fee managers.

我应该补充一点，我是言行一致的：我在这里的建议与我遗嘱中制定的某些指示基本相同。有一项遗嘱规定，现金将被交付给受托人为我的妻子利益服务。（我不得不用现金进行个人遗赠，因为我所有的伯克希尔股票将在我的遗产清算后的十年内全部分配给某些慈善组织。）我给受托人的建议再简单不过了：将 10% 的现金投入短期政府债券，90% 投入一只成本极低的标普 500 指数基金。（我推荐先锋集团的。）我相信，这一政策下信托的长期结果将优于大多数使用高费用经理的投资者——无论是养老基金、机构还是个人。

And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben's book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.

现在回到本·格雷厄姆。这次投资讨论中的大部分思想，我都是从本的书《聪明的投资者》中学到的，这本书是我 1949 年买的。我的金融生活因那次购买而改变。

Before reading Ben's book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn't shake the feeling that I wasn't getting anywhere.

在我读本的书之前，我曾在投资领域中游荡，如饥似渴地阅读所有相关内容。我读到的东西很多都让我着迷：我尝试过绘制图表，试图用市场指标预测股票走势。我坐在经纪公司的办公室里看着股票行情带滚动，听评论员的评论。所有这些都很有趣，但我无法摆脱一种感觉，那就是我没有取得任何进展。

In contrast, Ben's ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.

相比之下，本的思想以逻辑清晰、优雅易懂的文字（没有希腊字母或复杂的公式）进行了解释。对我来说，关键点体现在后来版本中标注的第 8 章和第 20 章。（1949 年原版的章节编号不同。）这些要点至今仍指导着我的投资决策。

A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and - brace yourself - the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire's would have been far different.

关于这本书，有几个有趣的侧面：后来的版本包括一个后记，描述了一项未命名的投资，这本是本的财富之源。本在 1948 年写第一版时买入了这家公司，而且——做好心理准备——这家神秘的公司就是 GEICO。如果本在 GEICO 还处于初创期时没有认识到它的特殊品质，我的未来和伯克希尔的未来将会大不相同。

The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.

1949 年版的这本书还推荐了一只铁路股票，当时该股票售价为 17 美元，每股收益约为 10 美元。（我钦佩本的原因之一，是他有勇气使用当时的例子，如果犯错就会招致嘲笑。）这种低估值部分源于当时的一项会计规则，该规则要求铁路公司从其报告的收益中排除子公司的大量留存收益。

The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.

推荐的那只股票是 Northern Pacific，其最重要的子公司是 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy。这些铁路现在是 BNSF 的重要组成部分，如今 BNSF 由伯克希尔全资拥有。当我读这本书的时候，Northern Pacific 的市值约为 4000 万美元。如今，它的继任者（当然，还增加了大量资产）每四天就能赚到那个数额。

I can't remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben's adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben's book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).

我不记得我买那本第一版《聪明的投资者》花了多少钱。无论花费多少，它都印证了本的一句格言的真谛：价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。在我所做的所有投资中，买本的书是最好的（除了我买的两张结婚证）。

Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn't afford. Citizens and public officials typically underappreciated the gigantic financial teamwork that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.

地方和州的财政问题正在加速恶化，很大程度上是因为公共实体承诺了无法负担的养老金。公民和公职人员通常低估了当承诺与支付意愿相冲突时所形成的巨大财务协作。不幸的是，如今养老金数学对大多数美国人来说仍然是个谜。

Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118-136.

投资政策在这些问题中也扮演着重要角色。1975 年，我给时任《华盛顿邮报》公司董事长的凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆写了一份备忘录，关于养老金承诺的陷阱和投资政策的重要性。该备忘录转载于第 118-136 页。

During the next decade, you will read a lot of news - bad news - about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.

在未来十年中，你会读到很多关于公共养老金计划的新闻——坏消息。我希望我的备忘录能帮助你理解在存在问题之处及时采取补救行动的必要性。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and - yes - saves us money.

年度股东大会将于 5 月 3 日星期六在 CenturyLink 中心举行。我们才华横溢的现场指挥 Carrie Sova 将负责，我们总部团队的所有人都将帮助她。我们这些人不仅比专业活动策划者做得更好，而且还——是的——为我们省钱。

CenturyLink's doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I'm pretty good. Challenge me: I'll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).

