1981 年致股东信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

February 26, 1982

1982 年 2 月 26 日

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Operating earnings of $39.7 million in 1981 amounted to 15.2% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) compared to 17.8% in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate charitable contributions (detailed later) reduced earnings by about $900,000 in 1981. This program, which we expect to continue subject to annual evaluation of our corporate tax position, had not been initiated in 1980.

1981 年的营业收益为 3,970 万美元，占年初净资产（按成本法计价证券）的 15.2%，而 1980 年为 17.8%。我们的新计划允许股东指定公司慈善捐款（稍后详述），该计划在 1981 年减少了约 90 万美元的收益。该计划我们预计会继续实施，但需每年评估公司的税务状况，1980 年尚未启动。

In the 1980 annual report we discussed extensively the concept of non-controlled ownership earnings, i.e., Berkshire’s share of the undistributed earnings of companies we don’t control or significantly influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire.

在 1980 年的年报中，我们广泛讨论了非控股权益收益的概念，即伯克希尔在不控制或没有重大影响但仍持有重要投资的公司中所占的未分配收益份额。（我们乐意应新股东或潜在股东的要求，提供该讨论或本报告提及的早期报告中的其他讨论的副本。）这些未分配收益的任何部分均未计入伯克希尔的营业收益。

However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained - and reported - similar earnings.

然而，我们相信，总体而言，这些未分配因而未记录的收益将会转化为伯克希尔股东的有形价值，就像我们控制的子公司赚取、保留并报告了类似收益一样确定。

We know that this translation of non-controlled ownership earnings into corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among companies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed non-productively, and far greater than dollar-for-dollar of retained earnings in cases of companies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of non-controlled companies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory.

我们知道，这种将非控股权益收益转化为伯克希尔相应的已实现和未实现资本收益的过程，在发生时间上将极不规律。尽管从长期看，市场价值与商业价值相当吻合，但在任何一年，两者的关系都可能反复无常地波动。市场对留存收益的认可在各公司之间也不均衡。在收益被非生产性利用的情况下，这种认可会低得令人失望甚至为负；而在那些以增加的资本获得高回报的公司中，认可度则会远远超过留存收益的美元数额。总体而言，如果以合理的技巧选择一组非控股公司，其整体结果应该是相当令人满意的。

In aggregate, our non-controlled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That’s understandable; the area of choice has been far wider. Small portions of exceptionally good businesses are usually available in the securities markets at reasonable prices. But such businesses are available for purchase in their entirety only rarely, and then almost always at high prices.

总体而言，我们的非控股商业利益具有比控股业务更有利的基本经济特征。这是可以理解的；选择的范围要广泛得多。优秀企业的一小部分股份通常可以在证券市场上以合理的价格买到。但这类企业的整体出售很少见，而且几乎总是以高价出售。

As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments - "If something's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well".) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.

正如我们的历史所表明的，我们对企业的全资控股以及代表企业一小部分的可流通证券都感到自在。我们不断寻求在这两个领域运用大笔资金的方法。（但我们尽量避免小额投入——“如果一件事根本不值得做，那也不值得把它做好”。）事实上，我们保险和 trading stamp 业务的流动性要求强制要求对可流通证券进行重大投资。

Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)

我们的收购决策将以最大化实际经济效益为目标，而不是最大化管理版图或会计报告数字。（从长远来看，强调会计表象而非经济实质的管理层通常两者都收获甚微。）

Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.

无论对当期报告收益有何影响，我们宁愿以每股 X 的价格购买优秀企业 T 的 10% 股份，也不愿以每股 2X 的价格购买 T 的 100% 股份。大多数企业管理者恰恰相反，而且他们从不缺乏为自己行为辩护的冠冕堂皇的理由。

However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:

然而，我们怀疑有三种动机——通常不直接说出来——单独或共同构成了大多数高溢价收购的重要驱动力：

(1) Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.

(1) 领导者，无论是商界还是其他领域，很少缺乏动物精神，常常热衷于增加活动和迎接挑战。在伯克希尔，公司的脉搏从未像收购在望时跳动得如此之快。

(2) Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)

(2) 大多数组织，无论是商界还是其他领域，都以规模来衡量自己、被他人衡量，并以规模而非其他任何标尺来补偿其管理者。（问问《财富》500 强的管理者他的公司在那个著名榜单上的排名，得到的数字必定是来自按销售额规模排名的榜单；他很可能甚至不知道他的公司在《财富》同样忠实地按盈利能力排名的同一 500 家公司榜单上位列何处。）

(3) Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).

(3) 许多管理层在易受影响的童年时代显然过度接触了这样一个故事：被囚禁的英俊王子被美丽公主的一吻从蟾蜍的身体中释放出来。因此，他们确信自己管理之吻会给目标公司的盈利能力带来奇迹。

Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?

这种乐观是必不可少的。没有这种乐观的看法，收购方公司的股东们为什么愿意以 2X 的收购成本拥有 T 的权益，而不是以他们在自己直接购买时会支付的 X 市场价格来购买呢？

In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We've observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.

