1992年致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

1992年，我们的每股账面价值增长了20.3%。过去28年间（即自现任管理层执掌公司以来），账面价值已从19美元增至7,745美元，年复合增长率为23.6%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares.

本年度，伯克希尔的净资产增加了15.2亿美元。其中超过98%的收益来自投资组合的盈利和增值，其余则来自新股的发行。这些股份的发行，是由于我们于1993年1月4日宣布赎回可转换债券，部分持有人选择收取普通股而非现金所致。大多数选择转股的债券持有人等到1月份才行动，但也有少数在12月份转股，因此在1992年收到了股份。总结一下我们已发行4.76亿美元债券的情况：2,500万美元在年底前转为股份；4,600万美元在1月份转股；4.05亿美元被赎回为现金。转股价格均为每股11,719美元，因此我们总共发行了6,106股。

Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the company.

伯克希尔目前有1,152,547股流通在外。想必各位会有兴趣知道，1964年10月1日，即巴菲特合伙有限公司（Buffett Partnership, Ltd.）取得公司控制权的那个财年之初，流通股为1,137,778股。

We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners.

我们对于发行伯克希尔股票有着坚定的原则：只有在能够获得与我们给予的价值相等的情况下才发行。然而，由于我们一向对自己的股票估值很高，实现等值交换并不容易。但即便如此：我们只希望在扩大伯克希尔规模的同时，也能增加现有股东的财富。

Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they all?) When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management - visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition: "You must promise me," he said in effect, "that once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb."

这两个目标并不总是并行不悖，我们过去一段既有趣又损毁价值的经历就说明了这一点。当时，我们在一家银行有重大投资，其管理层一心想扩张（哪家银行不是呢？）。当我们的银行向一家更小的银行示好时，对方股东要求换股，其依据是收购标的的净资产和盈利能力估值超过收购方两倍以上。我们的管理层——显然头脑发热——立刻答应了。对方股东接着又提出了一个条件：“你得答应我，”他大致这么说，“一旦合并完成，我成为大股东，你永远不能再做这么蠢的交易了。”

You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth. Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have required that these securities be valued at their market prices (less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation) rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical industrial company.

各位应该记得，我们的目标是每年将每股内在价值——账面价值是其保守但有用的替代指标——提高15%。然而，这一目标无法以平稳的方式实现。平稳性尤其难以实现，原因在于会计准则要求我们保险公司持有的普通股按市价计价（扣除未实现净增值的税项调整），而非成本与市价孰低法，而这些投资组合占伯克希尔净资产的很大比重。1979年以来，GAAP一直有这样的规定。因此，股票价格的日常波动导致我们的年度业绩大幅震荡，尤其是与典型的工业公司相比。

To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results (including dividends) of the S&P 500.

为了说明我们业绩的波动性，以及市场波动对短期结果的影响，我们在背面页上展示了每股净资产的年度变化，并与标普500指数的年度回报（含股息）进行了对比。

You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years. Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P.

评估这些数据时，至少要有三个要点。第一个要点涉及我们经营的许多业务，其年度盈利不受股市估值变化的影响。这些业务对我们的绝对和相对业绩的影响，多年来已发生变化。早期，当时占净资产很大比重的纺织业务严重拖累了业绩，其平均回报远低于将资金投入标普500指数的水平。近些年来，随着我们聚集了一批优秀的企业和同样优秀的管理层，我们旗下业务的回报一直很高——通常远超标普500的回报。

A second important factor to consider - and one that significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote for it.

第二个需要考虑的重要因素，也是严重拖累我们相对业绩的因素，是我们证券投资产生的收入和资本利得都要承担沉重的公司税负，而标普500的回报是税前的。要理解这种损害，不妨想象在这28年期间，伯克希尔除了标普500指数什么也没持有。那样的话，税负将导致我们公司的业绩明显低于表中所示的标普500回报。根据现行税法，标普500指数上涨18%时，持有该指数的公司所获回报远不到13%。如果公司税率上升，这个问题会更加严重。这是我们不得不承受的结构性劣势，没有解药。

The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index.

第三个要点包含两个预测：伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格和我几乎可以肯定，未来十年投资标普500指数的回报将远低于过去十年；而且我们绝对确信，伯克希尔不断扩大的资本规模所产生的拖累，将大幅削弱我们相对于该指数的历史优势。

Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain: We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable, though slowed, pace.

做出第一个预测有些违背我们的本性：我们一直觉得，股市预测师唯一的价值就是让算命先生看起来更好。即便现在，查理和我仍然相信，短期市场预测是毒药，应该锁在安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在市场中行为像儿童的成年人。然而，很明显，股票不可能永远大幅超越其基础业务的表现，而它们已经这样戏剧性地表现了一段时间，这一事实使我们相当确信自己的预测：未来十年股票投资的回报将显著小于过去十年。我们的第二个结论——不断扩大的资本基础将像船锚一样拖累我们的相对业绩——似乎无可争议。唯一的问题是，我们能否以某种可容忍的、尽管放缓的速度拖着这个锚前行。

We will continue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.

我们将继续经历年度业绩的大幅波动。这源于股市的总体波动、我们股票投资集中在少数几家公司，以及我们所做的某些商业决策，尤其是将大量资源投入超级巨灾保险。我们不仅接受这种波动，而且欢迎它：对短期波动的容忍度提高了我们的长期前景。用棒球术语来说，衡量我们表现的指标是长打率，而非打击率。

The Salomon Interlude

所罗门插曲

Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshire's 1991-92 results that the company didn't miss me while I was gone. But the reverse isn't true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am.

去年六月，我在担任所罗门股份有限公司临时董事长十个月后卸任。从伯克希尔1991-92年的业绩可以看出，公司在我离开期间并未想念我。但反过来并非如此：我想念伯克希尔，很高兴能全职回归。世界上没有比经营伯克希尔更有趣的工作了，我为自己能身处此位感到幸运。

The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and worthwhile: In Fortune's annual survey of America's Most Admired Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its reputation. Additionally, Salomon Brothers, the securities subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last year - 34% above the previous high.

所罗门的职位虽然远非有趣，但却很有意思且有价值：在《财富》杂志去年九月进行的年度“美国最受尊敬公司”调查中，所罗门在311家公司中声誉提升幅度排名第二。此外，所罗门股份有限公司的证券子公司所罗门兄弟去年税前盈利创下纪录，比此前最高纪录高出34%。

Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon's problems and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not have survived. In their work, these men were tireless, effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be grateful to them.

许多人为解决所罗门的问题和使公司重回正轨提供了帮助，但有几位特别值得提及。毫不夸张地说，如果没有所罗门高管德里克·莫恩、鲍勃·德纳姆、唐·霍华德和约翰·麦克法兰的共同努力，公司很可能无法存活。他们在工作中不知疲倦、卓有成效、相互支持且无私奉献，我将永远感激他们。

Salomon's lead lawyer in its Government matters, Ron Olson of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting through this trouble. The firm's problems were not only severe, but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business and human skills. Ron had them all.

所罗门在与政府事务中的首席律师，芒格·托尔斯·奥尔森律师事务所的罗恩·奥尔森，也是我们成功渡过此次难关的关键。公司的问题不仅严重，而且复杂。至少有五家机构——美国证券交易委员会、纽约联邦储备银行、美国财政部、纽约南区联邦检察官办公室以及司法部反垄断司——对所罗门有重大关切。如果我们想以协调且迅速的方式解决问题，就需要一位拥有卓越法律、商业和人际技能的律师。罗恩三者兼备。

Acquisitions

收购

Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.

在伯克希尔的所有活动中，最令查理和我兴奋的，莫过于收购一家具有卓越经济特质、且管理层为我们所喜欢、信任和钦佩的企业。这样的收购并不容易，但我们一直在寻找。在寻找过程中，我们采取的态度或许与寻找配偶时并无二致：积极主动、有兴趣、心态开放是有益的，但着急则没有好处。

In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads. ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.") Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.

