1982 年致股东信

Operating earnings of $31.5 million in 1982 amounted to only 9.8% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost), down from 15.2% in 1981 and far below our recent high of 19.4% in 1978. This decline largely resulted from:

1982 年营业利润为 3150 万美元，仅占期初股东权益（按成本计价证券）的 9.8%，低于 1981 年的 15.2%，更远低于 1978 年创下的近期高点 19.4%。这一下降主要源于：

(1) a significant deterioration in insurance underwriting results;

（1）保险承保业绩显著恶化；

(2) a considerable expansion of equity capital without a corresponding growth in the businesses we operate directly; and

（2）股东权益大幅扩张，而直接经营业务没有相应增长；

(3) a continually-enlarging commitment of our resources to investment in partially-owned, nonoperated businesses; accounting rules dictate that a major part of our pro-rata share of earnings from such businesses must be excluded from Berkshire’s reported earnings.

（3）我们将资源持续更多地投入到部分持有、非经营性的企业；会计准则规定，此类业务中我们按比例享有的绝大部分收益必须排除在伯克希尔的报告利润之外。

It was only a few years ago that we told you that the operating earnings/equity capital percentage, with proper allowance for a few other variables, was the most important yardstick of single-year managerial performance. While we still believe this to be the case with the vast majority of companies, we believe its utility in our own case has greatly diminished. You should be suspicious of such an assertion. Yardsticks seldom are discarded while yielding favorable readings. But when results deteriorate, most managers favor disposition of the yardstick rather than disposition of the manager.

就在几年前，我们曾告诉你们，在适当考虑其他几个变量的前提下，营业利润/股东权益的百分比是衡量单一年度管理层业绩最重要的标尺。虽然我们仍然相信对绝大多数公司而言确实如此，但我们认为这一标尺在我们自身案例中的效用已大大降低。你们应该对这种说法心存疑虑。标尺在给出有利读数时很少会被抛弃。但当业绩恶化时，大多数管理者更倾向于抛弃标尺，而不是抛弃管理者本人。

To managers faced with such deterioration, a more flexible measurement system often suggests itself: just shoot the arrow of business performance into a blank canvas and then carefully draw the bullseye around the implanted arrow. We generally believe in pre-set, long-lived and small bullseyes. However, because of the importance of item (3) above, further explained in the following section, we believe our abandonment of the operating earnings/equity capital bullseye to be warranted.

面对这种恶化，管理者往往会想到一个更灵活的衡量体系：先把业绩之箭射向一块空白的画布，然后小心地在箭落点周围画上靶心。我们通常相信预先设定、长期有效且较小的靶心。然而，由于上述第（3）点的重要性（下一节将进一步解释），我们认为放弃营业利润/股东权益这个靶心是合理的。

Non-Reported Ownership Earnings

未报告的股权收益

The appended financial statements reflect “accounting” earnings that generally include our proportionate share of earnings from any underlying business in which our ownership is at least 20%. Below the 20% ownership figure, however, only our share of dividends paid by the underlying business units is included in our accounting numbers; undistributed earnings of such less-than-20%-owned businesses are totally ignored.

随附的财务报表反映了“会计”利润，通常包括我们持有至少 20% 股权的任何基础业务中我们按比例享有的收益。然而，对于持股低于 20% 的情况，我们的会计数字中只包含我们从这些基础业务中获得的分红份额；此类持股低于 20% 的企业的未分配收益则被完全忽略。

There are a few exceptions to this rule; e.g., we own about 35% of GEICO Corporation but, because we have assigned our voting rights, the company is treated for accounting purposes as a less-than-20% holding. Thus, dividends received from GEICO in 1982 of $3.5 million after tax are the only item included in our “accounting” earnings. An additional $23 million that represents our share of GEICO’s undistributed operating earnings for 1982 is totally excluded from our reported operating earnings. If GEICO had earned less money in 1982 but had paid an additional $1 million in dividends, our reported earnings would have been larger despite the poorer business results. Conversely, if GEICO had earned an additional $100 million - and retained it all - our reported earnings would have been unchanged. Clearly “accounting” earnings can seriously misrepresent economic reality.

这个规则有几个例外：例如，我们持有 GEICO 公司约 35% 的股份，但由于我们将投票权转让，该公司在会计处理上被视为持股低于 20% 的持有。因此，1982 年从 GEICO 获得的税后 350 万美元分红是唯一计入我们“会计”利润的项目。另外 2300 万美元（代表我们在 GEICO 1982 年未分配营业利润中的份额）则被完全排除在我们报告的营业利润之外。如果 GEICO 在 1982 年赚得更少但多支付了 100 万美元分红，尽管业务表现更差，我们报告的利润反而会更高。相反，如果 GEICO 多赚了 1 亿美元并全部留存，我们报告的利润也不会改变。显然，“会计”利润可能严重歪曲经济现实。

We prefer a concept of “economic” earnings that includes all undistributed earnings, regardless of ownership percentage. In our view, the value to all owners of the retained earnings of a business enterprise is determined by the effectiveness with which those earnings are used - and not by the size of one’s ownership percentage. If you have owned .01 of 1% of Berkshire during the past decade, you have benefited economically in full measure from your share of our retained earnings, no matter what your accounting system. Proportionately, you have done just as well as if you had owned the magic 20%. But if you have owned 100% of a great many capital-intensive businesses during the decade, retained earnings that were credited fully and with painstaking precision to you under standard accounting methods have resulted in minor or zero economic value. This is not a criticism of accounting procedures. We would not like to have the job of designing a better system. It’s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers are the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.

我们更喜欢“经济”利润的概念，即包含所有未分配收益，无论持股比例是多少。我们认为，企业留存收益对所有所有者的价值，取决于这些收益的使用效率，而非所有者持股比例的大小。如果你在过去十年中持有伯克希尔 0.01% 的股份，无论你的会计体系如何，你都已经从你那份留存收益中获得了全部经济利益。按比例计算，你的收益与持有神奇的 20% 股份完全一样。但如果你在这十年中持有大量资本密集型企业的 100% 股份，那么按照标准会计方法精确全额记在你名下的留存收益，却只产生了很少或零经济价值。这不是对会计程序的批评。我们也不希望由自己来设计一个更好的体系。这只是想说，管理者和投资者都必须明白，会计数字是商业估值的起点，而非终点。

In most corporations, less-than-20% ownership positions are unimportant (perhaps, in part, because they prevent maximization of cherished reported earnings) and the distinction between accounting and economic results we have just discussed matters little. But in our own case, such positions are of very large and growing importance. Their magnitude, we believe, is what makes our reported operating earnings figure of limited significance.

在大多数公司，低于 20% 的持股地位并不重要（部分原因可能是它们妨碍了珍视的报告利润最大化），我们刚才讨论的会计结果与经济结果之间的区别关系不大。但在我们自己的案例中，这类持股地位非常重要且日益重要。我们认为，正是它们的规模使得我们报告的营业利润数字意义有限。

In our 1981 annual report we predicted that our share of undistributed earnings from four of our major non-controlled holdings would aggregate over $35 million in 1982. With no change in our holdings of three of these companies - GEICO, General Foods and The Washington Post - and a considerable increase in our ownership of the fourth, R. J. Reynolds Industries, our share of undistributed 1982 operating earnings of this group came to well over $40 million. This number - not reflected at all in our earnings - is greater than our total reported earnings, which include only the $14 million in dividends received from these companies. And, of course, we have a number of smaller ownership interests that, in aggregate, had substantial additional undistributed earnings.

在 1981 年的年报中，我们预测 1982 年我们从四大主要非控股持股中获得的未分配收益份额将总计超过 3500 万美元。我们在其中三家公司（GEICO、通用食品和华盛顿邮报）的持股没有变化，而对第四家 R.J.雷诺兹工业公司的持股大幅增加，结果 1982 年我们从这四家公司获得的未分配营业利润份额远超过 4000 万美元。这个数字（完全没有反映在我们的利润中）超过了我们的总报告利润（后者只包括从这些公司获得的 1400 万美元分红）。当然，我们还有一些较小的持股权益，它们合计还有大量额外的未分配收益。

We attach real significance to the general magnitude of these numbers, but we don’t believe they should be carried to ten decimal places. Realization by Berkshire of such retained earnings through improved market valuations is subject to very substantial, but indeterminate, taxation. And while retained earnings over the years, and in the aggregate, have translated into at least equal market value for shareholders, the translation has been both extraordinarily uneven among companies and irregular and unpredictable in timing.

