1994 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.

1994 年我们的净资产增加了 14.5 亿美元，增幅为 13.9%。在过去 30 年（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 10,083 美元，年复合增长率为 23%。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past.

伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格和我很少做预测。不过，我们可以自信地提出一个预测：伯克希尔未来的表现将远不及过去的表现。

The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, therefore, to keep on doing well.

问题不在于过去有效的方法在未来会失效。恰恰相反，我们相信我们的公式——以合理的价格购买具有良好经济基础、由诚实且能干的人经营的企业——一定能够产生合理的成功。因此，我们预计会继续做得不错。

A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.

然而，钱包太鼓是卓越投资业绩的敌人。伯克希尔现在的净资产为 119 亿美元，而查理和我开始管理公司时约为 2200 万美元。尽管好企业的数量一如既往，但相对于伯克希尔的资本而言，进行微不足道的购买对我们毫无用处。（正如查理经常提醒我的：“如果某件事根本不值得做，那就不值得做好。”）我们现在只考虑购买那些我们认为至少可以投入 1 亿美元的证券。考虑到这个最低门槛，伯克希尔的投资范围已急剧缩小。

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

尽管如此，我们将坚持让我们走到今天的方针，并努力不放松标准。泰德·威廉姆斯在《我的生活故事》中解释了原因：“我的观点是，要成为一个好击球手，你必须得到一个好球来打。这是规则的第一条。如果我不得不去咬那些不在我‘甜区’的球，我就不是一个 0.344 的击球手，可能只会是一个 0.250 的击球手。”查理和我同意这一点，并将努力等待完全在我们自己“甜区”内的机会。

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

我们将继续忽略政治和经济预测，这些预测对许多投资者和商人来说是一种昂贵的干扰。三十年前，没有人能预见到越南战争的急剧扩大、工资和价格管制、两次石油危机、一位总统辞职、苏联解体、道琼斯指数单日下跌 508 点，或是国库券收益率在 2.8% 和 17.4% 之间波动。

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

但是，令人惊讶的是——这些重磅事件中没有一件对本杰明·格雷厄姆的投资原则产生丝毫影响。它们也没有使以合理价格协商购买优秀企业变得不合理。那么，想象一下，如果我们因为对未知的恐惧而推迟或改变资本配置，我们将付出多大的代价。事实上，我们通常在对某些宏观事件的担忧达到顶峰时做出了最好的购买。恐惧是赶时髦者的敌人，但却是基本面主义者的朋友。

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.

未来 30 年肯定会出现另一系列重大冲击。我们既不试图预测它们，也不试图从中获利。如果我们能够识别出类似于我们过去购买过的企业，那么外部意外对我们的长期结果影响甚微。

What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.

我们向你们承诺——除了更温和的收益之外——在你们持有伯克希尔期间，你们的境遇将与查理和我完全一样。如果你们受损，我们也会受损；如果我们繁荣，你们也会繁荣。我们不会通过引入让我们在上涨时比下跌时获得更多收益的薪酬安排来打破这种纽带。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.

我们进一步向你们保证，我们的个人财富将绝大多数留在伯克希尔股票中：我们不会让你们和我们一起投资，却把自己的钱投到别处。此外，伯克希尔也是我们大多数家庭成员以及查理和我在 1960 年代经营合伙企业的众多朋友的投资组合中的核心持仓。我们尽全力做好工作的动力已经不能再大了。

Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest expense.

幸运的是，我们有一个良好的基础。十年前，即 1984 年，伯克希尔的保险公司持有价值 17 亿美元的证券，相当于每股伯克希尔股票约 1500 美元。撇开这些证券的所有收入和资本利得，伯克希尔当年的税前利润仅约为 600 万美元。是的，我们来自制造、零售和服务业务的各项利润，但几乎完全被保险业务的承保损失、公司管理费用和利息费用所抵消。

Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters).

现在我们持有价值 180 亿美元的证券，相当于每股伯克希尔股票超过 15,000 美元。如果再次排除这些证券的所有收入，我们 1994 年的税前利润约为 3.84 亿美元。在这十年中，员工人数从 5,000 人增长到 22,000 人（包括世界总部的 11 人）。

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.

我们的收益是通过一群出色的运营经理的努力实现的，他们从一些看似普通的企业中取得了非凡的成果。凯西·斯坦格尔将管理棒球队描述为“因为别人击出的本垒打而获得报酬”。这也是我在伯克希尔的模式。

The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.

我们拥有部分权益的企业对伯克希尔的成功同样重要。一些统计数据将说明其重要性：1994 年，可口可乐售出了约 2800 亿份 8 盎司装产品，每份盈利不到 1 美分。但一分钱加起来就多了。通过伯克希尔持有可口可乐 7.8% 的股份，我们相当于拥有 210 亿份产品的经济权益，这为我们产生了近 2 亿美元的“软饮料收益”。同样，通过持有吉列股票，伯克希尔拥有全球剃须刀和刀片市场约 7% 的份额（按收入计算，而非按件数），这一比例在 1994 年对应约 2.5 亿美元的销售额。在富国银行，一家 530 亿美元的银行，我们 13% 的持股意味着一个 70 亿美元的“伯克希尔银行”，该银行在 1994 年盈利约 1 亿美元。

It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.

拥有一颗“希望钻石”的很大一部分，远胜于拥有一颗水钻的全部。而刚刚提到的那些公司完全称得上是稀世珍宝。最棒的是，我们并不限于只拥有几只这类品种，而是拥有一个不断增长的收藏。

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.

股票价格将继续波动——有时剧烈波动——经济也会有起有落。然而，长期来看，我们相信我们拥有的这类企业继续以令人满意的速度增值的可能性非常高。

Book Value and Intrinsic Value

账面价值与内在价值

We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.