过去，我注意到许多渴望收购的经理人，显然是被童年读过的青蛙被公主亲吻的故事所迷惑。记着公主的成功，他们花大价钱去亲吻企业癞蛤蟆，期待奇迹般的转变。起初，令人失望的结果只会加深他们搜罗更多蛤蟆的欲望（桑塔亚那曾说：“狂热就是当你忘记了目标，却加倍努力。”）。最终，即使最乐观的经理人也必须面对现实。站在一堆无动于衷的蛤蟆里，他随后宣布一笔巨额“重组”费用。在这个相当于企业版启蒙计划的操作中，CEO接受了教育，而股东支付了学费。

In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads. They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads. I kissed and they croaked.

在我管理生涯的早期，我也曾约会过几只蛤蟆。它们都是廉价约会——我从来不是什么花花公子——但我的结果与那些追求高价蛤蟆的收购者不相上下。我亲吻了，它们呱呱叫。

After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous). Said the pro: "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.

在这类失败经历了几次之后，我终于想起了一位高尔夫职业教练曾给我的有用建议（这位教练和所有与我的球技有过交集的职业选手一样，希望匿名）。教练说：“练习不会带来完美；练习只会带来固化。”自那以后，我修改了策略，尝试以合理的价格买入优秀的企业，而非以低廉的价格买入平庸的企业。

Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of Central States Indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments for credit-card holders who are unable themselves to pay because they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently the company's annual premiums are about $90 million and profits about $10 million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill Kizer, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kizer family - which includes sons Bill, Dick and John - retains 18% ownership of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in the past. We could not be associated with better people.

去年12月，我们进行了一笔收购，这正是我们现在所寻找的收购的典型。我们收购了Central States Indemnity公司82%的股份，这是一家为因残疾或失业而无力还款的信用卡持有人提供月度赔付的保险公司。目前该公司年保费收入约为9,000万美元，利润约1,000万美元。Central States位于奥马哈，由我35年多的朋友比尔·凯泽管理。凯泽家族——包括他的儿子比尔、迪克和约翰——保留了公司18%的所有权，并将像过去一样继续经营。我们无法找到更好的人来合作了。

Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common with our first, made 26 years ago. At that time, we purchased another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company (along with a small sister company) from Jack Ringwalt, another long-time friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the case with Bill Kizer, thought of me when he wished to sell. (Jack's comment at the time: "If I don't sell the company, my executor will, and I'd rather pick the home for it.") National Indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and continued to be under Jack's management. Hollywood has had good luck with sequels; I believe we, too, will.

巧合的是，这桩最新的收购与我们26年前的第一笔收购有许多相似之处。当时，我们从另一位老朋友杰克·林沃特手中买下了奥马哈的另一家保险公司——国民赔偿公司（以及一家姐妹小公司）。杰克白手起家创建了这家公司，和比尔·凯泽一样，他在想出售时想到了我。（杰克当时的评论是：“如果我不卖掉公司，我的遗嘱执行人也会卖掉，我宁愿自己为它找个归宿。”）我们收购时，国民赔偿就是一家杰出的企业，在杰克的管理下依然如此。好莱坞在续集上运气不错；我相信我们也一样。

Berkshire's acquisition criteria are described on page 23. Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however, our subsidiaries sometimes make small "add-on" acquisitions that extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this manner, we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be outstanding - and that's a low-risk and high-return proposition. We made five acquisitions of this type in 1992, and one was not so small: At yearend, H. H. Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company, a business with $90 million in sales that makes Nursemates, a leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on opportunities, and we would expect these to contribute modestly to Berkshire's value in the future.

伯克希尔的收购标准见第23页。不过，除了母公司直接进行的收购外，我们的子公司有时也会进行较小的“附加”收购，以扩展其产品线或分销能力。通过这种方式，我们扩大了已知优秀经理人的管理范围——这是一个低风险、高回报的主张。1992年我们进行了五笔此类收购，其中一笔还不算太小：年底时，H. H. Brown收购了Lowell Shoe Company，这家公司销售额达9,000万美元，生产护士鞋领先品牌Nursemates及其他鞋类。我们的运营经理将继续寻找附加收购机会，我们预计这些收购未来将为伯克希尔的价值做出适度贡献。

Then again, a trend has emerged that may make further acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in 1991, buying H. H. Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has eight children. In 1992 our only deal was with Bill Kizer, father of nine. It won't be easy to keep this string going in 1993.

话说回来，出现了一种趋势，可能会使进一步收购变得困难。母公司1991年进行了一笔收购，买下了由弗兰克·鲁尼经营的H. H. Brown，鲁尼有八个孩子。1992年我们唯一的交易是与比尔·凯泽完成的，他是九个孩子的父亲。1993年要保持这一势头可不容易。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表列出了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在此列报中，商誉摊销及其他重大购买价格会计调整并未分摊到所涉及的具体业务，而是汇总并单独列示。这种方法让您能像我们未收购这些企业时那样，看到它们的盈利状况。在过去的报告中，我已经解释过为什么我们认为这种列报形式比GAAP要求的逐项调整更有用。我们表中显示的净利润总额，当然与经审计的财务报表中的GAAP总额完全一致。

(000s omitted)

（单位：千美元，省略000）

\* Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan. Includes $22.5 million in 1992 and $5.7 million in 1991 of premiums paid on the early redemption of debt.

\* 不包括斯科特·费策尔金融集团及互助储蓄与贷款的利息支出。包括1992年2,250万美元和1991年570万美元的提前偿债溢价。

A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 37-47, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. Our goal is to give you all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire.

有关这些业务的大量额外信息载于第37-47页，您还可以在那里看到按GAAP编制的分部盈利。我们的目标是向您提供查理和我认为在评估伯克希尔时重要的所有财务信息。

"Look-Through" Earnings

“透视”收益

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. Though no single figure can be perfect, we believe that the look-through number more accurately portrays the earnings of Berkshire than does the GAAP number.

我们之前讨论过透视收益，其构成包括：（1）上一节列报的营业利润；（2）主要被投资企业留存的营业利润，这些利润根据GAAP并未反映在我们的利润中；减去（3）如果这些被投资企业的留存收益已分配给我们，伯克希尔将缴纳的税款备抵。尽管任何单一数字都不可能完美，但我们认为透视收益比GAAP数字更准确地反映了伯克希尔的盈利。

I've told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Our look-through earnings in 1992 were $604 million, and they will need to grow to more than $1.8 billion by the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15% goal. For us to get there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill in capital allocation as well.

我曾告诉过你们，要使我们的内在商业价值以15%的速度增长，透视收益必须长期以约15%的速度增长。1992年我们的透视收益为6.04亿美元，若想实现15%的目标，到2000年它们需要增长到18亿美元以上。为实现这一目标，我们的运营子公司和被投资企业必须拿出出色的表现，我们也必须在资本配置上具备一定的技巧。

We cannot promise to achieve the $1.8 billion target. Indeed, we may not even come close to it. But it does guide our decision-making: When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what will maximize look-through earnings in 2000.

我们不能保证达到18亿美元的目标。事实上，我们甚至可能与之相去甚远。但它确实指导着我们的决策：今天在配置资本时，我们考虑的是如何在2000年最大化透视收益。

We do not, however, see this long-term focus as eliminating the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well. After all, we were thinking long-range thoughts five or ten years ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing harvests, something is wrong with the farmer. (Or perhaps with the farm: Investors should understand that for certain companies, and even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term strategy.) Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales and the like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long-term focus. (Even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about "jam tomorrow," finally insisted, "It must come sometimes to jam today.")

然而，我们不认为这种长期关注就消除了取得良好短期业绩的必要性。毕竟，我们在五年或十年前就着眼长远，当时的举措现在理应产生回报。如果满怀信心地播种后，接踵而至的却是令人失望的收成，那一定是农夫有问题（或者可能是农场本身有问题：投资者应当明白，对于某些公司，甚至某些行业，根本不存在好的长期战略）。正如你应该对那些通过会计手段、资产出售等手段美化短期盈利的经理人持怀疑态度一样，你也应该对那些长期无法交出成绩，却归咎于着眼长远的经理人持怀疑态度。（即使爱丽丝在听了王后关于“明天果酱”的说教后，也最终坚持说：“有时候今天也得有果酱。”）

The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

下表显示了我们对透视收益的计算方法，但我提醒您，这些数字必然非常粗略。（这些被投资企业支付给我们的股息已包含在第8页的营业利润中，主要反映在“保险集团：净投资收益”下。）

(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant

(1) 已扣除韦斯科的少数股东权益
(2) 按年度平均持股计算
(3) 不包括已实现的资本利得，这些利得反复出现且数额重大

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

以下是财产-意外保险行业关键数据的更新版本，沿用我们一贯的表格形式：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 106 - 110 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合成本率代表保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入之比：低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示承保亏损。比率越高，年份越差。当计入保险公司持保户资金（“浮存金”）所赚取的投资收益时，106-110之间的综合成本率通常会产生整体盈亏平衡的结果，其中不包括来自股东资金产生的收益。

About four points in the industry's 1992 combined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers. Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate. (It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.) One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital.

