1966年1月20日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

January 20, 1966

巴菲特合伙有限公司
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特大厦810号
1966年1月20日

OUR PERFORMANCE IN 1965

1965年的业绩表现

Our War on Poverty was successful in 1965. Specially, we were $12,304,060 less poor at the end of the year.

1965年，我们的“向贫穷开战”取得了成功。具体来说，年末我们的贫穷程度减少了12,304,060美元。

Last year under a section in the annual letter entitled “Our Goal” (please particularly note it was not headed "Our Promise"), I stated we were trying to achieve “… An average advantage (relative to the Dow) of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks.”

在去年的年度信中，有一个章节名为“我们的目标”（请注意，标题不是“我们的承诺”），我在其中表示，我们试图实现“……在向普通合伙人分配之前，BPL相对于道指的年平均优势达到十个百分点，但年度之间的波动幅度很大：在行情不好的年份可能比道指差十个百分点，而在一切顺利的年份可能比道指好25个百分点。”

My fallibility as a forecaster was quickly demonstrated when the first year fell outside my parameters. We achieved our widest margin over the Dow in the history of BPL with an overall gain of 47.2% compared to an overall gain (including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Dow) of 14.2% for the Dow. Naturally, no writer likes to be publicly humiliated by such a mistake. It is unlikely to be repeated.

我作为预言家的不可靠性很快就得到了证明，因为第一年就超出了我设定的参数。我们取得了BPL历史上相对于道指的最大优势：整体收益47.2%，而道指的整体收益（包括通过持有道指成分股本应收到的股息）为14.2%。当然，没有作者喜欢因为这种错误而公开出丑。这种情况不太可能重演。

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(1) 基于道指当年价值变动加上持有道指成分股本应收到的股息。该表包含合伙基金自成立以来所有完整的运营年度。
(2) 1957-61年为所有前身有限合伙基金在整个年度内的合并结果，已扣除所有费用，但未对合伙人进行分配，也未提取普通合伙人报酬。
(3) 1957-61年的计算基于前一列合伙基金结果，并按照当前的合伙协议提扣普通合伙人报酬，但未扣除有限合伙人的每月提款。

After last year the question naturally arises, "What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.

去年的业绩之后，自然会出现一个问题：“我们接着该怎么做？”我们这个行业的一个缺点是，它并不具备明显的持续性。如果通用汽车在1965年占据了国内新车注册量的54%，那么由于车主忠诚度、经销商能力、生产能力、消费者形象等因素，几乎可以肯定它在1966年也会接近这一数字。但BPL并非如此。每年我们都从零开始，发令枪响时，所有资产都按市价估值。无论是新合伙人还是老合伙人，他们在1966年能从1964年和1965年的努力中受益的程度非常有限。过去方法和思想的成功，并不能传递到未来的机会上。

I continue to hope, on a longer-range basis, for the sort of achievement outlined in the "Our Goal" section of last year's letter (copies still available). However, those who believe 1965 results can be achieved with any frequency are probably attending weekly meetings of the Halley’s Comet Observers Club. We are going to have loss years and are going to have years inferior to the Dow - no doubt about it. But I continue to believe we can achieve average performance superior to the Dow in the future. If my expectation regarding this should change, you will hear immediately.

从长期来看，我仍然期待达到去年信中“我们的目标”一节所描述的那种成就（复印件仍可提供）。不过，那些认为1965年的业绩能够经常实现的人，大概是在定期参加哈雷彗星观察者俱乐部的每周聚会吧。毫无疑问，我们将来会有亏损的年份，也会有跑输道指的年份。但我仍然相信，我们未来能够实现优于道指的平均业绩。如果我的这一预期发生改变，你们会立即得到通知。

INVESTMENT COMPANIES

投资公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95% - 100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp. manage over $5 billion, are owned by about 600,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $35 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行比较，这些公司通常将95%-100%的资产投资于普通股。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托（Massachusetts Investors Trust）、投资者股票基金（Investors Stock Fund）、Tri-Continental公司和Lehman公司——管理着超过50亿美元的资产，拥有约60万股东，很可能代表了整个350亿美元投资公司行业中的大多数。我认为，它们的业绩与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩大体相当，这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。

The purpose of this tabulation is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of about $10 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.

这一表格的目的是说明，道指作为一个衡量投资成就的指数，并非那么容易战胜。仅管理这四家公司的投资顾问人才每年就能收取约1000万美元的费用，而这只是整个专业投资管理行业的一小部分。这些高薪且广受尊敬的人才的公开成绩表明，他们的表现略逊于无人管理的道指。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1965 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for 1965.

(1) 根据年内资产价值变动加上向登记持有人分配的收益计算。
(2) 1957-64年数据来自1965年《穆迪银行与金融手册》；1965年数据为估计值。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1965 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for 1965.

