2005 年致股东信

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter.

注：下表在印刷版年报中刊登于董事长信的对页。

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔公司表现与标普 500 指数对比

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value equity securities at market rather than at the lower of cost or market. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas Berkshire numbers are after-tax.

注：数据按日历年度列示，但 1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度，1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。自 1979 年起，会计规则要求保险公司按市值计量其持有的权益证券，而不是此前要求的成本与市价孰低法。标普 500 数据为税前，伯克希尔数据为税后。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 41 years, book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：2005 年我们的净资产增加了 56 亿美元，使 A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值均增长 6.4%。过去 41 年，也就是现任管理层接手以来，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 59,377 美元，年复合增长率为 21.5%。

Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions, two of which had yet to close, and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses, and Berkshire estimated its loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion, while Rita and Wilma cost an additional $.9 billion.

伯克希尔 2005 年过得还不错。我们启动了五项收购，其中两项尚未完成；大多数经营子公司表现良好。卡特里娜飓风给伯克希尔和整个行业造成了创纪录损失，我们估计卡特里娜带来的损失为 25 亿美元，而丽塔和威尔玛又额外造成 9 亿美元损失。

Credit GEICO and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely, for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. In just two years, GEICO improved productivity by 32%; employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26%.

在这个灾害频仍的年份，保险业务仍取得出色结果，要归功于 GEICO 及其卓越的 CEO Tony Nicely。短短两年，GEICO 的生产率提升了 32%；保单数量增长 26%，员工人数却下降了 4%。

My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is all-important, but necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. Berkshire's stable earnings streams, great liquidity and minimum debt make its intrinsic value more precisely calculable than that of most companies.

我写这份报告的目标，是向你们提供估算伯克希尔内在价值所需的信息。内在价值至关重要，但其计算必然不精确，而且经常会严重出错。伯克希尔拥有多样且相对稳定的收益来源、充裕流动性和极低债务，因此它的内在价值比大多数公司更容易较准确地估算。

Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics, plus massive investment holdings.

回到 1965 年，当时我们只拥有一家小型纺织业务，计算内在价值很简单。如今我们拥有 68 家彼此差异很大的企业，并持有规模巨大的投资组合。

We have clustered our businesses into four logical groups. The value of Berkshire may be greater or less than the sum of these parts, depending on whether our units function better or worse as part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves under a holding company.

我们把业务归入四个逻辑板块。伯克希尔的价值可能高于或低于这些部分之和，取决于各业务作为大型企业一部分时运行得更好还是更差，也取决于在控股公司架构下资本配置是否改善。

Before reviewing the businesses, we show two sets of figures: per-share investments, including cash and cash equivalents, excluding finance-operation investments that are largely offset by borrowings.

在讨论各项业务前，我们先列示两组数据：第一组是每股投资额，包括现金及现金等价物，但不包括金融业务中的投资，因为这些投资大多由借款抵消。

Per-Share Investments

每股投资额

*Net of minority interests.

*扣除少数股东权益后。

Pre-tax earnings of non-insurance businesses, excluding goodwill amortization, again on a per-share basis.

非保险业务税前收益，不含商誉摊销，同样按每股列示。

*Pre-tax and net of minority interests.

*税前并扣除少数股东权益后。

When growth rates are discussed, be suspicious about why beginning and terminal years were selected. In the table above, however, 1965 was abnormally good, not abnormally poor.

讨论增长率时，应当警惕为什么选择某个起点和终点年份。不过，上表中的 1965 年并非异常低迷，反而是异常出色的一年。

Acquisitions: Over time, our current businesses should deliver modest growth in operating earnings, but they will not by themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We need major acquisitions to do that.

收购：长期看，我们现有业务整体上应能带来适度的经营收益增长，但仅靠它们并不能产生真正令人满意的增幅。要实现这一点，我们需要重大收购。

In 2005 we agreed to five purchases: Medical Protective Company, Forest River, Business Wire, 81% of Applied Underwriters, and PacifiCorp through MidAmerican Energy. None involved issuing Berkshire shares, a crucial point because stock acquisitions simultaneously sell part of shareholders' interest in everything they own.

