1966年7月12日致合伙人信

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110

巴菲特合伙有限公司
基威特广场610号
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市68131
电话：042-4110

July 12, 1966

1966年7月12日

First Half Performance

上半年表现

During the first half of 1966, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow") declined from 969.26 to 870.10. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.70 would have been received, reducing the overall loss of the Dow to about 8.7%.

1966年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）从969.26点下跌至870.10点。如果在此期间持有道指，将获得约14.70点的股息，从而将道指的整体损失降低到约8.7%。

It is my objective and my hope (but not my prediction!) that we achieve over a long period of time, an average yearly advantage of ten percentage points relative to the Dow. During the first half we did considerably better than expected with an overall gain of approximately 8.2%. Such results should be regarded as decidedly abnormal. I have previously complimented partners on the good-natured tolerance they display in shrugging off such unexpected positive variances. The nature of our business is such that over the years, we will not disappoint the many of you who must also desire a test of your capacity for tolerance of negative variances.

我的目标是，也希望（但不是预测！）我们能在长期内取得超越道指年均10个百分点的优势。上半年我们的表现远超预期，整体收益率约为8.2%。这样的业绩应当被视为非常不正常的。我之前曾赞扬合伙人们以宽容的态度轻松面对此类意外的优异表现。我们业务的性质决定了，在未来的岁月里，我们不会让那些想考验自己对不利情况容忍度的众多合伙人失望。

(1) 基于道指年度价值变化加上当年持有道指可获得的股息。表格包含了合伙基金所有完整年度。
(2) 1957-61年数据为所有前身有限合伙基金在整个年度的合并业绩，扣除所有费用，但未进行合伙人分配或普通合伙人分成。
(3) 1957-61年数据基于前一列合伙基金业绩计算，考虑了根据现行合伙协议分配给普通合伙人的部分，但未扣除有限合伙人的月度提款。

(1) 基于道指年度价值变化加上当年持有道指可获得的股息。表格包含了合伙基金所有完整年度。
(2) 1957-61年数据为所有前身有限合伙基金在整个年度的合并业绩，扣除所有费用，但未进行合伙人分配或普通合伙人分成。
(3) 1957-61年数据基于前一列合伙基金业绩计算，考虑了根据现行合伙协议分配给普通合伙人的部分，但未扣除有限合伙人的月度提款。

Even Samson gets clipped occasionally. If you had invested $100,000 on January 1 equally among -

即使是参孙也有被剃头的时候。如果你在1月1日将10万美元均等投资于：

a. the world's largest auto company (General Motors);
b. the world's largest oil company (Standard of New Jersey);
c. the world's largest retailing company (Sears Roebuck);
d. the world's largest chemical company (Dupont);
e. the world's largest steel company (U.S. Steel);
f. the world's largest stockholder-owned insurance company (Aetna);
g. the world's largest public utility (American Telephone & Telegraph);
h. the world's largest bank (Bank of America);

a. 全球最大的汽车公司（通用汽车）；
b. 全球最大的石油公司（新泽西标准石油）；
c. 全球最大的零售公司（西尔斯罗巴克）；
d. 全球最大的化学公司（杜邦）；
e. 全球最大的钢铁公司（美国钢铁）；
f. 全球最大的股东所有保险公司（安泰保险）；
g. 全球最大的公用事业公司（美国电话电报）；
h. 全球最大的银行（美国银行）；

your total portfolio (including dividends received) would have been worth $83,370 on June 30 for a loss of 16.6%. The total market value on January 1 of these eight giants was well over $100 billion. Everyone of them was selling lower on June 30.

那么你的整个投资组合（包括收到的股息）在6月30日将价值83,370美元，损失16.6%。这八家巨头在1月1日的总市值远超1000亿美元，而它们每一只在6月30日的价格都下跌了。

Investment Companies

投资公司

On the next page we bring up to date our regular comparison with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.