CenturyLink 的门将在早上 7 点开放，7:30 我们将举行第三届国际投报挑战赛。目标将是一个 Clayton Home 的门廊，距离投掷线正好 35 英尺。我十几岁的时候投了大约 50 万份报纸，所以我认为我相当不错。挑战我：任何比我更靠近门口的人，我都会买一个 Dilly Bar。报纸有 36 到 42 页，你必须自己折叠（不能用橡皮筋）。

At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink's stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day's question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

上午 8:30，将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，中间在 CenturyLink 的摊位午休，一直持续到下午 3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我将在 3:45 召集年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天的问答环节离开，请趁查理讲话时离场。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We'll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,062 pairs of Justin boots (that's a pair every 32 seconds), 12,792 pounds of See's candy, 11,162 Quikut knives (21 knives per minute) and 6,344 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie's picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don't let me down.

离场的最佳理由当然是购物。我们将为您提供便利，在与会议区相邻的 194,300 平方英尺的大厅里摆满来自数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品。去年，你们尽了自己的一份力，大多数展位都创下了销售记录。在九个小时内，我们售出了 1,062 双 Justin 靴子（每 32 秒一双）、12,792 磅喜诗糖果、11,162 把 Quikut 刀具（每分钟 21 把）和 6,344 双 Wells Lamont 手套，这总是热销商品。今年，查理和我会出售竞争性的番茄酱瓶。当然，印有查理照片的那款会大幅折扣。但是，如果你帮忙，我的瓶子会卖得比他的好。这很重要，所以不要让我失望。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual "Berkshire 5K," an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor's Guide that you will receive with your tickets for the meeting. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire's managers, directors and associates.

我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 将在会议上再次推出特别的纪念鞋。购买一双后，第二天早上 8 点穿上它们参加我们第二届年度“伯克希尔 5 公里跑”，比赛从 CenturyLink 出发。参与的详细信息将包含在随会议票一起发送给你的访客指南中。参赛者将发现他们与许多伯克希尔的经理、董事和同事一起跑步。

GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将在购物区设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的一些顶级顾问提供服务。请过来看看报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 可以给你股东折扣（通常为 8%）。我们运营所在的 51 个司法管辖区中有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能为你们省钱。我相信，你们中至少有一半的人，我们可以做到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson's compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index that I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You'll enjoy it.

一定要去拜访 Bookworm。它将携带约 35 本书和 DVD，其中包括几本新书。其中一本是 Max Olson 汇编的伯克希尔 1965 年以来的信件集。这本书包含一个我觉得特别有用的索引，指定了个人、公司和主题的页码。我还推荐我儿子霍华德的《四十次机会》。你会喜欢的。

If you are a big spender - or aspire to become one - visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft sure to set your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.

如果你是大手笔的消费者——或渴望成为其中一员——周六中午到下午 5 点之间前往奥马哈机场东侧的 Signature Flight Support。在那里，我们将有一支 NetJets 机队，肯定会让你心跳加速。乘巴士来；乘私人飞机离开。活得潇洒一点。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.

本报告随附的代理材料附件解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末提高票价。如果你从远方来，请比较飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。两座城市之间的车程约为 2.5 小时，堪萨斯城可能会为你节省大量资金，特别是如果你原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。把省下的钱花在我们这里。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did $40.2 million of business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间 72 街 77 英亩场地上的内布拉斯加家具城，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年在会议前后的一周里，该店的营业额为 4020 万美元，比之前的记录高出 12%。周六还创下了 820 万美元的单日记录，仅床垫就卖出了近 100 万美元。

To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 29th and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

要在 NFM 获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 29 日（周二）至 5 月 5 日（周一）期间购买商品，并且必须出示你的会议证件。期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有不允许打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为你破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周六上午 10 点至晚上 9 点开门，周日上午 10 点至下午 6 点。今年周六下午 5:30 至晚上 8 点，NFM 将举办野餐会，邀请你们所有人参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler's best month.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 5 月 2 日星期五下午 6 点至晚上 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于 5 月 4 日星期日上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午 6 点。近年来，我们三天的销售额远远超过整个 12 月的销售额，而 12 月通常是珠宝商的最佳月份。

At 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my "Crazy Warren" quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.

周日下午 1:15，我将开始在 Borsheims 当店员。询问我对你选择商品的“疯狂沃伦”报价。随着我变老，我的定价变得越来越离谱。来占我的便宜吧。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会有大量人群。因此，为了方便你，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 28 日（周一）持续到 5 月 10 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议证件或显示你是伯克希尔持有人的经纪账户报表来表明你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers - who will have their eyes wide open - in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world's top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don't play them for money.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场里，两次获得美国国际象棋冠军的帕特里克·沃尔夫将蒙住眼睛，以六人一组的形式接受所有挑战者——他们将睁大眼睛。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克会让围观者惊叹不已。此外，我们还将有世界顶级桥牌专家鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。不要和他们赌钱。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans - and especially me - proud with her performance at the Olympics.

