1988 年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

1988年我们的净值增长为5.69亿美元，即20.0%。在过去24年（即自现任管理层接管以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到2,974.52美元，年复合增长率为23.0%。

We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

我们在过去的报告中强调，真正重要的是内在商业价值——这个数字必然是一个估计值，表明我们所有组成业务的价值。根据我们的计算，伯克希尔的内在商业价值显著超过其账面价值。在过去24年中，商业价值增长略快于账面价值；然而，1988年账面价值增长稍快。

Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.

伯克希尔过去在账面价值和商业价值上的增长率是在与现在截然不同的环境下实现的。忽视这些差异的人会犯下与棒球经理相同的错误：仅凭职业生涯打击率判断一位42岁中外野手的未来前景。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.

当前影响我们前景的重要不利因素包括：(1) 股票市场的吸引力不如过去24年；(2) 大多数投资收入的公司税率更高；(3) 企业收购市场定价远高于以往；(4) 资本城/ABC公司、GEICO公司和华盛顿邮报公司——伯克希尔的三大永久投资，约占我们净值的一半——的行业条件比五到十年前略差或明显不利。所有这些公司都有杰出的管理和强大的资产。但以当前价格，它们的上涨潜力对我们来说远不如几年前那么令人兴奋。

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)

然而，我们面临的主要问题是日益增长的资本基础。你们以前听我们说过，但这个问题就像年龄一样，每年都变得更加重要。（而且，就像年龄一样，让这个问题继续增长也比“解决”它更好。）

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)

四年前我告诉过你们，要实现接下来十年15%的年回报率，我们需要39亿美元的利润。今天，对于下一个十年，15%的回报率需要103亿美元的利润。这对我和查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人）来说，似乎是一个非常巨大的数字。（如果这个数字确实太大，查理会在未来的报告中被追认资深合伙人。）

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.

作为对我们日益增长的资本基础对回报产生拖累的部分抵消，我们现在拥有一个24年前缺乏的非常重要的优势。那时，我们所有的资本都被束缚在纺织业务上，其经济特征不可避免地糟糕。如今，我们的部分资本投资于一些真正卓越的业务。

Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.

去年，我们称这些业务为“圣徒七杰”：布法罗新闻报、费奇海默、柯比、内布拉斯加家具城、斯科特·费泽制造集团、喜诗糖果和世界图书。1988年，圣徒们大显身手。您可以查看第45页的历史成本财务报表，其中合并了圣徒七杰和几个较小单位的数字，看看它们的资本回报率有多么惊人。在没有任何财务杠杆的情况下，该集团的平均股本回报率约为67%。

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

在大多数情况下，这些单位的卓越表现部分源于杰出的商业特许经营权；而在所有情况下，卓越的管理都是至关重要的因素。查理和我的贡献就是不干涉这些管理者。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.

依我看，这些业务总体而言将继续产生出色的回报。我们需要这些：没有这种帮助，伯克希尔不可能实现15%的目标。你们可以放心，我们的运营经理会交出成绩；未来的问号是查理和我能否有效运用他们产生的资金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.

在这方面，我们在1989年初迈出了正确的一步，收购了奥马哈珠宝企业波珊珠宝80%的权益。此次收购（在本信后面描述）恰好符合我们的期望：一家由我们喜欢、敬佩和信任的人经营的杰出企业。这是一个很好的新年开局。

Accounting Changes

会计变更

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

我们已经进行了一项1988年强制要求的重要会计变更，并且可能在1990年还需要进行另一项。当我们年复一年地调整数字，而经济现实没有任何变化时，我们那总是令人兴奋的会计讨论之一就是必要的。

First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the shareholder-owners of the corporation?

首先，我照例声明：尽管公认会计原则（GAAP）有缺陷，但我不愿意承担设计一套更好规则的工作。然而，现有规则的局限性不应成为阻碍：首席执行官可以自由地将GAAP报表视为告知所有者和债权人义务的起点而非终点——他们确实应该这样做。毕竟，任何子公司经理如果只报告最基本的GAAP数字，而省略了其老板（母公司CEO）所需的关键信息，他会陷入困境。那么，为什么CEO本人要向他的老板——公司的股东所有者——隐瞒对他们至关重要的信息呢？

What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?

需要报告的是数据——无论是GAAP、非GAAP还是额外GAAP——这些数据能帮助具备财务知识的读者回答三个关键问题：(1) 这家公司大约值多少钱？(2) 它履行未来义务的可能性有多大？(3) 考虑到它们所面临的局面，管理层的工作做得如何？

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

在大多数情况下，这些问题中的一个或多个答案很难甚至不可能从最简化的GAAP陈述中获取。商业世界过于复杂，单一规则无法有效描述所有企业的经济现实，尤其是像伯克希尔这样经营多种业务的企业。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

使问题更加复杂的是，许多管理层不把GAAP视为要遵守的标准，而是视为要克服的障碍。他们的会计师往往乐于协助。（客户问：“二加二等于多少？”合作的会计师回答：“您心里想的是多少？”）即使是诚实善意的管理层，有时也会稍微曲解GAAP，以便呈现他们认为更能恰当描述业绩的数字。无论是平滑收益还是“大洗澡”季度，都是正直管理层使用的“善意谎言”技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.

还有一些管理层积极利用GAAP进行欺骗和欺诈。他们知道许多投资者和债权人将GAAP结果视为真理。因此，这些骗子“富有想象力地”解释规则，并以技术上符合GAAP但实际上向世界展示经济幻象的方式记录商业交易。

As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.

只要投资者——包括所谓精明的机构——对稳步攀升的报告“收益”赋予高估值，你可以肯定，一些管理者和发起人就会利用GAAP来制造这样的数字，无论真相如何。多年来，查理和我观察到许多规模惊人的会计欺诈。很少有肇事者受到惩罚；许多人甚至没有受到谴责。用笔窃取巨款比用枪窃取小钱安全得多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

根据GAAP对1988年强制实施的一项重大变更，我们需要在资产负债表和收益表中完全合并所有子公司。过去，共同储蓄贷款公司和斯科特·费泽金融公司（一家主要为主业图书和柯比产品分期销售提供融资的信贷公司）是按“一行法”合并的。这意味着我们(1)在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表上，将我们在它们合并净资产中的权益作为单项资产列示；(2)在合并收益表中，将我们在它们合并年度收益中的权益作为单行收入项列示。现在规则要求我们在资产负债表中合并这些公司的每一项资产和负债，在收益表中合并它们每一项收入和费用。

This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这一变更凸显了公司也需要报告分部分数据的必要性：传统财务报表中将经济多元化的业务运营合并得越多，这些陈述的用处就越小，投资者回答前面提出的三个问题的能力也越弱。事实上，我们在伯克希尔编制合并数字的唯一原因是为了满足外部要求。另一方面，查理和我经常研究我们的分部数据。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.

