2000 年致股东信

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.

注：下表出现在印刷版年度报告董事长信函的扉页，并在该信函中被提及。

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔的公司业绩 vs. 标准普尔500指数

Average Annual Gain – 1965-2000: 23.6% (1), 11.8% (2), 11.8% (1)-(2)
Overall Gain – 1964-2000: 207,821% (1), 5,383% (2), 202,438% (1)-(2)

1965-2000年平均年化收益：23.6% (1)，11.8% (2)，11.8% (1)-(2)
1964-2000年总收益：207,821% (1)，5,383% (2)，202,438% (1)-(2)

Notes:
Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

注：
数据为日历年度，但有以下例外：1965和1966年截至9月30日；1967年为截至12月31日的15个月。
从1979年开始，会计准则要求保险公司按市值而非成本与市价孰低法对其持有的权益证券进行估值，而此前采用后者。在本表中，伯克希尔1978年及之前的业绩已根据变更后的规则进行了重述。在所有其他方面，业绩均使用最初报告的数字计算。
标普500指数数据为税前，而伯克希尔数据为税后。如果像伯克希尔这样的公司简单地持有标普500指数并计提适当的税金，那么在该指数为正回报的年份，其业绩将落后于标普500，而在该指数为负回报的年份，其业绩将超过标普500。多年来，税收成本将导致总体落后幅度巨大。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.5%. Over the last 36 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $40,442, a gain of 23.6% compounded annually.*

2000年，我们的净值增长了39.6亿美元，这使得我们的A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增加了6.5%。在过去36年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到40,442美元，年复合增长率为23.6%。*

Overall, we had a decent year, our book-value gain having outpaced the performance of the S&P 500. And, though this judgment is necessarily subjective, we believe Berkshire's gain in per-share intrinsic value moderately exceeded its gain in book value. (Intrinsic value, as well as other key investment and accounting terms and concepts, are explained in our Owner's Manual on pages 59-66. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 64.)

总体来看，我们度过了不错的一年，账面价值的增长超过了标普500指数的表现。而且，尽管这个判断必然是主观的，但我们相信伯克希尔每股内在价值的增长适度超过了账面价值的增长。（内在价值以及其他关键投资和会计术语及概念，在我们第59-66页的《所有者手册》中有解释。内在价值在第64页讨论。）

Furthermore, we completed two significant acquisitions that we negotiated in 1999 and initiated six more. All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion, with 97% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock. The eight businesses we've acquired have aggregate sales of about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people. Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases, and our shares outstanding have increased only 1/3 of 1%. Better yet, we remain awash in liquid assets and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.

此外，我们完成了1999年谈判的两项重大收购，并启动了另外六项收购。总的来说，这些收购花费了我们约80亿美元，其中97%以现金支付，3%以股票支付。我们收购的八家企业总销售额约为130亿美元，雇佣了58,000名员工。尽管如此，我们在进行这些收购时没有产生任何债务，我们的已发行股份仅增加了0.33%。更好的是，我们仍然拥有充足的流动资产，并且渴望并准备好进行更大的收购。

I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report. But I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century by entering such cutting-edge industries as brick, carpet, insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.

我将在报告下一节中详细说明我们的收购。但我要现在告诉你，我们已经通过进入砖块、地毯、隔热材料和油漆等尖端行业拥抱了21世纪。请控制你的兴奋。

On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt as the year progressed. It has become much more expensive to obtain new business. I told you last year that we would get our money's worth from stepped-up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong. We'll examine the reasons later in the report.

在不利方面，随着年度的推进，盖可保险的投保人增长停滞。获取新业务的成本变得更高。去年我告诉你，我们将在2000年从盖可保险增加的广告中获得物有所值的回报，但我错了。我们将在后面报告中分析原因。

Another negative — which has persisted for several years — is that we see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive. We own stocks of some excellent businesses, but most of our holdings are fully priced and are unlikely to deliver more than moderate returns in the future. We're not alone in facing this problem: The long-term prospect for equities in general is far from exciting.

另一个不利因素——已经持续了几年——是我们认为我们的股票组合只有温和的吸引力。我们持有一些优秀企业的股票，但我们的大部分持仓价格偏高，未来不太可能提供超过中等水平的回报。我们并非独自面对这个问题：股票的长期前景总体上远非令人兴奋。

Finally, there is the negative that recurs annually: Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are a year older than when we last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse development is the indisputable fact that the age of your top managers is increasing at a considerably lower rate — percentage-wise — than is the case at almost all other major corporations. Better yet, this differential will widen in the future.

最后，还有一个每年都会出现的不利因素：查理·芒格（伯克希尔副董事长、我的合伙人）和我比上次向你报告时又老了一岁。缓解这一不利发展的是一个无可争辩的事实：你们最高管理层的年龄增长速度——按百分比计算——远低于几乎所有其他大公司。更好的是，这种差异未来还会扩大。

Charlie and I continue to aim at increasing Berkshire's per-share value at a rate that, over time, will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P 500. As the table on the facing page shows, a small annual advantage in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anything-but-small long-term advantage. To reach our goal we will need to add a few good businesses to Berkshire's stable each year, have the businesses we own generally gain in value, and avoid any material increase in our outstanding shares. We are confident about meeting the last two objectives; the first will require some luck.

查理和我继续致力于以随时间推移适度超过持有标普500指数的增长率来提高伯克希尔的每股价值。如对页表格所示，如果我们能保持小幅的年度优势，长期来看将产生绝不小幅度的优势。为了实现我们的目标，我们需要每年为伯克希尔的马厩增加一些好企业，让我们拥有的企业整体增值，并避免已发行股份显著增加。我们对实现后两个目标充满信心；第一个目标则需要一些运气。

It's appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both easy and fun last year — just as they do every year. First, our operating managers continue to run their businesses in splendid fashion, which allows me to spend my time allocating capital rather than supervising them. (I wouldn't be good at that anyway.)

这里适合感谢两个群体，他们去年——就像每年一样——让我的工作既轻松又有趣。首先，我们的运营经理人继续以出色的方式经营他们的业务，这让我能够将时间用于配置资本而不是监督他们。（反正我也不擅长那个。）

Our managers are a very special breed. At most large companies, the truly talented divisional managers seldom have the job they really want. Instead they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present employer or elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they and their colleagues are likely to feel they have failed.

我们的经理人是一个非常特殊的群体。在大多数大公司，真正有才华的部门经理很少拥有他们真正想要的工作。相反，他们渴望成为CEO，无论是在现任雇主那里还是在其他地方。事实上，如果他们留在原地，他们和他们的同事很可能会觉得自己失败了。

At Berkshire, our all-stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones that they hope and expect to keep throughout their business lifetimes. They therefore concentrate solely on maximizing the long-term value of the businesses that they "own" and love. If the businesses succeed, they have succeeded. And they stick with us: In our last 36 years, Berkshire has never had a manager of a significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to join another business.

在伯克希尔，我们的全明星们拥有他们确切想要的工作，他们希望并期望在整个商业生涯中保留这些工作。因此，他们只专注于最大化他们“拥有”和热爱的业务的长期价值。如果业务成功了，他们就成功了。而且他们与我们在一起：在过去36年中，伯克希尔从未有过任何重要子公司的经理人自愿离开去加入另一家企业。

The other group to which I owe enormous thanks is the home-office staff. After the eight acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide workforce to about 112,000, Charlie and I went soft last year and added one more person at headquarters. (Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin's advice: "A small leak can sink a great ship.") Now we have 13.8 people.

我深表感谢的另一个群体是总部员工。在八次收购使我们的全球员工总数翻了一倍多，达到约112,000人之后，查理和我在去年心软了，在总部增加了一个人。（查理，愿上帝保佑他，从不让我忘记本·富兰克林的建议：“一个小漏洞可能沉没一艘大船。”）现在我们有了13.8人。

This tiny band works miracles. In 2000 it handled all of the details connected with our eight acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory and tax filings (our tax return covers 4,896 pages), smoothly produced an annual meeting to which 25,000 tickets were issued, and accurately dispensed checks to 3,660 charities designated by our shareholders. In addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks served up by a company with a revenue run-rate of $40 billion and more than 300,000 owners. And, to add to all of this, the other 12.8 are a delight to be around.

这个小团队创造了奇迹。2000年，他们处理了与我们八项收购相关的所有细节，处理了大量的监管和税务申报（我们的纳税申报表长达4,896页），顺利地举办了一场发放了25,000张门票的年会，并准确地将支票分发给了股东指定的3,660个慈善机构。此外，该团队还处理了一家收入运行率为400亿美元、拥有超过30万所有者的公司的所有日常事务。而且，除此之外，其他12.8人还是令人愉悦的同事。

I should pay to have my job.

我这份工作应该付钱给我才对。

Acquisitions of 2000

2000年的收购

Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself: We answer the phone. I'm also glad to report that it rings a bit more often now, because owners and/or managers increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire. Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23, and the number to call is 402-346-1400.

我们在伯克希尔的收购技巧非常简单：我们接电话。我也很高兴地报告，电话现在响得更频繁了，因为所有者/或经理人越来越希望将他们的公司与伯克希尔结合起来。我们的收购标准在第23页，电话号码是402-346-1400。

Let me tell you a bit about the businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months, starting with the two transactions that were initiated in 1999, but closed in 2000. (This list excludes some smaller purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and that, in most cases, will be integrated into their operations.)

让我告诉你一些关于我们在过去14个月中收购的业务的情况，从1999年发起但在2000年完成的两笔交易开始。（这份名单不包括我们子公司经理人进行的一些较小的收购，这些收购在大多数情况下将并入他们的业务。）

• I described the first purchase — 76% of MidAmerican Energy — in last year's report. Because of regulatory constraints on our voting privileges, we perform only a "one-line" consolidation of MidAmerican's earnings and equity in our financial statements. If we instead fully consolidated the company's figures, our revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we reported, though net income would remain the same.

• 我在去年的报告中描述了第一笔收购——中美能源76%的股份。由于监管对我们投票权的限制，我们仅在财务报表中对中美能源的收益和权益进行“单行”合并。如果我们改为全面合并该公司的数据，我们2000年的收入将比我们报告的多50亿美元，尽管净利润保持不变。

• On November 23, 1999, I received a one-page fax from Bruce Cort that appended a Washington Post article describing an aborted buyout of CORT Business Services. Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with CORT. Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire a jet in 1986 and who, before the fax, had not been in touch with me for about ten years.

• 1999年11月23日，我收到布鲁斯·科特的一页传真，附上了一篇《华盛顿邮报》的文章，描述了对CORT商业服务公司失败的收购。尽管名字相似，布鲁斯与CORT并无关联。相反，他是一名飞机经纪人，曾在1986年向伯克希尔出售过一架喷气机，在那份传真之前，他已经大约十年没有和我联系了。

I knew nothing about CORT, but I immediately printed out its SEC filings and liked what I saw. That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, CORT's CEO. Paul and I got together on November 29, and I knew at once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase: a fine though unglamorous business, an outstanding manager, and a price (going by that on the failed deal) that made sense.

我对CORT一无所知，但我立即打印了它的SEC文件，并且喜欢我所看到的内容。当天我就告诉布鲁斯我可能有兴趣，并请他安排与CORT的CEO保罗·阿诺德会面。我和保罗在11月29日见了面，我立刻知道我们具备了收购的正确要素：一个优秀但不光鲜的业务，一位出色的经理人，以及一个（根据那笔失败交易的价格）合理的价格。

Operating out of 117 showrooms, CORT is the national leader in "rent-to-rent" furniture, primarily used in offices but also by temporary occupants of apartments. This business, it should be noted, has no similarity to "rent-to-own" operations, which usually involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to people having limited income and poor credit.

CORT在117个展厅运营，是“租用-租赁”家具领域的全国领导者，主要用于办公室，也用于公寓的临时住户。需要注意的是，这项业务与“先租后买”业务没有相似之处，后者通常涉及向收入有限和信用不良的人出售家居用品和电子产品。

We quickly purchased CORT for Wesco, our 80%-owned subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash. You will find more details about CORT's operations in Wesco's 1999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working with Paul, and CORT looks like a good bet to beat our original expectations.

我们迅速为我们的子公司Wesco（我们持股80%）收购了CORT，支付了约3.86亿美元现金。你可以在Wesco的1999年和2000年年报中找到更多关于CORT运营的细节。查理和我都喜欢与保罗合作，CORT看起来很有可能超出我们最初的预期。

• Early last year, Ron Ferguson of General Re put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had owned U.S. Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two sister companies, is a medium-sized, highly-respected writer of unusual risks — "excess and surplus lines" in insurance jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we agreed by phone on a half-stock, half-cash deal.