我们定期报告每股账面价值，这是一个容易计算的数字，虽然用途有限。我们也同样定期告诉你们，重要的是内在价值，这是一个无法精确确定但必须估计的数字。

For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid."

例如，在 1964 年，我们可以确定地说伯克希尔的每股账面价值是 19.46 美元。然而，这个数字大大高估了股票的内在价值，因为公司的所有资源都束缚在盈利能力低下的纺织业务中。我们的纺织资产无论是作为持续经营还是清算，其价值都不等于账面价值。因此，在 1964 年，如果任何人询问伯克希尔资产负债表的稳健性，他很可能得到一位声誉可疑的好莱坞大亨曾给出的答案：“别担心，负债是实实在在的。”

Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also.

如今，伯克希尔的情况已经逆转：我们控制的许多企业价值远高于其账面价值。（我们未控制的企业，如可口可乐或吉列，则按当前市值入账。）然而，我们继续向你们提供账面价值数字，因为它们可以作为伯克希尔内在价值的一个粗略的、尽管被显著低估的追踪指标。事实上，去年这两个指标同步变动：账面价值增长了 13.9%，内在价值也大致增长了这么多。

We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.

我们将内在价值定义为一家企业在其剩余生命周期中可以提取的现金的折现值。任何计算内在价值的人都会得出一个高度主观的数字，该数字会随着未来现金流估计的修正和利率的变化而改变。尽管存在模糊性，但内在价值至关重要，是评估投资和企业相对吸引力的唯一合乎逻辑的方法。

To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

为了看清历史投入（账面价值）与未来产出（内在价值）之间可能出现的差异，让我们看看另一种投资形式：大学教育。把教育成本看作它的“账面价值”。如果要准确，成本应包括学生因为选择上大学而不是工作而放弃的收入。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

在这个练习中，我们将忽略教育的重要非经济利益，只专注于其经济价值。首先，我们必须估计毕业生一生将获得的收入，并从该数字中减去如果没有接受教育他本应获得的收入估计值。这样我们得到一个超额收益数字，然后必须用适当的利率将其折现回毕业日。得到的美元金额等于该教育的内在经济价值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

有些毕业生会发现他们教育的账面价值超过了其内在价值，这意味着支付教育费用的人没有物有所值。在其他情况下，教育的内在价值将远远超过其账面价值，这一结果证明资本得到了明智的配置。在所有情况下，显而易见的是，账面价值作为内在价值的指标毫无意义。

Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner.

现在让我们少一点学术味，看看 Scott Fetzer，一个来自伯克希尔自身经验的例子。这个叙述不仅将说明账面价值与内在价值的关系如何变化，还将提供一个我知道你们一直屏息以待的会计课程。自然而然，我在这里选择谈论一项最终成为巨大赢家的收购。

Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well.

伯克希尔于 1986 年初购买了 Scott Fetzer。当时，该公司由 22 项业务组成，今天我们拥有完全相同的业务组合——没有增加也没有处置。Scott Fetzer 的主要业务包括 World Book、Kirby 和 Campbell Hausfeld，但许多其他部门也是盈利的重要贡献者。

We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double its book value.

我们为 Scott Fetzer 支付了 3.152 亿美元，当时该公司有 1.726 亿美元的账面价值。我们支付的 1.426 亿美元溢价表明我们相信该公司的内在价值接近其账面价值的两倍。

In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.

下表追溯了 Scott Fetzer 自我们购买以来的账面价值、盈利和股息。

Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in 1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.

因为交易时公司有超额现金，尽管 Scott Fetzer 在 1986 年仅赚了 4030 万美元，但它仍能向伯克希尔支付 1.25 亿美元的股息。需要说明的是，我们并没有在 Scott Fetzer 的资产负债表中引入杠杆。事实上，该公司从我们购买时的低负债状态变成了几乎没有债务（除了其金融子公司使用的债务）。同样，我们也没有出售工厂再租回，也没有出售应收账款或类似操作。在我们拥有的这些年里，Scott Fetzer 一直以保守的财务和流动性的方式运营。

As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500, a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.

正如你所见，Scott Fetzer 的盈利自我们收购以来稳步增长，但账面价值并未同步增长。因此，在收购时已经非常出色的净资产收益率，现在变得真正非凡。将 Scott Fetzer 的业绩与《财富》500 强（如果它是一个独立公司，它会有资格入选）进行比较，可以说明其非凡程度。

Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest available for inspection - the company's return on equity would have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth.

如果 Scott Fetzer 出现在 1993 年的《财富》500 强名单上（这是可供查阅的最新名单），该公司的净资产收益率将排名第 4。但这远非全部。净资产收益率排名前三的公司是 Insilco、LTV 和 Gaylord Container，它们均在 1993 年从破产中走出，并且除了在破产程序中获得债务豁免时所实现的收益外，当年都没有取得有意义的盈利。撇开这些非营业性意外之财，Scott Fetzer 的净资产收益率将在《财富》500 强中排名第一，远超第二名。事实上，Scott Fetzer 的净资产收益率是排名第十的公司的一倍。

You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.

你可能会认为 Scott Fetzer 的成功只能用盈利的周期性峰值、垄断地位或杠杆来解释。但这种情况都不存在。相反，公司的成功来自于 CEO 拉尔夫·谢伊的管理专长，稍后我会告诉你更多关于他的情况。

First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer, that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet. I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings statement.