行业1992年综合成本率中约有四个百分点可归因于飓风安德鲁，该飓风造成了历史上最大的保险损失。安德鲁摧毁了几家小保险公司。此外，它让一些大公司意识到，它们应对巨灾的再保险保障远远不够。（只有当潮水退去，你才知道谁在裸泳。）有一家大型保险公司之所以能避免破产，仅仅是因为它有一个财力雄厚的母公司能迅速提供大量资本输血。

Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience.

尽管安德鲁的破坏已经很大，但如果它袭击佛州的位置再向北20到30英里，或者袭击路易斯安那州时再偏东一些，破坏性可能会大得多。总而言之，许多公司将因安德鲁的经历而重新思考其再保险安排。

As you know we are a large writer - perhaps the largest in the world - of "super-cat" coverages, which are the policies that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from Andrew, suffering losses from it of about $125 million, an amount roughly equal to our 1992 super-cat premium income. Our other super-cat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only $2 million for the year. (In addition, our investee, GEICO, suffered a net loss from Andrew, after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings, of about $50 million, of which our share is roughly $25 million. This loss did not affect our operating earnings, but did reduce our look-through earnings.)

如各位所知，我们是“超级巨灾”保单的大型承保人——也许是世界上最大的，这类保单是其他保险公司为保护自身免受重大巨灾损失而购买的。因此，我们也因安德鲁遭受了损失，损失金额约为1.25亿美元，大致相当于我们1992年的超级巨灾保费收入。但我们的其他超级巨灾损失微乎其微。因此，这一业务全年总体亏损仅为200万美元。（此外，我们的被投资企业GEICO在安德鲁中也遭受了约5,000万美元的净损失，已扣除再保险赔款和税收节省，其中我们应占份额约为2,500万美元。这一损失未影响我们的营业利润，但减少了我们的透视收益。）

In last year's report I told you that I hoped that our super-cat business would over time achieve a 10% profit margin. But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely to be "either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable." Instead, both 1991 and 1992 have come in close to a break-even level. Nonetheless, I see these results as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this business.

在去年的报告中我曾告诉各位，我希望我们的超级巨灾业务能长期实现10%的利润率。但我也提醒说，在任何单一年份，该业务很可能会“要么大赚，要么大亏”。然而，1991年和1992年都接近盈亏平衡。尽管如此，我认为这些结果是反常的，并坚持我的预测：该业务的年度盈利将出现巨大波动。

Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super-cat policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount - that's the policyholder's "retention" - from a catastrophe; and second, industry-wide insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum level, which usually is $3 billion or more. In most cases, the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such as a portion of the U.S., the entire U.S., or everywhere other than the U.S. Also, many policies are not activated by the first super-cat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only a "second-event" or even a third- or fourth-event. Finally, some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type, such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large: We have one policy that calls for us to pay $100 million to the policyholder if a specified catastrophe occurs. (Now you know why I suffer eyestrain: from watching The Weather Channel.)

让我提醒各位关于我们超级巨灾保单的一些特点。一般来说，它们只有在两个条件同时满足时才会被触发。第一，我们提供保障的直接保险公司或再保险公司必须因一次巨灾遭受特定金额的损失——即保单持有人的“自留额”；第二，该巨灾的行业总保险损失必须超过某个最低水平，通常是30亿美元或以上。在大多数情况下，我们签发的保单只覆盖特定的地理区域，例如美国的一部分、整个美国，或美国以外的所有地区。此外，许多保单不会被首次满足条款的超级巨灾触发，而是仅覆盖“二次事件”，甚至三次、四次事件。最后，有些保单只由特定类型的巨灾触发，如地震。我们的风险敞口很大：我们有一份保单约定，如果发生特定的巨灾，我们将向保单持有人支付1亿美元。（现在各位知道我为什么眼睛疲劳了：因为看天气频道看太多了。）

Currently, Berkshire is second in the U.S. property-casualty industry in net worth (the leader being State Farm, which neither buys nor sells reinsurance). Therefore, we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company. We have the appetite as well: As Berkshire's net worth and earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also. But let me add that means good business. The saying, "a fool and his money are soon invited everywhere," applies in spades in reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength: Ajit Jain, who runs our reinsurance operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination, these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the super-cat business so long as prices are appropriate.

目前，伯克希尔在美国财产-意外保险行业中净资产排名第二（领先者是State Farm，它既不购买也不出售再保险）。因此，我们有能力承担几乎其他所有公司都不感兴趣的规模风险。我们也有意愿：随着伯克希尔净资产和盈利的增长，我们承保的意愿也在增加。但我要补充一点，那指的是好业务。俗话说“傻瓜和他的钱很快就到处受欢迎”，这在再保险领域尤其适用，我们实际上拒绝了超过98%的报价。我们在好坏提案间做出选择的能力，反映了与财务实力相匹配的管理优势：负责我们再保险业务的阿吉特·贾恩，就是这一行中最优秀的。这些优势共同保证，只要价格合适，我们将一直是超级巨灾业务中的重要参与者。

What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can't simply extrapolate past experience. If there is truly "global warming," for example, the odds would shift, since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U.S. coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, the number one creator of super-cats. A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now.

当然，什么是合适的价格很难确定。巨灾保险公司不能简单地根据历史经验外推。例如，如果真的存在“全球变暖”，概率就会改变，因为大气条件的微小变化可能引发天气模式的剧变。此外，近年来美国沿海地区的人口和保险价值激增，这些地区特别容易受到飓风——头号超级巨灾制造者——的袭击。20年前造成x美元损失的飓风，现在轻易就会造成10倍的损失。

Occasionally, also, the unthinkable happens. Who would have guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston, S.C.? (It struck in 1886, registered an estimated 6.6 on the Richter scale, and caused 60 deaths.) And who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated 8.7 shocker in 1812. By comparison, the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7.1 - and remember that each one-point Richter increase represents a ten-fold increase in strength. Someday, a U.S. earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers.

有时，不可思议的事情也会发生。例如，谁能想到南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿会发生大地震？（这场地震发生于1886年，估计里氏6.6级，造成60人死亡。）又有谁能想到，我国最严重的地震会发生在密苏里州的新马德里，那里在1812年遭遇了估计8.7级的地震。相比之下，1989年旧金山地震为7.1级——请记住，里氏每增加一级，强度增加十倍。总有一天，一场远离加利福尼亚的美国地震将给保险公司造成巨大损失。

When viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand that our accounting for super-cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording our super-cat premiums on a pro-rata basis over the life of a given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires. We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super-cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that weather tends to kick up: Of the ten largest insured losses in U.S. history, nine occurred in the last half of the year. In addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely, by their very terms, to cause us losses until late in the year.

在审视我们的季度数据时，各位应当明白，我们对超级巨灾保费的会计处理与其他保费不同。我们不是按比例在保单有效期内确认收入，而是推迟到损失发生或保单到期时才确认。我们采取这种保守的做法，是因为巨灾造成损失的可能性尤其在年底时特别大。那时天气往往变得恶劣：美国历史上最大的十次保险损失中，有九次发生在下半年。此外，那些不会被首次事件触发的保单，按其条款本身，也不太可能在一年的早些时候造成损失。

The bottom-line effect of our accounting procedure for super-cats is this: Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter.

我们的超级巨灾会计处理的最终结果是：重大损失可能在任一季度上报，但重大利润只会在第四季度上报。

As I've told you in each of the last few years, what counts in our insurance business is "the cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float." Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.