(1) 根据年内资产价值变动加上向登记持有人分配的收益计算。
(2) 1957-64年数据来自1965年《穆迪银行与金融手册》；1965年数据为估计值。

A number of the largest investment advisory operations (managing, in some cases, well into the billions of dollars) also manage investment companies partly as a convenience for smaller clients and partly as a public showcase. The results of these funds roughly parallel those of the four funds on which we report.

许多最大的投资顾问机构（有些管理着数十亿美元的资产）也管理投资公司，部分是为了方便小客户，部分是为了公开展示。这些基金的业绩与我们所报告的四只基金大致相当。

I strongly believe in measurement. The investment managers mentioned above utilize measurement constantly in their activities. They constantly study changes in market shares, profit margins, return on capital, etc. Their entire decision-making process is geared to measurement - of managements, industries, comparative yields, etc. I am sure they keep score on their new business efforts as well as the profitability of their advisory operation. What then can be more fundamental than the measurement, in turn, of investment ideas and decisions? I certainly do not believe the standards I utilize (and wish my partners to utilize) in measuring my performance are the applicable ones for all money managers. But I certainly do believe anyone engaged in the management of money should have a standard of measurement, and that both he and the party whose money is managed should have a clear understanding why it is the appropriate standard, what time period should be utilized, etc.

我深信衡量标准的重要性。上述投资经理们在工作中不断使用衡量方法。他们不断研究市场份额、利润率、资本回报率等变化。他们的整个决策过程都围绕衡量展开——对管理层、行业、比较收益率等进行衡量。我确信他们也会计算新业务拓展的成绩以及咨询业务的盈利能力。那么，反过来对投资思想和决策本身进行衡量，还有什么比这更根本的呢？我当然不认为我用来衡量自己业绩（并希望合伙人也用来衡量我）的标准适用于所有资金管理人。但我确实坚信，任何从事资金管理的人都应该有一个衡量标准，并且他和资金委托方都应该清楚地理解为什么这是合适的标准、应该采用什么时间期限等等。

Frank Block put it very well in the November-December 1965 issue of the Financial Analysts Journal. Speaking of measurement of investment performance he said," ...However, the fact is that literature suffers a yawning hiatus in this subject. If investment management organizations sought always the best performance, there would be nothing unique in careful measurement of investment results. It does not matter that the customer has failed to ask for a formal presentation of the results. Pride alone should be sufficient to demand that each of us determine objectively the quality of his recommendations. This can hardly be done without precise knowledge of the outcome. Once this knowledge is in hand, it should be possible to extend the analysis to some point at which patterns of weakness and strength begin to assert themselves. We criticize a corporate management for failure to use the best of tools to keep it aware of the progress of a complicated industrial organization. We can hardly be excused for failure to provide ourselves with equal tools to show the efficiency of our own efforts to handle other people’s money. ...Thus, it is our dreary duty to report that systems of performance measurement are not automatically included in the data processing programs of most investment management organizations. The sad fact is that some seem to prefer not to know how well or poorly they are doing.

Frank Block在1965年11-12月的《金融分析师杂志》中很好地阐述了这一点。在谈到投资业绩衡量时，他说：“……然而，事实是这方面的文献存在巨大的空白。如果投资管理机构始终追求最佳业绩，那么仔细衡量投资结果就没什么独特之处。客户没有要求正式的结果展示并不重要。单单是自尊心就足以要求我们每一个人客观地判断自己建议的质量。如果对结果没有精确的了解，这几乎不可能做到。一旦掌握了这些信息，就应该可以将分析延伸到能够揭示弱点与强项模式的层面。我们批评公司管理层未能使用最好的工具来了解复杂企业组织的进展。那么，我们若不能为自己配备同样的工具来展示我们管理他人资金的效率，又怎能得到原谅呢？……因此，我们不得不沉痛地报告，在大多数投资管理机构的数据处理程序中，并没有自动包含业绩衡量系统。可悲的事实是，有些人似乎宁愿不知道自己做得好还是坏。”

Frankly, I have several selfish reasons for insisting that we apply a yardstick and that we both utilize the same yardstick. Naturally, I get a kick out of beating par - in the lyrical words of Casey Stengel, "Show me a good loser, and I’ll show you a loser.” More importantly, I insure that I will not get blamed for the wrong reason (having losing years) but only for the right reason (doing poorer than the Dow). Knowing partners will grade me on the right basis helps me do a better job. Finally, setting up the relevant yardsticks ahead of time insures that we will all get out of this business if the results become mediocre (or worse). It means that past successes cannot cloud judgment of current results. It should reduce the chance of ingenious rationalizations of inept performance. (Bad lighting has been bothering me at the bridge table lately.) While this masochistic approach to measurement may not sound like much of an advantage, I can assure you from my observations of business entities that such evaluation would have accomplished a great deal in many investment and industrial organizations.