接下来我们更新一下与两只最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两只最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的常规对比结果。这些基金通常保持95-100%的普通股投资仓位。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.

(1) 根据资产价值变化加上年内向记名持有人分配的任何收益计算。
(2) 1957-1965年数据来自1966年穆迪银行与金融手册；1966年上半年为估计值。

Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If “conservative” is interpreted to mean "productive of results varying only slightly from average experience" I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, "average experience" is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this form of investment medium.

机构投资的支持者经常提及其保守性。如果“保守”被理解为“产生的收益与平均表现仅有微小差异”，那么我认为这种说法是恰当的。通过在高等级证券中进行广泛分散，几乎必然会取得这样的结果。由于长期来看，“平均表现”很可能是不错的表现，普通投资者采用这种投资形式并没有错。

However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean "subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience". This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over $5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.

然而，我认为更恰当的保守主义定义应该是“承受的暂时或永久价值缩水远低于整体表现”。正如四家最大基金（目前管理资产超过50亿美元）的业绩所示，这一定义并未实现。具体而言，道指在1957年、1960年、1962年以及1966年上半年均出现下跌。将这三个完整年度中道指的缩水累加，得出20.6%的跌幅。按照同样的方法计算，四家最大基金分别下跌了9.7%、20.9%、22.3%和24.6%。若将1966年上半年的中期表现包括在内，道指累计下跌27.5%，而上述基金分别下跌14.4%、23.1%、27.1%和30.6%。这些基金（我认为它们的业绩在机构的普通股投资中具有相当代表性）似乎符合保守主义的第一种定义，但不符合第二种。

Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled "conventionalism" - what it really says is that “when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we'll do it at about the same rate." This is not to be equated with "when others are making it, we'll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less.” Very few investment programs accomplish the latter - we certainly don't promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, "I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.”)

如果大多数投资者能够清晰区分上述两种保守主义的解释，他们的认知水平将会上一个台阶。第一种或许更应该被称为“随大流主义”——它的真实含义是：“当大多数人在普通证券上赚钱时，我们也能赚到差不多同样的程度；当他们在亏钱时，我们也会以差不多的速度亏损。”这不能等同于“当别人赚钱时，我们赚得一样多；当别人亏钱时，我们亏得更少”。很少有投资计划能实现后者——我们当然不承诺这一点，但我们确实打算不断尝试。（我一直觉得我们的目标应该比赫尔曼·希克曼在耶鲁大学橄榄球队每季输八场比赛的艰难岁月里所说的更高尚一些。赫尔曼曾说：“我认为我的工作就是让校友们虽然不满，但还不至于哗变。”）

Hochschild, Kohn & Co.

霍赫希尔德-科恩公司

During the first half we, and two 10% partners, purchased all of the stock of Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned Baltimore department store. This is the first time in the history of the Partnership that an entire business has been purchased by negotiation, although we have, from time to time, negotiated purchase of specific important blocks of marketable securities. However, no new principles are involved. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the business are evaluated and weighed against price, both on an absolute basis and relative to other investment opportunities. HK (learn to call it that - I didn't find out how to pronounce it until the deal was concluded) stacks up fine in all respects.

上半年，我们与两家各持股10%的合伙人一起，通过协商收购了霍赫希尔德-科恩公司（一家巴尔的摩的私有百货商店）的全部股份。这是合伙基金历史上第一次通过谈判收购一家完整的企业，尽管我们偶尔也会谈判购买一些重要的有价证券大宗股份。不过，这并未涉及新的原则。我们对该企业的定性和定量方面进行了评估，并将其与价格进行权衡，既从绝对角度，也相对其他投资机会而言。HK（学着这么叫它吧——我直到交易完成后才知道它的发音）在各方面都表现不错。

We have topnotch people (both from a personal and business standpoint) handling the operation. Despite the edge that my extensive 75 cents an hour experience at the Penney's store in Omaha some years back gives us (I became an authority on the Minimum Wage Act), they will continue to run the business as in the past. Even if the price had been cheaper but the management had been run-of-the-mill, we would not have bought the business.

