1965年7月9日致合伙人信

First Half Performance:

上半年业绩：

During the first half of 1965, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter call the “Dow”) declined from 874.13 to 868.03. This minor change was accomplished in a decidedly non-Euclidian manner. The Dow instead took the scenic route, reaching a high of 939.62 on May 14th. Adding back dividends on the Dow of 13.49 gives an overall gain through ownership of the Dow for the first half of 7.39 or 0.8%.

1965年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称“道指”）从874.13点下跌至868.03点。这一微小变动是以一种完全非欧几里得的方式完成的。道指走了一条迂回路线，在5月14日达到939.62点的高位。加上道指13.49点的股息，持有道指的上半年总收益为7.39点，即0.8%。

We had one of our better periods with an overall gain, before allocation to the general partner, of 10.4% or a 9.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow. To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results:

我们度过了表现更好的时期之一，在向普通合伙人分配前总收益为10.4%，领先道指9.6个百分点。为了更新记录，下表总结了道指逐年表现、合伙企业在向普通合伙人分配前的表现以及有限合伙人的收益：

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

(1) 基于道指价值年度变动加上当年持有道指将获得的股息。表格涵盖了合伙企业运营的所有完整年度。

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

(2) 1957-61年的数据为所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的总结果，扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配或向普通合伙人分配。

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

(3) 1957-61年的数据根据前一列合伙企业收益计算，考虑了基于现行合伙协议向普通合伙人的分配，但扣除有限合伙人月度提款之前。

Our constant admonitions have been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that may devote a portion of resources to control situations; and, (2) that our results, relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media usually will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in very strong markets.

我们一直告诫大家：(1) 短期结果（少于三年）意义不大，尤其是对于我们这类可能将部分资源配置于控制型情境的投资运作而言；(2) 我们的业绩，相对于道指和其他普通股形式的投资媒介，通常在下跌市场中更优，而在强劲上涨市场中可能仅能勉强与之持平。

With the latter point in mind, it might be imagined that we struggled during the first four months of the half to stay even with the Dow and then opened up our margin as it declined in May and June. Just the opposite occurred. We actually achieved a wide margin during the upswing and then fell at a rate fully equal to the Dow during the market decline.

考虑到后一点，可能会有人认为我们在上半年头四个月艰难地与道指持平，然后在5月和6月道指下跌时领先幅度扩大。但实际情况恰恰相反。我们实际上在上涨阶段取得了较大领先优势，然后在市场下跌时以与道指完全相同的速率下跌。

I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and, (2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis. As mentioned in the most recent annual letter, our long-term goal is to achieve a ten percentage point per annum advantage over the Dow. Our advantage of 9.6 points achieved during the first six months must be regarded as substantially above average. The fortitude demonstrated by our partners in tolerating such favorable variations is commendable. We shall most certainly encounter periods when the variations are in the other direction.

我提及这一点并非因为对此表现感到自豪——相反，我更希望我们是以假设的方式实现收益。而我提及它有两个原因：(1) 无论对错，你们始终有权知晓；以及 (2) 这证明了尽管我们基于概率和期望行事，但实际结果可能与期望有显著偏差，尤其在短期内。正如最近的年度信中所提，我们的长期目标是实现年均领先道指十个百分点。上半年实现的9.6个百分点优势必须被视为远超平均水平。合伙人们在容忍这种有利偏差时所表现出的坚韧值得称赞。我们必定会遇到偏差朝另一个方向发展的时期。

During the first half, a series of purchases resulted in the acquisition of a controlling interest in one of the situations described in the “General Private Owner” section of the last annual letter. When such a controlling interest is acquired, the assets and earning power of the business become the immediate predominant factors in value. When a small minority interest in a company is held, earning power and assets are, of course, very important, but they represent an indirect influence on value which, in the short run, may or may not dominate the factors bearing on supply and demand which result in price.

上半年，通过一系列买入，我们获得了上一年度信中“普通私人所有者”部分所述的一个情境的控股权。当获得此类控股权时，企业的资产和盈利能力即刻成为价值的主导因素。而当持有公司少数股权时，盈利能力和资产当然非常重要，但它们对价值的影响是间接的，在短期内可能决定价格，也可能不决定，这取决于影响供求关系的因素。

When a controlling interest is held, we own a business rather than a stock, and a business valuation is appropriate. We have carried our controlling position at a conservative valuation at midyear and will reevaluate it in terms of assets and earning power at yearend. The annual letter, issued in January, 1966, will carry a full story on this current control situation. At this time it is enough to say that we are delighted with both the acquisition cost and the business operation, and even happier about the people we have managing the business.

当我们持有控股权时，我们拥有的是企业而非股票，适用于企业估值。我们在年中以保守估值计量这一控股头寸，并将在年末根据资产和盈利能力对其重新评估。将于1966年1月发布的年度信将完整讲述这一当前控股情况。此时只需说，我们对收购成本和业务运营都非常满意，对管理业务的人员更加满意。

Investment Companies:

投资公司：

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $30 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown in the following table. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行比较，这些公司通常保持95-100%投资于普通股。这四家公司——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三洲公司和雷曼公司——管理着超过40亿美元的资产，很可能代表了规模达300亿美元的投资公司行业中的大多数。它们的业绩如下表所示。我认为，这一表现与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的表现大致相当，这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

(1) 根据资产价值变动加上当年对登记持有人的任何分配计算。

(2) From 1965 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for first half 1965.

(2) 1957-64年数据来自1965年穆迪银行与金融手册。1965上半年数据为估算值。

Last year I mentioned that the performance of these companies in some ways resembles the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. The water level was virtually unchanged during the first half of 1965. The ducks, as you can see from the table, are still sitting on the pond.