坦率地说，我坚持使用衡量标准而且我们双方都使用相同标准，是有几个自私的原因的。自然，我喜欢战胜标准的感觉——借用Casey Stengel富有诗意的话来说，“给我看一个输得起的人，我就能让你看一个输家。”更重要的是，这能确保我不会因为错误的原因（比如出现亏损年份）而受到指责，而只会因为正确的原因（比如表现比道指差）而受责。知道合伙人会按照正确的基准来评价我，有助于我把工作做得更好。最后，提前设定好相关的衡量标准，能确保如果业绩变得平庸（或更差），我们都会退出这一行。这意味着过去的成功不能模糊对当前结果的判断。这应该能减少为无能表现寻找巧妙借口的机会。（最近打桥牌时，糟糕的灯光一直困扰着我。）虽然这种自虐式的衡量方法听起来没啥好处，但我可以向你保证，根据我对商业实体的观察，这样的评估在许多投资和工业组织中本可以带来很大的成就。

THE SORROWS OF COMPOUNDING

复利的烦恼

Usually, at this point in my letter, I have paused to modestly attempt to set straight the historical errors of the last four or five hundred years. While it might seem difficult to accomplish this in only a few paragraphs a year, I feel I have done my share to reshape world opinion on Columbus, Isabella, Francis I, Peter Minuit and the Manhattan Indians. A by-product of this endeavor has been to demonstrate the overwhelming power of compound interest. To insure reader attention I have entitled these essays "The Joys of Compounding. " The sharp-eyed may notice a slight change this year.

通常，在信中的这个地方，我会稍作停顿，谦逊地试图纠正过去四五百年的历史错误。虽然每年只用几段话来做到这一点似乎很难，但我觉得自己已经在重塑人们对哥伦布、伊莎贝拉、弗朗西斯一世、彼得·米纽特和曼哈顿印第安人的看法方面尽了一份力。这一努力的副产品是展示了复利的巨大威力。为了吸引读者注意，我将这些文章命名为“复利的乐趣”。眼尖的读者可能会发现今年略有不同。

A decent rate (better we have an indecent rate) of compound -plus the addition of substantial new money has brought our beginning capital this year to $43,645,000. Several times in the past I have raised the question whether increasing amounts of capital would harm our investment performance. Each time I have answered negatively and promised you that if my opinion changed, I would promptly report it.

不错的收益率（最好是不错的收益率）加上大量新增资金的注入，使我们今年的起始资本达到了43,645,000美元。过去我曾多次提出，不断增加的资金量是否会损害我们的投资业绩。每次我都给出了否定的回答，并承诺如果我的看法发生改变，我会及时汇报。

I do not feel that increased capital has hurt our operation to date. As a matter of fact, I believe that we have done somewhat better during the past few years with the capital we have had in the Partnership than we would have done if we had been working with a substantially smaller amount. This was due to the partly fortuitous development of several investments that were just the right size for us -big enough to be significant and small enough to handle.

我认为到目前为止，增加的资本并没有损害我们的运作。事实上，我相信在过去几年中，以合伙基金现有的资本运作，我们的表现要比用少得多的资金操作更好一些。这在一定程度上得益于偶然出现的几项投资，它们的规模刚好适合我们——大到足以产生重大影响，又小到足以掌控。

I now feel that we are much closer to the point where increased size may prove disadvantageous. I don't want to ascribe too much precision to that statement since there are many variables involved. What may be the optimum size under some market and business circumstances can be substantially more or less than optimum under other circumstances. There have been a few times in the past when on a very short-term basis I have felt it would have been advantageous to be smaller but substantially more times when the converse was true.

我现在觉得，我们离规模增大可能变得不利的临界点更近了。我不想给这个说法赋予太多精确性，因为涉及很多变量。在某些市场和商业环境下，最佳规模可能比另一些环境下的最佳规模大得多或小得多。过去有几次，在非常短期的时段内，我感到规模更小会更有优势，但更多的时候情况正好相反。

Nevertheless, as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.

然而，就目前的情况来看，我认为规模大幅增加更有可能损害未来的业绩，而不是提升它。对我个人的收益而言或许并非如此，但对你们的收益而言很可能是这样。

Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.

因此，除非情况出现变化（在某些条件下，额外的资本反而会改善业绩），或者除非新合伙人能为合伙基金带来除资本之外的其他资产，我打算不再接纳新的合伙人加入BPL。

The only way to make this effective is to apply it across-the-board and I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.