换句话说，投资者总是可以按蟾蜍的市价买到蟾蜍。如果投资者转而资助那些愿意花双倍价钱换取亲吻蟾蜍权利的公主们，那么这些亲吻最好要有一些真正的爆炸力。我们观察到许多亲吻，但奇迹很少。然而，许多管理界的公主们对其亲吻的未来效力仍然镇定自若——即使在他们公司的后院已经堆满了毫无反应的蟾蜍，深及膝盖。

In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.

公平地说，我们应该承认一些收购记录是令人眼花缭乱的。两大类别尤为突出。

The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.

第一类涉及那些通过设计或偶然，只购买了特别适应通胀环境的企业。这种受青睐的企业必须具备两个特征：(1) 能够相当容易地提高价格（即使产品需求平淡且产能未充分利用），而不必担心市场份额或销量的显著损失；(2) 只需少量额外资本投入就能适应业务金额的大幅增长（通常更多由通胀而非实际增长产生）。普通能力的管理者，只要专注于满足这些测试的收购机会，就在近几十年取得了优异的成绩。然而，很少有企业同时具备这两个特征，而收购这类企业的竞争已经激烈到弄巧成拙的地步。

The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial "twofer", whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives' achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)

第二类涉及管理超级明星——那些能够识别出伪装成蟾蜍的罕见王子，并且拥有剥去伪装的管理能力的人。我们向这样的管理者致敬：西北工业的 Ben Heineman、Teledyne 的 Henry Singleton、National Service Industries 的 Erwin Zaban，尤其是首都城市通信的 Tom Murphy（一个真正的管理“双料能手”，其收购努力恰当地聚焦于第一类，而其经营才能也使他成为第二类的领导者）。从直接和间接的经验中，我们认识到这些高管成就的难度和稀有性。（他们自己也承认；这些冠军近年来极少达成交易，并且常常发现回购自家股票是公司资本最明智的运用。）

Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn't count, building arks does.)

不幸的是，你们的主席不符合第二类。而且，尽管对迫使聚焦于第一类的经济因素有相当好的理解，我们在这类中的实际收购活动却是零散且不足的。我们的说教比我们的表现好。（我们忽略了诺亚原则：预测下雨不算数，建造方舟才算。）

We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.

我们偶尔尝试以低廉的价格购买蟾蜍，其结果已在过去的报告中记载。显然，我们的亲吻失败了。我们与少数王子合作得很好——但他们在被收购时就已经是王子。至少我们的亲吻没有把他们变成蟾蜍。最后，我们偶尔也相当成功地以蟾蜍般的价格购买了易于识别的王子的部分权益。

We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past. We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting. But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don't bring a lot.

我们将继续寻求以合理价格整体收购企业，即使被收购企业的未来发展很大程度上与过去相似。如果我们对自己得到的东西相当有信心，我们很可能会为第一类企业支付相当高的价格。但我们通常不会在任何收购中为我们应该带到交易中的东西付出很多——因为我们发现我们通常带不来很多东西。

During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer.

在 1981 年期间，我们曾非常接近一笔重大收购，涉及一家我们非常喜欢的企业和一位我们非常喜欢的经理人。然而，考虑到所涉资金的替代用途，最终要求的价码会使我们的所有者比收购前更糟糕。帝国会更大，但公民会更穷。

Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the future we will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major "non-voting partnership" as discussed under the Pinkerton's heading on page 47 of this report. We welcome suggestions regarding such companies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the long-term objectives of present owners and managers.

尽管我们在 1981 年没有成功，但未来时不时地，我们将能够购买到符合我们标准的 100% 业务。此外，我们预计会偶尔出现大型“非投票合伙”的机会，如本报告第 47 页关于 Pinkerton's 的标题下所讨论的。我们欢迎有关此类公司的建议，在这些公司中，我们作为重要的小合伙人，能够在促进现有所有者和管理者长期目标的同时，取得良好的经济成果。

Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.

目前，我们发现通过公开市场购买那些拥有优秀商业特许经营权、有能力且诚实的管理层的公司的部分股份，最容易获得价值。我们从不期望经营这些公司，但确实期望从中获利。

We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don't, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.

我们期望来自此类公司的未分配收益将为伯克希尔及其股东带来全部价值（在实现时需缴税）。如果没有，我们就在以下方面犯了错误：(1) 我们选择与之合作的管理层；(2) 业务未来的经济状况；或 (3) 我们支付的价格。

We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes - sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.

我们已经犯过很多这样的错误——无论是在购买企业的非控股权益还是控股权方面。第(2)类误判是最常见的。当然，有必要深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到此类错误的例证——有时只需深挖两三个月。例如，去年你们的主席自愿对铝业的光明前景发表了专家意见。此后，对该意见需要做一些微调——现在累计大约 180 度。

For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.

然而，出于个人以及更客观的原因，对于非控股业务（可流通证券），我们通常能够比控股子公司更快地纠正此类错误。实际上，缺乏控制往往被证明是一种经济优势。

As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded "ownership" earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category - GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company - our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance.