正如过去几年我每次都告诉各位的，我们的保险业务关键在于“保险所产生资金的成本”，通俗地说就是“浮存金的成本”。我们创造了巨额的浮存金，浮存金是损失准备金、损失调整费用准备金和未到期保费准备金的总和，减去代理人余额、预付承保费用和适用于分入再保险的递延费用。浮存金的成本由我们的承保亏损来衡量。

Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U.S. Government on its newly-issued long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government's rate, and often we have done so by a wide margin. (If, on average, we didn't beat the Government's rate, there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business.)

去年，我们的保险业务再次以低于美国政府新发行长期债券的利率获得了资金。这意味着在涉足保险业务的26年中，我们有21年的资金成本低于政府利率，而且常常是大幅低于。（如果平均而言我们无法战胜政府利率，那么我们就没有经济理由从事这一业务。）

In 1992, as in previous years, National Indemnity's commercial auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, and our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby generating float at a less-than-zero cost. The bulk of our float, meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993.

1992年，与往年一样，由唐·沃斯特领导的国民赔偿公司商业汽车和一般责任业务，以及由罗德·埃尔德雷德领导的本地业务，对我们浮存金的低成本做出了卓越贡献。事实上，这两项业务去年均实现了承保利润，从而以低于零的成本产生了浮存金。与此同时，我们大部分的浮存金来自阿吉特开发的大型交易。他的努力很可能使1993年浮存金进一步增长。

Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business, either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity.

查理和我仍然喜欢保险业务，我们预计它将在未来几十年继续成为我们的主要盈利来源。这个行业规模巨大；在某些领域我们可以参与全球竞争；而且伯克希尔拥有重要的竞争优势。我们将寻找扩大参与该业务的方式，无论是通过像GEICO这样的间接方式，还是像收购Central States Indemnity这样的直接方式。

Common Stock Investments

普通股投资

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

以下列出了我们市值超过1亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中有一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不到100%的子公司。

Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these companies changed during 1992 in only four cases: We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy.

撇除拆股因素，我们这些公司的持股数量在1992年仅有四处变化：我们适度增持了健力士和富国银行，将对房地美的持仓增加了一倍多，并新建仓了通用动力。我们喜欢买入。

Selling, however, is a different story. There, our pace of activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel. With no T.V. in his room, he faced an evening of boredom. But his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled "Things to do in Podunk." Opening it, he found just a single sentence: "You're doing it."

然而，卖出就另当别论了。在这方面，我们的行动节奏堪比一位被迫滞留在波当克小镇唯一旅馆的旅客。房间里没有电视，他面临一个无聊的夜晚。但当他瞥见床头桌上有一本名为《波当克可做之事》的书时，精神为之一振。翻开书，他发现里面只有一句话：“你正在做呢。”

We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase. I had paid little attention to the company until last summer, when it announced it would repurchase about 30% of its shares by way of a Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small profit. We've made the same sort of commitment perhaps a half-dozen times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return for the short periods our money has been tied up.

我们在通用动力的买入上很幸运。此前我很少关注这家公司，直到去年夏天，它宣布将通过荷兰式招标回购约30%的股份。看到套利机会，我开始为伯克希尔买入该股，期望通过投标出让持股获得小额利润。过去几年我们大约有过五六次类似的交易，在资金占用的短期内获得了不错的回报。

But then I began studying the company and the accomplishments of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO. And what I saw made my eyes pop: Bill had a clearly articulated and rational strategy; he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in carrying it out; and the results were truly remarkable.

但随后我开始研究这家公司以及比尔·安德斯在担任CEO的短暂时间内取得的成就。我所看到的令我瞠目：比尔拥有明确清晰而理性的战略；他专注且以一种紧迫感在贯彻执行；结果确实非同凡响。

In short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided that Berkshire should become a long-term investor with Bill. We were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month period, we were able to purchase 14% of the General Dynamics shares that remained outstanding after the tender was completed.

我不久就放弃了套利的想法，决定伯克希尔应与比尔一道成为长期投资者。我们之所以能获得大量持仓，得益于招标大大增加了股票的交易量。在一个月的时间内，我们买入了招标结束后仍流通在外的通用动力股份的14%。

Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report: "We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price." We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive price" for "a very attractive price."

我们的股票投资策略与十五年前相比变化不大，当时我们在1977年年报中写道：“我们选择可流通证券的方式，在很大程度上与我们评估一家整体收购的企业无异。我们希望这家企业（a）是我们能够理解的；（b）具有有利的长期前景；（c）由诚实且有能力的人经营；且（d）能够以非常有吸引力的价格买到。”我们发现仅有理由对这一信条做一个改动：由于市场状况和我们的规模，我们现在将“非常有吸引力的价格”替换为“有吸引力的价格”。

But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"? In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition: "value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.

但你会问，如何确定什么是“有吸引力的”？在回答这一问题时，大多数分析师认为他们必须在两种通常被认为相互对立的方法之间做出选择：“价值”与“成长”。事实上，许多投资专业人士认为将这两个术语混为一谈是一种知识分子的异装癖。

We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.

我们认为这是模糊的思维（必须承认，我自己多年前也曾如此）。我们认为，这两种方法密不可分：成长始终是计算价值的一个组成部分，它构成一个变量，其重要性可能从微不足道到极其巨大，其影响可能是负面的，也可能是正面的。

In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our view - financially fattening).

此外，我们认为“价值投资”这一术语本身就是多余的。如果不是寻求至少能证明支付价格合理性的价值，“投资”又是什么呢？有意识地以高于计算价值的价格购买股票——寄希望于能很快以更高的价格卖出——应被称为投机（这既不非法，不道德，在我们看来也非财务上的肥肉）。

Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly, opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way inconsistent with a "value" purchase.

无论是否恰当，“价值投资”一词被广泛使用。通常，它意味着购买具有低市净率、低市盈率或高股息率等特征的股票。不幸的是，这些特征，即便同时出现，也远不能决定投资者是否确实是以物有所值的价格买入，从而真正遵循了在投资中获取价值的原则。相应地，相反的特征——高市净率、高市盈率和低股息率——也绝不等同于不是“价值”型买入。

Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.

同样，企业成长本身告诉我们关于价值的信息很少。确实，成长通常对价值有正面影响，有时甚至影响巨大。但这种影响绝非确定无疑。例如，投资者不断向国内航空业注入资金，以资助无利可图（甚至更糟）的增长。对这些投资者来说，如果奥维尔当初在基蒂霍克没能飞上天，结果会好得多：该行业增长越大，对所有者的灾难就越严重。

Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words, only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.

只有当相关企业能够以诱人的增量回报进行投资时，成长才对投资者有利——换句话说，只有当用于支持成长的每一美元创造了超过一美元的长期市场价值时。对于需要增量资金的低回报企业，成长反而会伤害投资者。

In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity "coupons."

在50多年前写成的《投资价值理论》中，约翰·伯尔·威廉斯提出了价值的方程式，我们将其概括如下：任何股票、债券或企业今天的价值，都取决于在资产剩余寿命期间预期发生的现金流入和流出，以适当的利率贴现。请注意，这个公式对股票和债券是一样的。即便如此，两者之间存在一个重要且难以处理的不同：债券有息票和到期日来界定未来现金流；但就股票而言，投资分析师必须自行估计未来的“息票”。此外，管理层的质量极少影响债券息票——主要是在管理层极其无能或不诚实，以至于暂停支付利息时。相比之下，管理能力可极大地影响股票的“息票”。

The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't, displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable: When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment, they should be bought.

通过现金流量折现计算得出的最便宜的投资，就是投资者应当购买的那个——无论企业增长与否，盈利波动还是平稳，或者相对于当前盈利和账面价值的价格高低。此外，虽然价值等式通常显示股票比债券便宜，但这一结果并非必然：当债券被计算为更具吸引力的投资时，就应买入债券。

Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.

撇开价格问题不谈，最好的企业是那种能够长时间以极高的回报率运用大量新增资本的企业。最差的企业是那种必须、或将会做相反之事的企业——即持续以极低的回报率运用越来越多的资本。不幸的是，第一种企业很难找到：大多数高回报企业所需资本相对较少。如果这类企业将大部分收益以股息形式支付或进行大规模股票回购，其股东通常会获益。

Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.