我们确实重视这些数字的大致规模，但认为它们不必精确到小数点后十位。伯克希尔通过市场估值提升来实现此类留存收益，将面临非常重大但不确定的税收。而且，尽管多年累积的留存收益总体上至少为股东转化为了等值的市场价值，但这种转化在公司之间极为不均衡，在时间上也极不规则且不可预测。

However, this very unevenness and irregularity offers advantages to the value-oriented purchaser of fractional portions of businesses. This investor may select from almost the entire array of major American corporations, including many far superior to virtually any of the businesses that could be bought in their entirety in a negotiated deal. And fractional-interest purchases can be made in an auction market where prices are set by participants with behavior patterns that sometimes resemble those of an army of manic-depressive lemmings.

然而，这种不均衡和不规则恰恰为价值导向型的部分业务购买者提供了优势。这类投资者几乎可以从所有美国大公司中进行选择，其中包括许多远优于任何通过谈判整体购买所能获得的企业。而且，部分权益的购买可以在拍卖市场中进行，那里的价格由行为模式有时像一群躁郁症旅鼠的参与者决定。

Within this gigantic auction arena, it is our job to select businesses with economic characteristics allowing each dollar of retained earnings to be translated eventually into at least a dollar of market value. Despite a lot of mistakes, we have so far achieved this goal. In doing so, we have been greatly assisted by Arthur Okun’s patron saint for economists - St. Offset. In some cases, that is, retained earnings attributable to our ownership position have had insignificant or even negative impact on market value, while in other major positions a dollar retained by an investee corporation has been translated into two or more dollars of market value. To date, our corporate over-achievers have more than offset the laggards. If we can continue this record, it will validate our efforts to maximize “economic” earnings, regardless of the impact upon “accounting” earnings.

在这个巨大的拍卖场内，我们的工作是选择那些具备经济特征的企业，使得每一美元留存收益最终至少转化为一美元市场价值。尽管犯过很多错误，我们迄今仍实现了这一目标。在此过程中，我们得到了阿瑟·奥肯为经济学家设立的守护神——“圣抵消”的大力帮助。也就是说，在某些情况下，归属于我们持股地位的留存收益对市场价值的影响微乎其微甚至负面，而在另一些重要持股中，被投资公司留存的一美元转化为两美元甚至更多的市场价值。迄今为止，我们组合中的“优等生”业绩足以抵消“落后生”。如果我们能继续保持这一记录，那么无论对“会计”利润有何影响，我们最大化“经济”利润的努力都将得到验证。

Satisfactory as our partial-ownership approach has been, what really makes us dance is the purchase of 100% of good businesses at reasonable prices. We’ve accomplished this feat a few times (and expect to do so again), but it is an extraordinarily difficult job - far more difficult than the purchase at attractive prices of fractional interests.

尽管我们的部分持股方式令人满意，但真正让我们心动的，是以合理价格买入优秀企业 100% 的股权。我们曾数次完成这一壮举（并期望再次做到），但这极其困难——远比以有吸引力的价格购买部分权益困难得多。

As we look at the major acquisitions that others made during 1982, our reaction is not envy, but relief that we were non-participants. For in many of these acquisitions, managerial intellect wilted in competition with managerial adrenaline The thrill of the chase blinded the pursuers to the consequences of the catch. Pascal’s observation seems apt: “It has struck me that all men’s misfortunes spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”

当我们回顾 1982 年其他公司进行的大型收购时，我们的反应不是羡慕，而是庆幸自己未曾参与。因为在许多此类收购中，管理层的智慧在与管理层的肾上腺素竞争中枯萎了。追逐的刺激让追求者看不到捕获的后果。帕斯卡的观察似乎很贴切：“我突然意识到，所有人类的不幸都源于一个单一原因：他们不能安静地待在一个房间里。”

(Your Chairman left the room once too often last year and almost starred in the Acquisition Follies of 1982. In retrospect, our major accomplishment of the year was that a very large purchase to which we had firmly committed was unable to be completed for reasons totally beyond our control. Had it come off, this transaction would have consumed extraordinary amounts of time and energy, all for a most uncertain payoff. If we were to introduce graphics to this report, illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold.)

（你们的主席去年离开房间过于频繁，差点成为《1982 年收购蠢行录》的主角。回想起来，我们今年主要的成就是：一笔我们已坚定承诺的非常大的收购，因完全无法控制的原因未能完成。如果这笔交易做成，它将消耗异常多的时间和精力，却只为极其不确定的回报。如果我们要在这份报告中加入图表，以说明过去一年的有利业务发展，那么描绘这笔失败交易的两页空白将是合适的中页插画。）

Our partial-ownership approach can be continued soundly only as long as portions of attractive businesses can be acquired at attractive prices. We need a moderately-priced stock market to assist us in this endeavor. The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves. But, unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do. For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments.

我们的部分持股方法只有在能够以有吸引力的价格买入有吸引力企业的一部分时，才能持续健康地运作。我们需要一个价格适中的股市来协助我们。市场，就像上帝一样，帮助那些自助的人。但与上帝不同的是，市场不会宽恕那些不知道自己在做什么的人。对投资者而言，为一家优秀公司的股票支付过高的买入价格，可能会抵消随后十年有利业务发展的效果。

Should the stock market advance to considerably higher levels, our ability to utilize capital effectively in partial-ownership positions will be reduced or eliminated. This will happen periodically: just ten years ago, at the height of the two-tier market mania (with high-return-on-equity businesses bid to the sky by institutional investors), Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries owned only $18 million in market value of equities, excluding their interest in Blue Chip Stamps. At that time, such equity holdings amounted to about 15% of our insurance company investments versus the present 80%. There were as many good businesses around in 1972 as in 1982, but the prices the stock market placed upon those businesses in 1972 looked absurd. While high stock prices in the future would make our performance look good temporarily, they would hurt our long-term business prospects rather than help them. We currently are seeing early traces of this problem.

如果股市大幅上涨，我们在部分持股中有效配置资本的能力将会减弱或消失。这种情况会周期性出现：就在十年前，在两级市场狂热的顶峰时期（高净资产收益率的企业被机构投资者推到天价），伯克希尔的保险子公司只持有 1800 万美元市值的股票（不包括其在蓝筹印花公司的权益）。当时，这类股权投资约占我们保险子公司投资的 15%，而现在这一比例为 80%。1972 年的优秀企业与 1982 年一样多，但当时股市对这些企业的定价显得荒谬。虽然未来高股价会暂时让我们的业绩看起来不错，但这会损害而非帮助我们的长期业务前景。我们目前正看到这一问题的早期迹象。

Long-Term Corporate Performance

长期企业业绩

Our gain in net worth during 1982, valuing equities held by our insurance subsidiaries at market value (less capital gain taxes payable if unrealized gains were actually realized) amounted to $208 million. On a beginning net worth base of $519 million, the percentage gain was 40%.

1982 年，我们按市值（减去如果未实现收益实际实现时应缴纳的资本利得税）计算保险子公司持有的股票，我们的净资产增加了 2.08 亿美元。基于期初净资产 5.19 亿美元，增长率为 40%。

During the 18-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $737.43 per share, or 22.0% compounded annually. You can be certain that this percentage will diminish in the future. Geometric progressions eventually forge their own anchors.

在现任管理层任职的 18 年间，每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到 737.43 美元，年复合增长率为 22.0%。你们可以确信，这个百分率未来将会下降。几何级数最终会为自己锻造出锚。

Berkshire’s economic goal remains to produce a long-term rate of return well above the return achieved by the average large American corporation. Our willingness to purchase either partial or total ownership positions in favorably-situated businesses, coupled with reasonable discipline about the prices we are willing to pay, should give us a good chance of achieving our goal.

伯克希尔的经济目标仍然是实现长期回报率，远高于美国大型企业的平均水平。我们愿意以合理价格买入有利位置企业的部分或全部股权，再加上对价格的合理纪律，应该能给我们实现目标的好机会。

Again this year the gain in market valuation of partially-owned businesses outpaced the gain in underlying economic value of those businesses. For example, $79 million of our $208 million gain is attributable to an increased market price for GEICO. This company continues to do exceptionally well, and we are more impressed than ever by the strength of GEICO’s basic business idea and by the management skills of Jack Byrne. (Although not found in the catechism of the better business schools, “Let Jack Do It” works fine as a corporate creed for us.)

