1960年致合伙人信

The General Stock Market in 1960:

1960年整体股市：

A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one.

一年前，我评论了1959年道琼斯工业平均指数所呈现的某种程度上的失实景象，该指数从583点上涨到679点，涨幅16.4%。尽管几乎所有投资公司那一年都取得了收益，但只有不到10%的公司能够追平或超越工业平均指数的表现。道琼斯公用事业平均指数略有下跌，而铁路平均指数则出现了大幅下跌。

In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.

1960年，情况发生了逆转。工业平均指数从679点下跌至616点，跌幅9.3%。即使将持有该指数所能获得的股息加回去，整体损失仍为6.3%。另一方面，公用事业平均指数表现出色，尽管目前尚未获得全部数据，但我估计约90%的投资公司都跑赢了工业平均指数。大多数投资公司的全年业绩似乎都在正负5%之间。在纽约证券交易所，有653只普通股录得年度亏损，404只录得涨幅。

Results in 1960:

1960年的业绩：

My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.

我管理合伙人资金的持续目标，是取得长期超越工业平均指数的业绩记录。我相信，长期而言，该指数的表现将或多或少与领先投资公司的结果相似。如果我们不能实现这种超越表现，那么这些合伙企业就没有存在的理由。

However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.

然而，我也曾指出，如果我们能取得超额业绩，也不应期待相对于指数的表现优势会保持相对恒定。相反，如果能够取得这种优势，很可能是在平稳或下跌的市场中表现优于平均，而在上涨市场中表现持平甚至不及平均。

I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three's and par five's.

我会认为，我们下跌15%而指数下跌30%的年份，要远优于我们和指数都上涨20%的年份。长期以来，自然有好年景也有坏年景；为它们出现的先后顺序而兴奋或沮丧，并无任何益处。重要的是战胜基准；在一个三杆洞打出四杆，不如在一个五杆洞打出五杆，而且假设我们不会同时遇到三杆洞和五杆洞是不现实的。

The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations.

之所以在此阐述这段理念，是因为今年我们有一些新合伙人，我希望确保他们理解我的目标、衡量目标达成的标准，以及我已知的某些局限。

With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are:

了解了上述背景，1960年对我们来说是一个优于平均的年份，便不足为奇。与工业平均指数整体下跌6.3%相比，我们全年运营的七家合伙企业取得了22.8%的收益。我们这四年完整运营的合伙企业业绩如下（均为扣除费用后、未支付有限合伙人利息或普通合伙人分配前的数据）：

It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected.

再次强调，以上是合伙企业的净业绩；有限合伙人的实际净收益将取决于他们所选择的合伙协议安排。

The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning, of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.

整体收益或损失是按逐日盯市方法计算的。在考虑资金增减之后，这种方法给出的结果，是基于假设合伙企业年初即清算与年末清算所能实现的金额，而这当然不同于我们的税务结果——税务上按成本计价证券，只有证券实际出售时才确认收益或损失。

On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:

按复利计算，累计业绩如下：

Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned "blue-chip" securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.

尽管四年时间太短，不足以得出推断，但现有证据倾向于确认这样一个命题：我们的业绩在温和下跌或平淡的市场中应该相对更好。若果真如此，则表明我们的投资组合可能比持有“蓝筹”证券更为保守，尽管绝对没有那么传统。在蓝筹股大幅上涨的市场中，我们可能确实难以匹敌其表现。

Multiplicity of Partnerships:

合伙企业的多重性：

A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to "keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense.

先前的表格显示，这个家族正在壮大。没有哪家合伙企业的业绩持续优于或劣于我们的整体平均水平，但每年都存在一些差异，尽管我努力“让所有合伙企业投资于相同的证券，且比例大致相同”。当然，这种差异可以通过将现有合伙企业合并为一家大型合伙企业来消除。此举还能省去许多琐碎事务和相当一部分费用。

Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.

坦率地说，我希望在未来几年内在此方向上有所动作。问题在于，各合伙人表达了对于不同合伙安排的偏好。未经全体合伙人一致同意，不会采取任何行动。

Advance Payments:

预付款：

Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year.