2005 年我们同意进行五项收购：Medical Protective Company、Forest River、Business Wire、Applied Underwriters 81% 股权，以及通过 MidAmerican Energy 收购 PacifiCorp。这些交易均未发行伯克希尔股票，这一点很关键，因为以股票收购相当于同时出售股东在现有所有业务中的一部分权益。

MedPro is a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is difficult, but MedPro should benefit from Berkshire's underwriting discipline, financial strength and CEO Tim Kenesey.

MedPro 是一家总部位于韦恩堡、已有 106 年历史的医疗事故责任保险公司。医疗事故保险很难承保，但 MedPro 将受益于伯克希尔的承保纪律、财务实力以及 CEO Tim Kenesey。

Forest River closed on August 31. Warren Buffett first learned of the company through a two-page fax from Pete Liegl. Forest River had $1.6 billion of sales, 60 plants and 5,400 employees, and had consistently gained share in recreational vehicles while expanding into boats and other areas.

Forest River 于 8 月 31 日完成收购。沃伦·巴菲特最初是通过 Pete Liegl 发来的两页传真了解到这家公司。Forest River 销售额为 16 亿美元，拥有 60 家工厂和 5,400 名员工，在休闲车业务中持续提升份额，并扩展到船艇等领域。

Business Wire came to Berkshire after Cathy Baron Tamraz read a Wall Street Journal article about Berkshire's acquisition and managerial practices. Buffett liked the company's tight operation and willingness to invest big dollars for technological advantage.

Cathy Baron Tamraz 阅读《华尔街日报》关于伯克希尔独特收购和管理方式的文章后，将 Business Wire 介绍给伯克希尔。巴菲特欣赏这家公司精简运营，同时愿意为技术优势投入大笔资金。

Applied Underwriters offers payroll services and workers' compensation insurance to small businesses. Its founders Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies built the company from a shoestring, and Berkshire was pleased that they retained 19%.

Applied Underwriters 为小企业提供薪资服务和工伤赔偿保险。创始人 Sid Ferenc 和 Steve Menzies 白手起家建立了这家公司，伯克希尔也很高兴他们保留 19% 股权。

MidAmerican agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. Berkshire would buy $3.4 billion of MidAmerican common stock, supplemented by $1.7 billion of borrowing by MidAmerican.

MidAmerican 同意收购 PacifiCorp，这是一家服务美国西部六州的大型电力公用事业公司。伯克希尔将购买 MidAmerican 34 亿美元普通股，MidAmerican 另以 17 亿美元借款补足资金。

Insurance is Berkshire's core business. What counts is the amount of float and its cost over time. Float is money that does not belong to Berkshire but is temporarily held by it.

保险是伯克希尔的核心业务。关键在于浮存金的规模及其长期成本。浮存金并不属于伯克希尔，但由伯克希尔临时持有。

Float arises because premiums are paid upfront while insurance protection is delivered over time, and because loss events may take years to be reported, negotiated and settled. Berkshire's float has grown from $20 million in 1967 to $49 billion.

浮存金的形成，一是因为保费预先支付，而保险保障在之后一段时间内提供；二是因为损失事件可能需要多年才会报告、协商并结案。伯克希尔的浮存金从 1967 年的 2,000 万美元增长到 490 亿美元。

Float is wonderful if it does not come at a high price. In years when Berkshire earns an underwriting profit, float is better than free: Berkshire is paid for holding other people's money.

如果成本不高，浮存金非常美妙。在伯克希尔取得承保利润的年份，浮存金比免费还好：我们实际上是因持有别人的钱而获得报酬。

Underwriting and Float by Insurance Sector

按保险板块列示的承保与浮存金

(in $ millions). *Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.

（单位：百万美元）。*包括自 2005 年 6 月 30 日起的 MedPro。

GEICO's auto policies in force grew 12.1%, increasing its U.S. private passenger auto market share from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Berkshire's advertising spending at GEICO rose from $31 million when it acquired control in 1996 to $502 million in 2005.

GEICO 有效汽车保单增长 12.1%，美国私人乘用车保险市场份额从约 5.6% 提升到约 6.1%。伯克希尔 1996 年取得 GEICO 控制权时，其年度广告支出为 3,100 万美元，2005 年已增至 5.02 亿美元。

General Re and National Indemnity both performed well considering the extraordinary hurricane losses. Buffett, Joe Brandon, Tad Montross and Ajit Jain did not know whether storm patterns had permanently changed, so they chose caution in pricing and aggregate exposure.