不过，首先是我们承诺的会计课程：当我们为 Scott Fetzer 支付 1.426 亿美元的账面价值溢价时，这笔金额必须记录在伯克希尔的资产负债表上。我不详细说明其运作方式（这些在我们 1986 年年报的附录中已阐述），直接进入要点：在溢价初始入账后，几乎在所有情况下都必须随着时间的推移通过年度摊销冲销，这些摊销在收购公司的利润表中显示为成本。

The following table shows, first, the annual charges Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay, and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott Fetzer actually employs in its business.

下表显示了：第一，伯克希尔为逐步注销 Scott Fetzer 收购溢价而每年计提的费用；第二，我们账面上剩余的溢价。这些费用对现金或我们缴纳的税款没有影响，并且在我们看来不是经济成本（尽管许多会计师不同意）。它们只是我们减少 Scott Fetzer 账面价值的一种方式，以便该数字最终与 Scott Fetzer 实际在其业务中使用的净资产相匹配。

Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to $54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year-end book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have just as consistently marked down its carrying value through purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and net worth.

请注意，到 1994 年底，溢价已减少到 5420 万美元。当这个数字加上 Scott Fetzer 年末账面价值 9400 万美元时，总额为 1.482 亿美元，这是 Scott Fetzer 目前在伯克希尔账面上的账面价值。这个金额不到我们收购该公司时账面价值的一半。然而 Scott Fetzer 现在的盈利能力大约是当时的两倍。显然，这项业务的内在价值一直在持续增长，尽管我们通过降低伯克希尔利润和净资产的购买溢价摊销持续地减记了它的账面价值。

The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart and high-grade manager.

Scott Fetzer 的内在价值与其在伯克希尔账面上的账面价值之间的差距现在很大。正如我早些时候提到的——但很高兴再次提到——这种令人愉快的错配归功于拉尔夫·谢伊，一位专注、聪明且优秀的管理者。

The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important.

拉尔夫成功的原因并不复杂。45 年前，本·格雷厄姆教导我，在投资中，无需做非凡之事就能获得非凡结果。在后来的生活中，我惊讶地发现这句话在企业管理中也成立。管理者必须做的就是处理好基本事务，不要分心。这正是拉尔夫的秘诀。他设定正确的目标，从不忘记自己要做的事。在个人方面，与拉尔夫共事令人愉快。他对问题直言不讳，自信而不自大。

He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.

他也经验丰富。虽然我不知道拉尔夫的年龄，但我知道，像我们的许多管理者一样，他超过 65 岁。在伯克希尔，我们看重的是表现，而不是日历。查理和我分别 71 岁和 64 岁，现在我们把乔治·福尔曼的照片放在桌上。你可以肯定，我们对强制退休年龄的蔑视每年都会更加强烈。

Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation

内在价值与资本配置

Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares - it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.

理解内在价值对管理者来说和对投资者一样重要。当管理者做出资本配置决策——包括回购股票的决策——他们必须以增加每股内在价值、避免减少内在价值的方式行事，这一点至关重要。这个原则看似显而易见，但我们不断看到它被违反。当配置错误发生时，股东就会受到伤害。

For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?

例如，在考虑企业合并和收购时，许多管理者倾向于关注交易是立即稀释还是增厚每股收益（或者在金融机构，是每股账面价值）。这种侧重有很大危险。回到我们大学教育的例子，想象一个 25 岁的 MBA 一年级学生正在考虑将他未来的经济利益与一个 25 岁的日工的利益合并。这位 MBA 学生目前没有收入，他发现将自己对自身的股权与日工的股权进行“换股合并”会大幅提升他的近期收益！但是，还有什么比这种交易更愚蠢的呢？

In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.

在企业交易中，当潜在被收购方具有不同的前景、不同的非经营性资产数量或不同的资本结构时，潜在收购方关注当前收益同样是愚蠢的。在伯克希尔，我们拒绝了许多本可以提高当前和近期收益但会降低每股内在价值的合并和收购机会。相反，我们的方法是遵循韦恩·格雷茨基的建议：“去冰球将要到达的地方，而不是它现在所在的地方。”结果，我们的股东现在比我们如果使用标准教条时富裕了数十亿美元。

The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."

可悲的事实是，大多数重大收购表现出一种严重的不平衡：它们对被收购方的股东是一笔意外之财；它们增加了收购方管理层的收入和地位；它们对双方的投资银行家和其他专业人士来说是蜜罐。但是，唉，它们通常会减少收购方股东的财富，而且往往是大规模的。之所以发生这种情况，是因为收购方通常放弃的内在价值多于获得的内在价值。Wachovia 公司退休负责人约翰·梅德林说，如果做得足够多，“你就是在反向运行连锁信”。

Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.

随着时间的推移，公司管理者配置资本的技能对企业的价值产生巨大影响。几乎根据定义，一家真正优秀的企业产生的资金（至少在早期之后）远远超过其内部能够使用的资金。当然，公司可以通过股息或股票回购的方式将资金分配给股东。但 CEO 常常会问战略规划人员、顾问或投资银行家是否该进行一两次收购。这就像问你的室内装饰师你是否需要一张 5 万美元的地毯。

The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.

收购问题常常因一种生物学偏见而加剧：许多 CEO 能够获得职位，部分原因是他们拥有丰富的冒险精神和自我。如果一位高管被大量赋予这些品质——应该承认，这些品质有时有其优势——它们不会在他到达顶峰时消失。当这样的 CEO 受到顾问的鼓励去做交易时，他的反应就像一个被父亲鼓励去拥有正常性生活的十几岁男孩。他需要的不是推动。

Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."