既然我们被要求在GAAP报表中合并更多数字，我们决定发布额外的补充信息，我们认为这将有助于你们衡量商业价值和管理层表现。（伯克希尔履行对债权人义务的能力——我们列出的第三个问题——应该是显而易见的，无论你们检查哪些报表。）在这些补充陈述中，我们不一定遵循GAAP程序，甚至不遵循公司结构。相反，我们将尝试以有助于分析但不会用细节淹没你的方式合并主要业务活动。我们的目标是以如果我们角色互换时我们希望得到的形式，向你们提供重要信息。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

在第41-47页，我们分别显示了以下各项的合并资产负债表和收益表：(1) 从事金融类业务的子公司，即共同储蓄和斯科特·费泽金融；(2) 保险业务，并逐项列示其主要投资头寸；(3) 制造、出版和零售业务，并撇开某些非经营性资产和购买价格会计调整；(4) 一个“其他”类别，包括(3)中公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是可流通证券）以及Wesco和伯克希尔母公司的各种资产和债务。

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)

如果你将这四个分部的收益和净资产相加，你会得到与GAAP报表所示相同的总数。但我们要强调的是，我们的新陈述不属于审计师的范围，他们绝不认可它。（事实上，他们可能会感到震惊；我不想问。）

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.

我早些时候提到过预计在1990年进行的一项GAAP重大变更。这项变更涉及递延税项的计算，既复杂又有争议，以至于其实施原定于1989年，但被推迟了一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

实施后，新规则将在多个方面影响我们。最重要的是，我们将被要求改变计算保险公司持有的股票未实现增值的递延税负债的方式。

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.

目前，我们的负债是分层计算的。对于追溯到1986年及更早年份的12亿美元未实现增值，我们按28%税率计提了税负。对于此后积累的6亿美元未实现增值，按34%税率计提。差异反映了1987年生效的税率上调。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.

然而，现在看来，新的会计规则将要求我们在1990年按34%确定全部负债，并从收益中扣除。假设到1990年税率不变，这一步将使我们在该年度的收益（以及由此报告的净资产）减少7100万美元。拟议的规则也会影响我们资产负债表上的其他项目，但这些变化对收益和净资产的影响很小。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

我们对这项递延税计算变化的可取性没有强烈看法。但我们应该指出，28%或34%的税负都不能精确描述伯克希尔的经济现实，因为我们没有计划出售我们持有大部分收益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计不感兴趣的股东，我为这篇冗长的论述道歉。我知道你们很多人并不仔细研究我们的数字，而是持有伯克希尔主要是因为知道：(1) 查理和我把大部分资金投在伯克希尔；(2) 我们打算经营公司，使你们的收益或损失与我们的成正比；(3) 迄今为止的记录令人满意。这种“信仰”投资方式并没有什么必然的错误。然而，其他股东更喜欢“分析”方式，我们希望提供他们需要的信息。在我们自己的投资中，我们寻找两种方式给出相同答案的情况。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益来源

In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings just as we have in the past.

除了向你们提供我们新的四部门会计材料外，我们将继续像过去一样列出伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。

In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

在下表中，商誉摊销和其他重大购买价格会计调整不按各自适用的业务扣除，而是汇总后单独列示。这一程序使您能够看到如果我们没有购买这些业务，它们本应报告的收益。我在过去的报告中解释过，为什么这种陈述形式在我们看来比标准GAAP陈述（按业务逐项进行购买价格调整）对投资者和管理者更有用。当然，表中显示的总净收益与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额相同。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group.

*不包括斯科特·费泽金融集团的利息费用。

The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.

我们的运营业务取得的收益非常出色，无论是按绝对值衡量还是与竞争对手相比。为此，我们感谢我们的运营经理：你我是有幸与他们为伍的。

At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.

在伯克希尔，这样的合作关系持续很久。我们不会仅仅因为达到特定年龄——无论是传统上的65岁，还是1988年光明节前夕B太太达到的95岁——就将超级明星从阵容中移除。杰出的管理者是稀缺资源，不能仅仅因为蛋糕上蜡烛多了就丢弃。此外，我们对新出炉的MBA的经历并不那么美好。他们的学业成绩总是看起来很棒，候选人总是知道该说什么；但他们往往缺乏对公司的个人承诺和整体商业智慧。老狗学不会新把戏。

Here’s an update on our major non-insurance operations:

以下是我们主要非保险业务的最新情况：

o At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She’s been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.

o 在内布拉斯加家具城，B太太（罗斯·布兰肯）和她的推车不断前行。她已经当了51年的老板，44岁时用500美元创立了这家企业。（想想如果她有1000美元会怎样！）对B太太来说，衰老总是还有十年之遥。

The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.

家具城长期以来一直是全美最大的家居用品商店，并且持续增长。秋季，该店开设了一个独立的20,000平方英尺的清仓中心，增强了我们在各个价格区间提供优惠的能力。

Recently Dillard’s, one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard’s runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: “We don’t want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.”

最近，全美最成功的百货公司之一Dillard's进入了奥马哈市场。在其许多门店中，Dillard's设有完整的家具部门，在该领域无疑表现出色。然而，在奥马哈开业前不久，公司董事长威廉·迪拉德宣布，他的新店不会销售家具。他谈到NFM时说：“我们不想和他们竞争。我们认为他们是最棒的。”

At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.

在布法罗新闻报，我们颂扬广告的价值，而我们在NFM的政策证明我们言行一致。过去三年中，NFM一直是《奥马哈世界先驱报》最大的ROP广告客户。（ROP广告是指印在报纸上的广告，与预印插页广告相对。）据我所知，在其他任何主要市场，家居用品运营商都不是报纸的主要客户。有时，我们还在远至得梅因、苏城和堪萨斯城的报纸上投放大型广告——总是效果良好。只要你提供有价值的东西，做广告确实是值得的。

Mrs. B’s son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It’s a joy to work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.

B太太的儿子路易和她的孙子罗恩、伊夫组成了成功的布兰肯团队。与这个家族共事是一种快乐。所有成员都拥有与其非凡能力相匹配的品格。

o Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look foolish.

o 去年我明确表示布法罗新闻报的税前利润率将在1988年下降。这个预测对我们规模或更大的几乎任何其他报纸都会是正确的。但斯坦·利西——保佑他——却让我显得愚蠢。

Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our “newshole” percentage - the portion of the paper devoted to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.

尽管去年我们的提价幅度略低于行业平均水平，尽管新闻纸成本和工资率按行业标准上升，斯坦实际上还略微提高了利润率。在报业中，没有谁的经营记录比他更好。此外，他在经营一家为读者提供大量新闻的报纸的同时实现了这一成就。我们相信，我们的“新闻洞”比例——报纸用于新闻的部分——比任何其他同等规模或更大规模的强势报纸都要高。1988年这一比例为49.5%，而1987年为49.8%。我们致力于将其保持在50%左右，无论利润率水平或趋势如何。

Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.