• 去年初，通用再保险的罗恩·弗格森让我与鲍勃·贝里取得联系，他的家族拥有美国责任保险公司已达49年。这家保险公司连同两家姊妹公司，是一家中型、备受尊敬的非寻常风险承保商——用保险术语说就是“超额和盈余险”。鲍勃和我联系后，我们通过电话达成了半股票半现金的交易。

In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent growth and unusual profitability. Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well. In addition to having four adopted children (two from Russia), he has an extended family: the Philadelphia Belles, a young-teen girls basketball team that Tom coaches. The team had a 62-4 record last year and finished second in the AAU national tournament.

近年来，汤姆·纳尼为贝里家族管理着这项业务，并实现了卓越增长与非同寻常盈利能力的罕见结合。汤姆在其他方面也是一个强人。除了有四个收养的孩子（两个来自俄罗斯），他还有一个大家庭：他执教的一支青少年女子篮球队Philadelphia Belles。该队去年的战绩是62胜4负，并在AAU全国锦标赛中获得亚军。

Few property-casualty companies are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share, and U.S. Liability adds luster to the collection.

很少有财产意外险公司是卓越的企业。我们的份额远超平均水平，而美国责任保险公司为这个集合增添了光彩。

• Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone, prior to any face-to-face meeting between me and the management. Ed Bridge, who with his cousin, Jon, manages this 65-store West Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995. Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation. Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending some figures, and we made a deal, again half for cash and half for stock.

• Ben Bridge珠宝店是我们另一笔通过电话达成的收购，此前我和管理层没有任何面对面的会面。艾德·布里奇与他的堂兄乔恩一起管理这家拥有65家门店的西海岸零售商，他是巴内特·赫尔茨伯格的朋友，我们于1995年从后者手中收购了赫尔茨伯格钻石公司。得知布里奇家族打算出售其公司后，巴内特强烈推荐了伯克希尔。艾德随后打电话向我解释了他的业务，并寄来了一些数据，我们达成了交易，再次以一半现金一半股票支付。

Ed and Jon are fourth generation owner-managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle. Both the business and the family — including Herb and Bob, the fathers of Jon and Ed — enjoy extraordinary reputations. Same-store sales have increased by 9%, 11%, 13%, 10%, 12%, 21% and 7% over the past seven years, a truly remarkable record.

艾德和乔恩是这家89年前在西雅图创立的企业的第四代所有者兼经理人。无论是企业还是家族——包括乔恩和艾德的父亲赫伯和鲍勃——都享有非凡的声誉。在过去七年中，同店销售额分别增长了9%、11%、13%、10%、12%、21%和7%，这是一个真正非凡的记录。

It was vital to the family that the company operate in the future as in the past. No one wanted another jewelry chain to come in and decimate the organization with ideas about synergy and cost saving (which, though they would never work, were certain to be tried). I told Ed and Jon that they would be in charge, and they knew I could be believed: After all, it's obvious that your Chairman would be a disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry (though there are members of his family who have earned black belts as purchasers).

对公司未来像过去一样运营，对家族至关重要。没有人希望另一家珠宝连锁店带着协同效应和成本节约的想法（尽管这些想法从来都行不通，但肯定会被尝试）进来摧毁这个组织。我告诉艾德和乔恩，他们将负责，他们知道我可以被信任：毕竟，你们的主席在实际经营商店或销售珠宝方面显然会是一场灾难（尽管他家里有成员作为采购员获得了黑带）。

In their typically classy way, the Bridges allocated a substantial portion of the proceeds from their sale to the hundreds of co-workers who had helped the company achieve its success. We're proud to be associated with both the family and the company.

以他们典型的高雅方式，布里奇家族将出售所得的相当一部分分配给了数百位帮助公司取得成功的同事。我们为与这个家族和这家公司联系在一起感到自豪。

• In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of Western boots — including the Justin, Tony Lama, Nocona, and Chippewa brands — and the premier producer of brick in Texas and five neighboring states.

• 7月，我们收购了贾斯汀工业公司，该公司是西部靴子的领先制造商——包括贾斯汀、托尼·拉马、诺科纳和奇普瓦品牌——以及德克萨斯州和五个相邻州的顶级砖块生产商。

Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity. On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining that with rare exceptions we don't invest with others, but would happily pay him a commission if he sent details and we later made a purchase. He replied that the "mystery company" was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to meet John Roach, chairman of the company and John Justin, who had built the business and was its major shareholder. Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.

在这里，我们的收购再次涉及偶然性。5月4日，我收到一个陌生人马克·琼斯的传真，提议伯克希尔加入一个集团收购一家未具名公司。我回传真解释说，除了极少数例外，我们不与他人一起投资，但如果他寄来详细信息而我们随后进行了购买，我们乐意付给他佣金。他回答说“神秘公司”是贾斯汀。然后我去了沃斯堡，会见了公司董事长约翰·罗奇和约翰·贾斯汀，后者是这家企业的缔造者兼大股东。不久之后，我们以5.7亿美元现金收购了贾斯汀。

John Justin loved Justin Industries but had been forced to retire because of severe health problems (which sadly led to his death in late February). John was a class act — as a citizen, businessman and human being. Fortunately, he had groomed two outstanding managers, Harrold Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom runs his company autonomously.

约翰·贾斯汀热爱贾斯汀工业，但因严重的健康问题被迫退休（令人悲伤的是，他在2月下旬去世）。约翰是一个品格高尚的人——作为公民、商人和人都是如此。幸运的是，他培养了两位杰出的经理人：阿克米的哈罗德·梅尔顿和贾斯汀靴业的兰迪·沃森，他们各自独立经营自己的公司。

Acme, the larger of the two operations, produces more than one billion bricks per year at its 22 plants, about 11.7% of the industry's national output. The brick business, however, is necessarily regional, and in its territory Acme enjoys unquestioned leadership. When Texans are asked to name a brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the runner-up. (Before our purchase, I couldn't have named a brand of brick. Could you have?) This brand recognition is not only due to Acme's product quality, but also reflects many decades of extraordinary community service by both the company and John Justin.

两家业务中规模较大的是阿克米，在其22家工厂每年生产超过10亿块砖，约占全国行业总产量的11.7%。然而，砖块业务必然是区域性的，在其区域内，阿克米享有毋庸置疑的领导地位。当德克萨斯人被问及能说出哪个砖块品牌时，75%的人回答阿克米，而第二名只有16%。（在我们收购之前，我说不出任何一个砖块品牌。你能吗？）这种品牌认知度不仅归功于阿克米的产品质量，也反映了该公司和约翰·贾斯汀数十年来非凡的社区服务。

I can't resist pointing out that Berkshire — whose top management has long been mired in the 19th century — is now one of the very few authentic "clicks-and-bricks" businesses around. We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on the Internet, and then we added Acme. You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat in Silicon Valley.

我忍不住要指出，伯克希尔——其最高管理层长期深陷于19世纪——现在是周边极少数真正的“点击加砖块”企业之一。我们在2000年初就让盖可保险在互联网上开展了大量业务，然后我们加入了阿克米。你可以打赌，伯克希尔的这一举动让硅谷的人捏了一把汗。

• In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw Industries, the world's largest carpet manufacturer, came to see me with his partner, Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company with which Shaw was mulling a merger. The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities from past activities, and any deal depended on these being eliminated through insurance.

• 6月，全球最大的地毯制造商Shaw Industries的CEO鲍勃·肖与他的合伙人朱利安·索尔以及另一家Shaw正在考虑与之合并的公司的CEO来见我。然而，这家潜在的合作方因过去的经营活动面临巨大的石棉责任，任何交易都取决于通过保险消除这些责任。

The executives visiting me wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future asbestos costs. I explained that though we could write an exceptionally large policy — far larger than any other insurer would ever think of offering — we would never issue a policy that lacked a cap.

来访的高管希望伯克希尔提供一份保单，支付所有未来的石棉成本。我解释说，尽管我们可以承保一份异常庞大的保单——远大于任何其他保险公司所能提供的——但我们绝不会发行一份没有上限的保单。

Bob and Julian decided that if we didn't want to bet the ranch on the extent of the acquiree's liability, neither did they. So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was sparked, and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to work out a purchase by Berkshire. A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to continue owning at least 5% of Shaw. This leaves us associated with the best in the business as shown by Bob and Julian's record: Each built a large, successful carpet business before joining forces in 1998.

鲍勃和朱利安决定，如果我们不想在被收购方责任范围上赌上全部家当，他们也不想。所以他们的交易告吹。但我的兴趣被Shaw激发了，几个月后，查理和我与鲍勃会面，商定了伯克希尔的收购。这笔交易的一个关键特点是，鲍勃和朱利安将继续持有Shaw至少5%的股份。这使我们与业内最优秀的人联系在一起，鲍勃和朱利安的经历证明了这一点：在1998年联手之前，他们各自建立了一家大型、成功的地毯企业。

Shaw has annual sales of about $4 billion, and we own 87.3% of the company. Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our largest business. Now, if people walk all over us, we won't mind.

Shaw的年销售额约为40亿美元，我们拥有该公司87.3%的股份。撇开保险业务不谈，Shaw是迄今为止我们最大的业务。现在，如果人们在我们身上走来走去，我们不会介意的。

• In July, Bob Mundheim, a director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it. I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during some difficult times, and held him in very high regard. So my answer was "Tell me more."

• 7月，本杰明·摩尔涂料公司的董事鲍勃·芒德海姆打电话询问伯克希尔是否有意收购该公司。我在所罗门公司认识鲍勃，当时他在困难时期担任总法律顾问，我对他非常尊敬。所以我回答说：“告诉我更多细节。”

In late August, Charlie and I met with Richard Roob and Yvan Dupuy, past and present CEOs of Benjamin Moore. We liked them; we liked the business; and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot. In October, their board approved the transaction, and we completed it in December.

8月下旬，查理和我与本杰明·摩尔的前任和现任CEO理查德·鲁布和伊万·杜普伊会面。我们喜欢他们；我们喜欢这项业务；我们当场开出了10亿美元的现金收购要约。10月，他们的董事会批准了交易，我们在12月完成了交易。

Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its business. Make sure you specify our product for your next paint job.

本杰明·摩尔已经生产涂料117年，拥有数千家独立经销商，这是其业务的重要资产。确保你下次粉刷时指定我们的产品。

• Finally, in late December, we agreed to buy Johns Manville Corp. for about $1.8 billion. This company's incredible odyssey over the last few decades — too multifaceted to be chronicled here — was shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos products. The much-publicized health problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led to JM's declaring bankruptcy in 1982.

• 最后，在12月下旬，我们同意以约18亿美元收购约翰斯·曼维尔公司。这家公司过去几十年的不可思议的历程——过于复杂无法在此详述——由其作为石棉产品制造商的悠久历史所塑造。广为人知的健康问题影响了许多接触石棉的人，导致JM于1982年宣布破产。

Subsequently, the bankruptcy court established a trust for victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO group was unable to obtain financing.

随后，破产法院为受害者设立了一个信托基金，其主要资产是JM的控股权。该信托基金明智地希望分散其资产，于去年6月同意将业务出售给一家杠杆收购买家。然而最终，杠杆收购集团未能获得融资。

Consequently, the deal was called off on Friday, December 8th. The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felise, chairman of the trust, and made an all-cash offer with no financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted tentatively to accept our offer, and a week later we signed a contract.

因此，交易于12月8日星期五取消。接下来的星期一，查理和我致电信托基金主席鲍勃·费利斯，提出了一项没有融资条件的全现金收购要约。第二天，受托人暂时投票接受了我们的要约，一周后我们签署了合同。

JM is the nation's leading producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of engineered products. The company's sales exceed $2 billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical, returns. Jerry Henry, JM's CEO, had announced his retirement plans a year ago, but I'm happy to report that Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around.

JM是商业和工业隔热材料的全国领先生产商，在屋顶系统和各种工程产品方面也占有重要地位。该公司的销售额超过20亿美元，业务获得了良好（尽管是周期性的）回报。JM的CEO杰里·亨利一年前宣布了退休计划，但我很高兴地报告，查理和我已经说服他留下来。

Two economic factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners foresaw near-term slowdowns in their businesses — and, in fact, we purchased several companies whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000. The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all of our businesses to now and then have ups and downs. (Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings move forever upward.) We don't care about the bumps; what matters are the overall results. But the decisions of other people are sometimes affected by the near-term outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.