考虑到异常严重的飓风损失，General Re 和 National Indemnity 表现良好。巴菲特、Joe Brandon、Tad Montross 和 Ajit Jain 并不知道风暴模式是否已发生永久变化，因此在定价和总风险敞口上选择谨慎。

Regulated Utility Business: Berkshire had an 80.5% fully diluted interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings. Its operations included U.K. utilities, MidAmerican Energy in Iowa, Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, and soon PacifiCorp.

受监管公用事业业务：伯克希尔按完全稀释口径持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 80.5% 权益。其业务包括英国公用事业、爱荷华州 MidAmerican Energy、Kern River 和 Northern Natural 管道，以及即将纳入的 PacifiCorp。

MidAmerican Key Figures

MidAmerican 关键数据

*Includes interest earned by Berkshire, net of related income taxes.

*包括伯克希尔取得的利息，扣除相关所得税后。

Finance and Financial Products: Clayton Homes, run by Kevin Clayton, was the star. Industry sales were at 40-year lows, but Clayton bought and serviced manufactured-housing loans that others found unprofitable and difficult.

金融及金融产品：由 Kevin Clayton 管理的 Clayton Homes 是明星业务。行业销量处于 40 年低点，但 Clayton 收购并服务了其他机构认为无利可图且难以管理的活动房屋贷款。

Derivatives remained painful. Berkshire lost $104 million pre-tax in 2005 while attempting to exit Gen Re's derivative operation, bringing aggregate losses since beginning the exit to $404 million.

衍生品业务仍令人痛苦。伯克希尔在 2005 年继续退出 Gen Re 衍生品业务的过程中税前亏损 1.04 亿美元，自开始退出以来累计亏损达到 4.04 亿美元。

Buffett says he failed by not moving immediately to close Gen Re's trading operation. When a problem exists, whether in personnel or business operations, the time to act is now.

巴菲特说，他没有立即关闭 Gen Re 的交易业务，这是自己的失败。无论是人员问题还是经营问题，一旦问题存在，行动的时间就是现在。

Finance and Financial Products Results

金融及金融产品业绩

*Includes all liabilities.

*包括所有负债。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations covered businesses ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s. They earned 22.2% on average tangible net worth, with only minor financial leverage.

制造、服务和零售业务覆盖从 Dilly Bars 到波音 737 部分权益的各类产品和服务。该组业务在平均有形净资产上取得 22.2% 回报，且只使用了少量财务杠杆。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Pre-Tax Earnings

制造、服务和零售税前收益

Every day, the competitive position of each business grows either weaker or stronger. Delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs and improving products and services widens the moat; indifference and bloat make businesses wither.

每一天，每项业务的竞争地位不是变弱就是变强。取悦客户、消除不必要成本、改进产品和服务，会拓宽护城河；冷漠对待客户和容忍臃肿，则会让业务枯萎。

Investments: Berkshire listed common stocks with market value above $700 million at year-end 2005.

投资：伯克希尔列示了 2005 年末市值超过 7 亿美元的普通股投资。

Common Stock Investments at 12/31/05

2005 年 12 月 31 日普通股投资

*Actual purchase price and tax basis; GAAP cost differs in a few cases.

*实际购买价格和税务成本；若干项目的 GAAP 成本因会计调整而不同。

The P&G-Gillette merger required Berkshire to record a $5.0 billion pre-tax capital gain, but Buffett says this GAAP entry was economically meaningless because Berkshire did not intend to sell Gillette before the merger, did not intend to sell P&G afterward, and incurred no tax in the transaction.

宝洁与吉列的合并要求伯克希尔确认 50 亿美元税前资本利得，但巴菲特认为这项 GAAP 账面记录在经济意义上无关紧要，因为伯克希尔合并前无意出售吉列，合并后也无意出售宝洁，并且交易中没有产生税负。

Buffett criticizes executive compensation that is out of line with performance. Fixed-price options can richly reward mediocre CEOs simply for retaining earnings or repurchasing shares, even if the business itself does not improve.

巴菲特批评与业绩不匹配的高管薪酬。固定行权价期权可能让平庸 CEO 仅凭留存收益或回购股票就获得巨额回报，即使企业本身毫无进步。

On trade imbalances, Buffett's views remained unchanged, but his conviction cost Berkshire $955 million pre-tax in 2005. Direct currency positions are marked to market daily, unlike many long-term stock holdings.