几年前，我的一位 CEO 朋友——必须说是在开玩笑——无意中描述了许多大交易的病态。这位经营一家财产意外保险公司的朋友正在向他的董事们解释为什么他想收购某家人寿保险公司。在相当没有说服力地啰嗦了收购的经济和战略理由之后，他突然放弃了讲稿。带着一种顽皮的表情，他只是说：“哦，伙计们，其他所有孩子都有一个。”

At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.

在伯克希尔，我们的管理者将继续从看似普通的企业中赚取非凡的回报。作为第一步，这些管理者将寻找方法将他们的盈利有利地配置到自己的业务中。剩余部分，他们将交给查理和我。然后我们将努力以构建每股内在价值的方式使用这些资金。我们的目标是收购我们认为自己理解、拥有良好且可持续的经济基础、并且由我们喜欢、钦佩和信任的管理者经营的企业的一部分或全部。

Compensation

薪酬

At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging?

在伯克希尔，我们努力在薪酬问题上像在资本配置上一样合乎逻辑。例如，我们根据 Scott Fetzer 的业绩来补偿拉尔夫·谢伊，而不是根据伯克希尔的业绩。由于他负责一项业务而不负责另一项业务，还有什么比这更合理的呢？与伯克希尔命运挂钩的现金奖金或股票期权会给拉尔夫带来完全任意的奖励。例如，他可能在 Scott Fetzer 打出本垒打，而查理和我在伯克希尔犯下错误，从而多次抵消他的努力。反之，如果伯克希尔其他部分表现良好而 Scott Fetzer 落后，又为何要把期权利润或奖金堆在拉尔夫身上？

In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.

在设定薪酬时，我们喜欢承诺大额的胡萝卜，但确保它们与管理者所负责领域的业绩直接挂钩。当投入某项业务的资本规模较大时，我们还对管理者使用的增量资本收取高额费用，并对他们释放的资本以同样高的利率给予抵扣。

The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his business.

这种“钱不是免费的”方法的成果在 Scott Fetzer 是显而易见的。如果拉尔夫能够以良好的回报使用增量资金，他这样做的回报是值得的：当额外资本的收益超过一个有意义的门槛利率时，他的奖金会增加。但我们的奖金计算是对称的：如果增量投资产生低于标准的回报，短缺对拉尔夫和伯克希尔都是代价高昂的。这种双向安排的结果是，拉尔夫将任何他无法有利地用于自己业务的现金送到奥马哈，他会因此获得回报——而且回报丰厚。

It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of "heads I win, tails you lose."

在上市公司中，描述几乎每个薪酬计划时都宣称使管理层的利益与股东的利益一致，这已成为一种时尚。在我们看来，利益一致意味着成为双向的合作伙伴，而不仅仅是上涨时的一致。许多“一致”计划未能通过这一基本测试，它们是“正面我赢，反面你输”的巧妙形式。

A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.

一种常见的不一致形式出现在典型的股票期权安排中，这种安排并不定期提高期权价格以补偿留存收益正在积累公司财富这一事实。事实上，十年期期权、低股息支付率和复利的结合，可以为一个在工作中只是原地踏步的管理者提供丰厚的收益。愤世嫉俗者甚至可能注意到，当支付给所有者的款项被压低时，持有期权的管理者的利润就会增加。我还没有在要求股东批准期权计划的委托书中看到阐明这一关键点的。

I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.

我忍不住要提一下，我们与拉尔夫·谢伊的薪酬安排大约在五分钟内就敲定了，就在我们收购 Scott Fetzer 之后，没有律师或薪酬顾问的“帮助”。这种安排体现了一些非常简单的理念——不是顾问们偏爱的条款，除非他们认为你有一个大问题（当然，需要年度审查），否则他们无法轻易开出大额账单。我们与拉尔夫的协议从未改变。在 1986 年，它对他和对我都合理，现在也合理。我们与其他所有业务部门管理者的薪酬安排同样简单，尽管每份协议的条款因业务的经济特征、管理人员是否部分持有该业务部门等情况而有所不同。

In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.

在所有情况下，我们都追求理性。那些以任性方式、与管理者个人成就无关的薪酬安排，很可能会受到某些管理者的欢迎。毕竟，谁会拒绝一张免费彩票呢？但这种安排对公司来说是一种浪费，并导致管理者失去对他真正应该关注的领域的聚焦。此外，母公司的非理性行为很可能鼓励子公司的模仿行为。

At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need.

在伯克希尔，只有查理和我对整体业务负有管理责任。因此，逻辑上只有我们是应该根据企业的整体表现获得报酬的。即便如此，这也不是我们想要的薪酬安排。我们精心设计了公司和我们的工作，以便我们与喜欢的人一起做喜欢的事。同样重要的是，我们几乎没有被迫做无聊或不愉快的任务。我们还受益于流向公司负责人的大量物质和精神福利。在如此田园诗般的条件下，我们不指望股东为我们支付大量我们根本不需要的报酬。

Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."

确实，即使我们分文不取，查理和我也对我们的轻松工作感到高兴。从根本上说，我们认同罗纳德·里根的信条：“努力工作从未害死过任何人，这可能是真的，但我想何必冒这个险呢。”

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告盈利来源

The table on the next page shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下页表格显示了伯克希尔报告盈利的主要来源。在此列示中，我们之前在 Scott Fetzer 分析中讨论过的购买溢价费用不分配到具体业务，而是汇总单独列示。这种处理让你可以看到我们业务的盈利，如同我们没有收购它们时报告的那样。我们认为这种列示形式对投资者和管理者比使用 GAAP（要求逐项业务摊销购买溢价）更有用。当然，表中显示的总盈利与我们经审计财务报表中的 GAAP 总额相同。

*Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired, November 7, 1993.
**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

*包括 Dexter 自 1993 年 11 月 7 日收购之日起的盈利。
**不包括金融业务的利息费用。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.