查理和我从小热爱报业，自12年前购买该报以来，我们一直乐在其中。我们很幸运，当时找到了顶级编辑默里·莱特，他让我们从此为这份报纸感到骄傲。

o See’s Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.

o 喜诗糖果在1988年销售了创纪录的2510万磅。10月底前景并不乐观，但出色的圣诞销量（远高于1987年的纪录）扭转了局势。

As we’ve told you before, See’s business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out of $32.5 million before tax. (It’s enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December’s deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire’s corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.

我们之前告诉过你们，喜诗的业务越来越集中在圣诞节。1988年，该公司在12月赚取了全年利润的创纪录的90%：税前利润3250万美元中的2900万美元。（这足以让你相信圣诞老人。）12月的业务洪流给伯克希尔的公司收益带来了适度的季节性膨胀。另一个小膨胀发生在第一季度，此时大部分世界图书年鉴售出。

Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See’s about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.

查理和我在购买公司大约五分钟后就让查克·哈金斯负责喜诗。回顾他的记录，你可能想知道我们为什么花了那么久。

o At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that’s exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: “There’s a lot of heredity in that family.”)

o 在费奇海默，赫尔德曼家族——鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德——是辛辛那提版的布兰肯家族。家具零售业和制服制造业本质上都不具有吸引力的经济特性。在这些行业中，只有杰出的管理层才能带来高额的投入资本回报。而这正是赫尔德曼五兄弟所做的。（正如大都会队解说员拉尔夫·基纳在比较投手史蒂夫·特劳特和他的父亲、底特律老虎队著名投手迪齐·特劳特时所说：“这个家族有很多遗传。”）

Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500 - in which we would exhibit similar confidence.

费奇海默在1988年进行了一次规模相当大的收购。查理和我对赫尔德曼家族的商业智慧充满信心，甚至没有看一眼就批准了交易。在任何地方，包括管理《财富》500强顶级公司的管理层，我们很少表现出同样的信心。

Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.

由于这次收购和一些内部增长，费奇海默1989年的销售额应该会大幅增长。

o All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.

o 由拉尔夫·谢伊管理的所有业务——世界图书、柯比和斯科特·费泽制造集团——在1988年表现出色。委托给拉尔夫的资本回报率持续优异。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.

在斯科特·费泽制造集团内，其最大的单位坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德取得了特别好的进展。这家公司是美国中小型空气压缩机的领先生产商，自1986年以来收益翻了一番多。

Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country’s largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.

柯比和世界图书的销量在1988年均大幅增长，出口业务尤其强劲。世界图书于9月在苏联上市，当时该国最大的美国书店在莫斯科开业。我们的百科全书是店内唯一的综合性百科全书。

Ralph’s personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.

拉尔夫的个人生产力令人惊叹：除了出色地管理19个业务外，他还活跃于克利夫兰诊所、俄亥俄大学、凯斯西储大学以及一家风险投资公司，该公司孕育了16家俄亥俄州的公司并复兴了许多其他公司。俄亥俄州和伯克希尔都很幸运有拉尔夫在。

Borsheim’s

波珊珠宝

It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: “Are there any more at home like you?” Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.

1983年，伯克希尔购买了内布拉斯加家具城80%的权益。当时主席先生犯了一个错误，没有问B太太一个任何学童都会想到的问题：“家里还有像你这样的人吗？”上个月我纠正了这个错误：我们现在与该家族的另一支成为80%的合伙人。

After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B’s earlier odyssey to the east through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work - and that’s all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.

B太太于1917年从俄罗斯过来后，她的父母和五个兄弟姐妹也跟随而来。（她的另外两个兄弟姐妹先于她到来。）其中一位姐妹是丽贝卡·弗里德曼，她和丈夫路易斯于1922年经拉脱维亚向西逃亡，其旅程与B太太早先经满洲向东的奥德赛一样危险。当家庭成员在奥马哈重聚时，他们没有有形资产。但他们拥有非凡的智慧、正直和对工作的热情组合——这就是他们所需要的。此后他们证明自己是不可战胜的。

In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.

1948年，弗里德曼先生购买了波珊珠宝，一家奥马哈的小型珠宝店。1950年，他的儿子艾克加入生意，随着时间的推移，艾克的儿子艾伦以及女婿马文·科恩和唐纳德·耶鲁也加入了进来。

You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.

你们不会惊讶地发现，这个家族将布兰肯家族在家具业务中的方法原封不动地带到了珠宝业务中。两家企业的基石都是B太太的信条：“卖得便宜，说实话。”两家业务的其他基本要素包括：(1) 单店经营，拥有巨大库存，为顾客提供各个价格区间的广泛选择；(2) 高层管理人员每天关注细节；(3) 快速周转；(4) 精明的采购；(5) 极低的费用。最后三个因素的结合使两家店铺能够提供全美无人能及的日常价格。

Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.

大多数人在购买珠宝时，无论在其他方面多么老练，都感到像林中的婴儿。他们既无法判断质量，也无法判断价格。对他们来说，只有一条规则有意义：如果你不懂珠宝，就要懂珠宝商。

I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so - - and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.

我可以向你们保证，信任艾克·弗里德曼及其家族的人永远不会失望。我们购买他们业务权益的方式是最好的证明。波珊珠宝没有经审计的财务报表；尽管如此，我们没有盘点存货、核实应收账款或以任何方式审计运营。艾克只是告诉我们实际情况——在此基础上，我们起草了一份一页的合同，开出了一张大额支票。

Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.

随着弗里德曼家族声誉的传播，波珊珠宝的生意近年来迅速增长。现在顾客从全国各地来到这家店。其中包括我从东海岸和西海岸的一些朋友，他们后来感谢我带他们去那里。

Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.

波珊珠宝与伯克希尔的新联系不会改变其经营方式。弗里德曼家族的所有成员将继续像以前一样经营；查理和我将置身事外，待在我们该在的位置。当我们说“所有成员”时，这个词有实际意义。弗里德曼夫妇分别为88岁和87岁，每天在店里。艾克、艾伦、马文和唐纳德的妻子在忙碌时都来帮忙，第四代正开始学习门道。

It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.

与长期钦佩的人合作是非常有趣的。弗里德曼家族和布兰肯家族一样，因为值得成功而获得了成功。两个家族都关注什么对顾客有利，这不可避免地也为他们带来了好处。我们找不到更好的合作伙伴了。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下面是我们通常展示保险行业关键数据表格的更新版本：

Source: A.M. Best Co.

资料来源：A.M. Best公司

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率表示保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入之比：低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示亏损。考虑到保险公司持有保单持有人资金（“浮存金”）所赚取的投资收益，综合比率在107-111范围通常产生总体盈亏平衡的结果，不包括股东提供资金所赚取的收益。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.