有几位合伙人询问年内向合伙企业追加资金事宜。尽管有过特例，但在有限合伙人包含多个家庭的情况下，年中修改合伙协议过于困难。因此，在混合合伙中，额外份额只能在年末获得。

We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.

我们确实接受年内为合伙企业份额而预付的资金，并自收到之日起至年末，按6%支付利息。届时，在合伙人同意修改协议的前提下，该笔资金连同利息将计入合伙企业资本，并此后参与损益分配。

Sanborn Map:

桑伯恩地图公司：

Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you.

去年曾提及一项投资，其占我们净资产的比例极高且非比寻常（35%），同时说明我希望该投资能在1960年内结束。这一希望实现了。如此规模的一笔投资，其来龙去脉或许您会感兴趣。

Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year.

桑伯恩地图公司从事全美所有城市超详细地图的出版与持续修订工作。例如，包含奥马哈全城的图册重约五十磅，提供每栋建筑的细枝末节。地图采用粘贴覆盖法进行修订，标示新建工程、用途变更、新消防设施、结构材料变化等。这些修订大约每年进行一次，而当地图因覆盖过多而无法再粘贴时，才每二三十年出版一次新地图。一位奥马哈客户维持地图持续更新的费用约为每年100美元。

This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn's business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities.

这些详细信息——标明街道下水管口径、消防栓位置、屋顶材质等——主要供火灾保险公司使用。它们的承保部门设在总部，便可评估全国各地代理人所带来的业务。其理念是，一张图胜过千言万语，此类评估能决定风险是否恰当定价、某一区域火灾蔓延风险等级、再保险程序是否得当等。桑伯恩的大部分业务来自约三十家保险公司，不过地图也销售给保险业以外的客户，如公用事业公司、抵押贷款机构和税务部门。

For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn's profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn's board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity.

七十五年来，这门生意或多或少以垄断方式经营，每年都实现盈利，几乎完全不受经济衰退影响，也无需任何营销努力。在业务早期，保险业担心桑伯恩的利润过高，便指派多位知名保险人士加入桑伯恩董事会，充当监督角色。

In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as "carding" made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over $500,000 in the late 1930's to under $100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power.

20世纪50年代初，一种名为“卡片法”的竞争性承保方式侵蚀了桑伯恩的业务，地图业务的税后利润从30年代末年均50万美元以上，下降到1958年和1959年的不足10万美元。考虑到同期经济的上行趋势，这相当于原本可观且稳定的盈利能力几乎被完全消灭。

However, during the early 1930's Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.

然而，20世纪30年代初，桑伯恩开始积累投资组合。该业务无需资本投入，因此所有留存收益均可用于此项事业。随着时间推移，共投资约250万美元，其中债券与股票大致各半。因此，尤其是在最近十年，投资组合蓬勃发展，而地图运营业务却日渐凋零。

Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at $110 per share. In 1958 with the Average in the 550 area, Sanborn sold at $45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about $20 per share to $65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of $90 per share on the map business ($110 less the $20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus $20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.

我来让您大致了解这两个因素的极端背离。1938年，道琼斯工业平均指数在100-120点之间徘徊，桑伯恩的股价为每股110美元。1958年，指数已升至550点左右，桑伯恩的股价却为每股45美元。然而，同期桑伯恩投资组合的价值从每股约20美元增加到每股65美元。这实际上意味着，在商业与股市均低迷的1938年，桑伯恩股票的买家对地图业务给予每股90美元的正面估值（110美元减去与地图业务无关的投资价值20美元）。而在景气远为蓬勃的1958年，同一地图业务却被估值为负20美元，股票买家只愿为投资组合支付每股70美分，地图业务则相当于白送。

How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.

为何会出现这种情况？1958年的桑伯恩与1938年一样，拥有对保险业极具价值的丰富信息。要复制他们多年来收集的详细信息，需要花费数千万美元。尽管受“卡片法”冲击，仍有超过5亿美元的火灾保费由“制图”公司承保。然而，桑伯恩销售和包装其产品——信息——的方式多年来一成不变，这种惰性最终反映在了盈利上。

The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about $2 million per year and owned about $7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director's and committee fees.