有两个经济因素可能导致了我们去年经历的收购活动热潮。首先，许多经理人和所有者预见到他们的业务短期内将放缓——事实上，我们收购了几家公司，它们今年的收益几乎肯定会从1999年或2000年的峰值下降。对我们来说，下降无关紧要，因为我们预计我们所有的业务都会有起有落。（只有在投资银行的推销资料中，收益才会永远上升。）我们不在乎波动；重要的是整体结果。但其他人的决策有时会受到近期前景的影响，这既可以刺激卖家，也可以抑制原本可能与我们竞争的买家的热情。

A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for junk bonds dried up as the year progressed. In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed their standards, buying the obligations of ever-weaker issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were felt last year in a ballooning of defaults. In this environment, "financial" buyers of businesses — those who wish to buy using only a sliver of equity — became unable to borrow all they thought they needed. What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price. Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their bidding when businesses came up for sale last year. Because we analyze purchases on an all-equity basis, our evaluations did not change, which means we became considerably more competitive.

2000年帮助我们的第二个因素是，随着年度的推进，垃圾债券市场枯竭了。在此前的两年中，垃圾债券购买者放松了标准，以不适当的价格购买越来越弱发行人的债券。这种宽松的影响在去年违约率飙升中体现出来。在这种环境下，企业的“金融”买家——那些希望仅用少量股权进行购买的人——无法借到他们认为需要的所有资金。而且，他们仍然可以借到的钱价格高昂。因此，当企业去年出售时，杠杆收购运营商在竞标中变得不那么激进了。因为我们是在全股权基础上分析购买，我们的评估没有变化，这意味着我们变得更有竞争力。

Aside from the economic factors that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn't assure a deal — sellers have to like our price, and we have to like their business and management — but it does help.

除了对我们有利的经济因素外，我们现在在收购方面享有一个重大且不断增长的优势，即我们通常是卖方的首选买家。当然，这一事实并不能保证交易——卖家必须喜欢我们的价格，我们必须喜欢他们的业务和管理层——但它确实有帮助。

We find it meaningful when an owner cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale will bring him (though we certainly understand why he likes that as well). When this emotional attachment exists, it signals that important qualities will likely be found within the business: honest accounting, pride of product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates having a strong sense of direction. The reverse is apt to be true, also. When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the seller is a "financial owner." And if owners behave with little regard for their business and its people, their conduct will often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the company.

当所有者关心他把公司卖给谁时，我们觉得这很有意义。我们喜欢与热爱自己公司的人做生意，而不仅仅是关心出售给他带来的金钱（尽管我们当然也理解他为什么喜欢钱）。当这种情感依恋存在时，它预示着企业内部可能存在重要的品质：诚实的会计、对产品的自豪感、对客户的尊重以及一群忠诚且有强烈方向感的同事。反之亦然。当所有者拍卖他的企业，对后续发展表现出完全缺乏兴趣时，你经常会发现企业被粉饰出售，尤其是当卖方是“财务所有者”时。而如果所有者的行为很少考虑他们的企业和员工，他们的行为往往会污染整个公司的态度和实践。

When a business masterpiece has been created by a lifetime — or several lifetimes — of unstinting care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history. Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home. We take our obligations to the people who created a business very seriously, and Berkshire's ownership structure ensures that we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth, or assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises to the bank.

当一项商业杰作是由一生——或几代人——的悉心照料和非凡才华创造出来时，将它的历史托付给哪家公司对所有者来说应该很重要。查理和我相信伯克希尔提供了一个近乎独特的家园。我们非常认真对待对创造企业的人的义务，伯克希尔的所有权结构确保我们能够履行我们的承诺。当我们告诉约翰·贾斯汀，他的企业将继续以沃斯堡为总部，或者向布里奇家族保证他们的业务不会与另一家珠宝商合并时，这些卖家可以将这些承诺存入银行。

How much better it is for the "painter" of a business Rembrandt to personally select its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested heirs auction it off. Throughout the years we have had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and apply it to their business creations. We'll leave the auctions to others.

一幅商业伦勃朗的“画家”亲自选择它的永久家园，远比让信托官员或无利害关系的继承人拍卖掉要好得多。多年来，我们与那些认识到这一真理并将其应用于商业创造的人有着极好的经历。我们会把拍卖留给别人。

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

财产/意外险的经济学

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们的核心业务——尽管我们还有其他非常重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解伯克希尔，你必须理解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：（1）业务产生的浮存金数量；（2）浮存金的成本；（3）所有因素中最关键的是，这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，浮存金是我们持有但不属于我们的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金的产生是因为保费在损失赔付之前收到，这个时间间隔有时会延续多年。在此期间，保险公司将资金进行投资。这种令人愉快的活动通常伴随着一个缺点：保险公司收取的保费通常无法覆盖其最终必须支付的损失和费用。这就导致了“承保亏损”，即浮存金的成本。如果一家保险公司的浮存金成本随着时间的推移低于该公司为获得资金而可能承担的其他成本，那么这项保险业务就有价值。但如果其浮存金成本高于市场利率，那么这项业务就是一颗柠檬。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.

这里需要提醒注意：由于损失成本必须估计，保险公司在计算其承保业绩时有很大的自由度，这使得投资者很难计算一家公司的真实浮存金成本。估计错误——通常是无意的，但有时并非如此——可能非常巨大。这些错误计算的结果直接流入收益。有经验的观察者通常能发现大规模的准备金错误，但普通公众通常只能接受所呈现的内容，有时我会对大牌审计师含蓄认可的数字感到惊讶。保险公司的损益表和资产负债表都可能是雷区。

At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.

在伯克希尔，我们努力在准备金方面保持一贯和保守。但我们也会犯错。我们警告你，保险业的意外绝不对称：它们几乎总是不愉快的。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 34 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment "Other Primary"). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Don't panic, there won't be a quiz.)

下表显示了自34年前我们收购国民赔偿公司（其传统业务线包含在“其他主要保险”部分）进入保险业务以来，伯克希尔保险业务各板块产生的浮存金（每隔几年显示一次）。对于该表，我们通过将净损失准备金、损失调整准备金、分保业务下持有的资金和未到期保费准备金相加，然后减去保险相关应收账款、预付收购成本、预付税款和适用于分入再保险的递延费用，来计算我们的浮存金——相对于保费规模，我们产生的浮存金数额很大。（别慌，不会有测验。）

We're pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering 19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 — perhaps substantially — in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving trend.

我们对2000年浮存金的增长感到满意，但对其成本不满意。多年来，我们的浮存金成本非常接近于零，大多数年份实现的承保利润抵消了偶尔的糟糕年份，如1984年，当时我们的成本高达19%。然而，2000年，我们遭受了16亿美元的承保亏损，使我们的浮存金成本达到6%。如果不发生特大灾难，我们预计2001年我们的浮存金成本将下降——也许会大幅下降——很大程度上是因为通用再保险的价格修正，随着年度的推进，其影响应会日益显现。在较小的规模上，盖可保险也可能经历同样的改善趋势。

There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs attached to this business.

有两个影响我们浮存金成本的因素在其他保险公司非常罕见，但现在在伯克希尔显得突出。首先，一些目前正在经历巨额亏损的保险公司已经将其中的很大一部分转移给了我们，这种方式损害了我们当前的收益，但给了我们未来多年可以使用的浮存金。在保单第一年我们遭受损失之后，这项业务就没有进一步的成本了。

When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today, gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you about them as they occur.

当这些保单定价合理时，我们欢迎它们带来的“今天痛苦，明天收获”的效果。1999年，我们承保亏损中的4亿美元（约占总数的27.8%）来自这类业务，2000年这一数字为4.82亿美元（占我们亏损的34.4%）。我们无法预测未来会承保多少类似业务，但我们所获得的通常是一大块。因为这些交易可能会严重影响我们的数据，我们会在它们发生时告诉你。

Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can't stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results, even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers.

其他再保险公司对这种保险兴趣不大。他们根本无法忍受巨额承保亏损对他们报告业绩的影响，即使这些亏损是由整体经济效益肯定有利的保单产生的。因此，你在将我们的承保业绩与其他保险公司进行比较时应该小心。

An even more significant item in our numbers — which, again, you won't find much of elsewhere — arises from transactions in which we assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance company might have last year bought a policy obligating us to pay the first $1 billion of losses and loss adjustment expenses from events that happened in, say, 1995 and earlier years. These contracts can be very large, though we always require a cap on our exposure. We entered into a number of such transactions in 2000 and expect to close several more in 2001.

我们数字中一个更重要的项目——同样，你在其他地方找不到太多——来自我们承接那些希望摆脱过去麻烦的公司的历史损失的交易。举例说明，XYZ保险公司可能在去年购买了一份保单，要求我们支付例如1995年及更早年份发生的事件所产生的首批10亿美元损失和损失调整费用。这些合同可能非常大，尽管我们总是要求对我们的风险敞口设置上限。我们在2000年进行了许多此类交易，并预计在2001年再完成几项。

Under GAAP accounting, this "retroactive" insurance neither benefits nor penalizes our current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset called "deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance," in an amount reflecting the difference between the premium we receive and the (higher) losses we expect to pay (for which reserves are immediately established). We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses. You will find the amount of the loss that we incur from these transactions in both our quarterly and annual management discussion. By their nature, these losses will continue for many years, often stretching into decades. As an offset, though, we have the use of float — lots of it.

根据公认会计原则，这种“追溯”保险既不会增加也不会减少我们的当期收益。相反，我们设立了一项名为“适用于分入再保险的递延费用”的资产，其金额反映了我们收到的保费与我们预期支付的（更高的）损失之间的差额（准备金立即为此设立）。然后，我们通过每年向收益计费来摊销该资产，从而产生同等的承保亏损。你可以在我们的季度和年度管理层讨论中找到我们从这些交易中产生的亏损金额。就其性质而言，这些亏损将持续多年，常常延续数十年。不过，作为抵消，我们可以使用浮存金——大量的浮存金。

Clearly, float carrying an annual cost of this kind is not as desirable as float we generate from policies that are expected to produce an underwriting profit (of which we have plenty). Nevertheless, this retroactive insurance should be decent business for us.

显然，承担这种年度成本的浮存金不如我们从预期产生承保利润的保单中产生的浮存金（我们有很多这种）那么理想。尽管如此，这种追溯保险对我们来说应该是体面的业务。

The net of all this is that a) I expect our cost of float to be very attractive in the future but b) rarely to return to a "no-cost" mode because of the annual charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us. Also — obviously — the ultimate benefits that we derive from float will depend not only on its cost but, fully as important, how effectively we deploy it.

所有这一切的要点是：a) 我预计我们未来的浮存金成本将非常有吸引力，但 b) 由于追溯再保险将给我们带来的年度费用，很少会回到“零成本”模式。此外——显然——我们从浮存金中获得的最终利益不仅取决于其成本，同样重要的是我们如何有效地配置它。

Our retroactive business is almost single-handedly the work of Ajit Jain, whose praises I sing annually. It is impossible to overstate how valuable Ajit is to Berkshire. Don't worry about my health; worry about his.

我们的追溯业务几乎是由阿吉特·贾因一人完成的，我每年都称赞他。阿吉特对伯克希尔的价值怎么强调都不为过。不要担心我的健康；担心他的。

Last year, Ajit brought home a $2.4 billion reinsurance premium, perhaps the largest in history, from a policy that retroactively covers a major U.K. company. Subsequently, he wrote a large policy protecting the Texas Rangers from the possibility that Alex Rodriguez will become permanently disabled. As sports fans know, "A-Rod" was signed for $252 million, a record, and we think that our policy probably also set a record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports figures as well.

去年，阿吉特带回了一份24亿美元的再保险保费，这可能是历史上最大的，来自一份追溯覆盖一家英国大公司的保单。随后，他承保了一份大额保单，保护德克萨斯游骑兵队免受亚历克斯·罗德里格斯永久伤残的可能性。正如体育迷所知，“A-Rod”签下了创纪录的2.52亿美元合同，我们认为我们的保单可能也创下了伤残保险的纪录。我们还承保了许多其他体育人物。

In another example of his versatility, Ajit last fall negotiated a very interesting deal with Grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to attract millions of people to its site and there to extract information from them that would be useful to marketers. To lure these people, Grab.com held out the possibility of a $1 billion prize (having a $170 million present value) and we insured its payment. A message on the site explained that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and indeed no one won. But the possibility of a win was far from nil.