出于此前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计行业已发生损失将以每年约10%的速度增长，即使在整体通胀率低得多的年份也是如此。如果同时保费增长大幅落后于10%的增长率，承保亏损将增加，尽管行业在业务转差时准备金不足的倾向可能暂时掩盖其规模。如表所示，行业承保亏损在1988年有所增长。这一趋势几乎肯定会持续——而且可能加速——至少再持续两年。

The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.

财产意外险行业不仅盈利低于正常水平，而且受欢迎程度也低于正常水平。（正如萨姆·高德温的哲学格言：“生活中，一个人必须学会接受苦与酸。”）商业的讽刺之一是，许多相对无利可图的行业因价格不足而困扰，却习惯性地受到愤怒顾客的抨击，而其他利润丰厚的行业无论价格多高，都免受投诉。

Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.

以早餐麦片行业为例，其投入资本回报率是汽车保险行业的两倍多（这就是为什么凯洛格和通用磨坊等公司以五倍账面价值出售，而大多数大型保险公司接近账面价值出售）。麦片公司定期提价，其中很少有与成本大幅上涨相关的。然而消费者毫无怨言。但当汽车保险公司以甚至无法匹配成本增长的幅度提价时，顾客却愤怒不已。如果你想被爱，显然卖高价玉米片比卖低价汽车保险更好。

The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)

公众对行业的不满可能带来严重后果：去年秋天通过的加州103号提案威胁要大幅压低汽车保险价格，尽管成本一直在飙升。在法院审查该提案期间，降价已被暂停，但引发投票的怨恨并未消散：即使该提案被推翻，保险公司也可能会发现在加州难以盈利经营。（谢天谢地，市民不讨厌夹心巧克力：如果103号提案也适用于糖果，喜诗将被迫以每磅5.76美元的价格出售产品，而不是我们收取的7.60美元——并且会亏得血本无归。）

The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

该提案对伯克希尔的直接影响很小，因为我们在投票前加州存在的费率结构中看到很少获利机会。然而，价格强制下调将严重影响GEICO，我们持有44%股权的被投资公司，其约10%的保费收入来自加州。对GEICO更具威胁的是，其他州也通过提案或立法采取类似定价行动的可能性。

If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.

如果选民坚持要求汽车保险定价低于成本，那么最终必须由政府提供。股东可以短期补贴保单持有人，但只有纳税人可以长期补贴他们。对于大多数财产意外险公司，社会化汽车保险对股东来说并非灾难。由于该行业的商品特性，大多数保险公司收益平庸，因此如果被政府强制退出汽车保险业务，很少或没有经济商誉损失。但GEICO，由于它是能够获得高股本回报的低成本生产商，面临大量经济商誉风险。相应地，我们也是如此。

At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.

在伯克希尔，1988年我们的保费收入继续下降，1989年我们将因一个特殊原因经历大幅下降：我们获得Fireman's Fund业务7%的合同将于8月31日到期。届时，我们将把与该合同相关的未赚保费返还给Fireman's Fund。这笔资金转移将在我们的“承保保费”账户中显示为负约8500万美元，将使我们的第三季度数据看起来相当奇特。不过，该合同的终止不会对利润产生重大影响。

Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.

伯克希尔1988年的承保结果持续优异。我们的综合比率（按法定基础，不包括结构化结算和财务再保险）为104。在连续多年非常不令人满意之后，准备金发展连续第二年有利。有关承保和准备金发展的详细信息见第36-38页。

Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.

未来几年我们的保险业务量可能非常低，因为具有合理盈利潜力的业务几乎肯定稀少。就这样吧。在伯克希尔，我们根本不会以预期会导致经济损失的费率承保保单。即使我们预期盈利时，遭遇的麻烦也够多了。

Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管——或者可能正因为——业务量低，未来几年我们的盈利前景很可能比行业亮眼得多。与保费量相比，我们肯定拥有异常多的浮存金，这对利润是好兆头。在1989年和1990年，我们预计浮存金/保费比率至少是典型财产意外险公司的三倍。迈克·戈德堡，在阿吉特·贾因、迪诺斯·约丹努和国家赔偿管理团队的特殊帮助下，在这方面使我们处于有利地位。

At some point - we don’t know when - we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

在某个时刻——我们不知道何时——我们将被保险业务淹没。原因可能是某种重大的物理或金融灾难。但我们也可能经历业务爆炸，就像1985年那样，因为其他公司巨大且不断增长的承保亏损与它们意识到自己严重准备金不足同时发生。与此同时，我们将保留我们的有才华的专业人员，保护资本，并努力不犯重大错误。

Marketable Securities

可流通证券

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long- term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险公司选择可流通证券时，我们可以在五大类别中进行选择：(1) 长期普通股投资，(2) 中期固定收益证券，(3) 长期固定收益证券，(4) 短期现金等价物，以及(5) 短期套利承诺。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

我们在这些类别中做出选择时没有特别的偏好。我们只是持续在其中寻找用“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，始终将自己限制在我们认为理解的投资选择上。我们的标准与最大化立即报告的收益无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终的净资产。

o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

o 下面列出我们的普通股持股，价值超过1亿美元，不包括套利承诺（将在后面讨论）。这些投资的一小部分属于伯克希尔持有不足100%的子公司。

*Although nominally a preferred stock, this security is financially equivalent to a common stock.

*虽然名义上是优先股，但该证券在财务上等同于普通股。

Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们的永久持股——资本城/ABC公司、GEICO公司和华盛顿邮报公司——保持不变。我们对它们管理层的无保留钦佩也丝毫未变：资本城的汤姆·墨菲和丹·伯克，GEICO的比尔·斯奈德和卢·辛普森，以及华盛顿邮报的凯·格雷厄姆和迪克·西蒙斯。查理和我非常欣赏这些管理者为其业务带来的才华和正直。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

我们近距离观察到的他们的表现，与许多CEO形成鲜明对比，所幸我们是从安全距离观察这些CEO的。有时这些CEO显然不适合他们的工作；然而，他们的职位通常稳固。企业管理最大的讽刺是，不称职的CEO保住工作远比不称职的下属容易得多。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can’t make the grade, you’re out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.

例如，如果一名秘书被聘用从事一项要求至少每分钟80字打字能力的工作，而结果只能达到每分钟50字，她会立刻失去工作。这项工作有逻辑标准；绩效容易衡量；如果你达不到标准，你就会被淘汰。同样，如果新的销售人员未能迅速产生足够的业务，他们会被解雇。借口不能替代订单。

However, a CEO who doesn’t perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.