关于这些业务的大量信息见第 37-48 页，你也可以在那里找到按 GAAP 报告的分部盈利。此外，在第 53-59 页，我们按非 GAAP 基础将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个分部，这种列示与查理和我的思维方式一致。我们的意图是提供我们希望在我们角色互换时你提供给我们的财务信息。

"Look-Through" Earnings

“透视”盈利

In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges.

在过去的报告中，我们讨论过透视盈利，我们认为它比我们的 GAAP 结果更能准确描绘伯克希尔的盈利。按照我们的计算，透视盈利包括：（1）上一节报告的营业收益，加上；（2）主要被投资公司中根据 GAAP 会计未反映在我们利润中的留存营业收益，减去；（3）如果这些被投资公司的留存收益分配给我们，伯克希尔本应支付的税款准备金。我们在这里说的“营业收益”不包括资本利得、特殊会计项目和重大重组费用。

If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%, our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85 billion.

如果我们的内在价值要以 15% 的目标速度增长，那么随着时间的推移，我们的透视盈利也必须以大约同样的速度增长。几年前我第一次解释这个概念时，曾告诉你们要实现 15% 的目标，就需要我们在 2000 年前产生约 18 亿美元的透视盈利。因为我们此后发行了约 3% 的更多股份，这个数字已增长到 18.5 亿美元。

We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target but that, of course, is no sure thing.

现在我们略微领先于实现目标的计划，但这在很大程度上是因为我们的超级巨灾保险业务最近带来了远高于趋势线预期的盈利（我将在下一节讨论这一结果）。适当考虑这种异常情况后，我们仍然预计能达到目标，但这当然不是确定无疑的。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表显示了我们如何计算透视盈利，但我要提醒你，这些数字必然非常粗略。（这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已包含在第 12 页分项列出的营业收益中，主要是在“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest at Wesco
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives

(1) 不包括 Wesco 少数股东权益应占的股份
(2) 按年平均持股计算
(3) 不包括已实现资本利得，该利得既是经常性的大额的
(4) 使用的税率为 14%，即伯克希尔就所收股息支付的税率

Insurance Operations

保险业务

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.

正如我们在过去报告中解释的，保险业务中重要的是：第一，我们产生的“浮存金”数量；第二，它的成本。浮存金是我们持有但不拥有的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生的原因包括：大多数保单要求预付保费；更重要的是，保险公司通常需要时间了解和处理理赔。

Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.

通常，保险公司收取的保费不足以覆盖其必须支付的损失和费用。这就产生了“承保损失”——而该损失就是浮存金的成本。

An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.

如果浮存金的成本低于公司通过其他方式获取资金的成本，那么保险业务长期就是盈利的。但如果浮存金成本高于市场利率，那么该业务就有负价值。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.

如下表数字所示，伯克希尔的保险业务一直是一个巨大的赢家。在表中，我们通过加总损失准备金、理赔费用准备金、分保业务持有的资金和未到期保费准备金，再减去代理人余额、预付收购成本、预付税款和分保业务相关的递延费用，汇总了我们的浮存金（相对于保费收入，我们产生的浮存金数额异常大）。浮存金的成本由我们的承保损失或利润决定。在我们有承保利润的年份（如过去两年），浮存金成本为负，我们将承保利润与浮存金收入相加来确定保险收益。

Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently looks.

查理和我对 1994 年浮存金增长感到高兴，更满意的是它被证明是零成本的。但我们今年的信息与 1993 年传达的相同：尽管我们有一项优秀的保险业务，但它并不像目前看起来那么好。

The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat" business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995 Kobe earthquake.

我们必须重复这一告诫的原因是，我们的“超级巨灾”业务（向保险公司和再保险公司出售保单，以保护它们免受特大灾害的影响）再次获得了高额利润。由于真正的大灾不常发生，我们的超级巨灾业务预计在大多数年份会显示大额利润，但偶尔会记录巨额亏损。换句话说，我们超级巨灾业务的吸引力需要很多年才能衡量。1994 年无疑应被视为接近最佳情况。我们唯一的大额损失来自 1 月份的加州地震。我还要补充一点，我们不预计会从 1995 年初的神户地震中遭受重大损失。

Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous.

超级巨灾保单数量少、金额大且非标准化。因此，承保这项业务需要的判断力远多于像汽车保单那样有大量数据可用的业务。在这方面伯克希尔有一个主要优势：我们的超级巨灾业务经理阿吉特·贾恩，他的承保技能是最优秀的。他对我们的价值简直是巨大的。

In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-cat business because of our towering financial strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.

此外，伯克希尔在超级巨灾业务中还有一个特殊优势，即我们强大的财务实力，这从两个方面帮助我们。第一，一个谨慎的保险公司希望其针对真正特大灾害的保障——例如长岛 500 亿美元的风暴损失或加州同等成本的地震——是绝对确定的。但同一家保险公司知道，使其依赖于巨灾赔付的灾难也恰恰是可能导致许多再保险公司违约的灾难。为一笔在需要时恰好失效的保障支付保费没有多大意义。因此，在难以想象的灾难之后，伯克希尔仍将具备偿付能力和流动性的确定性，对我们来说是一个主要的竞争优势。

The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for their own account.

我们资本实力的第二个好处是，我们可以承保其他人甚至无法考虑的金额。例如，在 1994 年，一家原保险公司希望购买 4 亿美元的加州地震短期保单，我们立即承保了。我们知道世界上没有其他公司会为自己的账户承担 4 亿美元或接近此金额的风险。

Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.