我们拥有顶尖的人才（无论从个人品德还是业务能力方面）来负责运营。尽管多年前我在奥马哈彭尼百货以每小时75美分的丰富经验为我们带来了一定优势（我成了《最低工资法》的权威），但他们仍将像过去一样经营这家企业。即便价格更便宜，如果管理层很平庸，我们也不会收购这家企业。

It is impossible to avoid some public notice when a business with several thousand employees is acquired. However, it is important that you do not infer the degree of financial importance to BPL from its news value to the public. We have something over $50 million invested, primarily in marketable securities, of which only about 10% is represented by our net investment in HK. We have an investment of over three times this much in a marketable security where our ownership will never come to public attention. This is not to say an HK is not important - a 10% holding definitely is. However, it is not as significant relative to our total operation as it would be easy to think. I still prefer the iceberg approach toward investment disclosure.

当一家拥有数千名员工的企业被收购时，难免会引起公众的一定关注。然而，重要的是，您不应从公众关注度来推断其对BPL的财务重要性。我们超过5000万美元的投资主要是有价证券，其中仅约10%代表我们对HK的净投资。我们在一只有价证券上的投资是这一数额的三倍多，而我们在该证券上的所有权永远也不会引起公众注意。这并不是说HK不重要——10%的仓位绝对重要。但相对于我们的整体运作而言，它并不像看起来那么举足轻重。我仍然倾向于在投资披露上采用冰山一角的方式。

It is my intention to value HK at yearend at cost plus our share of retained earnings since purchase. This policy will be followed in future years unless there is a demonstrable change in our position relative to other department stores or in other objective standards of value. Naturally we wouldn't have purchased HK unless we felt the price was quite attractive. Therefore, a valuation policy based upon cost may somewhat undervalue our holdings. Nevertheless, it seems the most objective figure to apply. All of our investments usually appear undervalued to me - otherwise we wouldn't own them.

我打算在年底按成本加上自收购以来我们所占的留存收益来对HK进行估值。除非我们相对于其他百货商店的地位或其他客观价值标准发生明显变化，否则未来年份都将遵循这一政策。当然，除非我们认为价格非常具有吸引力，否则我们不会收购HK。因此，基于成本的估值方法可能会略微低估我们的持仓。尽管如此，这似乎是最客观可用的数字。我通常认为我们所有的投资都显得被低估了——否则我们也不会持有它们。

Market Forecasting

市场预测

Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”

基本规则第六条（来自我们十一月的资料）写道：“我不从事预测整体股票市场或商业波动的业务。如果你认为我能做到这一点，或者认为这对于一项投资计划至关重要，那么你不应该加入合伙基金。”

Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.

当然，这条规则可能被批评为模糊、复杂、含糊不清等等。尽管如此，我相信绝大多数合伙人都很好地理解了这一点。我们买卖股票不是基于别人认为股市将要如何（我从来没有看法），而是基于我们认为公司将会如何。股市的走势在很大程度上将决定我们何时正确，但我们对公司分析的准确性将在很大程度上决定我们是否能够正确。换句话说，我们倾向于专注于应该发生什么，而不是何时发生。

In our department store business I can say with considerable assurance that December will be better than July. (Notice how sophisticated I have already become about retailing.) What really counts is whether December is better than last December by a margin greater than our competitors' and what we are doing to set the stage for future Decembers. However, in our partnership business I not only can't say whether December will be better than July, but I can't even say that December won't produce a very large loss. It sometimes does. Our investments are simply not aware that it takes 365-1/4 days for the earth to make it around the sun. Even worse, they are not aware that your celestial orientation (and that of the IRS) requires that I report to you upon the conclusion of each orbit (the earth's - not ours). Therefore, we have to use a standard other than the calendar to measure our progress. This yardstick is obviously the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow. We have a strong feeling that this competitor will do quite decently over a period of years (Christmas will come even if it's in July) and if we keep beating our competitor we will have to do something better than "quite decently". It's something like a retailer measuring his sales gains and profit margins against Sears' - beat them every year and somehow you'll see daylight.