然而，一位表现不佳的CEO往往被无限期留用。一个原因是他的工作绩效标准很少存在。即使有，也常常模糊不清，或者即使绩效差距重大且反复出现，也可以被豁免或解释掉。在太多公司，老板射出管理绩效的箭，然后匆忙在落点周围画上靶心。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

老板与小兵之间的另一个重要但鲜为人知的区别是，CEO没有直接上司，其自身的绩效也正在被衡量。销售经理如果留用一批不称职的销售人员，他自己很快会陷入困境。立即清除自己的招聘错误符合他的直接自身利益。否则，他自己可能被清除。聘用了无能秘书的办公室经理面临同样的问题。

But the CEO’s boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但CEO的老板是董事会，它很少衡量自己，也很少因公司业绩不达标而被问责。如果董事会在聘用上犯了错误，并延续这个错误，那又怎样？即使公司因错误而被收购，这笔交易可能会给即将离任的董事会成员带来大量好处。（他们越大，摔得越软。）

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO’s performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后，董事会与CEO之间的关系应该和谐。在董事会上，批评CEO的业绩常被视为社交上的打嗝。办公室经理在批评不达标的打字员时没有这样的顾忌。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.

这些观点不应被理解为对CEO或董事会的全面谴责：大多数人有能力且勤奋，许多确实杰出。但查理和我看到的管理缺陷使我们感激与三大永久持股的管理层联系在一起。他们热爱自己的业务，像所有者一样思考，并散发出正直和能力。

o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (“Freddie Mac”) and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

o 1988年我们大笔买入了联邦住宅贷款抵押公司优先股（“房地美”）和可口可乐。我们期望长期持有这些证券。事实上，当我们拥有杰出企业的一部分股份，且管理层杰出时，我们最喜欢的持有期是永远。我们与那些在公司表现良好时急于卖出获利、却顽固持有令人失望业务的人截然相反。彼得·林奇恰当地将这种行为比作剪掉鲜花而浇灌野草。我们对房地美的持股是法律允许的最大数量，查理在他的信中详细描述。在我们的合并资产负债表中，这些股份按成本而非市值计价，因为它们由非保险子公司共同储蓄贷款公司持有。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

我们继续将投资集中在少数我们努力深入了解的公司上。只有少数企业我们对其有强烈的长期信念。因此，当我们找到这样的企业时，我们希望以有意义的方式参与。我们同意梅·韦斯特的话：“好东西太多也可以很美妙。”

o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the “tax-exempt” interest earned is subject to tax.

o 去年我们将中期免税债券的头寸减少了约1亿美元。所有出售的债券都是在1986年8月7日之后购买的。当财产意外险公司持有此类债券时，赚取的“免税”利息中有15%需要缴税。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds “grandfathered” under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.

我们仍持有的8亿美元头寸几乎全部由根据1986年《税收改革法案》“豁免”的债券组成，这意味着它们完全免税。我们的出售产生了小额利润，剩余债券的平均期限约为六年，其价值略高于账面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.

去年我们描述了我们持有的当时处于破产状态的德士古的短期和中期债券。1988年，我们几乎全部出售了这些债券，获得约2200万美元的税前利润。这笔出售解释了资产负债表中固定收益证券减少的近1亿美元。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还告诉过你们我们持有的另一种证券，其主要特征类似于中期固定收益发行：我们在所罗门公司9%可转换优先股上的7亿美元头寸。该优先股设有偿债基金，将在1995年至1999年每年等额赎回。伯克希尔按成本持有此项投资。由于查理在第69页讨论的原因，我们持有的预估市值已从去年年底略低于成本改善到1988年底略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred’s value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

过去一年我们与所罗门CEO约翰·古特弗罗因德的密切交往加深了我们对他的钦佩。但我们仍然对投资银行业务的短期、中期或长期经济前景没有深刻见解：这个行业不容易预测未来的盈利水平。我们仍然相信，在我们的优先股存续期内，转换特权可能具有重要价值。然而，优先股的绝大部分价值在于其固定收益特征，而非股权特征。

o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn’t in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about $352 million.

o 我们并未失去对长期债券的厌恶。只有当我们对货币购买力的长期稳定前景感到兴奋时，我们才会对这些证券感到兴奋。而这种稳定是不可能的：社会和民选官员有太多与购买力稳定相冲突的更高优先级事项。我们持有的唯一长期债券是华盛顿公共电力供应系统（WPPSS）的债券。我们的一些WPPSS债券期限较短，其他许多由于高票息，可能在几年内被赎回并偿还。总体而言，我们的WPPSS持有量在资产负债表上按2.47亿美元计价，市值约为3.52亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s. They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在1983年年报中解释了购买WPPSS的原因，很高兴告诉你们，这笔投资的结果与预期大致相符。购买时，我们的大部分债券税后收益率约17%，且无评级（评级已被暂停）。最近，这些债券被标准普尔评为AA-。现在它们的售价仅略低于最高等级信用债券的水平。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.

在1983年的报告中，我们将WPPSS购买的经济效益与购买企业进行了比较。结果证明，假设都按截至1988年的无杠杆税后回报衡量，这笔购买的实际效果优于1983年的一般企业收购。

Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.

我们的WPPSS经历虽然令人愉快，但并未改变我们对长期债券的负面看法。它只让我们希望遇到其他大型污名化发行，其困境导致市场对其严重误判。

Arbitrage

套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)

在过去的报告中，我们告诉过你们，我们的保险子公司有时会从事套利，作为持有短期现金等价物的替代方案。当然，我们更倾向于做出重大长期承诺，但我们经常有比好主意更多的现金。在这种时候，套利有时承诺比国库券高得多的回报，同样重要的是，它冷却了我们可能放松长期投资标准的任何诱惑。（查理在我们讨论完套利承诺后的结束语通常是：“好吧，至少它能让你远离酒吧。”）

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about $147 million.

1988年，无论是按绝对美元还是回报率衡量，我们从套利中获得了异常丰厚的利润。平均投入资金约1.47亿美元，税前收益约7800万美元。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.

这种活动水平使得对套利及我们处理方式的详细讨论变得恰当。曾经，这个词仅指在两个不同市场同时买卖证券或外汇。目标是利用可能存在的微小价格差异，例如，皇家荷兰壳牌股票在阿姆斯特丹以荷兰盾交易，在伦敦以英镑交易，在纽约以美元交易。有人可能称之为“剥头皮”；从业者选择了法语术语“arbitrage”，你不会感到惊讶。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.

自第一次世界大战以来，套利（或现在有时称为“风险套利”）的定义已扩展到包括从已宣布的公司事件中获利，如公司出售、合并、资本重组、重组、清算、自我要约收购等。在大多数情况下，套利者期望无论股市表现如何都能获利。他通常面临的主要风险是已宣布事件不会发生。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.

套利领域偶尔会出现一些不寻常的机会。我24岁在纽约为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作时就参与过一次。洛克伍德公司是一家位于布鲁克林的巧克力产品公司，盈利能力有限，1941年当可可售价每磅5美分时采用了后进先出存货估值法。1954年，可可短期短缺导致价格飙升至每磅60美分以上。因此洛克伍德希望迅速在价格下跌前抛售其有价值的库存。但如果简单出售可可，公司需缴纳近50%的收益税。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.