要使这一点生效，唯一的办法就是全面执行。我已经通知苏茜，如果我们再有孩子，她得负责为他们找别的合伙基金了。

Because I anticipate that withdrawals (for taxes, among other reasons) may well approach additions by present partners and also because I visualize the curve of expectable performance sloping only very mildly as capital increases, I presently see no reason why we should restrict capital additions by existing partners.

因为我预计现有合伙人的提款（用于纳税等原因）很可能与新增投入的资金相接近，而且我认为随着资本增加，预期业绩的下降曲线只会非常平缓，所以目前我看不出有什么理由限制现有合伙人增加资本。

The medically oriented probably will interpret this entire section as conclusive evidence that an effective antithyroid pill has been developed.

医学界人士可能会把这一整节解读为一种有效的抗甲状腺药物已经开发出来的确凿证据。

TRENDS IN OUR BUSINESS

我们业务的趋势

Last year I discussed our various categories of investments. Knowing the penalties for cruel and unusual punishments, I will skip a rehash of the characteristics of each category, but merely refer you to last year's letter. However, a few words should be said to bring you up to date on the various segments of the business, and perhaps to give you a better insight into their strengths and weaknesses.

去年我讨论了我们投资的不同类别。鉴于知道残酷且不寻常惩罚的后果，我就不再重复每个类别的特点了，只是请你们参考去年的信。不过，还是应该说几句，让你们了解各类业务的最新情况，或许也能让你们更好地了解它们的长处和短处。

The "Workout" business has become very spasmodic. We were able to employ an average of only about $6 million during the year in the Workout section, and this involved only a very limited number of situations. Although we earned about $1,410,000 or about 23 ½% on average capital employed (this is calculated on an all equity basis - borrowed money is appropriate in most Workout situations, and we utilize it, which improves our rate of return above this percentage), over half of this was earned from one situation. I think it unlikely that a really interesting rate of return can be earned consistently on large sums of money in this business under present conditions. Nevertheless, we will continue to try to remain alert for the occasional important opportunity and probably continue to utilize a few of the smaller opportunities where we like the probabilities.

“套利类”（Workout）业务变得非常时断时续。去年，我们在套利部分平均只动用了大约600万美元，而且只涉及非常有限的几个机会。尽管我们赚了大约141万美元，即平均投入资本的约23.5%（这是按全权益基础计算的——在大多数套利情况下，借款是合适的，我们利用了借款，从而使我们的回报率高于这一百分比），但其中超过一半的收益来自一个机会。我认为，在目前情况下，靠大量资金在这一领域持续赚取真正有吸引力的回报率不太可能。不过，我们会继续保持警觉，留心偶尔出现的重要机会，并可能继续利用一些我们比较看好的较小机会。

The "Generals-Private Owner Basis" category was very good to us in 1965. Opportunities in this area have become more scarce with a rising Dow, but when they come along, they are often quite significant. I mentioned at the start of last year that we were the largest stockholder of three companies in this category. Our largest yearend 1964 investment in this category was disposed of in 1965 pursuant to a tender offer resulting in a realized gain for BPL of $3,188,000. At yearend 1964 we had unrealized appreciation in this investment of $451,000. Therefore, the economic gain attributable to 1965 for this transaction was only $2,737,000 even though the entire tax effect fell in that year. I mention these figures to illustrate how our realized gain for tax purposes in any year bears no necessary relationship to our economic gain.

“普通股-私人所有者基础”类别在1965年对我们非常有利。随着道指上涨，这一领域的机会变得更加稀少，但一旦出现，往往相当可观。去年初我曾提到，我们是这一类别中三家公司的最大股东。我们在1964年末持有的这一类别中最大的一笔投资，在1965年因一项要约收购而被处置，为BPL带来了3,188,000美元的已实现收益。1964年末，我们对这笔投资有451,000美元的未实现增值。因此，这笔交易在1965年带来的经济收益仅为2,737,000美元，尽管全部税收影响都发生在该年。我提到这些数字是为了说明，我们在任何一年出于税收目的实现的收益，与我们实际的经济收益并没有必然的联系。

The fundamental concept underlying the Generals-Private Owner category is demonstrated by the above case. A private owner was quite willing (and in our opinion quite wise) to pay a price for control of the business which isolated stock buyers were not willing to pay for very small fractions of the business. This has been a quite common condition in the securities markets over many years, and although purchases in this category work out satisfactorily in terms of just general stock market behavior, there is the occasional dramatic profit due to corporate action such as the one above.