今年再次出现，部分持股企业的市值增长超过了这些企业内在经济价值的增长。例如，我们 2.08 亿美元增长中的 7900 万美元归因于 GEICO 股价的上涨。该公司持续表现异常出色，GEICO 基本商业理念的强大和杰克·伯恩的管理技能给我们留下的印象比以往任何时候都深刻。（尽管在优秀商学院的教义中找不到，“让杰克去做”作为我们的企业信条效果很好。）

However, GEICO’s increase in market value during the past two years has been considerably greater than the gain in its intrinsic business value, impressive as the latter has been. We expected such a favorable variation at some point, as the perception of investors converged with business reality. And we look forward to substantial future gains in underlying business value accompanied by irregular, but eventually full, market recognition of such gains.

然而，GEICO 过去两年市值的增长远超其内在业务价值的增长（尽管后者同样令人印象深刻）。我们预计投资者的认知终将与业务现实趋于一致，从而在某时出现这种有利变化。我们期待未来内在业务价值的大幅增长，并伴随市场对这种增长的不规则但最终充分的认可。

Year-to-year variances, however, cannot consistently be in our favor. Even if our partially-owned businesses continue to perform well in an economic sense, there will be years when they perform poorly in the market. At such times our net worth could shrink significantly. We will not be distressed by such a shrinkage; if the businesses continue to look attractive and we have cash available, we simply will add to our holdings at even more favorable prices.

然而，年度之间的差异不可能总是对我们有利。即使我们的部分持股企业在经济意义上持续表现良好，也会在某些年份市场表现不佳。到那时，我们的净资产可能会大幅缩水。我们不会为此感到苦恼；如果这些企业仍然具有吸引力，并且我们有现金可用，我们只会以更有利的价格增持。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告利润的来源

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1981 and 1982 Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owned 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告利润的来源。1981 年和 1982 年，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花公司约 60% 的股份，而后者又持有 Wesco 金融公司 80% 的股份。该表展示了各业务实体的总营业利润，以及伯克希尔在这些利润中所占的份额。任何业务实体因非常规资产出售产生的所有重大损益，与证券交易合并计入表格底部附近的栏目，不包括在营业利润中。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

• 收购企业（即喜诗糖果、互助储蓄和布法罗晚报）时产生的无形资产摊销反映在“其他”类别中。

On pages 45-61 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of Blue Chip and Wesco, in which they describe 1982 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

在本报告第 45-61 页，我们转载了蓝筹印花和 Wesco 主要高管的叙述性报告，其中描述了 1982 年的运营情况。任何伯克希尔股东若需索取任一家公司的完整年报，可致函蓝筹印花公司的 Robert H. Bird 先生（地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040），或 Wesco 金融公司的 Jeanne Leach 女士（地址：315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109），我们将邮寄副本。

I believe you will find the Blue Chip chronicle of developments in the Buffalo newspaper situation particularly interesting. There are now only 14 cities in the United States with a daily newspaper whose weekday circulation exceeds that of the Buffalo News. But the real story has been the growth in Sunday circulation. Six years ago, prior to introduction of a Sunday edition of the News, the long-established Courier-Express, as the only Sunday newspaper published in Buffalo, had circulation of 272,000. The News now has Sunday circulation of 367,000, a 35% gain - even though the number of households within the primary circulation area has shown little change during the six years. We know of no city in the United States with a long history of seven-day newspaper publication in which the percentage of households purchasing the Sunday newspaper has grown at anything like this rate. To the contrary, in most cities household penetration figures have grown negligibly, or not at all. Our key managers in Buffalo - Henry Urban, Stan Lipsey, Murray Light, Clyde Pinson, Dave Perona and Dick Feather - deserve great credit for this unmatched expansion in Sunday readership.

我相信你们会发现蓝筹印花关于布法罗报纸发展情况的记录特别有趣。目前美国只有 14 个城市的日报工作日发行量超过《布法罗新闻报》。但真正的故事是周日版发行量的增长。六年前，在《新闻报》推出周日版之前，历史悠久的《信使快报》作为布法罗唯一出版的周日报纸，发行量为 27.2 万份。《新闻报》现在的周日发行量达到 36.7 万份，增长了 35%——尽管六年间主要发行区域内的家庭户数几乎没有变化。我们不知道美国还有哪个拥有长期七日出版历史的城市，其周日报纸的家庭渗透率能以如此速度增长。相反，在大多数城市，家庭渗透率增长微乎其微，甚至没有增长。我们在布法罗的主要管理者——Henry Urban、Stan Lipsey、Murray Light、Clyde Pinson、Dave Perona 和 Dick Feather——为这次周日读者群无与伦比的扩张赢得了巨大荣誉。

As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of non-controlled earnings, of course, finds its way into that table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.

如前所述，我们未控股公司的未分配收益现在与前表详述的报告营业利润同等重要。当然，非控股收益中的已分配部分主要通过保险集团利润中的净投资收益栏目进入该表。

We show below Berkshire’s proportional holdings in those non-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.

下表列出伯克希尔在那些非控股企业中的持股比例，对于这些企业，只有已分配收益（分红）被计入我们的利润。

(a) 由伯克希尔或其保险子公司全资拥有。
(b) 蓝筹印花和/或 Wesco 持有这些公司的股份。所有数字代表伯克希尔在集团更大总持仓中的净权益。
(c) 作为现金替代品的临时持有。

In case you haven’t noticed, there is an important investment lesson to be derived from this table: nostalgia should be weighted heavily in stock selection. Our two largest unrealized gains are in Washington Post and GEICO, companies with which your Chairman formed his first commercial connections at the ages of 13 and 20, respectively After straying for roughly 25 years, we returned as investors in the mid-1970s. The table quantifies the rewards for even long-delayed corporate fidelity.

如果你们还没注意到，这张表包含了一个重要的投资教训：怀旧情绪在选股中应该占据很大权重。我们最大的两项未实现收益来自华盛顿邮报和 GEICO，你们的主席分别在 13 岁和 20 岁时与这两家公司建立了最初的商业联系。在大约 25 年的游离之后，我们在 1970 年代中期作为投资者回归。这张表量化了即使是长期延迟的企业忠诚所带来的回报。

Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much financial and operational information regarding the controlled businesses is included in Management’s Discussion on pages 34-39, and in the narrative reports on pages 45-61. However, our largest area of business activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area. So commentary on developments in that industry is appropriate.

我们的控股和非控股业务涵盖范围太广，在此详细评述会过于冗长。关于控股业务的大量财务和运营信息包含在第 34-39 页的管理层讨论以及第 45-61 页的叙述性报告中。然而，我们最大的业务领域过去是，并且几乎肯定会继续是财产意外险领域。因此，对该行业发展的评述是合适的。

Insurance Industry Conditions

保险行业状况

We show below an updated table of the industry statistics we utilized in last year’s annual report. Its message is clear: underwriting results in 1983 will not be a sight for the squeamish.

下面我们展示了一张更新的行业统计表，该表我们在去年的年报中使用过。它的信息很明确：1983 年的承保业绩将不是胆小者能看的景象。

The Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total operating and loss costs as compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

Best 的数据反映了几乎所有行业的经验，包括股份公司、互助公司和互惠公司。综合比率代表总运营和损失成本与保费收入的比较；比率低于 100 表示承保利润，高于 100 表示亏损。

For reasons outlined in last year’s report, as long as the annual gain in industry premiums written falls well below 10%, you can expect the underwriting picture in the next year to deteriorate. This will be true even at today’s lower general rate of inflation. With the number of policies increasing annually, medical inflation far exceeding general inflation, and concepts of insured liability broadening, it is highly unlikely that yearly increases in insured losses will fall much below 10%.

基于去年报告中概述的原因，只要行业保费收入的年增长率远低于 10%，你们就可以预计下一年的承保状况会恶化。即使在今天较低的一般通货膨胀率下，情况也是如此。随着保单数量每年增加、医疗通胀远超一般通胀、保险责任概念不断扩大，保险损失的年度增长率远低于 10% 的可能性极小。

You should be further aware that the 1982 combined ratio of 109.5 represents a “best case” estimate. In a given year, it is possible for an insurer to show almost any profit number it wishes, particularly if it (1) writes “long-tail” business (coverage where current costs can be only estimated, because claim payments are long delayed), (2) has been adequately reserved in the past, or (3) is growing very rapidly. There are indications that several large insurers opted in 1982 for obscure accounting and reserving maneuvers that masked significant deterioration in their underlying businesses. In insurance, as elsewhere, the reaction of weak managements to weak operations is often weak accounting. (“It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.”)