在我们的百货商店业务中，我可以说相当肯定十二月份会比七月份好。（注意，我对零售业已经变得如此老练。）真正重要的是，十二月份是否比去年十二月份好，且优势大于竞争对手，以及我们正在为未来的十二月做哪些准备。然而，在我们的合伙业务中，我不仅无法说十二月是否会比七月好，甚至无法说十二月不会产生巨额亏损。有时确实如此。我们的投资并不知道地球绕太阳一圈需要365又1/4天。更糟糕的是，它们不知道你的天体方位（以及美国国税局的方位）要求我在每个轨道周期（地球的，不是我们的）结束时向你报告。因此，我们必须使用日历以外的标准来衡量我们的进展。这个标准显然是以道指为代表的整体证券投资经验。我们强烈感觉到，这个竞争对手在多年间将表现得相当不错（圣诞节总会到来，哪怕是在七月），如果我们持续击败这个竞争对手，我们将不得不做得比“相当不错”更好。这就好比零售商将自己的销售增长和利润率与西尔斯进行对比——每年都击败它，终究会见到光明。

I resurrect this "market-guessing" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2) if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect.

我重新提这个“猜市场”的话题，只是因为道指在二月份见顶995点后，于五月份跌至约865点，期间我接到几位合伙人的电话，说他们认为股市还会大幅下跌。这总是让我想起两个问题：（1）如果他们二月份就知道道指会在五月份跌到865点，为什么当时不告诉我呢？（2）如果他们二月份不知道接下来三个月会发生什么，到了五月份又怎么知道了呢？在每次大约一百点的下跌之后，也总会有一两个声音建议我们卖出，等待前景更明确。请允许我再次提出两点：（1）未来对我来说从来都不明确（如果未来几个月对你来说显而易见，或者甚至未来几个小时，请给我们打电话）；（2）似乎从来没有人会在市场上涨一百点后打电话给我，关注一切是多么不明确，尽管回过头来看，二月份的情形似乎也并不那么清晰。

If we start deciding, based on guesses or emotions, whether we will or won't participate in a business where we should have some long run edge, we're in trouble. We will not sell our interests in businesses (stocks) when they are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks the quotations may go lower even though such forecasts are obviously going to be right some of the time. Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because "experts" think prices are going higher. Who would think of buying or selling a private business because of someone's guess on the stock market? The availability of a question for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations in turn formulate your judgments. A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in chapter two (The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations) of Benjamin Graham's "The Intelligent Investor". In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than anything else that has been written.

如果我们开始根据猜测或情绪来决定是否参与一项我们本应拥有长期优势的业务，那我们就有麻烦了。我们不会仅仅因为某些占星家认为报价可能更低就卖出我们持有的价格具有吸引力的企业（股票），即使这样的预测显然有时会是正确的。同样，我们也不会因为“专家”认为价格将上涨而买入价格已完全反映价值的证券。谁会因为某人对股市的猜测而买卖一家私人企业呢？你的企业权益（股票）的可交易性应当始终是一种可供利用的资产。如果它在某个方向上变得足够愚蠢，你就加以利用。它的可交易性永远不应变成一种负担，以致其周期性的偏差反过来左右你的判断。本杰明·格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》第二章（投资者与股市波动）对这一思想进行了精彩的阐述。在我看来，这一章比任何其他投资著作都更具重要性。

We will have a letter out about November 1 with the Commitment Letter for 1967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation.

我们将在11月1日左右发出一封信，内含1967年的承诺书以及1966年的税务估算。

Cordially,

诚挚的，

Warren Buffett

沃伦·巴菲特

WEB eh

WEB eh