在他多才多艺的另一个例子中，阿吉特去年秋天与互联网公司Grab.com谈判了一项非常有趣的交易，该公司的目标是吸引数百万人访问其网站，并从他们那里提取对营销人员有用的信息。为了吸引这些人，Grab.com 提供了10亿美元奖金的可能性（现值为1.7亿美元），我们为这笔奖金的支付提供了保险。网站上的一条消息解释说，任何人获胜的几率都很低，事实上没有人获胜。但获胜的可能性远非为零。

Writing such a policy, we receive a modest premium, face the possibility of a huge loss, and get good odds. Very few insurers like that equation. And they're unable to cure their unhappiness by reinsurance. Because each policy has unusual — and sometimes unique — characteristics, insurers can't lay off the occasional shock loss through their standard reinsurance arrangements. Therefore, any insurance CEO doing a piece of business like this must run the small, but real, risk of a horrible quarterly earnings number, one that he would not enjoy explaining to his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense, regardless of its effect on reported earnings.

承保这样的保单，我们收到适度的保费，面临巨额损失的可能性，并获得好的赔率。很少有保险公司喜欢这种等式。而且它们无法通过再保险来消除它们的不安。因为每份保单都有不寻常——有时是独特——的特点，保险公司无法通过其标准的再保险安排来转嫁偶尔的冲击损失。因此，任何做这种业务的保险公司CEO都必须承担一个很小但真实的风险，即出现一个可怕的季度收益数字，他可不希望向他的董事会或股东解释这一点。然而，查理和我喜欢任何具有令人信服的数学意义的提议，无论它对报告收益有何影响。

At General Re, the news has turned considerably better: Ron Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tad Montross, and a talented supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to bring that company's profitability back to past standards. Though our pricing is not fully corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was severely unprofitable or dropped it altogether. If there's no mega-catastrophe in 2001, General Re's float cost should fall materially.

在通用再保险，情况已显著好转：罗恩·弗格森以及乔·布兰登、塔德·蒙特罗斯和一群才华横溢的辅助人员在2000年采取了许多行动，以使该公司的盈利能力恢复到过去的标准。虽然我们的定价尚未完全纠正，但我们已对严重无利可图的业务进行了大幅重新定价，或完全放弃了这些业务。如果2001年没有特大灾难，通用再保险的浮存金成本应该会大幅下降。

The last couple of years haven't been any fun for Ron and his crew. But they have stepped up to tough decisions, and Charlie and I applaud them for these. General Re has several important and enduring business advantages. Better yet, it has managers who will make the most of them.

过去几年对罗恩和他的团队来说并不愉快。但他们毅然做出了艰难的决定，查理和我为他们鼓掌。通用再保险拥有几项重要且持久的商业优势。更好的是，它有能够充分利用这些优势的经理人。

In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations produced an excellent underwriting profit in 2000 while generating significant float — just as they have done for more than a decade. If these companies were a single and separate operation, people would consider it an outstanding insurer. Because the companies instead reside in an enterprise as large as Berkshire, the world may not appreciate their accomplishments — but I sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster, and I again do so. In addition, we now also owe thanks to Tom Nerney at U.S. Liability and Michael Stearns, the new head of Cypress.

总的来说，我们较小的保险业务在2000年产生了极好的承保利润，同时产生了大量的浮存金——就像过去十多年一样。如果这些公司是单一且独立的企业，人们会认为它是一家出色的保险公司。因为这些公司位于像伯克希尔这样庞大的企业内，世界可能不会欣赏他们的成就——但我确实欣赏。去年我感谢了罗德·埃尔德雷德、约翰·凯泽、唐·托尔和唐·沃斯特，我再次这样做。此外，我们现在还要感谢美国责任保险公司的汤姆·纳尼和赛普拉斯的新负责人迈克尔·斯特恩斯。

You may notice that Brad Kinstler, who was CEO of Cypress and whose praises I've sung in the past, is no longer in the list above. That's because we needed a new manager at Fechheimer Bros., our Cincinnati-based uniform company, and called on Brad. We seldom move Berkshire managers from one enterprise to another, but maybe we should try it more often: Brad is hitting home runs in his new job, just as he always did at Cypress.

你可能会注意到，布拉德·金斯特勒——赛普拉斯的前CEO，我曾称赞过他——已不在上述名单中。这是因为我们在辛辛那提的制服公司Fechheimer Bros.需要一位新经理人，于是我们请来了布拉德。我们很少将伯克希尔的经理人从一家企业调到另一家，但也许我们应该更经常地尝试：布拉德在他的新工作中表现出色，就像他在赛普拉斯一贯做的那样。

GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)

盖可保险（1-800-847-7536 或 GEICO.com）

We show below the usual table detailing GEICO's growth. Last year I enthusiastically told you that we would step up our expenditures on advertising in 2000 and that the added dollars were the best investment that GEICO could make. I was wrong: The extra money we spent did not produce a commensurate increase in inquiries. Additionally, the percentage of inquiries that we converted into sales fell for the first time in many years. These negative developments combined to produce a sharp increase in our per-policy acquisition cost.

下面我们显示通常的表格，详细说明盖可保险的增长情况。去年，我热情地告诉你，我们将在2000年增加广告支出，而这些额外资金是盖可保险能做的最佳投资。我错了：我们花费的额外资金并没有带来相应的咨询量增长。此外，我们将咨询转化为销售的比例多年来首次下降。这些负面发展共同导致我们的每保单获取成本急剧上升。

(1) "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.

(1) 仅限“自愿”保单；不包括指定风险等。

Agonizing over errors is a mistake. But acknowledging and analyzing them can be useful, though that practice is rare in corporate boardrooms. There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed a candid post-mortem of a failed decision, particularly one involving an acquisition. A notable exception to this never-look-back approach is that of The Washington Post Company, which unfailingly and objectively reviews its acquisitions three years after they are made. Elsewhere, triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions either get no follow-up or are rationalized.

为错误而痛苦是错误的。但是承认和分析它们可能是有用的，尽管这种做法在董事会中很少见。在那里，查理和我几乎从未目睹过对失败决策的坦诚事后剖析，尤其是涉及收购的决策。这种“永不回头”方法的一个显著例外是《华盛顿邮报》公司，它总是在收购三年后客观地审查其收购。在其他地方，胜利被吹嘘，而愚蠢的决定要么没有后续，要么被合理化。

The financial consequences of these boners are regularly dumped into massive restructuring charges or write-offs that are casually waved off as "nonrecurring." Managements just love these. Indeed, in recent years it has seemed that no earnings statement is complete without them. The origins of these charges, though, are never explored. When it comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the concept of the Virgin Birth.

这些错误的财务后果通常被归入巨额重组费用或核销，被随意地视为“非经常性”。管理层喜欢这些。事实上，近年来，似乎没有它们，任何收益表都不完整。然而，这些费用的起源从未被探究。当涉及到公司失误时，CEO们援引了处女受孕的概念。

To get back to our examination of GEICO: There are at least four factors that could account for the increased costs we experienced in obtaining new business last year, and all probably contributed in some manner.

回到我们对盖可保险的考察：至少有四个因素可以解释我们在去年获取新业务时经历的成本增加，而且所有这些因素可能都以某种方式起到了作用。

First, in our advertising we have pushed "frequency" very hard, and we probably overstepped in certain media. We've always known that increasing the number of messages through any medium would eventually produce diminishing returns. The third ad in an hour on a given cable channel is simply not going to be as effective as the first.

首先，在我们的广告中，我们非常强调“频率”，我们可能在某些媒体上做得过火了。我们一直知道，通过任何媒体增加信息量最终都会产生收益递减。在一个小时内在某个有线电视频道上播放第三个广告的效果就是不如第一个。

Second, we may have already picked much of the low-hanging fruit. Clearly, the willingness to do business with a direct marketer of insurance varies widely among individuals: Indeed, some percentage of Americans — particularly older ones — are reluctant to make direct purchases of any kind. Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb. A new generation with new habits will find the savings from direct purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to ignore.

其次，我们可能已经摘取了很多容易摘到的果实。显然，个人与保险直销商做生意的意愿差异很大：事实上，一定比例的美国人——尤其是老年人——不愿意进行任何形式的直接购买。然而，随着时间推移，这种不情愿将会消退。具有新习惯的新一代会发现直接购买汽车保险所节省的费用太有吸引力而无法忽视。

Another factor that surely decreased the conversion of inquiries into sales was stricter underwriting by GEICO. Both the frequency and severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in certain areas became inadequate, in some cases substantially so. In these instances, we necessarily tightened our underwriting standards. This tightening, as well as the many rate increases we put in during the year, made our offerings less attractive to some prospects.

另一个肯定降低了咨询转化为销售比例的因素是盖可保险收紧了承保标准。年内损失的频率和严重程度都有所增加，某些地区的费率变得不足，在某些情况下严重不足。在这些情况下，我们收紧了承保标准。这种收紧，以及我们在年内实施的多次费率上调，使我们的产品对某些潜在客户的吸引力降低。

A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still save money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some prospects will switch to save $200 per year but will not switch to save $50. Therefore, rate increases that bring our prices closer to those of our competitors will hurt our acceptance rate, even when we continue to offer the best deal.

需要强调的是，仍有很高比例的来电者可以通过在我们这里投保省钱。然而，可以理解的是，一些潜在客户会为了每年节省200美元而转换，但不会为了节省50美元而转换。因此，即使我们继续提供最优惠的价格，使我们的价格更接近竞争对手的费率上调也会损害我们的接受率。

Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one important respect: State Farm — by far the largest personal auto insurer, with about 19% of the market — has been very slow to raise prices. Its costs, however, are clearly increasing right along with those of the rest of the industry. Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting loss last year from auto insurance (including rebates to policyholders) of 18% of premiums, compared to 4% at GEICO. Our loss produced a float cost for us of 6.1%, an unsatisfactory result. (Indeed, at GEICO we expect float, over time, to be free.) But we estimate that State Farm's float cost in 2000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest player in the industry to tolerate such a cost makes the economics difficult for other participants.

最后，竞争格局至少在一個重要方面发生了变化：State Farm——迄今为止最大的个人汽车保险公司，拥有约19%的市场份额——提价非常缓慢。然而，其成本显然与业内其他公司一样在增加。因此，State Farm去年汽车保险的承保亏损（包括给投保人的回扣）占保费的18%，而盖可保险为4%。我们的亏损使我们的浮存金成本达到6.1%，这是一个不令人满意的结果。（事实上，在盖可保险，我们期望随着时间推移浮存金是免费的。）但我们估计State Farm在2000年的浮存金成本约为23%。业内最大的参与者愿意容忍这样高的成本，使得其他参与者的经济状况变得困难。

That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of America's greatest business stories. I've urged that the company be studied at business schools because it has achieved fabulous success while following a path that in many ways defies the dogma of those institutions. Studying counter-evidence is a highly useful activity, though not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of learning.

这并不否定State Farm是美国最伟大的商业故事之一的事实。我曾敦促商学院研究这家公司，因为它在很多方面遵循了违背那些学院教条的道路，却取得了非凡的成功。研究反面证据是一项非常有用的活动，尽管在学术殿堂中并不总是受到热情欢迎。

State Farm was launched in 1922, by a 45-year-old, semi-retired Illinois farmer, to compete with long-established insurers — haughty institutions in New York, Philadelphia and Hartford — that possessed overwhelming advantages in capital, reputation, and distribution. Because State Farm is a mutual company, its board members and managers could not be owners, and it had no access to capital markets during its years of fast growth. Similarly, the business never had the stock options or lavish salaries that many people think vital if an American enterprise is to attract able managers and thrive.

State Farm于1922年由一位45岁、半退休的伊利诺伊州农民创立，与那些在资本、声誉和分销方面拥有压倒性优势的长期保险公司——纽约、费城和哈特福德的傲慢机构——竞争。由于State Farm是互助公司，其董事会成员和经理人不能成为所有者，并且在其快速增长期间无法进入资本市场。同样，该公司从未拥有许多人认为美国企业吸引能干经理人和蓬勃发展所必需的股票期权或丰厚薪水。

In the end, however, State Farm eclipsed all its competitors. In fact, by 1999 the company had amassed a tangible net worth exceeding that of all but four American businesses. If you want to read how this happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Merna.