1954年的税法解了围。其中包含一条晦涩的条款，如果作为减少公司业务范围计划的一部分将存货分配给股东，则可免除因后进先出利润而应缴纳的税款。洛克伍德决定终止其一项业务——可可脂的销售，并称其1300万磅的可可豆存货归属于该业务。因此，公司提出用其不再需要的可可豆回购股票，每股支付80磅豆子。

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.

连续几周，我忙着买入股票、卖出豆子，并定期到施罗德信托公司把股票证书换成仓单。利润不错，我唯一的开销是地铁代币。

The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

洛克伍德重组的策划者是一位不知名但才华横溢的芝加哥人，杰伊·普利兹克，时年32岁。如果你熟悉杰伊后来的记录，你对这次行动对洛克伍德的持续股东也相当成功就不会感到惊讶。从要约收购前到要约收购后不久，洛克伍德股票从15美元涨到100美元，尽管公司正经历巨大经营亏损。有时股票估值不仅仅是市盈率。

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)

近年来，大多数套利操作涉及收购，包括友好和敌意。随着收购热潮盛行，反垄断挑战几乎不存在，出价往往不断抬高，套利者大获其利。他们不需要特殊才能就能做得好；诀窍，如同彼得·塞勒斯在电影中那样，只是“在那里”。在华尔街，古老的谚语被改写：“给人一条鱼，你喂他一天；教他套利，你喂他一辈子。”（不过，如果他上过伊万·博斯基套利学校，那可能是国家机构提供他的餐食。）

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire - a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

评估套利情况时，你必须回答四个问题：(1) 承诺的事件实际发生的可能性有多大？(2) 你的资金将被占用多长时间？(3) 出现更好结果的机会有多大——例如，竞争性收购要约？(4) 如果事件由于反垄断行动、融资障碍等而未能发生，会怎么样？

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.

阿卡塔公司是我们较为幸运的套利经历之一，说明了这项业务的曲折。1981年9月28日，阿卡塔董事会在原则上同意将公司出售给科尔伯格-克拉维斯-罗伯茨公司（KKR），当时和现在都是一家大型杠杆收购公司。阿卡塔从事印刷和林产品业务，还有一个有利因素：1978年，美国政府征用阿卡塔的10,700英亩木材（主要是原始红木）以扩建红木国家公园。政府分期支付了9790万美元，阿卡塔认为这些钱远远不够。双方还对从征用财产到最终付款期间适用的利率存在争议。授权立法规定6%的单利；阿卡塔主张更高且复利的利率。

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.

收购一家涉及高度投机性、大规模诉讼索赔的公司会造成谈判问题，无论索赔是代表公司还是针对公司。为了解决这个问题，KKR提出每股阿卡塔股票37.00美元，加上政府为红木土地支付的任何额外金额的三分之二。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.

评估这个套利机会时，我们必须问自己KKR是否会完成交易，因为其报价以获得“满意融资”为条件。这类条款对卖方来说总是危险的：它为求婚者的热情在求婚与结婚之间消退提供了轻松退出的途径。不过，我们对此可能性并不特别担心，因为KKR过去的成交记录良好。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须问自己，如果KKR交易失败会发生什么，对此我们也感到相当放心：阿卡塔的管理层和董事们已经推销公司一段时间，显然决心出售。如果KKR离开，阿卡塔可能会找到另一个买家，尽管价格可能更低。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后，我们不得不问自己红木索赔可能价值多少。你们的主席分不清榆树和橡树，但在这个问题上没有困难：他冷静地将索赔评估为零到非常大之间。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.

我们在9月30日开始买入阿卡塔股票，当时约33.50美元，八周内购买了约40万股，占公司的5%。最初的公告称37美元将在1982年1月支付。因此，如果一切顺利，我们本可实现约40%的年回报率——不包括红木索赔，那将是锦上添花。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been postponed - reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.

一切并不完美。12月份宣布交易完成将略有延迟。尽管如此，1月4日签署了最终协议。受到鼓舞，我们增加了头寸，以约38美元每股买入，将持股增加到65.5万股，超过公司的7%。我们愿意支付更高价格——尽管交易完成被推迟——反映了我们倾向于红木价值为“非常大”而非“零”。

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”

然后，2月25日，贷款人表示他们正在“重新审视”融资条款，“鉴于严重低迷的住房行业及其对阿卡塔前景的影响。”股东大会再次推迟到4月。一位阿卡塔发言人说他“认为收购本身的前途没有危险。”当套利者听到这样的保证时，他们脑海中闪过一句老话：“他撒谎就像贬值前夕的财政部长。”

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.

3月12日，KKR表示其之前的交易行不通，首先将出价降至33.50美元，两天后又提高到35.00美元。然而，3月15日，董事们拒绝了这个出价，接受了另一个集团的报价：每股37.50美元加上任何红木回收的一半。股东批准了交易，37.50美元于6月4日支付。

We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than satisfactory.

我们获得2460万美元，而成本为2290万美元；平均持有期接近六个月。考虑到这笔交易遇到的麻烦，我们扣除红木索赔任何价值后的15%年回报率——相当令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.

但最好的还在后头。主审法官任命了两个委员会，一个评估木材价值，另一个考虑利率问题。1987年1月，第一个委员会称红木价值2.757亿美元，第二个委员会建议复合混合回报率约为14%。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

1987年8月，法官维持了这些结论，这意味着阿卡塔将获得约6亿美元的净额。政府随后上诉。然而，在1988年，在此上诉听证之前，索赔以5.19亿美元和解。因此，我们每股额外获得29.48美元，约1930万美元。我们将在1989年再获得约80万美元。

Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)

伯克希尔的套利活动与许多套利者不同。首先，我们每年只参与少数几笔交易，通常规模很大。大多数从业者买入大量交易，每年可能50笔或更多。有这么多交易在进行，他们必须花大部分时间监控交易的进展和相关股票的市场波动。这不是查理和我想要的生活方式。（致富只是为了整天盯着股票行情机，有什么意义？）

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will - and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.

由于我们如此少的分散化，一笔特别盈利或不盈利的交易对我们年度套利结果的影响远大于典型的套利操作。到目前为止，伯克希尔还没有真正糟糕的经历。但我们会有的——一旦发生，我们会向你们报告血淋淋的细节。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

我们与一些套利操作的另一个不同之处在于，我们只参与公开宣布的交易。我们不做谣言交易或试图猜测收购目标。我们只是阅读报纸，思考一些大型提议，并根据自己对概率的判断行事。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

年底时，我们唯一的重大套利头寸是334.2万股RJR纳贝斯克股票，成本2.818亿美元，市值3.045亿美元。1月份我们将持股增加到约400万股，2月份清仓。当我们向收购RJR的KKR投标时，大约300万股被接受，退回的股票随即在市场出售。我们的税前利润为6400万美元，好于预期。

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”

早些时候，另一个熟悉的面孔出现在RJR竞标中：杰伊·普利兹克，他是第一波士顿集团的一员，提出了一个以税收为导向的报价。引用约吉·贝拉的话：“又是既视感。”

During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.