尽管评估股票所需的数学计算并不困难，但分析师——即使经验丰富、头脑聪明——也容易在估计未来“息票”时出错。在伯克希尔，我们试图通过两种方式应对这个问题。首先，我们努力坚守我们认为自己能够理解的企业。这意味着它们必须相对简单、性质稳定。如果一家企业复杂或不断变化，我们就不够聪明，无法预测未来现金流。顺便说一句，这一缺陷并不困扰我们。对于大多数人在投资中重要的，不是他们知道多少，而是他们如何现实地界定自己不知道什么。投资者只要避免犯重大错误，就极少需要做对多少事。

Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success.

第二，同样重要的是，我们坚持在买入价格上要有安全边际。如果我们计算出一只普通股的价值仅略高于其价格，我们就没兴趣买入。我们相信，本·格雷厄姆如此强调的安全边际原则，是投资成功的基石。

Fixed-Income Securities

固定收益证券

Below we list our largest holdings of fixed-income securities:

以下列出了我们最大的固定收益证券持仓：

(1) Carrying value in our financial statements
(2) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me

(1) 财务报表中的账面价值
(2) 由查理和我确定的公允价值

During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had some of our WPPSS bonds called, and sold our RJR Nabisco position.

1992年，我们增持了ACF债券，部分WPPSS债券被赎回，并出售了RJR纳比斯科的持仓。

Over the years, we've done well with fixed-income investments, having realized from them both large capital gains (including $80 million in 1992) and exceptional current income. Chrysler Financial, Texaco, Time-Warner, WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were particularly good investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed-income losses have been negligible: We've had thrills but so far no spills.

多年来，我们在固定收益投资上表现不错，从中实现了大笔资本利得（包括1992年的8,000万美元）和丰厚的当期收益。克莱斯勒金融、德士古、时代华纳、WPPSS和RJR纳比斯科对我们来说是特别好的投资。与此同时，我们的固定收益损失微乎其微：我们有过惊险，但迄今没有翻船。

Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette preferred, which converted to common stock in 1991, and despite our reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds, our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to that we have achieved with purchases made in the secondary market. This is actually the result we expected. It corresponds with our belief that an intelligent investor in common stocks will do better in the secondary market than he will do buying new issues.

尽管我们的吉列优先股投资取得了成功，该优先股于1991年转换为普通股，且尽管我们通过协商购买的其他优先股也取得了合理的回报，但我们在这类购买上的整体表现逊色于我们在二级市场上购买的表现。这实际上是我们预期到的结果。它与我们的信念相符：聪明的普通股投资者在二级市场的表现将优于购买新股。

The reason has to do with the way prices are set in each instance. The secondary market, which is periodically ruled by mass folly, is constantly setting a "clearing" price. No matter how foolish that price may be, it's what counts for the holder of a stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell, of whom there are always going to be a few at any moment. In many instances, shares worth x in business value have sold in the market for 1/2x or less.

原因在于每种情况下的定价方式。二级市场时常由群体性愚蠢所主导，它不断设定“清算”价格。无论这个价格多么愚蠢，对于需要或希望卖出的股票或债券持有者来说，那就是重要的，而任何时刻总会有少数这样的持有者。在许多情况下，内在商业价值为x的股票，在市场上的售价仅为1/2x或更低。

The new-issue market, on the other hand, is ruled by controlling stockholders and corporations, who can usually select the timing of offerings or, if the market looks unfavorable, can avoid an offering altogether. Understandably, these sellers are not going to offer any bargains, either by way of a public offering or in a negotiated transaction: It's rare you'll find x for 1/2x here. Indeed, in the case of common-stock offerings, selling shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel the market is overpaying. (These sellers, of course, would state that proposition somewhat differently, averring instead that they simply resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods.)

另一方面，新股发行市场则由控股股东和公司所主导，他们通常能选择发行的时机，或者如果市场看起来不利，可以完全避免发行。可以理解的是，这些卖家不会提供任何便宜货，无论是通过公开发行还是协商交易：在这里，你很少会遇到x换1/2x的情况。事实上，在普通股发行中，持有股份的卖家往往只有在觉得市场定价过高时才有动力抛售。（这些卖家当然会用不同的方式表述这一命题，声称他们只是抵制在市场对其货品支付不足时出售。）

To date, our negotiated purchases, as a group, have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual Report: "Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios." In truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open-market purchases of the type we like. But both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to do.

迄今为止，我们通过协商进行的购买总体上达到了，但未超过我们在1989年年报中设定的预期：“我们的优先股投资应产生略高于大多数固定收益投资组合的回报。”事实上，如果我们能将投入协商交易的钱投入到我们喜欢的那种公开市场购买中，我们的表现会更好。但我们的规模以及市场的整体强势使得这一点难以做到。

There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report: "We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business, the airline industry, or the paper industry." At the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance. Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth.

1989年年报中还有一句令人难忘的话：“我们没有能力预测投资银行业、航空业或造纸业的经济学。”当时，你们中有些人可能怀疑这一对无知的坦白。然而现在，就连我母亲也承认这话的真实性。

In the case of our commitment to USAir, industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check. As I've previously mentioned, it was I who happily jumped into the pool; no one pushed me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as if they are members of a competitive tontine, which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible.

就我们对全美航空的承诺而言，行业经济状况在我们支票上的墨水未干之前就已恶化。正如我之前提到的，是我自己高兴地跳进泳池的；没人推我。是的，我知道这个行业竞争激烈，但我没想到其领导者会进行旷日持久的自杀式行为。过去两年，航空公司表现得就像它们是竞争性唐提式养老金的成员，希望尽快结束这一切。

Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline. He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company. Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been equally disastrous: The company was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over time any high-cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the strike was settled in a few days.

在这场混乱中，全美航空的CEO塞思·斯科菲尔德在重新定位航空公司方面做了真正非凡的工作。他尤其勇敢地接受了去年秋天的一场罢工，如果罢工持续下去，很可能使公司破产。然而，向罢工的工会屈服同样会是灾难性的：公司背负的工资成本和工作规则远比其主要竞争对手的沉重，而且很明显，随着时间的推移，任何高成本生产商都面临灭绝。令所有人高兴的是，罢工几天内就解决了。

A competitively-beset business such as USAir requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics. Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.

像全美航空这样竞争激烈的企业，需要比经济状况良好的企业多得多的管理技能。然而不幸的是，在航空业，技能的短期回报仅仅是生存，而非繁荣。

In early 1993, USAir took a major step toward assuring survival - and eventual prosperity - by accepting British Airways' offer to make a substantial, but minority, investment in the company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were asked to join the USAir board. We agreed, though this makes five outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee's management and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well.

1993年初，全美航空通过接受英国航空公司进行重大少数股权投资，朝着确保生存——以及最终的繁荣——迈出了重要一步。就这笔交易，查理和我被邀请加入全美航空董事会。我们同意了，尽管这使我有了五个外部董事职位，对于一个活跃的CEO来说，这超出了我认为可取的数量。即便如此，如果被投资企业的管理层和董事认为查理和我加入其董事会特别重要，我们乐意这样做。我们期望被投资公司的经理人努力增加他们所经营企业的价值，而大股东有时也应尽自己的一份力。

Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More

两项新会计准则及再呼吁一项

A new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes becomes effective in 1993. It undoes a dichotomy in our books that I have described in previous annual reports and that relates to the accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our investment portfolio. At yearend 1992, that appreciation amounted to $7.6 billion. Against $6.4 billion of that, we carried taxes at the current 34% rate. Against the remainder of $1.2 billion, we carried an accrual of 28%, the tax rate in effect when that portion of the appreciation occurred. The new accounting rule says we must henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate, which to us seems sensible.

一项关于递延税项的新会计准则将于1993年生效。它消除了我们账面上的一种二分法，我在以前的年报中曾描述过这一点，这与我们投资组合中未实现增值所计提的应计税款有关。1992年底，该增值达76亿美元。其中的64亿美元，我们按当前34%的税率计提了税款。对于其余的12亿美元，我们按28%计提，这是该部分增值发生时的适用税率。新的会计准则说，我们必须从此按当前税率计提所有递延税项，我们认为这很合理。

The new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of 1993 we will apply a 34% rate to all of our unrealized appreciation, thereby increasing the tax liability and reducing net worth by $70 million. The new rule also will cause us to make other minor changes in our calculation of deferred taxes.