你们还应进一步了解，1982 年 109.5 的综合比率是一个“最佳情况”估计。在特定年份，保险公司几乎可以展示出它想要的任何利润数字，特别是如果它（1）承保“长尾”业务（由于赔付长期延迟，当前成本只能估算的保险），（2）过去有充足的准备金，或（3）增长非常迅速。有迹象表明，几家大型保险公司在 1982 年选择了晦涩的会计和准备金操作，掩盖了其基础业务的显著恶化。在保险业，如同在其他领域，薄弱的管理层对薄弱经营的反应往往是薄弱的会计。（“空袋子很难直立。”）

The great majority of managements, however, try to play it straight. But even managements of integrity may subconsciously be less willing in poor profit years to fully recognize adverse loss trends. Industry statistics indicate some deterioration in loss reserving practices during 1982 and the true combined ratio is likely to be modestly worse than indicated by our table.

然而，绝大多数管理层都试图诚实行事。但即使是正直的管理层，在利润不佳的年份，潜意识里也可能不太愿意完全承认不利的损失趋势。行业统计显示，1982 年损失准备金操作有所恶化，真实综合比率可能比我们表格显示的略差。

The conventional wisdom is that 1983 or 1984 will see the worst of underwriting experience and then, as in the past, the “cycle” will move, significantly and steadily, toward better results. We disagree because of a pronounced change in the competitive environment, hard to see for many years but now quite visible.

传统观点认为，1983 年或 1984 年将出现承保最糟糕的经历，然后，如同过去一样，“周期”将显著而稳定地向更好的结果转变。我们不同意，因为竞争环境发生了显著变化，多年来难以察觉，但现在相当明显。

To understand the change, we need to look at some major factors that affect levels of corporate profitability generally. Businesses in industries with both substantial over-capacity and a “commodity” product (undifferentiated in any customer-important way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support, etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles. These may be escaped, true, if prices or costs are administered in some manner and thereby insulated at least partially from normal market forces. This administration can be carried out (a) legally through government intervention (until recently, this category included pricing for truckers and deposit costs for financial institutions), (b) illegally through collusion, or (c) “extra-legally” through OPEC-style foreign cartelization (with tag-along benefits for domestic non-cartel operators).

为了理解这种变化，我们需要审视一些影响企业整体盈利水平的主要因素。处于产能严重过剩且产品是“大宗商品”（在性能、外观、服务支持等任何客户看重的方面没有差异）的行业中的企业，最可能出现利润问题。当然，如果价格或成本以某种方式被管理，从而至少部分地隔绝于正常的市场力量，这些问题是可以避免的。这种管理可以通过（a）合法的政府干预（直到最近，这包括卡车运输业的定价和金融机构的存款成本），（b）非法的共谋，或（c）“超法律”的欧佩克式外国卡特尔化（国内非卡特尔经营者可搭便车受益）来实现。

If, however, costs and prices are determined by full-bore competition, there is more than ample capacity, and the buyer cares little about whose product or distribution services he uses, industry economics are almost certain to be unexciting. They may well be disastrous.

然而，如果成本和价格由全面竞争决定，产能严重过剩，并且买家几乎不关心使用谁的产品或分销服务，那么行业的经济状况几乎肯定会是平淡无奇的。它们很可能是灾难性的。

Hence the constant struggle of every vendor to establish and emphasize special qualities of product or service. This works with candy bars (customers buy by brand name, not by asking for a “two-ounce candy bar”) but doesn’t work with sugar (how often do you hear, “I’ll have a cup of coffee with cream and C & H sugar, please”).

因此，每个供应商都在不断努力建立和强调产品或服务的特殊品质。这对糖果棒有效（顾客按品牌名称购买，而不是要求“两盎司的糖果棒”），但对糖无效（你多久听到一次“请给我一杯加奶油和 C&H 糖的咖啡”）。

In many industries, differentiation simply can’t be made meaningful. A few producers in such industries may consistently do well if they have a cost advantage that is both wide and sustainable. By definition such exceptions are few, and, in many industries, are non-existent. For the great majority of companies selling “commodity” products, a depressing equation of business economics prevails: persistent over-capacity without administered prices (or costs) equals poor profitability.

在许多行业，差异化根本无法做得有意义。这类行业中的少数生产者如果拥有既广泛又可持续的成本优势，可能会持续表现良好。根据定义，这种例外很少，而且在许多行业中根本不存在。对于绝大多数销售“大宗商品”产品的公司来说，一个令人沮丧的商业经济等式普遍存在：持续的产能过剩加上没有管控价格（或成本）等于糟糕的盈利能力。

Of course, over-capacity may eventually self-correct, either as capacity shrinks or demand expands. Unfortunately for the participants, such corrections often are long delayed. When they finally occur, the rebound to prosperity frequently produces a pervasive enthusiasm for expansion that, within a few years, again creates over-capacity and a new profitless environment. In other words, nothing fails like success.

当然，产能过剩最终可能会自我修正，要么通过产能收缩，要么通过需求扩张。对参与者来说不幸的是，这种修正往往拖延很久。当它们最终发生时，繁荣的反弹常常会产生普遍的扩张热情，几年内再次造成产能过剩和新的无利润环境。换句话说，没有什么比成功更失败。

What finally determines levels of long-term profitability in such industries is the ratio of supply-tight to supply-ample years. Frequently that ratio is dismal. (It seems as if the most recent supply-tight period in our textile business - it occurred some years back - lasted the better part of a morning.)

最终决定这类行业长期盈利水平的是供给紧张年份与供给充足年份的比例。这个比例通常很低。（似乎我们纺织业务最近一次供给紧张时期——发生在几年前——持续了差不多一个上午。）

In some industries, however, capacity-tight conditions can last a long time. Sometimes actual growth in demand will outrun forecasted growth for an extended period. In other cases, adding capacity requires very long lead times because complicated manufacturing facilities must be planned and built.

然而，在某些行业，产能紧张的状况可能会持续很长时间。有时实际需求增长会在很长一段时间内超过预测增长。在其他情况下，增加产能需要非常长的前置时间，因为必须规划和建造复杂的生产设施。

But in the insurance business, to return to that subject, capacity can be instantly created by capital plus an underwriter’s willingness to sign his name. (Even capital is less important in a world in which state-sponsored guaranty funds protect many policyholders against insurer insolvency.) Under almost all conditions except that of fear for survival - produced, perhaps, by a stock market debacle or a truly major natural disaster - the insurance industry operates under the competitive sword of substantial overcapacity. Generally, also, despite heroic attempts to do otherwise, the industry sells a relatively undifferentiated commodity-type product. (Many insureds, including the managers of large businesses, do not even know the names of their insurers.) Insurance, therefore, would seem to be a textbook case of an industry usually faced with the deadly combination of excess capacity and a “commodity” product.

但是回到保险业务，产能可以由资本加上承保人签字的意愿立即创造。（在一个由州政府支持的担保基金保护许多投保人免受保险公司破产影响的世界里，资本甚至不那么重要。）除了出于对生存的恐惧——也许由股市崩盘或真正重大的自然灾害引发——几乎在所有情况下，保险业都是在产能严重过剩的竞争利剑下运作的。此外，尽管做出了英勇的尝试，该行业销售的通常是一种相对无差异化的大宗商品型产品。（许多投保人，包括大企业的管理者，甚至不知道他们的保险公司叫什么名字。）因此，保险业似乎是一个教科书般的案例，一个通常面临产能过剩和“大宗商品”产品这种致命组合的行业。

Why, then, was underwriting, despite the existence of cycles, generally profitable over many decades? (From 1950 through 1970, the industry combined ratio averaged 99.0. allowing all investment income plus 1% of premiums to flow through to profits.) The answer lies primarily in the historic methods of regulation and distribution. For much of this century, a large portion of the industry worked, in effect, within a legal quasi-administered pricing system fostered by insurance regulators. While price competition existed, it was not pervasive among the larger companies. The main competition was for agents, who were courted via various non-price-related strategies.

那么，为什么尽管存在周期，承保业务在过去几十年中总体上还是有利可图的呢？（从 1950 年到 1970 年，行业的综合比率平均为 99.0，使得所有投资收益加上 1% 的保费都能转化为利润。）答案主要在于历史上的监管和分销方法。在本世纪的大部分时间里，很大一部分保险业实际上是在保险监管机构培育的合法准管控定价体系内运作的。虽然存在价格竞争，但在大公司中并不普遍。主要的竞争是为了争夺代理人，通过各种非价格相关策略来争取他们。

For the giants of the industry, most rates were set through negotiations between industry “bureaus” (or through companies acting in accord with their recommendations) and state regulators. Dignified haggling occurred, but it was between company and regulator rather than between company and customer. When the dust settled, Giant A charged the same price as Giant B - and both companies and agents were prohibited by law from cutting such filed rates.