然而，最终这家农场主保险公司超越了所有竞争对手。事实上，到1999年，该公司积累的有形净资产超过了除四家美国公司外的所有公司。如果你想了解这是如何发生的，请阅读《来自默纳的农民》。

Despite State Farm's strengths, however, GEICO has much the better business model, one that embodies significantly lower operating costs. And, when a company is selling a product with commodity-like economic characteristics, being the low-cost producer is all-important. This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO — one it possessed in 1951 when, as a 20-year-old student, I first became enamored with its stock — is the reason that over time it will inevitably increase its market share significantly while simultaneously achieving excellent profits. Our growth will be slow, however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing the underwriting losses that it is now suffering.

尽管State Farm实力雄厚，但盖可保险拥有更好的商业模式，其运营成本显著更低。而且，当一家公司销售具有商品般经济特征的产品时，成为低成本生产商至关重要。盖可保险这一持久的竞争优势——1951年，当我作为一个20岁的学生第一次迷恋上它的股票时它就拥有了——是它随着时间的推移将不可避免地显著增加其市场份额，同时实现卓越利润的原因。然而，如果State Farm选择继续承受其目前正在遭受的承保亏损，我们的增长将是缓慢的。

Tony Nicely, GEICO's CEO, remains an owner's dream. Everything he does makes sense. He never engages in wishful thinking or otherwise distorts reality, as so many managers do when the unexpected happens. As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back on advertising that was not cost-effective, and he will continue to do that in 2001 if cutbacks are called for (though we will always maintain a massive media presence). Tony has also aggressively filed for price increases where we need them. He looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind the curve. To steal a line from a competitor, we are in good hands with Tony.

盖可保险的CEO托尼·奈斯利仍然是所有者的梦想。他所做的一切都是合理的。他从不想入非非或以其他方式歪曲现实，不像许多经理人在意外发生时那样。随着2000年的展开，托尼削减了不具有成本效益的广告，如果2001年需要削减，他将继续这样做（尽管我们将始终保持大规模的媒体存在）。托尼还在我们需要的地方积极申请提价。他每天都查看损失报告，从不落后于形势。借用竞争对手的一句话，有托尼在，我们很放心。

I've told you about our profit-sharing arrangement at GEICO that targets only two variables — growth in policies and the underwriting results of seasoned business. Despite the headwinds of 2000, we still had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit-sharing payment, amounting to $40.7 million.

我告诉过你我们在盖可保险的利润分享安排，它只针对两个变量——保单增长和成熟业务的承保业绩。尽管2000年面临逆风，我们的业绩仍然产生了8.8%的利润分成，金额为4,070万美元。

GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire's future. Because of its rock-bottom operating costs, it offers a great many Americans the cheapest way to purchase a high-ticket product that they must buy. The company then couples this bargain with service that consistently ranks high in independent surveys. That's a combination inevitably producing growth and profitability.

盖可保险将成为伯克希尔未来的重要组成部分。由于其最低的运营成本，它为许多美国人提供了购买他们必须购买的高价产品的最便宜方式。然后，该公司将这种优惠与在独立调查中始终排名靠前的服务结合起来。这种结合必然会产生增长和盈利能力。

In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to associate the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance. We will pound that theme relentlessly until all Americans are aware of the value that we offer.

就在过去的几年里，越来越多的司机已经学会将盖可保险品牌与在他们的保险上省钱联系起来。我们将不懈地强调这一主题，直到所有美国人都意识到我们所提供的价值。

Investments

投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $1 billion at the end of 2000 are itemized.

下面我们列出普通股投资。那些在2000年底市值超过10亿美元的项目被逐项列出。

In 2000, we sold nearly all of our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae shares, established 15% positions in several mid-sized companies, bought the high-yield bonds of a few issuers (very few — the category is not labeled junk without reason) and added to our holdings of high-grade, mortgage-backed securities. There are no "bargains" among our current holdings: We're content with what we own but far from excited by it.

2000年，我们出售了几乎所有的房地美和房利美股份，在几家中型公司建立了15%的仓位，购买了一些发行人的高收益债券（非常少——这个类别被称为垃圾并非没有原因），并增加了我们的高等级抵押贷款支持证券的持有量。我们目前的持股中没有“便宜货”：我们对自己拥有的东西感到满意，但远未兴奋。

Many people assume that marketable securities are Berkshire's first choice when allocating capital, but that's not true: Ever since we first published our economic principles in 1983, we have consistently stated that we would rather purchase businesses than stocks. (See number 4 on page 60.) One reason for that preference is personal, in that I love working with our managers. They are high-grade, talented and loyal. And, frankly, I find their business behavior to be more rational and owner-oriented than that prevailing at many public companies.

许多人认为有价证券是伯克希尔配置资本时的首选，但事实并非如此：自从我们1983年首次公布我们的经济原则以来，我们一直声明我们宁愿购买企业而不是股票。（见第60页第4点。）这种偏好的一个原因是个人的，我喜欢与我们的经理人共事。他们是高素质、有才华和忠诚的。坦率地说，我发现他们的商业行为比许多上市公司更为理性和面向所有者。

But there's also a powerful financial reason behind the preference, and that has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshire's owning 80% or more of a business far more profitable for us, proportionately, than our owning a smaller share. When a company we own all of earns $1 million after tax, the entire amount inures to our benefit. If the $1 million is upstreamed to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the dividend. And, if the earnings are retained and we were to sell the subsidiary — not likely at Berkshire! — for $1 million more than we paid for it, we would owe no capital gains tax. That's because our "tax cost" upon sale would include both what we paid for the business and all earnings it subsequently retained.

但这种偏好背后还有一个强大的财务原因，与税收有关。税法使得伯克希尔拥有一家企业80%或以上的股份，按比例计算，比我们持有较小的股份对我们更有利。当我们完全拥有的一家公司税后赚取100万美元时，全部金额都归我们受益。如果这100万美元向上支付给伯克希尔，我们无需为股息缴税。而且，如果收益被留存，而我们以比购买价高出100万美元的价格出售该子公司——这在伯克希尔不太可能！——我们也无需缴纳资本利得税。这是因为我们在出售时的“税务成本”将包括我们为业务支付的金额以及其随后留存的所有收益。

Contrast that situation to what happens when we own an investment in a marketable security. There, if we own a 10% stake in a business earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share of the earnings is subject to additional state and federal taxes of (1) about $140,000 if it is distributed to us (our tax rate on most dividends is 14%); or (2) no less than $350,000 if the $1 million is retained and subsequently captured by us in the form of a capital gain (on which our tax rate is usually about 35%, though it sometimes approaches 40%). We may defer paying the $350,000 by not immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we must pay the tax. In effect, the government is our "partner" twice when we own part of a business through a stock investment, but only once when we own at least 80%.

将此情况与我们持有有价证券投资时发生的情况进行对比。在那里，如果我们持有一家税后盈利1000万美元的企业10%的股份，我们100万美元的盈利份额需要缴纳额外的州税和联邦税：（1）如果分配给我们，大约14万美元（我们对大多数股息的税率是14%）；或（2）如果这100万美元被留存，随后我们以资本收益的形式获得，则不少于35万美元（对此我们的税率通常约为35%，尽管有时接近40%）。我们可能通过不立即实现收益来延迟支付这35万美元，但最终我们必须缴税。实际上，当我们通过股票投资拥有一家企业的一部分时，政府是我们的“合伙人”两次，但当我们拥有至少80%时，只有一次。

Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for evaluating stocks and businesses is identical. Indeed, the formula for valuing all assets that are purchased for financial gain has been unchanged since it was first laid out by a very smart man in about 600 B.C. (though he wasn't smart enough to know it was 600 B.C.).

撇开税收因素，我们用于评估股票和企业的公式是相同的。事实上，自大约公元前600年一位非常聪明的人首次提出以来，用于评估所有为财务收益而购买的资产的公式从未改变（尽管他不够聪明，不知道那是公元前600年）。

The oracle was Aesop and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three questions. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush? When will they emerge and how many will there be? What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush — and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don't literally think birds. Think dollars.

这位先知是伊索，他持久但有些不完整的投资见解是“双鸟在林不如一鸟在手”。为了充实这一原则，你只需要回答三个问题。你有多确定灌木丛中确实有鸟？它们什么时候会出现，会有多少？无风险利率是多少（我们认为是长期美国国债的收益率）？如果你能回答这三个问题，你就会知道灌木丛的最大价值——以及你目前拥有的、应该用来交换它的鸟的最大数量。当然，不要真的想鸟。想美元。

Aesop's investment axiom, thus expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota — nor will the Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.

伊索的投资公理，如此扩展并转换为美元，是不变的。它适用于农场、石油开采权、债券、股票、彩票和制造工厂的支出。蒸汽机的出现、电力的利用、汽车的发明都没有改变这个公式一丁点——互联网也不会。只需输入正确的数字，你就可以对宇宙中所有可能的资本用途的吸引力进行排序。

Common yardsticks such as dividend yield, the ratio of price to earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have nothing to do with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount and timing of cash flows into and from the business. Indeed, growth can destroy value if it requires cash inputs in the early years of a project or enterprise that exceed the discounted value of the cash that those assets will generate in later years. Market commentators and investment managers who glibly refer to "growth" and "value" styles as contrasting approaches to investment are displaying their ignorance, not their sophistication. Growth is simply a component — usually a plus, sometimes a minus — in the value equation.

诸如股息率、市盈率或市净率，甚至增长率等常见指标与估值无关，除非它们为了解进入和离开企业的现金流数量和时机提供线索。事实上，如果一个项目或企业早期所需的现金投入超过这些资产在后期产生的现金的折现值，增长反而可能摧毁价值。市场评论员和投资经理轻率地谈论“成长”和“价值”风格作为对比的投资方法，显示出他们的无知，而非他们的老练。成长仅仅是价值等式中的一个组成部分——通常是加号，有时是减号。

Alas, though Aesop's proposition and the third variable — that is, interest rates — are simple, plugging in numbers for the other two variables is a difficult task. Using precise numbers is, in fact, foolish; working with a range of possibilities is the better approach.

唉，尽管伊索的命题和第三个变量——即利率——很简单，但为另外两个变量输入数字是一项困难的任务。使用精确的数字实际上是愚蠢的；使用可能性范围是更好的方法。

Usually, the range must be so wide that no useful conclusion can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative estimates about the future emergence of birds reveal that the price quoted is startlingly low in relation to value. (Let's call this phenomenon the IBT — Inefficient Bush Theory.) To be sure, an investor needs some general understanding of business economics as well as the ability to think independently to reach a well-founded positive conclusion. But the investor does not need brilliance nor blinding insights.

通常，这个范围必须如此之宽，以至于无法得出有用的结论。然而，偶尔，即使对未来出现鸟的非常保守的估计也表明，报价相对于价值惊人地低。（让我们称这种现象为IBT——低效灌木丛理论。）当然，投资者需要对企业经济学有一些一般的了解，以及独立思考和得出有充分根据的肯定结论的能力。但投资者不需要才华横溢或拥有非凡的洞察力。

At the other extreme, there are many times when the most brilliant of investors can't muster a conviction about the birds to emerge, not even when a very broad range of estimates is employed. This kind of uncertainty frequently occurs when new businesses and rapidly changing industries are under examination. In cases of this sort, any capital commitment must be labeled speculative.

在另一个极端，很多时候，即使是最聪明的投资者也无法对将要出现的鸟产生信心，即使采用非常宽的估计范围。这种不确定性在新企业和快速变化的行业被审视时经常发生。在这种情况下，任何资本承诺都必须被标记为投机。

Now, speculation — in which the focus is not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it — is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take anything home?

现在，投机——其焦点不是资产会产生什么，而是下一个人会为它支付什么——既不是非法的、不道德的，也不是非美国的。但这不是查理和我想玩的游戏。我们在这个派对上什么都不带，凭什么期望带什么回家？

The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There's a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.

区分投资和投机的界线从来都不是清晰明亮的，当大多数市场参与者最近都享受了胜利时，这条界线变得更加模糊。没有什么比大剂量的轻松赚钱更能麻痹理性了。在经历了一次令人陶醉的经历之后，通常明智的人会像灰姑娘在舞会上一样行为飘忽。他们知道，在庆祝活动中逗留过久——也就是说，继续投机于那些相对于它们未来可能产生的现金具有巨大估值的公司——最终会招来南瓜和老鼠。但他们仍然不愿错过这个美妙派对的任何一分钟。因此，头昏眼花的参与者都计划在午夜前几秒钟离开。不过，有一个问题：他们在一个钟表没有指针的房间里跳舞。

Last year, we commented on the exuberance — and, yes, it was irrational — that prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown to be several multiples of probable returns. One piece of evidence came from a Paine Webber-Gallup survey of investors conducted in December 1999, in which the participants were asked their opinion about the annual returns investors could expect to realize over the decade ahead. Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an irrational expectation: For American business as a whole, there couldn't possibly be enough birds in the 2009 bush to deliver such a return.