正如我们去年提到的，我们未记录的“所有权”收益的规模已经增长到其总额超过我们报告营业收益的程度。我们预计这种情况将持续下去。仅在这一类别中的四个持仓——GEICO 公司、通用食品公司、R. J. 雷诺兹工业公司和华盛顿邮报公司——我们在 1982 年所占的未分配因而未记录的收益很可能总计远超过 3,500 万美元。完全忽略这些未分配收益的会计规则降低了我们年度净资产收益率计算或任何其他单一年度经济绩效衡量指标的有用性。

In measuring long-term economic performance, equities held by our insurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our net worth. To date, this has been the case.

在衡量长期经济绩效时，我们保险子公司持有的股票按市值计价，并扣除反映未实现收益实际实现时需缴纳税款的金额。如果我们在本报告前一部分强调的前提是正确的，那么我们未报告的所有权收益将会以不规则但不可避免的方式进入我们的净资产。迄今为止，情况确是如此。

An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and non-insurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance companies, we will report its effect to you.

更纯粹的绩效计算将涉及对债券和非保险持有的股票按市值计价。然而，GAAP 会计并未规定这一程序，而且增加这种纯粹性只会使结果发生非常微小的变化。如果估值差异扩大至显著比例，正如在大多数主要保险公司发生的那样，我们会将其影响报告给你们。

On a GAAP basis, during the present management's term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $19.46 per share to $526.02 per share, or 21.1% compounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation.

按 GAAP 口径，在现任管理层任期的十七年间，每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增加到 526.02 美元，年复合增长率为 21.1%。这个回报率数字在未来年份极有可能会下降。然而，我们希望它能显著高于美国大型企业的平均回报率。

Over half of the large gain in Berkshire's net worth during 1981 - it totaled $124 million, or about 31% - resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side.

1981 年伯克希尔净资产大幅增长总额为 1.24 亿美元（约 31%），其中一半以上来自一项投资——GEICO 公司——的市场表现。总体而言，我们当年来自证券的市场收益大大超过了基础业务价值的增长。这种市场波动不会总是令人愉快。

In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused our apparently satisfactory long-term corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding long-term inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.

在过去的报告中，我们解释了通货膨胀如何使我们在表面上令人满意的长期公司业绩，作为衡量所有者真实投资结果的指标，变得虚幻。我们赞赏美联储主席沃尔克的努力，并注意到目前各种价格指数的增长较为温和。尽管如此，我们对长期通胀趋势的看法依然如故地悲观。就像贞洁一样，稳定的价格水平似乎可以维持，但无法恢复。

Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investment equation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views; inflation itself will be punishment enough. (Copies of previous discussions are available for masochists.) But, because of the unrelenting destruction of currency values, our corporate efforts will continue to do a much better job of filling your wallet than of filling your stomach.

尽管通胀在投资方程中具有压倒性的重要性，我们不会再以另一套完整的观点陈述来进一步惩罚你们；通胀本身就是足够的惩罚。（以往讨论的副本可供受虐狂索取。）但是，由于货币价值的无情破坏，我们的公司努力在填满你的钱包方面将继续做得比填饱你的肚子好得多。

An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns - interest on fixed-income securities - will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is "entitled" to higher returns. A "value-added" bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.

还有一个因素应该进一步抑制你对我们的长期回报率可能保留的任何残余热情。证明股权投资合理的经济理由是，总体而言，超出被动投资收益（固定收益证券的利息）的额外收益将通过管理及创业技能与该股权资本的结合而产生。此外，该理由认为，由于股权资本地位与比被动投资形式更大的风险相关，因此它“有权”获得更高的回报。股权资本的“增值”红利似乎是自然而然的。

But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10% enabled a corporation to be classified as a "good" business - i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands of the individual investor.

但果真如此吗？几十年前，仅 10% 的净资产收益率就能使一家公司被归类为“好”企业——也就是说，在该企业中，逻辑上可以预期，再投资于该企业的一美元在市场上的估值会超过一百美分。因为，当时长期应税债券收益率为 5%，长期免税债券为 3%，一个能够以 10% 的回报率运用股权资本的企业，显然对投资者来说比投入的股权资本有一定的溢价。即便考虑到股息税和资本利得税的结合会将公司赚取的 10% 降低到个人投资者手中的 6%-8%，这个结论仍然成立。

Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were "good" businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.

投资市场认识到了这一事实。在那个较早的时期，美国企业平均为其使用的股权资本赚取约 11% 的收益，股票总体以远高于股权资本（账面价值）的估值出售，平均每美元超过 150 美分。大多数企业都是“好”企业，因为它们的收益远高于其自身成本（长期被动资金的回报）。股权投资所产生的增值，总体上是可观的。

That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence are difficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday's assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.

那个时代已经一去不复返了。但那个时代留下的教训很难丢弃。虽然投资者和管理者必须立足未来，但他们的记忆和神经系统却常常停留在过去。对投资者来说，使用历史市盈率，或者对管理者来说，使用历史企业估值标准，比每天重新思考他们的前提要容易得多。当变化缓慢时，持续的重新思考实际上是不可取的；它收效甚微且会减慢响应速度。但当变化巨大时，保留昨日的假设只会付出高昂的代价。而经济变化的步伐已经变得令人惊叹。

During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.