上述案例体现了“普通股-私人所有者”类别的基本理念。一位私人所有者非常愿意（在我们看来也非常明智）为获得企业的控制权支付一个价格，而零散的股票买家却不愿意为企业的很小一部分支付同样的价格。多年来，这在证券市场上是一种相当普遍的现象。尽管这一类别中的买入操作仅就一般的股市表现而言就能取得令人满意的效果，但偶尔也会因公司行为（如上述案例）带来戏剧性的利润。

The "Control" section of our business received a transfer member from our “Private Owner” category. Shares in Berkshire Hathaway had been acquired since November 1962 on much the same line of reasoning as prevailed in the security mentioned above. In the case of Berkshire, however, we ended up purchasing enough stock to assume a controlling position ourselves rather than the more usual case of either selling our stock in the market or to another single buyer.

我们的“控制”类业务从“私人所有者”类别转入了一个成员。自1962年11月起，我们就基于与上述证券非常相似的逻辑，开始买入伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的股票。不过，在伯克希尔这个案例中，我们最终买入了足够多的股票，从而自己取得了控股地位，而不是像更常见的那样，要么在市场上卖出我们的股票，要么卖给另一个单一买家。

Our purchases of Berkshire started at a price of $7.60 per share in 1962. This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the prior management in closing some of the mills made obsolete by changing conditions within the textile business (which the old management had been quite slow to recognize). In the postwar period the company had slid downhill a considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about $29 1/2 million was earned before tax and about 11,000 workers were employed. This reflected output from 11 mills.

我们从1962年开始以每股7.60美元的价格买入伯克希尔。这个价格部分反映了前任管理层在关闭一些因纺织业环境变化而过时的工厂时所蒙受的巨大损失（旧管理层迟迟未能认识到这一点）。在战后时期，该公司经历了相当大幅度的下滑，其巅峰时期是1948年，当时税前利润约为2950万美元，雇佣了约11000名工人，这反映了11家工厂的产出。

At the time we acquired control in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2,300 employees. It was a very pleasant surprise to find that the remaining units had excellent management personnel, and we have not had to bring a single man from the outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning acquisition cost of $7.60 per share (the average cost, however, was $14.86 per share, reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965), the company on December 31, 1965, had net working capital alone (before placing any value on the plants and equipment) of about $19 per share.

在1965年春我们取得控制权时，伯克希尔仅剩下两家工厂和约2300名员工。令人非常惊喜的是，我们发现剩余的部门拥有出色的管理人员，我们无需从外部引入任何一个人。相对于我们最初的买入成本每股7.60美元（不过，由于1965年初的大量买入，平均成本为每股14.86美元），截至1965年12月31日，该公司仅净营运资本（未对厂房和设备赋予任何价值）就约为每股19美元。

Berkshire is a delight to own. There is no question that the state of the textile industry is the dominant factor in determining the earning power of the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chace running the business in a first-class manner, and we also have several of the best sales people in the business heading up this end of their respective divisions.

拥有伯克希尔是一件令人愉快的事。毫无疑问，纺织业的状况是决定该企业盈利能力的主导因素，但我们非常幸运有肯·蔡斯（Ken Chace）以一流的方式经营业务，而且我们还有几位业内最优秀的销售人员负责各自部门的工作。

While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a Xerox, Fairchild Camera or National Video in a hypertensed market, it is a very comfortable sort of thing to own. As my West Coast philosopher says, “It is well to have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as cream puffs.”

尽管在一个高度亢奋的市场中，伯克希尔几乎不可能像施乐（Xerox）、仙童相机（Fairchild Camera）或National Video那样盈利，但拥有它让人非常安心。正如我的西海岸哲学家所说：“饮食中既有燕麦粥，也有奶油泡芙，才是好的。”

Because of our controlling interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our audit as a business, not as a marketable security. If Berkshire advances $5 per share in the market, it does BPL no good - our holdings are not going to be sold. Similarly, if it goes down $5 per share, it is not meaningful to us. The value of our holding is determined directly by the value of the business. I received no divine inspiration in that valuation of our holdings. (Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do receive such a message in respect to their holdings -I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep well at present prices.) I attempt to apply a conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets, earning power, industry conditions, competitive position, etc. We would not be a seller of our holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of the other items in our portfolio at yearend valuations –otherwise, we would already have sold them.

由于我们拥有控股权，在对伯克希尔进行审计时，我们的投资是作为一项业务来估值的，而不是作为有价证券。如果伯克希尔的市价每股上涨5美元，这对BPL没有好处——我们不会卖出我们的持股。同样，如果它每股下跌5美元，对我们也没有意义。我们持股的价值直接由企业的价值决定。在评估我们持股的价值时，我并没有得到什么神启。（也许上面提到的三只神奇股票的持有者确实收到了关于其持股的此类信息——我感觉至少需要那样可靠的东西，才能在目前的价格水平下安然入睡。）我试图根据自己对资产、盈利能力、行业状况、竞争地位等的了解，采用保守的估值方法。我们不会以这样的价格卖出我们的持股，但我们也不会以年末估值卖出投资组合中的其他项目——否则我们早就卖掉了。

Our final category is "Generals-Relatively Undervalued.” This category has been growing in relative importance as opportunities in the other categories become less frequent.