去年，我们评论了当时普遍存在的亢奋——是的，这是非理性的——指出投资者的期望已经增长到可能回报的几倍。一个证据来自1999年12月Paine Webber-Gallup对投资者进行的一项调查，参与者被问及他们认为投资者在未来十年可以实现的年回报率是多少。他们的回答平均为19%。这当然是非理性的期望：对美国企业整体而言，2009年的灌木丛中不可能有足够多的鸟来提供这样的回报。

Far more irrational still were the huge valuations that market participants were then putting on businesses almost certain to end up being of modest or no value. Yet investors, mesmerized by soaring stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into these enterprises. It was as if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses that underlay them.

更非理性的是市场参与者当时对几乎肯定最终价值微乎其微或毫无价值的企业的巨大估值。然而，投资者被飙升的股价迷住，无视一切，蜂拥进入这些企业。好像某种病毒在投资专业人士和业余爱好者中疯狂传播，引发了幻觉，使得某些行业的股票价值与其所依托的企业价值脱钩。

This surreal scene was accompanied by much loose talk about "value creation." We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of true value created in the past decade by new or young businesses, and that there is much more to come. But value is destroyed, not created, by any business that loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its interim valuation may get.

这种超现实的情景伴随着大量关于“价值创造”的随意谈论。我们欣然承认，在过去十年中，新的或年轻的企业创造了大量的真实价值，未来还会有更多。但是，任何在其生命周期内亏损的企业都会破坏价值，而不是创造价值，无论其临时估值有多高。

What actually occurs in these cases is wealth transfer, often on a massive scale. By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes, promoters have in recent years moved billions of dollars from the pockets of the public to their own purses (and to those of their friends and associates). The fact is that a bubble market has allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities designed more with an eye to making money off investors rather than for them. Too often, an IPO, not profits, was the primary goal of a company's promoters. At bottom, the "business model" for these companies has been the old-fashioned chain letter, for which many fee-hungry investment bankers acted as eager postmen.

这些案例中实际发生的是财富转移，通常是大规模的。通过无耻地推销没有鸟的灌木丛，推动者在近年来将数十亿美元从公众的口袋转移到了他们自己的钱包里（以及他们的朋友和同伙的钱包里）。事实是，泡沫市场允许了泡沫公司的创建，这些实体更多地是为了从投资者身上赚钱，而不是为他们赚钱。通常情况下，首次公开募股而非利润是公司推动者的主要目标。从根本上说，这些公司的“商业模式”就是老式的连锁信，而许多渴望收费的投资银行家充当了热心的邮递员。

But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street — a community in which quality control is not prized — will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest.

但每个泡沫都有一根针在等着。当两者最终相遇时，新一波投资者会学到一些非常古老的教训：第一，华尔街的许多人——一个不重视质量控制的群体——会向投资者出售任何他们愿意购买的东西。第二，投机在最容易的时候最危险。

At Berkshire, we make no attempt to pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises. We're not smart enough to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Aesop's 2,600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a formulation that my grandsons would probably update to "A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook."). Obviously, we can never precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a business or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our estimates conservative and to focus on industries where business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we make many mistakes: I'm the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the future economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier department stores.

在伯克希尔，我们不会试图从大量未经证实的企业中挑选出少数赢家。我们不够聪明，做不到这一点，我们也知道这一点。相反，我们试图将伊索2600年前的公式应用于那些我们对灌木丛中有多少只鸟以及它们何时出现有合理信心的机会（我的孙子们可能会将这个公式更新为“一个开敞篷车的女孩顶得上电话簿里的五个”）。显然，我们永远无法精确预测进出企业的现金流的时间或确切金额。因此，我们努力保持估计的保守性，并专注于那些业务意外不太可能对所有者造成严重破坏的行业。即便如此，我们也会犯很多错误：记住，我就是那个以为自己了解 trading stamps、纺织品、鞋子和二线百货商店未来经济的人。

Lately, the most promising "bushes" have been negotiated transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us. You should clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions will at best provide us only reasonable returns. Really juicy results from negotiated deals can be anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained and the whole business world is pessimistic. We are 180 degrees from that point.

最近，最有希望的“灌木丛”是对整个企业的谈判交易，这让我们高兴。然而，你应该清楚地理解，这些收购充其量只能为我们提供合理的回报。只有在资本市场受到严重限制且整个商业界悲观时，才能预期谈判交易带来真正丰厚的成果。我们离那个点还有180度。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 65, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此报告中，购买会计调整未分配到适用的具体业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这种程序让你可以看到如果我们没有购买这些业务，它们本会报告的收益情况。出于第65页讨论的原因，我们认为这种报告形式比使用公认会计原则（要求逐项业务摊销购买溢价）对投资者和经理人更有用。当然，表中显示的总净收益与我们的经审计财务报表中的公认会计原则总额相同。

Most of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses did at least reasonably well last year.

我们的大部分制造、零售和服务业务去年至少表现合理。

The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter. In our shoe businesses generally, our attempt to keep the bulk of our production in domestic factories has cost us dearly. We face another very tough year in 2001 also, as we make significant changes in how we do business.

例外是鞋业，尤其是Dexter。总的来说，在我们的鞋业业务中，我们试图将大部分生产留在国内工厂的尝试让我们付出了高昂的代价。我们在2001年也将面临另一个非常艰难的一年，因为我们正在对经营方式进行重大改变。

I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter in 1993. Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using Berkshire shares in payment. Last year, to recognize my error, we charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was attributable to the Dexter transaction. We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the future, but we clearly have none at present.

我显然犯了一个错误，在1993年为我为Dexter支付的价格。此外，我通过使用伯克希尔股票支付，极大地放大了这个错误。去年，为了承认我的错误，我们将与Dexter交易相关的所有剩余会计商誉全部减记。未来我们可能会在Dexter重获一些经济商誉，但我们目前显然没有。

The managers of our shoe businesses are first-class from both a business and human perspective. They are working very hard at a tough — and often terribly painful — job, even though their personal financial circumstances don't require them to do so. They have my admiration and thanks.

我们的鞋业业务经理人从商业和人性的角度来看都是一流的。他们正在一项艰难——通常是极其痛苦——的工作上努力工作，即使他们个人的财务状况并不要求他们这样做。我钦佩并感谢他们。

On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed leader in two branches of Aircraft Services — pilot training at FlightSafety (FSI) and fractional ownership of business jets at Executive Jet (EJA). Both companies are run by their remarkable founders.

在一个更愉快的方面，我们仍然是飞机服务两个分支无可争议的领导者——飞安国际的飞行员培训和Executive Jet的公务机分时所有权。两家公司都由其杰出的创始人经营。

Al Ueltschi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full throttle. Though I am not a fan of stock splits, I am planning to split Al's age 2-for-1 when he hits 100. (If it works, guess who's next.)

飞安国际的阿尔·乌尔奇现在83岁，仍然全速运转。虽然我不喜欢股票分割，但我正计划在他100岁时将他的年龄2比1分割。（如果奏效，猜猜下一个是谁。）

We spent $272 million on flight simulators in 2000, and we'll spend a similar amount this year. Anyone who thinks that the annual charges for depreciation don't reflect a real cost — every bit as real as payroll or raw materials — should get an internship at a simulator company. Every year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge simply to stay in the same economic place — and then spend additional sums to grow. And growth is in prospect for FSI as far as the eye can see.

我们在2000年花费了2.72亿美元购买飞行模拟器，今年将花费类似金额。任何认为年度折旧费用不反映真实成本——与工资或原材料一样真实——的人都应该在模拟器公司实习。每年我们花费相当于折旧费用的金额仅仅是为了维持在同等的经济地位——然后再花费额外的资金来增长。而对于飞安国际来说，增长前景一望无际。

Even faster growth awaits EJA (whose fractional-ownership program is called NetJets®). Rich Santulli is the dynamo behind this business.

更快的增长在等待着Executive Jet（其分时所有权项目称为NetJets®）。里奇·桑图利是这项业务背后的动力源。

Last year I told you that EJA's recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000 the growth was 49%. I also told you that this was a low-margin business, in which survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring in developing our business in Europe.

去年我告诉你，Executive Jet来自月度管理费和小时使用费的经常性收入在1999年增长了46%。2000年的增长率为49%。我还告诉你这是一项低利润率的业务，幸存者将寥寥无几。去年Executive Jet的利润率确实很低，部分原因是我们在欧洲开发业务所承担的重大成本。

Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA's spending on safety will be whatever is needed. Obviously, we would follow this policy under any circumstances, but there's some self-interest here as well: I, my wife, my children, my sisters, my 94-year-old aunt, all but one of our directors, and at least nine Berkshire managers regularly fly in the NetJets program. Given that cargo, I applaud Rich's insistence on unusually high amounts of pilot training (an average of 23 days a year). In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so hours a year. Finally, each flies only one model of aircraft, which means our crews do no switching around among planes with different cockpit and flight characteristics.

不管成本如何，你可以放心，Executive Jet在安全方面的支出将是必需的。显然，我们在任何情况下都会遵循这一政策，但这里也有一些自身利益：我、我的妻子、我的孩子、我的姐妹、我94岁的姑妈、我们除一人外的所有董事，以及至少九位伯克希尔经理人经常乘坐NetJets的飞机。考虑到这些“货物”，我赞赏里奇坚持异常高的飞行员培训（平均每年23天）。此外，我们的飞行员通过每年飞行约800小时来巩固他们的技能。最后，每位飞行员只飞一种型号的飞机，这意味着我们的机组人员不会在不同驾驶舱和飞行特性的飞机之间切换。

EJA's business continues to be constrained by the availability of new aircraft. Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new jets in 2001, 7% of world output. We are confident we will remain the world leader in fractional ownership, in respect to number of planes flying, quality of service, and standards of safety.

Executive Jet的业务继续受到新飞机可用性的限制。尽管如此，我们的客户将在2001年接收超过50架新喷气机，占全球产量的7%。我们相信，在飞行飞机数量、服务质量和安全标准方面，我们将继续保持分时所有权领域的世界领先地位。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 42-58, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 67-73, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

关于我们各项业务的更多信息在第42-58页给出，在那里你也会找到按公认会计原则报告的业务分部收益。此外，在第67-73页，我们以非公认会计原则基础将伯克希尔的财务数据重新排列为四个部分，这种呈现方式与查理和我的思维方式相符。

Look-Through Earnings

穿透收益

Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table on page 15 include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported on page 15; plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.

报告收益是衡量伯克希尔经济进展的不充分指标，部分原因在于第15页表格中显示的数字只包括我们从被投资方收到的股息——尽管这些股息通常只占我们所有权应占收益的一小部分。然而，为了描绘比报告收益更接近伯克希尔经济现实的情况，我们采用了“穿透收益”的概念。我们计算这些收益时包括：（1）第15页报告的营业收益；加上（2）我们在主要被投资方留存营业收益中的份额，这些收益根据GAAP会计不反映在我们的利润中，减去；（3）如果这些被投资方的留存收益分配给我们，伯克希尔将支付的税款准备金。在编制这里的“营业收益”时，我们排除了购买会计调整以及资本利得和其他主要的非经常性项目。

The following table sets forth our 2000 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 15, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表列出了我们2000年的穿透收益，但我警告你，这些数字只能是近似值，因为它们基于许多判断。（这些被投资方支付给我们的股息已包含在第15页详细列出的营业收益中，主要是在“保险集团：净投资收益”项下。）

(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on most dividends it receives

(1) 不包括可分配给少数股东权益的股份
(2) 按年度平均持股计算
(3) 使用的税率为14%，这是伯克希尔对收到的大部分股息支付的税率

Full and Fair Reporting

充分与公平的报告

At Berkshire, full reporting means giving you the information that we would wish you to give to us if our positions were reversed. What Charlie and I would want under that circumstance would be all the important facts about current operations as well as the CEO's frank view of the long-term economic characteristics of the business. We would expect both a lot of financial details and a discussion of any significant data we would need to interpret what was presented.