在过去一年中，长期应税债券收益率超过 16%，长期免税债券超过 14%。当然，从这些免税债券中获得的总回报直接进入个人所有者的口袋。与此同时，美国企业的股权收益率仅为 14% 左右。而这 14% 在个人所有者存入银行之前，还会被税收大幅削减。这种缩减的程度取决于公司的股息政策和适用于投资者的税率。

Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax-exempt bond. And, if conditions persist - if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14% - the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.

因此，在 1981 年底被动投资利率水平下，对美国典型企业的个人所有者来说，其价值已不再是一美元值一美元。（如果企业由养老基金或其他免税投资者拥有，虽然仍然不诱人，但算术结果会大大改善。）假设一个投资者处于 50% 的税率等级；如果我们的典型公司派发所有收益，投资者的收入回报将等同于 7% 的免税债券。而且，如果条件持续——如果所有收益都被派发，净资产收益率保持在 14%——那么对于高税率等级的个人投资者来说，相当于 7% 的免税债券与免税债券的票息一样被锁定。在撰写本文时，这种永续 7% 免税债券的价值可能只有 50 美分兑 1 美元。

If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.

另一方面，如果我们典型的美国企业将所有收益留存，并且净资产收益率再次保持不变，那么收益将以每年 14% 的速度增长。如果市盈率保持不变，我们典型股票的价格也将以每年 14% 的速度增长。但这 14% 尚未进入股东的口袋。要把它变成现金，需要缴纳资本利得税，目前最高税率为 20%。这个净回报率当然比当前可获得的被动税后收益率要差。

Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains in earnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.

除非被动收益率下降，否则那些实现每股收益每年增长 14% 但不支付现金股息的公司，对其个人股东来说是经济上的失败。被动资本的回报超过了主动资本的回报。这对投资者和企业管理者来说都是一个令人不快的事实，因此他们可能希望忽视它。但事实不会因为令人不快或被忽视而停止存在。

Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of their earnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently "bad" businesses economically - producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.

大多数美国企业将其收益的很大一部分用于派息，因此介于这两个例子之间。而且目前大多数美国企业在经济上是“坏”企业——为其个人投资者创造的税后收益低于免税被动资金回报率。当然，即使在当前条件下，一些高回报企业仍然具有吸引力。但总体而言，美国股权资本并没有为个人投资者创造增值。

It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.

应该强调，这种令人沮丧的情况并非因为企业在经济上跳得比以前低。事实上，它们跳得更高了一些：过去十年净资产收益率提高了几点。但被动回报的横杆提升得更快。不幸的是，大多数公司除了希望横杆能大幅降低外，别无他法；几乎没有哪个行业在净资产收益率大幅提高的前景上看起来很光明。

Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically "bad" would be restored to the "good" category under such circumstances.

通胀经历和预期将是影响未来年份横杆高度的主要（但不是唯一）因素。如果长期通胀的原因能够得到缓解，被动回报可能下降，美国股权资本的内在地位应该会显著改善。在这种情况下，许多现在必须被归类为经济上“坏”的企业将会恢复到“好”的类别。

A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the "bad" business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings - no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.

通胀环境还对“坏”企业的所有者施加了进一步的、尤其具有讽刺意味的惩罚。为了以现有模式继续运营，这种低回报企业通常必须保留其大部分收益——无论这种政策对股东产生什么惩罚。

Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and - if inclined to reinvest - looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.

当然，理性会规定完全相反的政策。一个人持有还有多年到期的 5% 债券，他不会拿着该债券的利息，再以 100 美分兑 1 美元的价格购买更多的 5% 债券，而类似的债券可能只要 40 美分兑 1 美元就能买到。相反，他从低回报债券中取出那些利息——如果倾向于再投资——会寻找当前可得的安全且回报最高的投资。好钱不会追着坏钱跑。

What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised - "wicked and slothful" - but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)

对债券持有人合理的事情对股东也合理。从逻辑上讲，一家历史上和预期中净资产收益率很高的公司应该保留其大部分或全部收益，以便股东能够从增加的资本中获得溢价回报。相反，公司股权回报率低则意味着应该实行极高的股息支付率，以便所有者能够将资本引导到更有吸引力的领域。（《圣经》也同意这一点。在按才受托的比喻中，两个高收益的仆人被奖励 100% 的收益留存，并鼓励他们扩大经营。然而，那个不赚钱的第三个仆人不仅受到责备——“又恶又懒”——还被要求将他所有的资本重新分配给表现最好的人。《马太福音》25:14-30）

But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the "bad" business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past - and most entities, including businesses, do - it simply has no choice.

但通货膨胀带我们穿过镜子，进入了爱丽丝梦游仙境的颠倒世界。当价格持续上涨时，“坏”企业必须保留它所能保留的每一分钱。不是因为作为股权资本的储存地它很有吸引力，而恰恰是因为它如此没有吸引力，低回报企业才必须遵循高留存政策。如果它希望将来像过去一样继续运营——而包括企业在内的大多数实体都会如此——它别无选择。

For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.