去年我曾提到，这些公司的表现在某种程度上类似于一只坐在池塘上的鸭子。当水位（市场）上涨时，鸭子随之上升；当水位下跌时，鸭子随之下降。1965年上半年水位几乎没有变化。从表中可以看出，鸭子们仍然坐在池塘上。

As I mentioned earlier in the letter, the ebb of the tide in May and June also substantially affected us. Nevertheless, the fact we had flapped our wings a few times in the preceding four months enabled us to gain a little altitude on the rest of the flock. Utilizing a somewhat more restrained lexicon, James H. Lorie, director of the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices was quoted in the May 25, 1965, WALL STREET JOURNAL as saying: “There is no evidence that mutual funds select stocks better than by the random method.”

正如我在信中早先提到的，5月和6月的退潮也显著影响了我们。尽管如此，我们在前四个月中扑腾了几次翅膀，使我们比其他鸭子们飞得稍高一些。用更为克制的词汇来说，芝加哥大学证券价格研究中心主任詹姆斯·H·洛里在1965年5月25日的《华尔街日报》中被引述说：“没有证据表明共同基金选股优于随机方法。”

Of course, the beauty of the American economic scene has been that random results have been pretty darned good results. The water level has been rising. In our opinion, the probabilities are that over a long period of time, it will continue to rise, though, certainly not without important interruptions. It will be our policy, however, to endeavor to swim strongly, with or against the tide. If our performance declines to a level you can achieve by floating on your back, we will turn in our suits.

当然，美国经济图景的美妙之处在于，随机结果本身就非常不错。水位一直在上升。在我们看来，长期而言，它很可能继续上升，尽管肯定会有重大中断。然而，我们的方针将是努力奋力游泳，无论顺流还是逆流。如果我们的表现下滑到您仰面漂浮即可达到的水平，我们将上交泳衣。

Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals:

预付款和预提款：

We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert such advance payments to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time it is paid to us.

我们接受合伙人和潜在合伙人的预付款，从收款日至年末按6%计息。尽管没有义务在年末将这些预付款转为合伙权益，但在支付给我们时应有此意图。

Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for a truly unexpected need for funds. Predictable needs for funds such as quarterly federal tax payments should be handled by a beginning-of-the-year reduction in capital rather than through advance withdrawals from B.P.L. during the year. The withdrawal privilege is to provide for the unanticipated.

同样，我们允许合伙人在年末前提取最多20%的合伙账户资金，并从提款日至年末按6%计息，届时从资本账户中扣除。再次强调，这不意味着合伙人应像使用银行一样使用我们，而是应利用提款权应对真正意外的资金需求。可预见的资金需求，如季度联邦税付款，应通过在年初减少资本来处理，而不是在年中通过巴菲特合伙有限公司的预提款来解决。提款特权是为了应对意外情况。

The willingness to borrow (through advance payments) and lend (through advance withdrawals) at the same 6% rate may sound downright “un-Buffettlike”. (You can be sure it doesn’t start my adrenaline flowing.) Certainly such a no-spread arbitrage is devoid of the commercial overtones an observer might impute to the preponderance of our transactions. Nevertheless, we think it makes sense and is in the best interest of all partners.

以同样的6%利率借贷（通过预付款）和放贷（通过预提款）的意愿可能听起来完全“非巴菲特式”。（您可以确信这不会让我肾上腺素飙升。）当然，这种无利差的套利缺乏观察者可能赋予我们大多数交易的商业色彩。尽管如此，我们认为这是合理的，且符合所有合伙人的最佳利益。

The partner who has a large investment in indirect ownership of a group of liquid assets should have some liquidity present in his partnership interest other than at yearend. As a practical matter, we are reasonably certain that advance withdrawals will be far more than covered by advance payments. For example, on June 30, 1965, we had $98,851 of advance withdrawals and $652,931 of advance payments.

对于通过间接拥有一组流动资产而有大额投资的合伙人，其合伙权益应能在年末之外提供一些流动性。实际上，我们有理由确定预付款将远远覆盖预提款。例如，1965年6月30日，我们有98,851美元的预提款和652,931美元的预付款。

Why then the willingness to pay 6% for the net of advance payments over advance withdrawals when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner’s allocation is zero unless we do) although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude regarding the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable.

那么，为什么我们愿意为预付款减去预提款后的净额支付6%的利息，而我们可以以显著更低的利率从商业银行借款呢？答案是，我们预计长期能获得超过6%的收益（除非如此，否则普通合伙人将无分配），尽管在任何短期能否达到6%在很大程度上是随机的。此外，对于预期很快将成为我们权益资本的资金，我可以采取与短期借款不同的投资态度。预付款对我们还有一个额外好处，即可以分散新资金在全年的投资，而不是在1月份一次性涌入。另一方面，6%的利率高于合伙人通过短期美元安全投资所能获得的收益，因此我认为这是互利的。

Miscellaneous:

其他事项：

The bold expansion program to 909 ¼ square feet described in the annual letter was carried off without a hitch (the Pepsi’s never even got warm).

年度信中所述的大胆扩张至909.25平方英尺的计划顺利实施（百事可乐甚至都没变温）。

John Harding joined us in April and is continuing the record whereby all the actions in the personnel field have been winning ones.

约翰·哈丁于4月加入我们，并延续了人事方面所有举措均获成功的记录。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the commitment letter for 1966, estimate of the 1965 tax situation, etc.

与往年一样，我们将在11月1日左右发出一封信（给合伙人及届时已向我表明有意成为合伙人的人），附上1966年的承诺书、1965年税务情况估算等。

Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett

诚挚的，
沃伦·E·巴菲特