我的朋友邢延华也将在周日出现在商场里，与挑战者进行乒乓球比赛。去年，她在奥运会上的表现让美国人——尤其是我——感到自豪。

I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she's a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women's Champion. If you don't mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.

我在她九岁时就认识了她，即使在那时我也无法从她身上得分。现在，她是普林斯顿大学的新生，也是美国女子冠军。如果你不介意让自己难堪，可以在下午 1 点开始测试你的技能。比尔·盖茨和我将首先上场，试图削弱她的体力。

Gorat's and Piccolo's will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat's opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo's opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat's, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and for Piccolo's call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo's order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.

Gorat's 和 Piccolo's 将在 5 月 4 日星期天再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。两家餐厅都将营业到晚上 10 点，Gorat's 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo's 下午 4 点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅，我将在周日晚上两家都吃。记住：要在 Gorat's 预订，请在 4 月 1 日（但不是之前）致电 402-551-3733；Piccolo's 请致电 402-342-9038。在 Piccolo's，点一杯巨大的根汁汽水浮冰作为甜点。只有懦夫才会点小杯。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将再次有同样的三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。记者及其电子邮件地址是：《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯，电子邮件地址为 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的贝基·奎克，电子邮件地址为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，电子邮件地址为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选出他或她认为最有趣和最重要的六个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简洁、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关并且在你发送给他们的任何电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果被问到你提出的问题，请让记者知道你是否希望提及你的名字。）

We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb.

我们还将有一个由三位关注伯克希尔的分析师组成的小组。今年保险专家将是巴克莱的杰伊·格尔布。涉及我们非保险业务的问题将来自 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的乔纳森·勃兰特。

And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position). The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.

我们将再次邀请一位持证看空伯克希尔的人士。我们希望能收到做空伯克希尔的申请者的来信（请附上你的仓位证明）。三位分析师将带来他们自己关于伯克希尔的具体问题，并与记者和观众交替提问。

Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That's why we try to issue financial information late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, but rather treat all shareholders the same. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that further educate our owners about their investment.

查理和我认为，所有股东应该同时获得伯克希尔的新信息，并且应该有足够的时间进行分析。这就是为什么我们试图在周五晚些时候或周六早些时候发布财务信息，以及为什么我们的年会在周六举行。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一交谈，而是平等对待所有股东。我们希望记者和分析师提出的问题能够进一步教育我们的所有者了解他们的投资。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that's the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.

查理和我都不会得到任何关于将要提出的问题的线索。我们知道记者和分析师会提出一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的方式。总而言之，我们预计至少有 54 个问题，每位分析师和记者 6 个，观众 18 个。如果还有一些额外时间，我们将从观众中抽取更多。观众提问者将通过抽签决定，抽签将于早上 8:15 在主会场和主要溢出会场的 15 个麦克风处进行。

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business "home runs" means as much to them as their paycheck.

我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们的运营经理们的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营他们的企业就像这些是他们的家庭拥有的唯一资产一样。我相信我们的经理们的心态也与大型上市公司中能找到的一样以股东为导向。大多数人没有工作的经济需求；打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说和薪水一样重要。

Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 23,000-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country's largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board's activities - and the list goes on and on.

然而，同样重要的是在我公司办公室与我一起工作的 24 名男男女女。这个团队高效地处理着大量的 SEC 和其他监管要求，提交一份 23,000 页的联邦所得税申报表以及州和外国税表，回应无数的股东和媒体询问，发布年度报告，准备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的活动——这样的例子不胜枚举。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率高得令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超越了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动：去年，他们处理了 40 所大学（从 200 名申请者中选出）派学生到奥马哈与我进行问答日的事宜。他们处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买来汉堡包和炸薯条（当然要浇上番茄酱）作为午餐。没有 CEO 比我更好了；我真的每天都想跳着踢踏舞去上班。

In closing, I think it's become appropriate to ignore our "no pictures" policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn't make it; otherwise you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire's headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.

最后，我认为忽略我们“不拍照”的政策让你看看我们出色的总部团队是恰当的。下面是一张圣诞午餐时的照片。有两个人没赶上；除此之外，你看到的是所有伯克希尔总部的工作人员。他们真的是创造奇迹的人。

Next year's letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.

明年的信将回顾我们在伯克希尔的 50 年，并对未来 50 年做一些推测。与此同时，5 月 3 日来奥马哈，享受我们的资本家伍德斯托克。

February 28, 2014

2014 年 2 月 28 日

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席