因为通货膨胀就像一条巨大的公司绦虫。不管宿主的健康状况如何，这条绦虫都会先发制人地消耗其日常所需的投资美元。无论报告的利润水平如何（即使为零），企业都需要为应收账款、存货和固定资产投入更多的美元，仅仅为了维持上一年的销售量。企业越不景气，绦虫索取的可维持生计的比例就越大。

Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or "real" dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company's inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of "dividends" that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)

在当前条件下，一个净资产收益率为 8% 或 10% 的企业常常没有剩余资金用于扩张、减债或“真正”的股息。通货膨胀这条绦虫只是把盘子舔干净了。（可以理解的是，低回报公司无力支付股息的情况常常被掩盖。美国企业越来越转向股息再投资计划，有时甚至包含一种折扣安排，几乎强制股东再投资。其他公司向彼得出售新发行的股票，以便向保罗支付股息。小心那些只有在有人承诺替换所分配资本的情况下才能支付的“股息”。）

Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after-tax passive return - but barely. Our historic 21% return - not at all assured for the future - still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative. But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone's control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.

伯克希尔继续出于进攻性而非防御性或义务性的原因留存收益。但我们绝非不受不断上升的被动回报对股权资本施加的压力影响。我们继续越过税后被动回报的横杆——但也只是勉强越过。我们历史上 21% 的回报率——对未来绝无保证——在当前资本利得税率（我们预计在未来几年会大幅上升）下，仍然比当前被动资金的税后收益率略高一点。让我们的公司增值变成负数会有点丢脸。但这可能发生在这里，就像发生在其他地方一样，无论是由于任何人无法控制的事件，还是由于我们自身的相对适应能力差。

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire's share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table and are not included in operating earnings.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。伯克希尔拥有 Blue Chip Stamps 约 60% 的股份，而 Blue Chip Stamps 又拥有 Wesco Financial Corporation 80% 的股份。该表显示了各业务实体的总营业收益以及伯克希尔所占份额。任何业务实体因非常规资产出售而产生的所有重大收益和损失，均与证券交易汇总在表格底部附近的栏目中，不包含在营业收益中。

(in 000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

*Amortization of intangibles arising in accounting for purchases of businesses (i.e. See's, Mutual and Buffalo Evening News) is reflected in the category designated as "Other".
**Berkshire divested itself of its ownership of the Illinois National Bank on December 31, 1980.

• 企业收购会计中产生的无形资产摊销（即 See's、Mutual 和布法罗晚报）反映在“其他”类别中。
• ** 伯克希尔于 1980 年 12 月 31 日剥离了其在伊利诺伊国家银行的所有权。

Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 38-50 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1981 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

Blue Chip Stamps 和 Wesco 是上市公司，有自己的报告要求。在本报告第 38-50 页，我们转载了两家公司主要高管的叙述性报告，他们在其中描述了 1981 年的运营情况。任何伯克希尔股东均可致函索取任一家公司的完整年报：Blue Chip Stamps 请联系 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040；Wesco Financial Corporation 请联系 Jeanne Leach 女士，地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109。

As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of earnings, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.

正如我们之前指出的，我们在不控制的公司中的未分配收益，现在与上表详述的报告营业收益同等重要。当然，收益的已分配部分主要通过保险集团收益的净投资收益部分进入该表。

We show below Berkshire's proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.

下面我们列出伯克希尔在那些只有已分配收益（股息）计入我们收益的非控股业务中的持股比例。

(in 000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries.
(b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All numbers represent Berkshire's net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.

(a) 全部由伯克希尔或其保险子公司拥有。
(b) Blue Chip 和/或 Wesco 拥有这些公司的股份。所有数字代表伯克希尔在集团更大总持股中的净权益。

Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum of activities that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much additional financial information is included in Management's Discussion on pages 34-37 and in the narrative reports on pages 38-50. However, our largest area of both controlled and non-controlled activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area, and commentary on important developments in that industry is appropriate.

我们的控股和非控股业务涉及的经营活动范围如此之广，以至于在此进行详细评论会过于冗长。更多的财务信息包含在第 34-37 页的管理层讨论以及第 38-50 页的叙述性报告中。然而，我们最大的控股和非控股活动领域一直是，而且几乎肯定会继续是，财产意外险领域，对该行业重要发展的评论是恰当的。

"Forecasts", said Sam Goldwyn, "are dangerous, particularly those about the future." (Berkshire shareholders may have reached a similar conclusion after rereading our past annual reports featuring your Chairman's prescient analysis of textile prospects.)

“预测，”Sam Goldwyn 说，“是危险的，尤其是关于未来的预测。”（伯克希尔的股东们在重读我们过去以你们主席对纺织业前景的先见之明分析为特色的年报后，可能也得出了类似的结论。）

There is no danger, however, in forecasting that 1982 will be the worst year in recent history for insurance underwriting. That result already has been guaranteed by present pricing behavior, coupled with the term nature of the insurance contract.

然而，预测 1982 年将是保险承保近期历史上最糟糕的一年，这没有任何危险。这一结果已被当前的定价行为以及保险合同的期限性质所保证。

While many auto policies are priced and sold at six-month intervals - and many property policies are sold for a three-year term - a weighted average of the duration of all property-casualty insurance policies probably runs a little under twelve months. And prices for the insurance coverage, of course, are frozen for the life of the contract. Thus, this year's sales contracts ("premium written" in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year's level of revenue ("premiums earned"). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.