通常，经纪人试图通过将负担分散到若干小保单来安排大额保障。但充其量，这种保障需要相当长的时间来安排。与此同时，需要再保险的公司只能持有一个它不想要且可能严重威胁其生存的风险。而在伯克希尔，我们会在收到询价的同一天报出高达 5 亿美元的保障价格。业内没有其他公司会这样做。

By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.

通过以大宗方式承保，我们显然使伯克希尔面临不均衡的财务结果。这完全是我们能接受的：保险公司（以及其他企业）为了“平滑”报告盈利而采取次优策略的情况太常见了。通过接受波动性的前景，我们期望获得比追求可预测性更高的长期回报。

Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our "worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.

考虑到我们承担的风险，阿吉特和我不断关注我们的“最坏情况”，当然，我们知道很难判断这是什么，因为你可以想象在同一年发生长岛飓风、加州地震和超级巨灾 X。此外，保险损失可能伴随非保险的麻烦。例如，如果我们因南加州大地震而遭受超级巨灾损失，它们很可能会伴随着我们持有的喜诗糖果、富国银行和房地美价值的重大下跌。

All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega-catastrophe.

综合所有因素，我们相信现在超级巨灾的最坏情况保险损失税后约为 6 亿美元，这一金额将略超过伯克希尔来自其他来源的年度盈利。如果你对这种风险敞口水平感到不安，现在就是卖出你伯克希尔股票的时候，而不是在不可避免的特大灾难之后。

Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in 1995.

我们的超级巨灾业务量在 1995 年可能会下降。普通保单的价格有所下跌，几年前涌入再保险业务的资本洪流将倾向于追逐保费，无论其充足性如何。尽管如此，我们与一批重要客户保持着牢固的关系，他们将在 1995 年为我们提供大量业务。

Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.

伯克希尔的其他保险业务在 1994 年取得了出色业绩。我们的本州业务由罗德·埃尔德里德领导；我们的工人赔偿业务由布拉德·金斯勒负责；我们的信用卡业务由凯泽家族管理；National Indemnity 的传统汽车和一般责任业务由唐·沃斯特领导——所有这些都产生了显著的承保利润，并伴随着可观的浮存金。

We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

我们可以和去年一样结束这一部分：总而言之，我们拥有一流的保险业务。尽管其业绩会高度波动，但该业务拥有远超其账面价值的内在价值——事实上，比伯克希尔任何其他业务都更大。

Common Stock Investments

普通股投资

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面列出我们市值超过 3 亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不到 100% 的子公司。

Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).

我们的投资继续保持着数量少、概念简单的特点：真正的大投资想法通常可以用一小段话解释。我们喜欢具有持久竞争优势、由能干且以所有者为导向的人经营的企业。当这些特质存在，并且我们能以合理的价格购买时，很难出错（这是一个我们偶尔会设法克服的挑战）。

Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.

投资者应该记住，他们的计分不是用奥运跳水方法计算的：难度系数不计入。如果你对一个企业的判断是正确的，而该企业的价值主要依赖于一个既易于理解又持久的单一关键因素，那么回报与你正确分析了一个以许多不断变化的复杂变量为特征的投资替代方案是一样的。

We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess?

我们试图对购买进行定价，而不是择时。我们认为，因为对经济或股市（我们知道它们不可预测）的短期担忧，而放弃购买一家长期未来可预测的优秀企业的股票，是愚蠢的。为什么要因为一个无依据的猜测而放弃一个有依据的决定呢？

We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market?

我们在 1967 年购买了 National Indemnity，1972 年购买了喜诗糖果，1977 年购买了布法罗新闻报，1983 年购买了内布拉斯加家具店，1986 年购买了 Scott Fetzer，因为那些年份它们可以买到，并且我们认为其价格可以接受。在每种情况下，我们思考的是业务可能会做什么，而不是道琼斯指数、美联储或经济可能会做什么。如果我们认为这种方法在全额购买企业时是有道理的，那么在股票市场购买优秀企业的一小部分时，为什么我们要改变策略呢？

Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.

在考虑新投资之前，我们会考虑增持旧的投资。如果一家企业有足够的吸引力值得买一次，那么重复这个过程很可能是值得的。我们很想增加在喜诗糖果或 Scott Fetzer 的经济权益，但我们还没有找到在 100% 持股基础上再增持的方法。然而，在股票市场上，投资者经常有机会增加在他了解和喜欢的企业中的经济权益。去年我们朝这个方向走了，增持了可口可乐和美国运通。

Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents. It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.

我们与美国运通的历史渊源很深，事实上，它符合我从过往经历中提取当前投资决策的模式。例如，1951 年，GEICO 股票占我个人投资组合的 70%，GEICO 也是我作为证券推销员卖出的第一只股票（那时我 20 岁，卖了 100 股给我的爱丽丝姨妈，上帝保佑她，她会买我建议的任何东西）。25 年后，伯克希尔在 GEICO 面临破产威胁时购买了该公司的大量股权。另一个例子是华盛顿邮报，我最初投资资金中约有一半来自 1940 年代投递该报纸所得。三十年后，伯克希尔在该公司上市两年后购买了其大量股份。至于可口可乐，我的第一次商业冒险——在 1930 年代——是花 25 美分买一包六瓶装的可口可乐，然后每瓶卖 5 美分。我花了五十年才终于明白：真正的钱在糖浆里。

My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)

我投资美国运通的历史包括几个片段：1960 年代中期，在该公司因臭名昭著的沙拉油丑闻而股票受重创之后，我们将巴菲特合伙公司约 40% 的资金投入了该股票——这是合伙公司有史以来最大的一笔投资。我应该补充，这项投资使我们以 1300 万美元的成本获得了美国运通超过 5% 的股份。在我写这段话时，我们持有略低于 10% 的股份，成本为 13.6 亿美元。（美国运通 1964 年盈利 1250 万美元，1994 年盈利 14 亿美元。）

My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1 through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.