我们的最后一个类别是“普通股-相对低估”。随着其他类别机会的减少，这一类别的重要性相对提升。

Frankly, operating in this field is somewhat more ethereal than operating in the other three categories, and I'm just not an ethereal sort. Therefore, I feel accomplishments here are less solid and perhaps less meaningful for future projections than in the other categories. Nevertheless, our results in 1965 were quite good in the “Relatively Undervalued” group, partly due to implementation of the technique referred to in last year's letter which serves to reduce risk and potentially augment gains. It should reduce risk in any year, and it definitely augmented the gains in 1965. It is necessary to point out that results in this category were greatly affected for the better by only two investments.

坦率地说，在这个领域操作比其他三个类别更“虚”一些，而我恰恰不是那种“虚”的人。因此，我觉得这里的成就没那么扎实，对未来的预测意义也可能不如其他类别。尽管如此，1965年我们在“相对低估”组中的业绩相当不错，部分原因在于实施了去年信中提到的技巧，该技巧旨在降低风险并可能增加收益。它应该在任何年份都能降低风险，并且在1965年确实增加了收益。有必要指出，这一类别中的业绩在很大程度上仅受两项投资的积极影响。

Candor also demands I point out that during 1965 we had our worst single investment experience in the history of BPL on one idea in this group.

坦率地说，我还必须指出，1965年我们在这一组中的一个想法上，遭遇了BPL历史上最糟糕的单次投资经历。

Overall, we had more than our share of good breaks in 1965. We did not have a great quantity of ideas, but the quality, with the one important exception mentioned above, was very good and circumstances developed which accelerated the timetable in several. I do not have a great flood of good ideas as I go into 1966, although again I believe I have at least several potentially good ideas of substantial size. Much depends on whether market conditions are favorable for obtaining a larger position. All in all, however, you should recognize that more came out of the pipeline in 1965 than went in.

总体而言，1965年我们好运连连。我们并没有大量的想法，但除了上面提到的一个重要例外，想法的质量非常好，而且出现了加速几个项目进展的情况。进入1966年，我并没有大量的好主意，不过我相信我至少还有几个规模可观且具有潜力的好想法。这在很大程度上取决于市场条件是否有利于我们扩大持仓。总而言之，你们应该认识到，1965年从“管道”中流出的东西比流入的要多。

DIVERSIFICATION

分散化

Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: "(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”

去年在评论绝大多数投资经理无法取得优于纯随机表现的业绩时，我将其主要归因于以下几点：(1) 群体决策——我可能有些偏见的看法是，如果所有成员都真正参与决策，那么几乎不可能从任何一个规模的群体中产生杰出的投资管理；(2) 希望遵循其他大型知名机构的政策和（在一定程度上）投资组合的倾向；(3) 制度框架下，“平均”是“安全”的，而独立行动的个人回报与这种行为通常伴随的风险完全不成比例；(4) 固守某些不合理的分散化实践；以及最后也是很重要的一点，(5) 惯性。

This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."

今年在11月份发出的材料中，我特意请大家注意一条新的基本原则：“7. 我们的分散化程度远低于大多数投资机构。我们可能会将净资产的40%投资于单一证券，但前提是我们的判断和推理正确的概率极高，且任何因素根本改变投资内在价值的可能性极低。”

We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.

显然，我们遵循的分散化政策与几乎所有公开投资机构的做法截然不同。坦率地说，我最理想的情况莫过于拥有50个不同的投资机会，每个机会的数学期望值（这个词反映了所有可能的相对表现范围，包括负面表现，并根据每种情况的概率进行调整——请不要打哈欠）都能达到每年超越道指15个百分点的水平。如果这50个个别期望值之间互不关联（一个机会发生什么与其他机会发生什么无关），我就可以将我们资金的2%投入每一个机会，然后坐下来，几乎可以非常肯定地看到我们的整体业绩将非常接近这15个百分点的优势。

It doesn't work that way.

实际情况并非如此。

We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight. It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.

我们必须极其努力地寻找极少数有吸引力的投资机会。这类机会的定义是，我的业绩预期（定义如上）每年至少比道指高出十个百分点。在我们找到的寥寥几个机会中，预期值差异很大。问题始终是：“在第一名（按相对表现预期排序）上投入多少，在第八名上投入多少？”这在很大程度上取决于第一名与第八名之间的数学期望值差距。它还取决于第一名出现非常差的相对表现的可能性。两只证券可能具有同等的数学期望值，但一只可能有0.05的概率表现比道指差15个百分点以上，而另一只可能只有0.01的概率出现这种情况。第一种情况下较宽的预期范围，会降低对其重仓持有的吸引力。

The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.