虽然许多汽车保单以六个月为间隔定价和销售——许多财产保单销售期限为三年——但所有财产意外险保单的加权平均期限可能略低于十二个月。而且保险覆盖的价格，当然，在合同期内是固定的。因此，今年的销售合同（行业术语称为“已承保保费”）决定了明年约一半的收入水平（“已赚保费”）。剩下的一半将由明年签订的销售合同决定，这些合同在当年大约会赚取 50%。盈利能力的结果是自动的：如果你在定价上犯了错误，你将不得不在一个令人不适的时期内承受它。

Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry-wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year's level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.

注意下表中全行业已承保保费的同比增幅及其对当年和次年承保盈利能力水平的影响。结果正如你在通胀环境下所预期的那样。当业务量增幅达到两位数以上时，预示着当年和次年的盈利能力趋势良好。当行业业务量增幅较小时，无论当前水平多么不尽人意，承保业绩很快就会恶化。

The Best's data in the table reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio indicates total operating and loss costs as compared to premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

表中的 Best's 数据反映了几乎整个行业的经验，包括股份、互助和 reciprocal 公司。综合比率表示总运营和损失成本与保费的比较；比率低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示亏损。

Source: Best's Aggregates and Averages.

来源：Best's Aggregates and Averages。

As Pogo would say, "The future isn't what it used to be." Current pricing practices promise devastating results, particularly if the respite from major natural disasters that the industry has enjoyed in recent years should end. For underwriting experience has been getting worse in spite of good luck, not because of bad luck. In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won't always be so obliging.

正如 Pogo 所说：“未来已经不是过去的样子了。”当前的定价实践预示着毁灭性的结果，特别是如果该行业近年来免受重大自然灾害的喘息机会结束的话。因为承保经验一直在恶化，尽管有运气好，而不是因为运气差。近年来，飓风停留在海面，驾车者减少了驾驶。他们不会总是这么配合。

And, of course the twin inflations, monetary and "social" (the tendency of courts and juries to stretch the coverage of policies beyond what insurers, relying upon contract terminology and precedent, had expected), are unstoppable. Costs of repairing both property and people - and the extent to which these repairs are deemed to be the responsibility of the insurer - will advance relentlessly.

而且，当然，货币和社会（法院和陪审团倾向于将保单的覆盖范围扩大到保险公司依据合同条款和先例所预期的范围之外）的双重通胀是不可阻挡的。修复财产和人员的成本——以及这些修复在多大程度上被视为保险公司的责任——将无情地增加。

Absent any bad luck (catastrophes, increased driving, etc.), an immediate industry volume gain of at least 10% per year probably is necessary to stabilize the record level of underwriting losses that will automatically prevail in mid-1982. (Most underwriters expect incurred losses in aggregate to rise at least 10% annually; each, of course, counts on getting less than his share.) Every percentage point of annual premium growth below the 10% equilibrium figure quickens the pace of deterioration. Quarterly data in 1981 underscore the conclusion that a terrible underwriting picture is worsening at an accelerating rate.

如果没有坏运气（灾难、驾驶量增加等），行业业务量立即实现每年至少 10% 的增长，可能对于稳定 1982 年年中将自动出现的创纪录承保亏损水平是必要的。（大多数承保人预计总已发生损失每年至少增长 10%；当然，每个人都指望自己的份额低于这个数。）年保费增长低于 10% 均衡数字的每个百分点都会加速恶化的步伐。1981 年的季度数据强调了一个结论，即糟糕的承保情况正在加速恶化。

In the 1980 annual report we discussed the investment policies that have destroyed the integrity of many insurers' balance sheets, forcing them to abandon underwriting discipline and write business at any price in order to avoid negative cash flow. It was clear that insurers with large holdings of bonds valued, for accounting purposes, at nonsensically high prices would have little choice but to keep the money revolving by selling large numbers of policies at nonsensically low prices. Such insurers necessarily fear a major decrease in volume more than they fear a major underwriting loss.

在 1980 年的年报中，我们讨论了摧毁许多保险公司资产负债表完整性的投资政策，迫使它们放弃承保纪律，以任何价格承保业务以避免负现金流。很明显，那些持有大量债券、会计估值荒谬地高的保险公司，除了以荒谬的低价出售大量保单来保持资金循环外，几乎别无选择。这类保险公司必然更担心业务量大幅下降，而不是担心重大承保亏损。

But, unfortunately, all insurers are affected; it's difficult to price much differently than your most threatened competitor. This pressure continues unabated and adds a new motivation to the others that drive many insurance managers to push for business; worship of size over profitability, and the fear that market share surrendered never can be regained.

但不幸的是，所有保险公司都受到影响；很难与最受威胁的竞争者在定价上有太大差异。这种压力持续不减，并为驱使许多保险经理人争取业务的其他动机增加了新的动力；崇拜规模胜于盈利能力，以及担心一旦放弃市场份额就再也无法夺回。

Whatever the reasons, we believe it is true that virtually no major property-casualty insurer - despite protests by the entire industry that rates are inadequate and great selectivity should be exercised - has been willing to turn down business to the point where cash flow has turned significantly negative. Absent such a willingness, prices will remain under severe pressure.