在伯克希尔，充分报告意味着提供如果我们的位置互换我们希望你们提供給我们的信息。在这种情况下，查理和我希望得到的是关于当前运营的所有重要事实，以及首席执行官对企业长期经济特征的坦率看法。我们期望看到大量的财务细节，以及对任何需要解释所呈现内容的重大数据的讨论。

When Charlie and I read reports, we have no interest in pictures of personnel, plants or products. References to EBITDA make us shudder — does management think the tooth fairy pays for capital expenditures? We're very suspicious of accounting methodology that is vague or unclear, since too often that means management wishes to hide something. And we don't want to read messages that a public relations department or consultant has turned out. Instead, we expect a company's CEO to explain in his or her own words what's happening.

当查理和我阅读报告时，我们对人员、工厂或产品的图片不感兴趣。提到EBITDA让我们不寒而栗——管理层是否认为牙仙会支付资本支出？我们对模糊或不清晰的会计方法非常怀疑，因为这通常意味着管理层想要隐瞒什么。而且我们不想阅读公共关系部门或顾问编写的消息。相反，我们期望公司的CEO用自己的话解释正在发生的事情。

For us, fair reporting means getting information to our 300,000 "partners" simultaneously, or as close to that mark as possible. We therefore put our annual and quarterly financials on the Internet between the close of the market on a Friday and the following morning. By our doing that, shareholders and other interested investors have timely access to these important releases and also have a reasonable amount of time to digest the information they include before the markets open on Monday. This year our quarterly information will be available on the Saturdays of May 12, August 11, and November 10. The 2001 annual report will be posted on March 9.

对我们来说，公平报告意味着同时（或尽可能接近同时）将信息传达到我们的30万“合伙人”。因此，我们在周五市场收盘后至次日早晨之间将我们的年度和季度财务报告发布在互联网上。通过这样做，股东和其他感兴趣的投资者可以及时访问这些重要的信息发布，并在周一市场开盘前有合理的时间消化其中包含的信息。今年，我们的季度信息将在5月12日、8月11日和11月10日的星期六提供。2001年的年度报告将在3月9日发布。

We applaud the work that Arthur Levitt, Jr., until recently Chairman of the SEC, has done in cracking down on the corporate practice of "selective disclosure" that had spread like cancer in recent years. Indeed, it had become virtually standard practice for major corporations to "guide" analysts or large holders to earnings expectations that were intended either to be on the nose or a tiny bit below what the company truly expected to earn. Through the selectively dispersed hints, winks and nods that companies engaged in, speculatively-minded institutions and advisors were given an information edge over investment-oriented individuals. This was corrupt behavior, unfortunately embraced by both Wall Street and corporate America.

我们赞赏小亚瑟·莱维特（直到最近还是SEC主席）在打击近年来像癌症一样蔓延的“选择性披露”公司行为方面所做的工作。事实上，大公司“引导”分析师或大股东达到正好或略低于公司真实预期收益的盈利预期，几乎已成为标准做法。通过公司参与的选择性分散的暗示、眨眼和点头，投机性机构和顾问获得了相对于投资导向型个人的信息优势。这是腐败行为，不幸的是，华尔街和美国公司都接受了。

Thanks to Chairman Levitt, whose general efforts on behalf of investors were both tireless and effective, corporations are now required to treat all of their owners equally. The fact that this reform came about because of coercion rather than conscience should be a matter of shame for CEOs and their investor relations departments.

感谢莱维特主席，他为投资者所做的总体努力既不懈又有效，现在公司被要求平等对待他们所有的所有者。这一改革是通过强制而非良心实现的，这一事实应该是CEO及其投资者关系部门的耻辱。

One further thought while I'm on my soapbox: Charlie and I think it is both deceptive and dangerous for CEOs to predict growth rates for their companies. They are, of course, frequently egged on to do so by both analysts and their own investor relations departments. They should resist, however, because too often these predictions lead to trouble.

当我站在肥皂箱上时还有一个想法：查理和我认为CEO预测公司增长率既具有欺骗性又危险。当然，他们经常被分析师和他们自己的投资者关系部门怂恿这样做。然而，他们应该抵制，因为这些预测往往会导致麻烦。

It's fine for a CEO to have his own internal goals and, in our view, it's even appropriate for the CEO to publicly express some hopes about the future, if these expectations are accompanied by sensible caveats. But for a major corporation to predict that its per-share earnings will grow over the long term at, say, 15% annually is to court trouble.

CEO有自己的内部目标是可以的，在我们看来，如果这些期望伴随着合理的警告，CEO公开表达一些对未来的希望甚至是合适的。但是，一家大公司预测其每股收益将以例如每年15%的速度长期增长，那是自找麻烦。

That's true because a growth rate of that magnitude can only be maintained by a very small percentage of large businesses. Here's a test: Examine the record of, say, the 200 highest earning companies from 1970 or 1980 and tabulate how many have increased per-share earnings by 15% annually since those dates. You will find that only a handful have. I would wager you a very significant sum that fewer than 10 of the 200 most profitable companies in 2000 will attain 15% annual growth in earnings-per-share over the next 20 years.

这是因为这样的增长率只能由极少数大企业维持。这里有一个测试：检查一下1970年或1980年收入最高的200家公司的记录，并统计自那时以来有多少公司的每股收益每年增长15%。你会发现只有少数公司做到了。我愿意跟你打一个很大的赌：在2000年最赚钱的200家公司中，未来20年每股收益达到15%年增长的公司不会超过10家。

The problem arising from lofty predictions is not just that they spread unwarranted optimism. Even more troublesome is the fact that they corrode CEO behavior. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many instances in which CEOs engaged in uneconomic operating maneuvers so that they could meet earnings targets they had announced. Worse still, after exhausting all that operating acrobatics would do, they sometimes played a wide variety of accounting games to "make the numbers." These accounting shenanigans have a way of snowballing: Once a company moves earnings from one period to another, operating shortfalls that occur thereafter require it to engage in further accounting maneuvers that must be even more "heroic." These can turn fudging into fraud. (More money, it has been noted, has been stolen with the point of a pen than at the point of a gun.)

高远预测带来的问题不仅仅是它们传播了无根据的乐观情绪。更麻烦的是它们腐蚀了CEO的行为。多年来，查理和我观察到许多CEO为了达到他们宣布的盈利目标而从事非经济的运营操作的例子。更糟糕的是，在用尽了所有运营的花招之后，他们有时会玩各种各样的会计游戏来“制造数字”。这些会计上的鬼把戏有一种滚雪球的方式：一旦一家公司将收益从一个时期转移到另一个时期，此后出现的运营短缺就要求其进行更“英勇”的会计操作。这些可能把篡改变成欺诈。（有人指出，用笔尖偷走的钱比用枪口偷走的钱多得多。）

Charlie and I tend to be leery of companies run by CEOs who woo investors with fancy predictions. A few of these managers will prove prophetic — but others will turn out to be congenital optimists, or even charlatans. Unfortunately, it's not easy for investors to know in advance which species they are dealing with.

查理和我倾向于警惕那些用花哨预测吸引投资者的CEO领导的公司。这些经理人中的少数将被证明有先见之明——但其他人将被证明是天生的乐观主义者，甚至是骗子。不幸的是，投资者很难提前知道他们正在与哪一类打交道。

I've warned you in the past that you should not believe everything you read or hear about Berkshire — even when it is published or broadcast by a prestigious news organization. Indeed, erroneous reports are particularly dangerous when they are circulated by highly-respected members of the media, simply because most readers and listeners know these outlets to be generally credible and therefore believe what they say.

我以前警告过你，不要相信你读到或听到的关于伯克希尔的每件事——即使它是由一家有声望的新闻机构发表或广播的。事实上，错误的报道在被备受尊敬的媒体成员传播时尤其危险，仅仅是因为大多数读者和听众知道这些媒体通常是可信的，因此相信他们说的话。

An example is a glaring error about Berkshire's activities that appeared in the December 29 issue of The Wall Street Journal, a generally excellent paper that I have for all of my life found useful. On the front page (and above the fold, as they say) The Journal published a news brief that said, in unequivocal terms, that we were buying bonds of Conseco and Finova. This item directed the reader to the lead story of the Money and Investing section. There, in the second paragraph of the story, The Journal reported, again without any qualification, that Berkshire was buying Conseco and Finova bonds, adding that Berkshire had invested "several hundred million dollars" in each. Only in the 18th paragraph of the story (which by that point had jumped to an inside page) did the paper hedge a bit, saying that our Conseco purchases had been disclosed by "people familiar with the matter."

一个例子是《华尔街日报》12月29日一期中出现的关于伯克希尔活动的一个明显错误，这是一份总体来说很优秀的报纸，我一生都觉得它很有用。在头版（正如他们所说的折页上方），《华尔街日报》刊登了一条新闻简报，明确地说我们正在购买Conseco和Finova的债券。这个条目引导读者阅读“金钱与投资”版的头条新闻。在那里，在新闻的第二段，《华尔街日报》再次没有任何限定地报道说，伯克希尔正在购买Conseco和Finova的债券，并补充说伯克希尔在其中各投资了“数亿美元”。直到新闻的第18段（此时新闻已跳转到内页），该报才有所保留，说我们对Conseco的购买是由“熟悉此事的人”透露的。

Well, not that familiar. True, we had purchased bonds and bank debt of Finova — though the report was wildly inaccurate as to the amount. But to this day neither Berkshire nor I have ever bought a share of stock or a bond of Conseco.

嗯，不是那么熟悉。没错，我们购买了Finova的债券和银行债务——尽管报告中的金额极不准确。但直到今天，伯克希尔和我都没有买过Conseco的一股股票或一份债券。

Berkshire is normally covered by a Journal reporter in Chicago who is both accurate and conscientious. In this case, however, the "scoop" was the product of a New York reporter for the paper. Indeed, the 29th was a busy day for him: By early afternoon, he had repeated the story on CNBC. Immediately, in lemming-like manner, other respected news organizations, relying solely on the Journal, began relating the same "facts." The result: Conseco stock advanced sharply during the day on exceptional volume that placed it ninth on the NYSE most-active list.

伯克希尔通常由《华尔街日报》芝加哥的一位记者报道，他既准确又尽责。然而，在这种情况下，这个“独家新闻”是该报纽约记者炮制的。事实上，29日对他来说是很忙碌的一天：到下午早些时候，他已经在CNBC上重复了这个故事。立即，像旅鼠一样，其他受人尊敬的新闻机构，仅仅依赖《华尔街日报》，开始传播同样的“事实”。结果是：Conseco股价当天大幅上涨，成交量异常，使其在纽约证券交易所最活跃股票名单中排名第九。

During all of the story's iterations, I never heard or read the word "rumor." Apparently reporters and editors, who generally pride themselves on their careful use of language, just can't bring themselves to attach this word to their accounts. But what description would fit more precisely? Certainly not the usual "sources say" or "it has been reported."

在所有关于这个故事的传播中，我从未听到或读到“谣言”这个词。显然，那些通常以谨慎使用语言而自豪的记者和编辑，就是无法将这个词附在他们的报道中。但是什么样的描述会更精确呢？肯定不是通常的“消息人士称”或“据报道”。

A column entitled "Today's Rumors," however, would not equate with the self-image of the many news organizations that think themselves above such stuff. These members of the media would feel that publishing such acknowledged fluff would be akin to L'Osservatore Romano initiating a gossip column. But rumors are what these organizations often publish and broadcast, whatever euphemism they duck behind. At a minimum, readers deserve honest terminology — a warning label that will protect their financial health in the same way that smokers whose physical health is at risk are given a warning.

然而，一个名为“今日谣言”的专栏不会与许多认为自己在这些内容之上的新闻机构的自我形象相符。这些媒体成员会觉得发布这种公认的废话类似于《罗马观察家报》开设八卦专栏。但这些机构经常发布和广播的是谣言，不管他们躲在什么委婉语后面。至少，读者应该得到诚实的术语——一个警告标签，以保护他们的财务健康，就像身体健康的吸烟者得到警告一样。

The Constitution's First Amendment allows the media to print or say almost anything. Journalism's First Principle should require that the media be scrupulous in deciding what that will be.

宪法第一修正案允许媒体印刷或说几乎任何东西。新闻业的第一原则应该要求媒体在决定将是什么时谨慎行事。

Miscellaneous

杂项

In last year's report we examined the battle then raging over the use of "pooling" in accounting for mergers. It seemed to us that both sides were voicing arguments that were strong in certain respects and seriously flawed in others. We are pleased that the Financial Accounting Standards Board has since gone to an alternative approach that strikes us as very sound.