以上内容可能让整个操作听起来非常精确。其实不是。不过，我们的工作就是确定事实，然后将经验和理性应用于这些事实以形成预期。尽管我们的尝试可能不够精确且受情绪影响，但这正是投资工作的全部。多年证券决策的结果将展示你在进行这些计算方面做得如何——无论你是否意识到自己正在进行这些计算。我相信，当投资者清楚自己的思维过程所遵循的路径时，他就会占据明显的优势。

There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.

有一点我可以向你保证。如果基金的业绩良好只是次要目标，那么任何包含一百只股票的投资组合（无论管理者是管理一千美元还是十亿美元）都不是在合乎逻辑地运作。加入第一百只股票根本无法充分降低投资组合业绩的潜在波动，以弥补其纳入对整体投资组合预期所带来的负面影响。

Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)

任何人在据称研究了其投资价值后（我不管其名号有多响亮），却持有如此数量的证券，都是在遵循我所谓的“诺亚投资学派”——每样都来一对。这类投资者应该去驾驶方舟。尽管诺亚的行为可能符合某些久经考验的生物学原则，但投资者却在数学原理方面偏离了轨道。（我只学完了平面几何，不过除了一个人以外，我已经仔细地将数学家都筛选出了我们的合伙基金。）

Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.

当然，别人持有100只证券的非理性行为并不能证明我们就是对的。尽管他们在过度分散化方面可能是错的，但我们还是必须从自身目标出发，积极地推理出正确的分散化策略。

The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.

最优投资组合取决于各种可选机会的预期值以及可容忍的业绩波动程度。选择的数量越多，实际结果与预期结果之间的平均年际波动就越小。同时，假设不同选择的业绩预期不同，那么预期结果也会越低。

I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.

为了获得更好的整体长期业绩，我愿意在平抑年度间业绩波动方面做出很大让步（请记住，当我谈论“业绩”时，指的是相对于道指的表现）。简单来说，这意味着我愿意在我认为最好的投资机会上相当重地集中持仓，同时非常清楚这可能会导致偶尔出现非常糟糕的年份——很可能比更分散化投资时更糟糕的年份。虽然这意味着我们的业绩波动会更大，但我认为这也意味着我们长期的领先优势应该更大。

You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965. If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.

你们已经看到了一些这方面的例子。我们相对于道指的优势幅度从1958年的2.4个百分点到1965年的33.0个百分点不等。如果将其与第三页所列基金的偏离幅度对照，你们会发现我们的波动范围要大得多。我本可以通过某种方式操作来减小波动幅度，但同时也会在一定程度上降低整体业绩，尽管它仍会远超投资公司。回顾过去，并继续思考这个问题，我觉得如果要说的话，我本应比过去稍微更集中一些。因此，有了这条新的基本原则以及这番冗长的解释。

Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations - this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.

我想再次说明，这是一种有些非常规的推理（这并不意味着它是对还是错——只是意味着你们必须自己思考），你们很可能有不同的看法——如果确实如此，那么合伙基金就不适合你。很显然，我们只会在极少数情况下才会达到40%的比例——而这种稀缺性，恰恰就是我们在看到这样的机会时必须如此集中持仓的原因。在合伙基金九年的历史中，我们可能只有五六次超过25%的情况。任何这类情况都必须承诺，相对于当时其他可用的机会，其表现会显著优于道指。它们还必须具备如此优越的定性和/或定量因素，以至于发生严重永久性损失的可能性极小（短期报价方面何事都可能发生，这在一定程度上解释了年度间业绩波动风险更大的原因）。在为任何单项投资选择持仓上限时，我试图将单一投资（或一组投资，如果存在相互关联性）可能导致我们整个投资组合业绩比道指差超过10个百分点的概率降至极低水平。

We presently have two situations in the over 25% category - one a controlled company, and the other a large company where we will never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of five investment situations. The 1965 gains (in some cases there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior years) from these situations ranged from about $800,000 to about $3 1/2 million. If you should take the overall performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the results are lackluster (I chose a very charitable adjective).

目前我们有两项持仓处于超过25%的类别——一家是控股公司，另一家是我们永远不会积极参与的大型公司。值得指出的是，我们1965年的业绩绝大部分来自五个投资机会。这些机会在1965年带来的收益（在某些情况下，还包括前几年对同一持仓的收益）从大约80万美元到约350万美元不等。如果你看一看1965年我们五项最小的普通投资整体表现，结果会黯淡无光（我用了一个非常温和的形容词）。

Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification.

有趣的是，投资管理领域的文献几乎完全没有关于最优分散化演算推理的内容。

All texts counsel "adequate" diversification, but the ones who quantify "adequate" virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on overdiversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, "You've got a harem of seventy girls; you don't get to know any of them very well.”