无论原因如何，我们相信，实际上没有一家主要的财产意外险保险公司——尽管整个行业都在抗议费率不足，应该进行高度选择性承保——愿意拒绝业务到使现金流显著为负的程度。缺乏这种意愿，价格将面临严重压力。

Commentators continue to talk of the underwriting cycle, usually implying a regularity of rhythm and a relatively constant midpoint of profitability Our own view is different. We believe that very large, although obviously varying, underwriting losses will be the norm for the industry, and that the best underwriting years in the future decade may appear substandard against the average year of the past decade.

评论员们继续谈论承保周期，通常暗示一种规律的节奏和相对恒定的盈利能力中点。我们自己的看法不同。我们认为，尽管明显会变化，但非常巨大的承保亏损将成为该行业的常态，未来十年中最好的承保年份，与过去十年的平均年份相比，可能看起来会低于标准。

We have no magic formula to insulate our controlled insurance companies against this deteriorating future. Our managers, particularly Phil Liesche, Bill Lyons, Roland Miller, Floyd Taylor and Milt Thornton, have done a magnificent job of swimming against the tide. We have sacrificed much volume, but have maintained a substantial underwriting superiority in relation to industry-wide results. The outlook at Berkshire is for continued low volume. Our financial position offers us maximum flexibility, a very rare condition in the property-casualty insurance industry. And, at some point, should fear ever prevail throughout the industry, our financial strength could become an operational asset of immense value.

我们没有神奇的公式来保护我们控制的保险公司免受这种恶化的未来影响。我们的经理人，特别是 Phil Liesche、Bill Lyons、Roland Miller、Floyd Taylor 和 Milt Thornton，在逆流中游得非常好。我们牺牲了大量的业务量，但与全行业的结果相比，保持了显著的承保优势。伯克希尔的前景是业务量持续低迷。我们的财务状况为我们提供了最大的灵活性，这在财产意外险行业中是非常罕见的。而且，在某个时候，如果恐惧在整个行业中盛行，我们的财务实力可能会成为一项具有巨大价值的运营资产。

We believe that GEICO Corporation, our major non-controlled business operating in this field, is, by virtue of its extreme and improving operating efficiency, in a considerably more protected position than almost any other major insurer. GEICO is a brilliantly run implementation of a very important business idea.

我们相信，GEICO 公司，我们在这个领域的主要非控股业务，凭借其极高且不断提高的运营效率，其受保护的地位远高于几乎任何其他主要保险公司。GEICO 是对一项非常重要的商业理念的卓越运营实践。

Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.

我们允许股东指定公司慈善捐款接受方的新计划受到了非凡的热情欢迎。1981 年 10 月 14 日发出的描述该计划的信件副本见第 51-53 页。在 932,206 股有资格参与的股份（实际所有者姓名出现在我们股东记录上的股份）中，95.6% 做出了回应。即使排除与巴菲特相关的股份，回应率也超过了 90%。

In addition, more than 3% of our shareholders voluntarily wrote letters or notes, all but one approving of the program. Both the level of participation and of commentary surpass any shareholder response we have witnessed, even when such response has been intensively solicited by corporate staff and highly paid professional proxy organizations. In contrast, your extraordinary level of response occurred without even the nudge of a company-provided return envelope. This self-propelled behavior speaks well for the program, and speaks well for our shareholders.

此外，超过 3% 的股东自愿写信或便条，除一个人外，全部赞成该计划。参与程度和评论程度都超过了我们所见过的任何股东回应，即使当这些回应是由公司员工和高薪专业代理组织密集征集时也是如此。相比之下，你们非凡的回应水平甚至没有公司提供的回邮信封的推动。这种自发的行为很好地说明了该计划，也很好地说明了我们的股东。

Apparently the owners of our corporation like both possessing and exercising the ability to determine where gifts of their funds shall be made. The "father-knows-best" school of corporate governance will be surprised to find that none of our shareholders sent in a designation sheet with instructions that the officers of Berkshire - in their superior wisdom, of course - make the decision on charitable funds applicable to his shares. Nor did anyone suggest that his share of our charitable funds be used to match contributions made by our corporate directors to charities of the directors' choice (a popular, proliferating and non-publicized policy at many large corporations).

显然，我们公司的所有者既喜欢拥有也喜欢行使决定其资金捐赠去向的能力。公司治理的“爸爸最懂”学派会惊讶地发现，没有一个股东寄来指定表，指示伯克希尔的管理人员——当然，凭他们卓越的智慧——对其股份适用的慈善资金做出决定。也没有人建议将他那份我们的慈善资金用于匹配公司董事们向他们自己选择的慈善机构所做的捐款（这是许多大公司流行、日益增多且不公开的政策）。

All told, $1,783,655 of shareholder-designed contributions were distributed to about 675 charities. In addition, Berkshire and subsidiaries continue to make certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions made by our operating managers.

总计 1,783,655 美元的股东指定捐款被分配给约 675 家慈善机构。此外，伯克希尔及其子公司继续根据我们运营经理做出的地方层面决策进行某些捐款。

There will be some years, perhaps two or three out of ten, when contributions by Berkshire will produce substandard tax deductions - or none at all. In those years we will not effect our shareholder designated charitable program. In all other years we expect to inform you about October 10th of the amount per share that you may designate. A reply form will accompany the notice, and you will be given about three weeks to respond with your designation. To qualify, your shares must be registered in your own name or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, if applicable, on our shareholder list of September 30th, or the Friday preceding if such date falls on a Saturday or Sunday.

