1957年致合伙人信

The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

1957年股市整体情况

In last year's letter to partners, I said the following:

在去年致合伙人的信中，我写道：

My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.

我对整体市场水平的看法是，其定价高于内在价值。这一观点主要针对蓝筹股。如果这一看法正确，那么所有股票价格——无论是低估还是其他——都可能大幅下跌。无论如何，我认为五年后当前的市场水平被视作廉价的可能性极小。然而，即便出现全面熊市，也不应严重影响我们套利类投资的市场价值。

If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.

如果市场整体回到低估状态，我们的资金可能会全部投入普通股，并可能在那时动用一些借款来操作。反之，如果市场大幅上涨，我们的策略将是在获利时减少普通股持仓，并增加套利投资组合。

All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

以上所有内容并非暗示市场分析是我最关注的。我的首要任务始终是发现那些被大幅低估的证券。

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word "moderate" since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.

过去一年，股市出现了温和下跌。我强调“温和”这个词，因为随便翻阅报纸或与那些近期才接触股票的人交谈，容易给人一种跌幅更大的错觉。实际上，在我看来，股价的跌幅远小于当前商业环境下企业盈利能力的下降。这意味着公众对蓝筹股和整体经济形势仍然非常乐观。我不试图预测商业或股市；以上只是要打消任何认为股票遭受了剧烈下跌或整体市场处于低位的想法。基于长期投资价值，我仍然认为整体市场定价偏高。

Our Activities in 1957

我们1957年的投资活动

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term "work-out" is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.

市场下跌在低估类投资中创造了更大的机会，因此总体而言，我们的投资组合中低估类投资的比重相比套利类投资比去年更高了。或许有必要解释一下“套利类投资”这个术语。套利类投资是指其利润依赖于特定公司行为（如出售、合并、清算、要约收购等），而非像低估类投资那样依赖股票整体价格上涨。在每种套利情形中，风险在于某些意外事件打乱计划、导致预定行动被放弃，而不是经济形势恶化或股市普遍下跌。1956年底，我们投资组合中低估类与套利类的比例大约是70比30，现在大约是85比15。

During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

在过去一年中，我们投资了两个已具规模的项目，我们有望在这些公司决策中发挥一定作用。其中一个仓位占各合伙企业投资组合的10%至20%，另一个约占5%。这两笔投资可能需要三年到五年的时间，但目前看来它们具有潜在的高年均回报率且风险极小。虽然不属于套利类，但它们几乎不依赖于股市的整体走势。当然，如果市场大幅上涨，我预计这部分投资组合的表现将落后于市场。

Results for 1957

1957年业绩

In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

1957年，我们于1956年成立的三个合伙企业的表现远远优于整体市场。年初，道琼斯工业平均指数为499点，年底为435点，下跌64点。如果持有该指数，将获得22点的股息，将整体损失降至42点，即年跌幅8.470%。这一损失大致相当于投资大多数投资基金所能获得的结果，据我所知，没有任何投资基金在当年投资股票获得正收益。

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

1956年的三家合伙企业在年内均实现了盈利，相对1956年末净值的收益率分别约为6.2%、7.8%和25%。自然会产生疑问，尤其是前两家合伙企业的合伙人会想，为何最后一家合伙企业的表现如此突出。这一表现凸显了短期运气的重要性，尤其是关于资金到位的时机。第三家合伙企业是1956年最晚成立的，当时市场点位较低，且有几只证券特别有吸引力。由于资金到位，我们大量投资了这些证券。而早先成立的两家合伙企业已经几乎全部投入，因此只能在这些证券上建立相对较小的仓位。

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

基本而言，所有合伙企业都投资于相同的证券，比例也大致相同。然而，尤其是在初期阶段，资金的到位时间和市场行情都存在差异，因此结果的波动性可能比后期更大。多年来看，只要相对道指年均领先10个百分点，我就会相当满意。因此就这三家合伙企业而言，1957年是成功的一年，或许好于平均水平。

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

两家合伙企业于1957年年中成立，其当年剩余时间的表现与道指大致相当，道指自1957年合伙企业成立以来下跌了约12%。它们的投资组合现在开始接近1956年合伙企业，未来整个集团的业绩应该会更加接近。

Interpretation of results

业绩解读

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

在某种程度上，我们在1957年取得了优于平均水平的业绩，是因为对大多数股票而言，这是一个普遍低迷的年份。相对于牛市，我们在熊市中的表现可能更好，因此从上述结果中得出的推论应考虑到这一年是我们本应表现相对较好的年份。在整体市场大幅上涨的年份，我若能跟上道指的涨幅便会非常满意。

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

我肯定地说，我们在1957年末的投资组合比1956年末具有更好的价值。这既是由于价格普遍下跌，也因为我们有更多时间来收购那些严重低估的证券，而这些证券只能通过耐心来获得。之前我提到我们最大的仓位占各个合伙企业资产的10%至20%。我计划最终使其占所有合伙企业资产的20%，但这不能急于求成。显然，在任何收购期间，我们的首要利益是希望股票不动或下跌而不是上涨。因此，在任何特定时间，我们投资组合中相当一部分可能处于停滞阶段。这一策略虽然需要耐心，但应能最大化长期利润。

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

我已尽力涵盖了可能感兴趣的内容，并尽可能多地披露了我们的理念，而不涉及具体个股。如果有任何关于运营方面的问题，欢迎来信告知。