我与美国运通旗下 IDS 部门（如今贡献公司约三分之一的盈利）的历史渊源甚至更早。我第一次购买 IDS 股票是在 1953 年，当时它正快速增长，市盈率仅为 3 倍。（那些日子里有很多容易摘的果子。）我甚至为这家公司写了一份长篇报告——我写过短的吗？——通过《华尔街日报》的广告以 1 美元的价格出售。

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.

显然，美国运通和 IDS（最近更名为美国运通财务顾问）如今的业务与当时大不相同。尽管如此，我发现对一家公司及其产品的长期熟悉往往有助于评估它。

Mistake Du Jour

当日错误

Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie. But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow.

错误发生在决策之时。然而，我们只有在决策的愚蠢变得明显时才能颁发“当日错误”奖。按照这个标准，1994 年是金牌竞争激烈的黄金年份。在这里，我想告诉你们，我将要描述的错误源于查理。但每当我试图这样解释时，我的鼻子就开始变长。

And the nominees are . . .

候选者有……

Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5 million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in 1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.

1993 年底，我以 63 美元卖出了 1000 万股大都会/ABC；到 1994 年底，股价为 85.25 美元。（对于那些不想自己计算损失痛苦的人来说，差额是 2.225 亿美元。）当我们在 1986 年以 17.25 美元购买该股票时，我曾告诉你们，我在 1978-80 年间曾以每股 4.30 美元卖出过我们持有的大都会股票，并补充说我无法解释我早先的行为。现在我成了累犯。也许是时候找个监护人了。

Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September. In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an "unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large.

尽管大都会的决定令人发指，但它只获得银牌。最高荣誉属于我五年前犯下的一个错误，该错误在 1994 年完全成熟：我们以 3.58 亿美元购买全美航空优先股，该股息在 9 月被暂停。在 1990 年的年报中，我正确地称这笔交易为“非受迫性失误”，意思是既没有人强迫我进行这项投资，也没有人在我做决定时误导我。相反，这是一个草率分析的案例，这种失误可能是因为我们购买的是优先证券，或者是由于傲慢。无论原因如何，这个错误是巨大的。

Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high.

在这次购买之前，我只是没有关注那些成本高昂且极难降低的航空公司必然面临的问题。早些年，这些致命的成本几乎没有造成问题。当时航空公司受到监管保护免受竞争，航空公司可以吸收高成本，因为它们可以通过同样高昂的票价转嫁出去。

When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded.

当放松管制来临时，它并没有立即改变局面：低成本航空公司的运力如此之小，以至于高成本航线在很大程度上可以维持其现有的票价结构。在此期间，长期问题基本上不可见但缓慢扩散，不可持续的成本变得更加根深蒂固。

As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious to your Chairman, but I missed it.

随着低成本运营商的座位容量扩大，他们的票价开始迫使传统的高成本航空公司降低自己的票价。这些航空公司的清算日可以通过资本注入（如我们对全美航空的注资）推迟，但最终经济学的基本规则占了上风：在一个不受管制的大宗商品业务中，公司必须将成本降至具有竞争力的水平，否则将面临灭亡。这一原则对你们的主席本应显而易见，但我错过了。

Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear.

全美航空的 CEO 塞思·斯科菲尔德一直努力纠正公司的历史成本问题，但迄今为止未能成功。部分原因是他必须应对一个移动的目标，即某些主要航空公司获得了劳工让步，而其他航空公司则受益于破产程序中产生的“全新开始”成本。（正如西南航空 CEO 赫布·凯莱赫所说：“航空公司的破产法庭已经变成了健康水疗中心。”）此外，任何人都不应感到惊讶，那些合同约定获得高于市场水平薪水的航空公司员工，只要他们的支票能继续兑现，就会抵制任何减薪。

Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But it is far from sure that will happen.

尽管形势艰难，全美航空仍可能实现维持长期生存所需的成本削减。但这远非确定的事情。

Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5 million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it back the way that you lost it.

因此，我们将对全美航空的投资减记至 8950 万美元，相当于 1994 年底每美元面值 25 美分。这一估值既反映了我们的优先股可能完全或大部分恢复价值，也反映了最终可能一文不值的相反可能性。无论结果如何，我们将遵守一条主要投资规则：你不必用失去它的方式来挽回它。

The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated. Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.

我们减记全美航空的会计影响很复杂。根据 GAAP 会计，保险公司必须在资产负债表上按估计市值列示所有股票。因此，在去年第三季度末，我们将全美航空优先股记作 8950 万美元，即成本的 25%。换句话说，我们当时的净资产反映的全美航空价值远低于我们 3.58 亿美元的成本。

But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the diminution of value had already been reflected.

但在第四季度，我们得出结论，价值的下跌在会计上属于“非暂时性”，这一判断要求我们将 2.69 亿美元的减记通过利润表反映。这笔金额不会对第四季度产生其他影响。也就是说，它不会减少我们的净资产，因为价值的减损已经反映过了。

Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.

查理和我不会在即将举行的年度股东大会上竞选连任全美航空董事。但若塞思希望咨询我们，我们将乐意提供力所能及的帮助。

Miscellaneous

杂项

Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our gratitude.