对于行业巨头来说，大多数费率是通过行业“事务局”（或依照其建议行事的公司）与州监管机构之间的谈判确定的。发生了体面的讨价还价，但这是在公司与监管机构之间，而不是公司与客户之间。尘埃落定后，巨头 A 收取与巨头 B 相同的价格——法律禁止公司和代理人削减此类已备案费率。

The company-state negotiated prices included specific profit allowances and, when loss data indicated that current prices were unprofitable, both company managements and state regulators expected that they would act together to correct the situation. Thus, most of the pricing actions of the giants of the industry were “gentlemanly”, predictable, and profit-producing. Of prime importance - and in contrast to the way most of the business world operated - insurance companies could legally price their way to profitability even in the face of substantial overcapacity.

公司与州谈判的价格包含了特定的利润补贴，当损失数据表明当前价格无利可图时，公司管理层和州监管机构都期望他们会共同采取行动纠正这种情况。因此，行业巨头的大多数定价行为是“绅士般的”、可预测的且能产生利润。最重要的是——与大多数商业世界的运作方式相反——即使面对严重的产能过剩，保险公司也可以合法地通过定价实现盈利。

That day is gone. Although parts of the old structure remain, far more than enough new capacity exists outside of that structure to force all parties, old and new, to respond. The new capacity uses various methods of distribution and is not reluctant to use price as a prime competitive weapon. Indeed, it relishes that use. In the process, customers have learned that insurance is no longer a one-price business. They won’t forget.

那个时代已经一去不复返了。尽管旧结构的部分仍然存在，但该结构之外存在远超过足够的新产能，迫使所有各方，无论新旧，都必须做出反应。新产能使用各种分销方法，并且毫不迟疑地将价格作为主要的竞争武器。事实上，它乐于这样做。在这个过程中，客户已经认识到保险不再是统一定价的业务。他们不会忘记。

Future profitability of the industry will be determined by current competitive characteristics, not past ones. Many managers have been slow to recognize this. It’s not only generals that prefer to fight the last war. Most business and investment analysis also comes from the rear-view mirror. It seems clear to us, however, that only one condition will allow the insurance industry to achieve significantly improved underwriting results. That is the same condition that will allow better results for the aluminum, copper, or corn producer - a major narrowing of the gap between demand and supply.

该行业未来的盈利能力将取决于当前的竞争特征，而非过去的。许多管理者迟迟没有认识到这一点。不仅仅是将军们喜欢打上一场战争。大多数商业和投资分析也来自于后视镜。然而，在我们看来，只有一种条件能让保险业实现显著改善的承保结果。这与能让铝、铜或玉米生产商获得更好结果的条件相同——供需缺口大幅缩小。

Unfortunately, there can be no surge in demand for insurance policies comparable to one that might produce a market tightness in copper or aluminum. Rather, the supply of available insurance coverage must be curtailed. “Supply”, in this context, is mental rather than physical: plants or companies need not be shut; only the willingness of underwriters to sign their names need be curtailed.

不幸的是，保险单的需求不可能出现类似于铜或铝市场那种可能导致市场紧张的需求激增。相反，必须削减可用保险覆盖的供应。在这种语境下，“供应”是精神上的而非物质上的：工厂或公司不必关闭；只需要限制承保人签字的意愿。

This contraction will not happen because of generally poor profit levels. Bad profits produce much hand-wringing and finger-pointing. But they do not lead major sources of insurance capacity to turn their backs on very large chunks of business, thereby sacrificing market share and industry significance.

这种收缩不会因为普遍的低利润水平而发生。糟糕的利润会导致大量的搓手和指责。但它们不会导致主要的保险能力来源放弃非常大量的业务，从而牺牲市场份额和行业地位。

Instead, major capacity withdrawals require a shock factor such as a natural or financial “megadisaster”. One might occur tomorrow - or many years from now. The insurance business - even taking investment income into account - will not be particularly profitable in the meantime.

相反，大规模的产能撤出需要一个冲击因素，比如自然或金融的“特大灾难”。这可能在明天发生——也可能在多年后。在此期间，保险业务——即使考虑投资收益——也不会特别有利可图。

When supply ultimately contracts, large amounts of business will be available for the few with large capital capacity, a willingness to commit it, and an in-place distribution system. We would expect great opportunities for our insurance subsidiaries at such a time.

当供应最终收缩时，将有大量的业务可供少数拥有雄厚资本能力、投入意愿和现成分销系统的公司。我们预计到那时，我们的保险子公司将迎来巨大机遇。

During 1982, our insurance underwriting deteriorated far more than did the industry’s. From a profit position well above average, we, slipped to a performance modestly below average. The biggest swing was in National Indemnity’s traditional coverages. Lines that have been highly profitable for us in the past are now priced at levels that guarantee underwriting losses. In 1983 we expect our insurance group to record an average performance in an industry in which average is very poor.

1982 年，我们的保险承保业绩恶化程度远超行业平均水平。从一个远高于平均水平的盈利位置，我们下滑到略低于平均水平的业绩。最大的波动出现在国民赔偿公司的传统保险业务上。过去对我们来说利润非常高的险种，现在的定价水平注定会导致承保亏损。1983 年，我们预计我们的保险集团在一个平均水平非常差的行业中取得平均水平的业绩。

Two of our stars, Milt Thornton at Cypress and Floyd Taylor at Kansas Fire and Casualty, continued their outstanding records of producing an underwriting profit every year since joining us. Both Milt and Floyd simply are incapable of being average. They maintain a passionately proprietary attitude toward their operations and have developed a business culture centered upon unusual cost-consciousness and customer service. It shows on their scorecards.

我们的两位明星，Cypress 的 Milt Thornton 和堪萨斯火灾与意外险的 Floyd Taylor，延续了他们自加入我们以来每年都实现承保利润的杰出记录。Milt 和 Floyd 就是无法做到平庸。他们对经营保持着强烈的所有者心态，并建立了一种以非凡的成本意识和客户服务为核心的商业文化。这体现在他们的成绩单上。

During 1982, parent company responsibility for most of our insurance operations was given to Mike Goldberg. Planning, recruitment, and monitoring all have shown significant improvement since Mike replaced me in this role.

1982 年，我们大部分保险业务的母公司责任交给了 Mike Goldberg。自从 Mike 接替我担任这一职务以来，规划、招聘和监督都显示出显著的改善。

GEICO continues to be managed with a zeal for efficiency and value to the customer that virtually guarantees unusual success. Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder are achieving the most elusive of human goals - keeping things simple and remembering what you set out to do. In Lou Simpson, additionally, GEICO has the best investment manager in the property-casualty business. We are happy with every aspect of this operation. GEICO is a magnificent illustration of the high-profit exception we described earlier in discussing commodity industries with over-capacity - a company with a wide and sustainable cost advantage. Our 35% interest in GEICO represents about $250 million of premium volume, an amount considerably greater than all of the direct volume we produce.

GEICO 继续以对效率和客户价值的热情进行管理，这几乎保证了不寻常的成功。Jack Byrne 和 Bill Snyder 正在实现人类最难以实现的目标——保持简单并记住你最初要做的事。此外，GEICO 还拥有 Lou Simpson，他是财产意外险行业中最好的投资经理。我们对这项业务的每个方面都感到满意。GEICO 是我们在讨论产能过剩的大宗商品行业时描述的高利润例外的一个绝佳例证——一家拥有广泛且可持续成本优势的公司。我们持有的 35% 的 GEICO 股份代表了约 2.5 亿美元的保费量，远高于我们自己产生的所有直接业务量。

Issuance of Equity

股票发行

Berkshire and Blue Chip are considering merger in 1983. If it takes place, it will involve an exchange of stock based upon an identical valuation method applied to both companies. The one other significant issuance of shares by Berkshire or its affiliated companies that occurred during present management’s tenure was in the 1978 merger of Berkshire with Diversified Retailing Company.

伯克希尔和蓝筹印花正在考虑于 1983 年合并。如果合并发生，将基于对两家公司应用相同的估值方法进行股票交换。在现任管理层任期内，伯克希尔或其附属公司进行的另一次重大股票发行是在 1978 年伯克希尔与多元零售公司的合并中。

Our share issuances follow a simple basic rule: we will not issue shares unless we receive as much intrinsic business value as we give. Such a policy might seem axiomatic. Why, you might ask, would anyone issue dollar bills in exchange for fifty-cent pieces? Unfortunately, many corporate managers have been willing to do just that.