在我们通常本应是RJR买家的多数时间里，我们对股票的活动受到限制，因为所罗门参与了一个投标集团。通常，查理和我虽然身为所罗门董事，但被隔离在其并购工作信息之外。我们要求这样：这些信息对我们没有好处，实际上有时可能会阻碍伯克希尔的套利操作。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.

然而，所罗门计划在RJR交易中做出的异常大额承诺要求所有董事充分知情并参与。因此，伯克希尔仅两次购买RJR：第一次是在管理层宣布收购计划后的几天内，在所罗门介入之前；第二次是在RJR董事会做出支持KKR的决定之后相当晚的时候。由于我们无法在其他时间购买，我们的董事职位使伯克希尔付出了可观的金钱代价。

Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.

考虑到伯克希尔1988年的良好业绩，你可能预期我们在1989年会大举投入套利。相反，我们预计会保持观望。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down - because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个令人愉快的原因是我们的现金持有量下降——因为我们期望长期持有的股票头寸大幅上升。正如本报告的常客所知，我们的新承诺并非基于对股市短期前景的判断。相反，它们反映了对特定公司长期业务前景的看法。我们从未有过，也永远不会有关于股市、利率或商业活动一年后会怎样的观点。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”

即使我们有很多现金，1989年我们可能也不会做太多套利。收购领域出现了某些异常过度的现象。正如多萝西所说：“托托，我觉得我们不在堪萨斯了。”

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”

我们不知道这种过度会持续多久，也不知道什么会改变政府、贷款人和买家助长这种过度的态度。但我们知道，别人处理事务越不谨慎，我们就应该越谨慎地处理自己的事务。我们不想套利那些反映买家和贷款人无节制——而且在我们看来往往不合理——乐观情绪的交易。在我们的活动中，我们将遵循赫布·斯坦的智慧：“如果一件事不能永远持续，它就会结束。”

Efficient Market Theory

有效市场理论

The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of “efficient market theory” (EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.

前面关于套利的讨论也使对“有效市场理论”（EMT）的小讨论显得相关。这一理论在20世纪70年代变得非常流行——实际上，几乎成为学术界的圣典。它本质上说分析股票是无用的，因为所有公开信息都已恰当地反映在价格中。换句话说，市场总是知道一切。作为推论，教授EMT的教授们说，有人向股票行情表扔飞镖选出的股票组合，其前景与最聪明、最勤奋的证券分析师选出的组合一样好。令人惊讶的是，EMT不仅被学者接受，也被许多投资专业人士和公司管理者接受。他们正确观察到市场经常是有效的，却错误地得出结论它总是有效的。这些命题之间的差异是天壤之别。

In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There’s plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham’s arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I’ve not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben’s; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)

在我看来，格雷厄姆-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙公司和伯克希尔持续63年的套利经历说明了EMT是多么愚蠢。（还有很多其他证据。）在格雷厄姆-纽曼期间，我研究了该公司1926-1956整个存续期间从套利中获得的收益。无杠杆回报平均每年20%。从1956年开始，我将本·格雷厄姆的套利原则应用于巴菲特合伙公司，然后是伯克希尔。虽然我没有精确计算，但我做了足够的工作知道1956-1988年的平均回报远高于20%。（当然，我是在比本更有利的环境中运作；他必须应对1929-1932年。）

All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been selected by hindsight.

所有公平测试投资组合表现所需的条件都具备：(1) 这三个组织在建立这63年记录期间交易了数百种不同的证券；(2) 结果并未因少数幸运经历而失真；(3) 我们不必挖掘晦涩的事实或对产品或管理形成敏锐洞察——我们只是根据高度公开的事件行动；(4) 我们的套利头寸是一个明确确定的总体——它们不是事后选择的。

Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one’s curiosity.

在63年中，普通市场（包括股息）的年回报率略低于10%。这意味着如果所有收入再投资，1000美元将增长到40.5万美元。然而，20%的回报率将产生9700万美元。在我们看来，这是一个统计上显著的差异，可能会引起人们的好奇心。

Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don’t talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians.

然而，该理论的支持者似乎对这种不一致的证据从未感兴趣。诚然，他们今天不像过去那样经常谈论他们的理论。但据我所知，没有人说过自己错了，无论他误导了多少学生。此外，EMT仍然是主要商学院投资课程的组成部分。显然，不愿放弃并因此使神职人员不再神秘，并非神学家所独有。

Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.

当然，对接受EMT的学生和轻信的投资专业人士造成的损害，对我们和其他格雷厄姆追随者来说却是非凡的服务。在任何类型的竞争——财务、智力或体力——中，拥有被教导认为甚至尝试都无用的对手是巨大的优势。从自私的角度看，格雷厄姆学派可能应该设立教席以确保EMT的永久教学。

All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63- year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.

话虽如此，适当的警告是必要的。套利最近看起来容易。但这并非保证每年20%利润或任何利润的投资形式。如前所述，市场在大部分时间相当有效：在那63年期间，我们抓住的每一个套利机会，都有更多因为没有合理定价而放弃。

An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.

投资者不能仅仅通过承诺特定的投资类别或风格从股票中获得超额利润。他只能通过仔细评估事实并持续保持纪律来获得它们。投资套利情况本身并不比用扔飞镖选择投资组合更好的策略。

New York Stock Exchange Listing

纽约证券交易所上市

Berkshire’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.

伯克希尔股票于1988年11月29日在纽约证券交易所上市。在第50-51页，我们转载了我们就上市事宜致股东的信。

Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.

让我澄清信中未涉及的一点：虽然我们在纽交所的交易整手为10股，但一股以上的任意数量都可以买卖。

As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.

如信中所解释，我们上市的主要目标是降低交易成本，我们相信这一目标正在实现。总体而言，纽交所的买卖价差远低于场外市场的价差。

Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about $625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm’s performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.

亨德森兄弟公司是我们的股票专家，是交易所历史最悠久的持续经营专家公司；其创始人威廉·托马斯·亨德森于1861年9月8日以500美元购买了席位。（最近，席位售价约62.5万美元。）在54家作为专家的公司中，HBI在分配到的股票数量上排名第二，共83只。当伯克希尔被分配给HBI时，我们很高兴，并且对该公司的表现非常满意。HBI董事长吉姆·马奎尔亲自管理伯克希尔的交易，没有比这更好的了。

In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or, better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire’s business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.

在两个目标上，我们可能与大多数上市公司有所不同。首先，我们不想最大化伯克希尔股票的交易价格。相反，我们希望股价在内在商业价值（我们希望以合理——或者更好的是，不合理——的速度增长）为中心的窄幅区间交易。查理和我对显著高估和显著低估同样烦恼。两种极端都不可避免地使许多股东的结果与伯克希尔的业务结果大相径庭。如果我们的股价始终反映商业价值，那么我们的每位股东在持股期间将获得与伯克希尔业务结果大致平行的投资结果。

Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.