在去年的报告中，我们研究了当时关于在并购会计中使用“权益联营法”的争论。在我们看来，双方都提出了在某些方面有力但在其他方面有严重缺陷的论点。我们感到高兴的是，财务会计准则委员会此后采用了一种我们认为非常合理的替代方法。

If the proposed rule becomes final, we will no longer incur a large annual charge for amortization of intangibles. Consequently, our reported earnings will more closely reflect economic reality. (See page 65.) None of this will have an effect on Berkshire's intrinsic value. Your Chairman, however, will personally benefit in that there will be one less item to explain in these letters.

如果拟议的规则最终确定，我们将不再承担每年大额的无形资产摊销费用。因此，我们报告的收益将更贴近经济现实。（见第65页。）这都不会对伯克希尔的内在价值产生影响。但是，你们的主席将个人受益，因为这些信中将少一项需要解释的内容。

I'm enclosing a report — generously supplied by Outstanding Investor Digest — of Charlie's remarks at last May's Wesco annual meeting. Charlie thinks about business economics and investment matters better than anyone I know, and I've learned a lot over the years by listening to him. Reading his comments will improve your understanding of Berkshire.

我随信附上一份报告——由《杰出投资者文摘》慷慨提供——内容是查理在去年5月Wesco年会上的发言。查理在思考商业经济学和投资问题方面比我认识的任何人都好，多年来我通过倾听他学到了很多东西。阅读他的评论将提高你对伯克希尔的理解。

In 1985, we purchased Scott Fetzer, acquiring not only a fine business but the services of Ralph Schey, a truly outstanding CEO, as well. Ralph was then 61. Most companies, focused on the calendar rather than ability, would have benefited from Ralph's talents for only a few years.

1985年，我们收购了Scott Fetzer，不仅获得了一家优秀的企业，还获得了拉尔夫·谢伊的服务，一位真正出色的CEO。拉尔夫当时61岁。大多数公司，关注的是年龄而不是能力，本来只会从拉尔夫的天赋中受益几年。

At Berkshire, in contrast, Ralph ran Scott Fetzer for 15 years until his retirement at the end of 2000. Under his leadership, the company distributed $1.03 billion to Berkshire against our net purchase price of $230 million. We used these funds, in turn, to purchase other businesses. All told, Ralph's contributions to Berkshire's present value extend well into the billions of dollars.

相比之下，在伯克希尔，拉尔夫经营Scott Fetzer长达15年，直到2000年底退休。在他的领导下，该公司向伯克希尔分配了10.3亿美元，而我们的净购买价格为2.3亿美元。反过来，我们用这些资金购买了其他企业。总的来说，拉尔夫对伯克希尔当前价值的贡献远远超过数十亿美元。

As a manager, Ralph belongs in Berkshire's Hall of Fame, and Charlie and I welcome him to it.

作为一名经理人，拉尔夫属于伯克希尔的名人堂，查理和我欢迎他进入。

A bit of nostalgia: It was exactly 50 years ago that I entered Ben Graham's class at Columbia. During the decade before, I had enjoyed — make that loved — analyzing, buying and selling stocks. But my results were no better than average.

有一点怀旧：正是在50年前，我进入了本·格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学的课堂。在那之前的十年里，我一直享受——说是热爱——分析、买卖股票。但我的结果并不比平均水平好。

Beginning in 1951 my performance improved. No, I hadn't changed my diet or taken up exercise. The only new ingredient was Ben's ideas. Quite simply, a few hours spent at the feet of the master proved far more valuable to me than had ten years of supposedly original thinking.

从1951年开始，我的表现有所改善。不，我没有改变饮食或开始锻炼。唯一的新成分是本的思想。很简单，在导师身边度过的几个小时，被证明比十年的所谓独立思考对我更有价值。

In addition to being a great teacher, Ben was a wonderful friend. My debt to him is incalculable.

除了是一位伟大的老师，本还是一位很好的朋友。我欠他的债是无法计算的。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2000 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 74-75.

约97%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔2000年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐款总额为1,690万美元。该计划的完整描述在第74-75页。

Cumulatively, over the 20 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $164 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $18.3 million in 2000, including in-kind donations of $3 million.

在该计划开展的20年中，伯克希尔根据股东的指示累计捐款1.64亿美元。伯克希尔其余的捐赠由我们的子公司进行，它们坚持被收购前盛行的慈善模式（只是其前所有者自己承担个人慈善的责任）。总的来说，我们的子公司在2000年捐赠了1,830万美元，其中包括300万美元的实物捐赠。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2001 will be ineligible for the 2001 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

要参与未来的计划，你必须拥有以实际所有者名义注册的A类股票，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的名义注册。在2001年8月31日未如此注册的股票将没有资格参加2001年的计划。当你从我们这里收到捐款表格时，请及时寄回，以免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定将不被接受。

The Annual Meeting

年度会议

Last year we moved the annual meeting to the Civic Auditorium, and it worked very well for us. We will meet there again on Saturday, April 28. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food, with sandwiches available at the Civic's concession stands. Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30.

去年我们将年会搬到了市民礼堂，效果很好。我们将在4月28日星期六再次在那里开会。大门将在早上7点打开，电影将在8:30开始，会议本身将在9:30开始。中午有短暂的用餐休息时间，市民礼堂的食品摊位将提供三明治。除那段休息时间外，查理和我将回答问题直到下午3:30。

For the next couple of years, the Civic is our only choice. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare that would occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with ample parking. Assuming that the Center is then available to us, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to a Monday meeting. We will decide that vote based on the wishes of a majority of shareholders, not shares.

在未来几年里，市民礼堂是我们唯一的选择。因此，我们必须周六或周日举行会议，以避免工作日的交通和停车噩梦。然而，不久之后，奥马哈将有一个拥有充足停车位的新会议中心。假设届时我们可以使用该中心，我将对股东进行民意调查，看看你们是否希望回到周一的会议。我们将根据大多数股东的意愿而不是股份数来决定投票结果。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to this year's meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

本报告随附的委托书材料附件解释了如何获得参加今年年会和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次签约美国运通（800-799-6634）为您提供特别帮助。按照我们的惯例，我们将安排巴士从较大的酒店前往会场。会后，巴士将返回酒店以及内布拉斯加家具卖场、博希姆珠宝和机场。即便如此，您可能仍会发现汽车很有用。

We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I'm not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. One new product, however, deserves special note: Bob Shaw has designed a 3 x 5 rug featuring an excellent likeness of Charlie. Obviously, it would be embarrassing for Charlie — make that humiliating — if slow sales forced us to slash the rug's price, so step up and do your part.

今年我们为伯克希尔增加了这么多新公司，我不打算详细列出我们将在会议上销售的所有产品。但请准备好把从砖头到糖果的所有东西都带回家。不过，有一种新产品值得特别关注：鲍勃·肖设计了一张3x5英尺的小地毯，上面有查理的精美肖像。显然，如果销售缓慢迫使我们降价，对查理来说将是尴尬的——甚至是羞辱的——所以请行动起来，尽你的一份力。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder's discount (usually 8%). Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you some money.

盖可将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的许多顶级顾问提供服务，他们都准备好为您提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，盖可能够为您提供特别的股东折扣（通常为8%）。带上您现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮您省钱。

At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from Executive Jet available for your inspection. Just ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home.

星期六在奥马哈机场，我们将提供往常一样的一系列Executive Jet飞机供您参观。只需向市民礼堂的EJA代表询问观看这些飞机的事宜。如果您在周末购买了我们认为数量合适的物品，您很可能需要自己的飞机把它们带回家。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having "Berkshire Weekend" pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM four years ago and sales during the "Weekend" grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $9.1 million in 2000.

在位于道奇街和太平洋街之间第72街占地75英亩的内布拉斯加家具卖场，我们将再次提供“伯克希尔周末”定价，这意味着我们将为股东提供通常只给员工的折扣。我们四年前在NFM启动了这项特别定价活动，“周末”期间的销售额从1997年的530万美元增长到2000年的910万美元。

To get the discount, you must make your purchases between Wednesday, April 25 and Monday, April 30 and also present your meeting credential. The period's special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestige manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.

要获得折扣，您必须在4月25日星期三至4月30日星期一期间购物，并出示您的会议凭证。该期间的特价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有反对打折的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为您破例。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 周一至周五上午10点至晚上9点开放，周六和周日上午10点至下午6点开放。

Borsheim's — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany's Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 27. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, April 29. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim's operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that's what my family always tells me).

博希姆珠宝——除蒂芙尼曼哈顿店外全国最大的珠宝店——将举办两场股东专属活动。第一场是4月27日星期五晚上6点到10点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是主要盛会，将于4月29日星期日上午9点至下午5点举行。股东价格将从周四到周一有效，因此如果您想避开周五晚上和周日的拥挤人群，可以在其他时间光临并表明您的股东身份。周六，我们将营业至下午6点。博希姆珠宝的毛利率比其主要竞争对手低整整20个百分点，所以您买得越多，省得越多（至少我的家人总是这么告诉我的）。

In the mall outside of Borsheim's, we will have local bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. Bob Hamman, who normally is with us, will be in Africa this year. He has promised, however, to be on hand in 2002. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and demolished his opponents.

在博希姆珠宝外的商场里，我们将在周日安排当地桥牌专家与我们的股东一起打牌。通常与我们在一起的鲍勃·哈曼今年将在非洲。不过，他已承诺在2002年出席。两次美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫也将在商场里，蒙着眼睛接受所有挑战者的挑战！去年，帕特里克在蒙着眼罩的情况下，同时下了多达六盘棋，并击败了他的对手。

As if all this isn't enough to test your skills, our Borsheim's Olympiad this year will also include Bill Robertie, one of only two players to twice win the backgammon world championship. Backgammon can be a big money game, so bring along your stock certificates.

好像这些还不够测试你的技能，我们今年的博希姆奥林匹克运动会还将包括比尔·罗伯蒂，仅有的两位两次赢得西洋双陆棋世界冠军的选手之一。西洋双陆棋可能是一场大赌注的游戏，所以带上你的股票证书。

Gorat's — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 29, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that you can't come to Gorat's on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 2 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat's on one of the other evenings you will be in town. If you order a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns, you will establish your credentials as an epicure.

戈拉特牛排馆——我最喜欢的牛排餐厅——将于4月29日星期日再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间为下午4点至晚上10点。请记住，周日去戈拉特必须预订。预订请于4月2日（但不能提前）致电402-551-3733。如果周日售罄，请在您在该市的其他晚上尝试戈拉特。如果您点一份三分熟的T骨牛排和双份土豆煎饼，您将确立您作为美食家的资格。

The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the New Orleans Zephyrs. Ernie Banks is again going to be on hand to — bravely — face my fastball (once clocked at 95 mpm — miles per month).

周六晚上7点，在罗森布拉特体育场将举行例行的棒球比赛。今年奥马哈金刺队将对阵新奥尔良和风队。厄尼·班克斯将再次到场——勇敢地——面对我的快球（曾测速为95英里每月）。

My performance last year was not my best: It took me five pitches to throw anything resembling a strike. And, believe me, it gets lonely on the mound when you can't find the plate. Finally, I got one over, and Ernie lashed a line drive to left field. After I was yanked from the game, the many sports writers present asked what I had served up to Ernie. I quoted what Warren Spahn said after Willie Mays hit one of his pitches for a home run (Willie's first in the majors): "It was a helluva pitch for the first sixty feet."

我去年的表现不是最好的：我投了五球才投出任何像好球的东西。而且，相信我，当你找不到好球带时，投手丘上是很孤独的。最后，我投了一个好球，厄尼猛击出一记左外野平飞球。我被迫退场后，在场的许多体育记者问我给厄尼投了什么球。我引用了沃伦·斯潘在威利·梅斯将他投的一个球击出本垒打（威利在大联盟的第一个本垒打）后说的话：“在前六十英尺，那是一个很棒的球。”

It will be a different story this year. I don't want to tip my hand, so let's just say Ernie will have to deal with a pitch he has never seen before.

今年的故事将会不同。我不想透露我的底牌，所以我们只说厄尼将不得不面对一个他从未见过的球。

Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.

我们的委托书包含获取比赛门票的说明以及大量其他信息，应该有助于您享受在奥马哈的访问。城里会有很多活动。所以来参加伍德斯托克周末吧，在市民礼堂加入我们的资本主义庆典。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2001

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
2001年2月28日