我们的股票发行遵循一个简单的基本原则：除非我们获得与付出同等的内在商业价值，否则我们不会发行股票。这样的政策似乎是理所当然的。你可能会问，怎么会有人用一美元纸币换五十美分硬币？不幸的是，许多公司管理者一直愿意这样做。

The first choice of these managers in making acquisitions may be to use cash or debt. But frequently the CEO’s cravings outpace cash and credit resources (certainly mine always have). Frequently, also, these cravings occur when his own stock is selling far below intrinsic business value. This state of affairs produces a moment of truth. At that point, as Yogi Berra has said, “You can observe a lot just by watching.” For shareholders then will find which objective the management truly prefers - expansion of domain or maintenance of owners’ wealth.

这些管理者进行收购的首选可能是使用现金或债务。但 CEO 的渴望常常超出现金和信贷资源（当然，我的一贯如此）。同样常见的是，这种渴望发生在他自己的股票价格远低于内在商业价值的时候。这种状况产生了一个关键时刻。此时，正如 Yogi Berra 所说，“你只需观察就能发现很多。”因为股东们将发现管理层真正偏好哪个目标——扩大版图还是维护所有者的财富。

The need to choose between these objectives occurs for some simple reasons. Companies often sell in the stock market below their intrinsic business value. But when a company wishes to sell out completely, in a negotiated transaction, it inevitably wants to - and usually can - receive full business value in whatever kind of currency the value is to be delivered. If cash is to be used in payment, the seller’s calculation of value received couldn’t be easier. If stock of the buyer is to be the currency, the seller’s calculation is still relatively easy: just figure the market value in cash of what is to be received in stock.

之所以需要在这些目标之间做出选择，原因很简单。公司的股票在股市上的交易价格常常低于其内在商业价值。但是，当一家公司希望通过协商交易完全出售时，它不可避免地想要——并且通常能够——以任何交付价值的货币形式获得全部商业价值。如果使用现金支付，卖方对收到价值的计算再简单不过了。如果以买方的股票作为货币，卖方的计算仍然相对容易：只需计算出将收到的股票按现金计算的市场价值即可。

Meanwhile, the buyer wishing to use his own stock as currency for the purchase has no problems if the stock is selling in the market at full intrinsic value.

与此同时，希望使用自己股票作为购买货币的买方，如果其股票在市场上以完全的内在价值交易，则没有问题。

But suppose it is selling at only half intrinsic value. In that case, the buyer is faced with the unhappy prospect of using a substantially undervalued currency to make its purchase.

但假设其股票仅以内在价值的一半交易。在这种情况下，买方将面临使用一种被严重低估的货币进行购买的不幸前景。

Ironically, were the buyer to instead be a seller of its entire business, it too could negotiate for, and probably get, full intrinsic business value. But when the buyer makes a partial sale of itself - and that is what the issuance of shares to make an acquisition amounts to - it can customarily get no higher value set on its shares than the market chooses to grant it.

具有讽刺意味的是，如果买方转而成为其整个业务的卖方，它同样可以协商并可能获得全部内在商业价值。但是，当买方进行部分自我出售时——而发行股票进行收购就是这样一种行为——其股票的价值通常不会超过市场愿意给予的价格。

The acquirer who nevertheless barges ahead ends up using an undervalued (market value) currency to pay for a fully valued (negotiated value) property. In effect, the acquirer must give up $2 of value to receive $1 of value. Under such circumstances, a marvelous business purchased at a fair sales price becomes a terrible buy. For gold valued as gold cannot be purchased intelligently through the utilization of gold - or even silver - valued as lead.

然而，那些仍然贸然前行的收购者最终会使用被低估的（市场价值）货币来支付完全定价的（协商价值）资产。实际上，收购者必须放弃 2 美元的价值才能获得 1 美元的价值。在这种情况下，以公平售价购买的绝佳企业变成了一笔糟糕的买入。因为被当作黄金估值的黄金，不能明智地通过当作铅估值的黄金甚至白银来购买。

If, however, the thirst for size and action is strong enough, the acquirer’s manager will find ample rationalizations for such a value-destroying issuance of stock. Friendly investment bankers will reassure him as to the soundness of his actions. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)

然而，如果对规模和行动的渴望足够强烈，收购方的管理者会为这种破坏价值的股票发行找到充分的理由。友好的投资银行家会向他保证其行为的合理性。（不要问理发师你是否需要理发。）

A few favorite rationalizations employed by stock-issuing managements follow:

以下是发行股票的管理层常用的一些偏好理由：

(a) “The company we’re buying is going to be worth a lot more in the future.” (Presumably so is the interest in the old business that is being traded away; future prospects are implicit in the business valuation process. If 2X is issued for X, the imbalance still exists when both parts double in business value.)

（a）“我们正在收购的公司未来价值会高得多。”（大概被交换出去的旧业务权益也是如此；未来前景已隐含在业务估值过程中。如果用 2X 去换 X，那么当两者的业务价值都翻倍时，不平衡依然存在。）

(b) “We have to grow.” (Who, it might be asked, is the “we”? For present shareholders, the reality is that all existing businesses shrink when shares are issued. Were Berkshire to issue shares tomorrow for an acquisition, Berkshire would own everything that it now owns plus the new business, but your interest in such hard-to-match businesses as See’s Candy Shops, National Indemnity, etc. would automatically be reduced. If (1) your family owns a 120-acre farm and (2) you invite a neighbor with 60 acres of comparable land to merge his farm into an equal partnership - with you to be managing partner, then (3) your managerial domain will have grown to 180 acres but you will have permanently shrunk by 25% your family’s ownership interest in both acreage and crops. Managers who want to expand their domain at the expense of owners might better consider a career in government.)

（b）“我们必须增长。”（有人可能会问，“我们”是谁？对于现有股东而言，现实是发行股票时所有现有业务都会被稀释。如果伯克希尔明天为了收购而发行股票，伯克希尔将拥有现有的一切加上新业务，但你们在喜诗糖果、国民赔偿等难以复制的业务中的权益会自动减少。如果（1）你的家族拥有一个 120 英亩的农场，（2）你邀请一个拥有 60 英亩类似土地的邻居将其农场合并成一个对等合伙企业——你做管理合伙人，那么（3）你的管理版图将扩大到 180 英亩，但你的家族在土地面积和作物上的所有权权益将永久减少 25%。想要以牺牲所有者利益为代价来扩大版图的管理者，最好考虑去政府工作。）

(c) “Our stock is undervalued and we’ve minimized its use in this deal - but we need to give the selling shareholders 51% in stock and 49% in cash so that certain of those shareholders can get the tax-free exchange they want.” (This argument acknowledges that it is beneficial to the acquirer to hold down the issuance of shares, and we like that. But if it hurts the old owners to utilize shares on a 100% basis, it very likely hurts on a 51% basis. After all, a man is not charmed if a spaniel defaces his lawn, just because it’s a spaniel and not a St. Bernard. And the wishes of sellers can’t be the determinant of the best interests of the buyer - what would happen if, heaven forbid, the seller insisted that as a condition of merger the CEO of the acquirer be replaced?)

（c）“我们的股票被低估了，我们已尽量减少在这次交易中使用它——但我们需要给卖方股东 51% 的股票和 49% 的现金，以便其中某些股东能获得他们想要的免税交换。”（这个论点承认限制股票发行对收购方有利，我们赞同这一点。但是，如果 100% 使用股票会损害老股东的利益，那么 51% 使用股票也很可能会损害。毕竟，一个人不会因为一只西班牙猎犬在他的草坪上乱挖而只是因为它是一只西班牙猎犬而不是圣伯纳犬就感到庆幸。卖方的意愿不能决定买方的最佳利益——天哪，如果卖方坚持作为合并条件要更换收购方的 CEO，会发生什么？）

There are three ways to avoid destruction of value for old owners when shares are issued for acquisitions. One is to have a true business-value-for-business-value merger, such as the Berkshire-Blue Chip combination is intended to be. Such a merger attempts to be fair to shareholders of both parties, with each receiving just as much as it gives in terms of intrinsic business value. The Dart Industries-Kraft and Nabisco Standard Brands mergers appeared to be of this type, but they are the exceptions. It’s not that acquirers wish to avoid such deals; it’s just that they are very hard to do.