有些年份，也许十年中有两三年，伯克希尔的捐赠产生的税收扣除不达标——或根本没有抵扣。在这些年份里，我们将不实施股东指定慈善计划。在所有其他年份，我们预计在 10 月 10 日左右通知你们每股可以指定的金额。通知将附带回复表格，你们将有大约三周的时间来回复指定。要获得资格，你的股份必须在 9 月 30 日（如果该日是周六或周日，则为前一个周五）的股东名册上登记在你自己的名下，或适用的所有权信托、公司、合伙企业或遗产的名下。

Our only disappointment with this program in 1981 was that some of our shareholders, through no fault of their own, missed the opportunity to participate. The Treasury Department ruling allowing us to proceed without tax uncertainty was received early in October. The ruling did not cover participation by shareholders whose stock was registered in the name of nominees, such as brokers, and additionally required that the owners of all designating shares make certain assurances to Berkshire. These assurances could not be given us in effective form by nominee holders.

我们对 1981 年该计划的唯一失望是，我们的一些股东，并非他们自己的过错，错过了参与的机会。财政部允许我们在没有税收不确定性的情况下进行的裁定是在 10 月初收到的。该裁定不包括股票以代名人名义（如经纪人）登记的股东的参与，此外还要求所有指定股份的所有者向伯克希尔做出某些保证。代名人持有人无法以有效形式向我们提供这些保证。

Under these circumstances, we attempted to communicate with all of our owners promptly (via the October 14th letter) so that, if they wished, they could prepare themselves to participate by the November 13th record date. It was particularly important that this information be communicated promptly to stockholders whose holdings were in nominee name, since they would not be eligible unless they took action to re-register their shares before the record date.

在这种情况下，我们试图迅速与所有所有者沟通（通过 10 月 14 日的信函），以便如果他们愿意，可以在 11 月 13 日的记录日期前做好准备参与。向以代名人名义持有股份的股东迅速传达这一信息尤为重要，因为他们除非在记录日期前采取行动重新登记股份，否则将没有资格。

Unfortunately, communication to such non-record shareholders could take place only through the nominees. We therefore strongly urged those nominees, mostly brokerage houses, to promptly transmit our letter to the real owners. We explained that their failure to do so could deprive such owners of an important benefit.

不幸的是，与这类非登记股东的沟通只能通过代名人进行。因此，我们强烈敦促那些代名人（主要是经纪公司）迅速将我们的信函转交给真正的所有者。我们解释说，如果他们不这样做，可能会使这些所有者失去一项重要利益。

The results from our urgings would not strengthen the case for private ownership of the U.S. Postal Service. Many of our shareholders never heard from their brokers (as some shareholders told us after reading news accounts of the program). Others were forwarded our letter too late for action.

我们的敦促结果并不能为美国邮政服务的私有化提供有力的论据。我们的许多股东从未收到他们经纪人的任何消息（正如一些股东在阅读了该计划的新闻报道后告诉我们的那样）。其他人收到我们转发的信函时已为时过晚，无法采取行动。

One of the largest brokerage houses claiming to hold stock for sixty of its clients (about 4% of our shareholder population), apparently transmitted our letter about three weeks after receipt - too late for any of the sixty to participate. (Such lassitude did not pervade all departments of that firm; it billed Berkshire for mailing services within six days of that belated and ineffectual action.)

一家声称为其六十个客户（约占我们股东人数的 4%）持有股票的大型经纪公司，显然在收到信函约三周后才转交——这六十个客户都来不及参与。（这种怠惰并未弥漫到该公司所有部门；它在这次迟来且无效的行动后六天内就向伯克希尔开具了邮寄服务账单。）

We recite such horror stories for two reasons: (1) if you wish to participate in future designated contribution programs, be sure to have your stock registered in your name well before September 30th; and (2) even if you don't care to participate and prefer to leave your stock in nominee form, it would be wise to have at least one share registered in your own name. By so doing, you can be sure that you will be notified of any important corporate news at the same time as all other shareholders.

我们讲述这些可怕的故事有两个原因：(1) 如果你希望参与未来的指定捐款计划，请确保在 9 月 30 日之前将你的股票登记在你自己的名下；(2) 即使你不关心参与并且更愿意将股票以代名人形式持有，至少持有一股以你自己名义登记的股票也是明智的。这样，你可以确保与其他所有股东同时收到任何重要的公司新闻。

The designated-contributions idea, along with many other ideas that have turned out well for us, was conceived by Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and Chairman of Blue Chip. Irrespective of titles, Charlie and I work as partners in managing all controlled companies. To almost a sinful degree, we enjoy our work as managing partners. And we enjoy having you as our financial partners.

指定捐款的想法，以及许多其他对我们而言效果良好的想法，是由伯克希尔副董事长兼 Blue Chip 董事长查理·芒格构想出来的。无论头衔如何，查理和我作为合伙人共同管理所有控股公司。我们几乎到了罪恶的程度，热爱我们作为管理合伙人的工作。我们也乐于有你作为我们的财务合伙人。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席