1964年7月8日致合伙人信

First Half Performance

上半年业绩

The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.

我们全家计划于6月23日启程前往加利福尼亚，因此我提前在6月18日写这份报告，稍微打点折扣。不过对于以收到我们信件为准来校对手表的各位，我会保持一贯的时序对称，留出几处空白，待比尔在最终6月30日数据出来后填入。

During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "DOW") advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.

1964年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）从762.95点上涨至831.50点。如果在此期间持有道指，将获得约14.40点的股息，从而使道指上半年的总回报率达到+10.0%。在我写下这些文字时（6月18日），看来我们的业绩将与道指相差无几。我更愿意向各位报告道指打平而我们赚了5%，或者更好的是道指跌了10%而我们刚好不赚不赔。然而我一再指出，在上涨的市场中，我们想跑赢道指，比在横盘或下跌市场中难得多。

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners' results:

为更新记录，下表总结了道指的表现、合伙企业在分配给普通合伙人之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的实际结果：

(See next page for footnotes to table.)

（脚注见下页。）

Footnotes to preceding table:

上表脚注：

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

(1) 基于道指价值每年的变化，加上当年通过持有道指可获得的股息。该表包含合伙企业所有完整运营年份。

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(2) 1957-61年的数据为所有前身有限合伙企业全年扣除所有费用后、但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人提成之前的合并业绩。

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(3) 1957-61年的数据基于前面合伙企业业绩栏计算，并根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人提成后得出，但未扣除有限合伙人每月提款。

Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.

上半年的买入活动相当令人满意。我对此尤为满意，因为我认为买入环节约占这项工作的90%。我们的“通用”类别现在包括三家公司，B.P.L.是其最大单一股东。这些股票一直以远低于其私人所有者价值的价格买入，并继续买入。其中一只我们已经买了大约18个月，另外两只大约一年。我们可能还会在未来至少一年、甚至两年或更长时间里，每周耐心地只买这些股票，对此我并不感到意外。

What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn't do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.

在上述三类情形中，我们最喜欢看到的是：公司在提高盈利、增加资产价值等方面取得重大进展，但股价却几乎不动，我们得以继续买入。这对我们的短期业绩贡献不大，尤其是在市场上涨时，但它能舒适且合乎逻辑地创造长期利润。这样的操作通常会导致两种情况：要么市场因外部因素而认可其价值，股价上涨；要么我们以极低廉的价格取得一家公司的控股权。哪一种结果我都满意。

It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.

不过，重要的是要认识到，我们“通用”类别中的大部分持仓，仍然是那些我们相信被大幅低估、但绝无可能取得控股权的证券。我们期待市场在一段合理的时间内验证我们的分析，但在这些证券上，我们没有上一段所说的一石二鸟之机。

Investment Companies

共同基金与封闭式投资公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们定期将自己的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行比较，前者的政策通常是95%-100%投资于普通股。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三洲公司和雷曼公司——管理着超过40亿美元的资产，大致代表了管理着280亿美元资产的投资公司行业的大多数。它们的业绩如下所示。我认为，这一表现与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的表现大体相当，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964.

(1) 根据当年资产价值变动加上对登记持有人的任何分配计算。
(2) 1957-63年数据来自1964年穆迪银行与金融手册；1964年上半年为估计值。

These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L's performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.

这些数字一再表明，薪酬最高、最受尊敬的投资管理机构也很难匹敌一个不受管理的蓝筹股指数。这些公司的表现，在某种程度上就像一只坐在池塘上的鸭子。当水位（市场）上升时，鸭子也跟着上升；当水位下降时，鸭子也随着回落。不论有没有动物保护协会，我认为鸭子只能因自己的活动而受到赞扬（或批评）。湖水的涨落可不是它该呱呱叫的事情。正如第一页上的表格所示，水位高低对B.P.L.的业绩极为重要。不过，我们也偶尔扑腾几下翅膀。

I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self-management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.

我想强调，我并不是说道指是衡量普通股投资业绩的唯一标准。但我确实认为，所有投资管理（包括自我管理）都应接受客观检验，而且标准应当事先选定，而不是事后方便地挑选。

The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.

资金管理是一门大生意。投资经理们十分重视评估汽车业、钢铁业、化工业等行业的公司管理层。这些评估耗费大量工作，通常以极其郑重的态度提交，致力于找出哪些公司管理良好，哪些公司管理薄弱。在费尽心力客观评估投资组合公司管理层之后，不对投资组合经理自身进行类似的检验，这实在令人奇怪。我们认为，投资者和投资管理机构必须建立业绩标准，并定期、客观地审视自己的业绩，就像审视自己的投资一样仔细。

We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.

我们将始终遵循这一方针，无论结果如何。也许不言自明：我们的业绩考评政策绝不保证良好结果——它只保证客观评估。我想强调《基本规则》中提到的关于标准应用的要点——即由于我们运作的性质，至少应以三年为基础来应用标准，而且在投机热潮中我们可能会落后。不过，有一件事我可以向你们保证。我们一开始用的是一把36英寸的尺子，我们会一直用下去。如果我们达不到标准，我们不会换尺子。在我看来，整个投资管理领域涉及数千亿美元，如果每人都有一把衡量能力的好尺子并明智地加以应用，这个行业会运行得更令人满意。大多数人在经营自己的生意时，评估市场、人员、机器、方法等，正是这样做的，而资金管理是世界上最大的生意。

Taxes

税务

We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of $2,991,090 which is all attributable to partners belonging during 1963. Through June 30th we have realized capital gains of $2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I'm glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are.

我们进入1964年时，有2,991,090美元的未实现净收益，全部归属于1963年加入的合伙人。截至6月30日，我们已实现资本收益2,826,248.76美元（其中96%为长期收益），因此看起来，至少您在1964年1月25日的信中（第3项）获知的、归属于您的所有未实现增值，极有可能在今年全部实现。我再次强调，这与我们的业绩表现毫无关系。有可能我在做出上述陈述的同时，自1月1日以来您持有的B.P.L.权益市值已大幅缩水，因此有大额已实现收益并不值得欢喜。同样，当我们的已实现收益非常少时，也未必有理由气馁。我们不会玩弄任何游戏来加速或推迟税收。我们根据对最有利的概率组合的评估来做出投资决策。如果这意味着要交税，我很高兴长期资本利得税率像现在这样低。

As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.

如我们在1964年4月1日最近一封税务信中所说，处理中期预估税的稳妥做法是，1964年的预估税与您1963年的实际税款相同。遵循此程序不会受到任何罚款。

The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course, be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date.

对于1月1日加入的合伙人，其纳税义务自然相当温和，任何合伙人的第一年都是如此。这是因为已实现资本收益首先归属于对未实现增值享有权益的老合伙人。这当然也与经济表现无关。所有有限合伙人，无论新旧（除合伙协议第五款规定的比尔·斯科特、露丝·斯科特和苏珊·巴菲特外），最终都获得完全相同的结果。与往常一样，迄今所有合伙人的普通净收入均微不足道。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest, to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy.

与往年一样，我们将在11月1日前后发出一封信（致合伙人以及届时已向我们表达意向的未来合伙人），其中包含合伙协议修订案、1965年的承诺书、1964年税务状况预估等。与此同时，这个夏天让比尔忙起来，把本信中任何模糊之处弄清楚。

Cordially,

谨致问候，

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特