在为收购发行股票时，有三种方法可以避免对老股东造成价值破坏。第一种是进行真正的商业价值对商业价值的合并，例如伯克希尔-蓝筹印花的合并意图就是如此。这种合并试图对双方的股东都公平，每一方在内在商业价值方面都获得与付出一样多。Dart Industries-Kraft 和 Nabisco Standard Brands 的合并似乎属于这种类型，但它们是例外。并非收购方希望避免此类交易；只是它们非常难达成。

The second route presents itself when the acquirer’s stock sells at or above its intrinsic business value. In that situation, the use of stock as currency actually may enhance the wealth of the acquiring company’s owners. Many mergers were accomplished on this basis in the 1965-69 period. The results were the converse of most of the activity since 1970: the shareholders of the acquired company received very inflated currency (frequently pumped up by dubious accounting and promotional techniques) and were the losers of wealth through such transactions.

第二种途径出现在收购方的股票以等于或高于其内在商业价值交易时。在这种情况下，使用股票作为货币实际上可能会增加收购公司所有者的财富。1965-69 年期间，许多合并就是在此基础上完成的。其结果与 1970 年以来大多数活动相反：被收购公司的股东收到了严重膨胀的货币（通常由可疑的会计和促销手段吹大），并通过此类交易成为财富的输家。

During recent years the second solution has been available to very few large companies. The exceptions have primarily been those companies in glamorous or promotional businesses to which the market temporarily attaches valuations at or above intrinsic business valuation.

近年来，很少有大型公司能采用第二种解决方案。例外的主要是那些处于光鲜或促销型业务中的公司，市场暂时给予它们等于或高于内在商业价值的估值。

The third solution is for the acquirer to go ahead with the acquisition, but then subsequently repurchase a quantity of shares equal to the number issued in the merger. In this manner, what originally was a stock-for-stock merger can be converted, effectively, into a cash-for-stock acquisition. Repurchases of this kind are damage-repair moves. Regular readers will correctly guess that we much prefer repurchases that directly enhance the wealth of owners instead of repurchases that merely repair previous damage. Scoring touchdowns is more exhilarating than recovering one’s fumbles. But, when a fumble has occurred, recovery is important and we heartily recommend damage-repair repurchases that turn a bad stock deal into a fair cash deal.

第三种解决方案是收购方继续进行收购，但随后回购与合并中发行的股票数量相等的股份。通过这种方式，原本的股票换股票合并可以有效地转换为现金换股票收购。这类回购是修复损害的行动。老读者会正确猜到，我们更偏爱那些直接增加所有者财富的回购，而不是那些仅仅修复先前损害的回购。达阵得分比捡回自己的掉球更令人兴奋。但是，当掉球发生时，捡回是很重要的，我们衷心推荐那些将糟糕的股票交易转变为公平现金交易的修复性回购。

The language utilized in mergers tends to confuse the issues and encourage irrational actions by managers. For example, “dilution” is usually carefully calculated on a pro forma basis for both book value and current earnings per share. Particular emphasis is given to the latter item. When that calculation is negative (dilutive) from the acquiring company’s standpoint, a justifying explanation will be made (internally, if not elsewhere) that the lines will cross favorably at some point in the future. (While deals often fail in practice, they never fail in projections - if the CEO is visibly panting over a prospective acquisition, subordinates and consultants will supply the requisite projections to rationalize any price.) Should the calculation produce numbers that are immediately positive - that is, anti-dilutive - for the acquirer, no comment is thought to be necessary.

并购中使用的语言往往混淆问题，并鼓励管理者的非理性行为。例如，“稀释”通常是根据备考基础对每股账面价值和当前每股收益进行仔细计算的。尤其强调后者。当从收购方的角度看计算结果是负面的（稀释性）时，就会做出一个合理解释（在内部，如果不是其他地方），即这些指标会在未来某个时点有利地交叉。（虽然交易在实践中经常失败，但它们在预测中从未失败——如果 CEO 对一项潜在收购明显表现出热切渴望，下属和顾问们就会提供必要的预测来为任何价格提供理由。）如果计算结果对收购方来说是立即正向的——即反稀释——那么则认为无需评论。

The attention given this form of dilution is overdone: current earnings per share (or even earnings per share of the next few years) are an important variable in most business valuations, but far from all powerful.

对这种形式稀释的关注过度了：当前每股收益（甚至未来几年的每股收益）在大多数企业估值中是一个重要变量，但远非决定一切。

There have been plenty of mergers, non-dilutive in this limited sense, that were instantly value destroying for the acquirer. And some mergers that have diluted current and near-term earnings per share have in fact been value-enhancing. What really counts is whether a merger is dilutive or anti-dilutive in terms of intrinsic business value (a judgment involving consideration of many variables). We believe calculation of dilution from this viewpoint to be all-important (and too seldom made).

有很多在这种有限意义上非稀释性的合并，却立即对收购方造成了价值破坏。而一些稀释了当前和近期每股收益的合并，实际上却增加了价值。真正重要的是，就内在商业价值而言（一个涉及考虑许多变量的判断），合并是稀释性的还是反稀释性的。我们认为从这个角度计算稀释是至关重要的（而且很少有人这样做）。

A second language problem relates to the equation of exchange. If Company A announces that it will issue shares to merge with Company B, the process is customarily described as “Company A to Acquire Company B”, or “B Sells to A”. Clearer thinking about the matter would result if a more awkward but more accurate description were used: “Part of A sold to acquire B”, or “Owners of B to receive part of A in exchange for their properties”. In a trade, what you are giving is just as important as what you are getting. This remains true even when the final tally on what is being given is delayed. Subsequent sales of common stock or convertible issues, either to complete the financing for a deal or to restore balance sheet strength, must be fully counted in evaluating the fundamental mathematics of the original acquisition. (If corporate pregnancy is going to be the consequence of corporate mating, the time to face that fact is before the moment of ecstasy.)

第二个语言问题涉及到交换等式。如果 A 公司宣布将发行股票与 B 公司合并，这个过程通常被描述为“A 公司收购 B 公司”或“B 公司卖给 A 公司”。如果使用一个更笨拙但更准确的描述，会带来更清晰的思考：“出售 A 公司的部分以收购 B 公司”，或“B 公司的所有者以其财产换取 A 公司的部分股份”。在一笔交易中，你付出的与你得到的一样重要。即使当你所付出的最终总额被延迟确定时，这一点仍然成立。随后为完成交易融资或恢复资产负债表实力而进行的普通股或可转换债券的销售，在评估最初收购的基本数学逻辑时必须完全计入。（如果企业交配的后果是企业怀孕，那么面对这一事实的时机应该是在狂喜时刻之前。）

Managers and directors might sharpen their thinking by asking themselves if they would sell 100% of their business on the same basis they are being asked to sell part of it. And if it isn’t smart to sell all on such a basis, they should ask themselves why it is smart to sell a portion. A cumulation of small managerial stupidities will produce a major stupidity - not a major triumph. (Las Vegas has been built upon the wealth transfers that occur when people engage in seemingly-small disadvantageous capital transactions.)

管理者和董事们可以问自己一个问题来锐化他们的思维：他们是否愿意按照被要求出售部分业务的条件来出售整个企业？如果按照这样的条件出售全部不是明智之举，那么他们应该问问自己，为什么出售一部分就是明智的。管理上一些小愚蠢的累积会产生一个大的愚蠢——而不是一个大的胜利。（拉斯维加斯就是建立在人们进行看似微小不利的资本交易时发生的财富转移之上。）

The “giving versus getting” factor can most easily be calculated in the case of registered investment companies. Assume Investment Company X, selling at 50% of asset value, wishes to merge with Investment Company Y. Assume, also, that Company X therefore decides to issue shares equal in market value to 100% of Y’s asset value.

“付出与得到”的因素在注册投资公司的情况下最容易计算。假设投资公司 X 以资产价值 50% 的价格交易，希望与投资公司 Y 合并。再假设，公司 X 因此决定发行市场价值等于 Y 公司资产价值 100% 的股票。

Such a share exchange would leave X trading $2 of its previous intrinsic value for $1 of Y’s intrinsic value. Protests would promptly come forth from both X’s shareholders and the SEC, which rules on the fairness of registered investment company mergers. Such a transaction simply would not be allowed.

这样的股票交换将使 X 公司用其之前 2 美元的内在价值交换 Y 公司 1 美元的内在价值。X 公司的股东和美国证券交易委员会（SEC）都会立即提出抗议，SEC 负责裁决注册投资公司合并的公平性。这样的交易根本不会被允许。

In the case of manufacturing, service, financial companies, etc., values are not normally as precisely calculable as in the case of investment companies. But we have seen mergers in these industries that just as dramatically destroyed value for the owners of the acquiring company as was the case in the hypothetical illustration above. This destruction could not happen if management and directors would assess the fairness of any transaction by using the same yardstick in the measurement of both businesses.