其次，我们希望交易活动非常少。如果我们经营一家拥有少数被动合伙人的私人企业，如果这些合伙人及其接替者频繁想离开合伙企业，我们会感到失望。经营一家上市公司，我们同样这么感觉。

Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don’t understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: “There hasn’t been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.”)

我们的目标是吸引长期所有者，他们在购买时没有出售的时间表或价格目标，而是计划无限期地与我们在一起。我们无法理解希望大量股票交易的CEO，因为只有大量所有者不断退出才能实现这一点。在其他什么组织——学校、俱乐部、教堂等——领导者在成员离开时欢呼？（然而，如果有位经纪人的生计依赖于这些组织的成员流动，你可以肯定至少会有一个活动的倡导者，比如：“基督教已经有一段时间没什么动静了；也许下周我们应该改信佛教。”）

Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.

当然，一些伯克希尔所有者会不时需要或想要出售，我们希望有好的接替者，给他们公平的价格。因此，我们通过政策、业绩和沟通努力吸引新的股东，他们理解我们的经营，分享我们的时间视野，并像我们衡量自己一样衡量我们。如果我们能够继续吸引这类股东——同样重要的是，继续对短期或不切实际预期的人不感兴趣——伯克希尔股票应该始终以与商业价值合理相关的价格出售。

David L. Dodd

戴维·L·多德

Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don’t know of him. Yet any long- time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.

戴夫·多德，我38年的朋友和老师，去年去世，享年93岁。你们大多数人不知道他。然而，任何长期伯克希尔股东都因为他对我们公司的间接影响而显著更富有。

Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.

戴夫一生在哥伦比亚大学教书，与本·格雷厄姆合著了《证券分析》。从我到达哥伦比亚的那一刻起，戴夫就亲自鼓励和教育我；两种影响同样重要。他教给我的一切，无论是直接的还是通过他的书，都有道理。后来，通过几十封信，他继续教育我，直到去世。

I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.

我认识许多金融和投资教授，但除了本·格雷厄姆外，从未见过能与戴夫匹敌的人。他才能的证明是他学生的记录：没有其他投资教师培养出如此多取得非凡成功的人。

When students left Dave’s classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.

当学生离开戴夫的课堂时，他们具备了终身明智投资的能力，因为他所教的原则简单、合理、有用且持久。尽管这些看似不起眼的优点，但体现这些原则的教学很少见。

It’s particularly impressive that Dave could practice as well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.

特别令人印象深刻的是，戴夫既能言传也能身教。正如凯恩斯通过将学术思想应用于非常小的钱包而致富一样，戴夫也做到了。事实上，他的财务表现远远超过凯恩斯，凯恩斯最初是一个市场择时者（依赖商业和信贷周期理论），在深思后转向价值投资。戴夫从一开始就是对的。

In Berkshire’s investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.

在伯克希尔的投资中，查理和我运用了戴夫和本·格雷厄姆教导的原则。我们的繁荣是他们智慧之树的果实。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望购买更多与我们现有业务类似的企业，我们需要一些帮助。如果你有符合以下标准的企业，请给我打电话，或者最好写信。

Here’s what we’re looking for:

以下是我们寻找的目标：

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

(1) 大规模收购（至少1000万美元的税后利润），

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),

(2) 证明有持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们没什么兴趣，“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感兴趣），

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

(3) 企业股本回报率良好，同时很少或没有使用债务，

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

(4) 管理层到位（我们无法提供），

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

(5) 简单的业务（如果技术含量高，我们不会理解），

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

(6) 报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步地，浪费我们或卖方的时间讨论交易）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内——告诉您我们是否感兴趣。我们更喜欢用现金购买，但当我们获得与付出的内在商业价值相等时，也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin- Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner- managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜爱的购买形式是符合布兰肯-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的。在这样的案例中，公司的所有者兼管理者希望产生大量现金，有时是为了自己，但通常是为了他们的家人或不活跃的股东。然而，这些管理者也希望继续作为重要所有者，像过去一样经营他们的公司。我们认为我们特别适合这些目标的所有者，并邀请潜在卖家通过联系过去与我们有过业务往来的人来了解我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: “Please include me out.”

查理和我经常被接洽不符合我们测试的收购：我们发现，如果你登广告说想买牧羊犬，很多人会打电话希望卖给你他们的可卡犬。我们对新企业、扭亏为盈或拍卖式销售的兴趣可以用另一个高德温语最好地表达：“请把我排除在外。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了对上述企业收购感兴趣外，我们还对通过谈判购买大宗但不控股的股票感兴趣，类似于我们在资本城和所罗门持有的股票。我们对购买可转换优先股作为长期投资有特殊兴趣，就像我们在所罗门所做的那样。

We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor’s raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property- casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.

几周前我们收到一些好消息：标准普尔将我们的信用评级上调至AAA，这是其授予的最高评级。只有另外15家美国工业或财产意外险公司被评为AAA，而1980年为28家。

Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from “event risk.” This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.

公司债券持有人在过去几年中因“事件风险”而遭受打击。这个术语指的是伴随着对一家财务政策此前一直保守的企业进行高杠杆收购或重组的信用一夜之间的恶化。在一个由少数所有者管理者主导的收购世界中，大多数公司都存在这种风险。伯克希尔没有。查理和我向债券持有人承诺，我们给予他们的尊重与给予股东的相同。

About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.

约97.4%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1988年股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划缴纳的捐款为500万美元，2,319家慈善机构为受益者。如果我们实现合理的业务成果，我们计划在1989年增加每股捐款。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第48-49页关于我们股东指定捐款计划的描述。如果你希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈敦促你立即确保你的股票以实际所有者名义登记，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记。在1989年9月30日未如此登记的股票将没有资格参加1989年的计划。

Berkshire’s annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.

伯克希尔年度股东大会将于1989年4月24日星期一在奥马哈举行，我希望你们能来。会议为你提供提出任何与所有者相关问题的平台，我们将一直回答，直到所有问题（涉及投资组合活动或其他专有信息的问题除外）都得到处理。

After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim’s. Be prepared for bargains.

会后我们将有几辆巴士送你们去拜访内布拉斯加家具城的B太太和波珊珠宝的艾克·弗里德曼。准备好抢便宜货吧。

Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.

外地来客可能更喜欢早到，在周日中午到下午五点的营业时间拜访B太太。（这些周日营业时间在B太太看来短得可笑，她觉得几乎没有时间热身；她更喜欢商店从上午10点开到晚上9点的日子。）但波珊珠宝周日不营业。

Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how she does it: “I can sell so cheap ‘cause I work for this dummy who doesn’t know anything about carpet.”

问问B太太她惊人低的地毯价格的秘密。她会像告诉所有人一样告诉你她是怎么做到的：“我能卖这么便宜，因为我是给这个对地毯一窍不通的傻瓜打工的。”

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 1989

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
1989年2月28日