新的指令意味着，在1993年第一季度，我们将对全部未实现增值适用34%的税率，从而增加税项负债并减少净资产7,000万美元。新规则还将导致我们在计算递延税项时做出其他微小变化。

Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in the liability for deferred taxes and, correspondingly, in net worth. The impact could well be substantial. Nevertheless, what is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell securities, when unrealized appreciation becomes realized.

未来税率的变化将立即反映在递延税项负债中，并相应地反映在净资产中。其影响很可能相当重大。尽管如此，最终重要的是我们出售证券时的税率，那时未实现增值将变为已实现。

Another major accounting change, whose implementation is required by January 1, 1993, mandates that businesses recognize their present-value liability for post-retirement health benefits. Though GAAP has previously required recognition of pensions to be paid in the future, it has illogically ignored the costs that companies will then have to bear for health benefits. The new rule will force many companies to record a huge balance-sheet liability (and a consequent reduction in net worth) and also henceforth to recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating annual profits.

另一项重大的会计变更，要求自1993年1月1日起实施，规定企业必须确认其退休后医疗福利的现时负债。尽管GAAP此前已要求确认未来需支付的养老金，但其不合逻辑地忽略了公司届时将承担的医疗福利成本。新规则将迫使许多公司记录巨额的资产负债表负债（并相应地减少净资产），并且从此在计算年度利润时确认大幅增加的成本。

In making acquisitions, Charlie and I have tended to avoid companies with significant post-retirement liabilities. As a result, Berkshire's present liability and future costs for post-retirement health benefits - though we now have 22,000 employees - are inconsequential. I need to admit, though, that we had a near miss: In 1982 I made a huge mistake in committing to buy a company burdened by extraordinary post-retirement health obligations. Luckily, though, the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control. Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report, I said: "If we were to introduce graphics to this report, illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold." Even so, I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as they did. Another buyer appeared, the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down, and thousands of workers found those bountiful health-care promises to be largely worthless.

在进行收购时，查理和我倾向于避开那些拥有重大退休后负债的公司。因此，伯克希尔当前的退休后医疗福利负债和未来成本——尽管我们现在有22,000名员工——微不足道。但我需要承认，我们曾差点踩中。1982年，我犯了个大错，承诺收购一家背负着沉重退休后医疗义务的公司。不过幸运的是，由于我们无法控制的原因，交易未能达成。我在1982年年报中报道这一事件时说：“如果我们今年要在报告中加入图表来展示过去一年中有利的业务发展，那么两页描绘这笔流产交易的空白页面将是最合适的插页。”即便如此，我也没想到情况会变得那么糟。另一个买家出现了，那家公司很快就破产关门了，成千上万的工人发现那些慷慨的医疗承诺几乎一文不值。

In recent decades, no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his company become an insurer of uncapped post-retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install. A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business. Nevertheless, many a manager blithely committed his own company to a self-insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises - and thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences. In health-care, open-ended promises have created open-ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global competitiveness of major American industries.

近几十年来，没有哪个CEO会想到向董事会提议，让他的公司为其他公司设立的没有上限的退休后医疗福利提供保险。CEO不需要是医学专家也能明白，不断延长的预期寿命和飙升的医疗成本，会确保保险公司在这类业务上遭受财务重创。然而，许多经理人却轻率地将自己公司投入了一个自保计划，其中包含了完全相同的承诺——从而注定让股东承受必然的后果。在医疗保健领域，无上限的承诺已造成无上限的负债，个别案例中，这些负债大到足以威胁美国主要产业的全球竞争力。

I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not, for so long, require the booking of post-retirement health costs as they were incurred. Instead, the rules allowed cash-basis accounting, which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up. In effect, the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was "out-of-sight, out-of-mind." Ironically, some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing "cash-basis" thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size.

我认为，这种鲁莽行为的部分原因在于，会计准则长期不要求在实际发生时入账退休后医疗成本。相反，规则允许现金制会计，这大大低估了累积的负债。实际上，管理层及其会计师对这些负债的态度是“眼不见，心不烦”。具有讽刺意味的是，同样是这些经理人中，有些人会迅速批评国会在社会保障承诺或其他造成巨大未来负债的项目上采用“现金制”思维。

Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles: "How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg?" The answer: "Four, because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg." It behooves managers to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg.

思考会计问题的经理人永远不应忘记亚伯拉罕·林肯最喜欢的一个谜语：“如果你把狗的尾巴叫做腿，狗有几条腿？”答案是：“四条，因为把尾巴叫做腿并不能让它成为腿。”经理人应当记住，即使审计师愿意证明尾巴是腿，林肯也是对的。

The most egregious case of let's-not-face-up-to-reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options. In Berkshire's 1985 annual report, I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of options. But even when options are structured properly, they are accounted for in ways that make no sense. The lack of logic is not accidental: For decades, much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers, trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue them.

高管和会计师逃避现实的最恶劣案例，发生在股票期权领域。在伯克希尔1985年的年报中，我阐述了自己对期权的使用和滥用的看法。但即使期权结构合理，其会计处理也毫无道理。这种缺乏逻辑并非偶然：几十年来，商业世界中的许多人一直在与会计准则制定者对抗，试图不让股票期权的成本反映在发行公司的利润中。

Typically, executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored. At other times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small start-up businesses. Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that "out-of-the-money" options (those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price) have no value when they are issued.

通常，高管们辩称期权难以估值，因此其成本应被忽略。其他时候，经理人说，给期权分配成本会伤害小型初创企业。有时他们甚至郑重声明，“价外”期权（行权价等于或高于当前市价的期权）在发行时毫无价值。

Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a variation on that theme, opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they "aren't dollars out of a company's coffers." I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you're a CEO and subscribe to this "no cash-no cost" theory of accounting, I'll make you an offer you can't refuse: Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long-term options on your company's stock.

奇怪的是，机构投资者理事会也加入了这一论调，提出了一个变体，认为期权不应被视为成本，因为它们“不是从公司金库中拿出的美元”。我认为这种推理为美国企业立即提高报告利润提供了令人兴奋的可能性。例如，它们可以通过支付期权来消除保险成本。因此，如果你是CEO，并赞同这种“无现金即无成本”的会计理论，我将给你一个无法拒绝的提议：致电伯克希尔，我们将很乐意用保险换取你公司的一篮子长期股票期权。

Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now, accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual loan loss charge ought to be. And the estimates of losses that property-casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.

股东们应当明白，当公司向另一方交付有价值的东西时，成本就已经发生，而不仅仅是在现金易手时。此外，说一项重要的成本项目仅仅因为无法被极其精确地量化就不应被确认，既是愚蠢的也是玩世不恭的。目前，会计中充满了不精确性。毕竟，没有哪个经理或审计师知道一架波音747能飞多久，这意味着他也不知道这架飞机的年度折旧费用应该是多少。没人确切知道一家银行的年度贷款损失准备应为多少。而财险公司对损失的估计则出了名的不准确。

Does this mean that these important items of cost should be ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get right down to it, what other item of major but hard-to-precisely-calculate cost - other, that is, than stock options - does the accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of earnings?

这是否意味着这些重要的成本项目仅仅因为无法绝对精确地量化就应该被忽略呢？当然不是。相反，这些成本应由诚实而有经验的人进行估计，然后入账。说到底，除了股票期权，会计职业界还说过哪一项重大但难以精确计算的成本应在计算盈利时被忽略呢？

Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value. Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In fact, since I'm in the mood for offers, I'll make one to any executive who is granted a restricted option, even though it may be out of the money: On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newly-issued options have little or no value, tell him to try us out. In truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.

此外，期权并没有那么难以估值。诚然，由于授予高管的期权有各种限制，难度有所增加。这些限制会影响价值，但它们并不会消除价值。事实上，既然我有兴致提提议，我将对任何获授受限期权的执行官提出一个要约，即使该期权可能处于价外：在发行日，伯克希尔将支付他或她一大笔钱，以换取其未来从该期权中实现的任何收益的权利。因此，如果你发现某位CEO声称其新发行的期权价值极低或没有价值，告诉他来试试我们。事实上，我们对确定期权合理买入价的信心，远远超过对确定公司飞机合适折旧率的信心。

It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized quite simply: If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?