去年，两位为伯克希尔股东做出巨大贡献的 CEO 退休了：大都会/ABC 的丹·伯克和富国银行的卡尔·赖卡特。近年来，丹和卡尔面临着非常严峻的行业环境。但他们的管理才能使他们经营的企业在这些时期结束后获得了创纪录的盈利、更多的光彩和光明的前景。此外，丹和卡尔为离职做好了充分准备，将公司留给了优秀的接班人。我们应当感谢他们。

About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities were recipients.

约 95.7% 的合格股份参与了伯克希尔 1994 年股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划捐赠的金额为 1040 万美元，共有 3300 家慈善机构受益。

Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51.

每年都有少数股东错过参与该计划，原因是在规定的登记日没有将股票登记在自己名下，或者未能在允许的 60 天内将指定表格寄回给我们。由于我们不会在不符合要求时破例，因此我们敦促新老股东阅读第 50-51 页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。

To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995 program.

要参与未来的计划，你必须确保你的股票以实际所有人的名义登记，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记。在 1995 年 8 月 31 日之前未如此登记的股票将没有资格参加 1995 年的计划。

We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.

我们在 1994 年仅进行了一次小型收购——一家小型零售鞋连锁店——但我们寻找好目标的兴趣一如既往地浓厚。我们用于购买或合并的标准详见第 21 页的附录。

Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.

去年春天，我们提出以包括伯克希尔可转换优先股的条款与一家大型家族企业合并。虽然我们未能达成协议，但这件事让我意识到，我们需要请求股东授权发行优先股，以备将来出现类似收购机会时我们能够迅速行动。因此，我们的委托书提出了一项提案，请求你们授权大量的优先股，这些股票将按董事会设定的条款发行。你们可以放心，查理和我在没有完全确信获得的内在价值等于我们所给付的价值之前，不会使用这些股份。

Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another 1,000 people.

查理和我希望你们能来参加年度股东大会——在一个新地点。去年，我们略微超过了奥菲姆剧院 2,750 个座位的容量，因此我们将于 1995 年 5 月 1 日星期一上午 9:30 在假日会议中心集合。中心的主厅可容纳 3,300 人，如有需要，我们将在相邻房间配备音视频设备，可再容纳 1,000 人。

Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications. All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate.

去年我们在会议上展示了一些伯克希尔的产品，因此售出了约 800 磅糖果、507 双鞋，以及超过 12,000 美元的世界图书及相关出版物。所有这些商品今年将再次提供。尽管我们喜欢把会议视为一种精神体验，但我们必须记住，即使是最不世俗的宗教也包括奉献盘的仪式。

Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate attire.

当然，你真正应该购买的是 1995 年橙碗比赛的录像带。你们的主席每晚观看这场经典比赛，在第四节切换到慢动作。我们今年的封面颜色是对内布拉斯加大学橄榄球教练汤姆·奥斯本和他的 Cornhuskers 队——全国顶尖大学球队——的致敬。我敦促你们在年会上穿着 Husker 队的红色服装，并向你们保证，你们的两人管理团队中至少有一人会穿着合适的服装。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议你们立即预订会议的酒店房间，因为我们预计会有大量人群。喜欢住在市中心（距离会议中心约 6 英里）的人可以选择 Radisson Redick Tower（88 间客房，小巧但不错）或几个街区外更大的红狮酒店。会议中心附近有假日酒店（403 间客房）、Homewood Suites（118 间客房）和汉普顿酒店（136 间客房）。另一个推荐地点是万豪酒店，其西奥马哈分店距离 Borsheim 约 100 码，距离会议中心 10 分钟车程。万豪酒店将有巴士在 8:45 和 9:00 出发前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting.

我们的代理材料附件说明了如何获取进入会议所需的卡片。会议中心有相当大的停车场，而住在假日酒店、Homewood Suites 和汉普顿酒店的股东可以步行到会场。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor.

像往常一样，我们将安排巴士在会议后送你们去内布拉斯加家具店和 Borsheim，然后再从那里送你们去酒店或机场。我希望你们特别努力参观内布拉斯加家具店，因为它已经开设了 Mega Mart，一个真正的零售奇迹，销售电子产品、电器、电脑、CD、相机和音响设备。开业以来销售火爆，你们会对产品的种类和店内的陈列感到惊讶。

The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that matter, an hour.

Mega Mart 紧邻 NFM 的主店，位于会议中心以北约两英里处，占地 64 英亩。商店营业时间为：周五 10:00-21:00，周六 10:00-18:00，周日 12:00-18:00。你在那里时一定要向 B 夫人问好，她 101 岁高龄，仍在我们 B 夫人仓库辛勤工作。她从不缺席一天——甚至一小时。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.

Borsheim 通常在周日关门，但将在周日中午至下午 6 点为股东及其嘉宾开放。这总是一个特殊的日子，我们将试图带来一些惊喜。通常这是一年中最大的销售日，所以不止一个原因，查理和我也希望在那里见到你们。

On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will need plenty of vocal support.

4 月 29 日（周六）晚上，罗森布拉特体育场将举行奥马哈皇家队对阵布法罗野牛队的棒球比赛。布法罗队是我的朋友明迪和小鲍勃·里奇拥有的，我希望他们能来。如果这样，我会试着说服鲍勃在投手丘上进行一次投球对决。鲍勃是资本家的兰迪·约翰逊——年轻、强壮、运动能力好——不是那种你想在赛季初面对的人。所以我需要大量的呐喊支持。

The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be all smoke.

委托书将包含获取球赛门票的信息。去年约有 1,400 名股东参加了活动。那天晚上我为比赛开球，我状态不错，投出了一个好球，计分板显示速度为 8 英里/小时。许多球迷没有注意到的是，我拒绝接球手要求投快球的手势，而是投了一个变速球。今年将全是烟雾弹。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 7, 1995

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
1995年3月7日