投资组合表现如此出色，这一事实本身就使大多数董事严重低估了重振地图业务的必要性。桑伯恩的年销售额约为200万美元，拥有约700万美元的有价证券。投资组合带来的收入相当可观，公司毫无财务之忧，保险公司对地图价格感到满意，股东也仍能获得股息。然而，这些股息在八年间被削减了五次，尽管我从未发现任何记录显示曾有人提议削减薪资或董事及委员会津贴。

Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.

在我进入董事会之前，十四名董事中有九人是保险业的知名人士，他们合计持有46股股票，而公司流通在外总股数为105,000股。尽管他们在大型保险公司担任要职，按理应当具备至少作出适度资金投入的财力，但这群人中持股最多的也只有十股。在某些情况下，这些人所管理的保险公司也持有少量股份，但相对于其投资组合而言，不过是象征性的投资。过去十年里，在任何涉及桑伯恩股票的交易中，保险公司都仅仅是卖出方。

The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.

第十位董事是公司法律顾问，持股十股。第十一位是一位银行家，同样持股十股，他认识到了公司的问题，积极指出问题，后来还增加了持股。随后的两位董事是桑伯恩的高管，合计持股约300股。这些高管能力出众，深知业务问题所在，但被董事会压制在从属角色。最后一幕人物是桑伯恩已故总裁之子，其母（即遗孀）持有约15,000股股票。

In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we.

1958年末，那位儿子对业务走向不满，要求担任公司最高职位，遭拒后提交辞呈并获接受。不久之后，我们向其母出价购买她手中的股票，她接受了。当时还有另外两大持股，一笔约10,000股（分散在一家券商客户手中），另一笔约8,000股。这些人对现状相当不满，希望将投资组合与地图业务分离，与我们的想法一致。

Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn's wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer.

随后，我们（包括关联方）通过公开市场购买，将持股增至约24,000股，三大群体的总持股增至46,000股。我们希望将两项业务分离，实现投资组合的公允价值，并着手重建地图业务的盈利能力。看起来，通过利用桑伯恩丰厚的原始资料，并结合电子手段将数据转化为客户最可用的形式，存在大幅提升地图利润的真实机会。

There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over $l,25 million in government and municipal bonds as a reserve fund, and a potential corporate capital gains tax of over $1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.

董事会对于任何变革，尤其是由外部人士发起的变革，都存在相当大的反对意见，尽管管理层完全赞同我们的计划，且博思艾伦咨询公司（管理专家）也推荐过类似的计划。为避免委托书争夺战（这一争夺很可能本就不会发生，而且我们肯定能赢），也避免因桑伯恩大量资金套牢在蓝筹股上而延误时机（我当时并不看好这些股票的价格），我们制定了一项计划，以公允价格买断所有希望退出的股东。美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对该计划的公平性给出了有利裁决。约72%的桑伯恩股票（涉及1,600名股东中的50%）被按公平价值换为投资组合证券。地图业务留下超过125万美元的政府及市政债券作为储备基金，同时消除了超过100万美元的潜在公司资本利得税。剩余股东的资产价值略有提升，每股收益大幅增加，股息率也得到提高。

Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.”

以上这出小型戏码，自然只是对这项投资操作的极度简略描述。不过，它确实凸显了我们对投资组合操作保密的必要性，也说明以一年这样的短时间维度来衡量我们的业绩是徒劳的。此类控股情形可能极为罕见。我们的基本业务仍然是买入低估证券，待低估修正后卖出，同时投资于利润取决于公司行为而非市场行为的特殊情形。随着合伙资金继续增长，未来在“控股情形”上可能会有更多机会。

The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know.

审计师应会在大约一周内寄出各位的财务报表和税务信息。如对审计报告或本信有任何疑问，请务必告知我。

Warren E. Buffett 1-30-61

沃伦·E·巴菲特 1961年1月30日