在我看来，股票期权的现实情况可以很简单地总结：如果期权不是一种报酬形式，那它们是什么？如果报酬不是一项费用，那它是什么？还有，如果费用不应计入盈利的计算，那它们到底该去哪儿？

The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business executives on the option-accounting issue. Additionally, the lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate by-product: In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society - about which it may have much of value to say - when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.

会计职业界和美国证券交易委员会应感到羞耻，因为他们长期以来在期权会计问题上听任企业高管的摆布。此外，高管们所从事的游说可能产生一个不幸的副作用：在我看来，商业精英们在对自身重要的问题上鼓吹荒谬之事时，会冒着在对社会意义重大的问题（对此他们可能有很多有价值的话可说）上丧失信誉的风险。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First, Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for twenty-five years, will give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a jolt.

今年我们有两件令人遗憾的消息。第一，我的25年朋友兼助理格拉迪斯·凯泽将在1993年年会后卸任助理一职，不过她当然将永远是我的朋友。格拉迪斯和我一直是一个团队，虽然我知道她即将退休，但这仍然是一次冲击。

Secondly, in September, Verne McKenzie relinquished his role as Chief Financial Officer after a 30-year association with me that began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning. I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire but to do so at his own pace. Marc Hamburg, Verne's understudy for five years, has succeeded him as Chief Financial Officer.

第二，9月份，韦恩·麦肯齐在与我共事30年后卸任首席财务官一职，我们的关联始于他担任巴菲特合伙有限公司的外部审计师时。韦恩将留任顾问，虽然这一职位描述常常是一种委婉的说法，但在这个案例中它有其实际意义。我期望韦恩继续在伯克希尔扮演重要角色，但按照他自己的节奏。韦恩的五年副手马克·汉堡已继任首席财务官。

I recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the perfect spouse, specified an archeologist: "The older I get," she said, "the more he'll be interested in me." She would have liked my tastes: I treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who are working well past normal retirement age and who concomitantly are achieving results much superior to those of their younger competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it's time, theirs is not a step I wish to encourage. It's hard to teach a new dog old tricks.

我记得曾有位女士，在被要求描述完美配偶时，指定了考古学家：“我越老，”她说，“他对我就越感兴趣。”她会喜欢我的品味：我珍视伯克希尔那些远超正常退休年龄仍在工作，并同时取得远优于年轻竞争对手业绩的杰出经理人。虽然我理解并同情韦恩和格拉迪斯在日历时点到来时退休的决定，但这不是我希望鼓励的一步。教新狗学老把戏可不容易。

I am a moderate in my views about retirement compared to Rose Blumkin, better known as Mrs. B. At 99, she continues to work seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good news.

与罗斯·布卢姆金（更广为人知的B夫人）相比，我对退休的看法算是温和的。她99岁高龄，仍每周工作七天。关于她，我有些特别的好消息。

You will remember that after her family sold 80% of Nebraska Furniture Mart (NFM) to Berkshire in 1983, Mrs. B continued to be Chairman and run the carpet operation. In 1989, however, she left because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own operation next door in a large building that she had owned for several years. In her new business, she ran the carpet section but leased out other home-furnishings departments.

各位可能记得，1983年她的家族将内布拉斯加家具城（NFM）80%的股份出售给伯克希尔后，B夫人继续担任董事长并经营地毯业务。然而，1989年，她因管理分歧离开，并在旁边一座她已拥有数年的建筑中开办了自己的业务。在新生意中，她经营地毯部门，但将其他家居装饰部门出租。

At the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building and land to NFM. She'll continue, however, to run her carpet business at its current location (no sense slowing down just when you're hitting full stride). NFM will set up shop alongside her, in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its furniture business.

去年年底，B夫人决定将她的大楼和土地出售给NFM。不过，她将继续在现有地点经营她的地毯业务（正当你达到全速时，没有理由慢下来）。NFM将在同一栋楼里与她毗邻开店，从而大幅扩充其家具业务。

I am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her business story has no parallel and I have always been a fan of hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me, partner is better.

我很高兴B夫人再次与我们联手。她的商业故事无与伦比，我一直是她的崇拜者，无论她是合作伙伴还是竞争对手。但相信我，合作伙伴更好。

This time around, Mrs. B graciously offered to sign a non-compete agreement - and I, having been incautious on this point when she was 89, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B belongs in the Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a non-compete at 99 merely adds one more.

这一次，B夫人慷慨地提出签署一份竞业禁止协议——而我在她89岁时曾对此掉以轻心，这次我立刻抓住了这个机会。B夫人在很多方面都该被列入《吉尼斯世界纪录大全》。在99岁签署竞业禁止协议，只不过是再添一项罢了。

Ralph Schey, CEO of Scott Fetzer and a manager who I hope is with us at 99 also, hit a grand slam last year when that company earned a record $110 million pre-tax. What's even more impressive is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only $116 million of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not the product of leverage: The company uses only minor amounts of borrowed money (except for the debt it employs - appropriately - in its finance subsidiary).

斯科特·费策尔公司的CEO拉尔夫·谢伊，我也希望他到99岁仍与我们在一起的一位经理人，去年打出了一记全垒打，该公司税前盈利创纪录地达到1.1亿美元。更令人印象深刻的是，斯科特·费策尔仅用1.16亿美元权益资本就实现了这样的盈利。这一非凡成果并非杠杆所致：该公司仅使用了少量借款（除了在其金融子公司中适量使用的债务）。

Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings stream - which was excellent to begin with - by a lot. Ralph just keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a great deal.

斯科特·费策尔现在在库存和固定资产上的投资，比我们1986年收购时少得多。这意味着在公司我们持有的七年中，它不仅能够将超过100%的盈利分配给伯克希尔，同时还大幅增加了本就出色的盈利流。拉尔夫总在超越自己，伯克希尔的股东们欠他很多。

Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in 1992. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet, The Indefensible. Forget it! I find the thought of retiring the plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the Chairman. (In this matter I've demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility: For years I argued passionately against corporate jets. But finally my dogma was run over by my karma.)

眼光特别敏锐的读者会注意到，我们公司的费用从1991年的560万美元降至1992年的420万美元。也许你会以为我卖掉了公司的飞机“不可辩驳号”。忘了它吧！我发现让飞机退役的想法比让董事长退休的想法更令人厌恶。（在这件事上，我表现出了非典型的变通：多年来我强烈反对公司专机，但最终我的教条被我的业力碾过了。）

Our reduction in corporate overhead actually came about because those expenses were especially high in 1991, when we incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to normal, our after-tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported operating earnings and less than 1/2 of 1% of our look-through earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor relations, or strategic planning departments. In turn this means we don't need support personnel such as guards, drivers, messengers, etc. Finally, except for Verne, we employ no consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation - though Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat.

我们公司管理费用的减少，实际上是因为1991年的费用特别高，当时我们因纺织业务被指控1970年前的行为而产生了一次性的环境费用。现在一切恢复正常，我们的税后管理费用不到报告营业利润的1%，也不到透视收益的0.5%。我们没有法律、人事、公关、投资者关系或战略规划部门。这反过来意味着我们不需要诸如警卫、司机、信使等支持人员。最后，除韦恩外，我们不雇任何顾问。帕金森教授会喜欢我们的运营——不过我必须说，查理仍然觉得它惊人的臃肿。

At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters' costs achieves earnings at its operating levels identical to those achieved by the business that incurs costs of only 1%, shareholders of the first enterprise suffer a 9% loss in the value of their holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low-cost operation as more likely to operate effectively than its bureaucratic brethren. We're admirers of the Wal-Mart, Nucor, Dover, GEICO, Golden West Financial and Price Co. models.

在一些公司，公司费用占到营业利润的10%甚至更多。经营部门因此向总部上缴的什一税，不仅损害了盈利，更重要的是削减了资本价值。如果一家在总部成本上花费10%的公司，其经营层面的盈利与另一家成本仅为1%的公司完全相同，那么前者的股东仅因公司管理费就损失了9%的持股价值。查理和我从未观察到高公司成本与良好公司业绩之间存在任何关联。事实上，我们认为更简单、低成本的公司比其官僚化的同行更有可能高效运营。我们赞赏沃尔玛、纽柯、多弗、GEICO、金西金融和Price Co.的模式。

Late last year Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000. Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000 are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift taxes.