所有教科书都建议“充分”的分散化，但那些量化“充分”的人实际上从不解释他们是如何得出这一结论的。因此，关于过度分散化，让我们引用那位杰出的学者比利·罗斯（Billy Rose）的话作为总结：“你有一个七十个女孩的后宫；你不可能对她们中的任何一个都很了解。”

MISCELLANEOUS

其他事项

Last year we boldly announced an expansion move, encompassing an additional 227 1/4 square feet. Older partners shook their heads. I feel that our gain from operations in 1965 of $12,304,060 indicates that we did not overextend ourselves. Fortunately, we didn't sign a percentage lease. Operationally, things have never been running more smoothly, and I think our present setup unquestionably lets me devote a higher percentage of my time to thinking about the investment process than virtually anyone else in the money management business. This, of course, is the result of really outstanding personnel and cooperative partners.

去年，我们大胆地宣布了一项扩张举措，增加了227又1/4平方英尺的面积。年长的合伙人摇了摇头。我觉得1965年我们12,304,060美元的运营收益表明我们并没有过度扩张。幸运的是，我们没有签署按业绩分成的租约。运营上，一切都比以往更顺畅，我想我们目前的设置无疑让我比其他任何资金管理行业的人都能将更高比例的时间用于思考投资过程。这当然要归功于真正出色的人员和配合默契的合伙人。

John Harding has taken complete charge of all administrative operations with splendid results. Bill Scott continues to develop detailed information on investments which substantially enhances our net profit figure. Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and Elizabeth Hanon (who joined us in November) have all handled large work loads (secretary's note -Amen!) accurately and efficiently.

约翰·哈丁（John Harding）已全面负责所有行政运营，取得了出色的成效。比尔·斯科特（Bill Scott）继续深入挖掘投资的详细信息，这极大地提升了我们的净利润数字。贝丝·菲汉（Beth Feehan）、唐娜·沃尔特（Donna Walter）和伊丽莎白·哈农（Elizabeth Hanon）（她于11月加入我们）都准确高效地处理了大量工作（秘书注——阿门！）。

The above people, their spouses (one apiece) and children have a combined investment in the Partnership of over $600,000. Susie and I have an investment of $6,849,936, which should keep me from slipping away to the movies in the afternoon. This represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card, a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders.

上述人员、他们的配偶（每人一个）以及子女在合伙基金中的投资总额超过60万美元。我和苏茜的投资为6,849,936美元，这应该能阻止我在下午溜出去看电影。这几乎代表了我们的全部净资产，除了我们继续持有的Mid-Continent Tab Card（一家本地公司），我于1960年买入，当时它的股东还不到10人。

Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, two uncles, five cousins, and six nieces and nephews have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $2,708,233. So don't get any ideas about voting a change in the Partnership name.

此外，我的亲戚们，包括三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个妹夫/姐夫、岳父、三个阿姨、两个叔叔、五个表亲以及六个侄子侄女，在BPL中直接或间接拥有的权益总计为2,708,233美元。所以别动什么改合伙基金名称的念头。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. has done the customary excellent job of expediting the audit and tax information. This requires great effort and ability, and they supply both. This year a computer was brought to bear on our problems, and naturally, I was a little worried someone else would come out as the general partner. However, it all worked quite smoothly.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.一如既往地出色完成了加速提供审计和税务信息的工作。这需要巨大的努力和能力，而他们两者兼备。今年，我们借助计算机处理问题，自然，我有点担心会冒出别人来当普通合伙人。不过，一切进展得相当顺利。

Within the coming two weeks you will receive:

在接下来的两周内，你将收到：

1. A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1965 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
2. An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1965, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
3. A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/66. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.

1. 一封税务信函，提供你填报1965年联邦所得税申报表所需的全部BPL信息。该信函是用于税务目的的唯一凭据。
2. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.出具的1965年审计报告，列明BPL的运营和财务状况，以及你个人的资本账户。
3. 一封由我签名的信函，说明截至1966年1月1日你在BPL的权益状况。这与审计中得出的数据一致。

Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. It is difficult to anticipate all of the questions you may have and if there is anything that is confusing, I want to hear about it. For instance, we received an excellent suggestion last year from a partner regarding the presentation of the reconciliation of personal capital accounts.

如果信中有任何内容或在年内发生任何事情需要澄清，请告诉我。我很难预料到你们可能提出的全部问题，如果有任何令人困惑的地方，我想知道。例如，去年一位合伙人就个人资本账户对账的呈现方式提出了一个很好的建议。

My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first half of this year.

下一封信大概在7月15日左右，总结今年上半年的情况。

Cordially,

诚挚地，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特