在制造业、服务业、金融公司等情况下，价值通常不像投资公司那样可以精确计算。但我们看到这些行业的合并，正如上述假设例子一样，对收购公司所有者的价值造成了同样戏剧性的破坏。如果管理层和董事会在衡量两家企业时使用相同的标尺来评估任何交易的公平性，这种破坏就不会发生。

Finally, a word should be said about the “double whammy” effect upon owners of the acquiring company when value-diluting stock issuances occur. Under such circumstances, the first blow is the loss of intrinsic business value that occurs through the merger itself. The second is the downward revision in market valuation that, quite rationally, is given to that now-diluted business value. For current and prospective owners understandably will not pay as much for assets lodged in the hands of a management that has a record of wealth-destruction through unintelligent share issuances as they will pay for assets entrusted to a management with precisely equal operating talents, but a known distaste for anti-owner actions. Once management shows itself insensitive to the interests of owners, shareholders will suffer a long time from the price/value ratio afforded their stock (relative to other stocks), no matter what assurances management gives that the value-diluting action taken was a one-of-a-kind event.

最后，关于发生稀释价值的股票发行时对收购公司所有者的“双重打击”效应，应该提一下。在这种情况下，第一重打击是合并本身导致的内在商业价值损失。第二重是市场估值相当理性地下调了被稀释后的商业价值。因为现有和潜在的所有者可以理解，他们不会为一支由具有通过不明智股票发行破坏财富记录的管理层掌管的资产支付与一支由经营才能完全相同但已知厌恶反所有者行为的管理层掌管的资产相同的价格。一旦管理层表现出对所有者利益不敏感，无论管理层如何保证所采取的稀释价值行动是独一无二的事件，股东们都将在很长一段时间内承受其股票（相对于其他股票）价格/价值比率带来的痛苦。

Those assurances are treated by the market much as one-bug-in-the-salad explanations are treated at restaurants. Such explanations, even when accompanied by a new waiter, do not eliminate a drop in the demand (and hence market value) for salads, both on the part of the offended customer and his neighbors pondering what to order. Other things being equal, the highest stock market prices relative to intrinsic business value are given to companies whose managers have demonstrated their unwillingness to issue shares at any time on terms unfavorable to the owners of the business.

这些保证在市场上受到的对待，就像在餐厅里“沙拉里只有一只虫子”的解释一样。这种解释，即使有一位新服务员陪同，也无法消除被冒犯的顾客及其正在考虑点什么的邻座对沙拉需求（以及市场价值）的下降。在其他条件相同的情况下，相对于内在商业价值，股票市场价格最高的那些公司，其管理层已经证明他们不愿在任何时候以不利于企业所有者的条款发行股票。

At Berkshire, or any company whose policies we determine (including Blue Chip and Wesco), we will issue shares only if our owners receive in business value as much as we give. We will not equate activity with progress or corporate size with owner-wealth.

在伯克希尔，或者任何我们决定其政策的公司（包括蓝筹印花和 Wesco），只有当我们所有者在商业价值上获得的与我们付出的一样多时，我们才会发行股票。我们不会将活动等同于进步，也不会将公司规模等同于所有者财富。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

This annual report is read by a varied audience, and it is possible that some members of that audience may be helpful to us in our acquisition program.

这份年报的读者群体多样，其中一些读者可能会对我们的收购计划有所帮助。

We prefer:

我们偏好：

(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),

（1）大规模收购（税后收益至少 500 万美元）；

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),

（2）经证明有持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们兴趣不大，“扭亏为盈”的情况也不考虑）；

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

（3）在很少或没有债务的情况下获得良好净资产收益率的企业；

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

（4）已有管理层到位（我们无法提供）；

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

（5）业务简单（如果有大量技术，我们无法理解）；

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

（6）有报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下谈论交易，即使是初步的，从而浪费我们或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly transactions. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer as to possible interest - customarily within five minutes. Cash purchases are preferred, but we will consider the use of stock when it can be done on the basis described in the previous section.

我们不会进行不友好的交易。我们可以承诺完全保密，并就可能的兴趣给出非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内。首选现金购买，但如果能按照上一节所述的基础进行，我们也会考虑使用股票。

Our shareholder-designated contributions program met with enthusiasm again this year; 95.8% of eligible shares participated. This response was particularly encouraging since only $1 per share was made available for designation, down from $2 in 1981. If the merger with Blue Chip takes place, a probable by-product will be the attainment of a consolidated tax position that will significantly enlarge our contribution base and give us a potential for designating bigger per-share amounts in the future.

我们的股东指定捐款计划今年再次受到热烈欢迎；95.8% 的合格股份参与了。这一回应尤其令人鼓舞，因为每股只有 1 美元可用于指定，低于 1981 年的 2 美元。如果与蓝筹印花的合并完成，一个可能的副产品将是实现合并税务地位，这将显著扩大我们的捐款基数，并使我们未来有可能指定更大的每股金额。

If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the actual owner’s name, not a “street” or nominee name. For new shareholders, a more complete description of the program is on pages 62-63.

如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股份以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是“券商”或代名人名义。对于新股东，该计划的更完整描述在第 62-63 页。

In a characteristically rash move, we have expanded World Headquarters by 252 square feet (17%), coincidental with the signing of a new five-year lease at 1440 Kiewit Plaza. The five people who work here with me - Joan Atherton, Mike Goldberg, Gladys Kaiser, Verne McKenzie and Bill Scott - outproduce corporate groups many times their number. A compact organization lets all of us spend our time managing the business rather than managing each other.

以一次典型的鲁莽举动，我们将全球总部扩大了 252 平方英尺（17%），巧合的是，同时签署了在基威特广场 1440 号的新五年租约。和我一起在这里工作的五个人——Joan Atherton、Mike Goldberg、Gladys Kaiser、Verne McKenzie 和 Bill Scott——他们的产出是人数多倍的企业团队的好几倍。一个精简的组织让我们所有人都能把时间花在管理业务上，而不是彼此管理。

Charlie Munger, my partner in management, will continue to operate from Los Angeles whether or not the Blue Chip merger occurs. Charlie and I are interchangeable in business decisions. Distance impedes us not at all: we’ve always found a telephone call to be more productive than a half-day committee meeting.

我的管理合伙人查理·芒格，无论蓝筹印花合并是否发生，都将继续在洛杉矶工作。查理和我在商业决策上是可以互换的。距离对我们毫无阻碍：我们一直发现一个电话比半天的委员会会议更有成效。

Two of our managerial stars retired this year: Phil Liesche at 65 from National Indemnity Company, and Ben Rosner at 79 from Associated Retail Stores. Both of these men made you, as shareholders of Berkshire, a good bit wealthier than you otherwise would have been. National Indemnity has been the most important operation in Berkshire’s growth. Phil and Jack Ringwalt, his predecessor, were the two prime movers in National Indemnity’s success. Ben Rosner sold Associated Retail Stores to Diversified Retailing Company for cash in 1967, promised to stay on only until the end of the year, and then hit business home runs for us for the next fifteen years.

我们的两位管理明星今年退休了：国民赔偿公司的 Phil Liesche，65 岁；联合零售商店的 Ben Rosner，79 岁。这两个人让你们作为伯克希尔的股东，比原本的情况下富裕了不少。国民赔偿公司一直是伯克希尔发展中最重要的一环。Phil 和他的前任 Jack Ringwalt 是国民赔偿公司成功的两位主要推动者。Ben Rosner 于 1967 年将联合零售商店以现金卖给了多元零售公司，承诺只留任到年底，然后在接下来的十五年里为我们打出了业务上的本垒打。

Both Ben and Phil ran their businesses for Berkshire with every bit of the care and drive that they would have exhibited had they personally owned 100% of these businesses. No rules were necessary to enforce or even encourage this attitude; it was embedded in the character of these men long before we came on the scene. Their good character became our good fortune. If we can continue to attract managers with the qualities of Ben and Phil, you need not worry about Berkshire’s future.

Ben 和 Phil 都以他们亲自 100% 拥有这些企业时会表现出的那种谨慎和动力为伯克希尔经营业务。不需要任何规则来强制甚至鼓励这种态度；在我们出现之前很久，这种态度就已经根植于这些人的品格中。他们的好品格变成了我们的好运。如果我们能继续吸引具备 Ben 和 Phil 品质的管理者，你们就无需担心伯克希尔的未来。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席