去年底，伯克希尔的股价突破了10,000美元。一些股东向我提到，高股价给他们带来了问题：他们想每年赠送股票，但受到税法规则的阻碍，该规则区分了向单个个人赠送不超过10,000美元和超过10,000美元的礼物。也就是说，不超过10,000美元的赠予完全免税；超过10,000美元的赠予则要求捐赠者用掉其部分终身赠与和遗产税豁免额度，或者如果豁免额度已用完，则需缴纳赠与税。

I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first would be useful to a married shareholder, who can give up to $20,000 annually to a single recipient, as long as the donor files a gift tax return containing his or her spouse's written consent to gifts made during the year.

我可以建议三种解决这个问题的方法。第一种对已婚股东有用，只要捐赠者提交一份赠与税申报表，其中包含其配偶对年内所作赠予的书面同意，他们每年可以向单个受赠人赠送高达20,000美元。

Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain sale. Imagine, for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000 and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case, sell the stock to the giftee for $2,000. (Caution: You will be taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your giftee exceeds your tax basis.)

其次，无论是否已婚，股东都可以进行折价出售。例如，假设伯克希尔股价为12,000美元，而你只想赠送10,000美元。在这种情况下，可以以2,000美元的价格将股票卖给受赠人。（注意：如果对受赠人的销售价格超出你的税基，超出部分将被征税。）

Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom you are making gifts, fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is $10,000 or less, the gift will be tax-free.

最后，你可以与受赠对象建立合伙企业，以伯克希尔股票为其注资，然后每年仅赠与合伙企业中的百分比权益。这些权益可以是你选择的任何价值。如果价值在10,000美元或以下，赠予将免税。

We issue the customary warning: Consult with your own tax advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of gift-making.

我们发出惯常的提醒：在采取任何较隐晦的赠予方法行动之前，请咨询你自己的税务顾问。

We hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in the 1983 Annual Report. Overall, we believe our owner-related policies - including the no-split policy - have helped us assemble a body of shareholders that is the best associated with any widely-held American corporation. Our shareholders think and behave like rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range that is sensibly related to intrinsic value.

我们坚持1983年年报中关于股票拆分的观点。总体而言，我们相信我们的所有相关政策——包括不拆股政策——帮助我们聚集了一批股东，他们是与美国任何一家广泛持股公司相联系的最优秀的股东群体。我们的股东像理性的长期所有者一样思考和行动，看待企业的方式与查理和我非常相似。因此，我们的股票始终在合理地与内在价值相关的价格区间内交易。

Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less actively than do the shares of any other widely-held company. The frictional costs of trading - which act as a major "tax" on the owners of many companies - are virtually non-existent at Berkshire. (The market-making skills of Jim Maguire, our New York Stock Exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low.) Obviously a split would not change this situation dramatically. Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be upgraded by the new shareholders enticed by a split. Instead we believe that modest degradation would occur.

此外，我们相信我们的股票换手率远低于任何其他广泛持股的公司。交易摩擦成本——对许多公司的所有者来说，这相当于一种主要的“税收”——在伯克希尔几乎不存在。（我们在纽约证券交易所的专家吉姆·马圭尔的做市技巧，无疑有助于保持这些低成本。）显然，拆股不会急剧改变这一局面。然而，被拆股吸引而来的新股东绝无可能提升我们现有股东群体的质量。相反，我们认为会出现某种程度的降级。

As I mentioned earlier, on December 16th we called our zero-coupon, convertible debentures for payment on January 4, 1993. These obligations bore interest at 5 1/2%, a low cost for funds when they were issued in 1989, but an unattractive rate for us at the time of call.

如我之前所述，我们在12月16日宣布将于1993年1月4日兑付我们的零息可转换债券。这些债券的利率为5.5%，在1989年发行时是低成本资金，但在我们宣布赎回时，对我们已没有吸引力。

The debentures could have been redeemed at the option of the holder in September 1994, and 5 1/2% money available for no longer than that is not now of interest to us. Furthermore, Berkshire shareholders are disadvantaged by having a conversion option outstanding. At the time we issued the debentures, this disadvantage was offset by the attractive interest rate they carried; by late 1992, it was not.

这些债券本可在1994年9月由持有人选择赎回，而不到两年期限的5.5%资金现在对我们不具吸引力。此外，存在未了结的转换期权对伯克希尔股东不利。在我们发行这些债券时，这一劣势被其具有吸引力的利率所抵消；到1992年底，则不再如此。

In general, we continue to have an aversion to debt, particularly the short-term kind. But we are willing to incur modest amounts of debt when it is both properly structured and of significant benefit to shareholders.

总体而言，我们仍对债务持厌恶态度，特别是短期债务。但当债务结构合理且对股东有显著利益时，我们愿意承担适量的债务。

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1992 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $7.6 million, and 2,810 charities were recipients. I'm considering increasing these contributions in the future at a rate greater than the increase in Berkshire's book value, and I would be glad to hear from you as to your thinking about this idea.

约97%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1992年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划做出的捐赠为760万美元，共有2,810家慈善机构受益。我正在考虑未来以高于伯克希尔账面价值增长速度的比率增加这些捐献，并乐于听取各位对此想法的意见。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1993 will be ineligible for the 1993 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第48-49页关于股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如需参与未来的计划，你必须确保股份登记在实际所有者名下，而非以经纪人、银行或托管人的名义。如果在1993年8月31日仍未如此登记，则股份将没有资格参加1993年的计划。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.0 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除了伯克希尔分配的股东指定捐赠外，我们运营业务的经理人每年还做出平均约200万美元的捐献，包括商品。这些捐献支持当地慈善机构，如联合劝募会，并为我们企业带来大致相称的益处。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

然而，我们的运营经理和母公司的高级职员都不会使用伯克希尔的资金，向那些他们个人有特殊兴趣的全国性计划或慈善活动捐款，除非他们是以股东身份这样做。如果你的员工，包括你的CEO，希望向他们的母校或其他他们感到有个人归属感的机构捐款，我们相信他们应该用自己的钱，而不是你的钱。

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 1993. A record 1,700 people turned up for the meeting last year, but that number still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.

今年的年度股东大会将于1993年4月26日星期一上午9:30在奥马哈市中心的奥菲姆剧院举行。去年的会议创纪录地有1,700人出席，但这一人数在奥菲姆剧院仍有充足空间。

We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's, which is a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议您尽早预订以下酒店之一：（1）Radisson-Redick Tower，一家小型（88间客房）但不错的酒店，位于奥菲姆剧院街对面；（2）大得多的Red Lion Hotel，距奥菲姆剧院约五分钟步行路程；或（3）Marriott，位于西奥马哈，距Borsheim's约100码，距离市中心二十分钟车程。我们将在Marriott安排巴士，于8:30和8:45出发前往会议，会后返回。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理和我总是很享受股东大会，我们希望您能出席。我们股东的质量反映在我们收到的提问质量上：我们从未参加过任何其他地方的年会，能有如此一贯高水平的、智慧的、以所有者为导向的提问。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.

委托书材料中的附件说明了如何获取参加会议所需的入场卡。随入场卡，我们将附上奥菲姆附近停车设施的信息。如果您开车，请稍早到达。附近停车场很快会满，您可能需要步行几个街区。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good bit wider than we were back in 1972 when we bought See's.

照例，会后我们将安排巴士送您前往内布拉斯加家具城和Borsheim's，然后再送您回市中心酒店或机场。我希望您能留出充裕时间，充分探索两家商店的魅力。提前到达的各位可以在一周中的任何一天参观家具城；周六营业时间为上午10点至下午5:30，周日为中午12点至下午5:30。在那里，请在喜诗糖果车前驻足，亲自看看为什么查理和我比1972年我们买下喜诗时宽了不少。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 25. Charlie and I will be in attendance, sporting our jeweler's loupes, and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish enough to listen. Also available will be plenty of Cherry Cokes, See's candies, and other lesser goodies. I hope you will join us.

Borsheim's周日通常歇业，但将在4月25日周日中午12点至下午6点对股东及其宾客开放。查理和我将佩戴珠宝商放大镜出席，并准备好为任何有勇气聆听的人提供关于宝石的建议。还将有大量樱桃可乐、喜诗糖果和其他次要的美味。我希望您能加入我们。

Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1993
Chairman of the Board

沃伦·E·巴菲特
1993年3月1日
董事会主席