关于贸易失衡，巴菲特的观点没有改变，但这一判断在 2005 年让伯克希尔产生 9.55 亿美元税前损失。直接货币头寸每日按市值计价，不同于许多长期股票持仓。

How to Minimize Investment Returns: Buffett explains that owners in aggregate can only earn what their businesses earn, less frictional costs. Brokers, managers, consultants and hedge-fund-style helpers can consume a record portion of returns.

如何最小化投资回报：巴菲特解释说，所有股东整体上最多只能赚到企业整体赚到的钱，还要扣除摩擦成本。经纪人、基金经理、顾问以及对冲基金式的“帮手”会吞噬创纪录比例的回报。

Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion but lost money in the South Sea Bubble. Buffett's Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.

牛顿爵士给了我们三大运动定律，却在南海泡沫中亏了大钱。巴菲特提出“第四运动定律”：对投资者整体而言，行动越多，回报越低。

Debt and Risk: Berkshire shuns significant debt except for short-term repos involving highly liquid government securities, borrowing against understandable receivables, and MidAmerican debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire.

债务与风险：伯克希尔回避重大债务，例外包括以高流动性政府证券为基础的短期回购、以可理解的应收款组合为抵押的借款，以及 MidAmerican 自身承担且不由伯克希尔担保的债务。

Berkshire is willing to accept huge insurance and investment risks, but it maintains the net worth, earnings streams and liquidity to handle problems with ease. A long string of impressive numbers multiplied by a single zero always equals zero.

伯克希尔愿意承担巨大的保险和投资风险，但它保持足够净资产、收益来源和流动性，以便从容应对问题。一长串漂亮数字只要乘以一个零，结果永远是零。

Management Succession: Berkshire had three managers reasonably young and fully capable of being CEO. The board had fully discussed the candidates and unanimously agreed on the person who should succeed Buffett if a replacement were needed immediately.

管理层继任：伯克希尔有三位相对年轻、完全有能力担任 CEO 的管理者。董事会已经充分讨论这些候选人，并一致同意如果当下需要接任，应由谁接替巴菲特。

Buffett also addresses the harder question of whether the board would act if his abilities declined but he failed to recognize it. He says the board's financial interests are unusually aligned with shareholders, and it will do what is right.

巴菲特还谈到一个更难的问题：如果他的能力下降而自己没有意识到，董事会是否会采取行动。他说，董事会成员的财务利益与股东高度一致，他们会做正确的事。

The Annual Meeting in 2006 would be held Saturday, May 6 at the Qwest Center. Doors would open at 7 a.m., the movie would begin at 8:30, the question-and-answer period at 9:30, and the formal meeting at 3:15.

2006 年年会将于 5 月 6 日星期六在 Qwest Center 举行。大门早上 7 点开放，影片 8:30 播放，问答环节 9:30 开始，正式会议 3:15 召开。

The meeting would feature Berkshire subsidiary products, two Clayton homes, Forest River RVs, GEICO quotes, NetJets aircraft, Bookworm books, Nebraska Furniture Mart pricing, Borsheim's shareholder events, bridge and chess, and Gorat's for shareholders.

年会将展示伯克希尔子公司的产品，包括两套 Clayton 房屋、Forest River 房车、GEICO 报价、NetJets 飞机、Bookworm 书籍、Nebraska Furniture Mart 特价、Borsheim's 股东活动、桥牌和国际象棋，以及面向股东开放的 Gorat's 餐厅。

Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America, had terrific parents, wonderful families and great health, and came equipped with a business gene that lets us prosper disproportionately. No wonder we tap-dance to work.

查理和我极其幸运。我们出生在美国，有很棒的父母、美好的家庭和健康的身体，还天生带着让我们能以不成比例方式获得成功的“商业基因”。难怪我们跳着踢踏舞去上班。

Nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire's annual meeting. So join us on May 6th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We'll see you there. February 28, 2006. Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board.

对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔年会上与股东伙伴相聚更有趣。因此，请在 5 月 6 日来到 Qwest，参加我们一年一度的“资本家的伍德斯托克”。我们到时见。2006 年 2 月 28 日。沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事会主席。